SOME OTHER WRITERS ON RASA:

(i) DHANANJAYA AND DHANIKA (C. 10th A.D.).

(ii) BHOJA (11th A.D.)

DHANANJAYA AND DHANIKA:

Dhananjaya and Dhanika, the authors of *DR.* with its *Avaloka*, occupy an important place in the history of Sanskrit poetics and *dramaturgy*. Chronologically, they come after Ananda and are almost contemporaries of *Abhinava*. As against the kashmirian writers on poetics, Dhananjaya and Dhanika, along with Bhoja, the successor of *Mṛija*, represent the *Vala* school of writers. We must therefore consider in what aspects these authors differ from Ananda and Abhinava. As to the views of the latter they may or may not have been known to these writers.

Dhananjaya defines rasa as follows:

\[
\text{Vibhavairanubhavais ca sattvikairvyabhicāribhiḥ.}
\]

\[
\text{ānīyamānaḥ svādystvam sthāyībhavo rasaḥ smṛtah.}
\]

(DR. IV. 1)

This definition is in a way explanatory of the famous sutra of the *Nā.Sā.*, which is taken as authority for all the discussions on the subject.

We saw while discussing the views of Bhaṭṭa *Lollāṭa*, *Śrī śāhukaka* and others that the absence of mention of sthāyībhava in the rasa-sūtra is one of the main topics of discussion. We also saw that in the opinions of *Śrī śāhukaka* and *Abhinava*, the mention of sthāyībhava is not only unnecessary but would have also ruined the definition because in their view sthāyībhavas as such never become the objects of rasa.

Dhananjaya however is definite in his view that it is the sthāyībhava which becomes the object of rasa. This is an important difference.

A minor difference is to be found in the addition of sāttvikabhavas as one of the agents bringing about rasa. This is in fact an addition in the rasa-sūtra itself. Though the sāttvikas can be taken as implied in anubhavas, its separate mention is justified by Dhananjaya and Dhanika in the follow-
...ing way. Even though the sāttvika bhāvās are also anubhāvas, yet they are different from them as they originate from sattva i.e. mind alone. Says Dhanāñjaya (Dr. IV. 4. b. 5a.):

prthagbhāva bhavantyanye’nubhāvatve’pi sāttvikāh. 

4b.

sattvādeva samutpatte teccā tadbhāvabhāvanam...

5a.

Dhanika says:

paragataaduhkhahāreṇidhāvānāyāṃsatyantānukūlenteḥkaraṇatvaḥ sattvāṃ. 

yāhaṃ sāttvā nāma manah prabhavaṃ tace samāhitamanastvādutpaḍyate.

Another important point of difference lies in the modus operandi of rasa-experience. We have already seen that Dhanāñjaya and Dhanika do not accept the vyāngya-vyañjakabhāva but are satisfied with bhāva-bhāvakā relation. This, we have already noted, is the view propounded by Bhatṭācāryaka also, who mentions bhāvakatva and thojakatva vyāppārās. (Nā. Sū. Vol. II. G. O. S. Edn. P. 276. 7)

Yet another important topic to be found in Dhanāñjaya is that of the four cittabhūmis or four states of mind from which arise the different rasas. These are as follows:

Śvādaḥ kāvyārthaṣaṃbhedādātmānandasaṃbhāvah. 

vikāsa’vistarakaṣobhāviksepaiḥ sa caturvidhāḥ... II DR. IV.43.

Dhanika explains it elaborately as below. He says that the sthāyībhāva correlated with vibhāvādis is kāvyārtha. On the strength of this the heart of sāṃjīka is harmonised with that of Rāma, and the like. The ego centered limited cognition of 'I' is obliterated. The joy caused due to this is the kāvyānanda. This joy is basically the same with reference to all the rasas, but different rasas come into force by different vibhāvādis. On account of this difference in vibhāvādis, the mental states-cittabhūmis-are also divided into vikāsa, vistāra, kṣobha and vikṣepa. Rasas are also classified on the basis of these cittabhūmis. Says he:-

kāvyārthena vibhāvādisaṃśrasthāyātmakena bhāvakacetasāḥ saṃbhede’nyayaṃ- 

yasamgalaṇe pratyastamitasvaparavibhāge satī prabalastarasvānandodbhūtiḥ
svādāḥ tasya ca śāmīnyātma-κa-व्यi-पू यत्विद्विहविद्विदाण-पयाण-सह-हेतु-न(-Avaloka on D.R.IV.42)

Vikāsa is with reference to Svāngāra and hāsya, viṣṭāra with vīra and sādhuta, kṣ'ohha with bibhatsa and bhayānaka and vikṣepa with raudra and karaṇa. Says Dhananjaya,

Śvāngāravīrabhatsaraudrā-viṣṭa-manasah kramāt

hāsya-abhutasabhayotkarṣakarunānām a eva hi. || (DR.IV.44)

We have already seen that BhaṭṭaNāyaka mentions three cittabhūmis.

If BhaṭṭaNāyaka can be accepted as a predecessor of Dhananjaya, we may say that he follows BhaṭṭaNāyaka in this respect.

There is another important point in which Dhananjaya differs, viz. the number of rasas. In the Nā.S'ā itself we find, 'aṣṭau nātye rasaḥ saṃtāh'- (Nā.S'ā.VI.15). Later on we find s'antarasa also as the ninth rasa. This portion dealing with the topic of s'antarasa is, in view of modern critics, an interpolation, though we find that Abhinava, Mammaṭa, Hemacandra etc. all accept nine rasas. Dhananjaya and Dhanika however, forcibly controvert this latter view. Their arguments as to why s'antarasa cannot be a nātyarasa are interesting. They are as below:

Dhananjaya enumerates sthāyibhāvas in DR.IV.35, as,

'ratyātsāhajugupsāḥ krodha hāsāḥ smayo bhayaḥ s'okah.||

s'amamapi ketopraśnah paśṭimātyeṣu naitasya. ||

Dhanika adds that as s'ama is of the form of cessation of all activity it cannot be represented on the stage. Thus s'anta has no place in a dramatic representation. In Nāgānanda love for Malayavati is described throughout and the attainment of the state of vidyādhāra is narrated in the end. If s'ama is the sthāyibhāva in Nāgānanda it will not be in harmony with the above. The same anukāra cannot be the substance of two opposite types of things viz. amūrṣa and virāga. Thus in Nāgānanda s'ama is not the sthāyin but utṣaḥ is the sthāyin that goes with dayāvīra. Dayāvīra is not opposed to Svāngāra which is subservient to it or to phala in form of
Sovereignty (cakravartitva). Thus there are only eight rasas in nātya.

(Says Dhanika:...sarvathā nāṭakādibhavhīdayātmāni sthāyitvamasmēbhīḥ s'āmāyā
nīgīdhīyate...etc...ato'ṇīstreva sthāyinaḥ...Avaloka on DR.IV.35)

Dhananjaya further adds that nirveda has its nature not identical with
that of the sthāyin. So how can it be relished? Its enhancement will only
make for lack of relish. So, there are only eight sthāyins in drama. Says he,
nirvedādiśārūpyādāstēśyā svadāte kathām |

vairasyēyaiva tatpoṣasḥ tenāśṭau sthāyino matāḥ
|| (DR.IV.36)

As to the nature of rasa experience and as to the seat of rasa in
the connoisseur they seem to agree with Ananda and Abhinava. The concomittant
of rasa experience is joy. In fact Dhanika says:

vakṣyamāṇomāsvabhāvārāvitabhāvānubhāvavyahabhiśārāsēttvikalāḥ kāvyopāttaira-
bhīnavopadars'itairve st'rīprekṣaṃānāntarvipare trartemāno ratyādirvākṣya-
mānālākṣaṇāḥ sthāyī svādāgocaratāṁ nirbharānandaseṣāvidmātāmāśāyāmāno rasāḥ

(DR.Avaloka IV.1.)

As rasa is connected with cognition and joy, it rests only in the rasika
or the connoisseur. Says Dhanika:-

tene rasikāḥ sāmājikāḥ. kāvyen tu tathāvidmāndasesṣāvidumātanahetubhāvena
rasavādā yurghṛtamityādivyāspades'avat. (Avaloka on DR.I.1)

BHOJA:-

Bhoja succeeded Muñja whose court pandits were Dhananjaya and Dhanika.
S.K.A. and S'P.Tra. are the two works on poetics attributed to Bhoja. S.K.A.
is published*. S'P.Tra. is published in parts only. But we get a critical
evaluation of the contents of this work in the learned thesis of Dr.V.
Raghavan.

* Editions:(1)by A.Borooah,Calcutta 1884,(2)by Vires'vara S'astri,Benareses
1888(chs.iv and v),(3) by Jivananda Vidyasagar with Comm.of Ratnes'vara(on
chs.i-iii),Calcutta 1894,(4)by Kedarnath Durgaprasad and Vasudev L.Pansikar,
Mirmaya Sagar Press,with Comm.of Ratnes'vara (on chs.i-iii),and of Jagadā
dhāra(bn iv),Bombay 1925,1934. Cur references are to this.
Shoja has dealt with the topics of rasa in his two voluminous works. The former has been published several times and the latter is undertaken by H.C.S., though it is not yet out. Dr. V. Raghavan has, however, published an exhaustive treatise on S.X.A. He has also given at the end of chapters full quotations of the relevant portions of the text. Here, I draw upon NS.Ed. of the S.X.A.

