It should be noted at the outset that the earlier writers on poetics such as Bhamaha, Danandin, etc. do not discuss the problem of S'abdavrttis theoretically like later writers such as Mammatana. So, we cannot expect any definite mention of this subject in this work. However we meet with passages which go to show that the authors were familiar with the ideas of functions of work. 

BHĀMAHA-

We begin with Bhamaha. In Bhamaha, we come across some direct or indirect reference to abhidhā as below.

In the verse I.9 which reads as, "S'abdas'chando'bhidhānāṛthā, itihāsās'rayāḥ kathāḥ. loko yuktī kalās'ceti mantavyā kāvyagairhiyam...", he obviously seems to enumerate the different branches of learning which a poet-aspirant should study. They are S'abda or grammar, chandas or metrics, abhidhāna or lexicography, itihāsa or traditions etc. Thus, abhidhāna is here used in the sense of lexicon. However, Abhinava quotes from Udbhata's vivarāna of Bhamaha as follows:-

S'abdas'chandobhidhānāṛthā iti. abhidhānasya s'abhidhādham vṛkhyātum bhātoddhata babhape-s'abdenambhidhānam abhidhyāpārah, sukhāga guṇavṛtti's ca.

If this interpretation of Udbhata is correct, we may say that Bhamaha here refers to abhidhā vrūti by 'abhidhānam'. We have seen that earlier writers use the term abhidhāna to refer to abhidhā. But this interpretation of Udbhata seems doubtful, if we strictly adhere to the context which purports to enumerate the several branches of learning as noted above.
However, in the following passages we will find that Bhamaha is familiar with the theory of abhidhā.

At III.21, and III.25, we come across the mention of word 'abhidhā', but in both the cases, it means 'mere expression' or 'naming' and not abhidhāvyāpya. But, while discussing the fault called 'avacaka' at I.41, Bhamaha says that Sūkṣma-rūḍham Vācyerthe nābhidhānam pratiyat-. The line means that an expression which is not conventionally related to the direct meaning is not understood. Here, the terms viz. 'Vācyā artha' and 'Sūkṣma-rūḍham' show his familiarity with abhidhā.

The following discussion shows that Bhamaha knows very well the theories of Sphota and apoha which are mentioned by later writers in connexion with abhidhā. Bhamaha, of course, does not accept the theories of Sphota and apoha in this connexion.

In the sixth pariccheda Bhamaha discusses the nature and scope of S'abda. He also tries to strike some definition. In the discussion he sets aside the views of the Sphota-vādins and the apoha-vādins.

At VI.7, he says that some define S'abda as one from which apprehension of meaning follows—pratitirathesu yatah tam s'abdam bruvate pare-. He rejects this view on the ground that in case, the appearance of smoke which causes the knowledge of agni through reasoning, should also be recognised as a word (dhumabhāsorapi prāptyā S'abdatagnyanumānam prati VI.7 b). At VI.8, he quotes another view which holds that a collection of letters having meaning and used for conveying meaning is a word—(VI.8—nayakaradivartam Samudayo 'bhidheyavan

arthapratiṣṭaye gītah S'abda ityabhidhiyate...)

He rejects this view also. He says (VI.9.10) that how can a collection of letters that are meaningless taken individually convey meaning? Again, as letters follow one another in sequence, no collection is possible. And a whole cannot be different from its parts; a house cannot be anything else than wall, sticks and land.
Obviously the arguments mentioned in VI.9.10 in harmony with those advocated by the Upholders of the theory of Spota. But Bhamaha does not seem to accept the Spotaavada either. While the Upholders of Spota hold Spota to be eternal, Bhamaha differs from them because he feels that neither pratyaksha or direct perception, nor anumana or inference supports the Spotaavada. Says he:

tasmatkutastha ityesa S'abdi vah kalpana vrtah |
pratyaksamamamnam vah yattra tat paramarthatah // (VI.11)

Bhamaha then proceeds to refute the Spota apohaavada in the following verses.

At VI.16.2 he quotes the view of those who hold that a word connotes thing a particular meaning through the negation of something else—anyapohana S'abdo'rtmahetyanye pracaksate(VI.16.2). By 'anyapoha' is meant the negation of something else. Bhamaha argues at VI.17 that if the particular word 'gauh' has its connotation over only in the negation of something else, then we will have to find out some other sound which makes for the connotation of 'gauh' in that particular word.

