CHAPTER VII

ORDINARY-LANGUAGE ANALYSIS AND

ANTIMENTALISM

Introduction

This chapter deals exclusively with Wittgensteinian ordinary-language analysis. After a study of Ryle and Skinner, (i.e. dispositional and operant analysis), it is necessary to examine whether Wittgensteinian ordinary-language analysis substantiates antimentalism as defined in chapter 1 of this study. It is argued here that Wittgensteinian analysis is not antimentalist. He is neither a logical behaviourist nor a cartesian dualist. He has been mistakenly assimilated with behaviourists by Smart and Armstrong. It therefore follows that no objections to behaviourism in the radical antimentalist sense, can ever be applied to Wittgensteinian analysis of ordinary mentalist terms and propositions.

Ordinary-language analysis is welcome in so far as it prevents misunderstanding about the import of psychological words. Ordinary language analysis as undertaken by Wittgenstein, would on the contrary
be employed to demolish behaviourism as Malcolm (1972) has done. A study of Wittgenstein shows, in this context, that one can afford to reject cartesian dualism and logical behaviourism without thereby endorsing ontologically unidimensional materialism. (G O M).

It is thus the claim of this chapter that the charge that behaviourism is inadequate made by the neurophysiological antimentalists is inapplicable to Wittgenstein. In fact it is applicable to their own theories.

Wittgensteinian approach would therefore accommodate the mentalistic element in a mind-body theory without linking it with solipsistic privacy of experience or languages.

The design of our discussion of Wittgenstein here is as follows:

Wittgensteinian view of psychology and science is briefly referred to. (I)

Wittgenstein's treatment of mentalistic concept is discussed. (II). This discussion is followed by an analysis of the implications of The Private language
Argument. (III). It is shown that Wittgenstein is not a cartesian dualist. (IV) nor a behaviourist. (V).
The chapter concludes with a general review of Wittgensteinian ordinary-language analysis with reference to antimentalism.
Wittgensteinian analysis of psychological disputes between behaviourism and psychanalysis provides insights into the nature function and scope of psychological theories. Osheroff (1976) has brought out very clearly the Wittgensteinian approach to psychological disputes.

Wittgenstein has distinguished between seeing something and seeing something as something. "Seeing as..." is not a part of perception and yet it is like seeing. It involves a change of aspect. Seeing a certain pattern as duck or as rabbit involves a change of aspect. It presupposes different attitudes abilities and interests. The same kind of analysis gives us insight into psychoanalysis. The following points emerge therefore:

(1) Freudian psychoanalysis should not be treated as referring to hidden mental entities. The grammar of "felt" and "unfelt" pains is different from that of "seen" and "unseen" chairs. Psychoanalytic expressions do not refer to newly found entities.

(ii) Freudian interpretations are more like picture-puzzle solutions. They involve change of aspects.
Psychoanalytic interpretations are like "seeing as .......". "Psychoanalyst SEES the patient's behaviour AS unconsciously motivated". (Osheroff, 1976, p.347).

(iii) Freudian interpretations therefore involve neither formulation and testing of hypothesis nor the discovery of hidden mental entities. Causation, experiment and hypothesis-testing constitutes a different language-game compared to interpreting dreams, and ascribing unconscious motives. Justifying actions or giving reasons is different from finding causes or giving explanations. Freudian interpretations are to be understood as furnishing REASONS for patient's behaviour rather than supplying CAUSES of it. Dreams and jokes become understandable when psychoanalysts provide contexts and circumstances.

Wittgenstein (OC 298, 324) accepts the pervasive influence of science, but he is not of the view that there is a unitary way of understanding the world. He repeatedly emphasizes the diversity of human practices and areas of discourse. (Wilde, 1977) There are many ways of seeing the connections among facts. It is Wittgenstein's view that we should not base
our understanding of others on the kinds of reductive explanation to be found in physical sciences.

Wittgenstein's philosophy of science (if we can characterize a group of his ideas into such a theme), is neither a realist nor an idealist philosophy of science. His philosophy of psychology is quite unconventional. He sketches outlines of various paradigms and presents before us a perspicuous representation. Wittgenstein has stressed the need of linking the concepts and propositions with the frameworks, settings and cultures.

Wittgenstein speaks of a number of systems, e.g., colour-system, number-system, a system of religious beliefs and a system of physics. All testing and conformation take place within a system. Science is a paradigm of inquiry because its methodological rules are made more explicit. Wittgenstein would not accept the picture of science as THE standard for objective judgement.

A radical change in any system of belief, then, ...... involves the possibility of seeing the facts as
connected in different way, which, in turn, introduces the possibility of discovering different facts.

(Wilde, 1977, p. 69)

Wittgenstein's view of science thus does not necessarily involve a materialist monism i.e., antimentalism.

(iv) Different sorts of psychological explanations are different language-games i.e. in some contexts, causal explanations and in other contexts, reason-explanations are used.

Osheroff (1977) points out that Freudian and Skinnerian psychology would be construed as different paradigms in Wittgenstenian terms. Still however, Osheroff thinks that such paradigms are not as incommensurable as has been claimed by Wittgenstein. There are many possibilities of common moves across the paradigms.