Bhoja's theory of rasa appears in some aspects to be peculiar to himself, or we may say to his court literaty men. I will here mainly discuss his views as far as they bear upon the interpretation of the rasa-sutra of the N.E.S.E.

Dr. Raghavan has exhaustively and very ably analysed the different shreds of the complicated fabric of Bhoja's way of discussion on rasa.

Bhoja seems to have recognised three stages or kotis of rasa, viz., the madhyama and the uttara koti. He seems to have derived a plea for this arrangement from Dandin. For Bhoja, as for Dandin, rasa is also an alamkara in the wide sense of kavyos'obhangara dharma. Bhoja includes rasas under alamkaras and cites Dandin who says:

prayaḥ priyatarākṣyānena rasavadrasapeś'alam.

"Yuktotkāraṇam ca tat trayæna."

'Yuktotkāraṇam' is taken by Bhoja in an unusual sense and he bases his three kotis of rasa on this. Says he:

Ityanena ityanena atmavis'esanisthaśaya utkṛṣṭādṛṣṭaṁjaneśaḥ anekațajāmabhava śamkārsāditadhṛṣṭaṁmaṇaḥ samagraśasampadeśyaśaćitātaṁayabhatō alam(ālom)-kāravis'esaśya upasaṅgrahad āhāṃkārin(da)bhimānas'ṛigūra-

vyaparmāṇama rasasya mānasayavikārayuṣpēṇa abhimāninaḥ manasi jñāgrataḥ pūrvāy koṭin upavarṇayati ......................"rasaved rasapes'alam"ityanena vibhāvanasu-

bhāvayabhidhiśrasanipātītī ratyādiruṣpēṇa anekāhāvīr bhavaṁabha vivardhaṁviṣaya paraprakāraśaṁśaḥ s'ṛigūrasya mādyaṁvaśtiśaṁvasthiṣpayati

..................
For Bhōja, the rasas and the rasa-theory dealt with by other āḷamkārikas fall under the madhyamāvasthā. It should be noted, however, that for him rasas in the madhyamāvasthā are really bhūvas only but are secondarily called rasas. As noted earlier, he has derived his clue from Daṇḍin's dictum as quoted above viz. preyah priyatarakhvam etc. For him, the process which would result in rasa is the process of development and intensification of sentiments and emotions. So, for Bhōja, rasa is the utkāra or prakāra of emotion. This is similar to the upacaya theory of Lollāta. For the explanation of rasa-sūtra given by Bhōja, we have to rely on the passage in the Srī Pra. (See Dr. Raghavan's Srī Pra. p.516)(Srī Pra. p.381-383). He explains the rasa-sūtra with reference to what he calls the madhyamāvasthā in the following way.

Bhōja first explains the term 'Vibhāva' in its two aspects viz. ālambana and uddīpana. He says: kathāṃ punah vibhāvāmubhāvavyabhicāraśīm-yogāt rasanipattiḥ? ucyate-yatha indusannidhe gandakaḥ svendate, yathā-rkasannidhe śūryakānto jvalati, yathā karpurasannidhe Śphatiko viliyate, tathā tebhyaubhayāḥ ālambavibhāvebhayaḥ tadākaraṇapatendriyabuddhiparādyā yogino 'bhimānimanasaḥ te te ratikrodhas'okādayo bhūvah samutpadyante.

"There is abhimāna in the mind; when objects confront it, the abhimāna takes the shapes of objects and according as the objects are pleasant or otherwise, the bhūvas, rati, krodha, s'oka, etc. are born. The process is respectively similar to the candrakānta stone flowing out in the presence of the moon (rati); the Śūryakānta blazing forth on the sight of the Sun (krodha); and the Śphaṭika melting in the proximity of Karpūra (s'oka)- This explains ālambana-vibhāva" (Trans. Raghavan p.487).

Then, he explains the uddīpana vibhāva as follows: atha induḍayes yathā
samudraḥ kṣubhyati, yathā apathyasevaya vyādhirábhivardhate, yathaṁärasyasamni-

dhāḥ sādhuradhikāṁ duḥkhākaroti, tathā tebhyaṭebhyah uddīpanavr bhāvevibhyah-
tattadāmbhāva sanskārayogināṁ manasāḥ tattadābhēva(a)bhiyādahye te te

vīkārā upajāyante.-

"Just as the sea becomes boisterous at moon-rise, just as disease increases
by bad diet, just as a rogue creates more mischief when he gets to his aid one
more of his own class, so also Uddīpana-vibhāvas create trouble first (kṣobha),
then increase the suffering more and more. The uddīpanas are thus kṣobhakas,
abhivardhakas and pratikūlas, agitating inflaming and adverse. This explains

From these sthāyīvibhāvas thus created and kindled respectively from rasa by
śaṭapana and uddīpana vibhāvas, arise anubhāvas and vyabhicārins. They are
essentially of the form of bhāvas, though differing in name and form. They are
Abhyantara or internal and bāhya or external.

How are these vibhāvādis correlated and act upon the sthāyins to
produce rasa? Bhoja explains this in the words.

atha yathā ikṣubhya rasah, sarṣapadebhastalaś, dhātubhya hiranyam, as'mabhyo
loham, nasmo navanītam, kaśthato'gniḥ, tebhyaṭebhyah yantrāgneivasamyoga-
bhyah nispatanti, tathā svebhyaḥ svebhyaḥ vibhāvevuḥāvāvyabhicāriṣamyoga-
bhyah ratikrodhaśokādibhyah, te te rasah nispadyante...

i.e. As juice is created from sugarcane, oil is pressed out of sarṣapa, gold
from metal, iron from stone, butter from curds, fire from faggots, by the
instrumentality of machines, fire or churning, similarly, from rati, krodha, etc.,
with the help of particular vibhāvādis, are produced particular rasas.

So, rasas are intensified sthāyins through the contact of the sthāyins with
vibhāvādis. This upaśaya takes place in the following way:

Yathā lavaṇa(rasa)āmlādayaḥ svasaṃyogināṁ mṛdayikādināpi ātmarūpataṁ
nayante upacāyante, tathā ratyādini vibhāvādāṇayātmarūpataṁ nayanti

These three viz. vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicārins differ in nature but
they become identical and get merged in the one flood of rasa-rasata
So, it seems, Bhoja also, like Durdhiv and Lollatā, adopts the casual view. But here an important point is to be borne in mind. The casual theory adopted by Bhoja is śāṅkhya theory of satkāryavāda, according to which, effects pre-exist in an unmanifest form in the cause. The activity is concerned only with making manifest what was unmanifest. Similarly, according to this theory, rāsas pre-exist in vibhāvādis and their combination with sthāyins bring them out, makes them manifest. Bhoja's prakāra is similar to Lollatā's upacāya.

Many such rāsas combine to produce rasa-seṃkara, even as many tastes go to make up drinks. Says Bhoja: tatha yathā ośadhirasebhyaḥ madhunispatthiḥ, yathā madhurādi bhyaḥ śāṅjavatpattih, guḍādibhyaḥ āsavatpattih, tathā tebhyāḥ rasaśeṣaṃyebhyāḥ rasavis'esiḥchintyṛtiḥ.

Then he talks of the jātibhedas of rāsas such as bhāva, rasa, jātibhāva etc., and also of the stages or avasthās such as utpāda i.e. birth, abhivyādhi i.e. nourishment and sthairyā i.e. firmness. Says he:

atha yathā ekasyāpyagno bhūsamadivyamāndaryādayo jātibhedāḥ dhāhālokapāk-śādayo arthakriyāḥ sandra'yante, tathaikasyāpi rasseya bhūvārastadābhāsādayo jātibhedāḥ utkṛṣṭābhāsāranginirvṛtyādayāḥ arthakriyāḥ utpādaḥbhivyādhi-sthairyādayo evasthāḥ. samapalabhyante-

Another novel feature of this theory is that Bhoja tries to obliterate the distinction between sthāyināḥ, amabhāvas and vyabhicārinās. For Bhoja, all the 49 bhāvas can become rasa on attaining prakāra by vibhāvādis:-
ratyādināmekapānaśca ato'pi vibhāvaḥ bhāvaḥ vyabhicāriṣayogat paraprakāra-śādayo rasavyāpades'ārntā. (Śrī Pra. Vol. II. p. 381)

These are called rāsas only secondarily i.e. through upacāra. They are of three forms, prakṛṣṭa, bhūvarūpa and śāṅkśa:- sa s'īrgāraḥ, so bhūmāha sa rasaḥ, tāt ete ratyādayo jāyante...... tadupādhis'ādayamupajyomino rasaḥ tridhā vikhyāyate prakṛṣṭo bhūvarūpe, bhūmaska (ibid p. 356)

Now we come to the other kōtiḥ viz. parśa and the uttāraḥ. These seem to be his own original thinking on the matter, though they appear at the first sight.
Says Bhoja: etena rūṣṭhāh, amkāraśāḥ rasasya pūrvā kūṭih, ratyādīnāmako'nāpākā-
ātī, vihārunubhūvavahāhī saṃśayo'gat paraprakāśādhi sāme rasavypadesaṁ
ērhatā rasasyaiva madhamāsthaṁ, preyaḥ priyatarākhyānamiti upalaksanena
yathā rateḥ premārūpaṇa perinātī tathā bhavāntaraṇāmapi parasmāparāko
premārūpaṇa' perinātām rasāldvānamani rasasya paramā kṛṣṭā iti pratiṣṭhitam
bhave. P.351.'r. Prā. Vol. II.

