S'abda-vrttis as seen in the different Schools of thought such as the Vaiyākaranas, the Mīmāṃsakas etc.

We may now study the S'abda-vrttis as known to or recognised by the different schools of thought such as the grammarians, Mīmāṃsakas etc. First, we will take up the views of the grammarians. In the Mbh. of Patañjali, we find mainly the discussion of the mukhya and gaṇa artha i.e. the discussion of the primary and the secondary sense. In the discussion of mukhyārtha or the primary sense, we come across terms such as abhidhāna and the like. In the discussion on gaṇārtha, we find ideas which later on seem to crystallise into gaṇī and lakṣaṇa vṛtti.

Vaiyākaranas:-

In the Mbh., we come across terms such as gaṇa, mukhya, abhidhātum, abhidhānavat, abhidhāmārtha, abhidhāya, abhidhiyamāna, abhidheya, etc. etc. (1). But, we do not meet with either any precise mention of or any definition as such of abhidhā, gaṇī, lakṣaṇa, or vyākhyā. Nevertheless Patañjali mentions two types of meanings viz. mukhya or the primary sense, and gaṇa or the secondary sense.

While discussing the type of secondary meaning, he mentions at least four different circumstances under which the secondary function takes place (2). Thus, tātsthyā or the relation of location, tādāharmyā or the relation of substance and quality or function, sāmīpya or proximity, and sāhacaryā or being together, are mentioned under pā. IV.1.46. Thus we find that Patañjali mentions abhidhāna and the like which pave the way for abhidhā-vṛtti. Abhidhā is thus seen under the name of abhidhāna or mukhyārtha in the Mbh., and material for the later vṛttis of gaṇī and lakṣaṇa is also seen herein. The material for gaṇī lies in the Sādharmyā relation as noted above, while that for lakṣaṇa in other relations such as tātsthyā, sāmīpya etc. which lead to the secondary sense. No strict line of demarcation is laid between gaṇī and lakṣaṇa. When we come to a later grammarian of repute viz. Bhattārki, we find material which is the source of the later theory of vyākhyā. In the Mbh. itself, nothing more definite about vyākhyā than what we have already noticed in the earlier chapters is to be seen.
Bhartrhari, the author of V.P. has divided S'abdārtha into gana and mulchya, and has shown two-fold upaṣeṣa (or imposition) with reference to S'abda and artha. Those who take one word as capable of expressing several meanings, e.g. the word 'go' for both 'go-vyakti' and 'vāhika', have their theory based on the assumption of restricted or accidental meanings (4). A word does not express more than one meaning at a time-yaugapadatikramya paryāye vyavatiṣṭhate-V.P. The other meanings that are not mukhyārtha, are to be comprehended by either context (or prakaraṇa), or connexion with some other words (i.e. yogat S'abdāntareṇa va) (5). Bhartrhari holds that the word 'go' which denotes 'govyakti' is also applied to 'vāhika' on account of his sādhamya with 'go' (6). He observes that it is through usage that the meaning of a word becomes gana and mukhya-praṣṭīdhibhedat gauṣṭavam mukhyatvam copapadyate-V.P.

As explained by Puṇyarāja on V.P. II, 256, the artha is two-fold viz. Svarūpa and bāhya. Svarūpa is that which is naturally fixed by its very form such as 'gotva' of the word 'go'. The bāhya is that which is indicated by upacāra e.g. when vāhika is said to be go (7). Thus far, Bhartrhari gives the basis for abśddha and gauṣṭ or laksanā, almost on the lines of the Mbh.

Over and above this determination of the sense of a given word which has convention with reference to more than one sense, i.e. a word having multiple senses. Thus, he takes up the problem of a word having more meanings than one, all of which are mukhyārthas. In his view, the particular meaning out of several is determined by factors such as context, time, place, etc. In this connection, he gives the following verses.

Vākyat prakaraṇādārthādauṣṭi dādus's'ākālataḥ.
S'abdārthab previbhayante na rūpādeva kevalat∥ V.P. II, 316.
Sāmyogopa viprayogas'ca sāhacaryam virdhitā∥
Aṛthaḥ prakaraṇam lingam s'abdasyaṃsya samundhiḥ∥
Sāmarthyaevaicit des'ah kālo vyakti eva svarādayah∥
s'abdārthasyaṃsya navaccheda vis'eyamartihetvah.∥ V.P. II, 317, 318(8)
Here, we may ask as to what it is that fixes the particular meaning of the word and debars other multiple senses which it has by convention and usage? To Bhartrhari, this question does not seem to have occurred. For him, sansarga or conjunction and the like limit the word to one mukhyārtha or the primary sense. But to later thinkers on this subject, it appears necessary to postulate an additional s'abdavṛtti, over and above abhidhā and gauni, and laksana. In this, we may see the inspiration for the vyanjana vṛtti. This is corroborated by the fact that writers like Mammata, Vis'vanatha and others mention these very verses (i.e. V.P.II, 317, 318) as authority for their theory of abhidhāmulā vyanjana.

