CHAPTER 10

LATER INTERPRETATIONS OF THE THEORY OF RAGA
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This theory of Rasa expounded in the NS, assumed so much importance that it came to be regarded as the standard theory, explaining dramatic experience and Poetic experience and eventually all the aesthetic experience as in Indian theory, artistic delight in all cases is comprehended in terms of Rasa.¹ In later times several exeges took upon

¹ Vismudharmottara Purana, Khanda III, (ed. Dr. Priyabala Shah, Baroda : GOS., no. 130, 1953) mentions Rasa with reference to

i) music-gita (Chap.18, p.44) where different notes are to be used for different Rasas.

ii) dance-nrtya (Chap.20, v.62,p.62) which is described as “The nritya which is suspicious and desirable is accompanied by Rasa and Bhava and follows tala (rhythm), khyaraasa and gita (song).” It also says, “Rasa is basic in Nrtya and there can be no Nrtya without Rasa. So one should try to dance according to Rasa.” (Chap.39, v.29, p.103).

iii) Painting-Citra (including Silpa-sculpture) where nine 'citrarasā' are described (Chap.43, v.1, p.154).
themselves the task of interpreting the Rasa-sūtra and divergent critical views came into existence.

We have seen that the same has happened in the case of theory of Catharsis propounded by Aristotle. Scholars and critics have variously interpreted and elaborated it and the theory is imbibed and infused with their own divergent views and we have before us a large corpus on the theory of Catharsis.2

Abhinava Bharati, the commentary of AS on the NS, records four or five of those interpretations.3 The four widely accepted and recognised interpretations known as

2 Refer Chapter Five of this study.

(1) Utpattivāda, (2) Anumitivāda, (3) Bhuktivāda and (4) Abhivyaktivāda are put forward by Bhaṭṭa Lollata, Śri Ādśakaka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Ābhinavagupta respectively. Out of these the abhivyaktivāda of AG is the most comprehensive and well thought out and the Rasa theory culminates here and is accepted as the norm.

Those exegetes almost unanimously accept, the following points, from what has been stated in the Rasa-sūtra and the explanation of it in the prose-passage and the confirmatory verses in the NS. (1) Rasa derives its name from the fact that it is a process of tasting. (2) This tasting is that of the unique combination of several ingredients. (3) This tasting is joyful irrespective of its subject-matter. (4) This joyful taste is however possible only in the case of Sumanasah - the person with refined, cultivated taste for whom the later word is usually sahrdaya (one with the capacity of compassion).

The NS has explained this on the analogy from the culinary art, and on the fact of tasting food. What we have to keep in mind is to leave out physical analogy of food and understand Rasa on the mental plane. Rasa is not something gross or a physical phenomenon but it is a purely mental, 'ideal' realisation.

The exegetes raise several questions regarding the
Rasa-sūtra. The controversy in their differing interpretations revolves round (1) the absence of the mention of ēthāyibhāva in the sūtra, (2) the import of the term māyayogā and (3) of the term nispatī and the psychological and epistemological problems arising out of these.

Bhatta Lollata’s (750 – 800 A.D.) Interpretation

We begin our study of these various interpretations of Rasa-sūtra with the comments of Bhatta Lollata. Though Aśvara has tried to put the Pūrvapakṣasa – views other than his – adjutly as possible, yet we must note that they cannot take the place of original statement. According to Bhatta Lollata “Rasa (aesthetic delight or relish) takes place or is produced from the combination of the sthāyin with the vibhāvas, etc. (i.e., the vibhāvas, the anubhāvas and the vyāhīcārināśas)⁴.

Here Bhatta Lollata includes sthāyins by implication in the sūtra. He takes the term ‘nispatī’ as ‘utpatī’ production, that is Rasa is produced or caused from the combination of the vibhāvas, the anubhāvas and the vyāhīcārināśas of the ēthāyibhāva. “The vibhāvas (determinants) are the cause of the production (birth) of the mental states (cittavṛtti), which constitute the permanent mental states (sthāyibhāvas)”⁵.

⁴ Ibid., p.272.
⁵ Aśvara, p.272.
Bhatta Lollata maintains that the Anubhūvas (consequents) are not produced by Rasa, for they cannot be considered as causes of Rasa. They are the causes of mental states (bhūvānas) only. Bhatta Lollata explains why they are mentioned in the sūtra. Even though, the Vyābhičārina (the Transitory mental states), in so far as they are mental modifications or states (cittavrttyātmaktvāt) cannot simultaneously accompany the Permanent mental states, it is meant that the Permanent mental state remains nevertheless in a state of latent impression (vāsanā). In the illustration also, among several ingredients something like sthāyin is of the nature of latent impressions while others are produced (udbhuta) like vyābhičārīnas.⁶

Bhatta Lollata then, explains the sūtra as "... therefore, is simply sthāyibhāvas intensified (upaścita) by the Vibhūvas, the Anubhāvas and the Vyābhičāri bhāvas. The sthāyibhāvas, by themselves are not so intensified."⁷ Here Bhatta Lollata seems to take the Vibhūvas and the Anubhāvas as cause and effect and 'nispatti' as 'utpatti'. He also maintains that Rasa primarily resides in the represented personage (anukārya) and secondarily in the actor by his identification with the said character. Thus we see that for Lollata, Rasa is heightened or intensified, sthāyibhāva and it is produced as a result of the combination of the vibhāvas, etc. with the sthāyibhāvas.

⁶ Ibid., p.272.
⁷ Ibid., p.272.
Sri Saikaka's (940 A.D.) Interpretation

Sri Saikaka attempts to refute the thesis of Bhatta Lollata and then gives his own views on the matter, with the words ‘etad me’ – this is not so.

He first takes up the problem of sthāyins becoming Rasa. He says,

"There are no valid grounds, to infer the existence of the sthāyin, as long as, it does not come into contact with vibhavas, etc. In the absence of logical mark (liṅga) – that is without the combination of sthāyins with vibhāva, etc., we cannot logically comprehend the sthāyins." 9

So Lollata has to prove the existence of sthāyins before he can say that is combined with the vibhavas etc. Secondly, if the sthāyins become Rasa as a result of its combination with the vibhāvas, etc., Bharata should have first mentioned and defined the sthāyibhāvas instead of Rasas to follow the logical order. 9 Further if we regard both the sthāyins and Rasas as the same, the effort to define them separately would be purposeless.

The next objection is based on Lollata's view that intensified sthāyin is Rasa. "This intensification would have

3 Abhā, p.272.

9 This refers to Bharata explaining Rasas first in the Chap.6 of the NS and then explaining sthāyibhāvas later in the Chap. 7 of the NS.
infinite stages like slow, slower, slowest and indifferent. Sthāyin and Rasa are identical, this contingency of one Rasa, having infinite stages would face us. If to avoid this difficulty, Rasa is held to be the last stage of the intensification of the sthāyin, the six stages of Nāsya (laughter) that Bharata has given would be impossible in the very nature of things. If such is the case, the stages of a Rasa like Śrīgūr, cannot be confined to the ten stages mentioned traditionally. Lastly, it is a fact of observation, that in case of a Rasa, like Karuna, the intensity of sorrow actually decreases in course of time; instead of increasing as Lollata maintains. Similarly, in the case of Krodha (anger), Utāha (enthusiasm) and Rati (love), they become weaker, when the indignation, firmness and sexual enjoyment are absent.11

Thus the opposite of what Bhatta Lollata has said comes about. Similarly, 'what Daddin has said about Rati becoming Śrīgūr Rasa by the description of excellent beauty, or anger reaching the highest stage becoming Sandra Rasa, does not happen'.

After having thus refuted Bhatta Lollata's theory of Rasa, Śri Sañjuka advances his own views. He rejects the

10 For the stages of Śrīgūr, see p.231 of this study.
11 a.bhaḥ, p.272.
idea of Rasa being in the presented personage (anukārya) but for him it is the imitator-actor (anukartā) in whom primarily Rasa must be supposed to reside. With this implication he defines the Rasa Sūtra. For him "Rasa is simply an imitation of Permanent mental state proper to the represented personage, and just because it is an imitation it is called by a different name, Rasa." ¹²

Now the problem is how this Rasa is based on the actor's imitation of the represented person's sthāyin? Sāhānya's reply is that the normal factors of causation and inference in the world apply here also, but as belonging to the actor and not as belonging to the original historic person. "This imitated mental state is perceived by causes, (kāyās) here, called Vibhāvas, effects, Kāyas or Anubhāvas and the accompanying emotions called Vyabhicārins. Though these Vibhāvas, etc. are not natural, but brought into existence, by the conscious effort (prayātana) of the actor and are thus artificial and unreal but at the moment, they are felt as absolutely natural. Thus on the strength of the logical mark (liṅgā) the sthāyībhāva is known as existing in the actor. It is here in the nature of imitation of sthāyin, in the original character of Rāma and the sthāyin is called Rasa.

¹² Ibid., p.272.
because it is of the nature of imitation (anukāra).13
Thus Rasa is not the sthāyin of the original character as
maintained by Bhatta Bollatā but it is in the actor in the
form of imitation.

