Chapter IX
A PLEA FOR MENTALISM.

Introduction.

This chapter states the conclusion of this study.

It begins, by way of recapitulation, with a comprehensive statement of the critique of antimentalism, summarizing the findings of previous chapters.

As antimentalism is inadequate, it is claimed here that mentalism has to be a component of any mind-body theory. We need not accept mental substances, but mental properties and events have to be accepted. Mentalism as a theory about the ontology of mind-body theories can be conceived naturalistically. The study ends with an argument that naturalistic mentalism is a viable alternative to contemporary antimentalism.

I Comprehensive Statement of The Critique of Antimentalism - A Recapitulation.

This chapter argues for a case for accepting mentalism as a theory of ontology of all mind-body theories. No theory in the mind-body domain can
eliminate mentalistic component. This has emerged from the discussions in parts I to IV of this work.

Before substantiating mentalism or strengthening its case, it is necessary to make a comprehensive statement of the findings and arguments that have been presented in preceding parts of this work.

I have here summarized the case against antimentalism not in any polemical spirit, but in a spirit of seriously understanding what exactly has gone wrong with restrictively monistic antimentalism.

This study employs independent arguments against contemporary antimentalism. They have been advanced at the relevant places throughout this study but it would be convenient to list them again here. The claims made and arguments offered are as under:

Part I : (Chapter 1).

(1) Antimentalism has to be distinguished from materialism.

(2) In the light of this distinction, independent criteria for assessing antimentalism are needed. They are: (1) the criterion of adequacy (ii) The criterion of congruence.

(3) A critical study comprises the application of these criteria. A decision-procedure for
evaluating any antimentalist theory has emerged from the application of such criteria.

**Part II (Chapters 2, 3 and 4).**

(4) Antibehaviourism, antidualism, emphasis on contingent identity going beyond correlation to identity appeal to neurophysiology and a revisory approach to mentalistic language and mentalistic properties constitute the hardcore of identity theory, which is an OUM-LAM conjunction.

(5) It has ontological, linguistic and epistemic components.

(6) Arguments from intentionality and location have converged to identify a mentalistic component which could not be compatible with any OUM.

(7) If pains, afterimages and sensations are accepted, then problems of incorrigibility privileged access etc. are bound to arise. Such arguments converge towards a consensual indication of a refractory element in any theory of mind-brain identity.

(8) The modes of refuting the arguments from mentalistic properties indicate that there is a dissonant component in IT and if it accounts for such a component without eliminating it, it is
incongruent.

(9) If the theories deny the mentalistic component and maintain a congruent OUM-LUM stand, then the illusion of encountered phenomenal properties has to be explained. It has been found that eliminative theories have no theories of illusion and reductive theories maintain adequacy at the cost of congruence.

(10) It is argued that Armstrong's recent defense does not help identity-theory. The distinction between analysing and indicating predicates is not the distinction between psychological and neurological predicates. Even if all indicating psychological properties are neurological predicates, it might imply that they are linked by way of explanation and not identity. To admit indicating predicates is to admit raw observation and to admit raw observation is to admit sensations, and thus to admit phenomenal properties. This amounts to admitting a mentalistic component, which indicates a failure of antimentalism over psychological properties.

(11) It has been argued that just as antimentalists fail to refute the existence of mentalistic
properties, they also fail to give a proper analysis of mentalistic language. Arguments against Smart's topic-neutrality thesis establish this point. I have presented additional arguments against Smart's TNT by claiming that Smart's theory attempts at an OUM-LMM combination which is cognitively unstable and secondly, if the contents of sensation-reports are dislocated in the direction of neutrality, it renders IT trivial and uninteresting.

(12) It is found that objections against Armstrong's analysis on mentalistic language are valid and particularly it has been shown that Causey's (1977) analysis implies that mind-brain identity theory can not assign causal role to mental states qua neural states. It has been shown that mentalistically reportable encounters with items in the phenomenal field can not be analysed away in neurological language.

