CHAPTER IV

ARGUMENTS FROM MENTALISTIC LANGUAGE.

Introduction

We have seen that under the pressure of the arguments from mentalistic properties, the identity-theorists move towards congruence by denying them or by claiming that the properties do not upset the contingent identity.

In this chapter, the arguments from mentalistic language are considered and it is found that the identity theorists advocate either topic-neutral and/or caused or purely eliminative approaches and it turns out that topic-neutral analysis fails to maintain the adequacy claim and eliminative analysis moves towards congruence at the cost of adequacy.

The argument from the mentalistic language claims that sensation-reports or after-image reports refer to some property of feature of our experience immediately encountered and such property or feature
encountered in phenomenal field of consciousness is expressed in language which is characterized as mentalistic. The mind-brain identity theory has to refute this argument and in doing so, offer an alternative analysis of mentalistic language. What follows is a brief exposition of various types of analysis of mentalistic language. Such analysis is evaluated with reference to the critical design outlined in chapter 1 of this study.

I Inadequacy of Topic-Neutral Analysis

(I) T.N.T. thesis

Against the argument from mentalistic language, Smart, a reductive materialist, adopts a topic-neutral approach and argues that;

When a person says, "I see yellowish range after-image", he is saying something like this: "There is something going on, which is like what is going on when, I have my eyes open, am awake and there is an orange illuminated in good light in front of me, (i.e. when I really see an orange

(Smart, 1959/ in Borst, 1970 p.60)
Smart makes two claims (1) A person reporting after-image, claims that what is going on in him is like what is going on when he actually perceived something and (II) when a person perceived something, he REALLY sees something, of which the after-image experiences is a resemblance.

Smart distinguishes between the following statements,

(I) The lemon is yellow.

(II) The lemon looks yellow.

In (I) we are reacting to lemon and in (II) we are reacting to our own internal states. (II) does not entail that something really yellow actually exists out there.

Thus, a report of after-image is a neutral report. "There is something going on which is like what is going on when ..." is an expression which is topic-neutral or quasi-logical. The report is not only topic-neutral but is abstract. A person may say that 'Someone is in the room' thus reporting truly that a doctor is in the room, even though he has never heard of the doctor. There is only
one person in the room and the world 'someone'
refers to the same person referred to by the word
'doctor'. The statement about there being someone in
the room is neutral. Similarly, the reports of
sensations are topic-neutral in the sense that they
only imply that something is going on in the
organism reporting the sensation event, but they do
not specify the nature or identity of what is going
on in the person. The first stage of Smart's
argument is the claim that sensation reports are topic-
neutral and the second stage involves the claim that
SUCH topic-neutral reports refer to the brain events
only. Sensations have many properties, but all such
properties are neurological properties.

Smart admits that we can report that one
thing is like another thing without knowing the
respects in which they are alike. Smart illustrates
such a possibility by saying that a machine can be
devised such that, it can report on a punched tape
whether or not two objects are similar. Such a machine
would be easier to build, compared to a machine which
would report the locus of such similarities.
Of course, Smart clarifies that it is not the after image that is a brain process, but the experience of having the after-image is itself a brain process. There is, he adds, no such thing as after-image or sense datum, though there is the experience of having an image.

In his recent defence of the identity theory, Smart (1972) leans more towards the translation form of a theory. He argues that "topic-neutral formula provides a translation scheme" (1972, p. 151). He denies that common sense mentalistic discourse implies the falsity of materialism. If follows that such a discourse is metaphysically neutral Smart claims that the "hard core of common sense mentalistic idioms is topic-neutral" (p.151).

(II) Arguments against TNT thesis

It has been argued against Smart's TNT that:

(i) Topic-neutral translations can not be completed, because all relevant conditions will have to be specified in the translation (Shaffer, 1963).
(ii) Even if the completed translations are obtained, they will not be adequate to the meaning of sensation reports. If, for example, I have noticed a pretty woman and even if she is identical with the best dressed woman in my town, I may not be aware of it. The same is true regarding sensations. From this, it follows that a person reporting a mental event must have noticed some non-physical feature of the occurrence. (Shyffer, 1963)

(iii) Such translations are inadequate because introspective reports are necessarily private. (Bair, 1962)

(iv) Reporting of experience is not reporting something vaguely. If a person has never seen a yellow lemon, then on the first presentation of a yellow lemon, he will notice something not noticed before and Smart's translation fails in such cases. (Heil, 1970)

(v) If contingency thesis is to be maintained, then materialism which makes no room for sensations is a non-starter, because it either generates necessary identity statements or contingent but inappropriate identity statements (Wilkerson, 1974)
(vi) Unless we take into account the precise phenomenal contents of experiences, how can we classify experiences as like/unlike others? If however, we do take into account the specific phenomenal contents of experience, then we are back at the same phenomenal properties which Smart wants to avoid talking about. Thus, if mentalistic descriptions are characterized topic-neutrally, then there is a circularity which blocks the identifying references and if psychological descriptions are eliminated, then brain-process brain-process identity becomes a necessary identity. (Wilkerson, 1974)

(vii) Some words are obstensive terms, and nonobstensive terms can not fulfill the same descriptive role as obstensive terms. Colour-words are obstensive terms. 'Pain' is also an obstensive term. Therefore, one must either eliminate qualities of experience or ostensively define neurophysiological predicates in terms of the qualities of experience. Thus, the fact that an object looks red to a person can not be described without change of meaning in nonobstensive terminology of basic scientific theory. Still however, some scientific theory which comprises no obstensive terms can definitely provide all the explanation that there can be of the objects looking red.
It is quite plausible to believe that though the 
DESCRIPTIVE functions of nonostensive and ostensive 
terms (like 'yours', 'pains') are not the same, 
their REFERENTIAL functions are the same. Thus 
Smart's behaviouristic analysis of colour and 
Armstrong's physicalists account of colours is 
inadequate. (Thornton, 1972)

(viii) Smart's and Place's analysis of our concepts 
of experiences contain the ontological implication 
that experiences are not particulars and therefore 
can not be identical with particular neurophysiological 
processes. Reports of experiences are to be 
treated as CLASSIFICATIONS and not as SPECIFICATIONS, 
because there are no mental particulars. Smart should 
have claimed that as mental predicates are neutral, 
the application of them does not imply the existence 
of a category of mental particulars. (Jensen, 1972)

(iii) Adequacy criterion

We may now examine the impact of these arguments 
regarding the adequacy-criterion. In my paper, (Baxi, 
1977), I have discussed Smart's TNT. What follows 
here is a revised version of the main arguments of 
the paper (Baxi, 1977)
(a) The use language is to be committed in some way. To say that there is SOMEONE in the room, though neutral between there being a doctor or a burglar in the room, is not neutral between there being a computer and there being a person in the room. It can therefore be pointed out that when Smart treats image-statements as like or unlike perception statements he implies that there is some resemblance between the phenomena denoted by them. If therefore, the phenomena denoted by sensation-statements and afterimage statements do not exist, then there is neither any resemblance or lack of resemblance, because noticing the resemblance or lack of it presupposes the phenomena denoted by after-image statements and perception-statements.