Among the later grammarians, Nāges'a was the first to recommend the case of vyanjana. He apparently follows the Ālaṃkārikas and repeats the same arguments.

Nāges'a holds that in certain cases, after mukhyārtha is gathered, or after mukhārthabādha as the case may be, a further meaning is to be seen. This artha is either prasiddha or aprasiddha and is either related to the mukhyārtha or is unrelated to it. This sort of meaning is flashed upon the mind through vyanjanaakti. Thus, Nāges'a holds vyanjana to be abhidhāmulā and laksanamulā. This vyanjana rests on S'abda, artha, pada, padaikadesa, varṇa, rācanā, ċesta. When a woman casts a glance of her eye with reference to somebody, her desire is thereby suggested. This apprehension is supported by experience-amūbhavasiddha. So, even in ċesta, vyanjana can be seen. Vyanjakatva lies both in pada and artha. That vyanjana, wherein arthādi are suggested, rests on vaktābuddhavyādilais'ityajñāna, or the knowledge of the speaker, the hearer etc. The pratibhā or the genius of the hearer acts as a sahakāri kāraṇa. In the absence of pratibhā, there is absence of the apprehension of the suggested sense. By pratibhā is meant the navanāvommesā'linī buddhi. This navanāvommesa is due to purvajanaṃsaskāras or the impression of the past birth. So, for Nāges'a, pratibhā is that factor which accompanied by prakaraṇajñāna in form of the speaker, hearer etc. makes for the apprehension of the suggested sense.
This vyanjana is held to be connected even with the previous life.(13).

In case of gato' stamarkah, when we desire different meanings, the mukhyartha is never contradicted (bdhita). So, the other meaning is not gathered through lakṣaṇa. So Vyanjana is not to be included in lakṣaṇa.(14). The Nipātas and upasargas also are suggestors as are the padas. The Sphota is always vyāyangya, and is described as such in the works on grammar. Bhartrhari also takes Sphota to be vyāyangya. Thus, Nages'a considers vyanjana to be useful even for the grammarians: vaiyākaraṇānām api etatsvīkāraḥ āvas' yakah.

Now we will consider the views of the Mīmāṃsakas. Jaimini and S'abara hold that the language of the Sutras must, as far as possible be understood to convey the same sense as is conveyed by it in common parlance.

Jaimini says this expressly in 31.3.30. When it is said: prayogacodana-buddhārthaikatvamavibhāgat. 'Avibhāgat' means that no difference is seen between language of the scriptures and that of common parlance. Thus, both words and sentences in the Veda are in no way different from those in the popular usage. (23.1.2.32-avis'istastu väkyärthah)(15). However, the cases of Veda and loka are not absolutely parallel. The vaidika vákyā is apeuruṣeyam, i.e., of human origin and always true. lankika vákyā is pauruṣeyam, and therefore at times it may not be free from errors because of its human agency. A further important point of distinction is that in the case of a lankika vákyā, the abhipraya or some drṣṭa artha or intention of the particular speaker is more important than the s'abda. Thus, S'abda becomes only a means of conveying the artha or abhipraya.(16). Therefore, in a lankika vákyā, s'abda in its vácyārtha is not strictly honoured. Sometimes, the vácyārtha is given up in favour of some lakṣyārtha which suits the abhipraya of the speaker in a much better way.(17). In a lankika vákyā, at times such devices as adhyāhāra or implication and vipāṭaṁma, are also restored to (18). In the vaidika vákyā, nothing else but s'abda is pramāṇa.(19). S'abara therefore very often refers to the general rule that Lakṣaṇa is not admissible in a vidhi-vákyā, while it has scope elsewhere(20). Thus, the
Mimāmsakas mention both mukhya and gauna arthas. They seem to accept mukhyā vr̥tti and gauni or lakṣaṇa. We will try to see if there is any distinction drawn between gauni and lakṣaṇa.

Jaimini and S'abara discuss the two senses viz. mukhya and gauna under M.III.2.1-2. S'abara holds that 'mukhya' is so termed because it is perceived from the word and is as it were the face of the word. While, that sense which is known from the primary signification on the strength of some connection is termed as jaghanya, it being also termed as gauna as it is connected with some gauna(21). Thus, the Mimāmsakas seem to hold at least two S'abdarvṛttis viz. mukhya and gauna. They hold that a word, when seen to have two or more meanings, one is its mukhyārtha while the rest are all gathered by the secondary power through the relation such as sādṛṣya, and the like. The word barhih means grass primarily, but is applied to sanctified grass only secondarily through sādṛṣya. The word parvan, in the same way, primarily means 'samudāya' but through samudāya-saṁbanda it also secondarily means kāla(22).