(13) The Incoherence and Inadquacy arguments against Fotty's eliminative analysis of language have been examined and it is found that if eliminative materialism is only one of the vocabularies among the thousand vocabularies which Fotty allows to
bloom, then it is ontologically uninteresting and if Forty could prove that EM analysis is the only legitimate analysis of language, then IT is inadequate.

(14) Mentalistic language might be conceived as pre-scientific language in a temporal sense rather than as an unscientific language in an evaluative sense. It has been asserted that mentalistic language requires enrichment and not replacement. Perceptual subjectivity can not be converted into neural objectivity.

(15) It is not necessary to maintain that what is reported in phenomenal language is known or understood in all its causal connections. The question is not about the explanation but about the existence of perceptual experiences.

(16) The mentalistic language gets its nourishment from phenomenal field and antimentalist analysis which dissociates language from such a field, can not itself be meaningful, because experience get reported in language and if such a language is dissolved, even physicalism can not be established.

Part III (Chapters, 5, 6 and 7 )
The general argument of this part of the study is
that behaviourism, as a philosophy of mind as distinguished from psychological methodology, is either inadequate or mentalistic.

(17) It has been shown that Armstrong's and Tuolema's reliastic and functionalistic analysis of dispositions constitute a legitimate advance over Ryle's phenomenal analysis of dispositions.

(18) It is also true that dispositional predicates are inadequate from strictly scientific view and they deserve to be replaced by the categorical base-statements.

(19) It has been shown that Alston's distinction between ontological and conceptual theses about dispositions is valid and fruitful and it shows how the mentalistic component, ontologically accepted, would be compatible with methodological requirements of behaviourism.

(20) The arguments of Lewis against Ryle are valid because Lewis has shown like Alston, that dispositional analysis as such presupposes continuous consciousness as a flow. The argument that occurrence-disposition distinction is not the same as categorical-hypothetical distinction,
A review of psychological attribution research shows that simple dispositional analysis is inadequate. A distinction between ability-concepts and episode concepts would establish partial truth of behaviourism.

With reference Rylean ghosts in the machine, it has been argued that consciousness, as Gellner rightly views it, is a warm ghost. The reality of consciousness is presupposed when ghosts are distinguished from real persons and concept of consciousness is necessary for the concept of person.

Though most of the ability-indicating concepts admit of Rylean type of dispositional analysis, such an analysis is not adequate for all mentalistic concepts. Ryle's theory if it claims this, is an OUM-LMM combination and hence either inadequate or congruent.

Skinner's operant analysis is an attempt to demolish the myth of autonomic inner man. Arguments by Blanshard, Aston, Malcolm, Chomsky, Scriven and Flew converge to stress the point that behaviourism as a philosophy of mind based on parent analysis is inadequate. It has been found that
Malcolm's argument from asymmetry of first-person third-person ascription and Flew's objection regarding Skinner's concept of anthropomorphific fallacy are conclusive in showing the general inadequacy of Skinner's philosophy of psychology. This has nothing to do with enormously varied and complex researches and methodologies of Skinner in psychology.

(25) It has been the argument of the present study for that there is an ontological ambiguity in both Ryle and Skinner because it is one thing to abolish the mentalistic concepts as explanatory devices and it is quite a different thing to claim that nothing ever corresponds to any mentalistic concepts. Explanatory or methodological behaviourism is compatible with mentalism.

(26) Operant analysis, as a methodological approach, is not antimentalist. A distinction between explanatory and ontological antimentalism should be clearly drawn to disambiguate the ontology of operant analysis. The principle of scientific exclusion of fictional explanatory entities is welcome and it is true that absolutist dualism is irrelevant for psychological research, but a rejection of cartesian dualism is not a rejection of dualism as such, just
as a rejection of antimentalism is not a rejection of materialism as such.

