PART III

BECOMING FERTILE AFTER ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION.
CHAPTER V

DISPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS-AS ANTIMENTALISM

Introduction:

In this part of this study (i.e. part III), we will consider behaviouristic antimentalism. We agree with the proponents of identify theory that a dispositional analysis (suggested by Ryle) of all the mentalistic concepts cannot be accepted, because among such concepts, we have certain concepts which denote actual states or processes or events. In part II, we have referred the arguments of identity theorists about the inadequacy of behaviourism as a dispositional analysis of mentalistic concepts. The arguments can be accepted, but the claim of this critical study is that the same inadequacy-argument also undermines the identity theory as neurophysiological antimentalism. This claim has been substantiated in Part II (Chapters III and IV).

In this chapter, Ryle's dispositional-approach to mentalistic concepts is discussed with reference
to the objections raised by identity philosophers. We find that Armstrong's arguments against the inadequacy of the nature of dispositional analysis are acceptable. If dispositions require some basis of attribution, that basis may as well turn out to be neurophysiological. To this extent, Armstrong's realistic account of dispositional analysis is superior to Ryle's phenomenal account of dispositions. Still however, it is the main argument of this chapter that dispositional attribution of some ongoing processes should include a mentalistic component without which, there will be no difference between attribution of brittleness to glass and attribution of suspiciousness to a man. Even if, dispositions require a categorical basis, and even if, such a categorical basis is physical, the Ontology of dispositions should account for the mentalistic components included in the dispositional attribution. Psychological attribution to persons involves more than merely neurophysiological as basis. Armstrong has claimed and more than merely behavioural basis as Ryle has claimed. Dispositions, are linked with behaviour at a molar-level and they are also linked with neural events at a molecular-level; but the argument of this chapter is that dispositional attributions presuppose occurrences at psychological-field
level which includes encounters with experienced events having phenomenal properties. Thus, in so far as occurrences containing more than neural events are accepted, dispositional analysis is not antimentalistic, in so far as nothing mental at any level is admitted, behaviourism, as a dispositional view of mind, is antimentalistic. In so far as behaviourism is antimentalistic, it is inadequate.

Behaviourism, as a philosophy of mind, as distinguished from psychological methodology, is thus either inadequate or mentalistic.

The view found acceptable and emerging from the critical study of Ryle's dispositional analysis is that there is no basic incompatibility between dispositional analysis and mentalism as a component in theories about mind-body problem as long as conscious occurrences or experiences are granted. If the ontology of behaviourism is empty of anything corresponding to the whole of mentalistic language, then any dispositional attribution at a psychological level
is illegitimate and unintelligible. It is claimed here that this particular implication of dispositional attribution to persons has been overlooked both by Ryle and Armstrong.

In this chapter, deals with an introduction to the phenomenalist view of dispositions. (I) We have then presented a critique of Rylean phenomenalist account of dispositions. (II) The critique comprises Armstrong's realist view and Thomela's functionalist view of dispositions.

In section (III) we have considered how objections are raised regarding any dispositional analysis as far as the general scientific adequacy of any such account is concerned. In the sections I, II and III, we have discussed the nature of and functions of dispositional analysis. In (IV), the ontological inadequacy of the dispositional account of mentalistic concepts has been discussed. It has also been argued that psychological attribution research presuppose
occurrences picked out by some mentalistic concepts.

(v).

The chapter ends with the claim that dispositional analysis as antimentalism is either inadequate or mentalistic.

I Phenomenalist View of Dispositions.

Gilber Ryle (1949) has argued for a view which is characterized as phenomenalist view of dispositions, according to which, dispositions need not always have underlying basis.

For Ryle, many of the mental concepts are dispositional concepts. When a cow is described as ruminant or a man as a cigarette smokers, we thereby ascribed only only dispositional concepts, which of course, could not exist without occasional episodes of ruminating and smoking. But many dispositional statements do not entail any corresponding episodes or occurrences. Some
dispositional words are only determinables. A backer can be backing now but a grocer is not described as "grocing now", but only as selling sugar now or weighing tea now and so on.

Ryle claims that words like 'Know', 'believe', 'aspire' etc are dispositions in determinable sense

Ryle rejects the view that such a dispositional analysis will commit us to grant the ontology of potentialities over and above things and events. Dispositional statements are law-like statements and laws, though stated in indicative sentences, are merely "inference tickets". Law statements are not existential. The same is true of dispositional statements. Metaphor of "rails of inference" is misleading for laws, because Ryle thinks that railway lines and trains both exist, but law statements do not imply the existence of the unobserved bonds between the observed so and so
and the observed such and such law statements, as inference - tickets, are required for the passage from factual statements to factual statements. All true indicative statements are not reportive or descriptive. Dispositional statements are NOT reports of unobserved or unobservable entities. Ryle points out that they do not narrate incidents, although they connect narratives of incidents. There are no unwitnessable private occult hidden occurrences which are the referents of the disposition attribution. Mental predicates are thus dispositional and do not entail the existence of ghostly entities. Words for skills, qualities of intelligence and language are all dispositional.