(b) The inadequate firstly because it denies the phenomenal-property-component of mentalistic language and secondly because, even if such a denial could have been made, it has not been successfully made. The whole issue, to my mind, depends upon whether phenomenal properties are eliminable. Smart, on the one hand, admits them by saying that sensation language has a different meaning and logic; and on
the other hand, Smart denies them by construing sensation language topic-neutral. It can be admitted that when I say that I really see something green, it does not mean that my brain processes are green or that my consciousness is itself green. Nobody claims this. What is being claimed is that I have certain directly reportable experiences and the words 'green' etc. get their meaning due to the ostensive context. There is nothing neutral about my report of green objects or afterimages. First-person sensation reports are positive and content-bound. If all such reports are neutral, there will be no point in making distinctions between my report of a green object and my report of a yellow object. It is true that colour-discriminations can be tested with reference to behavioural response-discriminations. It is also true that colour-discriminations are caused by neurophysiological events. Smart's identity theory becomes inadequate only when it characterises colour and after-image statements as topic-neutral.

(c) Smart has said that something is going on in me when I really see an orange.
He has not specified as to what exactly is going on when I really see an orange before me. Neurophysiologists would discover the constant correlates of this experience. If this is what is asserted by Smart, it can be easily accepted. Something must be going on in my sense organs and brain when I really see a colour. This is not the point of dispute. The point is that whatever else is going on in my nervous system, at least what I am directly aware of when I see an orange before me is something that is actually experienced by me. The irreducibly phenomenal character of whatever is directly presented by the stimulation of my sense organs can not be merely characterized as something going on in me when something is presented in the environment. The experiential component of phenomenal language can not be topic-neutrally dissolved. It is very surprising that Smart has never referred to any psychological research on images and colour perception. He discusses common-sense language and neurophysiological language and omits the psychological language completely. Commonsense language may be inadequate or vague or imprecise. It may be necessary to refine it, but Smart has not successfully argued that it has to be revised only in the direction of neurophysiology.
To illustrate my point, I would like to refer to the descriptions of after-image accepted by psychologists.

When a bright light stimulates a retina, some of the pigment in the receptive cells is bleached and this bleaching or rather the conversion of the pigments from chemical to electrical energy induces the visual signal which in turn is transmitted to the appropriate areas of the brain. After the original stimulus has been removed, the pigments begin regenerating and this also sends a signal to the brain though a much weaker one. The result is the after image most commonly seen when the eyes are closed after fixating on a very bright light. (Evans, 1978, p. 20)

Similarly, Hilgard, Atkinson and Atkinson (1975) have defined after-image as under:

.....(It is) the sensory experience that remains when the stimulus is withdrawn.....

e.g. the negative afterimage of the picture or the train of coloured images that results after staring at the sun. (1975, p.599).
It thus follows that accepting the neurophysiological explanation of the occurrences of experiences of afterimages does not imply that there is no phenomenal character of the experience. A report of afterimage is definitely a report of such a phenomenal quality of experience. Whatever may be the explanation of such encountered qualities of the phenomenal field, the FACT of such encounterings can not just be eliminated from language.

Natsoulas (1977), a psychologist, has extensively reviewed the current literature on the controversies over the subjective experiential elements of perception. He indicates that qualitative content of experience has homogeneity and spatio-temporal smoothness and hence a blunt denial of such a dimension of experience can not help us.

(d) It can be said that in so far as Smart wants to endorse the claim that the language of sensations is referential, his theory is a linguistically multidimensional theory; but in so far as he claims that there is nothing else over and above that which is admitted by physics, his theory is an ontologically unicdimensional materialism (OUM). It is the
argument of this study that LMM - OUM combination is an unstable theory and hence Smart's argument for the topic-neutral translation of sensation reports is a move in the direction of making the components of the theory consonant with each other. This move results into a linguistically and ontologically unidimensional materialism. It is therefore not different from the move made by Focky towards a more consonant eliminative materialism. It was predicted by the help of the criteria of congruence and adequacy stated in Chapter I, that if any theory has a dissonant component, its defenders will move in the direction of making the theory more consistent. This is exactly what Smart has done by introducing the topic-neutrality device, but in doing so the theory loses its adequacy. This is because it fails to recognize the existence of what there is in the world i.e. phenomenal properties reported in sensational language.

Mundle (1971) argues that seeing of colours, and being conscious of their qualities can not be ignored by talking about 'discriminating' behaviour. For Mundle, Smart's (or any other behaviourst's) analysis in terms of discriminating behaviour presupposes that
other people discriminate colours in the sense in which you do it. For example, I can see red tomatoes and yellow lemons. Now if you are normal observers, I would expect you to identify red tomatoes and yellow lemons by suitable behavioural discriminations. But your successful discriminations presuppose that you also see colours in the same sense in which I see them. Unless this is the case, your discriminations, tallying exactly with my differential experiences of colours would be very mysterious.

(c) The original identity claim is that sensations are identical with the brain process. The topic-neutral claim is that reports of sensation are only reports of something going on and not the reports of sensations. This means that the contents of the sensation reports are dislocated in the direction of neutrality. It also means that what is reported in the afterimage reports of sensation reports is nothing over and above brain processes. Thus, the I N T (i.e., topic-neutrality thesis) neutralizes the contents of sensation reports. It would therefore follow that
identity now obtains between something going in the body and brain processes. This is a trivial and uninteresting identity. It is true without being important. The interesting identity is not between something going on and the brain processes but between sensations and brain processes. It is therefore found on a close scrutinizing of TNT that it generates a trivial identity which is not interesting or it fails to sustain an interesting identity.