(27) It theorists were primarily ontological antimentalists and secondarily explanatory antimentalists; behaviourism is primarily explanatory antimentalism and ambiguously ontological antimentalism. It theories object to the ontological antimentalism of behaviourists and behaviourist object to the explanatory antimentalism of IT. It has been found however that neurological and behavioural antimentalists, in so far as they are ontological antimentalists, face the same kind objection arising from the need of simultaneous compliance with the criteria of congruence and coherence.

(28) It is claimed that though Wittgenstein has often been construed as a behaviourist he is not a behaviourist.

(29) Wittgenstein is also not a cartesian dualist.

(30) Wittgenstein rejects the scepticism about other minds because he rejects the mere bodies on which psychological properties are projected.

(31) Wittgenstein's ordinary language analysis establishes the asymmetry of the first-person
third-person psychological reports and this
provides grounds for refuting a purely third-
person viewpoint in psychology.

(32) Wittgenstein's rejection of private language,
his denial of the thesis of cartesian origin
of mental concepts and his emphasis on stage-setting,
forms of life, language-games, praxis and
conventions, indicate the manner in which all solipsistic arguments against mentalistic language can
be eliminated. Wittgenstein's contextualism is a
saner way of looking at the language of sensations,
which can not be merely neurological or behavioural
be-merely-neurological-or-behavioural-or-cartesian.
Wittgenstein, by his G.E.A., has diffused the tensions
generated by sharply articulated cartesian dichotomies and at the same time he has made distinctions
which were collapsed methodologically by neurological and behavioural antimentalists. Wittgensteinian
analysis is non-revisionary as far as mentalistic
properties and language are concerned. Of course,
one need not endorse the view, which by implication
can be ascribed to Wittgenstein, that acceptable
ontology is the ontology of the ordinary English.
This does not also imply that acceptable ontology is the ontology of the physics of the day. It follows therefore that Wittgenstein's concern for ordinary language would never lead us to revisionary metaphysics of antimentalism.

The general argument of part III is that the dispositional, operant and ordinary-language analysis, in so far as they are confined to explanatory methodological or linguistic analysis do not establish antimentalism and in so far, the ontologies underlying such analysis turns out to be exclusively physicalist, they would be as behavioural-antimentalist ontologies, either inadequate or incongruent. It may be added that Wittgenstein is clearly not an antimentalist though some of his methods of dissolving cartesian linguistic confusions have behaviouristic implications.

Part IV (Chapter 8)

It has been shown in this part of the study that no form of antimentalism gets any confirmation from the current state of theories and research breakthroughs in psychobiological sciences. In a way, this establishes the scientific and empirical
Inadequacy of antimentalism, i.e. antimentalism does not get empirical feedback from sciences. This, of course does not mean that all types of ghostly entities and elements will have a good time for proliferation in future metaphysics. It only means that current science and philosophy can join hands against overpopulated ontologies without the drastic step of sterilization of fruitful ideas by the misguided use of Occam's razor.

(33) Delgado's conception of mind as intracerebral elaboration of extracerebral information illustrates that concept of information illustrates that concept of mind does not always require to be conceived in terms of Rylean ghosts.

(34) Sperry's recognition of a directive role and functional impact of the concept of consciousness amounts to a scientific plausible argument for interactionism.

(35) Bhardwaj's distinction between consciousness as a fact and consciousness as an explanatory concept is philosophically useful because it permits us to make the distinction between ontological and explanatory antimentalism.
Tridism of Eccles and Popper stresses the need to recognize the subjective component in a scientific world-view.

Penfield's confession of dualism is a scientist's warning to philosophers not to rush in where even scientist fear to tread.

Pribram's rejection of IR, cartesian dualism and behaviourism and his models of structural neurological changes is a proof that mind-brain relation is more complex than what the philosophers suspected.

Sommerhoff's reference to mental language rooted in awareness and his endorsement of mentalism against identity theory and behaviourism reinforces the claim that antimentalism is scientifically inadequate.

Even if the psychobiological scientists discussed here endorse some kind of antimentalism, it is an explanatory and not an ontological antimentalism. They do not deny the phenomena they study. Neuroscientists can afford to be materialists without being antimentalists.

