CHAPTER XIV—PRATĪYAMĀHĀRTHA OR IMPLIED SENSE IN THE EARLIER ĀLAMKĀRIKAS.

(i) BHĀMAHA
(ii) DANDIN
(iii) VĀMANA.
(iv) UDBHĀTA.
(v) NE RUDRATA;

INTRODUCTION:

Some of the exponents of the dhvani school like Ānandavardhana,
(Ind and Iraq quarters of 12th c. A.D.—6th P. 131, Sources of Poetry.
Abhinavagupta, Ruyyaka, and Jegannātha say that the earlier writers, though
they had not defined vyākhyā or dhvani, were more or less familiar with the
fact of dhvani.

Thus, Ānandavardhana says,

Yadyapi ca dhvanis'abdasākārtanena kavyalaksanavivekābhīh guṇavṛttire-
yo vē ca ksaścitprakāraḥ prakāśītaḥ tathāpi amukhyavṛtyā kavyeṣu vyava-
hāraṁ dars'ayata dhvanimērgo maṅk sprśto'pi na lakaṣitaḥ iti parikalpyaiva-
muktaṁ, 'bhāktaṁśāhustamanye'iti. (Dhv.I.)

Abhinava explains the above passage and tells us as to who were the
authors who touched the idea of dhvani,—says he,

dars'ayata iti, bhāṭṭodbhāta vāmānādinā, bhāmamoktām—St'abdas'chand'o'bhi-
dhānārthaḥ iti, abhidhānasya s'abdaḥbhedām vyākhyātum bhāṭṭodbhāta baḥheṣe-
S'abdanābhādhanabhābhāvābhīvāpārāmuḥkhyo guṇavṛttis'ca iti. Vāmano'pi
sādḥa'yāllakṣanā vakraṭkīṅ iti. parākṣipta iti. taistāvad dhvanidunmālitī
yathālikhitapāṭhaskaistu svarupavivekāṃ kartumāś'akmavābhīh tattvārpa-
viveko na kṛteḥ, pratyutpālabhye, abhāgana'rikelaye yathāśrute. —
tadgranthodṛahamānētṛaṇa iti. (locanā)

Ruyyaka, in the beginning of his work ālāṃkārārasavasva says

iha hi tāvad bhāmahodbhāṭaprabhātayasya'cirantarālaṃkārākarāḥ pratiyamāna-
marthām vācyopaskariyālaṃkārapakṣanikṣiptam manyante. tathāhi-paryayokta-
prastutaprasaṣaśāsasāktyaśāpanvyājastutyapameyopamānvyādaṃ vastumētṛaṃ
But here, we might demur. The presence of vyāñjana or suggested sense can be traced in all poetry beginning from the Rv. It is, however, quite a different thing to discover in poets and critics any conscious understanding of vyāñjana. So, in the discussion that follows, of the alamkāras and guṇas in which vyāñjana is subsumed, should not be taken as a proof that the idea of vyāñjana or dhvani had dawned upon the minds of Bhamaha, Dandin etc. They might have had or not have had the understanding of vyāñjana as a distinct function of a word.

**Bhamaha:**

We will begin with Bhamaha. In II.85, Bhamaha's general outlook towards all the alamkāras becomes evident when he says,

*sāsā sarvaiva vakroktih, anayārtho vibhāvyate |
yaśtvā 'ayam kavinē kāryaḥ, ko'labāṅkāro 'nayā vinē |

Thus for Bhamaha, atis'ayokti or vakrokti lies at the root of all the
alamkāras, i.e. it is implied in all the alamkāras in one way or the other. At I.30 also, Bhamaha asserts that this vakrakta should be present in all poetry, whether it be a mahākavya or just a stanza.

Says Bhamaha:

anibaddhaṃ punargāthā s'lokamātrādi tatpunah,

Thus vakrakta is nīrṇ omnipresent for Bhamaha. In I.34, Bhamaha is even prepared to reject the so-called vaidarbhe kāvyā, if it is bereft of the element of vakrakta.

I.34. ajaśśṭārtham eva vakrakta prasannam rju komalem,

Thus word and sense, charged with the element of vakrā alone make for poetry.