This point is elaborated in the rest of his thesis
by Sri Śāhīkārā. How Vibhāvas, Ānubhāvas and Vyabhāsabhāvas,
are imbibed by the actor? In answer Śāhīkārā describes the
process of Rasa-realisation as the combination of many factors.
It begins with Vibhāvas - the dramatist's picturesque and
powerful descriptions of the stimulants of a particular situa-
tion are learnt by the actor. To add to that there are
Ānubhāvas - the exquisite skill of the actor, acquired through
his long training in the art of gesticulation and exhibited
through abhinaya (acting) and the Vyabhāsabhāvas are also
enacted through the actor's ability to represent his own
artificial Ānubhāvas depending upon his own experience of his
feelings. Thus the actor would succeed to represent the
sthāyin as Rasa effectively.

But another problem remains. How the sthāyin is
grasped by the actor? Is that also provided by the force of
poetry in drama? Śāhīkārā replies that it is not grasped with
the force of poetry because the mere mention or verbal

13 Ibid., p.272.
description of Sthāyīna never makes one realise the particular Sthāyibhāva. For example, the words Rati, Soka etc. merely give us the meaning of the words and mere words do not convey the Sthāyibhāva unless they are known through the Vānika Abhinaya. It is the speech gesture, which is accomplished through words; just as mere limbs do not form the āngik abhinaya though it is accomplished with the help of limbs. To illustrate this point of Vānika abhinaya, as not mere words, he quotes a few verses from 'Ratnāvalī' of Śrī Harṣa. He points out that verbal gesticulation is not simply articulation of words but what is suggested or conveyed with the help of words. The art of gesticulation is nothing but this power of suggestion and it is quite different from the mere expression or direct connotation of words. "It is for this reason that the term Sthāyibhāva is not mentioned in the sūtra, even in a different case. As it is implied in the actor's gesticulations and not directly mentioned in words, so it is done in Bharata's formula also. Thus the Sthāyin of the original character being imitated by the actor, leads to Rasa and hence the Rasa śrūgara consists of Rati and results from it."  

Here Śrī Saṅkukka anticipates an opponent. He argues how right result can come out of false or unreal knowledge.
(illusion)? Here, how from the unreal vibhāvas etc. of the actor can the right result of inference in the mode of grasping Sthāyin as Rasa, come about? In answer Śaṅkūka maintains that genuine action can result even from false knowledge or an illusion. He quotes a verse from Dharmakirti to show that even from false or unreal knowledge right result would come about:

"Just as the lustre or dazzle of a gem may lead to gem itself similarly the imitation of the original Sthāyibhāva may lead to real aesthetic delight that is Rasa. Just as in a picture of horse, we call the horse, a horse, similarly we regard the actor who imitates Rāma as Rāma."

Śrī Śaṅkūka’s final triumphant argument is when a certain experience, coherent and unified is throbbing with life what logical arguments can contradict it? That is whatever may be the nature of Sthāyibhāva and Vibhāvas, etc., the actor, who cleverly presents them, does give the throbbing experience (dpharanānubhavaḥ) of Rasa.

Thus Śrī Śaṅkūka’s theory consists of four points
(1) Rasa is not produced (utpāyana). He denies the utpattivāda of Bhatta Lollato. (2) Secondly for him, nippatti is srākṛti - imitation and ansūniti inference (3) This inference becomes possible on account of 'citratumārgaṇya'- on semblance. As a picture horse cannot be totally identified

15 A. bhā., p. 273.
with a real horse nor can it be denied being similar to the real horse, it is neither totally true nor totally false. (4) He takes us to the domain of knowledge — cognition and not to that of production. This view is known as Amukrti AnumitiVada.

Bhatta Tauta's (950 - 980 A.D.) Criticism of Saññeya

This theory of imitation (Amukaraṇa) and inference (Anumiti) is refuted by the teacher of AG, Bhatta Tauta. I shall try to present here some of his arguments. Bhatta Tauta says that the view of Saññeya is "void of any substance and cannot bear the clash of debate".16

Bhatta Tauta first takes up imitation (Amukaraṇa). He would first like to know for whom this play-acting and the resultant Rasa-experience is imitation. The statement that Rasa is imitation, applies or refers whether (1) to the cognition of the spectator or (2) that of the actor or (3) simply because this is the opinion of vāstuvṛtta teachers or (4) because Bharata has said it.

The first alternative that the Rasa experience is imitation for the spectator is not valid, because the knowledge of imitation is possible when something is known by valid means

16 A.bhā., p.274.
of knowledge. This means that one can use the term imitation in relation to the original, known by valid means of knowledge. For example if some actor is shown as drinking wine, the spectator would say that the drinking of wine is similar to that of drinking milk which they have seen. So the drinking of milk would be their original and the drinking of wine its imitation.

So here what does the spectator see in the actor which appears to him as imitation of some feeling, as for instance, delight? "The spectator sees the actor's body, the headgear, horripilation, (romanes), his faltering word (gadgad), the throwing up and bending of arms (bhujakasapa), frowns (bharkasa), expressive glances (katësa) etc. All these things do not appear to any one, as the imitation of the mental state of Rati, because what the spectator sees in the actor is physical and insentient (jada) while Rati is a feeling and so mental."<sup>17</sup> This means that they are two different substances and so their imitation is not possible.

Another difficulty is that what is seen on the actor, the physical and the mental Rati are known through different senses. The physical is known by the five physical organs

<sup>17</sup> *Abhâ**, p.274.
while the mental is known by the internal organ of mind. The receptacles, (adhiśānta) of the two are also different. Therefore, the two things being utterly different, one cannot be the imitation of the other.

He further argues that only if we have seen the original, we can call something as its imitation. No one has ever seen the Rāti of Śūra and so we cannot say it is the Rāti of Śūra, which is imitated when the actor is playing the role of Śūra. Thus the possibility that the actor is imitating Śūra is excluded.

Bhatta Tauta now takes up another point suggested by Śāṅkara. According to this, Śānta like śānta would be the mental state of the actor only, being apprehended by the spectator as the imitation of the sānta of Rati (love) of the character. In that case, Tauta asks, "of what, when perceived, does this feeling appear to consist?"

"It may be said in reply that what one sees in the actor is in the same form of perception as the normal worldly mental state like love, brought about by causes (kāraṇa), effects (kārya) and concomitants (sahacārins). This is due to the inferential process in which the logical mark (liṅga) consists of causes in the form of young women etc., effects in the form of expressive glances etc. and concomitants as contentment etc. So what we know in the actor is his own
Saṁskara might try to explain the matter by saying that the vibhāvas, etc., of the character and of the actor are not the same because the vibhāvas, etc., are real in the character, while in the actor who is an imitator, they are unreal. If it is so, and if they are projected as artificial on the strength of the Poetry, the actor's training, etc., without being the causes or the effects or the concomitants of the actor's sthāyin like Rati, Tauta enquires, are they perceived by the spectator as artificial or not? If they are grasped as artificial, how can they lead to real understanding of Rati?

Dhatu Tauta then takes up some arguments based on the process of inference. He observes that where the knowledge of the indicative cause is wrong, the inference of something possessing a similar appearance also does not stand to reason. Thus if fog is perceived as resembling smoke, it is not found to lead to the perception of the China rose-flower resembling fire. Smoke may lead to the inference of fire, but fog resembling smoke cannot lead to the china rose, resembling fire.18
After this again, the follower of Jaftkulsa might argue that the actor appears angry, though he is not in fact angry, by virtue of imitation only. Here Tauta replies again that the actor appears angry in the sense that he is similar to one who is angry, and the similarity is due to the movements of eyebrows, etc. Just as a Gavaya (a species of ox) appears like a bull, on account of some resemblance of the mouth, etc. "Now this resemblance is not imitation." Again, the spectator has no sense of the actor's resemblance with the character - on the one hand he maintains that the spectators do not have the perception of the actor's feelings, whereas, on the other, he also asserts that what is perceived by the spectators is the actor's imitation. Thus the argument that what appears as similar is imitation, is void of substance.

Then the arguments based upon truth and its contradiction follow. One can say, a thing is true as long as it is not contradicted, while if it is untrue, it will always be untrue even though there is no occasion for contradiction. In the case of 'Sañkṣara's theory of imitation, he has already assumed

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19 Abā, p.276.
20 It seems that Bhaṭṭa Taute argues on the basis of the Nyāya theory of Pramāṇas of knowledge. He has so far, argued on the strength of Pratyaksa Pramāṇa - direct perception, Ānumāna - inference and upamāna - analogy.
that the actor is not real Rāma but he is an imitator. So the actor as Rāma is unreal and therefore will always remain unreal. So the thesis of imitation of Saṅkaku is not true. Then Tauntu says that even in a different actor, we have the same perception of Rāma, therefore it is not the original Rāma who is concerned here, but the 'Rāmatva'- the generalised characteristics of 'being Rāma'.

In the course of his arguments, Saṅkaku has said that the Vibhāvas are understood from poetry and the actor achieves identification (anusandhāna) through poetry. Tauntu says that he is not aware of this. No actor ever knows or apprehends like 'This Sītā is somebody to me'. In other words, Vibhāvas do not belong to him. The actor only so presents the Vibhāvas, etc. that the spectators grasp them as real. The actor is an instrument of making them understand the Vibhāvas, etc. in a particular way. Bhatta Tauntu suggests that it would be better if we understand this anusandhāna with reference to Sthāyībhāva as such. The spectator perceives the Sthāyin as 'this belongs to him' - the actor.

Saṅkaku has made a great fuss about what is Vācā-dhāna and what is Vācā-verbal gesticulation, saying words themselves are not verbal gesticulation. Tauntu reserves the reply to this point for future discussion.21 Thus Tauntu

21 The discussion appears in the 14th Adyāya of the NS.
completely rules out the (first) possibility of Rasa being the actor's imitation of the original character's Sthāyibhāva from the point of view of the spectator's perception.