Spili-brain studies, ESB studies, ASC studies,
EEG studies and Biofeedback studies have mentalistic implications and they do not in any way endorse antimentalism.

Thus parts I, II III and IV of this study have established that neurophysiological and behaviouristic antimentalism is inadequate. Theories and empirical research in neurosciences fail to establish AM because of their mentalistic implications.

It is therefore necessary to accept mentalism as a mentatheory of the ontology of all mind-brain theories. All mind-body theories have to be linguistically and ontologically multidimensional. They have to be both adequate and congruent only if they are not restrictively monistic.

II - A Case For Mentalism

It is clear from the preceding discussion that antimentalism is not plausible. This does not mean that Cartesian Dualism is to be endorsed. If the mentalistic component has to be accommodated in any mind-body theory, then no mind-body theory can be a unidimensional ontological materialism.

A case for mentalism can be made by saying
that the existence of the mental properties and events constitute the minimum conceptual requirement for mentalism. Such a minimum mentalism can be a component of a wide variety of mind-body theories. It is not the task of this study to select the fittest mentalistic theory because that depends upon the state of art current among scientists and philosophers. A case for physicalism as a component of any mind-body theory is not required to be argued for, because what is most frequently denied in mind-body theories is not the physicalist component but the mentalist component.

We will here discuss whether mentalism requires mental substances or whether mental properties or events can do.

(i) Mental Substances

The dualist claim that there is a mental substance and that it is a non-physical substance is hardly taken seriously in recent thinking. (Jaeger, 1979). It may be added that this is rightly so. In fact, mental substances are not needed to discard any anti-mentalist theory. There is no procedure of establishing that there are mental substances. Contemporary psychologists hardly refer to mind as a non-physical substance.
Lee (1979) has shown that if reality is conceived as a continuum, then there are no entities aside from the transaction between organism and environment. In categorizing reality, we are discussing about it and in doing so, we are contrasting discourse and reality. "ENTITY" is a term whose meaning is primarily one of discourse. Discursive activity is the result of the responses of organism to environment. The world that adults live in is a world of definite parts and due to the economy of responses on the part of the organism, objects are identified and recognized.

Lee argues that when entities are classified with definite boundaries and are treated as independent of the reactions of organism, then these entities are substantial. Thus the term "entity" can have substantial or pragmatic meaning. Lee himself opts for a view that reality independent of responses does not consist of entities, but the world to which you consciously respond does consist of entities. "Discourse is a semiotic response to concrete reality". (p. 129, 1979).

It has to be clearly seen that if we so
frame the criteria that only physical objects are substances, then antimentalism becomes true by definition and hence not interesting. If however only physical substances are admitted at a macro-object level, it does not follow that nothing mental exists unless we also establish an additional thesis that only the substantial can properly be conceived as existing. If nothing substantial is non-physical and if substantial entities exist, then antimentalism can be treated as true, but it is not clear what counts as having established that nothing non-substantial ever exists. Denial of mental substances does not necessarily lead to the denial of mentalism.

One fact should not escape us while talking about the mental. The model of solid physical macro-objects is our model of normal perceptual encounters with the world. Our perceptual mechanisms are "wired-in" or geared to the apprehension of certain macro-objects. We are equipped with natural cognitive stabilizers and this peculiar feature of cognitive mechanisms is reflected in our ordinary language of objects which contain nouns and verbs. It is therefore doubtful whether we can characterize what there is in the world as
exclusively physical. That will imply a finality beyond the peculiarities of our given cognitive and linguistic equipment. There is no cause for regret, if in this context, there are not mental substances. We do not processing mechanisms which would give a stable picture of our own mental realm lack proper linguistic categories to articulate them. It is may claim that this particular area of human cognitive equipment in relation to the processing of our mental field has not been so far given proper scientific attention and till then, there is no point in just saying that the mental items are not properly characterized as substances or entities.

9(ii) Mental Events.