Ryle (1949) also has advocated the "abandonment of the dream of psychology as a counterpart to Newtonian science". (p. 323). "Psychology" denotes a federation of inquiries and techniques. Psychology is not the name of a "single homogeneous theory". (p. 324).
II Wittgenstein's Treatment of Mentalistic Concepts

Ryle (1949) has argued that:

mind is not the topic of sets of untestable categorical propositions, but topic of sets of testable hypothetical and semihypothetical propositions.

(p. 46)

Ryle was very firm in his view that mentalistic predicates and concepts do not tell anecdotes about ghostly processes occurring in streams of consciousness. To find that people have minds is to find that they are able to do certain of things. Ryle was all the time concerned with denying that there are special hidden occult acts of mind going on behind behaviour and the expressions which describe such behaviour.

Wittgenstein applied language-analysis rather than conceptual analysis, but he also in his peculiar way attempts to reject the legend of two worlds; i.e., the world of mind and the world of body.
The general trend of Wittgensteinian approach is to take up certain expressions like "knowing", 'remembering', 'intending' etc, and ask us to see whether some specific mental process MUST be going on when we engage in knowing, recognizing or remembering something. Is there a specific process of "knowing how to go on ..." or 'remembering' or understanding or thinking something? The major theme of *Philosophical Investigations* is that the meaning of a work is not some private experience or object denoted by it.

Wittgenstein, like Ryle, emphasizes the mastery of techniques and abilities of applications. An appeal to inner pictures do not "get us any closer to what we are looking for". (Seligman; 1976, p 211) Wittgenstein's doctrine of meaning as use demystifies the conception of meaning as an inner process of ideas or images. Wittgenstein shares Ryle's contempt of Cartesian ghosts.

"Meaning" and 'Understanding' are not the names of mental occurrences. Of course, in the trivial sense of 'naming' and 'denoting', most words do denote something. As Pitcher (1964) has shown, Wittgenstein conveys the message that sensation-words also are not the names of inward experiences IN A WAY ANALOGOUS TO that in which 'tree' or 'red' are the names of familiar kinds of objects of property. (p 300).
What follows here is a brief account of Wittgensteinian analysis of mentalistic concepts as named in ordinary language.

(i) Thinking:

The most popular example of mental process usually referred to in a philosophical debate is the example of a man thinking without any outward manifestation of behaviour. If thinking is not actual behaviour then something different than muscular responses must be going on in the organism.

Wittgenstein points out that thinking is a mental activity; often it is not a mental activity. Thinking is exhibited in work, play, writing etc. It is not a question of postulating some occult unrelated processes. There are varieties of thinking - e.g. thinking aloud, pausing to think, thinking in conversation, silent thinking, putting thought into words and so on. Thinking is not some essentially private hidden occurrence always accompanying all episodes of thinking. This is Wittgenstein's general mode of analysing mental concepts. Public observable context is primary and there reference to private, silent, covert, unwitnessable inner occurrences is not the basic or even dominant
meaning of mental concepts. As Malcolm puts it, "the ability to multiply in one's head logically presupposes the ability to multiply aloud or in writing". (1978, p. 415) The general view which emerges from Wittgenstein's treatment of mental concepts is that they are tied to natural expressions and reported in a system of language, which has forms of life as as its foundation. Malcolm has argued that Fodor's type of computational functionalist thesis commits us needlessly to some a priori requirements of psychological theorizing. Wittgenstein does not reduce thinking to some inner unconscious process however cognitive it is.

(ii) **Remembering**

Wittgenstein applies the same technique to analysis of remembering as Redford (pp. 420-425, 1978) has shown. For memory concepts also, we do not require inner process story. Mental experiencings are not causally necessary for remembering something. But again Wittgenstein also admits that it could be that some inner experience is required for memory. So we have seen that Wittgenstein, on the one hand, says that sensation is nothing, thinking is not a mental process, no inner experience story is necessary for memory and so on; on the other hand, he claims that sometimes--thinking--is--a--mental sometimes thinking is a mental activity, sensation is something and some inner
experience might accompany rememberings of some sort. This peculiar feature of Wittgenstein makes it difficult for us to classify him wholeheartedly as a behaviourist like Ryle, though Armstrong, Rorty, Smart et al. treat him as behaviourist in so far as he rejects private language and insists on public criteria. According to Radford, Wittgenstein faces this difficulty; suppose a man has some thought which he did not express at the time of his thinking; further suppose that at some later time, he claims to remember that thought. How would Wittgenstein react to this? To say that he did not express the thought does not mean that the he did not have it; the point of this difficulty is that "meaning can not be collapsed into assertion conditions". (p 423)

(iii) Emotions

We will illustrate one more psychological concept treated by Wittgenstein, if the concept of emotion. Wittgenstein distinguishes between the object and the cause of emotions. He argues that it is wrong not to distinguish them as well to understand emotions only causally. It is necessary to understand emotions in terms of objects rather than its causes. Wittgenstein does not deny that there is a possibility in which, cause will become identical with the object as a matter of fact.
Miyashita (1978) points out that Wittgenstein has not sufficiently discussed the importance of distinguishing the cause from the object of emotion. Wittgenstein, however, emphasizes the intentionality aspect of emotion by his emphasis on the objects of emotions. Miyashita points out that though Wittgenstein distinguishes between emotions and sensation, ultimately "the most essential feature of an emotion is that it has a characteristic expression". (p. 451)

The language-game, 'I am afraid" already contains the object. The inner story of emotion-denoting words is rejected by Wittgenstein. Thoughts, sensations and emotions are not Cartesian ghostly entities. In Zettel (p. 487), Wittgenstein conveys this as under:

"Joy designates nothing at all; neither any inward or outward thing" (Z, 487).