Words such as mātā, having more than one primary sense are in fact two words and not one(23). It should be noted that S'abara seems to suggest that in case of a gaṇarthā, it is only a meaning that is somehow or other connected with the primary sense that is indicated and not any other sense at random. The S'abdārtha saṁbanda is nitya and therefore it is inadmissible to apply any word to anything which it has no power to śāme(24). It is also noted that at times, we come across words that convey two meanings e.g. kus'ala, praviṇa etc. In such cases, one meaning is derived through etymology and is termed nyāyakhyā the yaugikārtha and the other one is based on usage and is termed as rūdhārtha. On account of prasiddhi, the rūdhārtha is taken as the mukhyārtha in such cases. The Mimāmsakas seem to hold that lakṣaṇa is resorted to only as a means to avoid ānarthakya, when the primary sense is found to be unsuitable to the context. This again is only as the last resort(25). The Mimāmsakas hold that the most important principle to be borne in mind is that between the two functions of a word viz. S'rutī (or abhidhā) and lakṣaṇa, the former is stronger than the latter(26). S'rutyaśambhava or mukhyārthabādha
is the first pre-requisite of laksanā. On VIII.3.34 S’abara lays down that though the direct sense of a word is found unsuitable to the context, the vācyārtha cannot be entirely abandoned. Thus, even the laksāyārtha is bound to be S’abdārtha; it cannot be as ‘abdārtha (27). Thus, the condition of ‘tadaveda’ comes in. This is explained again under XI.4.23 (28). The illustration cited is that of the word ‘Simha’ S’abara says that when the word ‘Simha’ is uttered with reference to a certain individual, the idea of praśānyakārtī is conveyed there in, and therefore, this gentleman is praśānyakārtī as gathered. It should be noted that the laksāṇā, while vyanjana is not mentioned. The above illustration goes to prove that probably for the Mīmāṃsakas the prāyojana is also gathered by laksāṇā alone. ‘gaunī’ is another term used for laksāyārtha, guṇayogādgaṇapati is the explanation. It should be noted that the two vṛttis viz. gaunī and laksāṇā are taken as almost synonymous by S’abara. The Nyāyakos’a mentions that the Mīmāṃsakas take gaunī as a vṛtti different from laksāṇā. This is not borne out, at least, while referring to S’abara. We come across different types of laksāṇās that which convey (i) the sense of the possessive suffix, matvartha laksana, (ii) dēsa-laksanā, (iii) dharmā laksana or guṇavāda (iv) kāla laksanā, (v) karmā laksāṇā, (vi) kārīya or sādhya laksanā, (vii) kārpana or sādhana laksanā, (viii) laksanā conveying some svājātiya and also (ix) liṅgin. Sentences like ‘Simho’ Devadattaḥ and ‘Agniṁāṇavakah’ are given as popular examples of Dharmā laksanā. (III.2.4–Guṇādvyabhidhānan syat etc.) (29). The words Simha, and agni convey the qualities. This laksāṇā corresponds to gaunī śāropā in the alamkāras’āstra. It should be noted that though it appears that this dharma laksanā is termed as guṇavāda by Jaimini at II.2.10 (30), actually, the term guṇavāda is used by both Jaimini and S’abara in a sense much wider than dharma laksanā. It means upacāra or secondary application in general as is evident from the fact that antravādinī vāk is given as another example of guṇa-vāda, where laksanā conveys not dharma neet but bāhīlya or prāya-stya. Hence, we find that Jaimini laying down ‘rupa’ and ‘prāya’ as two possible grounds for guṇavāda among others (31) later.
Mimāṃsakas such as Kumārila and others mention the tātparya vṛtti also.

Thus the earlier Mimāṃsakas give us abhidhā and various kinds of lakṣaṇa.

There seems to be no reference to vyañjanā as such.

**Natyāyikas:**

We will not consider the views of the Nātyāyikas. We have seen in our discussion of samketa that Gotama recognises what is specified as abhidhā lateron. For him, the padartha or the meanings of the word consist in vyakti or individual, ēkṛti or form, and jāti or class. These are the aspects of reality expressed by a word. The acceptance of abhidhā by Gotama and other (see ch. XXVI). Nātyāyikas is clearly indicated in our discussion on samketa. As to what is expressed by a word is shown in sutra II.2.65–vyaktyākṛti jātayastupārthaḥ. This means that in the opinion of Gotama, a word expresses individuality, form and class. Now let us see his views regarding lakṣaṇa.

