CHAPTER FIVE

Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Response from India and China

The Maoist insurgency in Nepal (1996-2005) and its devastating effect on the security situation as well as politico-socio and economic life got Nepal into sharper international focus. The escalation of violence and growing instances of human Rights violation attracted the attention of the international community in general and the immediate neighbors in particular. The risk of the foreign intervention and the intensity of the insurgency alarmed its neighbors. This chapter seeks to focus on responses from India and China towards the developments in Nepal vis-à-vis Maoist Insurgency.

As discussed earlier, Nepal has been traditionally a buffer zone between two Asian giant neighbors, India and China. For both the countries, Nepal is an important country because of its geo-strategic location. Both India and China’s paramount concern in Nepal is related to security and stability. For, China, Nepal is just below Tibet which is Achilles Hill of China. Besides Nepal has a substantial number of Buddhists which has historical and cultural ties with the Buddhists in Tibet. Nepal’s close relations with India are also matter of concern for China. A porous boundary, people to people contact, centuries old cultural, social and historical ties between India and Nepal are areas of interest for India. Development of close relation between China and Nepal is a matter of concern for India. China’s help to Nepal in building roads and other infrastructures facilities may have the potentials to pave the way of Nepal getting sucked into Chinese
orbit as Tibet before. As both the countries are competing regional powers in Asia, they are not only protecting their interests in Nepal but also are seeking to enhance their sphere of influence to the extent possible. Having said that their interests in Nepal are economic and politico-strategic in nature. In addition both India and China are averse to the involvement of big powers outside of Asia in Nepal.

Throughout the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, one would find that the Maoists perceived China as a source of ideological support, where as India was regarded as a repository of the imperialist forces. The Maoists of Nepal claimed to have borrowed the idea of the ‘people’s war’ from the Cultural Revolution of China. On the other hand, the communist movement in Nepal in general and the Maoist insurgency in particular was influenced by the Communist movement of India. India has been suffering from a number of insurgency problems for years. There are reports suggesting the links between the Maoists of Nepal and some ultra left groups in India which are regarded as a matter of concern for India.

**Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Response from India**

India’s response to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal is of great interest for both of Nepal and India. For Nepal, India is the closest neighbor and the largest supplier of arms and ammunitions to the Nepali security forces. Secondly, the Maoists of Nepal used Indian soil as a safe heaven. Thirdly, the growing links between the Maoists of Nepal and the similar kind of groups in India created suspicion among the ruling elites of Nepal towards India. So far as the interest of India in relation to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal is
concerned, it can be divided into four categories. First, the anti-India stands of the Maoists in Nepal. India’s size and international clout causes apprehension in all the six smaller states with which India shares its boundary. India is a hotly debated neighbor among all the smaller neighbors in the sub-continent. The smaller countries are hyper sensitive about India and turn hostile to India on slightest protest. In Nepal India-bashing have always been an emblem of nationalism and the show of one’s love for the mother land\(^1\). As Prof. S.D.Muni rightly observes, “any problem that arises between two close neighbors like India and Nepal, or any other smaller South Asian country, is usually explained away in terms of India’s bigness and it’s over bearing and brotherly behavior. Indo-Nepal relations are obviously unequal relations”\(^2\). The Maoists were not above or beyond the aforesaid argument. Since their emergence India bashing or creating a sentiment among the Nepalese against India had been one of the important weapon for the Maoists to mobilize the mass. Time and again the Maoist went on branding the role of India in Nepal as colonialist, expansionist, and made India responsible for whatever under development Nepal had. The Maoists opposed the 1950 Treaty of peace and friendship and the Mahakali River Treaty of 1960. The Maoist leader, Baburam Bhattarai, in his literature had given a critical analysis of India’s role in the underdevelopment of Nepal in various sectors like Industries, Labour, Tourism, and Water and so on. To him India has been used as a medium through which the world imperialism entered into Nepal. To quote him:

This way world imperialism enters Nepal by riding over Indian horse. this combined intrusion and oppression of imperialism and expansionism has not only stunted the development of Nepal’s national industries but it has also created a situation where previously self-reliant industries are now beginning to get liquidated one after another.

He went on blaming India taking into account of the overall underdevelopment in Nepal. To him:

in this over all context there is no doubt that 180 years of uninterrupted semi-colonial relation with India expansionism has had very negative and destructive effect on the development of internal class relations and socio-economic structures and in essence in the development of national capitalism in Nepal. That is why it is one of the most important objectives of Maoist people’s war to break the chains of semi-colonialism and to usher in a new type of national capitalism (or New Democracy) by mobilizing people of all ranks and classes suffering under all forms of semi-colonial exploitation and oppression.

The anti-Indian stand of the Maoists is even clearer in their 40 points demands to the Nepali government before the emergence of the movement. A substantial portion of the 40 points demand of the Maoists covers the domination of India in Nepal in various fields ranging from nationalism to development, and from sociology to the politics of

Nepal. So the emergence of Maoist insurgency in Nepal, its growth in scale and size and its anti-India stand had been really a challenge and a concern for India’s age-old interest in Nepal.

Secondly, the 1700 k.M. long open border between Nepal and India had become even more a matter of concern for India with the growth of Maoist insurgency in Nepal. The open border and socio-cultural similarity of the people on either side of the border made quite easy movement to acquire arms and ammunitions and other necessary materials from India market. The free movement of the Nepalese Maoists in the Indian Territory and their organizational activities and political co-ordination with Indian rebel communist groups and north-east insurgents were certainly matter of concern for India. Besides, the open border also facilitated the increased incidents of illegal transaction on small arms and light weapons, provided sanctuaries of the Maoists and other criminal actors for treatment, hideouts and encouraged kidnapping for ransom, human trafficking, drug trafficking, cross border robbery, smuggling of forest resources and de-stabilizing the local labour market. While talking to a Maoist, it was revealed that, the Maoists also procured arms and similar kind of help for free movements into India territory from the local police personnel of India. As claimed from the Indian side, mostly by the Right wing political parties like BJP, since there was a link with the Maoists in Nepal and the terrorist elements from Pakistan and ISI, the open border between India and Nepal is

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6. Interview conducted by the researcher with Dinanath Sharma, chief whip, Maoist parliament committee, secretariat member Maoist on 17-02-08.
certainly a matter of concern for both India and Nepal in relation to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal.

The third important factor which concerned India to respond to the Maoists in Nepal was the connection and links of the Maoists link with the similar kind of groups in India. As it has been mentioned earlier, the Maoist insurgency movement certainly influenced by the self extremist movements in India. Not only the Maoists but the first ever armed communist uprising, known as Jhapa Movement, in 1971 also inspired by the Naxalite movement of West Bengal. With the increasing instances of linkages between the Maoists of Nepal and similar kind of groups in India, in the course of the insurgency, the Indian government became certainly concerned. After the years of ignoring the Maoist of Nepal, India suddenly became concerned about the spread of this violent band so close to the Hindi heartland of Utter Pradesh and Bihar. By the year 2002, the Maoist of Nepal ranked third in the Indian Home Minister’s assessment. In the year 2001, India’s intelligence Bureau Chief K.P.Sing, was reported to have said that, “there is a threat to relations between India and Nepal being entangled in the new ties emerging among the leftist insurgent groups”\(^7\). The above mentioned threat even more intensified with the formation of the CCOMPOSA (Co-ordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations). This committee was believed to be emerged out of a meeting of comrades from nine Maoist parties, organized in some place in West Bengal. Among the nine Maoist parties, there were four Indian groups in this alliance- the Communist party of India- Marxist Leninist (People’s War) of Andhra Pradesh, Maoist Communist Centre

(MCC) of Bihar, Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (MLM) and the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Maoist). In the course of time the Maoists of Nepal in co-ordination with the left extremist groups of India proposed to establish a ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ). This was proposed to stretch from Kathmandu-Nepal to Hyderabad- India, what the Maoist used to call it from Pashupati to Tirupati. So the intensity, size and the scale of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, in reverse became role model and sort of source of inspiration for the similar kind of groups in India. Hence, it was well understood by India, that the success or the failure of the Maoists in Nepal would definitely affect the similar kind of groups in India, which India has been fighting against for years.

