As already noted by us, the Dhvanyāloka in the very first verse of the first udyota takes note of some of the views which negate the theory of vyāñjana. Furtheron in the third udyota also, Ananda, tries to establish rasa or dhvani as the soul of poetry and rejects the suggestion of the relation of quality and qualified (i.e. guṇa-guṇabhāva) between rasa or sentiment and itivṛtta or subject-matter in a poem. The relation can only be of the type of the suggested and the suggestor i.e. vyāñjavyāñjakaḥbhāva. Ananda, goes on to prove this and distinguishes carefully between vyāñjana and abhiddhā, vyāñjana and lakṣaṇa, vyāñjana and tātātparya and vyāñjana and anumāna or inference. To do this, he refutes the views of mīmāṃsakas, Vaiyākaraṇas, and Naiyāyikas on this matter. Let us consider these arguments.

The Abhāvavadins:

First of all, Ananda, takes up the ālāṃkārikas who either deny vyāñjana or try to substitute it under other poetic categories.

Ananda, puts the views of the Pūrvapakṣa as below:

Some people are of the opinion that poetry is constituted of word and sense. Sources of charm with reference to both word and sense such as s'abdālāṃkāras and arthālāṃkāras or figures of word and sense are well-known. So also are the guṇas or qualities such as madhvīra, prasāda etc. Rūti or styles like vaidarbhi, gaudī, etc., vṛttis or modes like upanāgarika, paruṣa, etc., are also recognized sources of charm in poetry. So, what could this dhvani or suggestion be, which is different from the said sources of charm in poetry?

Others hold that suggestion does not exist indeed; for a species of poetry opposed to all well known canons will necessarily cease to be poetry. Poetry can not be defined only as that which is made up of such word and sense as will delight the mind of the critic. This definition will not hold good to a procedure which deflects from all the well known canons mentioned. Thus, even if the designation of poetry were brought into currency to convey dhvani, it could not be universally accepted.
There are again those who hold that it is impossible to think that suggestion or dhvani can be something unknown before. Since it is not distinct from a source of charm, it naturally comes under the cause of charm already noted. Just by coining a novel designation for one of them only, something of note will have been declared at the most. Moreover, since the ways of speech are endless, even if there should be an insignificant element left unexplained by the earlier writers, persons should not close their eyes under the self-assumed illusion of being 'cultured critics' and dance about with joy saying that they have discovered 'suggestion' therein. So many great critics have been expounding figurative elements of speech. But they see nothing in it to boast about. Suggestion can be one more alamkāra or guṇa if you like.

Ānanda have quotes a verse in support of the above view which runs as, yasmimmasti na vastu etc. Abhinava says that is is composed by some Manoratha Kavi. This, we have already noted.

Some others hold that suggested sense is something only indicated i.e. bhākta. Still others take it as something indescribable (1)

While explaining the theory of vyanjana as given in Dhv.I.13 (viz. yatrārthaḥ s'abde vā...etc.), Ānanda refutes the opposing views.

Refutation of the Abhāvavāda:

Ānanda's main argument in the refutation of the abhāvavādi is that while the guṇas and alamkāras etc. rest on the relation of the expressed and the expressor, dhvani or suggestion is based on the relation of the suggested and the suggestor i.e. vyaṅgyavyaṅjakabhāva. Thus, dhvani or suggestion can not be subsumed under it. He quotes a verse.

Vyaṅgyavyaṅjakasambandhanibandhanatayā dhvaneḥ,
vācyavācakaoḍrutva hetvantaḥpūtatā kutaḥ... II )Dhv.I.)

Ānanda also clarifies that the alamkāras such as samāsokti and the like do possess a touch of the implicit sense. But dhvani or suggestion cannot be subsumed under these alamkāras because in them the expressed sense is the principal source of charm and the implicit sense is only subordinate to it. Thus, in the verse,
which is an illustration of samāsokti, the expressed sense with reference to moon and night is more charming and the implicit sense with reference to the hero and the heroine is subservient to it. So, Ānanda observes that when the suggested is not principal source of charm, and when it only follows i.e. subserves the expressed sense, as in samāsokti and the like, it is said to be the province of alaṅkāras and the like. Or, when the suggested is just observed and where it is not held to be principal, it is not said to be dhvani. But only when word and sense have the suggested as their purport, it is said to be the province of dhvani.4,

BHAKTIVĀDINS REFUTED:

Ānanda's main arguments against the bhaktivādins proceed as below:

Dhvani cannot be identical with bhakti or secondary sense on account of difference in form-rūpabheda- and bhakti cannot be the laksāna or definition of dhvani as both the fallacies of too wide i.e. ativyāpti and too narrow i.e. avyāpti would result in that case. At the most it might serve as a pointer-upalaksāna to some of the species of dhvani or suggestion.

(bhaktibhibhartinaikatvanrūpabhedaśamyadyave

ativyāpterasātyāpyāptarēmatvācasyatayā.\) (Dhv.I.14)

(...kasyacid dhvaniḥvedasya sa tu syādupalaksānovam) (Dhv.I.19,2)

The difference in nature or form between dhvani and bhakti i.e. between suggestion and indication is that while suggestion lies in the implication of a meaning other than the expressed and in a way in which the suggested sense forms the purport and is principal, while bhakti is mere metaphorical expression.5.

Bhakti or secondary sense can not be the laksāna or definition of dhvani or suggestion on account of the faults of ativyāpti and avyāpti. The fault of ativyāpti or too wide occurs because bhakti exists even in the absence of dhvani e.g. in case of verses such as parimāṇasāna... etc. or cumbijai sa ahuttam etc. Words such as lāvanya and the like do not fall in the province of dhvani. Ānanda is of the opinion that if one gives up the primary expressive power of a word and understands a sense (secondarily conveyed by it) through its indicative power, it is because of a purpose. In conveying this purpose, the word does not move
falteringly at all (as it moves falteringly when indicating a meaning secondarily) (mukhyena vṛttim parityajya guṇavṛtyārthadarsanam.)

yaduddisyaphalam, tatra s'abdo naiva skhalagatih. (Dhv.I.17)

Guṇavṛtti or indication is based on vāṣṭakēva or the primary power of expression of words. Thus, it cannot be a definition of suggestion or dhvani which is solely based on suggestivity. Thus, suggestion i.e. dhvani is one thing and indication quite another-tasmādanyo dhvaniḥ anya ca guṇavṛttih.