In the very first karikā of the fifth ch. of his S. K. Ā. Bhoja puts forth
his new theory of rasa in the words:

\[ \text{raso'bhūmāno'hamkārah s'ṛṃgāra iti giyate,} \]
\[ \text{yo'rthah tasyānvayāt kāvyam kamanīyatvam'as'nutē.} \]

(S. K. A. Y. 1)

In the S'r. Prā.(Vol.I.P.1-3 Mas. Ed.) he says,

\[ \text{ātmasthitam guṇavis'esaḥamkārtasya} \]
\[ \text{sṛṃgāramāhuriṁa jīvitaṃ tmayoneḥ.} \]
\[ \text{tasyātmas'aktiresanīyatāyā rasatvāṃ} \]
\[ \text{yuktasya yena resiko'yanīti prāvadāḥ.} \]

In a person, says Bhoja, in whose consciousness Ego has become manifest, there
is a particular quality of such Ego-consciousness. This is the very life of
Eros who takes birth from such a self. This quality of Eros is known as
s'ṛṃgāra. This quality i.e. s'ṛṃgāra is tasted in the self by the self.

This tasting is rasa sui generis. A person in whom this self-tasting has
become manifest or developed is called rasika. Thus, by this verse, Bhoja
explains the meaning of the word ahamkāra used in the first karikā of his
S. K. Ā. V.

Let us try to understand the implications of this statement. We take as
our basis the sāmkhyā psychology, which Bhoja seems to follow or have in mind
and which teaches that the man in the world is a particular correlation of
puruṣa and prakṛti. According to its another dogma puruṣa is merely the
subject of knowledge. It is completely unchanging and inactive. Puruṣa can
not be said to do anything. It is consciousness itself and so to say enLIGHTens
the transformation that takes place in prakṛti. In such a relation,
therefore, what we ordinarily call mental transformations are to be understood
as the transformation of prakṛti which is material in nature but which is continuously being illuminated by the caitanya of the puruṣa.

In the evolution of prakṛti from its state of equilibrium of sattva, rajas and tamas, the first evolute is known as mahat. This seems to indicate the vastness of reality as such. From this evolves what is known as buddhi which should be understood as cognition as such. This is to say that the vastness of reality first evolves the specific quality of cognition. Buddhi gives birth to ahamkāra which we may interpret as Ego or individuality. This evolute of individuality further evolves into what are known as pāṇca tānmatrās i.e. the subtle elements which become gross in different kinds of matter and the motor organ and the sensoria organs and an inner organ called antaḥkaraṇa or manas, which seems to be the active agent between the buddhi and the remaining fifteen elements. We need not go in the study of the further evolutes of prakṛti. What we are concerned here with is the fact of individualised buddhi and Ego which is called 'abhimānoahamkāraḥ' by Is'varakṛṣṇa (Śa. K. 24).

It is the self-enjoyment of this Ego which in the opinion of Bhoja is rasa the taste poor excellence. In other words, when such a state of consciousness is reached it is called rasa. Bhoja seems to take this as his basic principle in the discussion of rasa. With this fact he joins up another fact and that is the nature of Eros or kāma as一味. This is supposed to be self-originating (atmayoni; compare Amarakosa, atmabhuh). This is the fundamental fact of love or tāti, which is usually identified with the sex-passion. Sex-passion is something which joins the two opposites. The relation of puruṣa and prakṛti, in a way, is visualised in a similar union though not identical. Eros seems to become manifest in this way. Because the manifestation of Eros is known by the term s'ringāra, Bhoja is tempted to equate the three: abhimāna, ahamkāra and s'ringāra as indicating the consciousness of taste or enjoyment.

How far Bhoja is justified in equating the three is another matter. If we here can take the tāntrika or the Śākta view of ultimate union of prakṛti and puruṣa, or of Śiva and Śakti, we can find justification for
Bhoja's view of defining rasa as Sṛṅgāra, abhimana and alampāra.

He, however, to be consistent with his utkārṣa theory, interprets Sṛṅgāra as Sṛṅgāra rīyate-etc. This view of Bhoja is, in a way, a substitute for the nirvīgna saṃvit of the kashmirian sākta Alampārikas. In the discussion of Abhinavagupta, however, we find nirvīgna saṃvit coming as a final state in rasa-consciousness. Bhoja starts with abhimāna, alampāra and Sṛṅgāra as the prime condition of rasa. Thus for Bhoja, a person whose Ego has developed the capacity of this tasting-rasa-is rasika proper. It is only such a person for whom rasa has meaning.

S.Iv.A. and S'r. Era. however, do not in a systematic way develop these ideas. So many different items have been brought in, so that it is very difficult to discover a consistent theory, as for example we do in case of Dhv. Bhoja's attempt to derive all the eight or nine or more rasas from this basic Sṛṅgāra has led to much confusion. Sṛṅgāra is by tradition the principal rasa among eight or nine other rasas. Its preponderance in literature is immense. It, therefore, in a popular way can be called rasa par excellence. But this is not the sense in which Bhoja uses the word Sṛṅgāra in his S.K.A.V.1., and its further explanation in the S'r. Pra.

Here Sṛṅgāra is the primary fact of the Ego experiencing itself. Even when we identify Ego and Eros, Sṛṅgāra in the usual sense cannot be identified with it. It is as much a derivative as the other rasas like vṛra, adbhuta, karuṇa, etc. Bhoja seems to have been misled into confusing these positions, unless we take the old platonic idea of Eros or the Modern Freudian idea of Libido as the source of all emotions. Anyway, Bhoja has the unique distinction of putting a new dynamic idea into the dialectics of rasa.

As Dr. Raghvan has pointed out, Bhoja bases his speculations on rasa on his concept of rasika. He tries to explain the current usage of the term 'rasika' as follows: rasāḥ asya astiti rasikah-. Rasa is thus a quality of an individual which makes a man rasika. Rasika, for Bhoja, is not merely the connoisseur or the enjoyer of poetry alone.
It means the cultured man in general. He has in him the excellent quality of rasa and this distinguishes him from the other viz. the nirasa. This quality of rasa is identical with all rasikas. Bhoja says that this rasa of the rasika is nothing else but the Ego-Ahamkara tattva itself. This rasa-ahamkara is in man, poet, character, actor and spectator. It is endowed in a person on account of meritorious deeds in past life. Says he: atma-sthitam gunavis'sam etc. (see above)

Rasa is cittasa-vada. But all men do not have cittasa-vada in all rasas. So, Bharata and following him Abhinava classify characters into Uttama, madhyama and adhama, dhirodatta, dhirodhata, dhiralahta and dhiras'anta etc. Bhoja also, therefore, tries to find out one characterising rasa for each of the four types of heroes such as dhirodatta, dhirodhata, etc. This classification becomes intelligible only when we accept a scheme of four different rasas as dominating the characters as their distinguishing marks and as their permanent moods. So, Bhoja speaks of udatta, uddhata, Preyas and S'anta as the rasas of the four types of heroes.

Bhoja has also criticised Bharata's scheme of four prakriti rasas producing the other four rasas. This scheme, Bhoja himself accepts with modifications. But Bhoja unnecessarily criticises Bharata by confusing his own idea of abhinava-s'righara, with Bharata's idea of the usual S'righara.

Bhoja's new S'righara is not the old S'righara of rati-prakarsha. This he makes amply clear by his classification of S'righara into dharma-S'righara, artha-S'righara, kama-S'righara and moksa-S'righara, and by this he means the activities or purushaha of men in these directions. Here, by kama-S'righara is meant the usual S'righara of rati-prakarsha. Says he:

Vibhavamubhavyabhiharaisamyogat (vi) prakarasaapadyamah pradhanah...

(bhā) vṛ ratīyāma kāma-s'righaraśāhyān labhate. P.733 Vol.IV.Ch.32. S'r.Pra.

This kama-S'righara also is subdivided by Bhoja into dharma, artha, kāma and moksha. It should be noted, however, that for Bhoja activity towards

* This classification seems to be based upon the different types of marriage.
mokṣa is mokṣa-s'ṛṣigra in which Bhoja treats the pure type of jñāna-
ṁāṅga of the sannyāsin or that of a karmayogin or he also speaks of śṛṇa-
thā-mukṣa and his activities. The last is the dhīra-prasaṁta, his wife
married according to vedic rites is the heroine in this case.