(Yadi saurityaya S'abda krtartho'nyamirakrtau |
janako gavi gobudhhergyatemaparo dhvanih. II VI.17)

He further argues that the word has arthajnana or connotation of a particular meaning as its phala or object. So, it cannot have two objects viz. negation as well as injunction. (Here, Bhamaha takes into consideration the apohaavada viz. that by apoha is meant argument of the aphavisisto vidihin.) (VI.16.8-arthajnamaphalam S'abda na caikasya Phaladvayam |
apaviddavidhiijnane phale caikasya vah katham. II) "

At VI.19, Bhamaha further argues that if you want to negate something else than gauh at least in the first instant you must apprehend the meaning of a cow from the word gauh, or else how are you to negate non-cow from it?

So, et VI.13. Bhamaha gives his own view as follows:

iyanta idrset varna idgarthabhidhayinah |
yavaharaya lokasya pragittham samayah krtah. II

i.e. 'Samaya' for convention, since ages, has been formed to the effect that these many letters of such and such a type should give such and such a meaning.
This word is eternal and imperishable (VI.18) and is different from sound-sa kūṭasthāh anapāyi ca nādādanyas'ca kathyate-(IV VI.14.a). He adds that the fools take the conventional meanings to be 'pāramārthika' or referring to reality (mandāḥ sāṃketikānarthān manyante pāramārthikān VI.14.b). He does not choose to enter into any controversy as to whether word is related to artha which is of the nature of reality, through a relation which is eternal or non-eternal.

Finally, at VI.20 he concludes that it is difficult to define precisely as to what a word is because it becomes manifold on account of the difference in letters which again are manifold on account of their parts.

(VI.20-Varṇabhedaśiṣataṁ bhinnam varṇāḥ svāms'avikalpatah.]

He then proceeds to classify words into a fourfold scheme based on drṣya or object, kriyā or action, jāti or class and guṇa or quality (VI.21)

From the above discussion it follows that Bhāmaha has some definite views as to the nature and scope of word (VI.13.14) and his views seem to be very near to those of the Māmatasakas. It may be noted that the above discussion, it follows that Bhāmaha seems to be quite familiar with abhidhā.

As to Bhāmaha's familiarity with functions of words other than the direct one, particularly vyaṉja, we may say that vyaṉja does not occupy the same place as abhidhā, in his mind, i.e. he does not seem to have known vyaṉja as a separate vṛtti. He, however, uses different forms of vi+व्रि with the later meaning of vyaṉja at different places, we will consider these usages.

At I.73., we come across the word 'vyajyate' as in,

hi s'abdenāpi hetvarthaprathanāduktasiddhayā.]

ayamārthāntaranābhāsāntaraṁ vyaţjyate yathā.]

-by the word 'hi' the idea of supporter and the supported or the samarthya-samarthakaabhāva is suggested.

At I.79. Samāsakti is defined as,

Yataroket ganyate'nd'arthaḥ tattvamanavis'esanah]

sa samasaktiruddhiṣaṃṣkṛtārthaḥ yathā.]

Ph.D.
Herein, we have a reference to another sense to be gathered by implication.

At III.9, paryayokta is illustrated and explained. Bhāmaha says that Kṛṣṇa's reply to S'isupāla's invitation for dinner is meant to serve the purpose of avoiding the possibility of taking poison—rasadānaṇivṛttaye. This is also only implied. At III.11 Udātta is only illustrated as,

Udātam S'aktaṁ rāmo guruvākyānurodhakah,|
Vihāyopavānam rājyaṁ yathā vanamupāgunat.||

Here the idea of Rāma's virtue is only implied. III.21 defines apahnuti which also carries the same touch as seen above (It is defined as—Riṣhīantargatopamā).

At V.58, we come across the term 'vyajyete' as in:

- 'yatya dṛṣṭāntamātreṇa vyajyete sādhyaśādhanā
tamārunā s'uddhādṛṣṭāntam tamāstrideśkṛtyasyathā.||

Herein, says Bhāmaha, the Sādhyā and sādhana are just suggested by the illustration. This according to Bhāmaha makes for 'dṛṣṭānta' which differs from upamā. At V.60 also, we have 'vyajyeren' to the same effect.