The most seriously discussed question is the question of properties and events in recent philosophy of mind. (Jeeger, 1979). Extremal physicalism claims that every mental property is a physical property and every mental event is a physical event.

Ontological behaviourism considers every mental event as a behavioural event and every mental property as a behavioural property. Identity theory considers every mental event as a neurological event and every mental property as neurological property. This
constitutes the hard-core of contemporary antimentalism. As against such a view, Davidson (1970), Taylor (1970), Nagel (1965) and Fodor (1975) are moderate physicalists i.e. mentalists. They believe that mental events are neurological events, but they doubt whether mental properties are neurological properties.

Taylor (1973) has raised the question whether there are any mental events. He has shown that expressions containing gerundives, possessives, nouns or adverbial modifications fail to neatly pick up mental events and even a pronouns in a mental even-sentence does not have a referring role. Taylor doubts the ontological category of mental events.

Puccetti (1974) points out the difficulties in speaking about mental events being located in some particular neural area.

Davidson (1970) has advanced a theory called "anomalous monism". Events, according to this view, are deemed mental and physical merely by virtue of how they are described. If there are mental events, they are mental by virtue of the mode of their description. The theory of anomalous monism comprises the following:
Every event has a physical description.

Some events have mental description.

Every event, with a mental description, has a physical description.

There are no psychophysical laws. The mental and the physical are autonomous nomological systems. Thus, such a monism does not clash with the principle of human freedom, because any event, only so far as it is described physically, is subject to causal laws.

Noren (1979) finds such a monism attractive without being plausible. He distinguishes between intentional mental phenomena and sensation phenomena and argues that no metalinguistic criterion will work in regard to sensation descriptions. As Noren puts it:

If what I report is a mental event, it would appear to be the fact that I feel something that makes what I report peculiarly mental and not merely the logic of what it is I say. (p. 70)

Noren is not happy with a situation in which it turns out that as every event is a physical event
and as only physical events are determined causally, some of these events having mental descriptions do not enter into the causal story at all. He points out that either Davidson's theory denies sentience or sentience is rendered ineffable. I fully agree with Noren because I have already stated that physicalist theories face this problem.

Noren also raises the question whether an event SIMPLICIT.R can fall under both mental and physical descriptions. Like Lee (1979), Noren maintains that what is real may be said to be what is out there as it falls under the criteria of objecthood implicit in the theories. "We can not drive a wedge between language and reality" (p. 72).

Within the physicalist framework, persons are construed as complex systems of logical subjects. Within the framework of the mental, persons are treated as indivisible telic entities. Noren thus does not find a clear sense in which we can talk about the SAME neutral events picked out by both mental and physical descriptions.

Noren concludes by saying that anomalous monism either has to deny sentience or render it efficable. Our present knowledge does not permit us to dispense
Thus the most recent trend in philosophizing about mental events is to doubt the thesis that there are no mental events and also to consider the argument from two different frameworks applying to a common reality as inadequate.

Considering the relation between events and properties, the most widely discussed view is the view of Kim (1966) (1972), that an event is an exemplification of properties. E.g. the event of the death of Socrates is the exemplification of the property of dying by Socrates at a particular time. Katz (1979) has however challenged Kim's view by showing that expressions that are typically used to pick out events do not always succeed in referring to the structures or complexes which, Kim's theory they are supposed to; e.g., death of Caesar at time t and VIOLENT death of Caesar at time t, refer to the same event.

Thus there is no consensus about linguistic structures which will pick up individuated and particularized mental events. But if there are mental properties and if some events are exemplification of mental properties, then there are some mental events and if there are
some mental events, then entimentalism is rendered implausible, though it does not thereby render all MATERIALISTIC theories implausible.

It is surprising that philosophers who have argued for materialism are somehow inclined to defend monism. A dualistic materialism is quite interesting in itself. To say that dualism should be always a dualism of substances is illegitimate. The concept of physical substance itself is not free from controversy. It is therefore quite in order if we speak of physical events, physical properties, mental events and mental properties. To continue to say that they are all ultimately characterizing only one reality means only that we can take a particular point of view from which we can see the whole of linguistic framework as depicting a whole domain or field. A monism which denies mental properties and events is a restricted monism and therefore inadequate and a monism which embraces both the physical and mental domains is too comprehensive to be relevant conceptually and empirically.