The object-view of emotion, is preferable according to Wittgenstein because causal view leads to cartesian inner events. Kenny (1963) for example, has argued that Descartes has confused the object of emotion with cause of emotion. Wilson (1972) does not agree with this, firstly because, the object has some causal relevance for emotions, and secondly, because it would be unfair to claim as Kenny does that Descartes was simply confusing
Kenny, like Wittgenstein, does not endorse the introspectionist account of emotion, though Kenny is not a behaviourist. All the same, the above statement quoted from Zettel, is startling precisely because Wittgenstein is not a behaviourist. The peculiarly of Wittgenstein’s materialism, (if it is really a seriously argued view on behalf of Wittgenstein) is that sensations feelings etc are not private, exclusively introspectible, infallibly and propositionally reportable inner mental states and yet he does not want to identify them with inner physiological states. The Wittgensteinian technique lies in appealing to the grammar of the mentalistic expressions as embodied in forms of life. This is not exactly a Rylean type of purely dispositional analysis from limited conceptual interests, but it has the same Rylean impact: it makes the inner-event accounts rather unattractive at least for most of the mentalistic terms which can be clearly fitted with the general non-episodic account of mind.

(iv) Intending

We have seen how Wittgenstein treats thinking remembering and emotion, quasi-behaviouristically. He is more concerned with the conditions of assertion in a language-game rather than giving a dispositional account
of all mental concepts Ryle wanted to dislodge the

two-worlds legend. Wittgenstein asks us to approach the

problem in the context of linguistic practices customs,

conditions etc. Wittgenstein asks us to consider the

context in which thinking remembering, understanding etc

are used in doing something. Rembert (1978), for example,

has illustrated Wittgenstein's treatment of intending

and has found that for Wittgenstein, intending also is

not some isolated detached process. Rembert points out that

Wittgenstein seems to think that when we talk of mental

processes we MUST talk as if they are isolated from

background of linguistic conventions and then it is easy

for him to show that there is not point in talking about

such processes. But the point is whether we MUST conceive

mental processes in the way in which Wittgenstein

conceives them for subsequent demolition of the mental

process concepts. Rembert does not consider the process of

intending as necessarily isolated from human background

and if so, Wittgenstein's account is not adequate.

Wittgenstein often warned us that we are sometimes under

the influence of false models of conceiving mental processes

and in his aim he has admirably succeeded, but then some

critics are right in raising a protest by saying that

Wittgenstein himself was under the impact of a model

according to which either your conception of a mental
Process is the conception of an isolated process or you do not know what you are talking about. This need not be the case according to Rambert.

Rambert has rightly pointed out that all philosophy cannot be conceived as variations of one category mistake or variations of one mistake. Knowing how the words for mental concept are actually used is one of the techniques of understanding them; it is a rewarding technique but the whole philosophy of mind is not be reduced to philosophy of language. I endorse this view.

I think that what generates the impression that Wittgenstein was a behaviourist is his sole emphasis on linguistic and social contexts. I would characterise Wittgenstein's analysis as "contextual behaviourism". Wittgenstein does not wholeheartedly deny mental processes and events. He is not an eliminative materialist, nor reductive materialist. He does not insist upon neurophysiological contexts; rather he talks about linguistic practices and social contexts. I would thus characterize his approach also as "sociolinguistic behaviourism." Discourse about the mental is primarily a sociolinguistic discourse and mental language is embedded in it.

(v) Dispositions and Occurrents.

Wittgenstein, in fact, rejected a purely disposi-
tional analysis of sensation. (Donagan, 1966)

Wittgenstein, according to Donagan, has admitted that there is something there all the same accompanying my cry of pain. (PI, 296) Wittgenstein considers visual sensations, like pain, non-dispositional. Sensations of seeing blue etc, involve a kind of attention that can be described as "immersing" yourself in it. For Wittgenstein, pain is nonbehavioural and non-dispositional. Sensations are defined with reference to external circumstances and yet they are not reducible to such circumstances. In this sense, he was not a behaviourist. Donagan has shown that Wittgenstein has rejected both Cartesianism and Behaviourism. What he was emphasising was that the language of the mental requires contingent connections between experience and behaviour.

The approach of Wittgenstein is that sensations are private non-dispositional occurrences, but they can not be named and investigated independently of the circumstances that produce them.

Kenny (1966), contrasts Descartes and Wittgenstein by pointing out, that Descartes' innovation was to identify the mental with the private, while Wittgenstein's contribution was to separate the two. The mental is what is peculiar to the language-user. The cogito-argument
leads to the view that mind is better known than body. The private-language argument leads to the view that "body is better known than mind." (p 361) Kenny considers PI as having philosophical merits, independent of specific PI doctrines of meaning.

(vi) First Person Reports of Pain.

Pitcher (1964) has said that there are, according to Wittgenstein, a number of important differences between "I have a toothache" and "He has a toothache." It makes no sense to wonder whether I have a toothache whereas it does make sense to wonder whether another person has a toothache. It does not make sense to collect evidence and verify that I have a toothache. There is also no sense in doubting whether it is I who have a toothache rather than some other person.