Ryle refers to 'minding concepts' i.e. concept of noticing, concentrating etc. These are "heed concepts" (C.M., 136.) Ryle argues that when a person is minding what he is saying, we are not saying that he is doing two things at once. We should not relapse into two worlds idiom when we talk about the nature of mental concepts. Of course, Ryle admits that heed concepts are not merely dispositional
but we are saying something episodic i.e. we are referring to the frame of mind within which a person's acting is 'clockable occurrence' (C M. 140)

Ryle rejects the privacy hypothesis. (C M, 205) A cobbler can not witness the tweaks that I feel when the shoe pinches. This is acceptable to Ryle. What he clarifies is that it is neither the cobbler nor the wearer who witnesses the pinching of the shoe. I only feel the pinch, I do not discover it by observation. Sensations can not be observed. They are neither observable nor non-observable. The question about their observability is senseless. It is like question of the spelling of the words of one letter. There is no 'glimpse of a glimpse' or the 'tingle of tingle'. My tweaks and tingles are neither external nor internal just as mere single letters are neither verbs or nouns. (C M, 208). Ryle accepts privacy in a trivial sense i.e. Venus can not have Neptune's satellites nor can Poland have Bulgaria's history. A 'look' of a horse-race is not a sporting events on a racecourse. Even if there are looks, smells and tingles, it does
Ryle has claimed that to assimilate the concept of sensation to the concept of observation is a howler. It makes nonsense of both the concepts. Sensations are neither "perceiving", nor "finding", nor "detectings" nor "intuitings" nor "knowing". Ryle rejects sense-datum theories. "Talking about the apparent speeds of aeroplanes is not talking about the speeds of appearances of aeroplanes" (C M, 217).

Ryle reaffirms his view that phenomenal statements are only mongrel-categorical. To say that \( \text{It looks green to me} \) is to specify the stimulus conditions for the normal observers. It tells no anecdotes about the author. Sensation-language is not reportive. We have no 'neat' sensation Vocabulary (C M p. 235) Ryle, like Wittgenstein, has argued that the incorrigibility hypothesis is useless because it is absurd to call sensations veridical or mistaken.

```
Ryle extends the same account to imaginations.
"Imaginings occurs, but images are not seen"
```
A person picturing his nursery is not a spectator of resemblance of his nursery but he is resembling a spectator of his nursery. If mock murderers are no murderers, imagined sights and sounds are no sights and sounds. There are no private sights and sounds. Imagining is not like perceiving, because for Ryle, it is not perceiving at all. There are no such objects as mental pictures.

We have illustrated how Ryle consistently extends his dispositional analysis of mental concepts to a variety of mental terms and he is generally opposed to any occurring analysis and even when he accepts mental occurrences, he treats them in a different way as compared to introspectionists and other mentalist. He is consistently against private unwitnessable ghostly entities. Ryle rejects the two worlds legend which is at the back of expectations of ordinary language and literature.
II Critique of Phenomenalist View of Dispositions.

We have discussed Ryle's phenomenalist view of dispositions. It is interesting to know that materialists like Armstrong and functionalists like Tuolema have expressed their dissatisfaction with such an analysis. Their views are discussed here in order to move to a position that some realistic base has to be accepted for dispositional ascriptions. The views that follow in this section are acceptable but all the same, it ultimately depends on what you conceive to be the basis underlying dispositional attribution. We have seen in Part II that any analysis of ascription of mentalistic predicates has to be adequate i.e. it should take into account the facts of our subjective experiences.

(i) Realist View of Dispositions.

Ryle's account is a phenomenalist account of dispositions. Armstrong rejects behaviourism and defends a realistic account of dispositions.
For Armstrong (1968, pp. 86-88), to speak of an object having a dispositional property entails that the object is in some non-dispositional state. An object manifests a disposition precisely because the disposition has an actual basis in some actual state of a thing.

It is the logic of disposition attribution, according to Armstrong, that such an attribution can be made even when the circumstances under which an object manifests its dispositions are not obtaining. A categorical state of a rubber band is responsible for stretching one inch under the force obtaining at time $t$. The rubber band has some non-dispositional states, due to which, it bends with $F$ applied to it. The connection between the categorical basis and dispositional basis is logically necessary according to Armstrong. This is wrongly denied by the phenomenalist account of dispositions.

According to the realist view of dispositions, we can think of dispositions as causes of behaviour.
This can not be true of phenomenal view, because it does not show that anything stands behind dispositions. Periphetlalism can not be compatible with inner-states account of dispositions. The realist account being an inner-states account, entails the rejection of peripheralism and along with it, the rejection of behaviourism. When we say "glass is brittle" there is some current state of the glass which accounts for its Britteness.

Armstrong (1973) agrees that compared to Hume's account of beliefs as occurrences, Ryle's account of beliefs as dispositions is more illuminating but, for Armstrong, a still satisfactory account of beliefs is the account according to which, beliefs are states. A believer may not be conscious of them. To claim that an object is in some state, is to attribute a property to it.

Armstrong argues that for every true containing proposition, there must be something in the world that makes the proposition true. From this it follows, that if a piece of glass, not brittle up to t, but can be said to be truely said to be brittle after t, then the object must have changed at t. Such a change
must be a change in the non-relation property of an object. A disposition entails the presence of such a property. The presence and absence of the initiating cause and other circumstances are the relational properties of a glass.

For Armstrong to say that possession of non-relational property is entailed by the attribution of disposition, is to say that the disposition is a state of object. Of course, the question as to what particular state it is which is entailed by disposition attribution, can not be settled apriori. It is better left to the scientists. Philosophically it can only be stated that if there is a triggering cause, of suitable nature, the state entailed by disposition attribution manifests the disposition. Armstrong argues for the identity between the disposition and states.