Aṣṭāptidoṣa or the fallacy of narrow definition also walks in if one tries to define dhvani or suggestion as indication. For, indication does not cover instances of suggestion like, 'that with meant but further extending expressed sense' i.e. vivaḵṣitānyaparāvācya dhvani. Thus, indication or bhakti cannot be the definition of suggestion or dhvani.

Ānanda is of the opinion that at the most indication or bhakti might serve as a pointer to some of the species of suggestion or dhvani, i.e. it may be an upalakṣaṇa of dhvani.

Finally, Ānanda makes a reply to those who took dhvani or suggestion as indescribable. Ānanda says that even those who declare that the nature of suggestion is only within the experience of cultured critics and that it is inexpressible, betray only their lack of discernment. The definition of dhvani or suggestion has been already profounded (Dhv.I.13) and so also the definitions of its several varieties will be set forth in the sequel. Inspite of all these, if it should be thought of as inexpressible or anirvacaniya, then this would be true of everything in the world. If, on the other hand, they are only giving expression to the all-surpassing nature of suggestion or dhvani by means of this exaggeration, then they also might be regarded as stating the truth itself. (6)

Thus, Ānanda first refutes the views of the opponents and clears the way for his theory.

VYĀŅJANĀ AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER S'ABDAVṛTTIS:

Ānandavardhana brilliantly distinguishes between the nature and scope of vyāņjana on one hand and that of abhidhā, laksāna, tātparya and anumāna on the other.
The objector seems to hold that there is the relation of quality and substance between rasa i.e., the implied sense in general and the vācyā or the expressed sense. (गुणगुणियवाहारो रसाधिन्मूत्तदिब्रीष सहा युक्तो, ना तु ज्ञवार्तिरवाहाराह्यरसाधिमयत्र यायम् न्यायम् यत् रसादिब्रीष प्रतिभेषात, न्या तु रसादिब्रीष पर्थवभूतं इति.) (Dhv.III.33) One can perceive the expressed only as full of sentiment but never the expressed as an entity separate from sentiment.

Ānanda does not seem to accept this position. In his opinion, the expressed is not full of sentiment in the same way as is the body full of whiteness and the like. Moreover, all do not seem to perceive rasa along with the expressed as is whiteness and the like perceived along with the body. It can not be argued that the presence of sentiment in the expressed can be discernible only to the cultured, as is the preciousness of a jewel being discernible only to some. For in that case, the sentiments would have to be discerned as something not different from the settings, i.e., vibhāva, emotional responses i.e., anubhāvas etc., as is preciousness in case of diamonds. (नयाम, यस्य यथा ज्ञयत्वेत्रवेमेव तस्या लक्ष्यायत, तथारसाधिनापैि विभवानुभवावदिरुपवाचकायतीर्थवेत् ताक्षयायत.) (Dhv.III.33) On the other hand, it is well known that vibhāva, anubhāva etc. are not identical with rasa. The apprehension of vibhāva, anubhāva etc. are not invariable condition of the apprehension of sentiments and the like. Thus, as there is the possibility of cause-effect relation between the two, sequence becomes inevitable. It is however, not noticeable because of quickness. Thus, the position stands that sentiments and the like, with unnoticeable sequence, are suggested. The objector holds that the word itself aided by context and the like, produces a simultaneous apprehension of the expressed and the suggested, and therefore the problem of sequence does not arise at all, and that the apprehension of the expressed sense is not inevitable for gathering the suggested sense, as in case of song and the like. To this, Ānanda has the following reply. That the word is suggestive of a particular sense only when aided by context and the like is acceptable to us also. But this suggestiveness is sometimes due to their specific nature itself and sometimes due to the denotative power of words. (किंतु तद्वयन्त्यकटवम् तस्याम् कदाचित्स्वयमपविस्वामिता-
nāhanam)(Dhv. III.33). In instances where suggestiveness is due only to the specific nature of sounds and where apprehension of expressed meanings does not play any part at all, it would be tantamount to saying that suggestiveness is not governed by the denotative power of words at all. But if suggestiveness is to be governed at all by the expressive power of words, the conclusion becomes irresistible that the apprehension of suggested sense can only be later in time than the apprehension of the expressed sense. If that temporal sequence is so brisk as to escape notice, what is to be done?

Inanda further argues that if in truth, the apprehension of sentiments were possible just by words aided by context and the like, then every reader acquainted with the context, including those who are quite ignorant of the connotation of words, should have had the apprehension of sentiment by merely hearing a poem. If the apprehension of the expressed and the suggested were simultaneous, there would be no use at all of the apprehension of the expressed. On the contrary, if there should be any use for the apprehension of the expressed, it is possible that the two cannot coexist—(sahabhāve ca vācyapratītenupayogah, upayoge vā na sahabhāvah)(Dhv. III.33)

It is true that in music, we have suggestiveness due to the perception of the specific nature of sound alone. But even there, we do have, invariably, temporal sequence between the apprehension of the nature of sounds and that of suggested sentiments. But this temporal sequence in the two functions of sounds cannot be noticed when sentiments are suggested, because sentiments are neither opposed to the expressed sense nor appear as similar to the other senses; they are incapable of being conveyed by anythings else, and all their accessaries work together with lightening-quickness.—(yeṣāṃapi svarūpaviśeṣapratītinimittam vyanjīkatvaṃ yathā gītādis'abdānāṃ, teṣāṃapi svarūpapratītervyanjīyatīte'sa
niyamabhivi kramah, tattu s'abdasya kriyapaurvaparyan ananyasadhyatatphalaghat-
anasvastubhavinirgu vacyenavirodhinyabhidheyantaravilaksane rasadeva na pratiyate. -Dhv.III.33)

But in some contexts, the sequence is noticeable also, e.g. in case of resonance-like suggestion. (anurusanarupavyayapratitish-Dhv.III.33). In this type of suggestion, there will be apprehension of two senses viz. (i) the expressed sense, and (ii) the sense suggested by the power of sense, but quite distinct from the other expressed sense. As nobody can conceal the cause-effect relation between the apprehensions of the two senses, the temporal sequence between them is obvious e.g. that prakrta gathas such as bhama dhamma etc. (atyantavilaksane ye pratiti toyore'akyanihnavo nimittanmitibhava iti sphutameva tatra paurvaparyam. Dhv.III.33.)