Kim (1972) accepts that a physicalist monism that retains mental events as legitimate entities in the world is difficult to establish Kim commends Davidson's attempt in this direction.
Davidson (1970), argued that there are some mental events though every event has a physical description. His view is anomalous monism. Wilkerson (1974) accepts mental properties i.e. phenomenal properties and rejects all alternative forms of extreme physicalism. Wilkerson points out that if by physicalism we mean ALL mental events are identical with some physical events, then physicalism is obviously true. Wilkerson accepts mental events and phenomenal properties and like Davidson, he offers a version of materialism which is not antimentalist. In fact, as McGill (1975) has shown, Wilkerson is a non-reductive materialist, because Wilkerson considers the concept of person as a logically primitive concept.

Like Feigl, Wilkerson is a raw-feel physicalist because he accepts phenomenal properties. Kim (1972), Davidson (1970) and Wilkerson (1974) have thus seen the need for retaining events and properties.

We will here briefly refer to one more form of non-reductive materialism.

In recent macro-philosophy of mind, any person-theory is a denial of antimentalism. The latest post-Straussism Person-theory is developed by Margolis (1978), who is a non-reductive materialist. Persons, according to Margolis, can neither be identified with
their bodies nor can they be comprehended as composites of mind and body. A person is a culturally emergent entity i.e. an abstract particular embodied in material particular just as a particular painting is embodied in material particular. Margolis rejects it because it does not adequately accept sentience. It is a sort of dualism of attributes.

Simon (1979) while appreciating the originality of the standpoint of Margolis, does not consider such a theory viable because Simon claims that Margolis has not shown that entities having mental states are only physical bodies whose non-material properties are all culturally emergent.

It can however be maintained that any person-theory is bound to be mentalistic though it can be a materialistic theory in the sense that basic entities are physical entities. According to the stand taken here, a person-theory is a multidimensional theory because a concept of person is a concept of something instantiated by more than one kind of variable.

Sociological and legal aspects of the concept of person should not however lead us to believe that "person" denotes mere body which is treated as person due
to culture-bound factors. Socio-cultural variables are related by way of exemplification or embodiment in the physical medium. This is not the way in which we can conceive of the mental variables. They denote occurrences and not mere reinterpretations of some patterns in cultural setting. Some movement-patterns are characterized as dancing; there are no dancing events over and above the movement events, but there are pain-events over and above neurological events. Of course, persons do not exist over and above human bodies, but the field of mental events and properties can be organized by the concept of person. The concept of person is a theoretical construct. Psychological predicates pick up mental events and properties and the bearer of such events and properties is better conceived as a person rather than a body because we have concept of mere bodies in connection with dead bodies or still-born babies.

Any mind-body theory has to accept mental events and mental properties and hence the talk of mental substances can be waived. How the relation between events and properties is to be characterized is an open question still, because it is a recent field of discriminative philosophizing but unless the mentalistic component is
accepted as an event-component and a property-component, no mind body theory is adequate. This establishes a case for mentalism.

(iii) Language of the Mental.