This however does not mean that Wittgenstein endorses the thesis of exclusive privacy of meaning. He warns us against using the word "I" in "I am in pain" in any metaphysical sense. (Wilde, 1977).

Wittgenstein has shown that to say that "I know I am in pain" is pointless. It lacks contrast. There is not contrast between "I know I am in pain", and "I rather
THINK I am in pain”. (Passmore, 1968) There is no point either in saying that "I doubt that I am in pain" or that "I know I am in pain".

Wittgenstein (PI, 246) rejects the suggestion that other people do not or can not know that I am in pain. He asks us just to try, in real case, to doubt someone else’s fear or pain. (PI, 303). Wittgenstein asks us to consider that in some cases doubting has an end. (PI p1 180) We are shutting our eyes in face of doubt. They are shut. (PI p 224).

There is a connection between pain and pain behaviour. The teaching and learning of the word pain requires at some stage a reference to pain behaviour. (PI, 257, 347). Wittgenstein even considered the suggestion that verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it (PI, 244). That is why it makes no sense to speak of being mistaken about our own pain. In PI, 404, Wittgenstein argues that as "groaning with pain" does not name a person, saying that I am in pain also does not name a person of course, Wittgenstein does not deny that "I am in pain" is sometimes a report of pain and it may be something else also (PI, p, 189).

Learning pain-language requires criteria and stage-setting "It is 5 O’clock on the sun" This statement has no
The same can be said of the sentence "The stove is in pain", "Only of what behaves like a human being can one say that IT has pains". (PI, 283). "What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - forms of life". (PI, p 226).

Malcolm (1972) endorses completely the Wittgenstein discussion of the asymmetry in the mental concepts.

There are, according Malcolm (p1 90) many mental phenomena whose criteria are primarily linguistic. We say "a dog is afraid his master will beat him, but not, he is afraid his master will beat him tomorrow." The reason for this is that the FEAR of a happening TOMORROW can not exist independently of language. The criteria of some mental phenomena are not linguistic e.g. we can say that a cat is afraid or dog is in pain. First-person psychological statements are not based on criteria.

In my paper, (Baxi, 1977) I have argued that pain is a non-dispositional non-neural and non-behavioural element in experience and this argument can be strengthened by Wittgenstein's reminders. To say that setting and human situation are required for pain-ascription is one thing's to deny pains is a different thing. Behaviourists and newophysiological antimentalists have both erred in not making this distinction. Pain has a peculiar epistemological
status and axiological status. Wittgensteinian analysis identifies the epistemological status. Gandhi (1973) has brought out the axiological status of pain by pointing out that regarding oneself as valuable involves regarding oneself as vulnerable. Illich (1975) has argued that perception of pain in another is so fundamentally human that it cannot be put into parenthesis. Sujata Miri (1976) has distinguished between pain and suffering and she has claimed that toothache has a cause but it is not about anything, while my suffering at a friend's death has an object. Gandhi, Illich and Sujata Miri have brought out the axiological dimensions of pain and this provides an additional reason for rejecting behaviourism in Wittgensteinian style without at the same time subscribing to cartesian dualism.

III The private Language Argument

Wittgenstein's views on the language reporting sensations are peculiar to his mode of philosophizing, but they do throw some light on the controversy between the mentalists and the antimentalists on the notion of the private object and private language.

David Pears (1971) has lucidly presented Wittgenstein's views on the language of sensations and I find his
treatment of the problem more relevant from the standpoint of the assessment of antimentalism with reference to the notion of privacy. The following main points emerge from Pears's treatment:

(i) For Wittgenstein, the notion of private language is to be rejected, because such a notion entails that such a language is necessarily unteachable. Sensation-language is not private in this sense because it is NOT necessarily unteachable.

(ii) Language of material objects and the language of sensations are different but the notion of private language presupposes that we can learn by ostensive definitions the words of both the languages without any disanalogy. The PL (private language) theory takes the assimilation of sensations to material objects too far. As Pears puts it:

Only a self-contained language can exist in isolation. But the language of mental phenomena is not self-contained, and if it appears to be, this is only because it has been excessively assimilated to the language of physical phenomena.
which really is self-contained and does not rest on further auxiliary language.

(Pears, 1971, p 146)

Wittgenstein does not rule out the language of sensations. What he rules out is a language which would cut it off from the shared base line, which is a "shared language with public criteria".

(iii) Our language of sensations is teachable as it has many links with the language of material objects. Pain*, for example, has such 'teaching links' with behaviour which belongs to the language of material objects. A child does not learn to say 'pain' by associating it with certain kind of sensation and affixing a word to it. He may learn the use of the word 'rose' by turning his attention to the right kind of flower and affixing a label to it. 'I know' can not be affixed with 'I am in pain' in the same manner in which it can be affixed with 'This a is a rose'.

In short, Wittgenstein draws out attention to the fact that the words for sensations do not get their meanings by being correlated with the sensations of those type just like words for a type of material object.
Similarly, for Wittgenstein, a person may be untruthful in his verbal reaction to a sensation, but there is no provision for doubt in that language game, and hence we can not say that he is mistaken. A person can however be mistaken in his meaning of description of material object. Meaning of sensation labels are not learned by private ostensive definition.

(iv) If sensations are private objects, our language for sensations would be necessarily unteachable, but this is not so; hence sensations are not private objects. Pears indicates that Wittgenstein is right in saying that the meaning of sensation words can not be based on private reference, because if anyone does believe in such an inner reference completely detachable and dominant, then such a position entails commitment to the necessarily unteachable language.