Bhāṭṭa Tauta, then takes up the second possibility in Sāhānak's view, viz., the imitation of the original character's Sthāyin is done from the actor's point of view. The actor is not aware that "I am imitating Rāma or his mental state". If we take anukarana (imitation) to mean doing something similar (sadraśya) - it is not possible for anyone who has not seen the original. Now if we take anukarana to mean something done later or afterwards then it would extend to the whole worldly life. Now if one says that it is not the imitation of some particular individual but is imitating the sorrow of some noble person, then the problem is - with what does he imitate the noble person's sorrow? Certainly not with his own sorrow, since the actor does not experience sorrow. Nor can we say that the imitation of sorrow is through tears, etc., because as we have said before these two are so different - sorrow is mental, while tears etc. are physical. There might be this much that the actor may think that he is imitating the Anubhāvas (consequents) of the sorrow of the noble person. Even then the problem remains:

22 abhā, p.275.
anubhāvavas of which noble person? If we answer: of any noble person, then the difficulty is how is it possible to bring the person to our understanding without his being particularised? Now if the actor says that he is imitating a person who weeps, as he does, then the self of the actor enters into the picture. In that case there is no relation of the imitated and the imitator.'

'Further, the actor by the strength of his training remembers his own vībhāvavas (causes) and this remembrance enables him to visualise that bhāva as universal or general. This generalised bhāva enables him to show its anubhāvavas (effects). At the same time, he recites the poem with the enhanced intonations. The actor is aware only of these facts. He does not feel that he is imitating. By imitating the costume of a lover he cannot be said to imitate the behaviour of Rāma. This point has already been shown in the first adhyāya of the NŚ.'

Then Bhaṭṭa Taṭa takes up the third possibility of imitation according to Vastuvṛttas, that which is distinguished between the object as it is and as it appears. But Vastuvṛttas does not fit into something which is known after the original thing. Here AS briefly points out that what is not cognised cannot be called as an objective fact. The mental state of the original character being something which is beyond the ken of
our direct apprehension or cognition, the imitation of that mental state is still more improbable.

He then takes up the fourth point regarding the opinion of Bharata. Bharata has never given any indication that Rasa is anyway imitation of the Sthāyībhāvas; on the contrary in the first Ādiyāya he has said that the singing of Brūvās, different kinds of tālas and varieties of Lasya are a definite indication of the fact that Rasa is not imitation. This problem will be discussed at the end of the chapter on Sandhyāgga (Chap. XIX of the MS). But then Śāhākṣa may ask, what about the statement - "The drama is the amukrti (imitation) of the seven islands".23 Tauta’s reply is that the word ‘imitate’ there, is to be explained or interpreted in a different way.24 And in cases of imitation, like the imitation of lover’s dress, gait, etc., do we really come across a different name of the process? In case of the imitation of Sthāyin, the process comes to be known by a different name viz., Rasa. This does not happen for all imitations.

Lastly, Tauta takes up the point of a picture of a cow

23 MS, GOS, I, I, v.107, p.35.

24 a) According to AC here the word ‘aman’ is not to be taken in the sense of ‘imitation’ or ‘similar to’ but as ‘something done after’.

as a real cow. There also if you say that the cow in the picture is produced or displayed - this cannot be. One cannot say by the pigments etc., that the real cow is produced or suggested just as a lamp would, bring to light an object in the dark. But it is only an aggregate resembling a cow. The pigment of Sindura, etc., are so arranged as to look like a cow but the aggregate of Vibhāvas, etc. does not similarly look like Rati. Therefore, it is wrong to say that Rasas are the imitation of character’s sthāyins.

The Interpretation of the Śāṁkhyā School of Thought

This is followed by a short discussion of the view of some followers of the Śāṁkhyā school of thought. According to their view, Rasa is of the nature of pleasure and pain. The objective world, or all the phenomena that possess the potentialities of causing pleasure and pain, is external. The sthāyins, however, produced by the combination (of Vibhāvas and Anubhāvas) are internal and also of the nature of pleasure and pain. In this combination the Vibhāvas constitute the material cause of Rasas and the Anubhāvas and the

\[25\] Abhā., p.276

As Gnoi has noted down (The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinava Gupta, p.42, n.2). This view of Śāṁkhyā is based upon a wrong interpretation of the verse 46 (NS, Chap.6) according to AG (Abhā., p.312).

\[26\] In the original text, the word used for Material cause is 'dalasthāniya Vibhāvah'. This has been amended by the editor of the GOS edition of the NS as 'talasthāniya Vibhāvah'. Gnoi (p.42) however, accepts the reading 'dalasthāniya' and translates the word 'dala' as Petal. In Śāṁkhyā philosophy the word, 'dala' is used in the sense of a substance of which a thing is made, that is upādāna kāraṇa. I have adopted this meaning.
Vyanichāribhāvas embellish the vibhāvas and thus make the experience of Rasa possible. According to this view also the sthāyins are Rasas. The text in Bharata 'sthāyibhāvas rasatvāh upanasyāmah' means that we shall bring the sthāyibhāvas into the state of Rasa or we shall reduce sthāyibhāvas to Rasa. It clearly shows that in the opinion of Bharata the sthāyibhāvas and Rasas are two different things or experiences. If they were one as the sāmkhya says here, it would be pointless to say that we will reduce sthāyibhāvas to Rasas. The sāmkhya critic is aware of this original text and so of the contradiction and knows that what he does is not the literal translation and therefore he uses the word upacāra - a figurative, metaphorical expression to justify his interpretation.

Bhātta Nāyaka's (935 - 985 A.D.) Interpretation

According to him Rasa is neither directly known (apprehended Pratīta)\textsuperscript{29}.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{NS}, 638., I,6, p.299.

\textsuperscript{29} 'Pratīta' means 'known as' or 'recognised as', according to W. Monier. Here it could mean 'not known as Rasa' or 'recognised as Rasa'. Snell (p.43) translates it as 'perceived' and Y.S. Salimbi, (Abhinavagupta on Indian aesthetics, Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1930, p.37) translates it as 'apprehended'.

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\textsuperscript{28} \textit{NS}, 638., I,6, p.299.

\textsuperscript{29} 'Pratīta' means 'known as' or 'recognised as', according to W. Monier. Here it could mean 'not known as Rasa' or 'recognised as Rasa'. Snell (p.43) translates it as 'perceived' and Y.S. Salimbi, (Abhinavagupta on Indian aesthetics, Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1930, p.37) translates it as 'apprehended'.
nor produced nor suggested nor manifested. If we believe that Rasa is known then according to Bhatta Rāyaka, it can be known only in two ways, either as belonging to someone else or as belonging to oneself. If we accept Rasa recognised as Rasa with reference to one's own self then the experience of Karunā Rasa (sorrow) would cause unhappiness. Such experience is not proper (because Rasa is supposed to be a matter of joy). Another argument is that Sītā or any such mythological characters cannot be the Viṣhevas with reference to one's self, because she does not remind one of one's own beloved. Again in the case of deities etc., it would be improper to generalise oneself with them, because feats like crossing the ocean (as Rāma does) are not possible for us. Nor can it be said that one remembers the person of Rāma because one has never seen him. Again the knowledge of Rāma through such verbal authority or through inference would not give us the experience of Rasa as one gets it through direct knowledge. When a pair of lovers united together, as in reality, appears on the stage there would be no experience of Rasa. On the contrary many conflicting feelings like shame, disgust, envy will disturb the mind and so where is the possibility of Rasa-experience?

Bhatta Nāyaka, then takes up the other alternative via., Rasa belonging to some one else. This is also not right,
because when Rasa is known as something belonging to others, there would be indifference. So it is not proper to say that Rasa is experienced through Pratiti (recognition) which consists either of experience or memory, etc. The same arguments go to disprove the other alternative of ‘uttpati’ that is production of Rasa.

Then he refutes the third alternative of Rasa as Abhivyakti or manifestation or suggestion. Bhatta Nāyaka here implies the theory of Vyanjanā – a power in the words which indicates a different meaning after the direct meaning (abhiśka) is understood. So there will be a gradation/disparity/difference between what is understood by the literal meaning (abhiśka) and what is understood by implication or suggestion. This is a logical fault. Here also the two alternatives of reference to one’s self or to someone other can be argued out.

30 In the text of the N3, (GOS, I.6, p.276), the reading here seems to be incomplete. Hemacandra, (Kūvyamaṇusana, with Alasmakacādāmanī and Viveka, ed. Prof. R.C. Parikh (Bombay: Mahāvira Jain Vidyālaya, 1964), p.94, supplies the missing reading - "Paragatavona Pratītan tātāthyaṃvaya bhaveta". Such a reading becomes necessary because when Bhatta Nāyaka discusses Rasa with reference to one’s own, - Svagata, it is implied that, he also discusses with reference to other self Paragata.
After thus refuting these three alternatives of Pratiti, uttpati, and Abhivyakti of Rasa, Bhatta Nāyaka gives his own theory of Bhoga. He has described it in one complicated sentence, connecting each aspect by the instrumental case which would be difficult to comprehend if translated literally. So I analyse each aspect in the realisation of feeling of Bhoga.