In these instances such as bhama dhamma etc. it is impossible to affirm that the apprehension of the one is identical with that of the other. Even in instances of resonance-like suggestion based on the prakrit power of word (i.e. Sabdaktimulamurunanarupavyayadhwani), such as gavo vah pavanam etc. also, wherein we have the apprehension of the two senses from the same words, similitude between the two senses will be found suggested. Since we do not have any word openly expressing similitude, we will have to agree that it is suggested only by the power of sound. Thus it is clear that there is temporal sequence between the apprehensions of the expressed sense and that of the suggested figure even here. Similar is the case with padaprakas'as'abdas'aktimulamurunanarupavyayya i.e. in the variety of resonance-like suggestion based on the power of sound, viz. that which shines out in individual words.

Ananda holds that in suggestion based on unmeant expressed sense i.e. avivakstavacyadhwani-, the suggested sense comes only after the apprehension that the conventional meaning is inapplicable (in the context), and therefore, the temporal sequence is present as a rule. It is therefore clear, that even as the apprehensions of the expressive word and the expressed sense involves a cause-effect relation and a temporal sequence. It may be noticeable or otherwise.
Ananda, after having established that the two apprehensions viz. those of the expressed and of the suggested senses as not simultaneous but as the latter following the former, now proceeds to establish the distinction between the expressed (vācyārtha) and the suggested (vyāgyārtha) on different grounds.

The pūrvapakṣa is given as below:

First objection of the pūrvapakṣa is that artha or meaning can neither suggest (vyanjaka) nor be suggested (vyangya), because the existence of the suggested sense is dependent upon the existence of the suggestive word, and the existence of the suggestive word is dependent upon the existence of the suggested sense, and therefore, it is a case or arguing in circle. The answer to this would be that the suggested sense is already established earlier by independent meaning and hence this fallacy does not arise. (7). This position is not accepted by the pūrvapakṣa. According to it, there is nothing like suggested sense of a word. Whatever is expressed immediately or in sequence is really the expressed sense of the word i.e. abhidhā. Thus, vyanjanē is in no way established. Hence, it is futile to speak of a relation called 'vyangyavyanjakabhāva'. In cases where one meaning leads to another the first is only a means-upāya-matra to the second. This, however, in no way proves the existence of vyanjanē as something other than abhidhā. This happens as in case of word-sense and sentence-sense. (8).

The name or the school of this objector is not mentioned by Ananda. Abhinavgupta, however, says that this objection is based upon the Māmāsaka and Vaiyākāra theories, which he explains as follows. (9):

Upāyamātramityamena sādhvyanjuktā bhāṭṭam prabhukaram vajkaranam ca pūrvapakṣam sūcayati. bhāṭṭamate hi.

vākyārthamitaye teṣām pravṛttam na nātariyakam.
pāke jvālāvā kaśṭhānām padārthapratipādänam... etc. (Locana, on Dhv. III. 33)

The s'lokavārtika says: the burning fuel has preparation of food as its goal, itself being only a means to this end. The fuel cannot do it in the absence of
fire. Thus, fire is nāntarıyaka hetu or the immediate cause in the act of food preparation. So, fuel is the hetu or cause of fire and fire brings about pūka i.e. food preparation. Ultimately fuel has 'pūka' for its end (hetu). Similarly, the words intend to give meaning. But for that meaning s'abdārtha (word-sense) becomes the nāntarıyakahetu i.e. the immediate cause.

The prābhākaraśa have a different analogy. They cite the analogy of an arrow that, when discharged by a powerful man, cuts through the armour, pierces the vitals and takes away the breath. Thus, the arrow has 'prāṇapaharaṇa' i.e. taking the life as its object, but gātrāpaghāta i.e. cutting the vitals is the means. In the same way, in going from a pada or word to a vākyārtha i.e. sentence-sense, padārtha i.e. word-sense serves as a means only.

The Yaiyakaranas also share this view. The only difference is that while the prābhākaraśa hold s'akti in the tākaraśvita, and therefore they do not stand in need of separate tatparyavṛtti, and the intermediate padārthas are taken to be tattvika or real, the Yaiyakaranas consider the padārtha as unreal-atattivika-in the sense in which the vedāntins hold ghaṭa, pāṭa etc. to be atattvika i.e. unreal, due to avidyā or nescience. Thus, for the Yaiyakaranas, these intermediate padārthas are unreal, the Sphota or S'abdabrahma is the only reality.

The arguments of the Siddhāntin are based on the assumption of the characteristics of distinctness (bheda) as such. Those things can be said to be distinct which are different in nature (i.e. Svarūpabheda), and different in Scope (i.e. Viṣayabheda). This dictum is applied to the expressed sense i.e. vācyārtha and the implicit sense i.e. the vyaṅgyārtha. If the vyaṅgyārtha (implicit sense) can be proved to be different from vācyārtha (expressed sense), both in svarūpa and viṣaya (i.e. nature and scope), they should be accepted as distinct from each other. This is the siddhāntin's argument in a nutshell. He elaborates it as follows:

In case of a word giving another meaning after conveying the primary meaning, will the objector accept any difference between these two functions or Not? Does the objector recognise these two functions viz. expression of the
The primary meaning and implication of the suggested sense as identical? The view that these two are identical cannot be accepted. There is a difference in the scope as well as nature of these two (i.e., viṣayabheda and svarūpabheda), e.g., the scope of the function of expression in a word is confined to the primary sense, and the scope of the function of implication involves a sense other than the primary sense. The objector cannot say 'no' to the fact that the expressed sense (vācyārtha) is 'its own' sense of the word, while the implicit sense (vyahgyārtha) is 'one belonging to the other'. The expressed (vācyārtha) is directly related to the word. The apprehension of the implied sense (vyahgyārtha) can be remotely related to the word through the medium of the expressed sense (vācyārtha). If the implicit sense (vyahgyārtha) is also considered as directly related to the word, and not as indirectly related through the medium of the expressed sense (vācyārtha), then, in that case, it should not be recognised as another sense at all. Thus the difference in the scope of these two functions becomes clear by itself.