(f) Smart has said that after-image statements are reports of likeness with perception of objects and this likeness consists entirely in neurological aspects. This can not be accepted. Phenomenologically we never experience brain processes and hence there is no question of likeness or unlikeness between neurological processes immediately reportable. The phenomenological immediacy characterizing the language of sensation is unique due to ostensive contexts. The language of "looks" and "feels" can never be replaced. In the context of pain and anger, the topic-neutrality can not be even entertained. A person reporting pain does not mean to say that something is going in his body which is like something else going on under certain other conditions. It is true that what looks
to us or appears to us as something might be something else. It is also true as Place (1956) has argued that it should not be assumed that because "our ability to describe things in our environment depends on our environment depends on our consciousness of them, our description of things are primarily descriptions of our conscious experience", (Borst, 1970, p. 50).

Place argues that it is wrong to assume that the real properties of things are always inferred from their phenomenal properties. This can be admitted. What does not follow from this is that there are no phenomenal properties. Strangely enough, Place (1956) asks to avoid this kind of phenomenological fallacy and at the same time admits that objects cause in us certain kinds of experiences. Both Place and Smart repeatedly admit that we are having certain kind of experience when we are in the presence of a real object (e.g. orange). Both also agree that in the absence of real objects we experience something which is like that which we experience when the real objects are encountered. Both of them affirm that there is certain likeness between the experiences which are recognized as images and experiences which are recognized as perceptions, but neither of them admits that there
are afterimages and sensations. As Kim (1972) has shown, identity theory cannot tolerate mental objects, like sensations, afterimages, sense data and pains. Smart accepts mental events which he calls "experiences" and he rejects mental objects. Thus by denying mental objects and accepting mental events, Smart wants to overcome the objection that sensation language reports irreducible phenomenal properties. A person's having pain at t is itself not throbbing, rather throbbing is "absorbed into the constitutive property of the event". (Kim, p.183). The event of person having throbbing pain is identical with a brain event.

Now this is a strange version. There are no dim afterimages, but only the event of person sensing a dim visual image. What is this event? I would treat it as non-event. It is like saying that though there are no ballot-boxes, there are events of a person casting his vote in the boxes. Casting votes in the ballot boxes when there are neither voting papers nor boxes would then turn out to be certain motions of a person and such an event can be characterized as identical with the muscular movements of the person. Similarly, it is not clear what exactly is reported in the mental-event language if there are no mental objects.
It is not clear how the argument of event-identity would function for dreams. The argument will have the implication that there are dreaming events but no dreams. Dream is something going on during sleep which is like something going on when a person is awake and encounters things and persons. This would mean that dreams are like waking experiences in some respects. But the argument here stressed is that this resemblance can be picked out only if there are dreams as mental objects over and above the events of having experienced dreams. Dream reports, thought-reports, emotion-reports etc are not even discussed by Smart in connection with his topic-neutrality.

Mental life is not merely confined to seeing yellowish afterimages and looking at red tomatoes. The richness and complexity of the mental activities can not to just be topic-neutralized into reports going on when certain situations obtain.
II Inadequacy of Causal Analysis.

(1) Causal analysis. Armstrong (1968) a central-state materialist, construes mental states as the central states of the organism's nervous system. These states are effects of some stimuli and causes of some responses. Mental states are links in the causal chain. We must not be misled by Armstrong's frequent use of the expression "mental states." Mental states, for him, are the physical states of the brain. Thus the causal role played by the mental states is only the neurological role played by the neural states.

Like Smart, Armstrong also attempts to refute the argument from mental language. "I am having a sense impression of red". According to Armstrong such a statement would mean that "I am in a state which inclines me to believe that there is something red in front of me". (Thornton, 1972). Armstrong argues that we may identify some property (e.g. redness) without knowing anything about its intrinsic nature. We may identify colours without actually knowing anything about their intrinsic
nature. Smart (1963) has analysed colour-statements behaviouristically and Armstrong (1968) analyses them physicalistically. Both want to avoid the objection that in colour experience some unique phenomenal qualities are encountered and reported. Colour statements are either to be construed behaviouristically (Smart) or physicalistically (Armstrong).

Armstrong (1965) maintains that perceptions are simply capacities for selective behaviours. Such capacities are not empty dispositions. When inner states are causally directed to the features of environment, we have external perceptions. When they are directed towards other inner states to selectively behave towards our own states of mind, it is called "consciousness". Consciousness is the perception of one's own states. Consciousness is the "self-scanning mechanism" in the central nervous system.

When we talk about images or looks or impressions, we acquire POTENTIAL beliefs which are inhibited by other beliefs. There is a similarity
of beliefs between seeing a yellow lemon and getting the sense impression of seeing it.

According to Armstrong, the occurrent brain state is the causal basis of such beliefs. In central cases of perceptions we have actual beliefs and in having just an impression of red, we are in a belief acquiring sort of state.

Armstrong, like Smart, admits that something going on within the organism is reported in the language of sensations. Like Smart, Armstrong also claims that ultimately that something would turn out to be neural states. But Armstrong prefers to explain in detail the causal concept of mind. Armstrong points out that a special inner state of glass is to be postulated to explain the breaking and shattering of its material. One may then say that a demon dwelling in the glass caused it to break, whereas a physicalist would consider it as a natural state of glass. The latter belief is more in the line with the facts & experiments in science.
Armstrong points out that philosophers such as Descartes came to believe that statements like 'I am thinking now' entail that something is going on. Such philosophers also found that as such statements do not entail that something physical is going on they thought that it follows that something non-physical is going on. Armstrong argues that they were mistaken in such beliefs, because such statements did not entail anything about the nature of what is going on (1968, p. 121).

Armstrong agrees with Smart's topic-neutral interpretation of such statements. He interprets topic-neutrality causally. To say that something is going on is to say that "something apt for causing behaviour" is going on and even such statements are topic-neutral in the sense that nothing is entailed about the causal process involved that specification is better left to science.

(ii) Arguments against Armstrong's analysis.

Let us now consider some recent assessments of Armstrong's account of perception. Goldman (1976)
has argued that 'appearing' is an irreducible element in perception and J.B. Maund (1977) has analysed the distinction between perceptual and ordinary beliefs and he has argued that perceptual experience can not be ignored by talking about perceptual beliefs. Both these philosophers have claimed that Armstrong-Pitcher account is inadequate.

(a)

Goldman offers two criteria for evaluating a theory of perception.

(I) The analysis should not by itself lead to sceptical conclusions which can simply be avoided by sifting data into different conceptual apparatus.