(v) The question would naturally arise as to why should we NOT accept that the language of sensations is necessarily unteachable. Wittgenstein has argued that since such a language would be cut off from teaching links, it is not possible to find out whether there are effective rules for the use of such a language and also whether the rules have been followed. Without such checks, there is no language.
David Pears clarifies that Wittgenstein rejects the private Language Thesis and yet he is not a behaviourist, and as Armstrong a (1968, p 54) has observed, even behaviourism does not entail materialism. It is difficult to affix labels to Wittgenstein and he has always opposed fixed frames of references for the solution of philosophical problems. Armstrong has referred to this difficulty of locating the position of both Wittgenstein and Ryle in the logical space of philosophical doctrines. But it is true that in some contexts at least, the PLA (Private Language Argument) has helped to focus on the shortcomings of the concept of privacy and its unique articulation, through private reference.

(i) Private Language and Osensive Definition.

We have seen that Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument (PLA) consists in his claims that; (a) a person construction a PL will have to find resources to establish the meanings of the words i.e. the meaning-rules for the words. and (b) a person having such rules is in no position to determine whether he has correctly followed the rules, because there is no public checking. Now Arrington (1978) points out that most of the literature on the private language argument concentrates on (b) rather than (a).
Private Linguist has not criteria of correctness and this is because he did not succeed in giving himself an ostensive definition of the sign 'S'. So Arrington concentrates on claim (a) of PLA. But why a person fails to provide ostensive definition for 'S' with reference to sensation? Arrington points out that it is wrong to believe that Wittgenstein has no use for ostensive definitions at all. Wittgenstein only rejects Augustanian ostensive definitions. Wittgenstein claims that Ostensive definitions are ambiguous e.g., "this" used in such definitions does not mean the object to which I am pointing, because in that case when I say "this is red", the red would mean the same as all other colour terms, for they too can be defined by saying "This (colour) is". Only on the particular occasion of their use the word 'red' this colour would mean what the words 'this colour' mean. On other occasions, we can say, "this (colour) is blue". The real significance of Wittgenstein's notion of Ostensive definition lies in its pointing out the fact that words 'this' and 'this colour' can be used in appropriate contexts to define 'red', 'blue', 'yellow' etc. What Wittgenstein wanted to clarify was what we must have some concept of red in order to understand the Ostensive definition of 'red'.
Now it follows from this that "one cannot ab initio create a language by means of Ostensive definition" (p. 37). That is the reason why a private linguist can not avail himself of the private Ostensive definition of his private sensations. Definitions are intralinguistic devices. A private linguist requires a previous mastery of the use of language to designate 'red' in order to work ostensive definitions for this signs. Privately saying, 'This is blue (or red)' is an idle ceremony conveying no sense and having no consequences. By distinguishing Ostensive definitions from Ostensive training of language, Wittgenstein has made his account of ostensive definition as an intralinguistic device consistent with his theory of language acquisition, as has been argued by Airington.

(iii) Language-Games and Privacy.

From the analysis of ostensive definition, it follows that Wittgenstein denies private ostensive definition and even public ostensive definition according to him, requires a previous stage-setting. This leads us now to the discussion of the very important concept of the very important concept of the later Wittgensteinian philosophy viz. language-games. We would like to think, according to the "recieved view" currently accepted by commentators on Wittgenstein, that through the concept of
language-games, Wittgenstein was snapping the links between language and reality. Contrary to this view, Hintikka and Provencé (1970) have argued that Wittgenstein himself believed that language-games serve the link between language and reality. The difference between *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations* is that Wittgenstein was reluctant to use the heuristic devices which he used in *Tractatus* to convey the difference between the 'sayable' and 'unsayable'. The continuity between 'I' and 'II' is Wittgenstein's insight that language is a universal medium and hence he referred to the conceptual ladder in *I* but in *II*, he does not refer to it because of his epistemic abstinance. Wittgenstein believed that there is an actual "beetle in each person's box". So Hintikka has argued that Wittgenstein did not deny privacy: he only emphasized the public framework required for talking about such experiences. Wittgenstein was against private observation and not against private experiences. This interpretation throws new light on Wittgenstein's FLA. Of course, Wittgenstein wanted to convey that one does not first speak of private experiences untouched by any reference to public frameworks. He then Wittgenstein claimed us only that we can not talk about sensations without language-games operating within public frameworks.
In the absence of the framework, the sensation language can not get a start anywhere. This is the main contention of the Private Language Argument (PLA).

Hintikka has thus made an important breakthrough by claiming that Wittgenstein was not denying sensations, he was only attacking the wrong model of conceiving sensation-language in terms of 'object and designation'. Sensations can not be talked about 'independently of public framework. Each person's box has a 'bettle' but even this is not communicable outside a certain language-game of public framework. To say, "I have my own sensation" presupposes the use of words drawn from the framework. Wittgenstein was only rejecting the semantics of private ostensive definition. Wittgenstein, according to Hintikka, has undertaken a thought-experiment of isolating sensation-language from public context and he shows how it fails.