In his uttāra-koṭi he talks of all rasas merging into one rasa—the
dhīra-prasaṁta
rasan tviha premān̄amaṃśānanti, sarveśaeva hi ratyādi prakārāraṁ ratipriyo
rasapriyoparāpradhyā parīhāsa pradhiyā iti premāveva paryavasāṇāt
(S'r.Pra.Vol.II.P.352-7 ch.XI).

The bhūmā of rati, hāsa, etc. is not rasa, but s'ṛṣigra alone is rasa. Says he:
tatkaṁhamucyte, "ratyādi bhūmāni parāvitaṁ ratoktih" iti? Ucyate na
ratyādi bhūmā rasaḥ, kiṁ terhi? S'ṛṣigraḥ. S'ṛṣigro hi nāma vis'ṛṣṭādṛṣṭa-
ceṣṭābhivyāsa jākaṁ atma-gaṇasa-pradām utkārṣabijam buddhisukcheṣeṣa-
pratyatnasāpūrvadāyatis'ayahetuh/sacetasāt rasyamāno rasa ityucye, ye-das-
tive rasikā'nythe-bhāve nirasa iti. (S'r.Pra.Vol.II.), 352-7, ch.XI).

In this last part we see that rasa, far from remaining merely a matter
of poetic taste, becomes a sort of the realisation of the essence of the
self in form of preman.

Here I may incidentally point out that in the later works of \textit{Vīmaṇvīte}
writers such as Ujjvalaṇa, S'ṛṣigra rasa does not remain merely a matter
of human love but rises to the Status of Divine Love, the love of the
Gopi's for S'ṛṣiṇa. We also find a similar but curious treatment of the
subject in the work called \textit{Hamsavilāsa} of Mitṭhu Kavi (A.D. ).
The influence of Dr. and that of S. K. A. and S. P. Pra., works of Malva, is evident in Hemacandra and his disciples Ramacandra and Guacandra in Gujarat. Hemacandra is cognised of the new ideas put forth by Bhoja and his works. But he prefers to follow the tradition of Anand and Abhinava and subsumes some of the items under old terms. Thus Sneha-rasa with ārdra-rāta as its sthāyin is subsumed under rati. The love for a friend is rati, love for a brother as in case Lagaṣma's love of Rama is dharmavīra, that of children for their parents is bhaya. In the same way, says Hemacandra that laulyarasa with gardhata as its sthāyin can be subsumed under rati. Similar is the case with bhalcti.

Ramacandra and Guacandra, the pupils of Hemacandra, however, are more independent of tradition of their guru in this respect. They seem to follow Bhoja in recognising some of the sāncārins as sthāyins developing into independent rasas. They hold that over and above the nine rasas there can be many more such as laulyarasa with gardha as its sthāyin, Sneha with ārdra-rāta as its sthāyin, vyasanarasa with āsakti as its sthāyin, duḥkhāna with arati as its sthāyin, sukhyaṁ with santosa as its sthāyin etc. They also recognise additional vyabhicārins such as kṣut, trṣṇa, maitri, sūdita, S'raddha, dayā, upēkṣā, rati, santosa, kṣamā, mārūva, ārjava, dākṣīṇya etc. They also hold that even the sthāyins and anubhavas become vyabhicārins. This is seen in Bhoja also who says: āsu sthāyuñāḥ asṭau sāttvikāḥ, trṣṇastrap-s'a'd vyabhicārinyaḥ iti bruvate na tat sādhau; yato 'miśāmānyatamasya ētaieva parasparaṁ hirvartyamāṇeṇvāt kacit kaḍācit sthāyu, kaḍācitu vyabhicāri. ato' vasthāva sa'vat sarve'pyāmi vyabhicārinyaḥ, sarve'pi ca sthāyuṁ, sāttvikā api sarva eva, manaḥprabhavatvāt; anupetate hi manaḥ sattvamityucyate.

(S'r.Pra.Vol.II.6.352-7.Ch.XI)

Dhoja also speaks of many other rasas such as ānandarasa with praharṣa as its sthāyin, and also viśva, auddhatya, svātantra, sādhvāsa, viśaa, anurāga
and sangama rasas. He also speaks of twenty more rasas such as rati, utkarṣa, diyṭi, utkanṭha, vega, vismaya, mati, vitarka, oṁta, cīpala, hāsa, uṭaka, stanbha, gacgacya, uṛmāda, vṛti, avahītha, bhaya and sankā etc. (S'ī. Pr. P. 400).

It should be noted that the inclusion of vīra in the list given as above is something curious, for vīra rasa is recognised by all the Ālekhamā́kikas and there is nothing new in it.

The tendency to recognise nine traditional rasas is not altogether new. Even Abhinava quotes the views of others who accepted rasas such as sneha, laulya, etc. with ārdra and gacgacya etc. as their sthāyins respectively.

Let us examine the definition of rasa as given in the ND. The ND says:

Sthāyibhāvah s'ītotkarṣah vibhāvavyabhicāriḥbhīhyā.

Spaṣṭanubhāvanis'cayah sukhaduhkatmakor rasah. ।

The first thing that we note is the mention, in this definition, of the term sthāyibhāvaḥ. This is in accordance with the practice of Dhanañjaya and Bhoja.

The second point to be noted is that in the rasa-sūtra of Bharata, all the three i.e. vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicārin, combine to give rasa, while here, a little different analysis is given. The effect of rasa is brought about by vibhāvas and the vyabhicārvins i.e. these are taken as the causes of rasa. But the determination of rasa is explained as due to clear and distinct anubhāvas. This determination or nis'caya comes about in an inferential process dependent upon concomitants. This reminds us of the Naiyāiyika view of Śrī Śaṅkara (anumāṇi-anakṛti).

The third important point of difference lies in recognising the dual nature of rasa, i.e. causing sukha or duḥka. The meaning is that some rasas give pleasure while others give pain. In all these matters Hemacandra follows the traditional view of Ānanda and Abhinava.

The ideas underlying this definition are explained by the authors in their commentary. They take up the position of realists like Bhoja. For them, as noted in the kārikā itself, sthāyibhāva, when intensified, is itself rasa. This really happens with the original persons. The love for Śītā...
can only reside in Rāma, and vice-versa. They enjoy the sentiment of mutual rati in reality. Their love cannot be experienced by anyone else.

Then how are we to explain the rasa in the readers and the spectators? The authors say that it is a well-known fact that people do cognize other peoples' sentiments. This cognition is not of course, direct, because sentiments of others are beyond direct perception. They are, therefore, only inferred. This inferential cognition is dependent upon concomitance. But how in a poem or a stage-play can we bring the original characters whose feelings we can infer? The actor gives a semblance of the vibhāvas etc. of the original characters, while during this act, even though the actor has not the original feeling in him, yet by his anubhāvas he creates the possibility of the inference of feelings in the minds of the spectators. It is for this reason that the authors say that rasa is determined by Spatānubhāva i.e. clear gestures etc.

The idea seems to be something like this. The actor with the help of the vibhāvas and vyabhicārins, is enabled to work out the proper anubhāvas which give rasa to his spectators.

The authors make this point clear in the part of the vṛtī which discusses the rasa sūtra: 

\[
\text{Yadeṣyucyate-vibhāvānubhāva vyabhicārisamyogādarsamī-
spattirīti tatrāpyanubhāva vyabhicārinś'c ca śrādi vā śrīyānukāryāpēkṣaysiva
dṛṣṭavyaḥ... etc.} \quad (p.163 \text{ G.O.S.Ed.})
\]

The terms anubhāvas and vyabhicārins in the sūtra, according to their interpretation, refer to the described or represented women etc. From these comes rasa by direct perception of one's own experience and by indirect inference of others' experience. This is in conformity with the other exponents of the sūtra who naturally take the anubhāvas and vyabhicārins as those of described or represented characters. The difference lies in taking vibhāvas as belonging to the original person. Probably here they follow Bhoja. The authors say that rasa in its distinctness can only reside in the original characters, because vibhāvādis are real only to them and for this reason, the vyabhicārins and anubhāvas born out of rasa are distinct only in their case.
But for others, i.e., spectators etc., the vibhāvādis are not real (kevalaṁ mukhya-stri-puṣṇayoh spastenaiva rūpeṇa raso, vibhāvānāparamārthasatētvāt. 
ata eva vyabhicāriṇo'nubhēvas'ca rasajanyah tatra spajārīpeḥ. anyytra tu prekṣakādau dhyāmaṇenaiva rūpeṇa, vibhāvānāparamārthasatētvā eva kavyādinā 
dar'anāt. at eva vyabhicāriṇo'nubhēvas'ca rasaḥūṣāṛṣeṇaśpaṣṭā eva. at 
eva prekṣakādīgato raso lokottara ityucyate—ND.III.Sū. 163). The vibhāvādis, 
being not real for others, i.e., spectators etc., are seen in a hazy form 
through a poem. For this reason their vibhāva and anubhēva, like their r 
rasa, are indistinct. The authors say that for this very reason, the rasa in 
the spectator is lokottara. Now, what do they mean by this? They do not seem 
to accept the recognised meaning of something sublime. Probably, they mean 
that the genuine rasa being that of loka, the rasa of the spectator is 
something which comes after it.