V.60 reads:

kathamekapadenaiva vyajyeranmasya te gupāh,
itī prayuṣjate santaḥ kecidvistārabhīravaḥ.||

In V.59 Bhāmaha has given an illustration of pure dṛṣṭānta wherein a king is said to be Bharata, Dīlīpa, Aila, Pradyumna and Nāravāhana, thereby implying the qualities of those monarchs in that king. In V.60 says Bhāmaha that in order to avoid unnecessary details, people resort to one word as in V.59 illustrated above. Thus herein, we see a clear reference to the power of suggestion where the qualities of Bharata, Dīlīpa etc. are suggested by their naming.

In his discussion of various alaṃkāras, we see that he takes for granted vyaṅgyārtha or implied sense, e.g. in aprastutaprasāpasā, dipaka, vyājastuti nidarsena etc. This point is further elaborated in a separate chapter called Pratīyemānārtha in the earlier Alaṃkārikas (Ch.15).
In the Kavyadars'a of Danandin we come across the following direct or indirect references to the different S'abdavrttis. There is no reference to abhidha as such.

We come across some references to gaunavrtti or lakṣana as follows:

At I.95, Danandin says that words such as niṣṭhyuta, ugdārpa, vānta etc. are said to have been used in a charming way only when they are found in the secondary sense. Says he:

niṣṭhyuṭodgārpa(va)ntādi gaunavrttivyayās'rayaḥ.

At II.254 he says:

teḥ prayogasārgesu gaunavrttivyayās'rayaḥ.

He says that at times in hetu alamkāra, the cause is said to be residing at a place far from that of the effect, or the effect is described as occurring simultaneously with its cause, or the hetu is said to operate after the effect takes place. These are actually instances where gaunavrtti functions.

At II.100 Samānarūpa prahelika is defined as:

Samānarūpa gaunārthāropitairgrathitā paddaḥ.

Thus, the texture of samānarūpa prahelika is woven with gaunārthāropita paddas, i.e. words having a secondary sense.

As in Bhamaha, so also in Danandin we do not come across any mentioning of vyañjanā as such by name. However, we come across different forms of the root, vi+vañj in the sense of 'to suggest'. We also meet with the term 'pratīyate'in the sense of 'is implied'. Thus, Danandin seems to know a lot also of what is called implied sense or pratīyamāna artha.

At I.76, Danandin defines the guṇa called udāratā as:
Thus udarata occurs in that sentence, wherein after the expressed meaning is gathered—yasminnukte—there is an implication of some high quality. This is an indirect reference to vyanjana.

At II 14 upama ia described as—

\[\text{yathakathao sit sadra'yaam} \]

\[\text{yatrodhamam pratiyate.} \]

Thus in upama, there is an experience of similarity either by abhidha, or lakshan or vyanjana.

At II 16 vastupama is said to be pratiyamanaika dharma. In prativastupama also (II.46) there is 'samyapratita in an implied way. We will see later on that so many varieties of upama have implied similarity. At II 65 Daṇḍin says that words such as spardhate, jayati, diveśti, etc. are sadra'yasūcakaḥ or suggestive of similarity. At II.156 amujhā ākṣepa is said to occur where through apparent amujhā or acceptance something else is implied, says he

\[\text{ityanujhāmukhena kāntasyākṣipiyate gatiḥ.} \]

\[\text{maranāt sūcayantiyāva somujhākṣepa ucyate.} \]

Thus there is some element of suggestion involved in this. So also, in ās'īrvacanākṣepa (II.142) the Nāyika suggests her own helplessness (svāvasthām sūcayantā).

At II 180 vyatireka is defined as, 'S'abdopātte pratīte vē sadra'ye vastumordvajōḥ.

\[\text{tatra yadbhedakahanaṃ vyatirekāḥ sa kathyate.} \]

Thus šākaca vyatireka has some touch of an implied similarity. II 189 mentions k vyatireka which has pratiyamanaśadra'ya.

At II.234 Daṇḍin holds utpreksā to be suggested by words such as manye, S'ahke, dhruvaḥ etc. says he:

\[(II.234)\]
Thus it seems that Dandin considers utprekṣā to be implied only.

At II.303, udātta is explained. Dandin says that in the two illustrations (at II.301, and II.302) Es'ayamāḥātmya and abhyudaya-gaurava, are respectively suggested-suṣvyānijita.