Wittgenstein admitted that we do talk about sensations, we do have words for them and they do refer. He also nowhere argues that sensations are public objects, in the sense that they are publicly accessible. Wittgenstein only warns us against misleading model of name-object correlations. Simple sign-significatum, relation may work in some cases, but for a language of privately accessible objects, the simple sign-object relationship does not work.
By advancing the "bettle in the box" analogy, Wittgenstein, according to Hintikka, was showing that "sensation-words in our ordinary language can not be used as names (Namen) of objects". (p 360). The commentators misunderstood him as saying that there are no sensations, but they overlooked the fact there is, in a certain sense, a continuity in Wittgenstein's thought. We find that even for the latter Wittgenstein, getting behind language and grasping the relation between language and reality is not possible. Semantics of such an enterprise is ineffable.

Wittgenstein, in a number of passages in PI (244, 246, 270 etc), has talked about the meaning of sensation-words and the physiognomic framework as well as physiological correlation framework associated with such normal sensation-talk. In short, Wittgenstein, as interpreted by Hintikka and Provence (1978), was only denying the descriptions of sensations, independent of some public framework.

I would like to point out that Wittgensteinian rejection of private language does not necessarily lead either to behaviourism or materialism. My impression is that Wittgenstein's contextual analysis mainly emphasizes linguistic learning and using contexts and results. Such emphasis need not have much impact on referential contexts of mentalistic language.
There are three demands of scepticism viz
(i) our ordinary ascriptions of mental states to other
person be rejected; (ii) The protocol statements which
form the basis of mental ascriptions to other are to be
treated as statements about mere bodies of men and
(iii) Justification of inferring from protocol statements
about mental ascriptions should given.

According to Cook, (1969, pp 117-151), it is
usually thought that Wittgenstein either meets the
first demand by way of Moore's type appeal to ordinary
language or he meets the third demand of the sceptic
by his doctrine of criteria. If the first alternative
is accepted, Wittgenstein is treated as an "ordinary-
language Cartesian"; if the third alternative is accepted,
then Wittgenstein is treated as a behaviourist. Cook
claims that commentators have neglected the second alter-
native i.e. Wittgenstein's rejection of the second
demand of the sceptic by rejecting the notion of merely
human bodies.

Cook finds that just as it is a mistake to consider
the language of appearances (or sense-data) as
epistemologically more basic to the language of material
objects, it is also a mistake to believe that we are
forced to recognize descriptions of bodily movements "as
being epistemologically. basic in our knowledge of other
persons' (p. 120) what has happened is that Cartesian analogy-argument and behaviourist criteria-argument have unknowingly conceded to the sceptic that statements about human bodies are basic statements, which ought to be available before mental-ascriptions. It is obvious that if your conceive of merely human bodies, then the problem of mental-ascription forces you to endorse either an analogy-argument (dualism) or criteria-argument. (behaviourism)

Contrary to the generally prevailing interpretations, Cook argues that Wittgenstein's originality lies precisely in refuting the sceptic in relation to his second demand, i.e. Wittgenstein's rejection of the claim that mere bodies are basic and mental ascriptions are then somehow attached to mere bodies.

The Cartesian problem of other minds could not get even stated, but for the strange view that we perceive the other human being as a body first and then worry about ascribing mental predicates to him via his bodily predicates. Descurtes asks us to consider that he is a man who sleeps at night and occasionally dreams. This is acceptable. We are with him so long as he claims that doubts can get a foothold because a man might be dreaming and unaware of it. But, as Cook tells us, Descartes
then makes a surprising move. He asks us to believe that he can even imagine that he has no body! By making his move, Descartes withdraws what he has asked us to consider, because now it means that he can dream without even a body!

Cook argues that if we endorse Descartes here, it would mean that Descartes has appealed to the possibility of dreaming and yet by his strange idea that he may not have a body, he withdraws even this possibility of dreaming. "So the wedge the Descartes would drive between himself and his body is never really driven" (p 123).

Unless a special Cartesian sense of "body" is smuggled in, we do not understand what it would mean to say that "I have no such hand, no such body". We usually do not make a distinction between "he" and "his body" e.g. "he was covered with mosquito bites" or "his body was covered with mosquito bites". Our ordinary use of "body" is never Cartesian in the sense that our use of 'body' is tied to particular contexts and distinctions. Thus, as Cook puts, it, we cannot drive a conceptual wedge between Descartes and his body. We can imagine a man who might be without shirts or without hands, but it makes no sense to say that a man need not even have a body.
I can understand, given a certain context, a man's believing that he has no right hand, that he was one-armed man, but I can make no sense of a man believing that he has no body .... I might have occasion to worry about a child being born with no hands, but there is no occasion to worry about a child being born with no body. And this is not because bodies are required for birth. Bodies are not born's they are still-born: What are born are babies, human beings.

(pp. 124-125)

The Cartesian mistake lies in believing that the right sort of contrast between 'I' and 'my body' has been provided. This is a mistake because, there is no place for this wedge be driven unless, his use of the word 'body' is itself presupposed. Wittgenstein rejects the peculiar Cartesian notion of body.

Cook does not agree with Chihara and Fodor's interpretation that Wittgenstein was answering scepticism about other minds by criteria-argument. Wittgenstein, according
Cook is not a behaviourist and his talk about criteria has been misinterpreted. For Wittgenstein, the concept of 'human being' is primary and not the concept of 'Cartesian Body'.

We do not see other persons as mere bodies. This false model generates the mental-ascription problem. "I must have learned considerable language in order to see human beings as machines". (p 133) It would also be wrong to say that children see their parents as human beings rather than bodies. Wittgenstein rejects the philosophical idea of 'mere' bodies and traces language back to primitive responses. For Wittgenstein:

My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul. (P I, p. 178).