First come the two arts, viz., poetry and drama. A Kavya or poem which is free of faults and full of poetic

31 Bhatta Nāyaka introduces two new terms 'bhoga' and 'Bhāvanā'. The synonym of bhoga, given in Amarakosa (Gujarati) is sukham - happy feelings. It may be translated as enjoyment. According to Amarkosa (Gujarati) bhāvanā is a synonym of 'dhi' or 'buddhi' intelligence, praksa - faculty of imagination. In Kairavāni's edition of Amarakosa, it is 'Vimarśa bhāvanā caiva Vasana ca'. This is a peculiar mental power akin to imagination or reflection.

Bhatta Nāyaka, himself explains Bhāvanā in two verses quoted in Viveka by Homchandra (pp.96-97) Nāyaka says, "Bhāvanā is different from abhidhā-direct meaning and it is in the form of enjoyment (bhogikrtam). When abhidhā is reduced to the lowest state or suppressed, consequently, the alcākāras of sabda and artha become suppressed." (It means the words with their meaning and figures of speech do not attract the attention). "Thus when the direct meaning and its consequent figures of speech are reduced to the lowest state, then Bhāvanā arises and all the Rasaas like bṛṣgaṇa, etc. are realised by this power of Bhāvanā. So the accomplished man is pervaded by this Bhāvanā in the form of enjoyment".
merits and figures of speech and a Nātya or drama of the nature of four types of histrionics, first remove the innate, intense dullness (in understanding the beauty of poetry or drama).

Then arises Bhāvanā, the second stage, after the direct meaning (abhidhā) is apprehended. This Bhāvanā generalises Vibhāvas, etc. Rasa is realised by this Bhāvanā that is the activity of Bhāvala. This second stage or process of realisation, or delectation is different from direct experience, memory, etc. Because it has elements of Rajas and Tamas, (delusion and stupor, etc.) it brings about a variety by which one has the experience of Dhrti-melting or softening of heart, vistāra-expansion of heart and vikāsa-blossoming of heart.

Then on account of preponderance of sattva (purity) our consciousness is called Bhoga by Bhātta Kāyaka. By such Bhoga, Rasa is enjoyed. "This experience of Bhoga or enjoyment is akin to the enjoyment of the experience of Parabrahman."32

The most important point of this thesis is the effect of the art of flawless poetry and well-acted drama. The effect lies in clearing the mind of dullness, in understanding these arts. This removal of dullness enables one to generalise or universalise the Vibhāvas. This is Bhāvanā or the result of the activity of a Bhāvala.

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32 Adbhā., p.277.
The second important point is taken from the \textit{Sāmkhya} theory of Sattva, Rajas, Tamas qualities in human nature. These are active in this process of Bhāvanā. Rajas and Tamas give it a variety which is experienced as Dhruti (melting) Vīrtāra (expansion) and Vikāsa (blossoming). These three are general states of mind of different Rasas.\footnote{Dhananjaya in *Daśarūpaka* describes kaśāha as the fourth mental state.}

The Sattva fills the Sāsvit or consciousness of the Bhāvāka with enlightenment and bliss. In such a state of consciousness, there is a feeling of repose. This is called Bhoga in Bhatta Nāyaka's theory. This state of viśrānti and joy is compared to the viśrānti and joy that comes out of the samādhi in supreme Brahma. Such is the character of the experience of Bhoga. Rasa is enjoyed by this mental condition, Bhoga.

Here we may note that the doctrine of Rasa, mainly confined to Nātya is extended to poetry in general in this theory of Bhatta Nāyaka. Here, Bhatta Nāyaka, through his theory of Bhāvanā, emphasizes one of the most important factors of aesthetic enjoyment. He emphasizes that "the contents of poetry or drama, though dealing with personal experience or situation, must have a generalised or universalised aspect (sadhārānikārana) in order to be appreciated or enjoyed by the reader. He also points out that the realisation of Rasa
is an extra-ordinary process, quite distinct from the normal process of knowledge and this realisation of Rasa reaches an ecstatic or transcendental level. We shall see that AG adopts all these aspects of Dhatta Nāyaka's thesis.

AG first refutes the theory of Bhoga of Dhatta Nāyaka. No questions, 'what is this bhoga in this world, other than Pratipatti - knowledge? If you say, it is rasamā - tasting then it is also a knowledge. Different types of knowledge, because of the differences of their means, get different names such as darśana-direct perception, anumiti - inference, ārthi-verbal testimony, upamity-analogy and pratimāna-intuition, etc. even though they are all pratipatti-knowledge. So, if Bhoga is only such a different name, it does not cease to be pratipatti. "If you do not accept the theory of the production of Rasa, it would mean that Rasa is eternal or if you do not accept Rasa as suggestion or manifestation (abhivyakti), it would mean Rasa does not exist at all. There is no third alternative in this. And the thing which is unknown cannot be the subject matter of discourse." 34

Supposing it is said that Rasa is bhogikarana, enjoyment of knowledge meant by us, then it would be of the nature of druti (state of fluidity), etc. But it is not

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34 ābhā., p.277.
simply that much because there would be as many forms of 
perception of the nature of carvāna — relish, as there are 
Rasas. Again the relations of the principle and the subor-
dinate of the three guṇas sattva—Rajas—Tamas are infinite. How 
can we limit it to three only? When Bhatta Nāyaka says that 
Rasas are made the objects of bhāvanā through Poetry, AG is 
prepared to accept it, provided this Bhāvanā means making 
the object of perception, of the nature of relish produced 
by the vibhāvās, etc.

Finally, AG explains a verse supposed to be of Bhatta 
Nāyaka,

"The Kavyārtha-Final meaning and the purpose of 
a poem is Rasa. It is the experience of the 
nature of tasting. It is cognized or perceived 
by the consciousness of the nature of suggestion, 
and manifested by the union of Vibhāvās, etc." 35

Here, AG points out that Bhatta Nāyaka apparently considers 
Rasa as manifested.

Thus in the refutation of the theory of Bhatta 
Nāyaka, AG really objects only to the introduction of the 
new term Bhoga.

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35 Adbhūtā, p. 277.
At this place, Viveka of Hemachandra (p. 95) has 
another verse, introduced by the words 'Yaduṛtaḥ', "Just as 
in a Sāstra, the different words by their mutual relation 
result in the total meaning of a sentence; similarly a poem, 
on account of mutual relation of words, results in Kavyārtha — 
that is Rasa".

It explains as to how the meaning of a sentence, 
here of a poem, results or becomes Rasa such as Srīgāra.
Abhinavagupta's (950 - 1070 A.D.) Interpretation

After expounding the different views of earlier commentators, AS advances his own theory of Rasa in detail.

He begins with a question - if all the opinions are wrong where does tātva (truth) of Rasa lie? In the verses quoted he declares that his object in giving new interpretation in the matter is not a mechanical repetition of what is obvious. He says that he has not defiled the opinions of the sages but he has only refined them, so that a rich and fruitful harvest may be gathered by posterity from the inheritance of thought left to it by its predecessors.

AS asks, then what is the pure truth about Rasa?
He answers, "That sage Bharata has said, nothing new." For Bharata has said that mental states are called Bhūvas because they make us feel the meaning of a poem. Therefore the meaning of a poem is Rasa.36

AS's claim is that he has to say nothing new; whatever he says, has already been said by Bharata. This

36 'Vivekas' (pp. 97-98) explains the meaning of artha in Kavyārtha as "The meaning of a word and the meaning of a sentence, ultimately end in Rasas. Therefore by the prominence and unusualness, the arthas (meanings) of a poem become Rasas. What is chiefly sought or desired in a poem is artha and not the abhidhoya - direct meaning of a word, because Rasa cannot be conveyed by direct meaning."
means that he holds that his own exegesis follows from whatever Bharata has said. We have to consider how far AG's claim is valid. That is, how much of what he has said proceeds from the sūtra and the prose commentary in the NS and how much is it of his own reading of thought in Bharata and how much is it of his own philosophical view?

He first makes us understand that a simple sentence or a general injunction carries a different meaning to one who has a certain purpose of his own. He gives two such injunctions from early vedic literature. The first is 'ṛṣtrimāṣata'- one should sit for the night and the second is 'Tāmagnau Prādāt' - He sacrificed it to fire. These two sentences, after imparting the direct literal meaning, make the concerned person think of doing something himself - in the first case 'I shall sit' and in the second 'I will offer'. AG explains how these sentences lead to other meaning after first giving the direct meaning. It is by saṃkramana - leading to other - that this transference or extension of meaning takes place. This happens to an Adhikārin - a person who is concerned and who is concerned and capable of this process of extension of meaning.

This capacity of saṃkramana - passing from one meaning to another meaning - is given different names by the different schools of philosophy such as Pratibhā-intuition or poetic inspiration, bhāvanā-propulsion, vādhi-injunction, and udyoga-activity. This passing from one meaning to another
holds good in the case of poetic world also. This means that the direct meaning of words in a poem passes to other meanings. Here also an Adhikārin a right, qualified, competent person, has an ability to pass from one direct meaning to other meanings. AG defines the Adhikārin as 'Vimla Pratibhānasāli hrdaya' – one, who has a mind, endowed with clear perception or imagination.

AG does not want to expound his theory of Rasa in an abstract way. He adopts the method of actual illustration. He quotes, three verses of Kālidāsa. The first one 'Grīvādbhanaḍāgūbhirāmaḥ .....' is from Abhijñāsāmantalam (1.7). The second, 'Umbi Nīlūkaka ..... etc.' and the third, 'Harsatva Kīḍcit ..... ' are from Kumārasambhavaṁ (III.62, 67). He chooses these verses to illustrate the process of realisation of Rasa.