The difference between belief-ascrition to person and brittleness ascription to glass, according to Armstrong, lies in the fact in the latter, we are not committed to any claim other than the claim that there is some state of
brittleness responsible for the breaking of glass if struck, whereas in the case of belief ascription, we are committed to states having a structure of the propositions believed. Another difference between belief and disposition is that dispositions, if manifested, are manifested in one sort of way, while beliefs, if manifested, are manifested in more than one way. Manifestation of disposition, as compared to beliefs, are not stimulus bound.

Ryle's account of dispositions is characterized as phenomenalist because he rejects the necessity of underlying occurrences for mental-dispositional attributions. The realist and the rationalist accounts argue for the categorical states & properties underlying dispositions. But Ryle himself rejects phenomenalism as theory of sensation, because he claims that "propositions about sensible objects" is a nonsensical phrase. His dispositional account is phenomenalist in the sense that he dispenses with unobservable entities.

J. L. Mackie (1977) who holds the realist view of dispositions, rejects the rationalist view of
According to the rationalist view, the basis of dispositions are intrinsic properties which are in themselves powers and they entail conditional statements.

Mackie argues that to postulate intrinsic powers is redundant. There are only intrinsic categorical properties, which bring causal results during interaction, e.g., the bonds between the molecules in a crystal structure are causally relevant for its solubility in water. The occurrent property of sugar is a categorical property. No hidden powers are to be postulated.

Mackie does not accept the rationalist account because it violates Hume's principle that there can be no logical connection between distinct existences. A piece of glass being fragile is one thing and the conjunction of fragility with its being struck is a different thing and there is no relation of logical entailment between these two distinct matters of fact and the rationalist view, according to Mackie, needlessly requires the logical entailment. On rationalist account of powers, we will have to conceive
for example, that dormative virtue would be intrinsic to opium and it would logically necessitate sleep. Such an aprioristic view makes empirical research redundant. Mackie warns us that the rationalist view should not be confused with the realist view of dispositions, although both the views are opposed to Ryle's phenomenalist view. Ryle's phenomenalist view regards dispositions to be minimal dispositions without grounds. Armstrong believes in occurrent grounds of disposition and Mackie agrees with this realistic view. For Mackie, a dispositional property is a causal property and not a power as conceived by rationalist. Dispositions are place-holders for genuine explanations. They can be used only to specify the unknown property and causal mechanism. Completed scientific explanation is still an ideal. Our ontology may not match our epistemology. We may know and talk about properties in many ways but it does not entail the properties we thus considered are really constitutive of things as they are in themselves.
(ii) Functionalism View of Dispositions.

Reimo Tuomela (1977a) has argued for a conceptual functionalism advancing the Functional-State Identity Theory of Putnam and the Computational-State Functionalism of Fodor and Block.

Tuomela distinguishes nonconceptual occurrence events (i.e., raw feels, sensations) and dispositional categorical states like wanting, hoping, believing etc. Such states are functionally construed and realistically conceived dispositional states with certain propositional structure. (Tuomela, 1978) Thus, Tuomela accepts Armstrong's realistic account of dispositions. "Dispositions essentially involve intrinsic basic properties." (p. 428, 1978)

On semantical grounds, Tuomela suggests that we should say "x is such that, if it is put in water it dissolves."

If a lump of sugar does not dissolve when put in water, we would not speak of it being a lump of sugar.
Epistemologically also, we express a disposition $D$ of a thing $\gamma$ by saying that under circumstances $C$, if it is stimulated ($F'ed$), then it will respond in a certain manner; i.e.

If $\gamma$'s having disposition $D$ is $F'ed$ (under $C$), then $\gamma$ will $G$ in response.

Tuomela maintains that $G'ing$ of $\gamma$ when $\gamma$ is $F'ed$ is causally accounted for by the basis properties; e.g., microstructural property of sugar can explain its disposition to dissolve in water. The semantic structure at the disposition-attribution has something underlying in reality to support it.

Tuomela (1973) has argued for the indispensability of theoretical concepts. This indispensability according to Tuomela (1976) is "the logical indispensability for deductive systematization".

$\gamma ' s G' ing$ by reference to it being $F'ed$, is explained on the basis of causal law that for all and all $t$, if $\gamma$ has $K$ at $t$ and $\gamma$ is in $C$ at $t$
then if \( \gamma \) is \( \text{fed} \) at \( t_1 \), it is \( \text{G'ing} \) at \( t \). Now if we have singulars like \( \chi \), has \( K \) at \( t_1 \), \( \gamma \) is in \( C \) at \( t_1 \) and \( \gamma \) has been \( \text{fed} \) at \( t_1 \), then any true statement that \( \gamma \cdot \text{G'ed} \) at \( t_1 \) is explained.

Tuomela accepts the time relative analysis of the predicates. Tuomela has shown that subjunctive conditionals are supported by law.

Tuomela makes it clear that though he endorses Armstrong's realism regarding dispositions, he does not accept the contingent identification of the dispositions with their basis. Tuomela's definition of disposition clarifies the link between some theoretical properties and observational properties. Tuomela's definition concerns only "single-track dispositions i.e. dispositions manifested in only one way". (1978, p. 473).