We come across some discussion as to the nature of secondary usage or upacāra at II 2.64–Sahacaranasthānatzādarthayavṛttaṁadhranaṁ–śāmīpyasādhanā dhipatyēbhyo brāhmaṇamacakātārāja–saktucandanaṁgaṅgāśatakāmapuruṣesvata-dbhāve'pi tadupacārāḥ (31–A). Thus Gotama holds that secondary usage or upacāra operates on the strength of ten relations such as sahacarana (or going together), sthāna (or place) etc. The Vāsēyāyana bhasya cites illustrations to the point. Thus, Yāstikām bhōjaya'or feed the stick, means the brāhmaṇa with a stick is to be fed. This explains the relation of sahacarana (or going together). Sthāna or location is illustrated in maṅgāḥ kroṣ'anti tādārthya or the relation of purpose, is illustrated when straw meant for preparing a mat is itself called a mat. Vṛtta or behaviour is the relation as seen in, 'this king is Yama or Kubera'. He is so called because he behaves like Yama or Kubera. Māna or measure is illustrated when grains are said to be of a particular measure. Dhāraṇa or the relation of weighing is illustrated when Sandal-wood held in balance is called tulācandana'. The relation of śāmīpya or proximity is seen as in, 'gaṅgāyāṁ gāvas'caranti'or cattle are grazing in the Ganges. Thus the place near the river is called by the name of the river on
the strength of sāṁśīpya or ātma-kśetram. 'Yoga' or combination is yet another relation. Thus a black piece of cloth is called black because it is united with black colour. Sādhana 'or means' is illustrated when food is said to be prūpa or life. Actually, food is the sādhana or means of life. Ādhipatya or being the head is illustrated when a man who is the head of a family is said to be family or house himself (ayaṁ puruṣah kulaṁ, ayaṁ gotraṁ etc.)

Elsewhere also in the Vātsyāyanaabhisāga we come across numerous references to bhakti and bhākta artha. But we do not come across any reference to vyāṇjana. Word is not accepted to be nitya and abhivyāṅgya or manifested. Vyaṅgya' is seen only in the sense of 'manifested' and not 'suggested'.

We now turn to the new school of Naiyāyikas as represented by Gaṅgāsāya, Gādāhara, Jagādīśa'ya etc. Gādāhara, Jagādīśa'ya and Mathurānātha are the authors of S'aktivāda, S'abdās'aktiprakāśikā and vyāpattivāda respectively, wherein they have dealt with the topic of S'abda, S'abdārtha and S'abdavṛttis.

In the S'abdās'aktiprakāśikā, words are classified as below:

(i) Words with conventional meanings assigned to them (or rūdhā);

(ii) Words with secondary signification, (or lakṣāka),

(iii) Words having both primary or conventional and derivative meanings (i.e.yogarūḍha)

and (iv) Words, possessing derivative or yajjgika artha alone.

S'abdās'aktiprakāśikā 16 reads:

(ṛūḍham ca lakṣākam caiva, yogarūḍham ca yajgikam.)

tacato dhātyā paraśrūḍhahayagikam, manyate 'dhikam.1)

The word 'Gaṅgāyām' in the illustration 'Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ' forms an example of lakṣākā. Paṇkāja is a yoga-rūḍha word defined as -

i.e. they are those which combine in themselves twofold signification—conventional as well as derivative. The yaugika words are those such as kāraka, pācaka etc., that cannot denote the same meanings as are gathered by their component parts in which they may be grammatically analysed.

Gadadhara in his S'aktivāda, discusses the problem of S'aktigraha. By 'S'akti' he means the mukhyā vṛtti called abhidhā. He discusses at length the topic of Saṅketāgrāhakatva of this mukhyāvṛtti. At places, he touches laksanā also, which is connected with abhidhā. In the beginning of his work, he recognises two and functions viz. Saṅketa/laksanā with reference to padārtha. −Saṅketa laksanā ca arthe padārvṛttih. (S'aktivāda). He does not go for any further relation. He has neither mentioned nor rejected vyañjana as a vṛtti, but his commentators try to interpret him in such a way as to make him refute vyañjana. Thus, Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa observes that vyañjana need not be recognised as distinct from laksanā and so also gauni. Both gauni and vyañjana can be included in laksanā. Another commentator of his, Mādhava, tries to refute vyañjana-vādā. The vyañjana-vādina figures as an objector here. The objection is that, the S'aktivibhāga of Gadadhara is not correct, for vyañjana is a separate vṛtti. When it is said by the heroine that, gaccha gacchasi cet kanta, etc., the meaning, viz., that 'if you will go, I will die', is gathered through vyañjana alone, in the absence of which we fail to gather this sense. The Siddhānti (i.e. Naiyāyika) does not agree with this. If vyañjana is recognised as a separate vṛtti, it must have some definite form. If at all it has any definite form, it is the form of vacya. When there is the apprehension of the suggested sense, it is always due to abhidhājñāna. Thus even in vyañjana, we cannot proceed viśikhaṁ without the vacyārtha, which is its cause. Thus, vyañjana is not a separate vṛtti. When the suggested meaning is not at all caused by any vṛtti other than abhidhā, it should not be taken as the result of vyañjana.

