PART V

CONCLUSION
This study ends with a plea for accepting naturalistic mentalism both methodologically and ontologically. Naturalistic mentalism is a vital component of the structure of any mind-body theory. In this sense, naturalistic mentalism is a metatheory because it is a theory about the ontology of mind-body theories. Substancementalism need not be endorsed but somewhere in ontology, property-mentalism and event-mentalism have to be accommodated. Any mind-body theory therefore has to be linguistically and ontologically multidimensional because whatever there is, is an instantiation of more than one kind of variable.

The fact that emergent properties and events can be legitimately ascribed to certain kinds of organism implies something about the structure of the entities to which mentalistic ascriptions are made. How to demarcate the field of what there is in the world depends upon the kind of species-specific sensory, perceptual and conceptual equipment. We are still in the dark regarding the perceptual and conceptual processing mechanisms and it will be too bold to propose that reality is exclusively physical because our assessment of what there is in the world is itself a function of cognitive processing variables. An all comprehensive nonism is irrelevant and restrictive nonism is inadequate.