CHAPTER I

I THE PROBLEM AND THE DESIGN OF THE STUDY

I The Title

"Contemporary Antimentalism - a critical study;" This title conveys the direction of this study. It suggests the kinds of theories to be studied and the mode of studying them.

This study belongs to philosophy of mind. In contemporary philosophy of mind, mind-brain problem is the major area of study. This problem - area comprises many kinds of theories, most of which are antimentalist theories. A critical study of such theories in the contemporary philosophy of mind is the subject-matter of this study and the title is chosen to denote this subject-matter. Such a critical study is fruitful only if it leads to some plausible alternative approach which accounts for those aspects of the theories which have been found to be inadequate. This critical study also claims to present such a plausible alternative to current theories in the field.
II Definitions of Basic Terms.

It is absolutely essential to clearly defined the terms used throughout the study. This is because, this study claims to be a fresh and independent assessment of contemporary antimentalism. A critical design has been evolved here which provides decision-procedure to evaluate any antimentalist theory. It is therefore quite in order if some new classifications, procedures and criteria are adopted here. The terms of such classifications, procedures and criteria therefore need a precise definition. The definitions of key terms used in the critical study of antimentalism are neither arbitrary nor ad-hoc. They have been stated not just for the sake of novelty or for the sake of dubious claims of originality. The terms and concepts defined here organize the current theories clearly for the purposes of the present study. Characterizing various theories in terms of certain philosophical criteria and clarifying the terms of assessment-scheme are the basic ingredients of any critical study of a groups of theories in a problem-area. What follows here are the definitions of basic terms used in this work.
Materialism

A theory is materialistic if and only if, matter, as understood in the science of the day is treated as ontologically basic as well as independent of the knowing subject.

Ontologically Unidimensional Materialism. (OUM)

A theory is ontologically unidimensional if and only if, what there is in the world is treated as an instance of or a value of only one kind of variable. A materialism is ontologically unidimensional if and only if, it claims that what there is in the world is some kind of a value of only physicalistic variable i.e. there is nothing in the world over and above that which is postulated by the physics of the day.

Linguistically Unidimensional Materialism. (LUM)

A theory is linguistically unidimensional if and only if, it claims that only one kind of language can communicate or refer or describe or explain what there is in the world. A linguistically unidimensional materialism is a view that what can be SAID about
what there is, can only be said in the language of physics. i.e., only physicalist language describes, refers or communicates about what there is in the world.

Ontologically Multidimensional Materialism (OMM)

A theory is ontologically multidimensional if and only if, what there is in the world includes some elements which are instances of more than one kind of variable. An ontologically multidimensional materialism is a theory that what there is in the world is an instance of more than one kind of variable i.e., physicalist variables are not the only kind of variables instantiated in what there is in the world.

Linguistically Multidimensional Materialism (LMM)

A theory is linguistically multidimensional if and only if, that more than one kind of language can refer to describe or explain what there is in the world. LMM is the view that what can be said about what there is in the world can be said in the language of physics as well as ordinary non-physicalist or psychological language. When a theory is LMM and also an OMM it
can claim that for some kinds of entities the language of physics is adequate and for the emergent or functional properties of the very same entities, some other kind of language can be used. An LLM-OM theory would be a claim that both non-physicalistic and physicalistic language capture the same entities and these entities are what are rightly captured by physicalistic language.

Antimentalism

Any OUM, with or without LUM, is an antimentalism i.e. any ontologically unidimensional materialism is an antimentalism. No ontologically multidimensional materialism (OMM) is antimentalism. Materialism if unidimensional is antimentalist; if not unidimensional, it is not antimentalist e.g. materialism of Marx. Any theory which grants the existence of mental states, processes etc is NOT an antimentalist theory though it may be materialist because the explanation of mental phenomena is given in terms of the basic physical processes and emergent properties.

Contemporary Antimentalism

Any neurophysiological or behavioural antimentalism claimed by philosophers and psychologists in Australia,
England and U.S.A., in last 30 years is treated as contemporary antimentalism in this study.