The fourth important factor which prompted India responding to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal was the security and strategic interest of India- since the time of British India the state of Nepal has been strategic and security interest for India. After independence Nepal became even more vulnerable and important for India. One of the major threats that India got was the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950. This very act of China not only affected the balance of power in the Himalayas but gravely exposed the entire region. India was all aware of the fact that, Nepal would not be in a position to withstand in case there was a military or ideological pressure from China. Because that time Nepal was going under a fundamental political change. With the Maoists tilting towards China ideologically and having India-bashing sentiment, once again, India could realize a repeated threat from Nepal. Throughout the insurgency movement, the Maoists of Nepal

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never had a statement against China. Where as one of the main factors of the insurgency was against, what they called, India domination. Moreover, along with this, the presence of external forces like U.S., U.K., France, and Norway and on the top, the United Nations certainly was a matter of concern for India. India would not like the presence of external forces like U.S. in Nepal. This did not only harm the strategic interest of India but also the power equation in the sub-continent. While interviewing with a Nepali intellectual, it was revealed that, some of the U.N Delegates who came to India from Nepal for tourism purpose, happened to visit one of the banned armed outfits of Tarai region of Nepal⁹. This was not liked by India, because it exposed that India was harbouring the banned organizations of Nepal in its territory. And it created a rift in the bilateral relation of both countries. So involvement of forces like U.S., U.K. and U.N. and security threat perception from Chinese side in relation to Maoist insurgency was matter of concern for India.

**India’s Response to Different Regimes in Nepal**

Nepal, as a state, has been going through a continuous political change since its exposure to the external world in general and precisely since 1951 in particular. 1951 was the year when the centuries old Rana autocracy was overthrown and a democratic form of government was established in Nepal. Ever since that it has been witnessed that in all its political changes in Nepal, India had played an important and decisive role in establishing and overthrowing a particular regime or the other. The rationale behind dealing with India’s role in previous political change in Nepal is very important to answer the question whether India played a role in favour either of the Maoist or of the Government.

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⁹Interview with Nischal Nath Pandey, Professor, Tribhuban University, Kathmandu, Nepal on 11-02-2008.
Addressing India’s role in previous political change would focus and highlights India’s domination or highhanded-role in determining them.

Before stepping into a democratic framework, the Rana Regime enjoyed the confidence of the British India. By giving ransom amounts, permitting Gorkha soldiers to be recruited into the British army. The Ranas could take the British into their confidence and never had a threat to their regime from the British- India side. After the Independence of India the Ranas failed to get similar kind of support from Nehru Government. The Ranas were in fact weakened by various factors. Already there had started an armed democratic revolution against the Ranas in Nepal. India feared the Revolutionary democratic change in Nepal could jeopardize its own security. Addressing to the Indian parliament Prime Minister Nehru declared that, “India cannot risk her own security by anything going wrong in Nepal which permits either that barrier (Himalayas) to be crossed or otherwise weakens our frontier”10. Consequently, a compromise was made for a democratic set up in Nepal known as the Delhi Agreement in 1951 with the mediation of India. Three parties involved in this compromise apart from India were the king Mahendra, Popular Nepali Congress representation and the Rana prime minister. Ironically, it was alleged by Nepali Congress leader B.P.Koirala that, the three parties involved in the deal were neither properly consulted by India, nor given a chance to sit

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together and discuss the matter. He further stated that all communications took place through Prime Minister Nehru, who never spoke about the terms concretely.\textsuperscript{11}

Another political change in which India played an indirect but very important role was the Royal coup of 1960 by king Mahendra. The Royal coup sustained for a period of 30 years in spite of regular sharp criticism. One of the interpretation and version of the Indian stand on the Royal coup was that, though India officially criticized it, but it was during this phase, Indian aid to Nepal had surprisingly increased. Taking the second Five Year Plan (1962-65) of Nepal as a base, the amount of Indian aid had been increased more than five times in the third and fourth Five Year Plans and ten times in the sixth Five Year Plan.\textsuperscript{12} The Panchayat Democratic phase of Nepal under the Monarchy seemed to going against India’s idea of democracy. The question arises; if India wanted it could have toppled the panchayat Regime at its beginning, but why India continued to have passive support to it for almost thirty years.

There can be various versions on the afore asked question. One of the most important factors which made India support the Monarch might be the strained relationship of the Nepali Congress led Government against India in general and between B.P.Koirala and Nehru in particular. For example during a debate in Indian parliament, Prime Minister Nehru declared that, “…. any aggression against Bhutan and Nepal would

\textsuperscript{11} For details see Statements of B.P. Koirala, cited in Shyam Shresta’s “India’s possible role in the future peace process in Nepal”, in Shiva K Dhungana (ed), No. 5, P.165.

\textsuperscript{12} See Shyam Shresta, “India’s possible role in the future peace process in Nepal”, No. 5, P.169.
be regarded aggression against India”\textsuperscript{13}. This statement of Nehru was immediately reacted by B.P. Koirala. He stated, "I take Mr. Nehru’s statement as an expression of friendship that in case of aggression against Nepal, India would send help, if such help is ever sought. It could never be taken as suggesting unilateral action”\textsuperscript{14}. Before this incident happened, there already started anti-Indian bogey by the Nepali Congress led Government. As early as 1956, there was a demand for the end of special relationship and beginning of ‘equal relationship’. The role of Indian members in the ‘constitutive Mechanism’ in Nepal was opposed by the then prime minister Tanka Prasad Acharya and he also demanded the Indian Military Mission (IMM) in Nepal. In fact Tanka Prasad Acharya was successful in winding up the former. Circumstances like these created discontent between India towards the democratic forces in Nepal.

Another interpretation in this regard is that king Mahendra, after the Royal Coup, established a close and cordial relation with China and later with Pakistan. He successfully used the China card to extract concession and recognition to the regime. The changing security concerns with Indo-Sino differences and the war 1962, led India to reassess its policy towards Nepal. In the change of stand, India approved of Nepal’s panchayat system\textsuperscript{15}. So looking into the panchayat Regime of Nepal one would find, one of the major factor of survival of panchayat regime had been continuous Indian backing.

\textsuperscript{13} For details see Jawaharlal Nehru, Lok Sabha Debate, Second Series, Vol. xxx, No.10, 1959, P.2211.

\textsuperscript{14} See Asian Recorder, Vol.51, 19-25, December, 1959, as cited in Shyam Shresta, , No. 5, P.168.

\textsuperscript{15} For details see Padmaja Murthy, “India and Nepal: Security and Economic Dimensions”, Accessed from the website \url{http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/xs/sa_99mup01.html} on 26\textsuperscript{th} February, 2009.
Once again India played a crucial role in toppling the panchayat regime and bringing about and supporting the movements for restoration of democracy in Nepal in 1991. Various factors, which went against the interest of India, compelled India to support the 1991 movement for the restoration of democracy. The first important factor which compelled India going against the Panchayat regime was the proposal for ‘zone of peace’ (ZOP). The proposal of ZOP was propounded by king Birendra in 1976. The idea behind the very proposal was directed towards relative political independence vis-à-vis India. It was an attempt by king Birendra to dilute mutual security convergence of two countries. The proposal of ZOP was thought out as one of the ways to come out from the Indian security umbrella and to change the existing security perceptions. The Indian government, from the very beginning, made its stand clear and remained defiant. It never approved the proposal though the proposal was recognized more than hundred countries including U.S., former USSR and China. So the proposal of ZOP, once again, boosted the strained relationship between Nepal and India.

Secondly, following the proposal of ZOP, what culminated the irritation of India towards the panchayat regime was, when Nepal imported arms and ammunitions from China in 1988 without the consultation with India. Nepal’s import of arms from China included anti-air craft guns and medium range SSM AND AK-49 assault rifles. The import of arms and ammunitions from China was a complete dilution of the spirit of 1950 Treaty.