The difference in nature, too, is equally obvious. The two functions can never be identical, for we find suggestiveness even in sounds of music etc., and even in gestures, which are not even sounds.

Again, the analogy of word-import and sentence-purport also does not quite apply to the expressed and the suggested senses. In the opinion of certain philosophers, the very concept of word-import is unreal. Even those who take it to be real, will have to agree that the analogy of pot and its material cause (i.e., ghaṭa, tadupādāneka trananyāya) will explain better the relation between sentence-purport and word-import. Just as the material causes of pot cannot be separately recognised after the pot is made, so also, word and its sense are not recognised as distinct, once the sentence-sense is gathered. But this principle does not hold good with reference to the expressed and the suggested senses. When the suggested sense is gathered, the expressed is not driven away. The apprehension of the suggested is inseparably occasioned by the gathering of the expressed sense. Thus, the analogy of the pot and lamp is more applicable. So,
In the remarks in the first udyota viz. 'just as the purport of a sentence ... etc' at Dhv.I.10 aims only at pointing out that there is some similarity between the two in the fact that both are means to some other end. The analogy ends at this, and need not be pursued in greater details. (10)

The objector now advances a fresh argument as below: 'now, in this case there arises the contingency of there being two senses simultaneously following from one and the same sentence. In that case, it ceases to be sentence itself.' To this, Ananda's reply is: that this fault cannot be there as the two senses are related as principal and subordinate. Either of the two senses can be principal or subordinate as the case may be. (11).

Ananda observes that when the vyāgṛthā or the suggested sense is subordinate, and the vācyārtha is principal, according to the maxim - yatpārah sa 'abdaḥ sa 'abdārthaḥ, i.e. a word means only that for which it is ultimately used; it is said to be case of the s'abda or word being 'vācyaparaka'. When the vyāgṛthā or the suggested sense is principal, the word is said to be 'vyāgṛyaparaka'. Now, in the first instance, when the vyāgya or, suggested sense is subordinate, it is not 'vyāgṛyaparaka', but the vyāgṛthā or the suggested sense is madhyavarti i.e. intermediary. So, it will have to be recognised as something different from vācyārtha or the expressed sense (12).

VYĀGṛJANA, A NECESSITY FOR THE MĪNĀMSAKAS:-

After having established the distinctness of vācyārtha or the expressed sense and vyaṅgṛthā or the implicit sense, i.e. of abhidhā and vyaṅjanā, Ananda gives other arguments showing how it is necessary for the Mīnāmsakas to accept vyaṅjanā, in order to make their distinction between laṃkika and vaidika vākyas (i.e. between sentences in ordinary speech and those in the Vedas) logical.

Ananda observes that the adherent of the Mīnāsa school of Philosophy will have to accept perforce the conclusion that words have also incidental power of the nature of suggestiveness. For the Mīnāmsakas, the relation between word and meaning is eternal. This is true both of the popular word and the Vedic word. For this reason, both the popular and Vedic word would be equally
eternally correct. But this is not agreed to by the Mīmāṃsakas. For them the popular speech is fallible, while the Vedic is not. The reason lies in the fact that the human speech is motivated by several considerations i.e. it is 'sopādhika'. Thus the Mīmāṃsakas have to accept the 'sopādhikasāmbandha' i.e. the element of intention in the popular speech in addition to direct relation between word and thus meaning. The suggestion of this intention is vyāñjana. So the Mīmāṃsakas cannot escape this contingency. (13).

This however does not mean that every sentence falls under the category of vyāñjana. In cases where intention is identical with the directly expressed sense, there is no need to bring in vyāñjana. We have to bring in vyāñjana only when the intended sense in the form of vastu, alaṃkāra and rasa cannot be expressed by the direct sense. (14).

LAKŚANĀ-VYĀNJANA.

After having thus disposed of the question of the identity of abhidhā and vyāñjana, we now take up lakṣanā.

The pūrvapakṣa holds that vyāñjana is not different from lakṣanā because both are dependent upon word and sense.

To this, Ānandā's answer is that both differ from each other on account of the difference in nature and scope i.e. because of svarūpabhedā and viśayabheda. The svarūpabheda or difference in nature or form consists in the fact that guṇavṛtti or indication is reputed to be not principal (i.e. amukya), while vyāñjakaṭva i.e. suggestivity is principal or mukhya. (30)

There is another difference in respect of their natures. Indication (guṇavṛtti) is practically abhidhā or expression itself, with the difference that it is a subordinate verbal function suggestion (vyāñjana), on the other hand is something far removed from expression (31).

Again, when another meaning is gathered through indication (guṇavṛtti), the first sense merges itself with the second and becomes one with it, e.g. in 'gangāyaṃ ghoṣāḥ' a hanlet on the Ganges'. But when the other sense is derived through suggestion, the first sense retains its individuality while conveying the other, in the fashion of a lamp. 'Lilāk'amalapatraṇi ganayāmāsa
pārvatī—i.e. Pārvatī counted the petals of her play-lotus, etc.—are illustrations to the point. If the names of indication (lakṣaṇā) were to be given to those instances also where one sense conveys another sense without losing its own importance, then it would be tantamount to saying that indication (lakṣaṇā) itself is the primary verbal function. For, usually, every sentence possesses the power to convey a purpose over and above the expressed senses of individual words. (32).

It may be asked by the objector, that, "when a word conveys another sense, what is the precise verbal function involved?" The Locana elaborates this argument as follows: the function of a word is two-fold, either principal or subordinate. Now, in the instances cited by the siddhāntin, if he calls it to be principal function, it is nothing else but abhidhā and if he calls it a subordinate one, it is guṇavṛtti or second sense. There is no third alternative. So, when vyañjanā operates how will it be called by the Siddhāntin? mukhya or amukhya? (principal or subordinate?).