Language has an inevitable reference to external objects. If this quinean view is true, then, it also follows the expressions like "seeing blue" or "imagining a woman" depict encounters with physical or imaginary objects. Mentalistic expressions have syntactically the positions of predicates. e.g. "X is in pain" "X is seeing red" etc. From this, it follows that the predicates, when ascribed to an individual replacing X, will have to be applied only to certain kinds of individuals which instantiate X. Wittgenstein was right. "Being afraid that somebody will beat him tomorrow" can not be predicated of a dog, because it denotes a fear that can not exist outside language and concepts. An analysis of mentalistic expressions as predicates does not mean that nothing ontological is conveyed thereby. Language with purely physicalist commitments can not entertain mentalistic expressions even in predicate positions. If mentalists predicates can really convey something about
an individual, then antimentalism is false. The antecedent of this conditional has been demonstrated in parts II, III & IV of this study. A theory accepting the language of mental events and properties is multidimensional because whatever there is is an instantiation of more than one kind of variable. Some mentalistic expressions which are dispositional can be physiologically and behaviourally unpacked, but there are sensation-feeling-emotion phenomena which denote occurrences and they pick up the modes of encounterings which are distinctly different from any physical processes. An exclusively physicalist language to denote EVERYTHING that there is in the world can not even be conceived. Accepting certain kinds of predicates is accepting certain kinds of properties and events and accepting certain kinds of properties and events is accepting a certain kind of ontology.

If there are genuinely mentalistic expressions then any mind-body theory includes a mentalistic ontology. Property and event ontology refers to agent-ontology. A person is an agent.

(iv) Naturalistic Mentalism.

The view I am suggesting is that mentalistic phenomena naturally conceived is a minimum need
both for neurophysiology and psychology according to naturalism, human beings belong to natural order though not devoid of species-specific characteristics. Danto (1968) has shown that naturalism is compatible with any kind of ontology and that is why I suggest that we should prefer to include naturalistic mentalism as a part of the mind-body theories. Naturalistic mentalism is both methodological and ontological.

By methodological mentalism I mean a view, according to which, it is fruitful and meaningful to postulate mental processes underlying behaviour and accompanying brain processes. E.g., dreams and imagery are studied by postulating that there are subjective processes underlying behaviour and accompanying neural processes. In the psychology of last decade there is almost a celebration of the return of consciousness. NM has generated fruitful non-eliminative hypotheses. New methods of studying mentalistic dimensions are also devised. Stoyya and Kamiya (1968) have proposed a method of converging operations according to which, consciousness can be studied by verbal report operations and physiological measures like EEG patterns.

Such a method conceptualizes dreams as
inner mental events and treats them as hypothetical constructs. The investigators have amply documented their research and have used various diagram techniques to conceptualize the relation or lack of it between dreams as hypothetical constructs and physiological indicators of dream. In my paper (Baxi, 1977(a)) I have shown that Malcolm’s analysis needlessly stops short of recognizing dreams as inner mental events. I have found Malcolm over Wittgensteinian in his analysis of dreams.

By Ontological Mentalism I mean a view according to which the mental, as the natural, is included as what there is in the world.

I believe that a concept of mind can be the concept of the central, mediating, causal, non-neural non-dispositional and non-behavioural states, processes or events which in humans, imply a peculiarly first-person dimension. The grammar of first-person sentences capture something mental which can be inferred from observation of behavioural and neurological coextensive processes. The concept of mind includes ability-components and experience-components. The former are inferred dimensions whereas the latter, though inferred from the third-person...
Naturalistic methodological mentalism (NMM) and naturalistic ontological mentalism (NOM) are both rational and intelligible components for a sound mind-body theory whatever else it contains. NM as NMM and assert
NOM does not deny that the mental is not at all linked with neurobehavioural dimensions. It only insists that the world of science can be organized without in any way eliminating minimum mentalism. Which kind of mind-body theory is more plausible or relevant depends upon the state of knowledge obtaining in a given period. NMM and NOM can be meaningful philosophers of psychobiological sciences. Mentalistic constructs can be accepted methodologically. Methodological behaviourism also does not clash with NOM. NOM is not a view which sanctions mysterious, ghostly, supernatural or occult elements. Fear of ghosts should not eliminate even the concept of persons. A misapplication of Occam's razor is to be avoided, as I have already argued. (Baxi, 1977 b).

It may be that emergence of consciousness
is an evolutionary accident. The crushing idea of this universe divested of all consciousness is not a self-contradiction. NM only warns us that methodological interests can not eliminate inconvenient subject-matters. NM restores the reality of experiential elements which has once again become a live theme in recent psychology. NM sounds more tentative and less ambitions than substance-dualism, but NM is the most we can say.