The vyañjana-vādā accepts something like a Sābdīvyañjana, e.g., vayastī. nāgarasahgadāngarēm hanti vedanēm. From this sentence, two senses viz. (i) a young woman, in company of a young man, removes the torment of the limbs of the body; and (ii) Harītakī with Śuṇṭhī removes physical pain, are derived. For the
supporter of vyanjana, it is a case of abhidhamulavyanjané. But for the Naiyáyikas, the other sense is also gathered through abhidhá and it is futile to go for an abhidhamulavyanjané with reference to the pratiyamánártha. For the Naiyáyikas, this implied sense is gathered not by any vṛttivīsa, but by the faculty of mind. Thus, vyanjara is just a mental apprehension (mānasabodha-metra), mansaiva tadabodhavikārat (Mādhavī).

Jagadīśa, in his sa'abdas'aktipakṣikā, kārikā 34, refers to the illustration viz. mukhaṃ vikasitasmitam etc., whereby suggestiveness has been established by Mīmāṃsa and others. He discusses at length the problem of the recognition of vyanjana. He holds that there is no justification to recognise something like suggestiveness, so far as the direct or indirect meaning of a word is concerned.

The so-called vyanjara, i.e., sa'itya and pavanatva, or saurabha (i.e., the smiling face is as fragrant as flowers) is derived by the usual mental apprehension; the special beauty of erotic sentiment (oamastkāra) also being a matter of mental apprehension (mānasabodha).

CONCLUSION:— Thus we have seen that language is used both in the scientific mode and also in the emotive mode. Scientific usage becomes the source of our abhidhá and the emotive use accounts for same lakṣaṇa and vyanjana.

We have thus tried to study the concept of abdāvṛtti in different dars'anas in the historical perspective. The grammarians and the Mānusakas, as seen above, were concerned more with the scientific use of language and therefore they mention only abhidhá and lakṣaṇa (and also guṇavāda in case of the latter). The Naiyáyikas also, for the same reason, see no need of recognising vyanjana. The grammarians, however, as observed by us, enunciate the doctrine of Sphota. They also provide us with clues regarding
the development of vyonjana. Coming to the ēka śāṃkaraśāsana, Ānandavardhana
and his followers clearly define the functions of word and establish the
doctrine of the three vṛttis viz. abhidhā, laksāṇā and vyonjana. In the
discussion of dhvani, they take the grammarians as their authority and we
have tried to show above that their claim is not unfounded.

**FOOT NOTES.**

**Patanjali has 'gauna' and 'mukhya' as below:**

at 1.1.15. यें ताहै गौणमुख्यायोऽपूले कार्यं प्रलयः इति।...

1.4.108- गौण मुख्यायोऽपूले तृत्य भवति। तथा गौणकृत्य-वचः कार्यैः-

dhārio तृत्य न भविष्यते।

8.3.182- जये: स्तुतसांस्कृतस्माः! ष्टद-गौणमुख्यायोऽपूले संप्रितिपिवः तथा

गौणहर्द्रयः---etc.

**वभ्रणाद्वृत्तोः occurs at 2.3.1** -करोत्तस्त्वमाः: करोत्तस्त्वमाः

dकरोत्तस्त्वमाः न करोत्तस्त्वमाः न विकरोत्तस्त्वमाः न विकरोत्तस्त्वमाः

लक्ष्य विभाग समासमाः occurs at 2.2.24.25-421** (सेठ.कवि.हेके)*

*सामान्यायामिनाः हि विकरोत्तस्त्वमाः 4.

*सामान्य विभागायामिनाः हि विकरोत्तस्त्वमाः 4.

**वभ्रणाद्वृत्तोः occurs at 2.3.1** -करोत्तस्त्वमाः: करोत्तस्त्वमाः

करोत्तस्त्वमाः न करोत्तस्त्वमाः न विकरोत्तस्त्वमाः न विकरोत्तस्त्वमाः

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**वभ्रणाद्वृत्तोः occurs at 2.3.1** -करोत्तस्त्वमाः: करोत्तस्त्वमाः

करोत्तस्त्वमाः न करोत्तस्त्वमाः न विकरोत्तस्त्वमाः न विकरोत्तस्त्वमाः

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*सामान्यायामिनाः हि विकरोत्तस्त्वमाः 4.