The reply is that even in case of vyañjanā (suggestion) the function involved is the principal one, but owing to difference in conditions, it cannot be called abhidhā. Abhidhā depends on convention. Vyañjanā depends on context and the like. Suggestion takes into consideration the importance of a particular word also, and therefore the word-element is also important (33).

Again, the difference in scope (visayabheda) is also quite clear. The scope of suggestion is three-fold viz. (i) sentiments and the like, (ii) specific figures of speech, and (iii) suggested ideas. Of these three, the apprehension of sentiments and the like can never take place through lakṣaṇā or indication. Same is the case with the suggested figures also. And, so far as the suggested idea is concerned, only that is suggested therein, which is intended to be conveyed by the poet by a process other than abhidhā or expression. All this cannot be included in the scope of lakṣaṇā, since we can see several examples of lakṣaṇā based merely on convention or usage i.e., rūḍhi. If at all there is any touch of beauty instanced in lakṣaṇā or indication, it is
entirely due to the element of suggestion or vyāñjana, involved in it. Hence, laksāna (indication) and vyāñjana (suggestion) are widely different from each other. Suggestion, in fact, is not only different from abhidhā or expression and laksāna or indication, but it is also based upon each of them. Thus, it is impossible to regard suggestiveness (vyāñjakatva) which is assisted by both these, to be wholly identical with either. As it derives assistance from laksāna, it cannot be identical with abhidhā and as it gets assistance sometimes from abhidhā (expression) it cannot be identical with laksāna (indication) alone. As it partakes the characteristics of both, it cannot be comprehended by either.

The objector may raise the following point, viz., that there may be no element of laksāna (indication) in suggestion with meant but further extending expressed sense. But what difference is there between suggestion with unmeant expressed sense and laksāna? (34). The reply is that there is no scope for any fault even here. Suggestion with unmeant expressed sense (laksānamālaka dhvani) might walk in the footsteps of laksāna (indication) but it does not assume the form of laksāna (indication) itself. It is possible to have an instance of indication (laksāna) which is devoid of suggestiveness. But we never come across suggestiveness devoid of the beauty of suggestion. Whenever we come across instances of indication (laksāna) that become a source of apprehension of the suggested content full of beauty, we find that it is all entirely due to its touch of suggestiveness in case of expression (abhidhā). So, in both the divisions of suggestion with unmeant expressed sense, we see that indication (laksāna) is tinged with a shade of suggestiveness. This certainly will not appear identical with laksāna (indication), but quite separate from it and brings delight to the minds of the cultured (35).

Ānanda further tells of resources of vyāñjana other than words. Sounds without meaning also suggest emotions just as notes of music. Gestures, without sounds, also can convey meaning and emotions.
Thus, Ananda establishes the three-fold division of the verbal function, viz. abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyākhyāna(36).

Ananda, in conclusion also makes a note the fact that he has based his theory of vyākhyāna on the authority of those who are masters of the principles of sādabrahma. He refers to the Vaiyākaraṇas upon whose Sphota theory he draws.(37)

Having shown the distinctness of the three functions of word viz. abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and vyākhyāna, Ananda takes up the arguments of those who regard vyākhyāna as an inference.

**VYĀKHYĀNA AND INFERENCE:**

The logicians argue as below:

In fact this suggestiveness is none other than implication, and implication is the same as the state of an inferential process. The apprehension of the suggested idea is thus identical with the inferential knowledge of the probandum(pakṣa). So, to put it otherwise, the relation of the suggester and the suggested is none other than the relation of liṅgāliṅgī i.e. probans-probandum. There is also another reason which substantiates this conclusion. The Siddhāntin has explained that words possess suggestiveness directed to the speaker's intention, and this element of the speaker's intention is only inferable(38).

Ananda replies that anyway, the Naiyāyika accepts the fact that over and above the meanings given by abhidhā and lakṣaṇā, there is a third process which gives its own peculiar meaning. However, this process cannot be regarded as inference, because there is no proper inference at all. An inference depends upon the relation of liṅgāliṅgībhāva which is absent in this process.

In a logical inference, there is no doubt about the sādhyā which is proved by means of hetu, e.g. when fire is inferred on the basis of hetu i.e. smoke, no doubt remains about the inference of the predicate i.e. sādhyā; such a logical sādhyāsādhana relation does not exist in the case of the implied sense or vyāgyārtha. No logical relation between sādhyā and sādhana is
meant in vyaŋgyārtha i.e. suggested sense. Hence though vyaŋgyārtha or suggested 
sense is grasped indirectly, mental process is not that of logical inference.
Hence vyaŋgyārtha is to be regarded as the function of word as such.

How vyaŋjakatva is different from liṅgaṭva or how vyaŋgyapratīti and 
liṅgaṇapratīti are dissimilar and non-identical, is explained by Ananda, as 
follows: The objecter has really made a clever use of the words of Siddhānta in 
substantiating his position. He has remarked that the speaker's intention 
is certainly implied and added that such implication is the same as the state 
of inferential probans (i.e. liṅgaṭva). But in fact the true meaning of the 
of the statement is as below. The scope of words is two-fold; (i) Inferable 
and (ii) expressive, of these, the inferable is always of the nature of the 
speaker's intention. This intention of the speaker, once again, is two-fold (i) 
desire to utter words for their own sake and (ii) desire to convey meanings 
through words. Between these, the first type of the speaker's intention does 
not play any part in verbal discourse. It only serves to distinguish an animal 
from a non-animal. But the second type of speaker's intention plays the part 
of a proximate cause in verbal discourse, though it is rendered rather remote 
due to several other intervening factors between the utterance of the word 
and the apprehension of its meaning. Both these types of speaker's intention 
are inferable from words. (39)