16 Ibid. P.
17 Shyam Shresta, No. 12, P.171.
Thirdly, in the 1980s Nepal tried to decrease trade and aid independence on India. Till that time India continued to be the largest donor and aid provider to Nepal. On an understanding of Treaty of trade and transit, Nepal always wanted to deal with it as two separate treaties. One was on trade and the other was on transit. While transit was of permanent importance, trade interests changed from time to time\(^\text{18}\). It should be mentioned here that, the Janata Party Government in India attempted to develop a close relationship and it agreed to the afore mentioned two separate treaties on trade and transit in 1978. An agreement to control un-authorised trade was also concluded. From Nepal side, it responded, not quite friendly, by imposing restriction on the movement of Indians in northern border areas of Nepal. A tariff of 55 percent was imposed on Indian goods entering Nepal. Nepal also regularized the restriction on citizenship and introduced a work permit system requirement for Indians. This act of Nepal adversely affected the interests of people of Indian origin in Nepal.

So it was Indian side to respond when the 1978 treaties on trade and transit rights expired. The Rajiv Gandhi Government responded using its economic leverage over Nepal. This time India insisted that the entire scope of India Nepal relations be reviewed and redefined. India also insisted on negotiating a single unified treaty in addition to an agreement on un-authorised trade\(^\text{19}\). In March 23 1989, India closed the trade and transit points except two border entry points. This had immediate effect on Nepal’s economy. On the other hand in 1989-90, India’s policy towards the political parties in general and the Nepali Congress in particular changed dramatically and it wanted to establish rapport

\(^{18}\) See Padmaja Murthy: No. 15, P.
with the Nepali Congress after weighing the pros and cons of the multi-party Democracy in Nepal. The Indian decision-makers took the view that in a multi-party democracy, lobbies could be created for or against certain policies with in turn, would help restrain a government\textsuperscript{20}. So the panchayat regime was weakened by, more than anything else, was the Indian trade embargo imposed on Nepal in 1989\textsuperscript{21}.

So from the above discussion it has been clear that, India’s role played to a great extent in all the political change that Nepal experienced. Moreover, it can be said that the deterioration of Indo-Nepal relation affected the political change in Nepal. Keeping in mind the above back-drop, it is important to explore, what role India played, what way India responded to the Maoist insurgency of Nepal.

**India’s Response**

So far India’s response to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal concerned, it is observed that, India did not take the Maoists seriously till 2001. From the emergence of the Maoists in 1996 till the year 2001, India’s response remained casual. India treated the Maoist insurgency in Nepal as a law and order problem of Nepal. And the government of India absolved itself of any responsibility in restraining and containing the activities of the Maoists along the Indo-Nepal border\textsuperscript{22}. India’s passive response towards the Maoists insurgency in Nepal can be termed, as Shyam Shresta observed:

> It is probable that Indian government, as its Nepalese counterpart did not and could not foresee that an insurgency started by a small group of

\textsuperscript{22} See S.D.Muni, *Maoist Insurgency in Nepal*, (Rupa Co., New Delhi, 2003), P.58.
revolutionaries with crude-home-made guns and Khukaries in four hill districts would expand so dramatically and become security threat for both of the countries in such a short period of time. It cannot also be ruled out that India could have been waiting as a passive spectator for an opportune moment in the form of a severe political crisis in Nepal in order to ‘fish in trouble water’.

The above mentioned interpretation of Shyam Shrestha, especially the second probable strategy of India, might be correct, but for five years, 1996 to 2001, India’s look, but let it go on’, policy got severe criticism from K.V.Rajan, India’s former ambassador to Nepal. K.V. Rajan, very critically suggested India that:

India, too, must accept its share of responsibility- it has been a passive spectator for far too long, despite the obvious danger it poses to its own security. There is no excuse for the fact that despite frequent communications from the Nepalese side, Maoist leaders for the past few years have been moving freely across the border, holding meeting with senior Nepalese politicians on Indian soil, without Indian agencies apparently knowing about it.

In the year 2001, all of sudden, India for the first time responded to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal branding them as ‘terrorist’ outfit. It is ironic to notice that, the country, which was very casual in responding to the Maoists in Nepal, is the first country


\[24\] See K.V.Rajan, as cited in Shyam Shrestha, No-23, Pp. 176-177.
to brand them as the terrorists. This response from India came immediately after the break down of talks between the Maoists and the Nepalese government in November 2001. More than anything, what worried India the most was the presence of the international forces like the U.S. and U.K. on the Nepalese soil in the name of fighting against the ‘Global Terrorism’. Apart from this, once the peace talk between the Maoist and the Nepalese government failed, the Maoist insurgency became more intensified, which caused definitely worry for India. The factors behind the response of India towards the Maoists in Nepal can be classified under the following three heads.

1. The formation of CCOMPOSA and suspicious growing relation with Maoists of Nepal and similar kind of groups of Nepal.
2. The direct involvement of international forces like U.S.
3. The change of Government in India.

Formation of CCOMPOSA and India’s Growing Concern

‘Co-ordination committee of Maoist parties and organizations of south Asia’ (CCOMPOSA) was formed with a combination of nine violence espousing reds of south Asia in West Bengal on July 2001. Initiated by the Maoists of Nepal, CCOMPOSA had four Indian groups in this alliance. They were the communist party of India – Marxist Leninist (people’s war) of Andhra Pradesh, Maoist communist centre of Bihar, the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Maoist) and the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (MLM). The other members of this alliance were Bangladesher Samyabadi Dal (M-L), Purbo Bangla Sarbahara Party (MPK) of Bangladesh, and Ceylon Communist party (Maoist) from Sri Lanka. The vision of this alliance was to stretch the
revolutionary ‘success’ achieved in Nepal across larger party of South Asia. This proposed ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone’ was to stretch from Hyderabad of India to Kathmandu of Nepal. Highlighting on the motive and aims of formation of CCOMPOSA, Maoist leader of Nepal Baburam Bhattarai said:

CCOMPOSA has been lunched to unify and co-ordinate the revolutionary process in the region. As South Asia is developing into one of the most potent volcanic centers of revolution in the twenty-first century, this initiative of the CCOMPOSA has been very timely and significant. We are all strengthening and expanding CCOMPOSA which is destined to play a historical role in the South Asia region.

In the 2001 July meeting of the CCOMPOSA said that, “we declare our principled unity and conscious determination to hoist the Red Flag of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and Communism in its entire splendor from the silver summits of the Himalayas and throughout the region”.

Before the emergence of the above mentioned ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone’ through CCOMPOSA, there were intelligence reports in India regarding the same. Indian media like Times of India and Frontline came out of the news that, the people’s war group was planning to create Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) from Hyderabad to Kathmandu, taking Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand into its area of

27. As mentioned in Sudheer Sharma, No.25, P.34.
influence with the help of other rebels out fits. This report came in early July 2001. This claim was initially rejected by both the Indian administration and by the Maoist leadership of Nepal. Once CCOMPOSA was formally launched all of sudden it became a serious matter of concern for India. Because if one looks back in the early 1970s, it was the Naxalites in India who inspired the communist movement in South Asia in general and the Nepal’s communist in particular. But by 2001 the situation was well reversed. The achievements and the success that the Maoists in Nepal achieved in six years of time fighting against a whole nation state inspired not only the likeminded groups in India but the movements across the South Asia region.

Looking into the India’s reaction to the formation of CRZ and CCOMPOSA in relation to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, the very first question arises, what made India concerned regarding the same? Once the CCOMPOSA was launched, a survey was conducted by the Home Ministry of Government of India. The Home Ministry came out of its Annual Report (MOHA 2002-2003) which stated that, country wide Naxalites violence has increased by about 13.8 percent since September 2001. The report also mentioned that in 2003, there were 546 incidents of Naxalites violence and 509 were killed in them. The MOHA also recorded that, group-wise activities of the ‘left wing extremist groups’ in the country revealed an increase in the violent activities of all the major groups in India as compared to the previous year.