*सामान्य विभागायामिनाः हि विकरोत्तस्त्वमाः 4.

**वभ्रणाद्वृत्तोः occurs at 2.3.1** -करोत्तस्त्वमाः: करोत्तस्त्वमाः

करोत्तस्त्वमाः न करोत्तस्त्वमाः न विकरोत्तस्त्वमाः न विकरोत्तस्त्वमाः

लक्ष्य विभाग समासमाः occurs at 2.2.24.25-421** (सेठ.कवि.हेके)*

*सामान्यायामिनाः हि विकरोत्तस्त्वमाः 4.

*सामान्य विभागायामिनाः हि विकरोत्तस्त्वमाः 4.
6.3.46...... प्राणाति वा यति कृति:।
अथा गौणमुख्यादिके कार्यसंपत्यः।तथा गौणरूपयोगोऽजोऽन्नातीनिय तति न वाहिकोऽनुक्षेते।

भविष्यानल्लाः: 3.3.19। 7/146; 15/227।
बल्लार्चा कारके संशयाम्। (3.3.19)

... वित्तिप्रकार हिति चेदभविष्यानल्लाःवित्तिप्रकार हिति चेदभविष्यानल्लाः।
बल्लार्चा कारणम्। भविष्यानल्लाःवित्तिप्रकार हिति चेदभविष्यानल्लाः।

कूल्लार्चातिसमासा:। अभिष्यानन्ति।
भविष्यानल्लाः। अन्बेद्विन्ति।

भविष्यानल्लाः। अन्बेद्विन्ति। at 1.2.51। 15/227।

लुपि सुकलवध्यन्तिनयने। 1। 2। 5।

वन्यवाहिष्यज्ञितकःमार्गाणां। महेश्वरविज्ञेयेः। 11।

अन्बेद्विन्ति। भविष्यानल्लाः। अन्बेद्विन्ति।
मार्गाणां। महेश्वरविज्ञेयेः। अन्बेद्विन्ति।

मार्गाणां। महेश्वरविज्ञेयेः। अन्बेद्विन्ति।

भविष्यानल्लाः। 2.1.5। 13/395।

तिवस्ताथार्थिन्दरसागाराहे। 2.1। 5।

... भविष्यानल्लाः।

भविष्यानल्लाः। तु॥

भविष्यानल्लाः।

भविष्यानल्लाः। तु॥

भविष्यानल्लाः। 5.3.7। 4। 6। 424।

कृतित्वते। 5.3.7।

इह कृतित्वते। अनुसूचितक हिति स्वरूपोन्नत्या।

ज्ञात्वत्क्रिये त्रित्यों न प्राप्तरूपोद्धारणे।

ज्ञात्वत्क्रिये त्रित्यों।

भविष्यानल्लाः। 1। 1। 6। 9। 1। 1। 6। 9।
-173-

• भविष्यात्मलयः सर्वश्री १३४९ अथवा द्वितीय प्रत्ययः सर्वग्रहणोन्नति १३६१। ब्रह्मविवेक कथिताः। इत्यतः

-1.2.60 6/231: -जलपनीप्रत्यक्षानं च नहाति। 1.2.60 

जलपनीप्रत्यक्षानं च नहाति। जलपनीप्रत्यक्षानं च नहाति। बहवस्ते/धर्मस्तत्र युक्तः बहुवचनम्।

यथा त्यावेदाभयां तदा चित्तवचनः भविष्यति।

-1.2.64. 18.21 

सहिष्ण्यांकुलोऽस्यामकां । 1.2.64 

प्रत्ययः शदानिवेशोऽन्नतेनेनक्ष्यामिताय ख्यातिः। ११। प्रत्ययः शदा: भागानिविवेकस्थः।

किमहि पैदायमिति। अर्थाः प्रि ता द्वितीय या प्रत्ययः शदानिवेशादेक्त्सत्सारात्मकाण्तेन शहनाने-

cस्य भागानिवेशामिताय प्राप्तोति। त्यति को दोषः।....etc.
also at 1.3.1. 6/268:—

again at, 1.4.51.8/335:—

again, 2.1.1.7/363:—

again, 3.1.7.18/12:—

again, 2.1.69.24/403:—

2.2.24.18/421:—

2.2.24.13, 35/424:—

2.2.29, 23/432:—
2.3.5. 14/445  

3.1.7. 18/12 see above.
3.1.7.13,11/15-  

3.1.86. 82/31-  

again at, 2.2.29. 25/433... विश्वासावर्धन पु. स्वामाविक । 19.99

and 2.3.1.12-18/442 - न वान्यारोपणानि भवनात्।।

न कृष्ण दोषः। श्री ज्ञानारोपणानि भवनात्। ज्ञानारोपणानि भवनात्। सदिक्ष्येनारोपणानि भवनात्।
अर्थात् न ज्ञानारोपणानि भवनात्। सदिक्ष्येनारोपणानि भवनात्।