(II) The analysis should state the necessary and sufficient conditions of perception Goldman judges Armstrong-Pitcher account of perceptions as a failure on both these criteria. We will concentrate on (ii) as it is more relevant here.

Dretske (1971) has made out a case for a "type of perception developmentally and logically sophisticated type which involves prior to the more..."
acquisition of beliefs". (Goldman, p. 149). Dretske illustrates many examples of nonepistemic seeing i.e. seeing which involves experience rather than the articulation of beliefs, the acquiring of which is treated as perception. Dretske has shown that infants and animals have perceptions which are not at all the acquiring of beliefs.

Goldman develops the points made by Dretske as under:

(i) If acquisition of beliefs presupposes the possession of concepts and if empirical concepts are not innate, then perception can not be construed as acquisition of beliefs from the beginning. Thus, if perception generates belief, it can not consist in acquiring them, at least initially. As the Armstrong-Fitcher account ignores the non-epistemic preconceptual element of perceptions, it fails to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions of perception.

(ii) There is a type of perception which simply involves the appearance of objects. If we reduce perception to belief and belief to dispositions
to discriminate, then we miss the 'appearing' aspect of perception (i.e., looks red to me).

In fact, Goldman argues that as sense experience is the basis of knowledge, non-epistemic perception is basic to concepts and beliefs. Pitcher is inclined to accept behaviouristic interpretation of epistemic seeing and Armstrong does not endorse behaviourism, but their accounts of perception suffer from the same type of defects according to Goldman.

(iii) The reason why I associate ripe apples with fire engines is that they look to me similar in colour, but the materialist account will have to reject this and claim that there are no REASONS why I associate ripe apples with fire engines there are only similar brain states when I look at them. Goldman points out that similarity of brain states is the cause of my association between red apple and fire engine, but such a similarity can not constitute reasons for my so associating them. Goldman shows that without experience or appearing element there is no evidential basis for perceptual beliefs. Armstrong's account lead us to a theory which has no provision for
the consciousness of the way something appears in perception. By an appearing of an object in consciousness, Goldman means only the way in which an object appears in regard to its qualities (p. 163)

Goldman thus finds that without the provision for appearing as an irreducible component of perception, Armstrong's materialistic theory turns out to be inadequate.

(b)

Maund finds the Armstrong pitcher account inadequate for following reasons.

(i) Pitcher (1971) argues that all acquired perceptual beliefs are nonconscious, but the event of causally receiving such beliefs may be conscious. Maund claims that if Pitcher allows that in perceptual experience a person is conscious of an event, it is difficult to see how Pitcher's account differs from the sense-impression theories who conceptually
distinguish between sense impressions and beliefs.

(II) Pitcher has argued that perceptual beliefs are rich as compared to ordinary beliefs which are "thin", e.g. if one directly perceives a scar on a girl's back, it is a rich perceptual belief whereas if one infers it on the basis of something else, it is a 'thin' ordinary belief. The richness of perceptual beliefs is due to the fact that a wide subset of beliefs is acquired in rich perceptual beliefs rather than in thin ordinary beliefs.

Maund gives many examples where such as distinction breaks down (p. 214-217) e.g. seeing something in a fog or in the dark of one's room, a retreating figure in the doorway etc. Here the perceptual beliefs are poorer in details than ordinary (thin) beliefs. Some non-perceptual beliefs are far richer than perceptual beliefs. In the cases offactory and auditory experience, the richness of perceptual beliefs almost dissolves.
Maund points out that what is true of perceptual beliefs is also true of memory-beliefs. Persons having visual memory image do not have rich beliefs and persons without memory images occasionally have rich beliefs in the sense in which Pitcher demarcates rich beliefs from thin beliefs.

Maund therefore maintains that "Perceptual experience necessarily involves the having of sense impressions" (p. 219.)

Puccetti (1970) has conceived of an imaginary experiment in which we have Armstrong himself in a chair under local anæsthetic. Holes are bored in his skull and electrodes are inserted in pre-slected areas of Armstrong's brain. Motion pictures are projected on the screen and E E G is also recorded.

A neuroanatomist activates neurons in Armstrong's cortex and he predicts that Armstrong will see blue when certain neurons are
activated. Now when the neurons in the particular area are activated, Armstrong does report seeing blue and the lines jumping on the chart indicate to the physiologist that certain neurons were firing. The dialogue between Armstrong and the scientist (i.e. the neuroanatomist) might then be imagined as under:

**Armstrong:** You saw my sensation of blue.

**Neuroanatomist:** I beg your pardon.

**Armstrong:** I said if you saw the cells firing you saw my sensation of blue.

**Neuroanatomist:** There must be some misunderstanding. Nothing blue has appeared on the screen.

and so on. The point is that Armstrong's claims that the sensations of blue are physicochemical states of the brain and the neurologist seeing them projected in the form of graph sees also the sensation of blue, naturally surprises the neuroanatomist.
Thus Puceetti rightly argues that what is reported introspectively and what is observed neurologically are different. Mental states are therefore not identical with the brain states. This argument is valuable we would like to add that but for the verbal reports of seeing, the physiologists would never have been helped in their research.

(d)

Mundle (1971) presents many interesting facts of perception and complains that ordinary-language philosopher's isolation from science is responsible for queue views on philosophical problems of perception.

Mundle also does not agree with Smart's and Ryle's behaviouristic analysis of colours, nor does he endorse Armstrong's identification of sense-data with beliefs.

Mundle argues for a position which comprises:

(i) realism regarding perception of one's own body
(ii) spatial properties of external objects and
(iii) representative theory of colours, according to which "colour qualities do not inhere in any body", unlike the sensible qualities peculiar to touch, taste and smell which inhere, from time to time, in our bodies" (p. 178). Mundle ascribes colours to sense data qua transitory by-products of CNS (i.e., central nervous system).

(III) Inadequacy - Criterion.

From these illustrations of recent assessment of Armstrong's theory of perception which is claimed to be compatible with materialism, it is found that the main objection against materialism is not that it gives the account of sensations and perceptions in terms of dispositions, beliefs and causes. There is nothing wrong with the causal account as such. The problem is to give a proper account of what appears in perception and this appearance component (Goldman) or experience component (Maund) is just what contributes to a valid concept of perception. Materialists have denied this component,
while retaining the concept of perception. Critics think that it is a change of subject and I agree with them.