(pūrvarūpa's'ayamāḥātmyamatrābhhyudaya-gauravaṃ | suṣvyānijitaṃti proktamudattadvayamapya pādah.
)

At II.350 Nidars'anā is said to contain suggestions; yāti candrāṣ'ubhīḥ sprṣṭā dhvāntarājī parābhavaṃ.

sadyo rājarūpa saṃyayaṁ sūcayantī durantataṁ.

Thus there is an indirect reference to vyañjanā.

We will see in greater detail later on that as in Bhāma, so also in Dandin we can read a lot of pratiyamāna element in the different alāmkaras such as dīpaka, saṃsokti, aprastutaprasamsa, vyañjastuti etc.

VĀMANA:-

Vāmana, in his kāvya-alāmkaāra sūtra very often refers to 'bhakti', lakṣānōr'gaunārtha' and upacāra. But he also does not mention vyañjanā. He, however, seems to touch vyañjanā only indirectly.

At I.1.1 he says that the word 'kāvya' here stands for word and sense embellished by guṇa and alāmkaāra. But, by 'bhakti', i.e. through secondary usage, it is taken with reference to S'abdārthamātra or 'word and sense' along.

(kāvyas'abdoyāṃ guṇālāmkaāra-saṃskṛtayoh sabdārthayoh vartate.

Bhaktīyā tu s'abdārthamātra vacanōtra grhyate.)

On I.11.1 Vāmana says that the word 'arocakī' and 'satṛṣābhhyavahārī' are metaphorically used. (arocakī satṛṣābhhyavahārī-s'abdārthamātra.) Vāmana holds that in vaidarbhī the presence of all the arthaguṇas makes for the charm (tasyāmartha guṇasaṃpadāsvādyā bhavati). Now this totality of arthaguṇas by themselves, as it resides in the diction called vaidarbhī, is itself known by the name of Vaidarbhī I.11.22 says: sa'pi vaidarbhī tātsthyāt.
Vāmana then adds: सपियामरथगुमसांपद वाैदर्भित्युक्तः तत्स्थ्यौव्युपावरताः व्यावहारम दारस्याति. Thus, it is used secondarily.

At I.1.12 Vāmana considers the fault called 'neyārtha'. He holds that when something meaning which is not heard of in the particular sentence is somehow inferred, it makes for the fault of 'neyārtha'. The term viz. 'पांक्तिवीहंगमानंमाब्यस्ति' for 'Das'aratha' is an instance in point. By 'पांक्ति' is meant 'ten' by 'Vihāgamāna' is meant 'cakravāka'. 'Ratha' or chariot is one that bears the name of 'cakravāka' on itself. Thus 'पांक्ति' and 'Vihāgamānamāb्यस्ति' mean 'Das'aratha'. This makes for the fault of neyārtha. Then, it is argued that if you find neyārtha in such illustrations then the word 'rathāhganāma' for cakravāka used by all poets also will be an illustration of neyārtha. To this, Vāmana says: न तस्यम निरूढलक्षणात्वात्. Such words as 'rathāhganāma' for cakravāka are instances of निरूढलक्षणः i.e. what later आलंकारिकास call लक्षणां based on रूढि or convention.

In II.1.14 Vāmana says that whatever has an obscene as the other sense is 'लिला' and it is a दोष- (साब्यार्थार्थातामासभ्यासर्वित्तेश्चलिला). But, he adds at II.1.15 that secondary usages do not fall under this. He says न गुप्तलक्षितसाप्तुतानि. At II.1.17 he defines lakṣita as: 'लक्षणिकासाब्याम लक्षितमानि' i.e. if the obscene sense is gathered secondarily, it is called 'लक्षिता' and it does not make for the fault of as 'लिलर्थाः. The illustration cited is 'जनमबहुमिः'. Vāmana says: 'तदेष बसब्यार्थार्थातामासभ्याम लक्षणिकेन साब्याम लक्षितमानि पदाम लक्षितमानि ज्ञात जनमबहुमिः इति.

Vāmanā adds that here this word जनमबहुमिः means the female organ only secondarily and not by the power of expression. तदेष लक्षणाय सघ्यार्थाम न स्वसायक्ता इति.