Tuomela thus claims that his functionalism conceives psychological dispositions "as realistically conceivable dispositional theorectico-reportive concepts" (p. 446).
III Scientific Inadequacy of Dispositional Analysis.

We have seen that the main controversy about dispositions is whether and how dispositional states are linked with their categorical basic states.

Quine (1977) traces the use of dispositional idioms to our ignorance about the real nature of things. To say that a body is soluble in water is to say that it would dissolve if it were in water. This is an intensional conditional. Ryle, argues Quine, remained contented with the claims that dispositions do not hold any mystery and there is no plainer English than the dispositional idioms. Thus, Ryle acquiesced in an undefined notion of disposition.

According to Quine's own view, disposition is a "physical state or mechanism". The physical mechanisms of solubility are now clarified in scientific theory and hence the idiom is replaced by the language of states and mechanisms of sugar in microphysical terms. Quine admits that we are still
very far from discovering the physical basis of intelligence and hence we have to go by only dispositional predicates, but they will be replaced eventually by non-dispositional terms of scientific theory. With the progress of scientific theory, dispositional predicates will eventually be replaced. e.g. 'water soluble' as a predicate is replaced by theoretical terms specifying the microphysical structure. Perhaps psychological dispositional terms are not easily eliminable like this. Dispositional idiom, according to Quine, is programmatic and regulative, not constitutive. For an ideal language of a finished theory, dispositional predicates are not required. The dispositional idiom, according to Quine is "handy but not indispensable". (p.160)

Levi and Morgenbesser (1977) discuss the criteria for distinguishing between non-occurrent terms that can be treated dispositionally and the non-occurrent terms which can not be treated dispositionally. Levi and Morgenbesser point to Quine's illuminating reference to "ceteris paribus" (i.e. other things being equal or same clause) clause and dispositions. (Ceteris paribus clauses
are place-holders for unspecified standing conditions. Dispositional explanations are extendable, because we can always ask for additional explanations. Thus dispositional explanations are not to be assimilated to ideal explanations, because, for the latter, asking for additional explanations would be like asking why the world is what it is. Both, CETERIS PARIBUS clauses and dispositional explanations acknowledge that necessary conditions are not fulfilled yet.

For Levy and Morgenbesser, dispositional predicates, like the CETERIS PARIBUS clauses, function as place-holders for specifying conditions in generalized statements. The difference between them is that the dispositional predicate, unlike ceteris paribus clauses, entail commitment to the kind of predicates which will replace the place-holder. Thus, use of "magnetism" in a general hypothetical is more specific than CETERIS PARIBUS clause. Similarly, to say that objects break when tapped lightly, is vague compared to saying that they break because they are fragile, as thus dispositional predicate gives specific clues regarding further investigation about the microstructure of fragile objects.
The point of Levy's argument is that even if beliefs and other mental predicates are dispositional predicates serving as placeholders, it is still an open question whether such predicates are to be unpacked by using only neurophysiological terms. Dispositional predicates, with basis, are problem-solving predicates; dispositional predicates without basis are problem raising; and those predicates lacking basis, though supposed to have some basis, are mystery-making predicates.

Levy and Morgenbasser have argued that in psychology, as contrasted to physics, "there is no consensus regarding the kinds of predicates to be used in specifying basis for psychological dispositions" (p.404). Adequate scientific grounds for characterizing the basis is till lacking in psychology. Thus the dispositions in psychology are mystery-making predicates. Thus, Levy and Morgenbasser claim that to say that beliefs are dispositions to act, is not to solve a philosophical problem, but to raise a scientific problem.

IV Ontological Inadequacy of Dispositional Analysis

William Alston (1978), distinguished between conceptual and ontological theses about dispositions by claiming that
even if our concepts of beliefs, enjoyments need etc. are purely dispositional, it does not entail that psychological states grasped by the means of these concepts are not actual states or processes.

The conceptual thesis about dispositions is that some mental concepts do not carry any implication of the existence of mental happenings, but the ontological thesis, which is stronger than conceptual thesis, is that there are no mental happenings at all. Ryle was not aware of this distinction, and as a result of this, critics like Place and Penelhum have argued that to defend ourselves against Ryle's attack is to show that particular concept which we want to defend is not dispositional.

Both Ryle and his critics unnecessarily take for granted the following "Exclusiveness Principle", according to Alston:

A state which can be identified by the use of a purely dispositional predicate can not also be an occurrence.

(p. 366)
Now this principle is to be accepted at the conceptual level and not at the ontological level. Alston clarifies that a dispositional analysis of concept leaves no room for an episodic analysis of that concept. Thus the dispositional and the occurrent concepts are mutually exclusive, but that does not mean that a state satisfying a purely dispositional concept does not involve something going on. Purely dispositional and purely occurrent predicates and statements are indeed mutually exclusive. But this exclusiveness is not ontological. Ryle therefore wrongly assumes that if any state is identified as a disposition, then it cannot also be an occurrence. E.g., a certain concept of an oak tree may be perfectly adequate for an accurate identification of oak trees; but this does not show that there are no features of oak trees not reflected in the concept of an oak tree.