3.1.22. 9/11/29-  

3.1.26. 22/31-  

3.1.67. 1-1-3-9  

again at, 3.4.26 13-18/174...
4.1.48. 6/218- विषयं द्वारा: पुंक्तिविधानानि।
सिद्धेतु। क्रमम: पुंक्तिविधानानि स्वी पुंक्तिकारण्यानि।
4.1.91.14-15  बप्तव्यामिनाने स्तूपुलित्व ग्यायाप्रक्रियानुसारः
बालामिनाने स्तूपुलित्व ग्यायाप्रक्रियानुसारः। कि कारणाः
न्यूकलिकात्वः। वाप्तच न्यूकलिकात्वः केन न्यूकलिकात्वः
स्वातः न्यूकलिकात्वः न त्वातः नु ब्युने पुरस्तादेव
हृदं पारस्यदेव चौदीः। उद्योगित चौह्रत एव युक्तप्रनाननि
चौह्रते। 4.1.93.5/248। उथ्याद्विनवर चापथुके सिंहं गुङ्या
बिनानं न ग्राषोत्ति।
14/249। स्वमयि सिंहं गुङ्या बिनानं न ग्राषोत्ति।
25/260। क्रिमाणोऽपि कि हस्ताक्षरां यथा जात्वादिर्म उत्यथमान्
प्रत्येकार्थ्यां-मित्राणां नां तति भवति ततोत्परः।... etc.
4.2.1.5/271 रक्षादीनामयामिनाने प्रत्येकविधानादुपादायान्यार्थयथाः
रक्षादीनामयामिनाने प्रत्येकविधानादुपादायान्यार्थयथाः
न व रागादुपादायानुपन्त्ये-नायादायानान्तः उत्पक्षिन भविष्यति।
4.3.25। 13/307। वस्मान्त भवति तवथ तत्र कैसे हेतुः। क्रिमानात्
तत्परायामायात्मकः। क्रिमाणोऽपि हस्ताक्षरां यथा जात्वादिर्प्रत्येकार्थ्यां
मित्राणां न भवति तत् प्रत्येकार्थ्यां
also at 4.3.155 3-6/325; 4.4.76-14/333; 5.1.59-24/355; and 8.1.4-4/365
in the same sense.

(2) Pā. IV.1.48 is पुंक्तिविधायथायामः
सिद्धः तु स्तिथिः पुंक्तिविधायथायामः।...  क्ष्या पुरस्तु तत्यथाद्वेद-नामादिष्ठीतः। नूतनेकं पुंक्तिवादेखायां तदित्तुल्गण्यानि। नौष दौष्ट्‌। तत्वाद्य-नामादिष्ठीतः। न्यूकलिकात्वः। अस्मारथित्वादिष्ठी।
त्त्त्त्त्तः। कथयुक्तेऽत्त्त्तः। अस्मारथित्वादिष्ठी। चौप्रभृति: पुरस्तूलस्वतं तत्यथादृष्टः। क्ष्या पुरस्तूलस्वतं तत्यथादृष्टः।
तत्यथात् तत्यथात्। चौप्रभृति। चौप्रभृति। चौप्रभृति।
177

(3) - The न्यायविद observes: शर्कन्तकन्दाश्यामविन्दकै गृंदितित भीमवनसा। या स तदारीकत्ता नैति नायकिका। बाहु। (न्यायसिद्धान्तकृत-वर्तमानः)

(4) - एकमाहुदेयकथा शब्दमें परोदकां। निमित्तुमेदेकथा साधिकथा तत्स भीते। v.p.

II 262 also Puṇyārāja says: अद्यतन मात्र: शब्दवा कर्तात॥ निमित्तु मेदेकथा: प्रभुदृष्टिविपचितमुनिकम्।

(5) - कर्मफलात्मको वा मानिकदानात्मको वा। v.p.

(6) - कथा सान्तादिकमानुपड़ो गोर्वेनामभियो।

तथा त्यस गोर्वाती वाणीत् प्रक्षिपतरू।

(7) - Puṇyārāja Says: शब्दमें योगियोऽस्मात्: स्वरूप बाहुक। तव निमित्तु मेदेकथा- 

गाँवे सांगनेव शब्दस्तु गृंदि वेदावतिक हि बाह्यात्मात्माः।

(8) - Puṇyārāja holds that verses 317, 318 give someone else’s views. Mamāṭa and others quote them as representing Bhartṛhari’s views.