**Mentalistic Component**

A theory has a mentalistic component if and only if, it acknowledges the existence AND causal efficacy of mental events, states or processes, whatever else such a theory may assert (Macklin, 1978).

**Mentalism**

A theory is mentalistic if and only if it recognizes mentalistic component linguistically and ontologically.

**Naturalistic Mentalism**

It is a or a viewpoint which claims that mentalistic component is a legitimate component of mind-body theories and that a such a component is not incompatible with the requirement of naturalistic methodology of sciences.

**Normal Criticism**

It is a mode of assessment of philosophical theory
in which, philosophical problems are not characterized as problems which will be dissolved after linguistic analysis. It does not endorse the position that all philosophical problems are pseudo-problems. Hence, the critical design adopted within such a view is meant for assessing philosophical positions rather than overthrowing all paradigms of philosophizing.

**Revolutionary Criticism**

A mode of philosophical criticism which claims a-priori that all philosophical problems are illegitimate is a revolutionary mode of philosophical criticism. The approach of Lazerowitz (1977) illustrates how revolutionary criticism might lead a philosopher to motivational, diagnostic, genetic, clinical, therapeutic and prescriptive analysis of a theory.

**Congruence Criterion**

A philosophical theory is congruent if and only if, its components are linguistically and ontologically compatible. To identify a dissonant component is to establish that a theory fails to satisfy congruence criterion.
Adequacy Criterion

A theory is adequate if and only if, it accounts for what there is in the world in the form of macro-objects like chairs and trees and experiences like pains and seeing red things or after images. If a theory denies either that there are external objects or experiences, it is then adequate if and only if, it accounts for the illusions or false beliefs about either external objects or having of any kind of experiences.

Critical Study

For the purposes of this work, a critical study of antimentalism is a study undertaken to assess antimentalism by evolving a general design of assessment comprising the criteria of Congruence Adequacy.
III Statement of the Problem

The problem of the relation between mind and body has been very clearly formulated by Wittgenstein in his *Blue Book* (1933-4) as under:

.....certain physiological processes correspond to our thoughts in such a way that if we know the correspondence, we can, by observing these processes, find the thoughts. But in what sense can we be said to get the thoughts from the observation of the brain?

.....Let us imagine..... an experiment crudely. It consists in looking at the brain while the subject thinks.....the subject is at the same time the experimenter who is looking at his own brain, say by means of the minor (The crudity of this description in no way reduces the force of the argument.)

Then I ask you, is the subject-experimenter observing one thing or two things?

This is the basic problem of mind and body. Wittgenstein has raised the ontological question by asking whether the subject-experimenter is observing one thing or two things.

A group of theories characterized here as antimentalist theories have claimed that there is really only kind of thing i.e. physical kind of thing.

The problem of this study is not to examine the relation between mind and brain, but to examine the theories which examine such a relation.

The problem of this study is whether antimentalist theories can be CONGRUENT without being INADEQUATE i.e., whether the antimentalist theories, in claiming to be ADEQUATE are thereby rendered INCONGRUENT.

In other words, this study is undertaken to find out whether any mind-body theory can eliminate the mentalistic component successfully and yet be congruent as well as adequate. Antimentalist theories attempt to answer the Wittgensteinian question by offering various versions of ontologically unidimensional materialism. They also claim that such a materialism is compatible with a scientific account of what there is in the world.
Any principle or hypothesis which allows one to understand the relation between particular facts and also allows predictions to be made is called a "theory" (Evans, 1978). The problem of this study is whether neurophysiological and behaviouristic antimentalism, as such theories (philosophical or psychological), allow us to understand the relation between physical facts and mental facts. Theories have also been viewed as systems of ideas containing some abstract concepts, some rules about the interconnection of these concepts and some ways of linking these concepts to observed facts (wrightsman, 1977). In this context, the problem of this study is to determine whether having only neuro-behavioural concepts and the rules of their interconnections, a philosophical psychological mind-body theory can meaningfully link such concepts to observed facts.