We may use dispositional concepts and they may help us to identify certain objects and their properties. We can describe a person's enjoying playing tennis by using subjunctive conditionals and thereby giving a purely dispositional analysis of it, but this does not exclude that the enjoyment itself is an actual state or occurrence, however short-lived. Alston makes an
important contribution to the philosophy of mind by making the distinction between an ontological claim and a conceptual claim about dispositions. This distinction throws light on how Ryle was misguided in his belief that the "dogma of the ghost in machine" can be destroyed by way of showing that our concepts of the mental are merely dispositional. Critics of Ryle are also equally misguided in believing that it will be enough to show that the concepts of the mental states are not dispositional. In short, the Concepts might be dispositional and yet there might be occurrences corresponding to them. Of course, Alston is not all interested in rehabilitating the "dogma of the ghost in machine".

Alston makes it clear that entity referred to by a linguistic expression may have many properties not reflected in the meaning of that expression, such that, an account of the meaning of that expression will afford no basis for anticipating them. The expression 'the banker who lives next door' leaves many questions open about the person to whom it refers.

Alston argues that we can definitely talk about what an expression means, but when we move from the
talk about the meaning of an expression to the talk about what it refers to we are making ontological claims. So talking about the meaning of mental predicates is different from talking about its reference. The conceptual thesis is about our ways of grasping the things; the ontological thesis is about what things there are. The bridge between the conceptual and the ontological lies in the 'reference formulations'. To determine the nature of the mental state is an ontological question; analysing the mental concept is a Conceptual-cum-linguistic question. Ryle and critics have conflated the two theses unknowingly.

Ryle has given us phenomenal account of dispositions; Armstrong has argued for a realistic account of dispositions. For Ryle, it is logically impossible for a disposition to be an actual state; for Armstrong, it is logically necessary for a disposition to be an actual state. Alston rejects both these accounts. He claims that it the generic features of dispositional concepts leave open the possibility of the identification between the dispositions and states.

The dispositional predicate conceptualizing a state may be identical with the one conceptualized by means of the neurological predicate i.e., we need not be afraid of
ghosts in the machine. The neurophysiological and the psychological predicates are not synonymous. An actual state, which make dispositional attribution true, is the same state that would make a certain neurophysiological attribution true. This does not undermine the legitimacy of referring to processes by mentalistic terms at some level.

In his close scrutiny of Ryle's philosophy of mind, R. D. Lewis (1969) points out that talking about skills, habits and dispositions is not enough. He believes that in the very exercises of skills and dispositions, some occurring processes are continuously involved. A surgeon's skill does not lie in uttering medical truths: Lewis agrees with this, but he is not prepared to conclude therefore, that the skill lies only in surgeon's hands making the correct movements. (p.53) What surgeon knows in dispositional way is actualized from moment to moment in conscious process in his understanding. The hands of skilled surgeon function during operation efficiently because the appropriate mental processes do continues as well.

Lewis agrees with Ryle that mental episodes are not countable or isolable like physical episodes; but for Lewis, we can not derive from this peculiarity of mental
episodes that they should be treated as nonexistent. Thus Ryle's dispositional analysis is ontologically inadequate. "Much of this richly varied content of conscious state is moreover constantly changing, some shifting more to the centre of attention and drifting away again". (p.55) Mental activity, according to Lewis, is like a stream or flow, in which there are many "currents, whirls and eddies" (p.55). Mental life is not a series of discrete isolable episodes. i.e., it is not a series of jerks or spasms. Lewis agrees that Ryle is right in saying that no one ever says that at 10 a.m. he was occupied in willing this or that. According to Lewis, Ryle has overlooked that my willing is the continuous maintaining of my intention. No one, for example, can say that he was occupied with being alive at 10.00 a.m. because whatever he at that time was doing he was alive at that time. So Ryle's argument about our not being able to localize or count our acts of willing rests on the confused belief that mental life comprises jerky, isolable countable and datable occurrences. From the standpoint of Lewis, dispositions are compatible with dualist ontology.
Ryle examines certain linguistic usages which are appropriate for the locatable, and episodic occurrences, and then argues that as such occurrences are never to be identified by the proper linguistic usages, there are no mental processes at all. Lewis shows that it is not necessary to restrict our view of mental life to jerky spasmodic episodes. The nature of consciousness is better conceptualized in terms of flow of events of continuous stream. Such a concept of consciousness is not incompatible with the ascriptions of dispositions, because during the exercise of such dispositions, continuous activity of attending, noticing, willing, intending would be involved. From the standpoint of Lewis, Ryle falsely assumed that if there is any inner mental activity, then it should resemble or be a strict counterpart of overt behaviour, because such assumptions led him to discard the concept of mental occurrences.

There is an epistemological dimension of disposition statements very clearly brought out by
Stuart Hampshire (1971), Hampshire has listed the following criteria of dispositional ascriptions.

(i) it is a summary statement of what tends to happen or is liable to happen. (ii) Dispositions can not come into being, then pass away and then come into being very rapidly.

(iii) A dispositions must be manifested in actual incidents. (iv) Dispositional ascription of character traits are true only when, (a) one has occasions for continuous studies and (b) one can quote incident in which the dispositions manifest themselves, in someone's actual behaviour (v) There is no logical connection between dispositions and behaviour. (vi) Denial of a dispositional tendency does not mean an ascription of counter-tendency. (vii) Dispositional ascription does not guarantee that a person will never act contrary to the ascribed dispositions. Dispositional statements are thus different from universal statements.

What Hampshire stresses, here by his analysis of dispositions is that we should not construe statements about human dispositions as hypothetical statements as such.
When one makes a dispositional statements, he is summarizing the trend of someone behaviour up to the time of making such a statement.