Under IV.iii.7. Vāmana notes that gamārtha, lakṣanikārtha can also become आलंकारः. उँचित्ते: He says संत्था स गमार्थास्यसार्थास्यालंकारात्वम tathā लक्षणिकेश्वर्ति दारस्यायित्वांह- and he quotes सूत्र IV.iii.6 viz- सदृश्याल्लक्षणे वाक्रोक्तिः. He says बहुमि hi निरूढलक्षणे लक्षणायेः तत्त्रा सदृश्याल्लक्षणे वक्रोक्तिस्वविति. Thus he knows a variety of lakṣaṇa, but शोचे only one based on similarity as the germ for वक्रोक्ति. He quotes
an illustration in which 'umilana'and 'nimilana' i.e. opening and closing, which are the qualities of eye are superimposed on Kamala and Karava, through similarity, and secondary mean the blossoming and fading of the respective flowers. ('Sāḍrṣyāt vikāsāyaṃ kāṣhān lākṣayataḥ'). He cites some more illustrations to the same effect and adds; 'ityevanāti śa lākṣāṇārtho niṣṭhīyate iti. lākṣāṇaṃ ca jhaṭiti artha-pratipettikāvatārahamāśocakṣata iti. The secret of lākṣāṇa lies in an immediate gathering of the sense. He says that lākṣāṇa based on something else than similarity does not make for vaktrokti-asāḍrṣyaṃ nibandhanā tu lākṣāṇa na vaktroktih.

In at IV.iii.9 he defines utprekṣā. In utprekṣā, the source of charm is adhyavasāṇa which is neither adhyāropa as in case of rūpaka, nor lākṣāṇa as in case of vaktrokti. Says he, na punarādhyāropo lākṣāṇa vā.

At V.i.15, he discusses the topic of words that can or cannot be used in poetry i.e. those that are prayojya or aprayojya. He says: (V.i.15)-lākṣāṇaṃ-śābdaḥ 'ca, and adds; lākṣāṇaṃ 'abda's 'ca atiprayuktāḥ prayottavyāḥ. Yatā dhvirepha-rodāra-S'abdam bhramarāca rakrava kārah lākṣāṇaparaun. He adds that: anatiprayuktāḥ 'ca aprayojojyāḥ. Yatā dvikaḥ kūkāḥ iti. Thus Vāmana here refers to what is termed as rūdhimūlā lākṣāṇa lateron.

As already noticed by us, Vāmana does not refer to vyahijana directly. But at places, he notes certain illustrations of 'pumaraukta' or repition, which are actually not 'pumaraukta' according to him. He says that such words or such repetitions are charged with some further sense. This is an acceptance of the implied sense. But as to how this implied sense is gathered is not made clear by Vāmana.

In II.ii.13 he cites certain illustrations. Thus says he, "dhanurjyā-dhvanaḥ dhyāyās 'rutīrūḍhīḥ pratipatyaiv" i.e. in case of 'dhanurjyā-dhvanaḥ' i.e. in case of a sound created by a bow-string, the idea of dhamuḥ or a bow is already gathered by the term 'jyā' or bow-string. So, the use of 'dhamuḥ' should be termed as redundant. But, says Vāmana, it is not so, because the idea of 'ārohana' is not gathered in the absence of the word dhamuḥ-na hi dhamuḥ s'rutimantareṇa dhanuṣyārūḍhā jyā dhanurjyā iti s'akyam pratipattum.
In II.ii.14 he cites further illustrations to the same effect—karnavatamasa 'ravanakundalas'iraha'ekhareśu karnadindres'ah samnidheḥ. Thus, in karnavatamasa, 'karna' is meant only to help the gathering of the idea of 'samnidhi' or juxtaposition. In II.ii.15 Vāmana says: 'muktāhāras'abda mukta-s'abda s'uddheḥ'—i.e. in the word 'muktāhāra', the idea of muktā or pearls is already expressed by the word 'hāra' but the mentioning of muktā is not mere repetition as it brings about the apprehension of purity. In the same way, (II II.ii.16) 'pūṣpamālā'has pus'pa, only to bring about the sense of 'utkarsa' or excellence. He adds: utkṛṣṭānām pus'pānām mālā iti. When we come across the use of 'mālā' with reference to 'ratna' or 's'abda', as in 'ratnamālā' or 'S'abdamālā', the usage is said to be a secondary one—sa tāvadupakritasya prayağa-nirupapado hi mālīs'abḍaḥ pūs'pārascānāvis'ēṣameva abhidhatte iti. In the same way the word 'kari'in karikalabha is not redundant as it brings about the apprehension of 'tāḍrīyya' or similarity. Vāmana says: karikalabhas'abde kari-s'abdaḥ kalabheshive gātārthāḥ prayaćeate, tāḍrīyyasya pratipatyarthe iti, added. Thus, this type of further sense is derived in certain usages. But whether it can lead us to S'abdas'aktivām īvyayaṇjanā or not is not made clear by Vāmana.