Mundle (1971) for example, does not accept Armstrong's assimilation of illusions to false beliefs and perceptions to correct beliefs. Mundle refers to Helson's experiments where his subjects were asked to name apparent colours, whose real (daylight) corresponding colours were not known to them. Now such experiments assume that subjects consistently apply colour words independently of knowing the real colours of what they are looking at. Such experiments would be pointless on Armstrong's premises, which contain the claim that 'red' is used in different senses when applied to a ripe tomato and to something which turns out not to be red. Awareness of secondary qualities cannot be identified with overt behaviours, wave movements, causal powers or beliefs. Such moves according to Mundle, are inconsistent with empiricism. Unless we are aware of a variety of secondary qualities, nothing can be perceived.
A very interesting feature of Armstrong's theory is the causal role assigned to mental states qua neural states. Causey (1977) in his analysis of microreduction and identity has however pointed out that identity statements which are synthetic are non-causal \((X) (\varnothing \rightarrow \varnothing X)\) is non-causal, so if \(\varnothing = R\), then \((X) (\varnothing X \rightarrow R X)\) is a noncausal sentence. If \(\varnothing \neq R\), but \(\varnothing\) is nomologically coextensional with \(R\), then \((X) (\varnothing X \rightarrow R X)\) is a law sentence. No law-statements can be non-causal and no noncausal statement can be a law-sentence. Causey clarifies the distinction between accidental and nomological coextensionality. Similarly, he distinguishes between a synthetic causal sentence. This distinction provides a criterion for distinguishing correlations from identity.

From the distinctions made by Causey (1977), it follows that if the neural states and the mental states are strictly but contingently identical, then the causal role assigned to the mental states qua neural states is rendered pointless.
Thus the following points can be made against Armstrong's causal analysis in relation to mentalistic language.

(i) If contingent identities are non-causal, (Causey, 19??), then Armstrong's causal analysis is pointless.

(ii) If mental states are neural states, then mental causality is neural causality and hence no mental state qua mental can ever be causally effective. This is counter-intuitive.

(iii) Whatever the causal mechanisms involved, it is clear that we should distinguish between reporting of descriptive language and analysing of explanatory language. Seeing red objects and reporting this event is different from explaining the seeing of red objects. It is clear that explaining the seeing of red objects would require neurological categories at a micro-level. What is not at all acceptable is the claim that when I say "I see red objects" I am not reporting some encounter with some qualities not obviously the qualities of neural processes. There need not be any confusion regarding the causal approach.
and phenomenal approach. The fact of my encounter with certain qualities is what is claimed in sensation-language.

Sensations are reportable in mentalistic language, whether such sensations are caused by neurological antecedents is a different question. The causal role is an explanatory role, it has nothing to do with the experiential element reported in descriptive language. When I report that something looks green to me, I am reporting certain effects of stimuli and certain causes of my subsequent behaviour. This is acceptable, but this is not incompatible with there being mentalistically reportable encounter with objects in the phenomenal field.

Armstrong's analysis fails to take into account what there is in the world and hence it is generally inadequate. This does not mean that there is no neurological causality. It also does not imply that when reporting something green, we immediately know the intrinsic nature of the green object or the experience of it. We do not know the intrinsic qualities either
of the objects or of the nature of our encounters with the object. Introspective knowledge is not necessarily scientific knowledge, still sensation reports are not topic-neutral or physicalistic reports.

III Inadequacy of Eliminative Analysis.

Rorty has advocated eliminative materialism (R M) which differs from R M which is a theory of Smart that sensation-words are referential, but they refer to brain processes. Rorty's E M is a thesis that sensation words do not refer to anything and they are to be replaced by neurophysiological terms.

Rorty does not find that there is any loss of adequacy in his theory. On the contrary, his eliminative analysis is claimed to have advantages both of congruence and adequacy. It is argued here that the claim of Rorty is unfounded.

His theory is a move towards O U M. His theory is also a L U M. O U M - L U M combination is a congruent theory, but then it can not claim to explain adequately the language of mind.
(1) **Eliminative Thesis.**

Sensation terms are used to explain, predict, report and describe and all these functions can be better performed by physicalist language. All observation terms are eliminable. When "I think that I am reporting on a stabbing pain, I am actually reporting on a stimulation of my C-fibers" (Borst, 1970).

Brain processes are the fit subjects of non-inferential reports. Language would change as empirical discoveries are made. Expressions of sensations would simply drop out as the expression about demons have been dropped out after the progress of science.

Rorty recognizes his theory as a 'disappearance from' of I T. Rorty considers it unnecessary to give suitable translations from phenomenal language to physicalist language.

Feyerabend (1963) considers the following hypothesis:
is a mental process of kind $A \leftrightarrow X$
is a central process of kind $C$. (H).

As the statement is a conditional, it would follow that mental events have physical features and central events will have mental features. From (H), dualism of properties follow. Feyerabend points out that a materialist, in his case, by arguing for $H$, misstates it. Feyerabend accepts that only atoms and their aggregates exist. He rejects the arguments from common language. The facts of the common language are only beliefs. He rejects arguments from direct acquaintance of the mental events in introspection. Materialist language should be given a fair trial. It can not just be dismissed on a priori grounds. Common language hides dualism and is also given exemption from testing and revision. Feyerabend does not share this attitude towards common language.

(ii) Incoherence Argument.

Lycan and Pappas (1972) have claimed that Rorty's EM is incoherent.
Rorty claims that EM is superior to RM (i.e. reductive materialism) because Smart's RM requires topic-neutrality thesis. Lycan and Pappas have distinguished RM and SEM (i.e. strong eliminative materialism). SEM is a thesis which claims that it is false that there are any sensations. SEM can be distinguished from Weak Eliminative Materialism (WEM), which is a claim that our present beliefs about sensations are not false, and yet there are no sensations. Rorty's position i.e., WEM, claims to be between RM and SEM. As Rush (1974) has shown, Lycan and Pappas (1972) have argued that there is a dilemma such that either weak eliminative materialism entails reductive materialism or collapses with strong eliminative materialism. The dilemma results from the Denotation Argument stated as under:

1. "There are X's" is true-in-English = "X" denotes-in-English.
4. "There are sensations is true-in English. (1, 2, 3)

5. "There are sensations is true-in-English = there are sensations.