Hampshire points out that we must distinguish between testing or epistemological checks of mentalistic statements and their nature. What Ryle means is that tests of mentalistic statements would require dispositional (hypothetically expressed) statements. Ryle himself, according to Hampshire, has warned against converting the epistemological distinctions into the distinctions of logic, and yet as Hampshire puts it, in Ryle there is a confusion regarding identifying the meaning of statement with the method of its verification. Overt behaviour definitely is an evidence for mentalistic statements, but this does not mean that mentalistic statements, are to be identified with "hypothetical statements about behaviour". (p.100) We test the concentration of children by testing their performance, but we do not identify the performance and the concentration, words like 'brittle' behave differently than words like 'irritable.'
Hampshire (1971) dissociates himself from the philosophy of logical behaviourism as well as Cartesian dualism. According to Hampshire:

One need only discard the primitive prejudice that all mental verbs must either stand for an instantaneous event or for a continuous process which is always the same whenever it occurs in the sense that it always admits of one and only one description or failing this, that the criterion of the application of the verb must be found in overt behaviour and the external situation. (p.158)

---

Mentalistic Component in Psychological Attribution - Research.

Personality traits are treated as enduring and stable characteristics used to explain behaviour. Recent psychological research (Mishel, 1968, 73, Shweder, 1975 considers personality traits as only summaries of past behaviour, Alston (1970), like Ryle (1949), considers traits as dispositional in Character. Hirschberg (1978) however, contends that dispositional analysis of traits, correctly understood, does not rule out the causal status of traits.
nor the possibility of traits entering into theoretical relationship with other constructs like beliefs and desires. Dispositions are construed by Hirschberg as structures, that under specified conditions, cause the specified performance. Traits derive their explanatory power by virtue of being embedded in a theoretical network. For psychological dispositions, the causal property may not be discoverable.

Golding (1975, 1977a, 1977b, 1978) takes a position, according to which human beings are extraordinarily active in the process of responding to and constructing the psychological realities upon which they operate. Golding suggests that we should rely on the notion of psychological organizing principles. Golding considers the lawful organization of subjective event structure vis-a-vis objective event structure as due to psychologically organizing principles. The clinical personality social phenomena require the hypothesized existence of psychological organizing principles.
In the clinical personality social domain, most of the perceptions and articulation of psychological phenomena depends upon the psychological construal processes of observers. Thus, the notion of objective behavioural criterion vanishes. A purely behavioural and dispositional analysis is inadequate scientifically, because, "it is difficult to think of a case where any objective criterion, ontologically independent of the perceptual-psychological transformations of observes, exists."

(Golding, in London, 1978, p.81)

Geis (1978) has also argued that an explicit phenomenological analysis that recognizes subject's roles in constructing their experience account for behaviour more adequately then either simple SITUATIONIST OR TRAIT approaches.

In studies of person perceptions, Jones and Nisbett (1971) have found that people are more likely to attribute the causes of their own behaviour to situations, whereas observers are more likely to attribute the responsibility of same behaviour to the internal dispositions of the actors. There is
an actor observer difference in causal attributions. It is therefore clear that a mere dispositional attribution is not enough across all kinds of situations. Dispositional attribution is a legitimate concept in psychology of personality and person perception, but the meaning of situation as perceived is more important than mere behaviour or dispositions. A behavioural analysis has to include more than muscular movements of a response.

It is interesting to see that what is known as "the problem of other minds" in philosophy of mind, is taken up for research in psychology dealing with attribution. Baron, Byrne and Kentowitz (1977) have shown that in our attempts to know and understand others, we must, firstly, understand the major traits of others through the observation of their overt behaviour and secondly, we must combine the information thus obtained into consistent and unified impressions of the persons. The first task is to understand attribution and the second task of psychology is to understand the process of impression formation. Research on attribution and impression formation is a very recent area of psychological...
research (Kelly, 1972, 1973; Miller, 1975; Nisbett et al., 1973), but it is clear that unless some non-neural properties and processes are admitted, psychological attribution is unintelligible.

Sheaver (1975) has drawn a flow chart for attribution to a personal disposition. (Wrightsman, 1977, p.101). It appears for example that if an action of an actor striking another person is observed and if the action is found intentional, then if it is not coerced, the action is attributed to personal disposition or hostility. From the research on impression-management (Alexander, 1973; Goffman, 1967; Modigliani, 1968), it emerges that, "people are always forming impressions of us and using these impressions to guide their interaction". (Wrightsman, 1977, p.118).

These illustrations from recent psychological research indicate that a simple dispositional analysis based on observations of random behavioural events cannot advance our knowledge of human affairs very much. Psychology has moved away from behaviourism current during Ryle's publication of The Concept of Mind (1949), and the very fact that complicated models and theories in the areas of social perception and attribution are available, indicates the need to accommodate the
Ryle, of course, is right in saying that psychological predicates like "intelligent" are not ascribed because of some special occurrences preceding intelligent behaviour. Psychologist Radford and Burton (1974) hold that Ryle's argument is also relevant to the study of thinking. It is a fundamental mistake to believe that intelligence is an "entity separate from the behaviour from which it is inferred". (9, 128, 1974). Radford and Burton regret the fact that psychologists write on intelligence as though Ryle's argument did not exist. They believe that no psychologist should be unaware of Ryle's *The Concept of Mind*. Hebb (1949), a psychologist in *The Organization of Behaviour*, also came up with Ryle's type of analysis by conceiving "intelligence" as referring to enduring aptitude; but Hebb (1949) explains psychological processes neurophysiologically, Ryle did not agree with such an analysis. Hebb (1968) denies that introspection is involved in reporting imagery.