In the third adhkarana, second adhyāya, he deals with samādhi guṇa with reference to artha. He defines it as arthadṛṣṭāḥ samādhiḥ, III.2.7. Then, he classifies artha into vyakta and sūkṣma at III.2.9—(artho vyakte sūkṣmas-ca. In III 2.10, he says that the sūkṣma is also two-fold bhāya or that which can be easily grasped and vāsanīya or which can be elicited after close application(sūkṣmo bhāyo bhavati vāsanīyas'caIII 2.10), and adds—sūkṣmo āvīrdhā bhavati bhāyaḥ vāsanīyas'ca. s'īghrānarupanāgamyo bhāyayā, ekāgraṭāprakarṣa-gamyo vāsanīya iti.) He goes on giving illustrations for the same. Now both bhāya and vāsanīya are more subtle as compared to the vyakta or expressed. Out of these two, vāsanīya is more subtle. Thus, we come across a clear recognition of the implied sense without however, any reference to any vṛtti.

III.ii.15 defines kāntiguna as-dīpaśatvaṃ kāntiḥ. The illustration he supplies implies is purely that of S'rigūḍa rasa. But again, as to how these rasas
are to be gathered, is not made clear by him. In all these cases, we may feel that Vāmana comes close to vyājanāvyāpāra.

**UDBHĀTA:-**

In Udbhāta we come across some indirect or direct references to all three vṛttis as below:

At V.60. Udbhāta defines vyājastuti as 'S'abdas'aktisvabhāvena yatra nindēva
gamyate.

vastuṁstūrūtī s'ṛesthā vyājastutirasau mātā.u

'S'abdas'aktī' here refers to abhidhāvyāpāra.

At I.11, Udbhāta defines rūpakā as:

S'rutyā sambandhavirahādyatpadena pandentaram,
gunavrtyttrpradhānena yujyate rūpakām tu tat..u

Thus, we come across a reference to both abhidhā and gunavrtyti, as is explained by Pratīhārendrājā, who says: S'rutyā nirantarārthamāsthah

S'abdavyāpāraḥ.

taya S'rutyā amapapyamānapadāntarasambandham sat padāntaram gunavrtytiḥ
yatāpārena padena yujyate tatra rūpakatā...

At IV.47, Udbhāta defines paryāyokta wherein we come across a reference to both abhidhā and vyājanē. The definition runs as:

paryāyoktaṁ yadanyenabrahāraṁabhidhiyate,

vaçayaçacakavrtytibhyāṁ s'ṛmēṇyavagamātmanā.1

Vācakavrtyti is abhidhā and avagamāna vyañjana. The Commentators viz. Pratīhārendrājā, the author of Laghuavrtyti and the Vivṛtikāra, identified āṣa Rājānaka Tīlahā by the editor, explain the definition of paryāyokta as follows:

Pratīhārendrājā explains:- Vācakasya abhidhāyakasya Svas'abdayasya vṛttih
vyāpāro vaçayārthapratyāyanam. Vaçyasya tvaśabhidheyasya vyāpāro vaçyāntareṇa
sahākhāśasannidhiyogatāmaḥśatmyātsaṁsargamātanā, evamvidhā'ca yo
vaçyavāçacakayorvyāpāramantareṇāpi prakārāntareṇa arthasaṁarthapratyāyāṁ
avagamasvabhāvena yadayagamayate tat paryāyena svakṣaṁthānaabhīhitamapi
sāntareṇa S'abdavyāpāreṇāvagamyemānatvāt paryāyoktaṁ vastu.
Thus according to the commentators, Udbhata here seems to refer to vacakavrtti, i.e. abhidha, Vacyavrtti or tatparya and avagamana i.e. possibly vyaya. Thus, it seems that according to the commentators, Udbhata is fairly conversant with vyajana vyapar.

RUDRAṬA-

In Rudraṭa, we do not come across any direct reference to abhidha. However, at VI. 3, he defines 'asamārthā', a fault, as:

"Padamidamasamarthaḥ syādvatokamarthasya na ca vaṁtaḥ. 
	

'tas' aknoti tirohitatatsamārthāṁ nimittena..."