Keeping in mind the above mentioned reports of the Home Ministry, the Indian administration became very sensitive towards the Maoists of Nepal. From a policy of

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indifference towards the Maoist in Nepal the India Government became all the more serious. One of the reasons may be, as discussed earlier, the CPN-Maoist, with all its achievements and success had been a motivating and unifying factor for many similar kind of groups in India. In India groups like PWG, and MCC were not only united in action, but also trying to unify their party organizations in tone. Indian intelligence could feel that the PWG and the MCC merge under a new identity: the ‘All India Maoist Communist Centre’ (AIMCC) and would acquire a more militant ‘avatar’ in India. The threat perception for India was that, if both these organizations succeeded in doing so, a CRZ would be created linking Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Chhatisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar and all the frontier territories of Nepal— the Terai. This threat perception was clearly stated in the annual report of MOHA OF India 2002-2003:

the restructuring of relation between Naxalites outfits, extensive militarization, particularly by the Communist Party of India Marxist Leninist- people’s war (CPML-PW), formation of new organizational structure for military as well as organizational tasks by CPML-PW, possibilities of co-operation between Naxalites outfits and other terrorist organizations in India and abroad are all matter of concern. Efforts were made by left-wing. Extremist outfits towards actualization of the Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) envisaged by the MCC, CPML-PW and the CPN-Maoist of Nepal for linking up the

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strongholds of CPML-PW in Telengana and with those of the CPN-Maoist in Nepal\textsuperscript{31}.

All these threat perception and fear for India turned into a reality with the formation of the CCOMPOSA and with the growing linkages with the Maoists of Nepal and similar kinds of groups in India. Looking at the growing relation between the Maoists of Nepal and similar outfits in India, the Indian ambassador to Nepal Shyam Sharan urged the Maoist to “cut of their links with the terrorist entities in India like the PWG and MCC”\textsuperscript{32}. Hence the Maoist insurgency in Nepal had become a serious matter of concern for India in relation to its relation to the groups in India.

**Maoist in Nepal and Connection with Indian Groups**

Before the Maoists of Nepal declared the People’s War, they consulted with the PWG of India in selecting regions within Nepal that would be most conducive for launching their struggle. In this regard, in 1995, people’s war strategists from India conducted two surveys and recommended mid hills of mid-western Nepal. The People’s War Group also helped training the first few batches of the Nepali guerillas\textsuperscript{33}. At the initial stage of the Maoist insurgency it used to appear that, the Maoists in Nepal were taking a leaf from the book written by the PWG and MCC. Moreover, the Maoists of Nepal used to use either their own shelter in India or depended on PWG’s shelter. Initially, it was the PWG and other Maoist groups in India supported the Maoist comrades of Nepal. For example, as early as 13 September 1998, India’s struggling Forum for People’s Resistance organized

\textsuperscript{32} For details see The Kathmandu Post, August 14, 2003.
\textsuperscript{33} For details see Sudheer Sharma, No.25, P.38.
a meeting in Calcutta and called on all Maoists in the two countries to join hands in supports of the struggle in Nepal. Another group called the Solidarity Forum to support the people’s war in Nepal even organized a rally and public meeting in New Delhi on 13th February 1999, to mark the third anniversary of the insurgency in Nepal\textsuperscript{34}. So from the above mentioned facts it is clear that the Maoist groups of India particularly the PWG and the MCC inspired and helped the Maoist insurgency in Nepal in terms of ideologically strategically and military wise.

Communist movement in India during 1970s was a motivating factor for the communist movement in Nepal. But by the year 2000, the situation was well reversed. The communist movement under the leadership of the Maoist in Nepal became an inspiring and motivating factor not only for the communist groups in India but also the communist groups in whole of South Asian Region. The connection between the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the groups in India, both ideologically and strategically, grew which ultimately led to the formation of a Compact Revolutionary Zone under the alliance of CCMPOSA. Though the connection between the communist groups of two countries was nothing new or first of its kind but this time it was more of a threat perception towards India both internally and externally. Once the Maoists had their strong holds in Nepal the connection became more solid with the Indian groups. Exchange of ideology, joint military exercises, arm deals and exchanges of ideas became even more frequent. As early as May 2000, before the formation of CCMPOSA, one of the India’s magazines ‘Frontline’ reported that “the growing co-ordination between the extremist groups in Nepal and India have resulted in simultaneous attacks in both

\textsuperscript{34} See Ibid. P.36.
countries. When Nepali Maoists struck in Dailekh, on April 7, 2000 killing 47 people, the Indian Maoists of MCC also killed 14 people in Hajaribagh district of Jharkhand on April 14 2000\(^35\). Followed by this report, Indian newspaper reported that, “the Nepali government had made an official request to the Indian government that, the activities of Nepali Maoists in Indian territory be checked, claiming that they were being trained in Bihar by members of People’s War Group (PWG) and Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)\(^36\). Till that time India Government used to be in a denial mode claiming its territory was not being used by the Nepali Maoists.

There had been many reports and interpretation regarding the Maoists of Nepal’s link with various insurgent groups in India. In 2001, a Nepali government commission on peace prospects with the Maoists, headed by the then Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba concluded that the Nepal’s rebels have ties with the Northern Bihar Liberation Front and the United Liberation Front of Assam\(^37\). This report became even clearer when it came to the public that the ULFA was a member in South Asian People’s Journalist Association (SAPJA)\(^38\). Not only there were evidence on Maoists’ link with the insurgent groups in the North-East region of India, but there were also reports which claimed the Maoists of Nepal also had links with the terrorist groups of Kashmir. In an interview in Spotlight, it was reported that, Bamdev Chhetri, a Maoist leader of Nepal, had visited Jammu in September 2002 to establish contact with Kashmir militant groups for

\(^36\) See The Times of India, Delhi, April 16, 2001.
\(^37\) See Sudheer Sharma, No.25, P.35.
\(^38\) On November 2001, the journalists of South Asia, sympathetic to the rebels, who call themselves ‘pro people’ scribes announced the founding of the South Asia people’s Journalist Association (SAPJA). The ULFA had their delegate in this named Ajit Kumar Bhuyan, editor of the Assamiya Daily ‘Aji’.
procuring arms for the CPN (Maoist). Apart from that, the Indian Intelligence sources, quoted in Hindustan, an Indian daily newspaper, reported that, the Maoists of Nepal were believed to have obtained a large amount of sophisticated weapons equivalent to Rs. 55 million from India’s people’s war group. According to the news report of the Himalayan times, which had been denied by the Defense Ministry of Nepal, the Maoists of Nepal had set up an improvised helipad in the thick jungles of Bihar and are using choppers to transport weapons and cadres. Again, very similar to this, the news report, quoting the intelligence wing of the Bihar police, said that, the Maoist insurgents had set up training camps in the jungles of East and West Champaran districts and were regrouping with help from their Indian counterparts.

So the Maoists of Nepal and its connection with India groups starting from Kashmir to the north-eastern region of India was certainly a serious issue of concern for the Indian administration. With the growing connection with these groups, there came out different version of threat perception and security issue concerns for India. Scholars of different orientation could sense a potential threat to Indian in relation to the Maoists connection with the north-eastern insurgent groups; Prakash A. Raj made a statement that,

As the Maoists in Nepal were collaborating with some separatist movements such as the Khumbuwan Liberation Front in the far eastern hills, the possibility of involvement of separatist movements in the

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40. See The Hindustan, Lucknow, February 27, 2002, P.08.
41. See Himalayan Times as mentioned in Nischalnath Pandey’s nepal’s Maoist Movement and Implications for India and China, (Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 2005), P.135.
northeast with that of Maoist would endanger Indian security, especially in the sensitive ‘chicken’s neck’ area near Siliguri in India where a narrow strip of Indian territory links the northeast with the rest of India42.

Moreover, the Maoists’ activities in the Terai region were also matter of serious concern for India. Nepal’s Terai is the bordering areas to the Indian Territory. An open border, connection of Nepal’s Maoist and similar groups in India, illegal arms and ammunition supply through the border certainly made Indian Administration more concern regarding the Indo-Nepal border. This was not only about the Maoist insurgency, but the Indian administration could realize that, the Maoist affected Terai region and its spillover effect on the bordering areas of Indian territory, might cause the total Indo-Gangetic plain seriously disturbed. And the Indian Administration was well aware of the fact that, the disturbed Terai region and its connection with the Indian Territory was more close to the Indian capital than any other insurgent or uprising movements in India. Analyzing this Problem Pushkar Gautam rightly mentioned that, “even if the Nepalese security forces were able to drive the Maoists out of the hills of Nepal, the guerrillas would simply head off to their hideous in India. What this also meant was that Nepal’s security concern would span the Indian plains, where both the problem and solution may be hiding”43.