Then the authors explain as to how a poem is called 'sārāsa', and how an 
actor also may experience rasa. In these matters, they follow Dhananjaya 
and Bhoga.

As noted above, another important point of difference with these authors 
is the dual nature of rasa. What they mean is that some rasas give 
pleasure while others give pain. This view is in a way natural for those 
who hold the realistic view of sthāyibhāvas as being rasa, and because in 
life all the sthāyibhāvas are not pleasant. In this respect, the authors 
not only do not follow Ananda, Abhinava and their guru Hemacandra, but they 
do not follow even Dhananjaya and Bhoga, because all these authors, in 
their own different ways, regard all the rasas as ultimately giving pleasu-
re. We saw that Bhoga justifies this view by relating all the sentiments 
and feelings ultimately to Abhimūna and abhēmākāra. There, however, seems to 
have been a tradition about regarding only certain rasas as pleasant and 
others not pleasant. Our authors seem to follow this.

This controversy seems to be very old, Bharata says—yathā hi nānāvāyān-
janasaṁskṛtamannē bhuṭjēna rasāṁsvādayanti suśmanāḥ purusāḥ harṣate-
s'cādihigaśchanti tathā nānābhāvābhinaṇayaśyātītān vāgadgasat tvopetān
Thus, according to this view, it is held that the rasas, presumably all, are present. But those, however, who think that all the rasas are not pleasant, interpret the passage differently. Abhinavagupta says: anya tvādiva abdena s'okādināmatra semgrahah (G.O.S.Ed.p.290). Abhinava's own view is as said above, that all rasas are pleasant. He rejects the other opinion by saying—sa ca na yukteḥ. sāmājikānām harsaikaphalam nātiyeḥ, na s'okādiphalam. He says with emphasis—asmānmatete tu saṃvedanaśaṃvānandagahanaśevādyete. tatra kā mānasa'vāṅka. kevlo'ṃ tasyaiva citrakaraṇe ratis'okādīvān śaṃvyāpharatadad-bodhane cābhīnayāvāpāraḥ (p.293, ibid) Dr. Raghavan notes the sukha-duhkha-mākata view of one Rudrabhata given in his Rasakalika. He also refers to Haripāla's view regarding the painful nature of vipralambha (J.O.R.Madras Vol.XI.P.113-14,107)

Thus we see that Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra do not follow tradition of their guru in many respects.

...
CHAPTER XXXI.

(i) MAMMAṬA (11th-12th A.D.)

(ii) HEMACANDRA (1088 A.D.-1172 A.D.)

(iii) VISIVANĀṬHA (1300-1350 A.D.)

and (iv) JAGANNĀṬHA (1620-1660 A.D.)

ON RASA.

Mammatā, the great syneretist of Sanskrit Poetics has tried to synthesise most of the views of earlier ācāryas. In his maṅgalakā, he characterises the poetic creation as pleasant on account of nine rasas. But in the definition of poetry, he does not mention rasa as such. This, however, is implied in s'abdārthau, because of the three varieties of artha, vyaṅgārtha for him being the meaning of poetry par excellence. In the varieties of vyaṅgārtha it is rasavyāṅga which is the most important. He summarises the discussions of A bh in one elaborate sentence. In this matter, Mammatā implicitly follows Ānanda and Abhinava.

So does Hemacandra in his Kāvyāūmāsaṇa. In fact he has quoted the whole passage bearing on rasa from A bh. At the end of this he says that he also follows Abhinava in this matter—cāsāmbhirupājīvita-miti. (Viveka p.103). Vis'vārtha similarly follows Ānanda and Abhinava in this matter. But he gives prominence to rasa in his definition of kāvyā viz. vākyām rasātmakaṃ kāvyam(S.D.I.). He says, however, clarified one point as how rasa becomes abhivyakta. He says: vyakto dādhyādīṃyāyena rupāntaranapariṇāto vyaktikirtν eva rasaḥ. na tu dīpam gṛhaḥ iva purvasiddho vyajñate. tadhūtām locanakāraṅg 'rasāḥ pratīyaṁta iti tvadaṃ paccatītivad vyavahāraḥ iti' (S.D.III.1)

Pundit Jagannāṭha in his R.G. has discussed many of the problems of Sanskrit Poetics in an independent way. The sum and substance of his ideas on rasa, however, are not different from those of Ānanda, Abhinava and Mammata. He, however, like the earlier theorists of rasa such as Bhaṭṭa Ṣaṅk Lolleṭa, S'ṛi S'āṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, etc., who give the explanation of
rasa-experience according to their philosophical dogma, gives his Vedantic
twist to the explanation of rasa-experience. According to Vedantic
view, the nature of the atman is 'sat' 'cit' and 'ananda'. This 'cit' in our
ordinary life is darkened by a cloud (avarana), may be of maya. The poet's
speech through its vibhavādīsāngām breaks up this covering-avarana-and
when this happens, the essential constituent of the soul, viz. ananda, becomes
self-revealed. This is the reason according to him why all rasa experiences
have as their condition ananda-bliss. And it is for this reason that, accord-
ing to Jagannātha, rasa-ananda is regarded as similar to brahma-ananda, of course,
it is not brahmananda as such. We may say following Jagannātha that
poetry by temporarily removing the coverage of the consciousness gives for
the time being a glimpse of the bliss of the soul.

...
It is my purpose in this chapter to put together the main ideas arising out of the discussions in the different chapters of this thesis. I have tried to trace the semantic history of dhvani, vyākhyāṇa, and rasa.

As to dhvani we saw that the meaning that is attached to it in works of poetics is not found, as far as my inquiry goes, in either early Vedic literature or later. It is found in its usual sense of sound or making sound. In this sense it is used as a synonym for śabda in the works of the vaiyākaraṇas, particularly in connection with śphota. This usage of the grammarians seems to have been taken up by the poeticists in their works. Just as dhvani suggests śphota, similarly in a poem word and its meaning suggest something else and are on that analogy called dhvani. When and by whom such a usage was made current is not known. Anyway, by the time of Anandavardhana it seems to have been an established usage because his work is called Dhvanyāloka which, as we have seen, is devoted to the discussion of dhvani and vyākhyāṇa. It may be noted here that in some of the modern regional languages such as Gujarati, the word dhvani is used in the sense of purport or suggestion.

Coming to vyākhyāṇa or vyākhyāṇa we find that we do not find these verbal nouns used in the Vedas. But vañj and vi+ vañj are frequently used.

The meaning that we gather from this is interesting. vañj has the sense of anointing. The surveys of the occurrences of vi+vañj in the Vedas shows two connected meanings, viz., to bring out something hidden by applying some other thing, to brighten, to adorn, to decorate, to embellish, to manifest. In this sense vyākhyāṇa becomes something like śāṃkarāṇa. It has the sense almost of adorning beauty or exhibiting it.

The Nighantu and the Nirukta do not have any word like vyākhyāṇa as in case of the Vedas. The Nighantu has not even vañj or vi+vañj in any form. The Nirukta contains occurrences of vañj in the sense of 'to anoint'. In Nirukta, in the Śīlaśāstra we come across 'vyākhyāna' in the sense of 'indicator'. In Ch.I., Yaska cites the opinion of Cārgya who holds that upasa-
rgas, though not meaningful by themselves, are yet suggestive of (dyotana) of the relation of name and akhyāta. Yāska does not mention 'dyotana' by name, but he seems to come very close to 'dyotana' here, which, however, is equivalent to 'vyānjana' of the later ālāmākārikas.

In the Rk-prātis'ākhya we come across 'vyānjana' only in the technical sense of a consonant. As to why consonants are called vyānjana is not explained. But we may presume that they are so called because the consonants are indicated or made manifest by their relevant sound units.

In Pāṇini's Āstādhyāyī, we find 'vyānjana' used in a special sense in addition to the technical sense of a consonant. In Pā. II.1.34, we have 'vyānjana-rupasikte', wherein 'vyānjana is something which serves to enhance the relish of the main item of food. This usage extends the meaning of the word vyānjana to ingredients which add to the flavour of the original substance or bring out its original taste to a greater advantage. When Bharata (N.S.'A.VI) while describing the nature of rasa gave the analogy of śādavādirasa and shows the importance of vyānjana, he might have had in his mind this idea, meaning viz. that of ingredients enhancing or exhibiting the taste of the original substance. This has an important bearing on the relation of vyānjana and rasa.

For Bharata, vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicārin are ingredients which enhance or make manifest the taste of the Sthāyins.

How far this analogical application of vyānjana to rasa is responsible for the later relation of vyānjana and rasa is difficult to say. In the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, we come across many occurrences of vānj and vi+vānj and their words such as vyānjana. We find vi+vānj in the sense of suggestion as in Pā. VIII.1.70 line 15 (Mbh.Ed.Keilhorn) - 'ihāpi mandrasādhanē kriyānā vyājyate'. At Mbh.Pā. VIII.2.48 line 23 (Mbh.Ed.Keilhorn) we have vyañjana in the sense of 'prakāśana'.