'asamārthā' occurs when a particular word, which is normally expressive of a particular sense, becomes incapable of doing so on account of its power of expression being eclipsed by some other factors. Herein, we may read an indirect reference to abhidha. VI. 5 and 6, in the same context, Rudraṭa describes another variety of asamārthā wherein a particular meaning, though normal to a particular word and yet not usually read from it, is read, e.g. 'vah in the sense of 'going'.

VI. 6, says that

S'abdapravṛttiḥetam satyamaprasamarthameva rūḍhibalāt,]

yeṣaṃ kamarthāviṣeṣam padam yathā viśṛḍhan jalabhṝ."

i.e. 'asamārthā' also happens when ordinarily a word is capable of conveying a sense on the strength of etymology, but is rendered incapable to convey it on account of rūḍhi or usage. e.g. jalabhṝ cannot be used for Viśṛḍhi.

The maxim viz. rūḍhiyogādbalīyasyāi seems to be known to Rudraṭa also and he thus knows a variety of abhidhārtha.

In VI. 11, he defines apratīta, a fault, as,
Thus, Rudra mentions abhidhanataya rudhamarthara i.e. a meaning fixed by the power of abhidha. VI.12 gives an illustration of apratita having doubt e.g., himah. VI.13 gives an illustration of apratitadosa having no doubt—asaas'ayam—e.g., as'vayoishnukhārcīṣmān for vadāmala. Rudra says that here this particular word is used for the normally used yaugika or rūṣha words. Here again we come across a reference to yaugika and rūṣha s'abdas, which may lead to abhidha.

[padamaparamapratītam yadyaṅgikarūḍhas'abḍaparyāyaiḥ ]
kalpitamethe tasmāyathas'vayośnikhārcīṣmān. VI.13]

At VII.1 also Rudra seems to refer to abhidhārtha very clearly when he says:

arthaḥ punarabhidhāvānpravartate
yasya vācakaḥ s'abḍaḥ.

tasya bhavanti dravyaṃ guṇaḥ kriyā
dhātīti bhedāḥ.

We do not come across any reference to guṇavṛtti or laksanā in Rudra except at VII.58 and here too indirectly, when he illustrates viparīta anumāna. The anumāna is said to be viparīta because the sādhya is described as following the sādhakas! The illustration cited is:

Vacanaupacāragarbhāḥ dūrdudgamanamāmsānm sakalaṃ.
idamadya mayi tathā te yathāi niḥmaṃ priye kupitā.

Herein 'Vacana' is said to be 'Upacāragarbhā'. Thus, there is an indirect mention of 'Upacāra'.

At VII.38, Rudra defines Bhāva as:

Yasya vikāraṃ prabhava-mpratibaddhena hetumā yena.
gamyati tadabhiprayam tatpratibandham ca bhavose...

The illustration is:
Namisādhau explains that the bhāva of the lady is manifested here. This is a case of an implied sense.

Bhāva also occurs, says Rudrata, when a sentence conveying the direct sense also suggests another sense.

abhidheyam abhidhānam tadeva tadasaṅga'asakalagunadoṣam.

arthaṁtaremaravagamayati yadvākyam so'paro bhāvah.||

The illustration (VII.41) is,

ekākini yadabala taurui tathāhamasminghe gāthapatis'ca gato vides'ām.

kim yāc ane tadiha vāsaniyam varāki S'vas'rūrmanādhanādhirā nanu mūčha||

Namisādhau explains as:—ekākini. taurupathikasya vāsam yūcmanāsya kābīta-bhilāśa yosidīm prakāta-pratiśedhārthām vākyamāha. etena coktapadārthena vilakṣaṇo vāsanumatividhilakṣaṇo bhāvo vāgamyate.

This is an indirect recognition of vyañjana, pure and simple.

At VII.74, anyokti is defined as:

assamānasvis'esaṅsaṃapi yatra samānetivṛttamupameyam.||

Thus, herein also, vyañjana is implied.

CONCLUSION:—

Thus we have seen that in earlier ālaṃkārikas from Bhamaha to Rudraṭa, we do not find the topic of S'abdavṛttis discussed as is done by later writers such as Māmatta. We do, however, find references in their works which show that they were acquainted with abhidhā and laksana. As to vyañjana, we do find references in these works which show that the idea of vyañjana was not absent in their minds. Though we cannot say that they had clearly visualised it, much less defined it.