But the expressive scope of words is related to meaning itself 
which happens to be the aim of the speaker's intention to convey meanings. It 
is also two-fold, (i) The expressed and (ii) the suggested. (40). The speaker 
may use words in a view to convey his meaning directly by means of them (and 
then we get the vācyārtha), or he may use words which do not directly convey 
his meanings, with a view to achieving some purpose (and thus we get the 
vyaŋgyārtha). Both these aspects are far from appearing as probandum of any 
inference based on mūkṣa words. On the other hand, the relationship between 
word and such expressive content is something other than inference, whether 
it be a conventional or unconventional relationship. It is only the aspect 
of intention on the part of a speaker to employ words or meaningful words.
that is inferable and not the meaning itself conveyed by his words. If it were
true that the meaning itself could form the probandum of an inference
having words for its probans, there should be no scope for doubts at all,
whether any meaning is right or otherwise, e.g., when the probandum viz. Fire,
is inferred from the probans, viz. smoke, there is indeed no room for any doubt
about the existence of fire (41)

Ānanda, then goes on to explain that the vyānīyārtha as it is conveyed
by the power of the expressed itself (Vācyasāmartyākṣiptatayā), it too, is
related to the word, just as the expressed meaning is related to the word.
Directness or indirectness is not the differentiating condition of a relation-
ship. (sākṣēdasākṣēdbhūvo hi saṃbandhasya aprayojakaḥ). That suggestiveness is
related to expression has been already shown. The conclusion is thus indis-
putable that words will have the state of an inferential probans only
while implying the intention of the speaker and that the meanings themselves
which are signified by the words are due to the verbal power of expression
and not inference. (42)

Now, we may take instances of meanings which are suggested by a word.
These may be of the nature of suggested, intention and may not be
as well. Can we say that all such meanings are conveyed by the power of
expression alone in words? or should we postulate some other function? It
has been already shown that the power of expression alone cannot explain the
suggested meaning. Hence we will have to admit another function and that
function itself is called suggestiveness by us. The nature of suggestiveness
is not co-extensive with the nature of an inferential probans, since the for-\nmar
exists in objects like light where the latter is absent (43). Just as the
expressed content of words is not identical with the probandum of an infer-
ence, so also suggested content is not identical with it (44). On the contrary,
that which becomes the object of an inferred probandum as shown above, does
not constitute what is expressed but constitutes only an adventitious attri-
bute of what is expressed (45). If the expressed meaning too were to be
gathered by inference, there could be no scope for any differences of opinion regarding it in the world, which we do come across in our daily life.

It is true, doubtless, that at times, one does not resort to inference and other instruments of knowledge while deciding the truth of even an expressed meaning. Though it falls within the scope of other instruments of knowledge, its being simultaneously an object of the verbal power of expression does not suffer in the least. The same is the case with the suggested meaning also (46). Again, as a matter of fact, the question of logical truth and falsity in regard to suggested sense in poetry, is entirely futile. Therefore, it is ridiculous to indulge in discussions regarding different instruments of knowledge applicable therein (47). So it is impossible to identify the apprehension of the suggested meaning with the apprehension of the inferred probandum in every case.

Thus Ananda establishes the theory of vyanjana and shows how vyanjana is different from abhidha, tatparya, lakṣaṇa and anumāna.
Chapter XXIII.

FOOT NOTES.

(1) युः काय्यत्वाचिह्नि: साधस्वात्त्व अनिरिति संजिति परमायि य समामांतः
सम्यक वा समन्तां मात्र! प्रकटित् तत्त्व सहस्यवनम्: प्रकाशमानस्यायामावनये
कावः। तद्राजानां चार्मी विकल्पः सम्प्रसचिति।
तत्र केवलाधिकरितन: सर्वधिशीर्षे तत्वत्वायम्। तत्र न श्रवणस्वालकस्तः सुन्माङ्गशः
प्रसिद्धा हन। केवलान्तप्रभावः। वर्णितनान्तमाणिः ये मात्रसदवस्य: पिप प्रतिवन्ते।
तदन्तिरितिक्षुभवाः पिप या: केवलदुमानरिस्वायः प्रकाशितः ता विप गता: अवान-
गोचरसं: सत्यायनं कैलस्मृत्वा। तदन्तिरितिक्तः कौः अनिन्दितेऽः।

अवने ज्वलः: नास्त्येव अच्छि। प्रक्षिप्तस्यान्त्वातिरिक्तः काय्यप्रार्थस्य काय्यतः
हन: सहस्यवनमार्थादि सर्वधिशैलमेव काय्यक्षेत्रमणां। न चोऽकै प्रसिद्धस्यान्त्वातिरिक्तः
पार्गस्य वस्तुमित्रां। न च तत्त्वस्यात: पार्तिः: सहस्यान वार्तिक परिकल्पय तत: प्रसिद्धश्च
अन्तो काय्यप्रेधेः: प्रकाशिताः पिप सत्यविधनस्यान्त्वातिरिक्तः क्षः।

पुनःपरः तत्स्यात्मप्रथमं कार्यकृ: न समक्षेऽव अनिन्दितापूर्वः: कैलित
काय्यस्यात्मनस्यस्य तस्यीकोऽक्षे चार्मि: तुल्यस्य: सुभवार्यामानवात: तेषाम्यमस्यत्रस्वव: अवुपस्यानामात्रात:
बार्याः व्याकरणान: कहराः।

पैं च वार्तिक्यप्राप्तनान्त्वायस्य सम्बन्धापि का वार्तिकर्तायम्याविदायम्याः: प्रक्षिप्तप्रक्षिप्त हिनी प्रारक्षे
अनिन्दिति विदायम्यात: वेदहदी: महामित्रस्यान्त्वातिरिक्तः प्रकाशिताः पिप कामस्य
च: न च तेषामेक्षा: दसा ज्वलिः।

तस्यात्मप्रथमयेः अमि:। न तस्य चार्मिकामेघ तथे विभिन्दापि प्रकाशितु: स्याम्
तथा चार्मिकेऽनु: स्याम: श्वास्य: श्वास्य:।

विस्मितानि न वस्तु शिक्तिन मा: प्रकाशादि साह्वृति: खुल्यनो: चित न वेद: कविन्द्रगिरि-
दूनयं व यत्र। अस्य तद्यथों समाचिनितानि प्रत्यत्व: प्रकाशों न विविधाद्वारत्ति: किं
भुवित्वा युक्त: स्वसंस्कप्नेऽः।
भारतमाहस्यस्य। अत्यन्ते: यु अनिन्दितं काय्यश्चनां गुणावृतिचित्वाः।