6. There are sensations.

If 1 is true, Rorty cannot maintain that sensations do not exist. This would commit him to topic-neutrality thesis because of his forced acceptance of RM. If however, Rorty is to avoid topic-neutral translations, he should reject the first premise of the denotation argument stated above, but in doing so he will have to give up the claim that present beliefs about sensations are not false. Thus Rorty would be forced to move either to RM by accepting the first premise or by rejecting the first premise he will be forced to accept SEM hence his WEM is an incoherent position.

Hiley (1978) agrees that Rorty wants to avoid both RM and SEM. But Hiley points out that denotation argument need not pose a threatening dilemma to Rorty, if RM does not require topic-neutral
translation as Bush (1972) has shown or S E M need not have counter intuitive consequences. Bush (1972) has shown that Rorty, in claiming that what people call 'sensation' are brain-processes, already started with a more acceptable topic-neutrality thesis than Smart. Hiley (1978) shows that just as Rorty's RM would not involve topic-neutrality thesis, his move towards S E M would not be as counterintuitive as it appears because, after all, a whole set of beliefs turn out to be false, then perhaps the framework itself has to be changed.

Rorty (1974) has distinguished three senses of "Reference" (R). $R_1$ is a reference in which, a person, in talking about anything refers to that thing whether it exists or not. This is the ordinary sense of reference ($R_1$). There is a philosophical sense of reference in which one can only refer to what exists. ($R_3$) A heuristic sense of reference ($R_2$) is a sense in which, the notion of reference is employed in talking about the transition from one framework to another.
Hiley (1978) argues that it is open to Rorty to argue that when people were referring to sensations they were really referring to brain processes or "in so far as people thought that they were referring to sensations they have false beliefs since there are no sensations". (Hiley, 1978, p.329) The first alternative is R M and the second is S E M. Smart accepts the first alternative i.e. references to sensations are really references to brain processes, whereas Rorty would accept the first premises of the denotation argument only if it is construed as having reference in the sense of R. In short, for Rorty, people who report sensations do not have false beliefs since they are operating within a given framework, and given an alternative framework, it may turn out that there are no sensations. Thus Rorty can escape the argument from incoherence.

The incoherence charges grows out of the claim there is no middle ground between R M and S E M. The attempt to counter the charge does not suggest that there is such a middle ground, but is a rejection of the very ground on which the contrast between R M and S E M is drawn (Hilery, 1978, p.330.)
Hiley's defense lies in rejecting the ground of distinction between RM and EM. I do not find anything wrong in Hiley's defense, but my point is that the argument from framework is not as neutral as it appears. To say that sensation-take within our present framework is true and yet to say that the brain-talk in new framework is more acceptable, amounts to saying that we are really mistaken in saying that there are sensations.

(III) Inadequacy Argument

Nathan (1975) analyses materialism in connection with human action and argues that unless there is some other reason for supposing that no one ever performs an action, materialism is false.

Nathan argues that what we need is the distinction between reporting in the sense of identifying and reporting in the sense of giving descriptions. Suppose it is true that pains occur only when c-fibres are stimulated. Now in such a case
our ability to identify would remain undiminished even when sensation-terms are eliminated. But what about our descriptive abilities? It is true that descriptive functions of our non-inferential report of demons remain intact in our revised non-inferential report about content of hallucination but the same type of logical designs is not available for pain-talk being replaced by brain talk.

According Nathan, in Rorty's analysis the reporting function of 'pain' can only be replaced by 'mistaken impression of pain' and this is disallowed by Rorty. As Nathan puts it,

if there is a set of mental terms including all terms of the form 'mistaken impression of X' and no member of this set is synonymous with physical terms, then Rorty's kind of eliminative materialism involves a "vicious infinite regress" (1975, 510.)

Reporting functions of terms from the set indicated above can thus only be taken over by a term of the form 'mistaken impression of X", and the same
goes on and on generating regress. The difficulty that is the main obstacle to Rorty’s materialism lies in its inability to clarify how noninferential reports of sensations can be taken over by noninferential reports of stimulations of c-fibres.

Brenstein (1968) and Common (1968, 71, 72) have challenged Rorty’s EM on the grounds of adequacy.

Brenstein (1968) admits that for scientific purposes, my ability to describe and predict is diminished if I adopt the new neurophysiological discourse, but the issue is whether I can give the same types of descriptions and reports that I now give of my sensations, in the new neurophysiological language. Common (1968) makes a similar point by saying that no neurophysiological sentence is synonymous with “This pain is intense, sharp and trobbing”.

Hiley (1978) p. 330) presents this inadequacy-argument as under.
(1) E M is inadequate if the elimination of sensation terms diminishes our ability to describe.  
(ii) If there are true descriptive sentences which can not be formulated in neurophysiological discourse, our ability to describe is diminished.  

(3) "John's pain is intense". This is a true descriptive sensation-sentence.  
(4) One sentence provides the same description as another only if the two sentences are synonymous.  
(5) No neurophysiological sentences is synonymous with "John's pain is intense".  
(6) No neurophysiological sentence can be used to make at least some of the same true descriptions I now make with sensation sentences.  
(7) The elimination of sensation terms will diminish our ability to describe.  
(8) Therefore, E M is inadequate.  

Hiley claims that by Dennett's (1969) fusion-technique, i.e., if 'pain' is fused into complex predicate "is-the having-of-a-pain",  

(5) Can be rejected (5) is rejected because the sentence "John has intense pain" is rendered as there is the having-of-a-pain which occurs in John. (3) can be denied by a radical eliminative materialist.

Commen (1971) concedes that reporting and explanatory role of sensation sentences can be taken over by neurophysiological sentences, but descriptive role of certain sensation sentences containing pure phenomenal terms can not be taken over by neurophysiological terms. Hiley (1978) points out that against such objections, Rorty has already argued that he (i.e. Rorty) offers only alternative vocabulary. He asks us to let a "thousand vocabularies bloom". (1970, p.119) Rorty would not accept that neurophysiological and sensation description give different description of the same thing nor would he agree that such descriptions describe different things. Rorty would claim that they are alternative vocabularies. A philosopher can neither determine which is the most adequate description of what there is nor prescribe which ought to be (Hiley, p. 335). Thus, Hiley asks us to be satisfied with Rorty's point that E, M is a
coherent possibility. The implication of such a possibility is that EM is one of the thousand vocabularies that might bloom. What gives EM any weight is the prediction that it will survive as materialism, but then such predication depends upon the future course of neurophysiology.

There is nothing MATERIALISTIC about the philosophical claim that a materialist vocabulary is a coherent possibility, and there is nothing PHILOSOPHICAL about the materialist claim that it will be vocabulary that survives (Hiley, 1978, p. 337).