The first verse 'Grīvādbhanaḍāgūbhirāmaḥ' is spoken to his charioteer, by Dasyanta, the hero of the play, who is out hunting a deer. The verse may be translated as thus "Look, there he (deer) is, repeatedly looking fixedly, at the pursuing chariot, gracefully curving his neck, by the fear of the falling of the arrow, his hinder half almost enters the fore-part of his body. His path is strewn with grass, half chewed, dropping from his mouth opened due to exertion. By his lofty boundings he seems to fly in the sky and little on the ground."

AG analyses and explains that after apprehending the
The direct meaning of these sentences, another perception arises. "This perception is of the nature of mental visualisation (aṣeṣṭhākṛatmika) in which the distinctions of time, space, etc. are set aside. The young deer, which appears in this perception is void of particularisation. (No particular deer is meant). So what appears in this perception is that this one is frightened, and on account of the unreality of the person who frightens, what results is only fear, fear as such, unencumbered or untainted by space, time, etc.

Hence, it is distinct from ordinary perceptions such as 'I am afraid', 'This one is afraid', 'Enemy is afraid', 'Friend is afraid' or 'Neither is afraid'. These reactions/perceptions of I, You, He, etc., produce necessarily the feelings of pain and pleasure and the consequent attempts of abandoning and recieving. When one is free from these interruptions, or limitations, one gets a perception (pratiti) which is free from these barriers. Such a barrierless perception grasps fear Bhaya directly entering the heart, dancing before our eyes. The perception of such a fear in itself is Bhayānaka (terrible) Rasa. This unhindered perception is Rasa - when a perception is free from such barriers as time-place and self, it is Rasa. In such a perception of fear, the self as subject is neither completely obliterated nor particularly protuding or thrusting to prominence."  

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37 A.bha., p.279.
Now AG introduces the concept of Sūdhārāṇya - generalisation or universality accepted from Bhāṭṭa Śāyaka. AG says, that, this experience which one has is true for another competent person also. Thus the generalisation of perception is not limited to one perceiving subject but extended like the grasping of concomitant relation between smoke and fire and also like the causal relation of trembling and fear.  

What is it that nourishes this visualisation (vivid realisation) of Rasa? This vivid realisation of Rasa is nourished or reinforced by the complete assemblage (dramatic accessories) of actors, etc. In this combination, the real, and those offered in poetry, space, time, percepient subject etc. cancel one another and completely fade away. Thus the generalisation is exceedingly nourished, and because of this only, all the spectators get one uniformed or intense perception. This unified perception leads to great nourishment of Rasa.

38 All those who are trained in Logic can understand the vyāpti (concomitant) relation of smoke and fire; and the Kāryakārāṇa, the causal relation of trembling and fear. These are two well-known forms of generalisation in Indian philosophy. But here one should not confuse the generalisation of Vyāpti with the generalisation of art experience. What we have to distinguish is that the generalisation preceding Rasa is sui generis.
This unified, 'akaghana' perception occurs because, all the minds, being variegated by beginningless latent impressions, concord with one another.

This cognition (saśvittī) free from all barriers (nirvighanā) is 'camatkāra' - the relish - the feeling of wonder or the thrill or flash of delight. The physical change such as tremor, horripilation, joyful movements of limbs etc. are born out of this feeling of wonder or thrill of delight. AG illustrates camatkāra as follows. 'Even today, Hari is surprised, how is it that the limbs of Laxmi, resembling the delicate digits of the orb of the moon, are not pounded by Mount Mandāra (in the process of churning the ocean').

This camatkāra is called Bhogāveśa - immersion in enjoyment. It is continuous enjoyment, bereft of all feeling of insatiety. This camatkāra is the consciousness, 'mohākara', of the throbbing, pulsating, wonderful enjoyment of one who enjoys. And this camatkāra - the feeling of wonderful relish is of the nature of sākṣātkāra - (direct perception or visualisation). It may be called mental perception or apprehension or imagining or remembrance. All these manifest themselves as camatkāra. AG further illustrates this with a verse from Kālidāsa's 'Abhijñā Śākuntala' Act 5

"Seeing beautiful things, or hearing sweet words (of a song or a poem), even a happy person experiences anxiety. This is so because he
remembers something not known before, (in this life) the friendly affections of a former existence embedded in the states of mind (Bhāva), which continue from earlier births.\(^39\)

In every way, this perception or cognition, of the nature of tasting exists, in which Rati as such shines forth. Not being conditioned by other particularities, this perception is tasted as such and it is neither an ordinary worldly perception (leukikī) nor false, (mithyā) nor inexpressible, (anirvacanīyā), nor similar to ordinary worldly perception, (leukikstulīyā) nor superimposed (āropādirūpā) by ordinary worldly perception.

This perception in its intensified state (Upacayā-vastrapā)\(^40\) and not being restricted by the space time etc., may be called - imitation (anukaraṇa) also as it follows, in the wake of the Dhāvas.

Now AG takes up an idea from the Sākhyā theory of Viṣayasaṅgri—collection of external things, which has the potentiality of creating pain and pleasure. AG says this theory

\(^39\) This remembrance is not the remembrance known to logicians and Śastras, because one has not experienced this state before in this existence. But its nature is of direct perception, which is another word for pratibhāna—intuition.

\(^40\) Upacayāvastrapā—intensification is an idea adopted from Bhaṭṭa Lollata and anukaraṇa from Saṅkārā.
can be accepted by resorting to the *vijñānavāda* of the Buddhists according to which everything that exists is purely mental.

"In every way Rasa is only a Rāva, a state of mind grasped or apprehended by a perception which is free from all barriers and which is of the nature of tasting." 41

**Barriers (Vighanas) to Rasa-Perception**

Having thus explained his own thesis about the exact nature and realisation of Rasa, AS tells that the Viśhīvas and other accessories in drama are instrumental in removing the vīghanas or barriers to the perception of Rasa, and that spectator’s consciousness itself, freed from all interruptions or barriers is known in the world by various names such as cāndāra—feeling of wonder or thrill of delight, nirvēśa—impression, rasam—relish, ēśvēdana—tasting, bhoga—enjoyment, saṁpatti—accomplishment, laya—lysis, viśrānti—repose. The barriers to such a perception of consciousness are seven: (1) unsuitability due to lack of probability, (2) attachment to, or overabsoption in a particular place and time as belonging to oneself or to another self, (3) the state of being affected by one’s personal happiness, etc., (4) the defective state of the means of perception, (5) the absence of clarity or distinctness,

41 *A. bhā.*, p.280.
(6) the absence of the prominence (of sthāyin), (7) the rise of doubt.

AG explains the nature of these barriers in detail. The first barrier to Rasā realisation is unacceptability to our understanding on account of the lack of probability. Due to this barrier one is unable to put one’s consciousness or mind into the subject-matter presented. As a result, how can his consciousness experience repose? To remove this interruption the consent of the heart is necessary. This becomes possible if the subject-matter is generally accepted by society. In case of unusual happenings one is able to achieve repose on account of our acceptance of the matter by the unbroken tradition, i.e. taking the name of well-known Rāma etc. Hence in the particular form of drama, Nāṭaka, of which the purpose is learning and giving advice, regarding extraordinary excellence, and also wisdom, a well-known theme is necessarily treated as a rule, but not so in the forms of drama like farce (Prahasana).

The second barrier to the perception of Rasā that AG mentions is the confinement of the consciousness to one’s own person and to another. This interruption occurs when the speaker is at the mercy of the tasting of pleasures, pains, etc., inhering in his own person. This barrier consists
in the appearance of other worldly kinds of feelings, due to
the fear of the disappearance of the feelings of pleasure, etc.,
to his concern for their preservation to a desire for acquiring
something similar to them, to the desire for avoiding them,
to a desire for making them known to others or to conceal them
or in any other manner possible. Even when he perceives
pleasures, pains etc. as inhering necessarily in other person,
the barriers are inevitable as they are likely to give rise
to other corresponding worldly feelings in his own heart, such
as pleasure, pain, stupor, neutrality, etc. These worldly
feelings come in the way of generalization, necessary for
the realization of Rasa.

The means of eliminating this barrier are the
theoretical conventions like the revelation of Purvarāṇga
with words "Now do not prolong it further here the prologue
defined in the stanza." The actress or the Jester..., a
number of things not to be found in ordinary life such as the
zones dividing the pavilion of the stage, to indicate
different regions, the various types of delicate dance, the
various dialects used, and the different dresses of the actors,
the headgear etc., by which they conceal the real
identity of the actor. With this device there is no
knowledge or apprehension that the pleasure or sorrow is of
this particular actor, or of this particular time and place,
since the original personality of the actor as a person
is concealed, on the other hand since the spectator’s consciousness does not rest entirely on the represented images there is no repose in the real being of the superimposed character. So that as a result of all this, there is eventually just a negation both of the real being of the character he is playing and that of the actor. Even if the varieties of delicate dance like āsānāpathya, Puspragan-dhika, etc. are not usually seen in the world, they are not totally impossible since somehow their possibility exists.

All this subject has been discussed by Bharata as it promotes the mastication or relish (carvāna) of Rasa by the state of generality, produced, and will be clarified at its proper place. So it is of no use that we exert for it here. And thus we have explained the way to eliminate this barrier to Rasa when the consciousness is related or confined to oneself or to other.