There are no minds" and the "bodies" manifesting them. There are only minding bodies. "Minding bodies", though physical objects are different kind of physical objects.

Conclusion.

NM is a view that the language of mind has captured some natural property or function which is not found in some other kinds of objects and this minding function denotes experiential encounters which are from dispositional encounters, with other persons. That minds are not entities like tables appears profound because of the linguistic prejudice in favour of the weighty, solid, compact and thing-like or substantial entities. Given the linguistic framework geared to encounter with macro-level physical objects, solidity and substantiality
have merged beyond retrieval. Shadows and mirror-reflections are accepted as objects of knowledge, but most grudgingly. Perhaps, there is a Chomskyean 'Deep...' Structure' merging solidity with substantiality and thereby with reality. The criterion of reality thus seems to be an accident of genetic epistemology. I believe that pains are not tables nor dreams nor chairs; This is not because pains or dreams are less real or unreal but because our language is loaded by terms of macro-physical solidity and externality.

In condemning common, language, the antimeentalists have failed to note that their criterion of reality is smuggled intact to the from common-sense level to the level of science. Intersubjective and concurrent observability is a criterion of reality and it is acceptable; but originally, it is a criterion of macro-physical reality. My mode of identifying and reidentifying a radio-set is different from my mode of identifying and reidentifying the tunes or the songs. The puzzle about identifying the same headache (if not the same head) or similar headache, arises because the words 'same' and 'similar' are allowed to function intact both for macrophysical objects and experiential objects. A
pure language of experience is not possible because somewhere the macrophysical, identifying and solidity-denoting expressions will have to be used. 'Headache' is an example where 'Head' is a macrophysical ordinary object. There is no headache without head. This is naturalism; there is no headache, only heads; this is antimentalism. We have discussed a version called 'fusion-materialism' where mental words are fused with physical-denoting words and they have no referential value. This is where NM differs from antimentalism. Either you accept consciousness or experience distinguishable from behaviour and brain processes or you do not accept such experiences. If you do admit them, you are a naturalistic mentalist; if you do not admit them you are an antimentalist excluding the mental as non-natural and non-existent.

Ayer (1973) has rightly said that the postulation of mental substance is not needed to explain self-consciousness. Ayer admits that it is true that with scientific advance, people will conceive of their experience as more knowledgeably described by the use of physical predicates, but this is not a philosophically interesting thesis. So identity theory is not very
interesting if it has only this implication. If however, the thesis has the implication that our descendants will have give up talking about conscious sensations, then the thesis, according to Ayer, is not very plausible.

Flew (1978) has expressed his doubts about the "Great Physicist Imperialism" of materialists like Smart. Flew has shown that enjoying or suffering of any from is an attribute of organism as a whole and it makes "No sense to say that a cortex or a part of cortex enjoys or suffers anything." (p 138).

Such observations strengthen naturalistic mentalism as a philosophy of mind. There is no mystification here. NM is strengthened by neurophysiological and psychological research. We know more about dream by EEG research; we know more about colour-vision by knowing about rods and cones and their distribution in retina. Natural events are interconnected. There is no need to postulate a transcendent and other worldly seer or witness who is dragged in and rehabilitated inside the organism to explain the events of perception, sleep, dreams etc. Spiritism, like devilism, is a linguistic excess, requiring Occam's Razor, but the operation of Occam's Razor, like surgery, should be for removing
the unwanted portions; it should not damage or destroy usefully functioning ideas.

I would end this study by referring to the comments of Lewis on the ultimates and a way of looking at philosophy. (1976, p.296).

Nothing seems plainer to me than that seeing, hearing, pondering, resolving etc., while they have behavioural and dispositional aspects, are essentially non-extended and non-physical ongoings. The simplest stock example is having pain. I know in my own case that there is pain and that I am having it. I just know that I have a pain.

(Lewis, 1976, pp 295-296)