(Emphasis added).

I agree with Hiley's analysis but I would like to add that Rorty would initially allow a thousand vocabularies to BLOOM, his general analysis requires that that mentalistic vocabulary ought to WITHER.
IV General Review of the Antimentalist Analysis of Language.

All the arguments discussed here converge to identify the inadequacy of antimentalism i.e. neurophysiological antimentalism. What can be said about what there is in the world is not said exhaustively in the neurophysiological language. This is the failure of neurophysiological antimentalism. It does not mean that whatever can be said about whatever there is in the world can never have any connection with neurophysiological language. The point is that reports of seeing after-images or red objects are not eliminable as mistaken, though they may be supplemented by more scientific reports. I would like to argue that we may, at best, treat after-image reports or sensation reports as PRESCIENTIFIC rather than as UNScientific. Language that is prescientific in a temporal sense only can be enriched by scientific language, but language that is pre-scientific in the derogatory sense might be rightly replaced by scientific language.
Language using "sunset expressions" is prescientific in a temporal sense and hence even when the sunset phenomena is elaborately explained now in scientific terms, sunset expressions are used normally at present. Demon-expressions are prescientific in the derogatory sense and hence they are rightly replaced by hallucination expressions. My argument is that sensation statements or afterimage statements are prescientific in temporal sense and not in derogatory sense and hence they do not require elimination or replacement but enrichment. It appears that Forty has not distinguished between a language enriched by scientific language and language replaced by scientific language. Neurophysiological language would throw more light on the nature qualities and causation of my pains, aches and it definitely enhances our scientific understanding of pains etc.

Dream-reports, for example, still continue to be needed even when it has been established that
dreaming events are highly correlated with certain patterns of electrical activity of the brain. When a person retrospectively reports dreams or concurrently reports pains or afterimages, he is not claiming that he knows the nature of dreams or pains. A person simply reports what is going on before him. If this is also not accepted, then it would mean that a person has been deluded into reporting what he has never encountered. If there are no images as Smart claims and if there are no sensations as Forty claims, then the delusion of having experienced sensations or dreams or afterimages require scientific explanation. But if we turn to science (i.e., neurophysiology or psychology) we get the explanation not of our delusion of having a sensation, but of our having a sensation. It is this fact that has been overlooked by Smart Armstrong and Forty. In science, we find the explanation of both illusions and valid perceptions but if there are no sensations, then the distinction can not be made at all.
Analysing Jastrow's deck-rabbit illusion, Leeper's drawing etc, Wright (1979) shows that such gestalt-switches in perception imply that the neutral uninterpreted sensory presentation, under various context-indicators lead to different shifts in perceptions. Two persons might see the SAME thing in so far as they are both seeing something which is the same in distributional pattern upon their retinas, but each of them is having a different subjective experience caused by more or less the same light-wave patterns. (p- 415) There are distributional and structural similarities between two subjective experiences, but they remain distinct REGISTERINGS. Thus according to Wright, even when two observers believe themselves to be wholly in agreement as regards perceiving, there will always be the logical possibility of one of them SENDING differently from the other what they assume to be the same. In this sense for Wright (1979) all human communication is ironic.

Neither Smart nor Armstrong nor Forty has ever discussed perceptual illusions and gestalt-switches. The presentational element in both perception and illusion can not just be treated
as behavioural or neural patterns. There is an irreducible presentational element reporting the registerings of experiences. Perceptual subjectivity can not be converted into neural objectivity. Correlated neural patterns do exist, but there is something immediately, encountered.

The antimentalist analysis of language overlooks the subjectively encountered immediacy as well as the first person dimension of phenomenal language.

What the antimentalists have ignored is the phenomenal field of representation. As Aldrich (1979) has put it,

A percipient person...... is the body which qua representing device determines a field of perceptual representation that the percipient person is, in intention. Such a field is a field of consciousness, within which things like mirrors pictures, verbalisms and notations can function as representing devices in their own right———
The only ontic bulge thus generated is nothing worse than that of adding iron-filings to sawdust particles, among 'what there is'. There are also persons. Ontology must be bulged to include them. The fields are nothing in themselves. (507, SC9).

It is thus necessary to preserve the link between mentalistic language and the phenomenal field. Whatever qualities get reported in mentalistic language are due to encountering within the field of consciousness. The primacy of the items in this field over the items of neurological theory construction is reflected in the language of experiences. Neurological language is the language of explanations. It is impossible to confound the two, or collapse the distinction, without rendering the scientific discourse itself unintelligible at a certain stage.

Barnette (1978) has rightly shown that most of the physicalist theories unnecessarily assume a rule called 'the grounding the mental'.
(G.M.). G M can be stated as under:

For each and every justifiable mental ascription "m" made to one or more individuals, there has to be (theoretically) some particular nonmental feature "r" of the individual(s) to show for it. (p.92).

Barnette considers it impossible to pin down a relevant list of identifying kinds of mental attributes with kinds of material ones; this is because the class of possible material states identifiable with each kind of mental state looks like an indefinitely large disjunctive class. Barnette admits that some mental ascriptions might enjoy more or less "referential specificity". (p.101)

E.g. "She is now in pain". Head-rubbing, aspirin-taking, speech-reporting etc. are behaviours specific to the situation of the ascription. Thus, there is no point in driving pain into the system through identify. Barnette's point can easily be granted. We need not assume that for each mental ascription there is thus a distinct mental referent, but that does not also mean that for no mental ascription there is any referent. I maintain that pain-reports and dream reports in the first-person case like
colour-reports and after-image reports specify some referents other than neural events and to that extent the topic-neutral, causal and eliminative analysis of the language of sensations is inadequate. Such analyses have pushed the theories towards congruent OUM and it is therefore required of neurophysiological antimentalism to drop LMM and endorse LUM with OUM. This proves that LUM–OUM combination is unstable.

The identity theorists have three options: (i) Endorsement of ML (i.e. mentalistic language) (ii) Reinterpretation of ML and (iii) Elimination of ML.