The third barrier to the matter of the realisation of Rasa is connected with the second and refers to the spectator’s over absorption with his own personal worldly feelings. How can anyone who is over powered by his own happiness etc. make his consciousness rest on something else? With a view to remove this barrier there are various means to be used at suitable times and places such as musical instruments, songs, various kinds of pavillions, well-accomplished courtesans, etc.
These things which refer to particular objects, but are capable of being enjoyed by all spectators, by the virtue of generalisation, consisting of sense-objects like sound etc. and they possess such a charming power that even an unesthetic person is turned into an aesthetic person as he obtains clarity of heart. Hence, it has been said 'It is both visible and audible'.

The fourth and fifth barriers to the realisation of Rasa viz., the defective state of the means of perception and the absence of clarity or distinctiveness, are discussed by As simultaneously, since their nature is more or less the same. He tells that in the absence of the proper means of perception or apprehension, the realisation (of Rasa) cannot take place. Even if there are verbal testimonies and inferences the apprehension or understanding remains indistinct. Apprehension, does not repose, because it demands a knowledge which is in conformity with direct perception of the nature of clear knowledge. As it has been said in Vatsayana Bhāṣya "all true knowledge depends upon direct perception" what is directly perceived cannot be proved to be otherwise by hundreds of inferences and verbal testimonies.

In the case of the imaginary circle of the fire, created when a burning stick is swiftly revolved, our knowledge is disproved only by a more powerful direct perception. This

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42 NS, G03., I,1, v.11, p.10.
is the ordinary way of knowledge. Therefore to remove these
two barriers there are consecrated by tradition - the four
modes of acting, furnished with the styles (vṛtti), the local
usages (pravṛtti) and the worldly representation (Lokadharma).
Acting (Abhinaya) indeed is a different operation from infe-
rences and verbal testimony, and this as we will expound
later on, is something equal to direct perception.

The sixth barrier to the realisation of Rasa is the
absence of pre-eminence given to the sthāya in a play. AG
explains this in detail. He begins by asking a question "Is
there a man whose consciousness would rest on anything un-
important?" Such an unimportant perception runs after another
important or essential thing because it does not rest in itself.
This is the reason why the sthāyibhāva only can be the object
of tasting, because the determinants and the consequents which
are insentient (jada) and the transitory mental states, though
of the nature of consciousness, being necessarily dependent
on the Permanent states, are equally subordinate. Hence the
Sthāya itself, distinct from them, is the abode of relish.

Among these sthāyins again some states of
consciousness are more prominent, as they are based on the
goals of human existence. AG explains the pre-eminence of
some states of consciousness or Sthāyibhāvas from the two
points of view. First he takes up, in accordance with the
Hindu view of what is useful for the achievement of Purusarthas or four main purposes of human life. Then he takes up the point of view of psychology as to why the Sthāyibhāvas are pre-eminent and the Transitory emotions have the function of only nourishing the Sthāyibhāvas and so are subordinate to them. Thus the Sthāyin of love Rati is based on joy or pleasure in sex-relation, what is known in Hindu culture as Kāma Purusārtha and related to it are social duties (Dharma) or material gain (Artha). The second such Sthāyin is krodha-anger. Persons in whom anger is pre-eminent are bent upon achieving the economic and political purposes. Then AG takes up utsāha. This Sthāyibhāva, utsāha-energy would result in the achievement of Kāma Purusārtha and Dharma Purusārtha and other purposes of human life also. The Vibhāva is full of Nirveda-indifference brought about by philosophical knowledge; it is the means of liberation. Therefore these four are predominant.

These four can have the mutual relation of pre-eminence and sub-ordination. Though in a particular form of drama Rupaka, each one may be pre-eminent, and in the same drama, in the same act, all these Sthāyibhāvas may have their own individual pre-eminence.43

43 Śṛṅgāra Rasa which depends on the Sthāyibhāva of Rati, is said to be of three kinds - (1) Kāma Śṛṅgāra
The second point of view is psychological. RG tells us that certain states of consciousness are innate and abiding and so they are pre-eminent. While some states of consciousness are fleeting and transitory. The sthīyibhāvās are such innate abiding states of consciousness and hence they can be subject-matter of rasa. These two types of states of consciousness are already discussed in the Chap. eight of this work. RG sums up by saying that "Sage Bharata has removed the barrier of the lack of prominence given to the sthīyin with the elucidation - 'We shall carry the sthīyins to the state of rasa', based on a special definition of the rasa, evolving out of its general definition." 44

The seventh barrier to the realisation of rasa that RG mentions, is the rise of doubt or uncertainty as to the exact nature of the sthīyin, as there is no rule that certain vibhāvās, anubhāvās and vyabhicāribhāvās are related individually to any one sthīyin. For example the anubhāva of falling of tears may be due to joy, some disease of the eye or sorrow, etc. The vibhāvās of the appearance of tiger,

(Contd)
(2) Dharma śrīgāra and (3) Artha śrīgāra. According to the Hindu concept of social duties - dharma - a man, in order to be saved must begot a son, who would free him from all debts, and from the hell known as 'Pa'. So also there are marriages which are meant to help achieve political and economical gains (artha).

44 A. bhā., p.293.
etc., may cause anger (in a brave person), fear (in a coward) etc. The transitory mental states like ārama-fatigue, cintā-anxiety etc., may accompany any Sthāyina like enthusiasm, fear etc. However, their totality (assemblage) does not give rise to a doubt – that is – there is no uncertainty about their totality.

Thus where the Vibhāva consists of the death of a relative, then the Anubhāva consists of wailing, falling of tears etc. and Vyabhicārinīs are like anxiety, misery, etc; the Sthāyin is necessarily (or certainly) ūkṣa-sorrow. Thus when a doubt arises, the assembly or totality of these (Vibhāva, Anubhāva, Vyabhicārinībhāvas) removes the barrier of doubt.

**Blissful Nature of Rasa**

In between the discussion regarding the two types of pre-eminence of Sthāyina (1) related to goals of human existence and (2) psychological nature of Sthāyina there is a passage about the nature of all Rasas. AG says all these Rasas are pre-dominantly full of joy or bliss. The enlightenment, which is of the nature of mastication or gustation or relish (carvānā) of one’s consciousness, is of the essence of bliss. This bliss has the form of repose in the heart – a

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45 *A. bhā.,* p.282.
repose (vidrānti) devoid of other disturbances or barriers. Unhappiness or pain is due to the absence of such repose. For this reason only, the followers of sage Kapil regard dūncaiyā (oscillation of the mind or the restless condition of the mind), resulting from the activity of Rājas, as the very essence (or life) of the pain. Thus all the Rasas are of the nature of joy or bliss because they proceed from a complete repose in consciousness.

The statement that all the Rasas including Karuna, Śābhatsa, Bhayānaka, etc., are blissful, is apparently unacceptable. AG is aware how could they lead to the realization of joy or bliss? AG solves this difficulty by taking his stand on the fundamental tenets of the Sāmkhya philosophy. His argument is in consonance with the view of the Sāmkhya philosophers, who hold that the essence of pain consists in the restless condition of the mind; and when this restlessness is removed, the mind is in the state of complete repose and that is joy.

AG further explains this by taking an example from everyday life. Here he follows the old Sanskrit method of exposition of giving an example from ordinary everyday life. Even Karuna - sorrow - which is painful becomes the source of serenity or joy due to complete repose. Thus it is found in the world that the hearts of women find repose even in the relish (carvanā) of their consciousness, which consists of
sorrow, deep and intense, because the nature of that relish is repose itself, free from any disturbances or restlessness; what constitutes sorrow is the absence of repose itself. As there is complete absorption in weeping, etc. there is repose.

However, there is a touch of bitterness (katuta) that we feel in some of the Rasas, with regard to the objects of diversion (uparājaka) as in the case of the heroic emotion (vīra Rasa). The life of this touch of bitterness is really the capacity to endure pain etc. Thus on a philosophic basis, AS explains how tragic Rasa is joyful, even while human nature is averse to the experience of pain.

The Process of the Realisation of Rasa

AS, now, states his own theory of Rasa. For him the realisation or the apprehension of Rasa is one whole continuous process. To explain this whole process he analyses it into several stages. Like other theorists of Rasa, he bases his theory on his strict interpretation of Rasa-sūtra. The sūtra says that the realisation (nipatti) of Rasa, in the mind of a member of the assembly; who witnesses a play (sāmājika dhiyi) takes place by a complete union of the Vibhūvas, Anubhūvas and Vyabhicārins or when these three reach 'one pointedness' or are concentrated in the mind of the sāmājika
through the relation of pre-dominance and subordination—that is, of these vibhāvas, etc., some are pre-dominant and others are sub-ordinate.

This realisation of Rasa is one integrated process in which there are several stages. The first stage presupposes close acquaintance or intimate knowledge of relation between the states of mind, Sthāyibhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas, feelings—emotions and sentiments—causes that produce them as well as the effects of such states of mind, and their accompanying emotions. So whenever he witnesses these causes and effects of mental states, he is able to take them as a probative mark (Liṅgāṇa) or proof of the existence of these states of mind.

This sort of logical training gives the sāmājika the power of quick understanding of the Permanent mental states through a sort of inferential process. When a Sāmājika witnesses a garden and the amorous glances of a beautiful woman, he immediately infers the Sthāyin of Rati (love) in the person concerned. This sort of equipment of the reader or spectator prepares him for the second stage when he witnesses the performance of a drama. Now the objects which were ordinary causes, transcend the plane of empirical causality, when depicted on the stage and their sole essence consists in manifesting and nourishing the Sthāyin. Here in the world
of art, the process of causality only enables the spectator to cognise, to know such a sthāya - as not of an actor's nor of one's self or of others, nor is this cognition of a sthāya limited to time and place. He cognises or perceives the sthāya as such. Here the action of causality is superseded by the colouring of the process of Vibhāvanā and Anabhāvanā - the act of revealing a particular sthāya and the action or gestures like expression or indicating relevant sthāya. These are known as Vibhāvas and Anabhāvas in the unusual world (ālaukika) of kāvya and Nātaka.