यथापि अभिनंदुस्स्वरूपने काव्यक्षेत्रायिथिमयिः: गुणावृतिचित्रीयो व न कौऽितु प्रकाश: प्रकाशित: तथापि अत्युक्तेऽतियु: कार्येऽछ क्वार्थं दश्यात: अनिन्दिताः मानक्यद्धोः पिप
न लक्षित हसि परिकल्प: समुक्ताम- माहानामाहस्यस्य: हसि।

कैविकजीविकारणाश्रीनुद्दयो अनेकस्त्वे सुरमानचरं सहस्यवनमायेभ: समार्थवात-
वातः: कैविकजीविकारणाश्रीनुद्दयो।
लस्य हि व्यने: सुभुम व्याख्यातापिनिषादसमतित्वादृश्यादिपिनिषादस्मिनिषादविभेदित्वादृश्यादिपिनिषादस्मिनिषादविभेदित्वादृश्यादिपिनिषादस्मिनिषादविभेदित्वादृश्यादिपिनिषादस्मिनिषादविभेदित्वादृश्यादिपिनिषादस्मिनिषाद

(2) Abinave puts them as,

(1)तत समावाहोपोन सधारणारूपातिच: हृति कृत्या वाच्यध्यातितिं नास्तै च व्याख्यातिं.
(11)सदिप वा वत्तिकावृत्यायाधिक्यं सहास्तार्यायाकालावस्तुत्वात् मात्रम्.
(111)तदनिर्देशार्थी वा न वच्चे शब्दे कुमारिणिः वज्रः कुमारिणिः अविभेदयति हृति कर्म शब्दे प्रथणाविनिर्दिष्टतार्थाः। Locana on Dhw.I.1.

(3) तुलचरि on Dhw.I.1 reads:-

(4) व्याख्यात्वमाध्यायास्त्राच: वाच्यात्वमाध्यायास्त्राच:।
(4) वाच्यात्वमाध्यायास्त्राच: वाच्यात्वमाध्यायास्त्राच:।

(5) वाच्यात्वमाध्यायास्त्राच: वाच्यात्वमाध्यायास्त्राच:।
(5) वाच्यात्वमाध्यायास्त्राच: वाच्यात्वमाध्यायास्त्राच:।

(6) वाच्यात्वमाध्यायास्त्राच: वाच्यात्वमाध्यायास्त्राच:।

(Dhw.1.)

(Dhw.1.14)
On this the Locana reads:-

On this the Locana reads:-

On this the Locana reads:-

On this the Locana reads:-

On this the Locana reads:-
(10) अन्वांशेक

(11) अन्वांशेक

(12) अन्वांशेक

(13) अन्वांशेक

(14) अन्वांशेक

(15) अन्वांशेक
(12) अन्वया III.33.- किं च यथृप्रस्थ प्रायान्येः जीविकायां वाच्यात तावस्तु फार्मिन् न अन्नुस्त्रत्वं अत्त्तप्रत्यात्माः सहस्रस्तु यद्यति तत्रवश्यः। दश्यानां ब्रह्मभेदः विषयः इति। ज्ञाति तस्य प्रायान्येः तत्सां विभक्तिः तत्स्य सहस्रप्रस्थः।

(13) अन्वया III.33.-स तवत्त्वनिव जीविकायेः यथा। शरदानात्मत्वविज्ञानविभेदः जीविकायां वाच्यात तत्कथात्तत्वविज्ञानविभेदः। तद्युपास्तु हि तस्य शरदानात्मत्वविज्ञानविभेदः सत्यप्रृथवायोमणात्तत्वविज्ञानविभेदः।

(14) अन्वया III.33.-केतन्नेन न्यायेः सृष्टेषान्वेषण लौकिकाः वाच्याः अनन्तवहारः प्रकृतः। सृष्टेषान्वेषण न्यायेः यथो-वाक्याः। सृष्टेषान्वेषण न्यायेः वाच्याः। किंतु वकात-प्रकृतयुक्तेऽद्वा। यथो-वाक्याः। सृष्टेषान्वेषण लौकिकाः वाच्याः। किंतु वकात-प्रकृतयुक्तेऽद्वा। यथो-वाक्याः।

(15) (30) अन्वया III.33.-हृदरूपस्तात्तत्वविज्ञानवाच्याः प्रकृतिः। यथो-क्षेत्रेऽद्य वृत्ताः शरदाः। यथो-क्षेत्रेऽद्य वृत्ताः। न हि यथात्त्वयथाप्रकृतिः तस्य अन्नुस्त्रत्वं फार्मिन् इति।
(16)(32) अन्यत्र III.33.-अर्थ चार्य: स्कुपेन्द्र: यदु गुणावृत्तिमुल्यतन्त्र व्यक्तिस्ते

वाचकप्रमेयोऽवलोऽत्र विशिष्टमेवात्कथ ग्रहितादित्वम्।

Dhy. III.33.

(17)(32) अर्थ चार्यं: स्कुपेन्द्रं यदुगुणावृत्तिस्ते तथार्थमुल्यतन्त्र व्यक्तिस्ते

वाचकप्रमेयोऽवलोऽत्र विशिष्टमेवात्कथ ग्रहितादित्वम्।

वाचकप्रमेयोऽवलोऽत्र विशिष्टमेवात्कथ ग्रहितादित्वम्।

वाचकप्रमेयोऽवलोऽत्र विशिष्टमेवात्कथ ग्रहितादित्वम्।

(18)(33) होलन on अन्यत्र III.33.-कृत्तिः विविधाद्विविध्यसु नियत: गुणावृत्तिः

कृत्तिः विविधाद्विविध्यसु नियत: गुणावृत्तिः।

(19)(34) अन्यत्र III.33.-विविधाद्विविध्यसु नियत: गुणावृत्तिः कथे भिक्षे: तथा ग्रहितादित्वम्

(20)(35) अन्यत्र III.33.-विविधाद्विविध्यसु नियत: गुणावृत्तिः कथे भिक्षे: तथा ग्रहितादित्वम्