More than the concerns for the Maoists of Nepal, the growing connection of the insurgent groups across South Asia was in fact a matter of concern. Not exactly the

insurgent groups, many a time the terrorist groups were also connected to these insurgent groups. As rightly mentioned regarding the insurgent groups and terrorist groups connection in South Asia:

In the terrorists of the North-East establish some kind of link with Afghanistan and the Golden Triangle and Mekong Valley and the state of Molucca in the east and the LTTE further south, terrorism will pose a great threat. As most Afghan warlords are now fighting in Jammu and Kashmir, one cannot rule out the possibility of their expanding links with insurgents in western Nepal44.

This mentioned statement, though was a serious threat perception for the whole of South Asia, but its relation to the security threat towards India cannot be undermined. Apart from the above mentioned Maoist connection with the similar kind of groups in India, what also made India worried with the Maoists in Nepal was its connection with the ‘Gorkhas’ and the Nepalese Diaspora in India. Gorkhas have been a major part of the Indian army since the time of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, when he recruited them in the Sikh army some two hundred years back. They also served the British India. And now the Indian army has six regiments consisting of 60,000 Nepalese Gorkhas serving. Along with them there are 1, 15,000 Gorkhas dependent on the military pension branch at the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu. At the same time it would be interesting to note that these Gorkha soldiers and the Maoists in Nepal are more or less from the same clans; and the possibility of these soldiers and the Maoist insurgents. Gen. Padmanabhan told a

44. For details see Dhrub Kumar, “Regional Initiatives Against Terrorism Required”, Interview with Spotlight, 21 September 2001, Pp22-3, as mentioned in Nnischalnath Pandey’s, No.1, P.134.
gathering of ex-Indian Gorkha soldiers in Pokhara that, they should always be loyal to Nepal and should not help the Maoist insurgents in any way. This statement of Gen. Padmanabhan clearly mentions that the Government of India and the Indian army particularly could sense that, there was a link and connection of the Gorkha, retired soldiers and the Maoists. Speculations from many fields and areas were made claiming, the British and Indian ex-Gorkha-soldiers were training the Maoist insurgents with their skills and experience in jungle warfare. The speculations came to be proved true when Indian Government stopped the pension privileges of retired Gorkha soldier of 2/11 Gorkha Rifles, Jagat Bahadur Sunwar and Lance Naik Ratna Bashadur Gurung on the ground that they were assisting the Maoist insurgents. Retired General Ashok K. Mehta speaking out at an interaction programme at the united Service Institution of India on 16 September 2002 mentioned that several such cases of retired Gorkha soldiers helping the Maoists had been reported.

Coming to the aspect of the Nepalese Diaspora in India and its connection with the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, it added up to the concerns for India. The Nepalese Diaspora in India comes up to roughly 8 million. This population of 8 million is well spread over states like Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal to Sikkim, Assam, and Meghalaya. In places like Darjeeling in West Bengal, Sikkim, Uttarakhand and Meghalaya throughout India one would find the Nepalese employed in various formal and informal sectors, starting from security guards, rickshaw pullers to the waiters and workers in the hotels and restaurants. With the emergence of the Maoists in Nepal and

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45. See as cited in Nischalnath Pandey, No.1. P. 137.
46. See for details Ibid. P137.
their appeal towards the downtrodden and the poor of Nepal had created a sense of positive notion among the Nepalese working in India. From the very beginning the Maoist went on addressing the mass inside Nepal over the issues like unemployment, poverty, social justice. And this created a hope and made a sense among the Nepalese population inside India, especially the working class that the Maoist could bring about a positive change in Nepal and that could bring down all the problems mentioned above. The Maoists very successfully could win the trust of the Nepalese in India. these people inside India went on organizing rallies in different places in India time to time and mobilized not only the Nepalese but also tried to draw the support of the public in India in favour of the Maoist insurgency. rallies, meetings, and other activities in support of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal in Indian land was not definitely a good symbol. What made India much worried about this situation was that, these activities were also supported by some of the leftwing groups, of India, intellectuals, civil societies and the mass. In one hand India has been fighting against similar kind of its own problem and on the other hand this added up to that.

The Maoists in their propaganda highlighted the issue of Nepali Nationalism. Whenever in Nepal, one talk about nationalism, it has to go through an anti-Indian notion. The Maoists were no exception to that. Back in India there are instances where the Nepali dominated places like Darjeeling and Sikkim demand for some special privileges and status. The demand for a separate Gorkha state by the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) led by Subhash Ghising can be cited as an example. The idea of a Greater Nepal formation which includes the places in India, that have the substantial
Nepalese population, certainly created a pan-Nepali Nationalism. And this, in a way, created an anti India sentiment among these people. The Maoists, since their emergence, had been anti-India, throughout their insurgent movement. The idea of Nepali-Nationalism and Nepali identity was well capitalized by the Maoists. Based on this, there were reports that claimed the Maoist insurgents had been instigating the Nepalese in Darjeeling and surrounding areas to assert their right to self-determination. According to Prof. Nischanath Pandey, this activity of the Maoists inside the territory of India might be the case of West Bengal chief minister Buddhadev Bhattacharya’s anger and the subsequent hard-line attitude against the Maoists\(^{47}\). In this connection, the then Prime Minister of Nepal Sher Bahadur Deuba called on the chief minister of West Bengal. As an outcome of this meeting Abhijit Mazumdar, General Secretary CPI (ML) Darjeeling district, was arrested on a suspicion that he was the key contact point of Nepalese Maoist leaders. In spite of all the efforts of the Government of India to wipe out the Maoists and cut all the links of Maoists in India, still India continued to be in serious dilemma. On the one hand however, aids and privileges are given to the Nepalese in India. The Nepalese in India continued to treat India as a second home. As rightly mentioned by Prof. Pandey, the Nepali Indians for several generations have still maintained their contacts in Nepal; they are, in spite of everything, disconnected with their status and employment in Indian cities, making them an unappreciative and ungrateful Diaspora that neither returns to their own country, nor integrates happily with the adopted country\(^{48}\). The areas like Darjeeling and Sikkim are very closely situated to India’s most sensitive North-Eastern region, where India has been fighting against various insurgent groups. This was a very

\(^{47}\) Ibid. P.140.

\(^{48}\) Ibid. P.140-141.
concerned issue in relation to the Maoist connection with the Nepali Diaspora in India. India realized that any anti-India movement by these groups and their connection with the Maoists of Nepal and which are very close to the North-eastern areas would go against not only the internal security but the external security of the country as well.

**Presence of International Forces and Displeasure for India**

Though the Maoist insurgency in Nepal drew the attention of India more than any other country, it also drew the attention of other countries especially the United States of America and the United Kingdom. The United States of America reacted to the Maoist insurgency more than any other country. Once two of the America’s places were attacked in 9/11 by the ‘terrorist group’ America made it a point to fight against, what they call, ‘Global Terrorism’. In the name of fighting the global terrorism, US declared the Maoists as terrorist and made its presence in Nepali soil. Visit of US state secretary, Collin Powell, the first ever visit of any high level statesman to Nepal, in 2002, was in fact a point which made India realized its interest on Nepal. The presence of America followed by other western countries and their reaction towards the Maoist insurgency was not only a matter of concern for the Maoists, but for India as well. The geo-strategic position of Nepal, as mentioned earlier, makes Nepal a very important country in the South Asia region. The presence of US in Nepal would implicitly mean that, it wants to keep its eyes vigilant on two of the Asia’s major powers, India and China. For US there could not be a better situation and a better country other than Nepal.
With the presence of these above mentioned countries in Nepal, the displeasure of India towards Nepal grew. What made India to take up the Maoist issues more seriously than before was that the state of Nepal continued to get help in terms of military assistance from the countries like US, UK, and Belgium. According to the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Nepal was supposed to import arms and ammunitions from India or through the mediation of India. Now that Nepal was getting military assistance from the above mentioned countries India felt a breach to the 1950 treaty. This was not for the first time Nepal got the military assistance from the foreign countries other than India. In 1989, when Nepal imported arms from China against India’s consent, India reacted strongly. Comparing to the military assistance Nepal was getting in the name of combating the Maoist from the western countries, the Chinese export of arms to Nepal was very nominal both in quantity and quality. But this time India was not in a position to take a hard line approach what it did in 1989. Because there were the involvement of the major powers like US and UK. India could only realize that it was high time to react to the Maoists more seriously to engage itself in the internal affairs of Nepal and to win the trust of the ruling elites. Reacting to this issue, former Indian Ambassador to Nepal commented that, “India was left in a weak position to question the need or assert itself under the 1950 Treaty”\(^{49}\). On a very similar note, Yuv Raj Gihimire, commented that, “the increasing military assistance from the US and the UK has provided some

\(^{49}\) For details see K.V.Rajan, *Recent US/UK Activities in Nepal*, (Observers Research Foundation, New Delhi, 2003).
maneuverability to Nepal in its foreign policy and has diluted the issue of importing arms from third countries without Indian knowledge or consent” 50.