Human beings are not senseless bodies plus mental entities, Wittgenstein, according to Cook, has rejected Cartesian-Humean metaphysical account of sensations as well as behaviourism.

As Cook has shown, Wittgenstein was arguing against a peculiar philosophical notion of body and hence his discussions of criteria can not be construed behaviouristi-
cally. Reinhardt (1969, p 152-165) also finds it wrong to construe criteria as observable features of mental ascriptions. Wittgenstein says that our eyes are shut to doubt. Manser (1969, pp 166-183) admits that initially it appears to us that Wittgenstein is denying mental processes by reducing them to outward criteria, but Manser reminds us that Wittgenstein does not here offer a definite solution of a philosophical problem. He was more concerned with breaking the hold of certain pictures or models on our thought. Wittgenstein was assembling a series of reminders.

Malcolm (1972) examines and refutes that Cartesian and Lockean picture of the relation between mind and body. Malcolm argues against this picture in Wittgensteinian style. It is wholly wrong to conceive language as standing in a purely external relation to the mental activities. Malcolm challenges the notion underlying introspectionism that each of us obtains his concepts of the mental from introspection. His refutation of this position is entirely Wittgenstenian. He also endorses Strawson's rejection of the analogy-argument for other minds. In the light of Wittgenstenian private-language argument, Malcolm shows the defects of the Cartesian-Iockean account of the mental concepts. Malcolm admits that Wittgenstein in PI, has undermined the assumption that
we can obtain the concepts of the mental only through introspection Malcolm considers this to be, the greatest. Contribution of Wittgenstein to the philosophy of mind.

V. Wittgenstein and Behaviourism.

Hervey (1959-60) has pointed out that in his private language argument, Wittgenstein has been moving towards some form of behaviourism. Hervey admits private experiences as meaningful and she claims that Wittgenstein's arguments against private language do not undermine the concept of private experience. Strawson (1954) has already shown that Wittgenstein oscillates between a stronger thesis that no words refer to sensation and weaker theiss that the common language of sensations require public criteria. In this comments on the private language argument and the controversy it generated, Jones (1970) surveys various characterizations of Wittgensteinian behaviourism and concludes that, "If Wittgenstein is a behaviourist, then certainly he is not a consistent one" (p 22)

Mundle (9166) characterizes Wittgenstein as a "Linguistic behaviourist", because Mandle argues that Wittgenstein's remarks against private language leads to
the thesis that nothing can be said about private experiences. Mundle also argues that Wittgenstein's behaviourism would be inherent because Wittgenstein distinguishes between pain and natural expression of pain. Holborow (1967) however, defends Wittgenstein's approach by pointing out that the word 'toothache' gets its meaning from the usual behaviour and circumstances with which it is associated, and in emphasising this particular point, Wittgenstein was right. In fact, Holborow maintains that Wittgenstein was not a behaviourist in any important sense. Malcolm (1963) has already pointed out that Wittgenstein does not deny that there are inner experiences or mental occurrences, as he was not interested in reforming language at all; not was he interested in defending a particular theory or approach.

Donald Gustafson (1978) has shown that mental states are not denied by Wittgenstein. Bowie (1978) characterizes Wittgenstein as methodological behaviourist but not an ontological behaviourist. Mental states are extrinsic, brain states are intrinsic. There is therefore no mind-brain identity.

Commenting on the passages from Zettel (608, 609), Hunger (1977) has pointed out that Wittgenstein was wondering whether mind-brain correlations have any point.
Luria (1973) finds neither idealism nor materialism confirmed by modern psychology. Bolton (1978) attributes the same kind of insight to Wittgenstein; i.e., in later Wittgenstein, there is the fundamental concept of mental life as PRAXIS. It is interesting to note that Bolton (1978) characterizes the Wittgensteinian approach as more compatible with a kind of socio-historical materialism whose ontology does not exclude the mental.

Commenting on the relation between behaviourism and positivism, Day (1969) has shown that it is a mistake to associate Wittgenstein's later views with the physicalism based on logical positivism. As Day has put it:

The student of radical behaviourism is well-advised to read the Philosophical Investigations as an antidote to the inroads of logical positivism in psychology.

(Day, 1969; in Marx and Goodson, 1976, p. 607)

Thus, Wittgenstein can not be compared to a radical behaviourist backed up by logical positivism.
In this connection, Malcolm's (1971) argument against logical behaviourism based on Wittgenstein clearly support the view that Wittgenstein is not a logical behaviourist. According to Malcolm, logical behaviourism is false, because: (i) it denies the asymmetry of ascription of mental predicates between the first-person and the third-person; and (ii) it falsely maintains that in our attitude to other, physical descriptions are more basic than mental descriptions. A reading of Wittgenstein's P I conclusively shows that he is against logical behaviourism, according to which mental sentences are translatable exhaustively into physical sentences. Thus Wittgenstein has put before us a noncartesian nonbehaviourist view of the mental which is broader than Ryle's dispositional analysis and yet not incompatible with occurrence-analysis linked to public criteria.

Let us then conclude this analysis with reference to Wittgenstein's position in the logical space of mind-body theories.
VI Wittgensteinian Analysis -
A General Review.