The problem of this study can therefore be summarily stated as under

The problem of this study is to determine whether any contemporary antimentalist theory is congruent AND adequate. i.e. if congruence and adequacy are the criteria of philosophical appraisal, whether a sound mind-body study should accommodate a mentalistic component.
The Mind-Body problem is one of the areas of Philosophy of mind. As Glover (1976) has shown, current philosophy of mind is mainly concerned with, (i) The problem of justifying the ascription of mental states on the basis of behaviour, (ii) The problems connected with description and classification of mental states, (iii) the problems arising out of various models of mind based on computers and holograms, (iv) the problem of mind-body relation and (v) the problem of justification of personal identity.

This work deals with Glover's problem area no. (iv) i.e. the mind-body problem. This problem is now known as 'mind-brain problem'. Of course, this study does not deal exclusively with mind-brain problem, it is also concerned with mind-behaviour problem. Antimentalism, whether neurophysiological or behaviouristic, is discussed in this study in order to determine whether it is an congruent as well as an adequate theory.

There are two levels of treatment of this problem. At a micro-level treatment, we can discuss the relation between a the mental states of a person and the internal state of his organism. The contemporary mind-brain
identity theories (Smart, 1959 Armstrong, 1968 Place, 1956; Rorty, 1965), illustrate microlevel analysis. On the other hand, at a macro level of analysis the problem of the subject to whom the psychological states are ascribed is discussed. The problem of "other minds" or the problem of "personal identity" are macro-level questions. This study deals with the treatment of micro level.

Neurophysiological antimentalism deals with mental processes in relation to the brain processes. Behavioural antimentalism deals with dispositional nature of mental ascriptions. Behaviourism has a molar dimension but still in this study we are concerned with the relation between dispositions and their underlying states.

The following grounds justify the choice of the problem.

(i) Antimentalism renders all mentalistic ascriptions illegitimate. This means that states of falsely conceiving mind-brain problem can be ascribed to the critics of antimentalism. On the one hand, the antimentalists deny meaningful ascription of non-physical states; on the other hand, in order to refute the mentalists, they must accept
that there are states like being mistaken, having been deluded etc. which are applicable to the mentalists. This is a paradox of ascription. The study is an analysis of such a paradox. Unless we analyse such a paradox, it is doubtful whether any other kind of philosophizing about any other problem has any point. The argument here is that if OUM is true, then there is no philosophizing going on anywhere, because philosophizing is thinking and thinking, according to OUM, is a purely physical event. One can say that brains are philosophizing or arguing, but then the question remains whether there is any point in doing philosophy at all. The mind-brain problem, according to the argument of this study, is the most basic problem, because the whole enterprise of doing philosophy or being mistaken in doing it etc. would have no point. Is the continuum of philosophy right? There are brain processes of the critics (or the verbal behavioural responses of the critics) on the one hand, and the brain processes or verbal behaviour of the proponents on the other hand, and nothing else exists. If this is a theory of OUM, then something should be done about it, because the probability of its being true would render philosophical or any cognitive activity unintelligible.
(ii) If nothing except atoms or their aggregate exist, then we would like to know whether social psychology, psychosomatic medicine, clinical psychology, psychophysiology, physiological psychology, psychoanalysis etc. would have any point. Of course, I can argue that plumbers exist, but there are no average plumbers and yet their is a point in talking about average plumbers. But then such an argument would lead us to believe that emotions, pains etc. are only statistical fictions. This is exactly what has been denied by psychologists and neurophysiologists. There are thus devastating scientific implications of purely unidimensional materialism. Such a situation renders the antimentalist theories interesting and systematic study of it is therefore required.