Parallelism between Bhamaha and Dandin:

It will be interesting to note incidentally, that Dandin also, like Bhamaha, holds that atis'ayokti is at the root of all other alamkāras. Thus, it is necessarily present as an implied element in all the other figures of sense. II.214 defines atis'ayokti as,

vivakṣā yā vis'ēṣasya lokasāmātivartini
asāvatis'ayoktiṭī syādalamkārotaṃ yathā.

Thus atis'ayokti, the best of alamkāras, consists of a statement which tends to describe the matter in hand in an uncommon way. II.215 cites an illustration in which ladies who are secretly going to meet their lovers, are described as non-descernible in the moon-light on account of their putting on garlands of mallikā flowers and silk garments and having their bodies besmeared with sendal paste. II.216 says that in the above illustration there is an implied hyperbolic description of the excellence of the moon-light-candrātapasya
In II.217, there is an element of doubt implied. This doubt, however, is not genuine as āhārya. (Dandin says II.216.b–)

Sams'ayatis'ayādinam vyaktyal kīcchinnidars'yate.)

In II.219 the three worlds are described as enormously big enough to contain the glory of a king which is boundless. The idea of the praise of a king is only implied.

At II.220, Dandin says that this figure is the essence of all other figures of speech and that this sort of an expression is praised by all the masters of speech—says he,

alamkārāntarānāmapyekamānuḥ parāyaṇam.

Thus both Bhamaha and Dandin seem to have an identical attitude towards alamkāras in the sense that both of them seem to have been struck not by the mere outward form of any alamkāra as such, but by something else that lies at the root of all the alamkāras. This element, they term as vakrokti or atis'ayokti. We will find the element of avagamana or pratiyamānata i.e. implied sense in some of the figures described by them. It may be noted here incidentally, that it is in this element of implied sense that the charm of mācamākara of the particular alamkāra lies.

BHĀMAHA'S TREATMENT OF THE ARTHĀLAMKĀRAS:

Now, we proceed with Bhāmaha's treatment of alamkāras of sense.

Bhāmaha begins with rūpaka. Rūpaka occurs when in consideration of the similarity in qualities, the upameya is identified with the upamāna (II.22). Thus, it is clear that the idea of similarity is implied in rūpaka, that is to say, upamā is implied in rūpaka. At II.24, Bhāmaha describes ekades'āvārti rūpaka and it is already clear that this involves some implied element. II.25 describes Dīpaka as three-fold. The element of upamā is implied in all the varieties of dīpaka as illustrated by Bhāmaha (II, 27, 28, 29) as follows:

Samānavastunyas ena prativastupamocyate. yaṭhevānabhidhāne'pi guṇasāmya pratītitaḥ..(Kāvyālaṅkāra, II.34)
Thus, there is prativastūpamś when, even in the absence of words such as yathā, vā, etc. which are directly expressive of upamā, we have the apprehension of the similarity of qualities. So, in this figure also, the idea of similarity seems to be implied only.

At II.66 ākṣepa is defined as,

\[-{\text{pratisedhā investasya yo vis'ēśābhīdhitasyā}}|\]

\[\text{ākṣepa iti taṁ santaḥ sāṁsanti dvividhāṁ yathā...}]\]

Ākṣepa occurs when there is an apparent denial only with a view to convey some further sense-viś'ēśābhīdhitasyā. Thus, the additional sense is implied only.

II.75 defines vyatireka as,

\[\text{upamāśnavato'ṛthaśya yadivis'eśāṁśīpāṁsamāṁ..}|\]

\[\text{vyatirekāṁ tamiochanti viś'ēśāpāṁśīpāṁyathā...}]\]

Thus vyatireka has also an element of similarity implied in it. In the same way in Viśvāvanā, kāraṇāntarakalpanā is always implied (II.77, 78).

II.80 defines samāsokti as,

\[\text{yatrokte gamyate'nya'ortheṣaḥtatsamānvis'ēsāṁ..}|\]

\[\text{sa samāsoktiruddhāṁ samāśiptīrthatayā yathā...}]\]

Samāsokti occurs when on the narration of a particular sense, another sense having similar qualities is implied. There is a clear recognition of an implied sense here.