(21)(36) अन्यत्र III.33.विविधाद्विविध्यसु नियत: गुणावृत्तिः कथे भिक्षे: तथा ग्रहितादित्वम्।

(22)(37) अन्यत्र III.33.विविधाद्विविध्यसु नियत: गुणावृत्तिः कथे भिक्षे: तथा ग्रहितादित्वम्।
गुणावृत्तिरूप न केवलित् यथा न च सहकीत वचारन। व्याख्यात्मकप्रेषीतं वसेय। वसु चासूमुख्यायतः स्वाधिकारीमेवश्च यत्रिति पादवितुमिष्ठि तद्व्यः। तथा न \( r \) व गुणावृत्तिलित्यायांपि गौणानां शास्त्रां ग्रंथविद्वानां तथा कैव्ये ग्रंथाः। यदापि च गुणावृत्तिलित्यायांपि व्याख्यात्मकचिन्तानिदारणत्वम्। वाचकत्वुपन्नविविधानिदारणस्यामि च तत्स स्वाधिकारीमेवश्च व्यवस्थानाम्।

and also, (Dhv.III.23)...

सन्तोष द्विअविद्याक्षरश्चेष्टा व्यविधातान्यानां व्यविधातान्यानां। तत्सनामन्त्रप्रतिवाचाश्चेष्टायां श्रवषोऽध्योति अवतुमोक्षेऽवतु। तथा हि गीतमध्यीनानां व्याख्याबंशीत साक्षात्विषयं। न च तेनाचार्येऽवर्तमये वाचकत्वान्यानां व्यविधातान्यानां व्यविधातान्यानां। तथा हि गीतमध्यीनानां व्याख्याबंशीत साक्षात्विषयं। न च तेनाचार्येऽवर्तमये वाचकत्वान्यानां व्यविधातान्यानां।

वाचकत्वुपन्नविविधानिदारणस्य व्याख्यात्मकप्रेषीतं वसेय। तत्स स्वाधिकारीमेवश्च व्यवस्थानाम्।

तदति शाले व्यापारे तथं प्रकाराः। वाचकत्वुपन्नविविधानिदारणस्य व्याख्यात्मकप्रेषीतं वसेय। तत्स स्वाधिकारीमेवश्च व्यवस्थानाम्।

(यथान्त्रया III.33) 22 (२७) अपरिनिर्द्वितनिर्धारण्येऽविषयं विशेषत्वः मनमहिमेऽद्रूपां अविद्याराहितः तस्मात् व्याख्यात्मकत्वमविषयं विद्याराहितः। अध्यायाः III.33. and also Locana-

(यथान्त्रया III.33) 23 (३८) यथान्त्रया III.33। अस्त्यष्टिशास्त्रानवसाः। व्याख्यात्मकप्रेषीतं शास्त्रान्याप्राप्तं गुणावृत्तिलितिः। अस्त्यष्टिशास्त्रान्याप्राप्तं गुणावृत्तिलितिः।

(यथान्त्रया III.33) 24 (३९) यथान्त्रया III.33। व्याख्यात्मकप्रेषीतं विविधानिदारणस्य व्याख्यात्मकप्रेषीतं शास्त्रान्याप्राप्तं गुणावृत्तिलितिः।
विषयकार। तत्त्वा न शास्त्रवक्तारण। सा हि प्रासांसमांग्रतिरितिः। वक्ती। ्तौ शब्दकथान्तरण्यां विशिष्ट्वक्तितां। स्मरणः व्यवहारः विभक्त्वंम्।

25 (४५) प्रतिपादः प्राणेवल्लालः प्रतिपादकरणमिहाः विषयकीकृतः। तथा मित्रविद्यो

काव्योऽवशयः। अन्त्यः III.33.

26 (४६) प्रयोक्ता हि कारिकों में शस्त्रायः पुनःकाव्यिनः समीरसे, कलारिकों स्वशा समानमिथि

यत्चै प्राप्तानायाः कारिकों। तु मयः प्रतिपादः विषयः। शब्दाः न क्षिप्रकाय स्वकाय प्रकायेण, जस्मि तु कृत्तिमेक्षणाः कृत्तिमेक्षणाः वा सम्बन्धान्तरणाद्

विकाराणाविषयत्च। त हि तत्सर्वस्य स्वप्रक्षेपित्वा प्रयोक्ता हि तु स्वहितम्। यद्य हि

क्षिप्रकाय तत् शब्दाः व्याप्यः स्वाच्छेन्द्रियाः विषयविवाह्यः श्व न प्रकृतेन, धृष्टारि चिन्तानुमितानुस्मार्नतवः। अन्त्यः III.33.

27 (४७) तत्साधनकृत्वा प्रकारः सा धार्येः विकाराणायः शब्दाः व्याप्यः। तत्वचेताः

कृते तु प्रतिपादः। अन्त्यः III.33.

28 (४८) न च ध्व-काकतः क्षिप्रकायः, जाकोक्ष प्रक्षेपण्याः दुष्क्वालः। अन्त्यः III.33.

29 (४९) तत्साधन प्रतिपादः विषयः। शब्दाः न क्षिप्रकाय स्वसन्धिनः। वाच्यः।

अन्त्यः III.33.

30 (५०) यहो न क्षिप्रकाय तत्त्वमानहि स्वसन्धिनः। विषयः। न वाच्यात्मकः

प्रतिपादः, आपात्वापिनः। अन्त्यः III.33.

31 (५१) यथा च धार्यान्वितः ध्वाणात्तरानुभूतः संकृत्तिः। कारिकों। ध्वानात्तरानुभूतः

तत्त्वमाण्डतान्तरविविषयत्च। सत्मिः न शब्दार्थार्थः। विषयः।

अन्त्यः III.33.

32 (५२) काव्यविषये च ध्व-प्रक्रीतिः। स्थायित्वानिविषयस्य। अविवेकानुभूतम्। हति तत्र

ध्वानात्तरावधार्थार्थरतिः। सम्बन्धे। तत्साधनान्तरविविषयविषयाः। सकलः।

तत्साधनान्तरक्तिरिति न सकलः विषयः। अन्त्यः III.33.