Surveying recent psychological research on imagery, Sheehan (1978) concludes that although imagery exists it is disappointing that we do not yet
know how exactly we should define its nature. He agrees that the cumulative research in the last two decades affirms the reality of imagery. Imagery is functionally linked with remembering and perceiving.

It is therefore not true that we can just brush aside imagery-reports as empty dispositional reports. Intelligence-research and imagery-research have different implications for philosophy of mind. In intelligence-research, Ryle's view fits with facts, because ability-denoting concepts are dispositional; but imagery-research does not necessarily endorse Rylean analysis.

It is the contention of this study that perception involving encountered qualities of various sense-modalities is inevitable for knowledge of objects and events and such encounters called as "experiences" can not just be neural processes although they might be perfectly correlated with neural processes. Similarly, mental processes can not just be behavioural processes though they may be very highly correlated with them. A man is called irritable because on some occasions, we have observed his angry behaviour and the relative frequency of such observations on our part results into our ascription of the irritable dispositions to persons.
So even when most of the mentalistic language turns out to be dispositional, some encounters including perception of clues emitted by the behaving person in social settings are presupposed. Such encounterings are not to be treated in dispositional terms.

Ginsberg (1972) has shown that counterexamples are available which can make it true both that (a) one can have belief without tendencies and (b) one can have tendencies without having the belief. This means that there are cases where we would accept either the belief-ascription or the tendencies ascription but not both. As Ginsberg puts it:

If a dispositional analysis is to be adequate, then, it will have to be more sophisticated than that programmatically suggested by Ryle. But even more sophisticated formulations will be inadequate because the general program of a dispositional reduction of belief is conceptually unacceptable. (1974, p. 14).

Ginsberg considers even an analysis of belief as "clusters" of dispositions as inadequate. At the
same time, Ginsberg does not consider beliefs as a phenomenologically presented entity. (PPE).

Sensations, twitches, pains, cramps, aches, tastes etc. are PPEs. Ginsberg argues that it is not necessary to believe that something is mental if and only if it is a PPE. Beliefs are non-PPEs and yet mental.

Mind, according to Ginsberg (1972), has certain functions (e.g., that of remembering), capacities (e.g., that of analogizing), and components (e.g., consciousness). Our answer to a question of whether a given entity has beliefs wants emotions etc. depends upon whether or not we can establish that an M-theory (i.e., a theory essentially employing mentalistic concepts) can be appropriately used in a given context in reference to that entity.

Malcolm (1972) has attacked logical behaviourism on the ground that behaviourism is a third-person philosophy of mind, because first person ascriptions or self-ascriptions are not to be treated as based on the observation of one's behaviour. Contrary to this, psychologist Bem (1967, 1970, 1972) has claimed that people come to know their attitudes and
other internal states partially by inferring them from observation of their own behaviour. Bem's theory is known 'self-perception theory'. Behaviour changes our feelings and attitudes. Bem (1970, 72) has quoted experimental studies in support of the view that observation of one's own behaviour leads to self-attribution.

This is an important research on attribution interesting to philosophers, who have been impressed by Malcolm's argument about first-person attributions not based on observations. Bem's studies make it clear that people infer their attitudes from behaviour provided that the information from internal cues is weak or ambiguous.

It is however relevant to note that self-attribution of attitudes is different from self-attribution of episodes. If I am angry, I need not wait for verifying whether I am angry by looking into a mirror. If I am suffering from toothache, no observation would be required for me to decide whether I have a toothache. Self-attribution research and other-attribution research both converge to highlight a
mentalistic component required for a psychological theory. Malcolm's argument is valid for episodic self-attribution and is not damaged by Bem's self-perception theory, because Bem's theory is concerned with attribution of dispositional concepts like attitudes rather than phenomenal concepts like colour-perception or pains. Malcolm (1972) rules out inferential self-ascriptions of experience-indicative concepts whereas Bem (1972) accepts inferential self-ascription of dispositional concepts.

Bem's self-ascription theory is very important for philosophy of mind because it would have the impact of weakening some part of the first-person argument used against Rylean type of dispositional analysis. There are, if Bem's view is accepted, some first-person self-attributions which are based on the observation of one's own behaviour. It is still not true that all kinds of self-attributions are observation-based. Dispositional analysis of mentalistic concepts can not be defeated by showing that self-attributions are not dispositional but by showing that ALL mentalistic ascriptions are not dispositional. Bem's researches would thus require a philosopher
to change the mode of his argument against dispositional attribution. Ascription of intelligence, achievement need or ambition to myself by will be myself will be inaccurate compared to the same attributions by others about myself.

Like Bem's self-attribute theory, Hebb claims that we infer our knowledge of private events from behaviour.

It is however not necessary to follow this psychological researches any further at stage; what can be safely asserted is that even though concepts like 'intelligence' or 'neuroticism' are not necessarily concepts of some actual ongoing inner processes, it does not follow that all mentalistic concepts are the concepts of dispositional attribution and even if, due to the methodological requirements of psychology if such concepts are treated dispositionally, it does not follow that they have no connection at all with what we call 'experiences'
Conclusion.