As mentioned above, US state secretary of state visited Nepal in January 2002. Once after this visit a number of military aid and help was granted to Nepal by US. To look back in the history of US Nepal relation prior to this visit, one would find there was no military office in the US Embassy in Nepal. Since the visit of Collin Powell, a military training and assistance programme was been seen by a defense advisors of USA. In the year 2003, throughout, there were up to 25 American military trainers periodically present in Nepal as part of exercise ‘Balance Nail’ 51. According to one of the statements given by the US Ambassador to Nepal James F Moriarty, in the three year’s period from 2002-2004, US had given US $24 million military aid to Nepal and increased the amount up to US $ 40 million in the year 2004 52. Similarly the United Kingdom was not lagging behind in the race for providing military help to Nepal. It was only with the initiative of the British government, an international conference was held in London in June 2002 to understand and look at the Maoist problem in Nepal. Apart from that, the UK also provided Rs 780 million as military aid in the year 2002-2003. A special envoy was also appointed by the British government in Nepal in order to co-ordinate the military relations between the US, UK and India.

50. For details see Interview with Yuv Raj Ghimre, as mentioned in, Rajan Bhattarai, Geopolitics of Nepal and International Responses to Conflict Transformation, (FFP Publication, Series 006, Kathmandu, January 2005).
While all these activities were going on in the immediate and one of the most important neighborhoods of India. India seemed quite helpless during that time. Because it was neither possible for India to stop the flow of arms aid and help from the countries like US and UK nor feasible for India to take an action against Nepal in a similar manner of 1989. But certainly India was successful in not allowing the passage of the consignment of 5,500 machine guns from Belgium in 2002, for some days, until Nepal was ready to by INSAS rifles from India. For India the US-UK block was too powerful to react. With its helplessness, Indian External Affair Minister Mr Natwar Singh came out a statement that, “India is determined to work closely with the US to take the partnership forward in all areas”\textsuperscript{53}. Adding to the statement of Natwar Singh, US Ambassador to Nepal mentioned on 10\textsuperscript{th} September 2002 that, “the US government is working together with Indian government to fight against the Maoist in Nepal”\textsuperscript{54}.

Though both the countries, India and US, came to an understanding on fighting against the Maoist, India simply could not undermine the fear and potential strategic threat with the presence of the US in Nepal. All of sudden the government was all set for a competition, in providing military assistance to Nepal. To prove itself as a friendly neighbor, India provided Rs 3.2 billion military aid between 2002-2004. Along with that, it also provided 13,000 INSAS rifles, 6 helicopters, 2 gunships and many more military tracks. In a way this move of Indian government, helping the Nepal Government, against the Maoist, was a kind of forced and desperate foreign policy towards Nepal. The presence of the US and other western countries in Nepal left India in such a situation that,

\textsuperscript{53} As cited in Shyan Shrestha, Ibid. P.183.
if Colin Powell went to the military head quarters of Nepal and discussed defense related policy matters; the Indian external Affairs Minister also demanded the same and did the same. If the US Ambassador or the UK army chief went inside the Nepalese military barracks around the country to observe and know the security position, the Indian counterpart followed the suit. In fact, India was paying for the tear of negligence and indifference towards the Maoist insurgency in Nepal.

As mentioned above, India was in a position, with the presence of the western countries, of mutual understanding with these countries. In the mean time India was fully aware of the fact that, the presence of countries like US and UK was not a very desirable development in India’s own long-term interests. Reacting to the gradual spread and consolidation of the American and British military and political presence, India’s Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal made a statement at the French Institute of International Relations in Paris on 17 December 2002 that, “Western countries should also be careful about extending excessive military assistance to Nepal in order to avoid increase in the lethality of internal conflict and leakage of arms to the Maoists”\(^{55}\). India’s displeasure on the issue of western countries intervention in the internal affairs of Nepal became more evident, when it refused to join multilateral committees to monitor developmental, political and security issues in Nepal. By inspecting the arms cargos from America and Belgium India wanted to make sure that they did not pose any long-term threat to India’s internal stability and security by these arms falling eventually into the wrong hands. All these reactions of India towards the countries involved in Nepal, mentioned above, makes it clear that India was very much concerned about its own strategy security and interest in

\(^{55}\) The Indian Express, New Delhi, 3 January 2003.
Nepal. In a way involvement of third countries made India respond, unlike the earlier situation, to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal.

**Initiatives by India to Crackdown the Maoist in Nepal**

Considering the threat assessment and the fear factor, caused by the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, due to the reasons mentioned earlier, India’s first reaction towards the same was anti-Maoist. There could be different reasons, why the government of India chose to act against the Maoist insurgency and to take a pro-monarch stand at the initial stage. First important cause could be, India has been fighting against a number of similar kinds of groups in different parts of its own territory. As mentioned earlier, there were links and exchange of ideas and arms between the groups from India and the Maoist in Nepal. Any initiative by India to help the Maoists in Nepal would lead to the success for the Maoists in India. Because the state of Nepal was in no way would be successful fighting against the Maoist if at all there was external help and support towards the Maoist. And the success of Maoist in Nepal would definitely boost up the similar minded groups of India, which would definitely go against the internal security interest of India. Secondly, India, during the period from 2001-2004 was being ruled by a National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). BJP is known to be a pro-Hindu political party. Nepal used to be the only Hindu state in the world ruled by a king who used to be considered as an incarnation of lord Vishnu. So it was obvious for the NDA Government of India to support the Monarch on the ideological ground. Thirdly, the countries like the US, UK, Belgium and some other came out openly by providing military and other assistance to the Government of Nepal to crack down the Maoists. If
India wished to help the Maoist, it would have invited the criticism not only from the above mentioned countries but internationally also.

One of the first initiatives India had taken to crack down the Maoists of Nepal was that, it promised military assistance to Nepal in 2001, which started reaching Nepal in subsequent years. As a step towards to monitor and stop the connection of Nepali as well as the Indian Maoists, the Government of India asked nine states (Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Uttarakhand, and Sikkim) to raise special task forces to crack down on Maoist groups, especially those operating along the open border. The proposed police forces were directed to concentrate on severing all links between Indian and Nepali Maoist groups\(^{56}\). In addition to this, GOI also came to an agreement with Nepali Government to set up Border Management Committees (BMC) headed by District Magistrates (India) and CDOS (Nepal). The BMC would also include security personnel, custom officials and development related officers. GOI also tried to disrupt the linkages of Maoists with the Nepalese speaking people in India. Nepalese dominated settlements in border areas have been brought under strict surveillance by the Indian security forces. All these initiatives of India were undertaken keeping in mind the internal security interest of India.

Secondly, to crackdown the Maoist in Nepal, the GOI followed a policy to strengthen the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA). India’s multilaterals support to the RNA increased since 2001. In this regard, India also proposed to construct a military training

\(^{56}\) As reported by Joseph Nathan, Indian Special Force to Crakedown on Maoist on Border, The Himalaya Times, Kathmandu, 12 June 2001, P.1.
school at Saijhandi area in Rupandehi district of Nepal for the RNA. This initiative of GOI was one of the massive assistant fully funded as part of its efforts to help strengthen the RNA to fight against the Maoists. In addition to this, India also provided counter insurgency trainings to Nepal police by its special contingent called ‘Grey Hounds’ in Andhra Pradesh. It is interesting to note that, for the first time since 1970, Indian military teams had been located inside Nepal to train the RNA to train both counter insurgency and jungle warfare tactics.