This point has been discussed in the 7th Adhāya of NS to suggest their dependence on the previous impression of causality. In this way these Vibhāvas, etc., become the subject of carvanā (choosing, relishing, masticating, gustation). This carvanā is of state of consciousness, free from all barriers and therefore called other than worldly or unusual (ālaukika). The meaning of a poem or a drama, which is made the subject of such a process of tasting or relish—carvanā - is Rasa.

In order to show that Rasa is a dynamic process and not a static state, it is said that the only essence of Rasa is 'Carvyamāna' - the capacity or the quality of being relished. Rasa is not something which is previously existent or established (sidhasvabhāva). It comes into
existence at the time of carvanā - relish only. It is immediate only and does not depend upon the time other than that of relish or carvanā, therefore Rasa is totally distinct from sthāyin.

AG further adds that Rasa is not sthāyin made known by Vibhūvas, etc., and therefore being tasted, as Śri Saṅkṣaka and others maintained, it is a process of tasting sthāyins.

If it is so then the worldly experience of sthāyin would also be Rasa; If Rasa can take place in the Vibhūvas, etc., which do not really exist and are imaginary why should it not occur in the case of things which do really exist as in life? AG adds that it is for this reason that the apprehension of sthāyin, which is obtained in the form of an inference, as Śri Saṅkṣaka explains it, is not Rasa. Sthāyin, as actually existing in the ordinary world, is not Rasa and so Bharata has not mentioned the word sthāyin in the sūtra. If it were mentioned in the sūtra, "it would be like a thorn".46 It is only a matter of propriety that sthāyin is called Rasa. And the propriety lies in the fact that the previously known causality of sthāyin, now becomes helpful for relish-carvanā by resorting to Vibhūvas, etc.

In that case, what Rasa would there be in the inference of

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46 Ābhāṣa, p.284.
othāyaṁ of ordinary, everyday life? So the relish or taste of Rasa is of the nature of unusual camatkāra and is different from the normal forms of knowledge like remembrance, inference, worldly self-consciousness, etc.

The saṃājika who is learned in the ordinary type of inference, when witnessing a play, does not cognize a young woman etc., with indifference but perceives the young woman etc., as the very essence of carvāna which is proper to identification with the object of perception. This he does by the sprouting of the taste of Rasa becoming complete, on the strength of his sensibility, consisting in a consent of heart without mounting the steps of customary inference or remembrance. The carvāna does not precede other forms of knowledge like direct knowledge through the senses. But this carvāna is brought about by the force of the complete, rare union of the vibhāvas, amabhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas, etc., which are different from the worldly ordinary causality.

Now AS shows how Rasasaṃvedana or the cognition of Rasa is different from other forms of cognition or knowledge. He says that carvāna does not precede other means of knowledge and therefore it cannot be remembrance (as we can only remember that which we have known before). It is also distinct from the ordinary means of knowledge like direct perception. This carvāna is brought about by the force of the rare union of vibhāvas, etc. The knowledge or cognition of
Rati, etc., produced by such customary means of knowledge as direct perception, inference, analogy and authoritative statements of the śāstras is distinct from the knowledge of Rati, etc., in this carvāṇā. Thus after rejecting the empirical means of knowledge, AG mentions the other two means of knowledge recognised in the Indian thought. "There is the direct perception of a yogin which is indifferent to the consciousness of others. There is the second type of knowledge of a higher yogin which, void of the colouring of all sense objects, consists of pure, intense joy." 47

The knowledge of Rati etc., through this carvāṇā is different from all these empirical and yogic means of knowledge. In each case, there occur barriers proper to each form of knowledge. In the case of empirical ājñā of knowledge, there are barriers like the desire of acquisition of objects. 48

In the case of the first type of yogic knowledge, there is tātaasthya - indifference and this brings about the lack of clarity (asphutatvā). While in the case of the higher type of yogic knowledge, as there is total absence of sense-objects, there is the lack of beauty.

AG now explains as to why in the process of proper carvāṇā and the resulting Rasa-realisation, these barriers do

47 A. bhās. p.285

48 Here, the second and the third Vighnas - barriers to Rasa-realisation are once again brought to notice in relation to the empirical forms of knowledge.
not arise. 'Here there is no helplessness resulting from attachment caused by the involvement of one self only because there is no rule that what one witnesses refers to one's own self only. Again there is no limiting rule that the reference is to others alone, as one's own self is in it also (in the capacity of the spectator). Here there is no lack of clarity resulting from indifference. We have often said that there is no possibility of the rise of other barriers. Due to generalising power of Vibhāvas, one's own proper Vṝsena (latent impressions) of Rati, etc., arise. For this reason, the Vibhāvas, etc., are neither the material cause (Karaka Hetu) of the production of Rasa, (as Bhaṭṭa Bollata maintains) nor are they its indicative cause (anyārakhetu as Śri Śaṅkara holds) leading to its inferences. If they were to be the material cause of Rasa, there would arise the contingency of Rasa arising even in the absence or disappearance of their cognition, as the effect can exist even after the disappearance of cause. This does not happen in the case of the carvāna) relish of Rasa, which lasts only as long as the Vibhāvas, etc., last. Nor are the Vibhāvas, etc., the indicative cause — or cause of knowledge (jñāpti hetu) of Rasa which supposes the pre existence of a thing and Rasa is not some accomplished fact which is an object of knowledge or cognition. In the case of Rasa, its existence is a part and parcel of the carvāna of
Vibhūvas etc. Rasa does not exist before its experience due to carvana. For this reason, the Vibhūvas, etc., do not fall under the category of means of knowledge (Pramāṇa). Thus, the Vibhūvas, etc., are neither the material cause as Bhatta Lolita maintains nor are they indicative cause as Śri Śaṅkara holds.

Well then, it may be asked, what are Vibhūvas, etc? AG replies that 'the operation of Vibhūvas, etc., is quite unusual or extra-ordinary and useful for the purpose of process of carvana. If you ask where else do you find such a thing we may say that this is an argument in favour of proving the extra-ordinary nature of Vibhūvas, etc. Do we find in the taste of a drink the different, individual tastes of various ingredients such as jaggery, pepper, etc? The relish of Rasa is like this'.

'Well, in such a case, Rasa would be unknowable (incomprehensible). Yes, it has to be like that because the very life of Rasa is the process of tasting - Rasana - and therefore it cannot be of the nature of 'knowable' (Pramōya). Then why is the term 'Nispatti' used in the Rasa-sūtra? Well, it is not the production of Rasa, but it is the production of the process of Rasana, of its relish, which results in Rasa-experience - that is what the term 'Nispatti' refers to, and if Rasa is said to be 'produced' figuratively, because of the production of its relish (Rasanā), on which its existence
This rasana is not the activity of means of right knowledge, nor it is affected by the operation of causality, it is not something which is not untrue or unreal, but it is something established by its own consciousness (svassāvedanāta). This rasana or relish is undoubtedly of the nature of cognition, though it is quite distinct from the other ordinary cognitions, since the Vibhavas, etc., which are the means of its cognition are different from the ordinary worldly means of knowledge. Since rasana is created by the complete union of the Vibhavas, etc., Rasa, which is the subject of this kind of rasana, is of the extra-ordinary, unusual nature. This is the essence of Rasa-sūtra.

This discussion of AG regarding the extra-ordinary nature of the relish of Rasa and its inherent distinction from all other kinds of ordinary cognition as well as from Yogic cognition, establishes the concept of Rasa on its own unique philosophical basis.

After this discussion of the Rasa-concept, AG gives a summary account as to how a spectator realizes Rasa when he witnesses a dramatic performance. "The first thing that happens is that as the actor dresses himself with a crown or puts on a mask and such other means of make-up, the actor's own identity is concealed - that is, he appears not
as his own particular person but as the character, whose part he is playing. Then on account of deep impressions of former states of consciousness, and also of the force of poetry, even though the spectator has a notion of Rāma (a person), his mind does not rest there—he does not believe him to be real Rāma. Thus, the elements of space and time drop off both regarding Rāma and actor. In the acting of the character, there are such things as horripilation, etc. They are observed ascending the awareness of Rati (love), but as there is no regulation of time and space, this makes us cognise Rati as such. In this consciousness of Rati as such, the spectator's own self participates. It so participates because he possesses latent impression of Rati etc., and for this reason he does not cognise Rati neutrally or indifferently or abstractly. This Rati is not due to any cause referring to oneself and so there is no barrier of desire of acquisition, attachment, etc. So also it does not refer exclusively to others—since in that case there will be feelings like misery, jealousy, etc. So the generalised Rati becomes the subject matter of one and the same (unitary) consciousness which is of the abiding or unified nature and of the nature of flow. Rati cognised thus is the Śrīgāra Rasa. The generalisation of Rati takes place due to the Vibhāvas, etc.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Abhā, pp. 295-36.
Thus ends AG his exposition of the Rasa-theory.