From this study, it emerges that Wittgenstein is a mentalist. A mentalist is not necessarily a cartesian dualist. Wittgenstein is not a cartesian dualist.

Wittgenstein was dealing generally with the grammar of psychological words. An interest in language for its own sake is foreign to Wittgenstein, (Passmore, 1968). His object of analysing ordinary language was therapeutic. He wanted to cure us of the temptation to think that psychological words must name private experiences "which we alone can know". (Passmore, p. 431). It is to be admitted that he has admirably succeeded in his purpose. He has cured us of solipsistic obsession with psychological words as words naming some ghostly processes.

It is worthwhile to notice that the major non-isolationists moves in philosophy have been made by Kant, Marx and Wittgenstein. Kant liked concepts with percepts; Marx linked consciousness with socio-economic history and matter and Wittgenstein linked the language
with the social praxis. Such moves are noneliminative and non-reductionists. These philosophers do not deny what they contextualize i.e. Kant's 'synthetic-apriori', Marx's 'Dialectics' and Wittgenstein's 'language-games' are restoring, linking, embedding moves in philosophy. They can be contrasted with Platonic, Cartesian & Spinozistic moves in philosophy which are isolationist, transcendent and totalitarian. A Contextualist like Wittgenstein sometimes has the best of both the worlds as has been shown by Redfird. (1978)

A distinction ought to be made between what we can say about the mental and whether anything answering to what we can say about it ever exists. Wittgenstein mainly talked about criteria etc. with reference to what we can say about the mental. Here he is on a firm ground. Saying something about the mental does require antecedent conventions of communication and methods of public validation, but PAIN CLAIMS are not pains and I do not think Wittgenstein ever has confounded the two; of course, his assimilation of pain-reports to pain-behaviour and pain-expression seem to convey a materialistic message, but then he also admits that sensations are not nothing either. Wittgenstein has been successful in drawing our attention to the limits of human communication.
So much has been made of private-language argument and the language-learning models that critics have come to believe that Wittgenstein has almost nothing to say about mental processes or experiences. This is not the case. Wittgenstein did not ever deny experiences. He was worried about wrong models of talking about them. His approach is Rylean in this context. By taking about learning a language with teaching links with the extralinguistic elements, Wittgenstein clarified what it means to learn a language which includes words which do not refer to publicly observable objects. But that does not imply anything towards the elimination of the mental.

I suggest that a genuinely Wittgensteinian concern with ordinary language would never lead us to revisionary metaphysics of antimentalism.

It would be a misunderstanding to maintain that because language presupposes a stage-setting, form of life and public framework, the mentalistic language can not be ever successful in picking up something which is different from both behaviour and neurophysiology. Semantics cannot be collapsed into pragmatics Mentalistic language has to viewed in certain learning-contexts and
use-contexts. This itself diminishes the force of purely neunphy si ©logical reduction of mentalistic language. I do not see any grounds for attributing ontological behaviourism to Wittgenstein. His emphasis of criteria of mentalistic ascription can not be exploited to endorse antimentalism, because even if ascription, description and verification of the mental states require such criteria, they are not the criteria of the existence of mental states.

In considering critically the behaviourists, the identity-philosophers wrongly included Wittgenstein as a behaviourist some to the discussion of criteria of the ascription of the mental and constant reference to the stage-setting required for the beaming of any kind of language might have easily generated the impression that he is a behaviourist. Even if he is a behaviourist he is an ordinary-language behaviourist in the sense that he considers behaviour as an important dimension of the mentalist-language learning.

It is the claim of the thesis that neither epistemological nor methodological nor linguistic behaviourism has to be antimentalist in the sense that it has to endorse OUM. If such a behaviourism does endorse an
OUM, then by the criteria of adequacy, it is bound to turn out to be inadequate.

We have seen that Ryle's dispositional analysis and Skinner's operant analysis, in so far as they are not committed to OUM are not objectionable; but if they have a commitment to OUM then they are either inadequate or incongruent. The same applies to Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein's approach to science as a language-game would have prevented him from endorsing a picture-theory of the relation between language and reality. A materialistic monism reflected in the language of physics as the only viable theory of mind body problem, would not have been endorsed by Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein is not a behaviourist. He is also not a cartesian dualist. He is definitely a mentalist in the sense that at a macro-level of philosophizing, he rejects the idea of a mere human body which is not also a person and at a micro-level he does not identify the mental with the neurophysiological. He rejects cartesian substances. His ordinary language-analysis is not antimentalist. On the contrary, it provides a method for refuting antimentalist position. Language, including the language of pains and colours, has a human, social and situational context and it makes no sense to say that
one can use or understand a mentalistic language, embedded in ordinary language, in a purely phenomenal way, or in a purely neurophysiological manner.

Neurophysiological antimentalists have subscribed to unambiguously to the unidimensional antimentalist ontology. The same can not be said about the behaviourists. Ryle's epistemological behaviourism, Skinner's methodological behaviourism and Wittgenstein's linguistic behaviourism are compatible with mentalism if only they deny only explanatory mentalism but not ontological mentalism.

It is claimed here that ontological antimentalism is inadequate or incongruent. If we disambiguate the ontology of Ryle, Skinner and Wittgenstein it has to be either unidimensional or multidimensional. If it turns out to be multidimensional, then it would be compatible with mentalism. If it turns out to be an OUM then it will face the same difficulties that were faced by the identity philosophers.