Thus we learn from the earlier literature that vyānjana has the sense of decoration, decorator, indication, indicator, consonant sounds suggesting or giving the inner meaning and ingredients enhancing or exhibiting to advantage the original taste of substance.
From the study of the works of classical writers prior to Bhamaha and Dandin such as Bhasa, Asvaghoṣa and Kālidāsa, we find that the meanings of the earlier literature continue. But in these works we also find the later sense of suggested meaning or suggestion or something other than directly expressed, clearly grasped, e.g., Bu. Ca. IV. 84 has 'upapanna idam vākyam sauhārdavyāfjakaṁ tvayi', wherein a vākya is said to be suggestive of 'sauhārda' or the feeling of friendship, or Megha. (pūrva) 29 has 'Saubhāgyaṁ te subhāga virahāvasthāya vyañjayanti', wherein Nirvindhyā suggests, by her state, the good-luck of the cloud.

In Saundarananda XVIII, 11, we have 'vyañjana' in the sense of alaṃkāra. We know that in Vāmana the word alaṃkāra has two senses vis. that of 'saundarya' and a figure of speech. It is not unlikely that the word vyañjana also had a sense similar to alaṃkāra i.e. beauty or beautifying agent and also the sense of suggestion. The first sense of alaṃkāra seems to have gone out of usage but the second sense seems to have prevailed in Sanskrit poetics. Thus it seems that the word vyañjanā, in the sense used in Sanskrit poetics, seems to be current in the works of early classical writers.

Thus with the earlier poets, vyañjanā seems to have been accepted as suggestion in poetry. This naturally makes for the recognition of vyañjanā as one of the functions of a word. This topic of the functions of words has to be studied through the discussions in the works of grammarians and other philosophical schools. From these discussions the following points emerge. Firstly the relation between Sphoṭa and dhvani, we can make the following observation:

(1) In the view of the grammarians dhvani explained as 'dhvanatīti dhvanihā'. Dhvani is so termed because it sounds, or rings or reverberates Sphoṭa. The word ghaṭa, for example, is used for the object ghaṭa which is seen, touched, etc., while the utterance of ghaṭa is sound by itself. This means that what is touched and seen is expressed through sound which is the function of hearing.
Thus dhvani came to have the meaning of suggesting one thing by another. This import of dhvani was taken up in poetics as suggestion—vyākṣajñā in all its varied forms. All the different items that had the capacity to suggest something were regarded as vyākṣakas e.g. sābd, artha, pada, padāmsa, varṣa and also guna, alamkāra, riti, vṛtti, vākyakaranā, prabandha as a whole, etc.

(2) In the philosophy of the grammarians the sound ghata, for example, does not give the meaning directly. It does so through Sphota which in its turn is suggested by the sound ghata. Thus what we ordinarily call meaning is arrived at by an indirect process. For the Ālamkārikas also, the process of vyaṅgyārthagrahaṇa is not direct but indirect. We arrive at the suggested sense either through abhidhā or through laksāṇa.

(3) The grammarians believe in vākyasphota. They do not accept the separate existence of padas i.e. individual words, and much less of letters or varṇas. But common experience of ordinary people misleads many to believe that the meaning is derived from individual words or padas and thus through letters or varṇas. The Māmāṣakas accept this position. It seems, however, that here ordinary people, and so also the Māmāṣakas, do not seem to pierce the veil of delusion and they mistake the nature of condition for the nature of the contents. The nature of the condition is the multiplicity of letters, the nature of contents is the unity of word—the vākyasphota.

Similar is the case with some Ālamkārikas. Abhidhā and laksāṇa from the nature of condition and vyākṣajñā or dhvani is the nature of the contents. Those who fail to distinguish between ends and means seem to confuse abhidhā and laksāṇa with vyākṣajñā.

(4) To put it otherwise, for the grammarians, the letters may be taken just as what we may call the object of knowledge i.e. jñānasya viśayah, while the word-whole is jñānasya phalam—the result or the fruit of knowledge. For the Ālamkārikas also, abhidhā and laksāṇa are jñānasya viśayah, while vyākṣajñā may be taken as jñānasya phalam. These two are not to be confused.

(5) The grammarians believe in vākyasphota. So they avoid the contingency faced by the padāvin din viz. that of recognising parts even of letters or
Similarly those ālāṃkārikas who want to arrive at the Vyāhgyārtha with the help of lakṣaṇa, will have to go for a second lakṣaṇa, and a third and a fourth lakṣaṇa ad infinitum, involving further and further prayojanas.

(6) Sphota is a distinct entity by itself, not to be identified with dhvani i.e. sound of a word. The Vyāhgya'is also a separate entity, not to be confused with abhidheyaṛtha or lakṣaṇāṛtha.

(7) For the grammarians, there is a krama or sequence in the process of gathering meaning from Sphota a word. From word to Sphota and from Sphota to meaning—this is the sequence. In the same way with the ālāṃkārikas also, there is a sequence perceptible or imperceptible, between vācyārtha and vyāhgyārtha.

Ānanda-vardhanā, Abhinavaguptā & Mammeta etc., while discussing this topic refer to the budhas, the wise men, who have taught this doctrine. These budhas are Vaiyākāraṇas (ch. 5) and they are, as we have seen, justified in making this ānoddha remark.

The second line of inquiry leads us into the consideration of abhidhārtha—these represented by the vṛttis in other schools of thought such as Vaiyākāraṇas, Amāyāsakas, etc. The points that emerge are as follows. The vaiyākāraṇa view, particularly as represented by Patanjali, we find the discussion of mukhyārtha and gauṇārtha.

But we do not come across any definition as such of abhidha, gauṇi, lakṣaṇa or vyañjana. While discussing the gauṇārtha or secondary sense, he mentions four different circumstances in which secondary function takes place. Tattvātya or the relation of location, tāddhārma, or the relation of substance and quality, or function, sānāpya or the relation of proximity and sāhacarya or being together are mentioned under Pat. IV. 1. 48. We come across the term abhidhāna paving way for abhidhāna vṛtti. In sādharmā relation as mentioned above, we find the material for gauṇi vṛtti and for lakṣaṇa we find material in other relations as mentioned above. No strict line of demarcation is laid between gauṇi and lakṣaṇa. When we come to Bhartṛhari, we find material which is the source of vyañjana in the later ālāṃkārikas. In the Mahābhāṣya nothing more definite for
Bhartrhari not only mentions gauna and mukhya artha (see. §18), but also discusses the problem of determination of the sense of a given word which has convention (saṅketa) with reference to more than one senses, i.e. a word having multiple senses. In his view, the particular meaning is determined by factors such as context, time, place, etc. (VP. II.317, 318).

It is important to note that later Śāṅkārikas like Abhinava, Mammaṇa, etc. quote these very verses while explaining the abhiddhūla sābdā vyanjana. Now, the particular sense being fixed, other senses come to our mind, according to the Śāṅkārikas with the help of vyanjana. 

Bhartrhari does not concern himself with the gathering of this extra sense. He only discusses how a particular word, out of the many conventional senses, is limited to convey only one sense at a time. But it is exactly here that the Śāṅkārikas begin where the grammarian has ended. Thus the original inspiration for vyanjana is supplied by the grammarian.

Among the later grammarians, Nāgaiṣṭhāna was the first to recommend the case of vyanjana clearly.

As for the Mīmāṁsakas, we find in Jaimini and S'abara clear reference to abhidhā and lakṣana. We also come across some varieties of lakṣana and dharma lakṣana is also termed guṇavāda (Mī. I. 2. 10). Guṇavāda is also found to be used in a wider connotation of upacāra or secondary application in general. Later Mīmāṁsakas such as Kumārila and others mention the tātparya vṛtti also. But, there seems to be no reference to vyanjana as such.

As for the Naiyāyikas, the acceptance of abhidhā by Gotama and others is clearly indicated in the discussion of saṅketa-grahaṇa (Ny. Sū. II. 2. 55). We also come across a reference to the nature of secondary usage or upacāra in Ny. Sū. II. 2. 64. The Vātsyāyanabhāṣya illustrates different varieties, and also refers elsewhere to bhakti and bhākta artha. But we do not come across any reference to vyanjana as such.

Later Naiyāyikas such as Gaṅādhara, Jagadīśa etc. are not inclined favourably
towards *vyañjana* which is just a mental cognition or *mānasā bodha* for them. They accept words to be *rūdhra*, *laksāra*, *yogarūḍha*, and *yaugika* (*S' a.S'a. Pra. 16*).

The relevance of noting different views on *S'abdārthavruttis* in different schools of thought is that our earliest writers on poetics such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, etc. are familiar with these ideas, though the actual discussion of this topic is found later in Ānandavardhana.

*Bhāmaha* seems to be quite familiar with *abhidhā*. But as to his familiarity with functions of word other than the direct one, particularly *vyañjana*, we may say that *vyañjana* does not occupy the same place as *abhidhā* in his mind i.e. he does not seem to have recognised *vyañjana* as a separate *vṛtti*. He, however, uses *vi+vīśajj* with the later meaning of *vyañjana* at different places. Similar is the case with Daṇḍin who also mentions *gaṇavṛtti* in clear terms. Viśamānārī refers to *laksāna* but we miss any clear reference to *vyañjana* in his writing. It is in Udbhāta that we come across a clear mention of *avagamana-vṛtti* as distinct from *vācyavācakavṛtti* (*IV.47*) when he defines *paryāvyokta*. This *avagamana-vṛtti* can be *vyañjana*. In Rudrāṇa, we come across only an indirect recognition of *vyañjana* when he defines and illustrates *bhāva-lāmākāra* (*VII.38.39*).