(iii) Monism, whether materialistic or idealistic, has been a great temptation to philosophers and scientists alike. An examination of their views would thus help us in forming a clear picture of the epistemological designs. The grave problem for monism is the explanation of the illusion of duality or plurality. Illusion of having experiences, independent of knowing them to be brain processes or behaviour has to be explained. A philosophy which denies my toothache or my nausea, deserves urgent consideration.
Thus the approaches to mind-brain problem of anti­
mentalist variety, have grave philosophical and scientifi-c
implications. All kinds of critical study are therefore
called for. Uttal (1978), a Michigan psychologist,
has stated that the complexity of the unsolved mind-
brain problem represents the most EXCITING and IMPORTANT
issues in contemporary science.

Environmental theories were closely related to the
hopes of rising middle classes in the eighteenth
century and the instincticativist theories, based on
Darwinian teachings, reflect the basic assumptions of the
nineteenth century capitalism. (Erich Fromm 1973). It
has been further claimed that the new behaviourism "
expresses the mood of the twentieth century industrialism"
(ibid, p. 100, 1973). Thus there are political and
socio-philosopher implications of mind brain theories.
This study is not concerned with genetic sociology of
philosophical theories, but it is clear from the history
of science and philosophy that the rise and fall of
theories is closely linked with developments in cultural
and technological contexts. If, as Marxists claims,
communism leads to the "dictatorship of the proletariat"
it is worth studying whether antimentalism, as an
extreme form of materialism, would lead to the "dictatorship of neurologists."

A brief Resume of the History and the present status of the problem.

In a recent survey of the field, McMullan (1971) has shown that after Anaxagoras, the first philosopher of the mind, three types of answers were given to the problems of mind, (i) Reductionism argued by the Greek atomists, (ii) Dualism of Plato and (iii) Naturalism of Aristotle.

McMullan has traced the problem to its early formulation and he has pointed out that till Renaissance nothing new was added to the problem. In the sixteenth century cartesian dualism and mechanism became the dominant paradigm of philosophical thought on thus problem.

If Newtonian mechanist philosophy left the options open, the Darwinian biology, not exempting men from evolutionary explanations, made the options precarious.
In this century, Ethology has shown that certain abilities regarded as unique to men are found in some animals also and computer science upsets the neat distinctions between men and machines. The gap between men and machines as well as the gap between men and animals has been narrowed down due to computer science, cybernetic models, comparative psychology, ethology and recent developments in neurophysiology. This is the present status of the problem.

It is quite clear from McMullen's survey that there has been a continuous interaction between philosophy and science throughout the Western philosophy. It may be that mind brain gap is still as wide as it was during the period of Greek philosophy, but the perception of the dimensions of the problem and the cognitive styles of the articulation of these dimensions have changed considerably. New breakthroughs in science lead to new philosophical formulations of the same problem. Philosophers have always taken into consideration the relevant sciences of the day and without referring to recent psychology and neurophysiology, the problem can not be meaningfully discussed. The present status of the problem is philosophical scientific and not exclusively philosophical.
VII The General Design of the Critique of Antimentalism

The general critical design outlined here is a method of independently assessing contemporary antimentalism. A need is felt for such a design because it is found that some new criteria are needed or some new critical categories are needed which would result in a new organization of the problem area. The present study is not concerned with detailed statements of various arguments against antimentalism already current among philosophers. At the same time, it does not want to ignore the relevant points made by other philosophers. The reportive component and the innovative components have to interact in any research study and the general design presented here would satisfy this requirement.

Two criteria are presented here which can be applied to assess antimentalism philosophically. They are: (i) The Criterion of Congruence, and (ii) The Criterion of Adequacy.

(1) The Criterion of Congruence

A theory is congruent if and only if, its components
are compatible. A theory with a dissonant component is incongruent.

(ii) The procedure of applying the criterion of congruence

(i) It is assumed initially that the theory is congruent.
(ii) Various arguments already made are examined with a view to find out whether they identify a dissonant component in the theory. (iii) Various moves made by the defenders of the theories are then analysed to determine whether the arguments presented by the defenders have resulted in pushing the theory towards a more homogenous unidimensional approach.

(iv) Congruence move of the defenders is then analysed to find out whether it has resulted into the loss of differentiation, among many versions of the same domain theories.