While GOI was taking up all initiatives to crack down the Maoists of Nepal and to cut the links between the Indian and Nepali Maoists, the GOI also got severe criticism and request letters from Nepal alleging, the Maoists of Nepal had been operating from the Indian soil and had their safe hideouts in India. In reaction to this allegation, the next step of India was to arrest the Maoists of Nepal in the Indian Territory. Important leaders of the Maoists like, Matrika Yadav and Suresh Ale Magar were arrested by the Indian police in Lucknow to prove a point that, India was no longer a safe haven for the Maoist. In this action of India, the UP police arrested two sister in laws named Savitri alias Kalpana and Manisala Rawat of Dang district along with two others from a nursing home in Bareilly. The most important arrest, made by Indian police was the arrest of C.P. Gajural alias com. Gaurav from Chennai airport on 19th August 2003 when he was trying to go to Frankfurt on a fake British passport. This act of India was, in fact a definite attempt to prove Government of Nepal wrong that Indian Territory was a safe haven for the Maoist.

58 The Kathmandu Post, 23 July, 2002, P.1
Reacting to the arrest of one of its top leaders the Maoists of Nepal requested the GOI to release C. P. Gajurel. In his letter to GOI, CPN (M) chairman Prachanda wrote:

Indian security forces have taken comrade Chandra Prasad Gajural (com. Gaurav), a polit bureau member of the central committee of our glorious party..., in custody on August 20 from Chennai airport. Comrade Gajurel was heading towards Europe clandestinely according to our party decision for the propagation of our party policy and programme. In the context of ongoing peace negotiation between our party and old state of Nepal, to which the GOI has extended its support, we urge the GOI to release com. Gajurel immediately, without making the technical question of going to Europe clandestinely as an unnecessarily serious matter. His release will not only confirm the GOI’s willingness to bring peace in Nepal but will also provide new dimension to our diplomatic relation....\(^{59}\)

What was against the interest of India was that, the arrest of the above mentioned Maoist leader, also could not satisfy the Government of Nepal, when the same again alleged that, com. C.P.Gajurel was operating from the Indian soil. To support this allegation the GOI of India also faced hesitations, back home, demanding the release of the leader. According to the news reports nine organizations staged an impressive mass rally in Chennai asking for his release. A committee to defend his life has also been formed in the South Indian state. Similarly, a ‘committee in Defense of Com. Gaurav’,

\(^{59}\) For details see Press statement by Com. Prachanda, CPN (Maoist), to GOI on 23 August 2003.
was reported to have been formed by intellectuals and human rights activists including Prof. Manoranjan Mohanty, Anand Swarup Verma and others in New Delhi.

Along with the arrest of Maoists of Nepal in Indian territory, the Indian Government also banned the Maoist Front Organization, Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Ekta Samaj (ABNES) under the Prevention of Terrorist Act (POTA), 2002 for indulging in anti-Indian activities and for its involvement with the Indian extreme left organizations. Analyzing the arrest of some thirteen central leaders of Maoists, a Nepali scholar said that, more than India’s motive to disrupt the relationship between CPN-Moist and Indian insurgents and north-eastern insurgents. However, the much wider speculation claimed that, the detention of Maoist top leaders could be used a trump card by India to bargain for its national interest. Subsequently, government of India was also trying to appease the Nepalese Government and to dispel the complaint that India was nurturing the Maoists in India.

India was, in fact, successful in appeasing the Nepalese government. In 2004 it got the permission to establish the second consulate General office in Birjung in 2004. Birjung is situated in the heart of Terai, bordering India and in only 6 hours journey from Kathmandu. Hence, it serious security concerns through which GOI could easily augment its activities, movement and grip on Nepalese Terai in diplomatic garbs. Secondly, Indian Government was also allowed to open its pension camp in Butwal, another important centre of the western Terai.

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60. See Nischalnath Pandey, No.12, P.125.
61. See Shyam Shrestha, No.12, P.193.
62. Ibid.
One would find a bitter kind of bilateral relation between India and Nepal grew due to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. As said earlier that, the Government of Nepal was very constant in its approach towards India alleging that, the Maoists of Nepal were operating from Indian soil in spite of all India’s initiative to crackdown the Maoist. In certain cases the Government of Nepal seemed to be right. When the GOI had all its initiatives against the Maoist, the Maoist were gaining support from Indian intellectuals, civil societies and moreover from the left wing parties of India. Not only had the government of Nepal, the intellectuals of Kathmandu also alleged India as ‘tacitly aiding the Maoist terrorists’. They also claimed that, though India banned some Maoist front organizations in India and handed over some leaders to Nepal, still some senior leaders were still at large in India. to support this kind of allegation it was reported that, in 2002, some prominent leaders of the left parties of Nepal, including the leader of the opposition Madhav Kumar Nepal and the then CPN (ML) General Secretary Bam Dev Gautam met the Maoist leaders in Siliguri in West Best. Prior to this meeting, C.P. Mainali of the CPN (ml) also met the top two leaders of the CPN (Maoist) in Siliguri63. Under this light, American Ambassador A. Peter Burleigh, ex-officer- US mission in Kathmandu mentioned candidly in a talk programme in New York on June 2002, “During my recent visit to Nepal, I met a person who had met Baburam Bhattarai at a house in New Delhi. If that person can meet him, I am sure the Government of India can do the same. For that reason, India has a major role to play in resolving the Maoist problem in Nepal”64. The hardening policy of India towards the Maoists in Nepal was viewed differently by several

63. See Nischalnath Pandey, No. 1, P.127.
64. See Akhilesh Upadhyaya, “Indian Policy Towards Moist not Clear: Former US Envoy”, Kantipur, 10 June 2002, P.1, as cited in Nischalnath Pandey, ibid.
power structures in Nepal. When the government of Nepal called it as a double dealing of India, on the other hand, it was widely suspected that Indian government might use the arrested leaders as a trump card for bargaining their vital interest. The Maoist leader also alleged that Indian government was making their arrested leaders as a bargain chip for valuable natural resources\textsuperscript{65}.

Hence, India was in such a situation where it was alleged by the Maoist as pro-monarch and by the elite and ruling class of Nepal that India was not doing enough to bring down the Maoists. So India was in a situation of ‘do and be damned, do not do and be damned’. In this situation India was in a dilemma whether to keep its national interest as first priority or a healthy bilateral relation or the both. India also showed its displeasure towards the government of Nepal regarding some of its activities towards the Maoists. India has been an important and dominant neighbor that determined the politics inside Nepal. With the intervention of the western powers, and their involvement in the affairs of Nepal the GOI somehow fest annoyed by the Government of Nepal. India had been consistent in its policy of not favoring third party involvement in the peace process between the Maoist and the Government of Nepal. India kept on insisting on the point that, the Maoist conflict was an internal matter and the Nepalese themselves should solve it. Even the consensus was being built among the political parties of Nepal and the insurgents, about the possible involvement of the United Nations in the peace process had been rendered ineffectual because of India’s opposition, India’s displeasure also came to be seen when prime minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand’s government and the Maoists declared a ceasefire on January 29, 2003 without the consultation of India. The then

\textsuperscript{65} See Shyam Shrestha, No. 12, P.180.
foreign secretary Mr Kanwal Sibal raised the issue at a track-11 meeting where he said, “India was not taken into confidence and that there was no consultation from the Nepalese side on vital issues affecting bilateral relations between the two countries”. He further showed India’s dissatisfaction stating, what India is expected to do in relation to the Nepalese Maoists: stop monitoring their movements across the border and stop giving military support to the Nepalese government since ceasefire and talks have been announced. What was indicated by this reaction by India was a change of stand and in a way it seemed India was trying to favour a third-party involvement in solving the Maoist problem in Nepal. For the first time on the changing stand of India’s policy on third-party involvement, India’s Ambassador to Nepal Shyam Sharan said on October 18 2003 that, “India is ready to help solve the Maoist problem”. India’s displeasure on the matter could be viewed when it refused to join the multilateral committees with other donor countries to monitor developmental, political and security issues in Nepal later in the year. To look at India’s response towards the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, in this context, one would find that India went for a shift in the policy, when it felt its national interests was at a difficult situation.