Thus it seems that the import of *vyañjana* was not unknown to the early poetics though they have not clearly recognised it (*ch.13*).

Ānandavardhana, Abhinava, Ruyyaka and Jagannātha observe that the fact of *dhvani*, though not clearly so named, was not unknown to the early poetics such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, etc. who tried to subsume it under different categories. But I have tried to show that we do find an element of implicit sense in the treatment of various topics such as *guna*, *alāmākāra*, etc. by these authors but it does not go to prove that they knew *dhvani* clearly and subsumed it under various heads (*Ch.14*).

This may be the basis for the belief of Ānanda, Abhinava, etc. who observe that Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, etc. knew *dhvani* and subsumed it under different poetic categories. The extent works of Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, etc., however, do not give proof of the fact that they recognised *dhvani* consciously and subsumed it under various heads (*Ch.14*).
Thus, it is only in the Dhvanyaloka that we find the first s'astric discussion of s'abdārthavṛtti giving a definite status to vyanjana as one of the three s'abdārthavṛttis. In the discussion of the varieties of dhvani or vyanjana, Ānandavardhāna gives mainly three viz. vastudhvani, alaṃkāradhvani and rasadhvani. In poetry, however, vastu and alaṃkāra can be also conveyed by abhidhāna and lakṣaṇa. It is only rasa which is exclusively conveyed by vyanjana. It therefore seems that the clear recognition of rasa as the very essence of poetry necessitated the discussion as to how rasa, which is not conveyed directly, is conveyed. The process of vyanjana appeared to be the most satisfying process for the suggestion of rasa. Thus the fact of rasa and the function of vyanjana become interrelated, and hence the theory of vyanjana and rasa has to be viewed as one. For the proper understanding of this interrelation, an inquiry into the origin and development of the concept of rasa become desirable (Chs. 15-19).

In the Vedas we find rasa not only in the physical sense of something liquid, but also in the sense of sap in the plants, animals, etc., and also the juice that can be pressed out or extracted, taste, etc. In one context, Rv. IX. 67. 31 and 32, we may be able to find some reference to a meaning similar to kāvyarasa. There are the pāvamāni suktas to be studied by the ṛṣis. Feeling of ecstasy or fulfilment is attached to rasa at Av. X. 8. 44. Qualities such as those of exhilaration, joy-giving, taste, flavour, etc., are also associated with rasa which thus becomes an object of relish, a joy-giving essence. These meanings make it very easy for the connoisseurs to utilise the word for the aesthetic flavour of sentiments and emotions as found in literature.

In the Nyāsa (I. 17) rasa is associated with Av. Rasa occurs very often in the AV. but there is no clear case of later meaning of kāvyarasa or māyārasa in it.

* It may be noted here that Unomj in his learned introduction mentions only rasadhvani as dhvani proper.
Abhinava tries to explain this connection in his own way. But I have suggested that probably a better link can be sought in the love-charms, which are as many as 33, and which can be safely taken as beautiful love-lyrics; their ritualistic application notwithstanding.

The Taittirīya U. contains the famous utterance in which rasa is said to be the soul of the universe and which, on attainment, results in highest joy. This also can be taken as an original inspiration for later theorists.

In the Nighaṇṭu, Mirukta, and Prāhadevaṭa, we have nothing new to make a note of with reference to rasa. Pāṇini's use (V.2.95) of rasa is not very clear. But the Mābh. supplies some interesting data. On पā. V.2.95, Patañjali has the following discussion. He tries to justify this sutra when the preceding sutra to the same effect is already there. A possible answer suggested is that this sutra is mentioned in order to exclude the use of किंतु other matup suffixes. Patañjali illustrates other matvarthiya suffixes as in 'rasikō nātaka', 'urvasī vai rūpīṇī apsarasaś etc. Kāśikā and Tattvabodhinī on the Siddhāntakumārī make it clear that here 'rasa' in 'rasikō nātaka' and 'rūpā' in 'rūpīṇī' do not stand for sense qualities to be perceived by the corresponding sense of taste and sight, but for aesthetic taste and beauty respectively. Thus it is in the Mābh. of Patañjali that we first find a clear mention of rasa in 'rasikō nātaka' in the later sense of Bā. S.Ś. Naturally the usage must have been much older for Patañjali to give it as an illustration.

'Rasa' in the early classical poets such as Bhasa, As'vaghosa and Kālidāsa, has the sense of aesthetic taste (Ch. XVII). The authors lived before 500 A.D. and the Mā.Ś.Ś. of Bharata which is placed between 300-500 A.D. may be regarded as familiar with these poets or with such other works. Whatever it may be, in the Mā.Ś.Ś. we find the theory of rasa crystallised into a Sūtra (ch. XVIII). This naturally presupposes previous discussions on the subject. Whether the discussion on the nature of rasa started in the schools of dramaturgy or in earlier nāṭakas mentioned by Pāṇini, we have no means of giving a definite opinion. As in case of vyākhyā, the earlier poeticists such as Bhamaha, Daṇḍin, etc. seem to be aware of rasa and bring it under
alankāra and guṇa (ch. XIX). It is only in Dhv. that like vyaya, rasa gets full recognition and is taken as the very essence or soul of poetry (chs. XX, XXI and XXII).

Thus in Dhv. we find a full exposition of the theory of rasa, particularly the nature of the process of conveying rasa. We saw that according to Ānanda, rasa can be conveyed only through vyaya. In the Netravedavirīti and the Locana by Abhinavagupta pādārthya, we find other theories of the process of rasa realisation such as those of Bhaṭṭa Māyaka, etc. (ch. XXVII). It seems that Ānanda had all these theories before him and he tried to establish that it is only vyaya that can convey rasa (ch. XXIII) (See also ch. XXIV).

Abhinava elaborated this point by giving in the pūrva-pakṣa the views of different thinkers and refuting them and finally establishing the vyaya process as the exclusive process for rasa-realisation (ch. XXV, XXVI and XXVIII).

However, there were still others who tried to disagree from Ānanda. Dhanaśījaya, like Bhaṭṭa Māyaka seems to maintain bhāvyabhāvaka relation with reference to rasa-and kavya, while Kuntaka has vicītra abhidiśa; rasa being a form of vakrokti in the wider sense of the term; Ishāna tries to revive the anumātivada (ch. XXIV). In Bhoja we find a different trend. He has a novel approach and tries to correlate rasa-abhināma-alankāra-Sṛṅgāra, with the sāṃkhya trend of thought in its background (ch. XXIX). Hemacandra and Guṇecandra also strike a different note (ch. XXX) though the traditional views of Ānanda and Abhinava ultimately gain ground and are firmly reestablished in the hands of Mamata, Hemacandra, Visvanātha and Jagannātha (ch. XXXI).

The mental process which enables one to experience rasa can not be really separated from the experience itself as said above. It may be analytically separated for the purpose of discussion. But in fact it is one unitary whole. It is for this reason that we have to consider the theory of the process of rasa and the experience of rasa as one. It is for this very reason that the view that one holds about the process of rasa affects the theory regarding the nature of the experience of rasa and vice-versa. The consideration of this aspect is essential for the understanding of this aspect of
rasa. We have therefore to consider the different views on rasa experience from this point of view also. (As noted earlier in the earlier vedic literature rasa is something liquid. It is flavour in the mouth, sense of taste etc. On the other side it is the juicy extract of something, the essence of a thing. In the Taittiriya Upaniṣad we find that the ātman which is the supreme reality of the universe is also the essence of the universe—raso vai saḥ—). In sanskrit literature, on one side we find that the different meanings of rasa given in Amarakośa and other lexicons continue. On the other side, however, we find that right from the time of the Ṛgveda, the term rasa is in use for non-material flavour or taste, i.e. in its aesthetic sense. In ‘rasiko nāṭakas’, as noted frequently we find the word rasa used in this sense. When the word rasa is used in early poetry, it appears in this sense of literary or artistic flavour.

In the period of the Mahabharata and even in earlier ages the nature of rasa seems to have been a subject of great and varied discussion. The Mahabharata has crystallised it in form of sutra viz. ‘Vibbhaṇa-anubhava-vyabhicāri sāmyogād rasyaṁ pātīḥ’ (Mahabharata Ch.6). The explanations given in the Mahabharata show that rasa is a resultant of many things, technically of vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāri vibhāva. It is explained on the analogy of gāḍavādīrasya. It is accompanied by a feeling of joy. But just any resultant of various ingredients is not rasa in the Mahabharata. The sentiments and the emotions, the sthānīya vibhāvas and the vyabhicāri sattvika vibhāvas and their expressions anubhāvas that are part and parcel of the human mind are experienced as rasa.