A design of criticism is thus a statement of the criteria of the assessment, the theories along with the description of the procedures for applying them.
(iii) **Criterion of adequacy.**

A theory is ontologically adequate if and only if, it does not deny the existence of an entity, process or event i.e., it does not deny what there is in the world compatible with Occam's razor principle.

A theory is epistemologically adequate if and only if, in attempting an explanation, it does not deny what it explains.

(iv) **The procedure of applying of the criterion of adequacy.**

(i) It is assumed initially that the theory is adequate.

(ii) Various arguments are examined to see whether they identify a dissonant component of a theory.

(iii) Various defense moves are analyzed to find out whether under the pressure of dissonant component the theory is pushed towards multidimensional approach.

(iv) Adequacy moves of the defenders are then analyzed to find out whether it has resulted into the loss of congruence.

Thus, the hard core of the critical design evolved here lies in determining whether contemporary antimenatalism emerges as a CONGRUENT as well as ADEQUATE theory.
The critical design outlined here provides a decision procedure for any antimentalistic theory. It predicts that if the arguments against any such theory successfully identify a mentalistic component, then such a theory with move to a completely unidimensional materialism to ward off objections from mentalistic components. In making such a move, the point of different versions could be lost. It is also predicted that in securing congruence, such a theory will fail to meet the criterion of adequacy, because the point of differentiated versions was to provide for adequacy of the theory, and that point is lost due to the defensive congruence move. The critical design thus helps us to find out whether it can be claimed that antimentalism is either congruent or adequate but not both.

The critical design applied successfully generates a view about the plausible theories of mind-body relations. The critical design by itself does not generate a full sized theory because that presupposes experimental investigations by psychologists and neurologists. Still however, a sketch of interrelated components, can be provided which can be used for theory construction in philosophy and psychology. It emerges from the criteria listed above, that a theory of mind-body relationship has
to be congruent and adequate i.e. such a theory has to accommodate the mentalistic component. A mentalism compatible with naturalistic framework of science, can be accepted as an alternative. It may not amount to cartesian dualism. It may be a "dual elementism". A mentalism which does not accommodate "physicalistic component" can also be judged by the criteria of congruence and adequacy. The critical design is such that if it finds antimentalism incongruent or inadequate it will also find anti-physicalism equally incongruent or inadequate. "Antiphysicalism" denotes here a theory that there is nothing physical anywhere in the universe.

VIII The Aims of this Study

This study is undertaken with a view,

(i) to provide criteria of identifying antimentalist theories,
(ii) to distinguish antimentalism from materialism,
(iii) to present a new critical design for the assessment of contemporary antimentalism,
(iv) to apply the criteria of congruence and adequacy to neurophysiological antimentalism and behaviourist antimentalism.
(vii) to evaluate contemporary antimentalism with reference to current research in neurophysiology and psychology.

(viii) to argue that, as contemporary antimentalism is not both congruent and adequate, theories about mind-body have to take into account the mentalistic component and hence compatibility with scientific research demands a view which is characterized here as "naturalistic mentalism."

IX Assumptions of this study.

(I) Mind-body problem is not a pseudo problem.

(II) Normal mode of criticism as distinguished from revolutionary mode of criticism, can legitimately be applied to philosophy of mind.

(III) Reference to scientific theories and research are very relevant both to the understanding and assessment of mind-body theories.

(IV) Mind-body theories are bound to have ontological as distinguished from merely methodological implications.

(V) Recommendations for revision of mentalistic language or vice versa, are not merely linguistic recommendations. They are based on ontological commitments of theory.
Philosophizing, though a second-order, metatheoretical, conceptual, and linguistic analysis has ultimate connections with what there is in the world and hence even a purely philosophical mind-body view, has some consequence relevant to the domain of psychological and neurological facts.