After defining atis'ayokti at II.81, Bhāmaha, as noted earlier, wants it to remain present in all the alamkāras. The poets should be vigilant in bringing forth this element in kāvyā as such. Anything bereft of this element of atis'aya is only vārtā or a bare statement of fact and is no poetry. Thus Bhāmaha rejects hetu, suksma, and les'a as they have no element of vakrokti in them.

\[\text{[II.86-hetus'ca sukṣmo les'o'tha nālamkāratayā matāḥ...}|\]

\[\text{samudāyēśābhīdhitasyā vakroktyanabhīdhitatāh...}]\]

II.91 defines Utpreksā as,
(Thus utpreksa has no śāṁśya i.e. idea of similarity as its purport, i.e. utpreksa centres round sāṁbhāvana or probability, and not mere similarity or sādṛśya. But it has again some element of upamā; i.e. similarity is only implied. In utpreksa the upameya is said to possess such quality or action as normally does not go with it. Thus, it has an element of atis'aya implied in it. At II.50 also Bhāmaha clearly recognises an element of atis'aya involved in both upamā and utpreksa. Says he-)

Yas'eśtis'ayānāṁarthāḥ katham so' sāṁbhavo mataḥ. 
istaṁ eśtis'ayāṁarthavān upamāotpukṣayoryathā."

In the third chapter, Bhāmaha begins his treatment with the alaṃkāras such as preyas, rasavat and ārjasvi. We will discuss the case of these alaṃkāras when we deal with the treatment of rasa in earlier alaṃkārikas in a separate chapter later on."

Bhāmaha defines paryāyokta at III.6.a-as,
paryāyoktaṁ yadanyena prakāreṇaḥ bhidhiyate and illustrates it at III.9.
Bhāmaha holds (III.9) that the idea of avoiding the possible intake of poison is implied in Kṛṣṇa's speech who words it differently. Thus paryāyokta has an element of implied sense. Bhāmaha does not define the figure called udātta (III.11.12), but it follows very clearly that the idea of ās'ayamahattva or vibhūtimahattva is only implied.

Bhāmaha has a totally novel connotation of S'les'sa (III.14) which occurs when there is realisation of identity of the upameya with the upamāna through a guṇa or quality, kriyā or action or proper noun that is nāma.
It differs from the rūpaka in this respect that in rūpaka there is a clear mention of both the upameya and the upamāna in different terms (III.15). Thus, an element of similarity is implied in S'les'sa also.

III.21 defines apahmuti.a.s,
apahmutirabhiaśṭā ca kīcchidantargaṇaḥ padmaḥ .
bhūtārthaḥ pahanaṇādasyaḥ kriyate cābhidha yathā."

[Note: The text contains several symbols and marks that are not standard in the English language. They appear to be part of the original manuscript or copy and are not translated.]
Thus it has upamā which is implied.

III.23 defines vis'ēśokti as,

\[ \text{ekadesiāsya vigame yā guṇāntarasamsthitāḥ} \]

\[ \text{vis'ēsaprathetāyēsah vis'ēśoktirmatā yathā...} \]

The added sense, viz. that of kāraṇāntarakalpanā is always implied.

In the same way tulyayogitā (III.27) has an element of similarity implied in it. It occurs when in order to suggest some similarity in qualities, in case of two objects, one of which is smaller in status, both are narrated as being connected through an identical action.

III.27- nyūnasāpi vis'iṣṭena guṇasāmyavivākṣayē.

\[ \text{tulyakāryakriyāyogāt ityukte tulyayogitā...} \]

III.29 defines aprastutapras'āmē, wherein there is mention of an matter not in hand implying the matter in hand.