To put it in another way, one may say that rasa is a taste of sentiments and emotions as they ooze out from the cognitive chewing of vibhāvādis. This makes it necessary for the Mahabharata to base its concept of rasa on psychological knowledge of human sentiments and emotions and their causes and effects.
This body of the doctrine is taken up by Anandvardhana, Abhinavagupta, Dhananjaya etc. We see however, that their concept of the experience of rasa is dependent upon their philosophical and psychological view of the process of rasa conveyance. Thus Lolatlta has a realistic view regarding rasa. The emotions and sentiments are generated or caused by vibhavādīs. As these become more and more intense, they reach the higher stages of rasa. In this view the nature of rasa experience of intense sentiments and emotions, in ordinary life. Saṅkuka departs from the realistic view and regards the presentation of life in poetry as imitation-anukṛti, and it is through the process of anumiti-inference-based on similarity that one experiences rasa. Thus for him, rasa experience is a sort of anukṛti.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaṇa regards rasa experience as a sort of 'bhoga'. This word 'bhoga' is a term of Śāṅkya philosophy. Its ultimate meaning is the reflected coming together in prakṛti of puruṣa and the evolutes of prakṛti. Here, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaṇa seems to regard the experience of rasa as this sort of bhoga, i.e., the enjoyment by the subject of cognizing the enjoyment of vibhavādīs.

Probably the idea is to convey the identity of the two.

Abhinava rejects this new addition of bhoga to explain rasa experience. Previous to this he has got the views of Lollata refuted by Saṅkuka, and those of Saṅkuka by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaṇa. Abhinava's theory is that there is no need for the additional concept of bhoga. According to him the process of vyakṣa is quite adequate as noted above, to explain the psychological process of rasa conveyance. He starts his exposition by giving examples from Mimamsa discussions e.g.-nirātmasta', tāmangau uvaśāt etc. From this analogy he derives one important condition of rasa experience. Just as from those sentences the purport other than the one directly expressed is grasped by a person who is concerned with it, similarly, rasa is cognised only by those who have a concern in it, i.e., are qualified to grasp it. Saṃ-asa in Abhinava's theory is experienced by a sahṛdaya only. This emphasis on sahṛdaya is very important in Abhinava's theory.
The state of rasa experience is understood by Abhinava as 'nirvighna samvit. With this he equates other words such as camatkāra, nirvē'sa, rasanā, āsvādana, bhoga, samāpatti, viśrānti etc.

The theory of vighnas or obstacles and their removal is an important contribution of Abhinava. These vighnas as noted above (ch.XXVIII) arise out of the weakness in the poet's art and/or egoistic obsessions of the reader. The proper delineation of vibhāvādis removes these obstacles—tatra vighnāparākā vibhāvaprabhūtayah (p. 280. Abh. MT. S'a.)

The state of unimpeded cognition is in itself joy. Such a state brought about by the vibhāvādis is also joy by itself. Therefore, rasa being the subject of nirvighna samvit is pure joy, whatever may be the realistic nature of the sentiments and emotions conveyed by the respective vibhāvādis.

This view of Abhinava makes the nirvighna samvit of rasa something akin to the experience of Brahman. In one passage showing the difference between the yogic jñāna and nirvighna samvit of rasa, Abhinava says that the former is dry: eteśāṃ yathāyogamārjanādīvighmāntarodādayatītātśaḥ kriyā 'Sphutatva-viśayā-vas'vaivas'yaktaśaundaryavirahāt (p. 285). i.e. because there is no beauty in it as in the case of the latter.

An attempt has been made by Scholars to co-relate these acaryas with different philosophical schools. Jalkikar in his commentary on the K.P. mentions a view that Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, S'ri S'ankuka and Bhaṭṭa Nēyaka belonged to the Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya and Sāṃkhya schools of thought respectively, while Abhinava represents the alaṃkāra view. Dr. Kane and Dr. De hold that Lollaṭa was a Mīmāṃsaka. Dr. Pande try to prove that he belonged to the school of Kashmir S'aivism (See ch.XXVIII p. 285). We have tried to suggest that excepting the case of Abhinavagupta, who was a philosopher of the Pratyabhijñā School of Kashmir S'aivism, nothing definite can be said of other acaryas. As nirvighna samvit and camatkāra play the central role in Abhinava's philosophy of rasa, their technical meanings have to be understood from a consideration of them in the pratyabhijñā School.
Abhinavagupta has said in the verses preceding this discussion that his is an attempt not to find fault with the teaching of the previous Saṅgīyas but to put them in clearer and purer form. This is not merely an expression of modesty on his part. If we analyse the different threads in the web of Abhinava’s final statement, we will see in them the opinions of the previous Saṅgīyas put in a more acceptable position. The Saṅḍaya who only has the capacity to aperceive rasa is well informed about the relation of things and events, and the sentiments, emotions and feeling that they arouse in life. This ingredient in rasa perception comes from, we may say, Lollata. The element in rasa perception of the swiftness with which a Saṅḍaya, witnessing a drama or reading a poem, infers from the presentation of the spectacle, the appropriate sentiments and emotions, comes from S’rī S’aṅkuka. S’aṅkuka also by invoking the citraturaganyāya frees the presentation in a poem of drama from the limitations of reality which would necessitate the judgement about the truth of falsehood or the doubtfulness or the similarity of the poetic spectacle with life. In other words, S’aṅkuka takes poetic creation out of the field of gross reality.

The universality in the perception of rasa comes from the sādhāreṇīkaraṇa of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. In rasa perception one is not troubled by intrusion of the egoistic impulses of myness, thyness, or hisness. This makes it possible for the Saṅḍaya to see a sthāyibhāva in its universality, free from these obstructions. This makes for the heightening of pure consciousness—Sattvodreka—which is joy itself.

Abhinava weaves in his theory all these ideas freeing them from logical blemishes. Abhinava accepts from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka his sādhāreṇīkaraṇa vyāpāra, but not his idea of bhoga. In his view vibhāvādiś are adequate for the manifestation—vyakti—of rasa. The contemplation of the vibhāvādiś is compared to chewing. Thus contemplative chewing yields rasa. But the activity of chewing and the experience of rasa are, so to say, pari passu.

Jagannātha accepts this view but substitutes Vedantic terminology. He calls it ‘bhagnavaraṇa cit’ and equates rasa with the experience of the
highest reality, quoting 'rasa, vai sañ'.

We have already seen that though Dhanaśjaya and Dhanika do not accept the theory of vyajfjana, yet regard the experience of all rasas as joyful. Bhoja also regards the experience of all the rasas as joyful. But Rāmacandra and Gunacandra, and later on Siddhacandra in his commentary on K.P. called Kāvyapraκāsa'khandana, follow a different tradition. They take the realistic view that the sentiments, emotions and feelings, not pleasant in life, cannot be pleasant, because they are conveyed through poetry. We do not know whether Lollata who is a realist held this view. But it is quite consistent for those who do not distinguish between the nature of the experience, in ordinary life, of sentiments, emotions and feelings from their cognition in poetry and art, to hold such a view.

Most of the theorists in Sanskrit poetics have adopted the view of lokottarate in poetic experience. In fact it is by the suppression of the conceptional side of the ego that the rasa experience becomes possible. Bhoja, however, regards abhimāna as central to rasa. As already noted (Ch.XXX), in his view a nāyakā according to the type of his abhimāna or abhimaκāra is able to experience the relevant rasa, e.g. dhūralalita enjoys kāmas'ringāra, dhūroddhata enjoys artha s'ringāra, dharma s'ringāra is enjoyed by a grhastha with his wedded wife, etc. (Sr.Pra.Chs.18,19,20).

In Bhoja's philosophy there are three stages of rasa viz. parā, madhyamā and uttara. For him the traditional understanding of rasas comes in the madhyamā kōti. His highest stages of uttara kōti is the experience of preman rasa.

We have seen that Bharata regards eight only as the nātyarasas. But we find the ninth rasa viz. S'ānta, even in the Mā.Ś.+., whether a later addition or the view of a different school, we are unable to say. In any case, the experience of S'ānta rasa carries a man beyond the aesthetic stage as such. In it he comes back to life, where however, the ego and its passion are calmed down. This is the life of an unworldly man. If the suppression
of egoistic passions is the condition of rasa, S'anta is also rasa. But because it is a part of his life, it does not reach the aesthetic or imaginative stage. The rasika of Bhoja who has the highest preman-rasa is in a way similar to this but different in as much as his view goes beyond the aesthetic S'anta rasa to the state of preman—great love. This imperceptibly carries us into Bhakti rasa. It is both imaginative and aesthetic in its nature as well as real for the Bhakta. There is so much genuine poetry in the songs of the Bhakta which is a reality as far as Bhaktas are concerned.

The works of Rāpaghosalī, viz. Haribhaktiśaṃtaśruta and Ujvalanilamāṇi illustrate this development. Hamsavilāsa, the Sanskrit work of the Gujarati poet Hitthu (18th Cen) also illustrates this development in a new way.

We thus find in the rasa theorists an attempt to grapple with that type of experience which in poetry and art, using the material of life, yet takes them beyond life's egoistic limitations and in certain cases makes their very life free from such limitations. Thus rasa is a spiritual experience and we find it illustrated in the history of Indian Culture wherein poetry, art and religion move together.