Feigl and Hirst initially opted for endorsement of ML, but an endorsement of ML would only go well with OMM and not OUM. So Feigl, Smart and Armstrong later moved to reinterpretation of ML. Smart adopted TNT and Armstrong endorsing it, also advanced causal analysis. It was still a linguistically multi-dimensional and ontologically unidimensional materialism. The translation version as a reinterpretation device failed against the arguments from mentalistic language and Rorty pushed materialism to its extreme form combining ontologically unidimensional and linguistically
The requirements of congruence clash with the requirements of adequacy as far as the analysis of the language of the mind is concerned. The same has happened in the case of mentalistic properties. There is a consistent pattern of failure among all neurophysiologically antimentalist theories i.e. the failure to be congruent as well as adequate. This failure is not due to some weakness in this or that argument employed in defense of the theory. The failure is due to a conceptual fault in the theorizing itself. It generates constant errors over problem-areas covered by the theories. Ontologically multidimensional materialists have taken note of such conceptual weaknesses of identity theories. They recognize phenomenal properties as emergent properties and mentalistic language as referring to such properties.

It is obvious that as the neurophysiological antimentalists have not developed any philosophy of language, they have concentrated only on the need for translation or replacement of mentalistic language. In the light of their unidimensional ontology, they argue in support of translation or replacement move.
Peyrerabend's (1963) theory is a strong eliminative materialism SEM. Rorty's doctrine of "let thousand vocabularies bloom", has been characterized as WEM. Smart's RM is usually contrasted with both SEM and WEM. The differences according to the arguments advanced here, are pointless. If nothing exists except atoms and their aggregate, then it does not matter whether you say that there are sensations but they are brain processes or that there are no sensations.

All antimentalists have agreed that when I make an after-image statement or a perception statement, something is going on in me. Armstrong (1968) even specifies that the something which goes on in me has a causal role to play. Critics also agree that something is going on in a person who reports afterimages. This is where neurophysiological antimentalists claim superiority over behavioural antimentalists. According to some behaviourists (e.g. Ryle) nothing might be going on in the person and his statements report only dispositions to behave in certain manner toward certain situations. Armstrong argues that dispositions must have a categorical basis.
The question is not whether something going on in a person reporting perception or after image can be totally specified without reference to neurophysiological discourse. The introspective description or reporting is neither exhaustive nor analytic. It is just a description and as description it should be accepted as demarcating something which is somehow linked with neurophysiological processes. The neurophysiological language has no intrinsically first-person dimension.

If I say that my c-fibres are stimulated, then even if I report it in a first-person mode, such a mode has no uniqueness, because it is open to intersubjective verification. When I say "I am in pain", this statement has a first person dimension in the sense that I do not, for myself, require a public observation to confirm it. I consult dentists for eliminating toothache and for finding out its cause. It would not make any sense to consult a dentist to find out whether I have a toothache.

The linguistic replacement hypothesis of Rorty would require us to become full-time neurologists even before we begin to read and write. We may be conditioned to talk about c-fibres etc from the moment
we learn to talk, but then such replacement would cancel the first-person dimension of mentalistic language.

In Chapter II, we have shown that identity theory has language, knowledge and ontology components. I know my pains in a different manner than I know any physical object. My pain-talk has a first person dimension not found in the brain-talk. If identity theory is supported by unidimensional ontological materialism, then the highest correlations among components would obtain when its theory is ontologically, epistemically and linguistically unidimensional. i.e. whatever there is, is an instantiation of physicalist variable; whatever can be SAID about what there is can be said only in a language which refers to that variable of which everything is an instantiation i.e. physicalist variable. Similarly, whatever can be KNOWN about what there is in the world refers to that variable of which everything is an instantiation, i.e. the physicalist variable.

An OHM is congruent when the knowledge, language and epistemic components are perfectly correlated. But in being congruent in this manner, it loses its inadequacy. Smart (1972) for example, expressed his
dissatisfaction with Rorty's type of eliminative approach to the language and knowledge of the mental phenomena. Smart (1970) is dissatisfied with Dennett's types of Fusion Materialism which advocates fusion-techniques to overcome arguments from mentalistic language. This indicates his concern for adequacy. Using Dennett's fusion-techniques of the analysis of the language of the mental one can say that we should talk about "... is the having-of-a-pain," rather than 'pain', but such linguistic devices do not dissolve the problem of phenomenal properties, their knowledge and their language. "Having-of-a-pain" still refers to having of some experience which is intense throbbing etc.

In part III of this work, we will consider various other approaches to mentalist language i.e. behaviouristic approaches. The peculiarity of neurophysiological approach is that it claims to protect mentalistic terms and their referents against behaviouristic and reductive analysis and at the same time, the neurophysiological antimentalists either propose topic-neutral analysis or eliminative analysis. Causal analysis by Armstrong is also a centralist as against the peripheralist position of behaviourists, but even the causal approach endorses the reductive approach of Smart. The framework
argument of Rorty ultimately implies that we were really mistaken in ascribing something other than brain processes to ourselves or others when we use the language of sensations and afterimages. Thus, the neurophysiological antimentalists have not done justice to phenomenal terms in mentalistic language.

It is very important to take note of the fact that the argument from mentalistic language does not necessarily lead to cartesian dualism. The fear of being pushed into cartesian dualism should not lead us to deny the legitimate mentalistic concepts and mentalistic language. It would be too simple to believe that if ontologically unidimensional materialism fails, the take of spirits or demons would be legitimized. There are no "ghosts in machine", but then there are "machine-operators" and "programmers" also. It is not necessary to believe that mentalistic language will necessarily be private language. The truth of Wittgenstenian critique of private language does not render mentalistic language illegitimate.

Some words linked with mind are ability-words. They need not be construed as indexing any on going event e.g. if a person is described as 'intelligent', we need not
believe that there are actually some processes going on in his mind. Intelligent persons do not feel their intelligence in the same way in which they feel their toothaches. In fact a person himself can hardly be considered as a better authority about his own intelligence or skills. There is no first-person dimension as far as such competence-expressing words are concerned.

The position argued for here is not that every mentalistic expression uniquely demarcates some peculiar mental entities or processes secretly going on within person's mind. Most of our processes of cognition go on unnoticed within us and we are hardly conscious of how we come to have sudden thoughts or memories or images.

Knowledge of the mind is as difficult and as indirect as the knowledge of the matter. It is not claimed here that knowledge of the mental is self-validating. Our ordinary language of pains, dreams and images do not give us any detailed knowledge of the events or processes encountered. Correlational knowledge of the relation between the mental and the cerebral processes can not be available to simple "looking within" or introspection. What is claimed here is that the directness or immediacy of something intimately encountered in sensations, is expressed in
the language of the mind. Mind-brain identity thesis this and hence it is inadequate.

-x-x-x-x-x-