III.29- adhikārādapetasayā vastunoc'nyasya yā stūṭiḥ.

\[ \text{aprastutapras'ām seti sā caivaṃ kathyste yathā...} \]

Vyājastuti (III.31) has apparent censure and implied praise. It is defined as,

\[ \text{dūrādikāguṇastotravyapades'ena tulyatērā...} \]

\[ \text{kiścidvidhītsoryā ninda vyājastutirasaṃ yathā...} \]

Nidars'anā has also implied similarly, because in it, without the use of yathāgīva, etc., through action only, some idea is expressed. III.34 defines nidarsanā as,

\[ \text{-kriyayaiva vis'iṣṭāya tadarthasyapadars'anāt...} \]

\[ \text{jñeyā nidars'anā nāma yathecavattibhirvinā...} \]

In upameyopama (III.37), the idea of the elimination of any third similar object, i.e., tṛtyasyadṛśavyayavacchada is implied. In Sahokti also (III.39) there is implied similarity. Sasamdeha is defined at III.43 as,

\[ \text{upamānena tattvaṃ ca bhedaṃ ca vadataḥ punah...} \]

\[ \text{sasamdeham vacaḥ stutyai sasamdeham viduryathē...} \]

Thus, the idea of the praise of upameya is implied nyāya only.

III.45 defines ananvaya:
Ananvya occurs when a thing is compared with one's own self, in order to suggest that it is beyond comparison, that is, it is unrivalled, ananvaya occurs. The idea of aśādrṣ'ya yavivakṣa is implied only.

III.47 defines utpreksamavyava having in itself the use of double-meaning words and an element of both utprekṣa and rūpaka. The idea of similarity between upamanya and upamāna is necessarily implied.

III.53,54 defines Bhāvikatva which is a guna with reference to a whole composition in which past and future events look as if they are present and which rests on a meaning that is charming, elevated and uncommon and a narrative that is capable of being effectively staged and wherein the expression is not involved. The definition runs as:

III.53,54- bhāvikatvam iti prāhā prabandhaviśayan gaman.

Thus Bhāvika is by itself of the nature of implied only as it rests on a whole composition.

DANDIN:

Dandin defines madhura guna at I.51,52 as a statement which is gifted with rasa or sentiment and also when there is rasa with reference to the object or vastu described. Dandin says that such a composition, padasattih, as has words that look similar when heard also are capable of conveying rasa.

I.51,52- madhuraṃ rasavādācī vastuvyapi rasathitih.

In the illustration viz.(I.55)

esa rūpā yada lakṣmīṃ prāptevān brāhmaṇapriyāḥ.

tada prabhṛti dharmasya lokesminmutseva 'bhavat.
I.79—Sa également, ce qui est une indication que la beauté est un attribut universel de la nature.

I.85 définit kāṇṭi guṇa as,

kāṇṭaṃ sarvajagatkāntaṃ laukikārthānatikrānat.

I.95 gives an illustration when there is an absence of hyperbole i.e., when things are described in a normally charming fashion and is seen both in conveying facts or in the description of objects and is liked by all.

Thus, kāṇṭi guṇa has a natural mode of expression and thereby implies a world of ideas as is illustrated at I.86, 87, as,

grāhī nāma tānyeva taporūpārthavādāraś'ah.

and also

anayorasādvyāṇi stenayorjambhāsamānyoḥ.

In the first illustration, the praise-worthiness of the house is implied and in the second, feeling of love with reference to the heroine is implied.

In Samādhī guṇa, according to somebody else's quality on something else. This is a clear instance of lokaśāpaṭa based on similarity which is implied.

I.93 says,

anyadharmastato'nyatra lokāśāpaṇurodhinā.

I.94 given an illustration in point-

kumudāni nimilanti kamalānyumīṣanti ca.

Dandin then adds that words such as niśthya, udghṛṣṇa, vānta etc. convey a charming sense when used metaphorically. If they are used in the direct sense, they turn out to be vulgar. Thus even here, we have a touch of an
This samādhi guṇa, says Daṇḍin is the quint essence of poetry and is resorted to by all poets.

I.95 says:—niṣṭhīyutodgirnavāntādī gauravṛttīvyapāsīrayam,
   atisundaramanyatra grāmakāṣṇī vīgāhete...

Thus, in his treatment of guṇās Daṇḍin seems to cover implied sense. In his treatment of the figures of sense i.e. arthālāṃkāras also, he seems to have incorporated implied sense. We have already noted earlier his general attitude towards alāṃkāras. We will not discuss all the alāṃkāras such as rūpaka, dīpaka, apanmuti, vyājastuti, aprastutaprāsāmsī, tulyayogita, paryāyoktaḥ, ākṣepa, etc. which have implied element as explained earlier when we dealt with Bhāmaha. But, Daṇḍin has given a good many varieties of upamā and almost all of them contain an implied sense.