X. The main claims of this study.

This study evaluates arguments for and against antimentalism and with reference to the general design of philosophical appraisal. It concludes by claiming that:

(I) Mentalistic component is a dissonant component of neuro-physiological antimentalism and the arguments from mentalistic property and mentalistic language have identified this component.

(II) Under the impact of such arguments, the defenders are compelled to move towards homogeneous unidimensional theory and they can then meet the congruence criterion, but at the cost of not satisfying the adequacy criterion.

(III) If the theories move to satisfy the adequacy criterion by accepting the mentalistic component, they have to give up their ontologically unidimensional materialism or suffer incongruence among components.
(IV) All antimentalist theories appeal to science, it ought to have got empirical reinforcement from neurophysiology and psychology. It has been argued here that as neuro-scientists and psychologists themselves are still theorizing in terms of classical dualistic alternative and, the current breakthroughs in empirical research have mentalistic consequences. No form of antimentalism is either confirmed or is likely to be confirmed from the theories and research in allied sciences.

(V) As the antimentalistic theories are not both congruent and adequate and as they lack support from contemporary science, it follows that the claims of neurophysiological antimentalists regarding their superiority over behaviouristic theories or the superiority claims of behaviourists over neurophysiological antimentalists are not established.

(VI) The mutual superiority claims among neurophysiological and behaviouristic antimentalists are not adequately established because both kinds of theories are eliminating the mentalistic component.

(VII) As the recognition of mentalistic component is vital to an adequate and congruent theory of mind, it can be asserted that the mental states are the causal, mediate, non-dispositional, and non-neural states of an organism.
A mind-body theory must not only recognize the mentalistic component, but should see that it is compatible with naturalistic orientation of recent science. Thus finally it has been claimed that a "naturalistic mentalism" is a viable component of a sound mind-body theory.

(VIII) A mentalistic component recognized by the methods of science does not involve any concession to the dogma of "ghost in machine" or "autonomous man" or supernatural elements. Thus, compatibility with science does not require abandonment of mentalism and endorsement of mentalism does not involve the violation of Occam's Razor Principle.

This thesis claims that as neurophysiological and behaviouristic antimentalism fail to adequately account for what there is in the world, a mentalism of some kind is necessary for any theory of the relation between mind and body. Such a minimum mentalism is compatible with explanatory materialism i.e., it is compatible with a view that EXPLAINS the mental with reference to the neural process.

The critique of antimentalism and defense of mentalism can be undertaken even to establish a transcendent metaphysics. In this work, the arguments discussed or independently advanced have no such implications. The study is based on
philosophy in relation sciences only.

XI Division of this Study.

Part I comprises a statement of the problem and an outline of the general critical design of the study (Chapter 1)

Part II (Chapters 2, 3, 4) deals with Neurophysiological Antimentalism. Basic features of Neurophysiological Antimentalism are identified and the arguments from mentalistic properties and language are examined to determine whether they have been able to successfully identify a mentalistic component which is a dissonant component for such an antimentalist theory. The antimentalist theories of neurophysiological orientation are evaluated with reference to the criteria of congruence and adequacy.

Part III (Chapter 5, 6 and 7) discusses Behaviouristic Antimentalism. The theories of Ryle and Skinner are analysed and assessed to determine whether they are ontologically, epistemologically and scientifically adequate. The Wittgensteinian approach is also discussed. In this context.

Part IX (Chapters 8) discusses the views of neurologists, psychologists and psychobiologists with reference to mind-body problem with a view to find out whether neurophysiological
and behavioural antimentalism have any legitimacy in the realm of scientific theory-construction. Mentalistic implications of empirical research breakthroughs are also presented.

Part V (Chapter 9) which is a conclusion of this study argues for the need of accommodating mentalistic component in mind-brain philosophical and scientific theories. An outline of a view emerging from this study is presented. The view presented here is characterized as 'Naturalistic Mentalism and its components have been identified. This study, independently of other studies discusses whether an alliance between philosophy and science can converge to abolish the mentalistic component in theorizing in psychology and philosophy. It concludes with the claim that this can not be done without violating adequacy criterion.