(9) - मुक्तारंबलस्य दृष्टिकथा भाषारमात्रमधुर्माचार्यात्रित्रिता भाष्यात्मानेकाव्यसंस्कृताः विज्ञाताः व्यवहारः

(10) - कथा जटाहोणात्मादिकमावेशिणित: हिति सर्वत्रप्रसिद्धेशस्यां जैत्यादिविलस्य 

(11) - कथा चार्यस्मात् जननीये वक्तुमौद्यमवाच्यात्माविशिष्टकृतां प्रतिमा च सहारित तुम्तिन्क्लानकनकेन वा।

(12) - वक्तुमौद्यमवाच्यात्मां सार्वत्रिक तत्त्वेन पुनः प्रतिमा हिति जलितम्।

(13) - एवं च शर्कन्तकन्दाश्यामाविशिष्टकृताञ्च प्रतिमा च महान्तर: सृजनीताः प्रति हित्यपि 

(14) - एवं गता स्तरः इत्यादि: खिलेण सन्यासन-नादे: कर्त्यात्माभिमाध्ये गुरु 

(15) - मी.1.2.32 - किश्विषेषस्तु वाक्यार्थः। and also, विशिष्टस्तु छोटे 

(16) - मी.11.26 - छोटे भ्रमायामना। and also SB. on it- वर्षा लोकविदित, 

(17) - मी.1.2.32. pp.150।

(16) - मी.11.26 - छोटे कर्माकायाम। and also SB. on it- वर्षा लोकविदित, 

(18) - मी.1.2.32. pp.2114 and also see MS.11.62 क्वा वोके विचित्त्रतिपप्पमान व्यापै।
-178-
and also SB on it. ज्ञात होते प्रीति पर सम्भव्यता दिया। विषय सम्बन्धः। सबः प्राकृतिक, सबूत, जिन्ते, क्या न प्राकृति, तताः सबूत। तत्तत्त्वार्थः प्रकृति प्राचार्यामध्ये। जोहेष विक्रितः। उपाधि
(17) SB on X.5.57 pp.1968
(18) SB on VI.8.27 pp.1516 and also SB on VIII.5.44 pp.1962
(19) See 16 above and also: SB on III.2.36 pp.793 and also SB on III.1.17 pp.726
(20) नन्दनुवादेन:। नन्दनुवादको ज्ञानाया। ज्ञानोऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽऽঃ-
प्रादेशिकारीति गण्यते। वर्यप्रकारणस्मृतिः। यो हि मन्यते प्रादेशिकारिणां प्रादेशिकारीत्वमिति
स यदि सिद्धभवान्वितयिति सिद्धस्यविशेषताः। सिद्धार्थः प्रादेशिकारीत्वमिति
प्रादेशिकारिणां। तथ्य स्वाथार्थानां कथा संबंधे ज्ञातो। SB. on I.4.22, pp.357-358

(29) गुणार्थोगणान्वितयिति सिद्धांविशेषताः। कथाः हि गुणार्थोगणान्विताः। यथा
सिद्धार्थः देवदर्शनां भर्तिनिगुणविकसाम हि।

(30) गुणवादस्तु गौण मानव भाषित स्तवतथे संबंधन्तः स्तुतिः। SB. pp.213.

(31) (SB. on I.2.11 pp.127) गुणवादस्तु स्पर्शः। कथाः स्तवः। गुणान्विताः
एवं चूर्ण हि गौणः। शब्। Thus stenam mahāh is gunavāda-and also,


(32) एवं च गौणित्वा अन्वयः। प्रादेशिकारणां अनुकूलः। तथाः। गुणवादस्तु गौणान्विताः।

(33) सत्तत्त्वानुसरणकृतम्। गुणवादस्तु मानवानुसरणकृतम्। etc.

(34) गुणवादस्तु गौणमानवानुसरणकृतम्। गौणानुसरणकृतम्। मानवानुसरणकृतम्।

(35) गौणवादस्तु गौणमानवानुसरणकृतम्। गौणानुसरणकृतम्।

(36) गौणवादस्तु गौणमानवानुसरणकृतम्। गौणानुसरणकृतम्।

(37) गौणवादस्तु गौणमानवानुसरणकृतम्। गौणानुसरणकृतम्।

(38) गौणवादस्तु गौणमानवानुसरणकृतम्। गौणानुसरणकृतम्।

(39) गौणवादस्तु गौणमानवानुसरणकृतम्। गौणानुसरणकृतम्।