He has renamed the Sthāyībhāvas of Bharata in the psychological term "Vāsanās" — the latent impressions of the human mind. The vivid representation of the Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas, and Vyabhicāribhāvas in a drama or a poem call forth this dormant Vāsanā and develop it to a climax; and by the operation of generalisation, by our complete imaginative sympathy, we relish this mental state (emotion, sentiment or feeling) in its generic aspect, free from all barriers like individualistic elements and of time and place, and this relish is Rasa. This relish is 'Alaukika', quite unlike the ordinary experiences of the feelings in the world which involve pain and pleasure, accepting and rejecting because of the pleasure and pain and though it is a cognition, it is a unique cognition different from all other cognitions. This interpretation of the theory of Rasa by AG is considered the most comprehensive and generally accepted as the norm in the Sanskrit Poetics today.

After these four major interpretations of the theory of Rasa propounded by Bharata in the NS, some later writers on Sanskrit Poetics explained and elaborated the concept of Rasa. Jagannātha in his work 'Rasagehādhāra' mentions such

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eleven different interpretations (including those four) of the Rasa-sūtra. They all agree about the nature of Rasa, that Rasa is the relish or savouring of the Sthāyibhāvas, awakened or suggested by the union of the Vibhāvas, etc. and the Rasa-experience is full of 'ānanda'—bliss or joy though they interpret differently the word 'Sāmyoga' in the Rasa-sūtra. Out of these later interpretations we must take note of that of Mammeta, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha.

Mammeta (1050 - 1100 A.D.) in his work, 'Kāvyaprakāśa' accepts the view of AG regarding the nature of Rasa and reinforces the Abhivyaktivā of AG. He makes it clear that "the Kāranas (causes), Kāryas (effects) and Sahakāri (concomitants) of real life are known as Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas when taken to drama or poetry. Rasa is nothing but the Sthāyibhāva awakened or suggested or revealed (vyakta) by the union of these Vibhāvas, etc."51. Rasa is realised due to vyanjana—the suggestive, evocative power of word. Thus, Mammeta emphatically distinguished the experience of Sthāyibhāvas in ordinary life and in drama or poetry. He, describes Rasa as 'Lokottara' or 'claukika' which mean other than the worldly experience.

Vishvanātha Kaviraj (1300-1384 A.D.) in his work 'Śāhitya-Darpaṇa' accepts Dvaita's explanation of the process of Rasa. "When satya-dishthāyivāc (which are in the form of latent impressions - Vēsanā), in the heart of a Sahādaya are suggested or revealed by the Vibhīvās, Anabhīvās and Sancārībhīvās, they attain the state of Rasa."  

Vishvanātha acknowledges Rasa as the soul of Kāvyā by defining Kāvyā as "Vēkyaḥ rasaṁkaraṁ kāvyah."  

Vishvanātha describes the nature of Rasa thus: "When the Sattva is prominent in the mind, Rasa is cognised or tasted or experienced. This Rasa-experience is of the nature of consciousness without any breaks - one continuous whole (akhandā) and self-luminous (svapraśīka). It is totally void of the touch of any other knowable objects. It resembles or comes near to the relish of brahma experience. Its life is flash or thrill of delight (syamāraṇa) which is other than the worldly. It is identical with one's own self. This Rasa is experienced only by some percipients."  

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53 Ibid., Chap.1, p.23.

54 Ibid., Chap.3, v.2-3, p.105.
Jagannātha first takes up the view of AG and Mamata regarding Rasā with which he agrees. He first states their view: "Rasā is a Sthāyibhāva such as characterised by blissful consciousness (or becoming the object of pure, blissful consciousness) from which the covering lid has been removed."⁵⁵ But says Jagannātha, really speaking the view of AG and Mamata ought to be stated as follows: "Rasā is the blissful consciousness itself from which the covering lid (of ignorance, desire and worldly distractions) has been removed and of which the Sthāyibhāvas like Rati have become the object (rātyādyavacchinnā bhagnāvaranā cid eva rasā)."⁵⁶ The difference in his view and in the view of AG and Mamata consists in the shifting of the viśeṣānvīśeṣya bhāva. According to AG and Mamata bhagnāvaranā cid becomes the viśeṣa and rātyādisthāyibhāva becomes the viśeṣya, while according to Jagannātha rātyādisthāyibhāva becomes the viśeṣa and bhagnāvaranā cid becomes the viśeṣya.

Jagannātha then goes on to say that 'the relishing of Rasā is nothing but the breaking off (or withdrawal) of the screen (or mantle) (of ignorance, etc) covering the pure

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⁵⁵ Rasagangādhara, p.23.
⁵⁶ Ibid., p.23.
consciousness (cigatāvaranābhaṭṭāgah) or the transformation of the mind into the bliss of pure consciousness which is the nature of ītān (tadākārāntahkaraṇavṛttirvā). Now this aesthetic enjoyment (rasa-carvanā) is different from the meditational trance (samādhi). For it has for its object (ālambana) the bliss of pure consciousness blended with the cognition (or the consciousness) of the Vibhūvas, Anabhāvas and Vyabhicāribhūvas – which are worldly or mundane matters. But brahmāsvāda is not mixed or blended with the cognition of worldly matters. Further, rasaśvāda is the outcome of the special function, namely vyanyāsa peculiar to poetry, while brahmāsvāda is the outcome of the process laid down in the Upanisads viz., śravana, manana, nididhyāsana, etc!

It would not be out of place here, if we take a summary review of the concept of Rasa as propounded in the Nāıl itself. In the 6th Adhyāya of the Nāıl, we find a discourse on the different mental states. These are distributed into three classes – vis., (1) Eight Sthāyibhūvas – Permanent mental states (instincts or propensities), (2) thirty-three Vyabhicāribhūvas – Transitory, Fleeting mental states and (3) eight Sattvikabhāvas – Psycho-somatic conditions or states.

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57 See Chap. 8 of this study.
These 49 states of mind is Bharata's understanding of human psychology.

Another important point that Bharata has emphasized is how these mental states are generated and how they become expressed physically. These are called Kāraṇās (causes) and Kāryas (effects) on the one hand and Vibhāvas and Anubhāvas on the other hand, of the mental states. In the 6th Adhyāya of the MS, Bharata takes all this psychological material of the forty-nine states of mind for granted. While putting forth the Rasa-sūtra he drops the terms Kāraṇās and Kāryas and also the term Sthāyibhāvas and uses the terms Vibhāvas and Anubhāvas as they are of Sthāyibhāvas. This omission of Kāraṇās (causes) and Kāryas (effects) the Laukiki terms of the mental states sublimes or transcends the concept of Rasa from the experience of these mental states in ordinary worldly life, which is full of pain or pleasure or indifference, (or as Bharata often says, from Loka-ordinary world). This omission of the terms Kāraṇa and Kārya and the use of the terms Vibhāva and Anubhāva gives wide scope to differences in opinion of the later commentators and exegetes of the Rasa-theory.

The main aspects of Bharata's theory of Rasa, that Rasa is the union of these Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas and
Vyabhicārībhāvas, and that the total experience of Rasa in all its varieties, is full of joy are accepted by the later exegetes. But as we have already seen their differences of opinion refer to the mode of operation of Rasa, whether Rasa is produced (utpattivāda) by direct statement or in Abhinaya (uttapatti and abhidha) whether it is brought about by imitation and inference (Anukruti and anumiti) or whether through suggestion (Vyanjanā) or manifestation (Abhivyakti). The final problem that emerges out of this epistemological discussion is what kind of cognition (sāṃvitti) or perception or knowledge is Rasa?

The answers to these questions as we have seen, are given by Bhatta Lollata, Śri Śāṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta in accordance with their respective philosophical or Dārśanik views on the matter.

Ag and his preceptor Bhaṭṭa Tauta belong to the Pratyabhijñā school or what is popularly known as Kashmiri Saivism. According to this school, knowledge is nothing new but recognition of what is and what had been known. So the final result of Rasa viz., Ānand or bliss exists in the human soul as part of its constitution or nature. One of the ways of knowing or recognising this Ānand is poetry or art in general. What is relevant here is that Nāṭya as also the other different forms of poetic composition are means to the
revelation or recognition of Anand or bliss in the soul. As AG would tell us, Rasa is a process, a mental process, which is a unitary process and which gives the bliss of soul, the bliss of drama and poetry and art in general.

We have no information about the philosophical tenets of the author of the NS and therefore we cannot say which of the later interpretations ultimately based upon the different philosophical views was acceptable to him. But the main point, common to Bharata and his later commentators is that Rasa is a sort of process, a sort of chewing process (carvanā) which results in a delightful taste or relish.

Another point which we may emphasize here is that whatever may be the difference in the philosophical naming, all agree that Rasa is a sort of Saññāviti - cognition - knowledge or mental perception. AG has made great effort to show that Rasa is a unique saññāviti, a cognitive process, different from the other well-known processes, accepted by the Dārśanik schools such as, direct perception (Pratyakṣa) inference (Anumāṇa) scriptural testimony (Āgama), analogy (Upanēṇa), Pratibhāna (Intuition), etc., and it is also different from the Yogic cognition of the Brahman.

So Rasa being purely a cognitive process it is a contemplative activity. Rasa experience is not concerned with the social or moral or hygienic welfare, eventhough many
other purposes such as didactic, ethical, etc., are attributed to poetry, drama and art in general.

In the Rasa-experience the everyday world is not negated, but sublimated or transcended, and the world of drama is, in this sense, autonomous, being bound by its own laws. Thus the Rasa-experience is nothing but what we call in the modern terms, the aesthetic enjoyment itself.