It is clear from the preceding discussion that Rylean analysis is not without its merits. It demolishes meaningless proliferation of mental entities behind every kind of mentalistic ascription. We will be saved from postulating all kinds of ghostly entities behind the psychological predicates of tendencies capacities and skills. Ryle has rightly laid to rest the ghosts corresponding to each psychological predicate and such ghosts had no business except functioning as pseudo-explanatory mechanisms. But at the same time Ryle need not throw away the baby with bath-tub. All mentalistic concepts are not necessarily dispositional. All dispositional concepts do not necessarily undermine any reference to occurrences at some level.

It is a matter of some controversy whether Ryle is a materialist.

Hanfling (1974) discusses whether Ryle is a behaviourist as well as materialist. The question arises because Ryle regards the whole mind-matter dichotomy as one huge mistake. He recommends that theorists should drop BOTH the words. Even then,
Hanfling et al. include Ryle's behaviourism under 'materialism.' This is because he (Ryle) denies the 'inner', mental theatre. This is the reason why his theory can not be regarded as neutral between mental and physical. "He is, I would say, a materialist in the sense that according to him all mentalistic talk can be reduced to talk about physical, bodily happenings or tendencies." (Hanfling, p.43). Hanfling does not consider Ryle as a simple-minded materialist, because Ryle has made important distinctions between different types of concepts and categories, some of which are and some of which are not applicable to physical objects. According to our classification (Chapter I), Ryle's theory is an O UM - L M M combination and hence is cognitively unstable in the sense that it would turn out to be either mentalistic or inadequate.

Ryle, like the neurophysiological materialists (i.e. Smart and Armstrong), keeps the mentalistic language distinct but only to dissolve it into behavioural or dispositional language.

Ryle should be given the credit for dealing satisfactorily with a great number of mentalistic expressions but Hanfling (1974) finds Ryle's
treatment of OCCURRENCES like sensations, mental images and thoughts, inadequate. Ryle's treatment of "seeing in the mind's eye" and of "talking to oneself in silence" is not satisfactory and thus dispositional analysis can not be applied to them. Ryle's approach is valid only for some mentalistic concepts.

Ryle leaves out the occurrents which are non-neural and non-dispositional. It is not claimed here that such occurrences have for their own substratum, some non-physical medium or spirit. In this sense, there are no "ghosts in machine".

Gellner (1974) objects to Ryle's position because Ryle's expression 'ghost-in-machine' employs the "mechanics of denigration by terminology". (p.59). If at all consciousness is a ghost, it is a WARM GHOST having cognitive role and contact with the world. Gellner fully accepts Ryle's attack on PARAMECHANICAL GHOST of philosophical psychology. Such a ghost is invoked to explain various activities which are described as mental. Such a ghost has no other role than that of providing (seeing) explanations of human intellectual capacities Gellner argues that
Ryle failed to distinguish sharply the cold ghost of old fashioned psychologists from the warm ghost of epistemologists. As Gellner puts it; "Materialism is an ontological prejudice against the heavy stuff". (p.63). The term 'solid', according to Gellner, has a favourable emotive charge.

In my paper (Baxi, 1979 pp. 67-74), I have argued that:

(i) the reality of consciousness is presupposed when ghosts are distinguished from real persons.

(ii) the concept of ghost presupposes the concept of person.

(iii) the concept of consciousness is necessary for the concept of person.

(iv) the unreality of ghost implies the reality of persons.

(v) consciousness is neither unreal nor insubstantial and hence there is no point in conceiving consciousness in terms of ghosts.

(vi) accepting Gellner's WARM GHOST in epistemology, implies that the use of denigrating terminology like 'ghost-in-machine' fails to DISSOLVE the mind-body problem.
(vii) Unless conscious states are somehow accommodated in general ontology, the distinction between ghost and machine itself is a non-starter. Either ghosts and persons are both rejected in order to establish a completely physicalist ontology or if, persons are admitted, there is no logical space to conceive persons as ghosts in machine. "To admit PERSONS is to deny that THEY are like ghosts rather than that THERE are ghosts" (Baxi, p.68, 1979).

It can therefore be concluded that Rylean dispositional approach is doubly inadequate: it is inadequate. As dispositional approach because Armstrong has shown that realist account of dispositions is superior to Rylean account; it is also inadequate as dispositional account of ALL mentalistic concepts.

It can therefore be maintained that:

(i) Most of the ability-indicating or tendency-indicating concepts can be dispositionally analysed.

(ii) Dispositional analysis cannot just be phenomenally; some realistic basis should be accepted for dispositions.
(iii) Even if dispositional analysis is epistemologically required, it does not rule out the existence of occurrent events ontologically.

(iv) Psychological Attribution-Research establishes a non-neural nexus of dispositional attribution. Unless mentalistic component is admitted, psychological self-attribution or other-attribution is illegitimate and unintelligible.

(v) Ryle's materialism i.e. behaviouristic antimentalism is an O U M - L M M combination and hence it is either inadequate or it has to move towards some kind of mentalism.

(vi) The advantages claimed over neurophysiological antimentalism are not genuine because both neurophysiological and behaviouristic reductionism are equally inadequate without the recognition of the mentalistic component and with such a recognition of the existence of mentalistic component, the theory ceases to be unidimensional materialism.