Daṇḍin's treatment of the arthālāṃkāras:

Dandin defines upamā at II.14 as,

yathākathaḥcit śabdasyaḥ yatrodbhūtam pratiyate,

upamā niśma ś ca tasyaḥ praśeṇo'yaṃ pradars'ya-te...

Thus, when upamā occurs when similarity is gathered in anyway—yathākathacit—i.e. in a directly expressed fashion or an implied way. Most of the varieties of upamā as explained by Daṇḍin have implied similarity. Thus, vastūpamā (II.16) has the common quality implied only (pratīyamanaiśaṅkadharmā).

Viparyāyopamā has upamāna in place of upameya and vice versa. Thus it implies the superiority of the upameya. (II.17). Anyonyopamā (II.18) is the same as upameyopamā having the idea of tṛtiyāsadsṛṣṭī-vaśya-ccheda—or elimination of a third possible similar object—as implied only. Nyeyopamā (II.19) has the idea of restriction implied when the face is described as similar to the lotus alone.

In atis'eyopamā also (II.22), in the absence of any upamāvādaika, the similarity is only implied. II.23 gives utprekṣitaopamā and has an element
of utpreshā implied in it. Adbhutopama (II.24) which is the same as what later ālakārikas recognise as yadyarthātis'ayokti, has also implied similarity. Mohopama (II.25) has moha or bhṛanti implied. Sans'ayopama (II.26) is the same as sasaṇdeha of the later ālakārikas having implied similarity. Hirāyopama (II.27) is what Vis'vanātha recognises as nis'ayālakāra having implied comparison. II 30 gocayindopama which has the same quality of implied sense. Similar is the case with pras'amsopama (II.31), ācikhyāsopama (II.32), Virodhopama (II.33), pratigadhopama (II.34), Caturpama (II.35), tattvāyāsopama (II.36), asādhāraṇopama (II.37), asambhavitopama (II.39), bhūpama (II.40), vikriyopama (II.41), etc. etc. 

Pratīvastupama (II.46) is Vastu kiñcidupanyasya nyasanāt tatsadharmanāh. sāmyapratītirastīti pratīvastupama yathā. There is implied comparison between the statements. Tulyayogopama (II.48) also has the same charm of implied sense. 

Thus we see that in Daṇḍin also, there is recognition of pratīyamāna or implied sense.

Vāmana:-

For Vāmana, the position is all the more clear for he recognises upama as the basis of all the ālakārās and all the rest are termed by him as upamāprapāna. His kāntiguna is defined as dīptarasaṇam-i.e., one in which rasas are aroused. This clearly bears the stamp of an implied sense. His samādhi is defined as arthadṛṣṭiḥ i.e., a perception of the sense (III.2.7). Vāmana goes on classifying artha as vyakta and sūkṣma (III.2.9) and the latter again as bhāvyā or that which is elicited easily and vāsenīya or that which is elicited only after concentration (III.2.10). The illustrations of both these varieties contain an implied sense.

UdBhATA:-

Udbhata in his K.S.S. practically follows the same pattern as laid down by Bhāmaha and seems to incorporate the element of implied sense in the same way as seen in Bhāmaha. Pratibārendraṭīṭa wants us to believe that Udbhata
has knowingly incorporated dhvani under alakaras when he says:

-kramāt kais'cit sahrdayaih dhvanirnāma vyañjakaṭvabhedātmā kāvyadharmaḥ bhhi-
tah.

Sa kasmādiha nopādiṣṭah? ucyate, esvevālaṃkāresvantarbhṛvāt!

**RUDRATA:**

Rudrāta in also can be safely imagined to have touched the element of implied sense with reference to all the alakaras such as rūpaka, dipaka, paryāyokta etc. He defines and illustrates the two-fold Bhāva also in VII.38-41, which contains an implied sense. He has an elaborate treatment of Rasa but is silent about any theoretical discussion of rasa-relation.