**Changing Face of India’s Response towards the Maoist in Nepal**

Throughout the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, India kept on changing its policy and response under different circumstances. The change of stand and policy towards the Maoist came broadly under three circumstances. First, the intervention of the foreign

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powers other than India into the internal affairs of Nepal. Secondly, change of government in India. Thirdly, keeping in mind the national interest of India.

To analyse the response of India towards the Maoist in Nepal, one would find that, India never maintained a neutral position. From 1996, when the Maoist insurgency emerged, till 2001, India had an indifferent attitude towards the same. India maintained a position stating, that was an internal problem of the state of Nepal and both the Maoist and the Government of Nepal should resolve it. Once countries like the US had its presence in Nepal in name of fighting against the ‘Global Terrorism’, for the first time India responded in a very clear manner. It is interesting to note that, India was the first country to declare the Maoist as terrorist in 2001 even before the Government of Nepal. Number of statements and initiatives in relation to the Maoist of Nepal followed in the subsequent years. Supporting the Royal Nepalese army against the Maoist, its displeasure towards the Nepali government in most of the cases, simply were reactions to the foreign countries’ activities in Nepal.

Secondly, India’s declaration of Maoist as terrorist came from the Government led by the NDA. It is quite understandable that NDA used to be led by BJP, which is considered to be ‘pro-Hindu’ political party. Since Nepal was a Hindu state ruled by a Hindu king supporting a Hindu king was quite natural. In this context, a ‘pro-Hindutva’ Journal, Panchajanya, declared Maoist as anti-Hindu and by extension pro-Pakistani and pro-ISI. By alleging that, the journal’s propaganda organ wanted to state that, the growth of the Maoist movement in Nepal was largely aided by Pakistani money and policy and
that consequently they were threat to India’s security\textsuperscript{68}. So the ‘Hindu’ factor made India to take an anti-Maoist stand from 2001 to 2004 under the NDA government in India. Once the UPA government led by the congress party came to power, India’s response was rather balanced. It always tried to maintain its as usual policy towards Nepal and the Maoist, what it called the ‘Twin Pillar Policy’. By Twin Pillar Policy India meant constitutional monarchy and a party democracy. This time India chose to have a middle stand; some scholars also claim that India under the UPA was more tilted towards the Maoist. Because the left parties of India in UPA government kept on pressurizing the government, one hand India was providing military assistance to the Nepali government on the other hand, it showed its interest to mediate between the Maoist and the government of Nepal. And in the later stage said there was no military solution of the insurgency. This, in fact, shows the contradictory approach of the government of India. In this regard, the then ambassador to Nepal tried to clarify this position of India in an interview by saying, “India’s own experience in dealing with insurgency clearly indicates that military solution is neither practical nor even possible. The armed forces can only help create a space within which political process can be activated for a negotiated solution. We believe the same applies to the current situation in Nepal”\textsuperscript{69}. Two months later, very contrary to this statement, the Prime Minister of India came out with a statement saying, “Indian government is committed to provide all possible military and non-military assistance to Nepal in addressing the difficult challenges that in presently

\textsuperscript{68} For details see Yubraj Ghimre, “Nepal’s Agony”, \textit{Seminar}, 517, September 2004, P.49.

faces’\textsuperscript{70}. Hence this contradictory approach was not only criticized by Nepal government and the Maoist it also severely criticized by the intellectuals, civil societies and the opposition political parties back in India.

Like other initiatives of India towards the Maoist in Nepal, the ‘Twin Pillar Policy’ was also not very effective in dealing with the Maoist. By the spirit of the policy, that talks constitutional monarchy and multi party democracy, India tried to unite the parliamentary political parties with the monarchy. By doing India aimed that when both these power structure unite, they could face the challenge by the Maoist. Otherwise the Maoist insurgency would be strengthened. In fact that was what going on during that point of time. But the problem came from this approach of India was that, it did not tally with the historical ground reality of Nepal. to review the modern history of Nepal one would find that, every time the political parties tried to establish a democratic set up with an agreement of the monarchy the parliamentary democracy had been demolished by the monarchy, first in 1953, then in 1960, than on 2002 and recent past in February 2005. So it clearly showed that the historical ground reality of Nepal is quite different from what India was propounding. Moreover, there used to be a serious inherent conflict, what Prof. S.D.Muni observed, between the interests of multi-party democracy based on the concept of popular sovereignty and kings political aspirations and self-perceived divine role rule\textsuperscript{71}. On the other hand India failed to make a proper understanding of the Maoist insurgency of Nepal. Most cases India termed them as security threat on the grounds

\textsuperscript{70} This was stated by Prime Minister Monmohan Singh of India during an official luncheon when Nepalese Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba visited India (September 8-12, 2004) as quoted in Nation Weekly September 19 2004.

\textsuperscript{71} See S.D.Muni, No.22, P.61.
mentioned earlier. Some of the demands of the Maoists like abrogation of some of the important bilateral treaties like the Treaty of 1950, and the Mahakali Treaty of 1996, which projected India as an exploitative and hegemonic neighbor of Nepal was seen by India as going against the its national interest. In this contest India should keep in mind that a peace and stable Nepal can best satisfy the interest of India. The way India was never clear on its stand whether to take king’s side or the Maoist side or the political parties left India in a tricky position.

Finally, the Maoist insurgency got two types of responses from the state of India. When the government of India was anti-Maoist in its policy, the civil society, the intellectuals supported the Maoists to a great extent. The long open border between the two countries, in spite of all the measures by two countries to stop the links of Indian and Nepali Maoist turned to be failure. Throughout their insurgency movement, the Maoist used India as a free and safe transit point.

**Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Response from China**

As the name of the insurgency movement in Nepal suggested, Maoist, it was claimed that the insurgency movement in Nepal started following the thoughts and ideas of Chinese leader Com. Mao-Tse-Tung. Ideologically, it makes a sense that, China would be supportive to the Maoists of Nepal, since the Maoist of Nepal claimed to have launched the people’s war on the basis of Mao’s ideology. They also claimed that they followed the tactics and strategies followed by comrade Mao. Following this kind of analogy, a common perception would be that, China would support the Maoist insurgency in Nepal.
But, it is interesting to note that, throughout the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, one would find, China has distanced itself from the Maoist and always it supported the Government of Nepal. There were many speculations and interpretations why China did not, supported the Maoist of Nepal even though they followed, as mentioned above, the ideology of Mao. To answer this question, it is necessary to analysis China’s Nepal policy and China’s interest in Nepal.

Throughout the years, China has maintained its stand very clear, that Nepal is a friendly neighbor. China’s relation with Nepal should be based, according to China, on the five principles of peaceful co-existence. Three determinates, through which China has maintained a friendly relation with Nepal are: first, the policy of non-interference into the affairs of Nepal, secondly, the Chinese Government firmly pursue the principle that a country is equal with others no matter how big or small into is. In a way China consistently supports Nepal in its effort to safeguard sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. And thirdly, over the past 50 years, as a matter of sincerity, China has provided financial and technical assistance more than 30 projects in Nepal. China has always stood by the Nepali government, even in the bad time of 1989 when there was an economic blockade imposed by India over Nepal. Having said the above, there arises a question, why the state of China treats Nepal so sincerely, when China’s overall South Asia Policy tells a different story altogether. What makes China to go by the Government of Nepal whenever there is a crisis in Nepal rather than it goes against the anti-government forces in Nepal?

**China’s Interest in Nepal**
So far as China’s interest in Nepal is concerned, apart from any other issues, the Tibet issue remains to be the main interest concern for China in Nepal. For China what worries the most is that despite of all its efforts of over fifty years, Tibet still remains its soft underbelly, and a sustained conflict in Nepal, which adjoins the most poverty-stricken area of its Tibet Autonomous region, can well be used by anti-Chinese activist. To be more specific, China’s main concern in Nepal remains to be the hostile activities of the free Tibet movement which includes the presence of representative of the exiled Dalai Lama and reception center for Tibetans secretly crossing the border to join other exiles in India.

China does not want some of the incidents to repeat, where the Nepalese soil was used for anti-China activities. One of such incident was the ‘Khampa Armed struggle’ in the early 1970s. To the surprise of both the intelligence of China and Nepal, two of Nepal’s air fields, Syuchatar and Rasua were used by CIA to supply arms and other logistic helps to the ‘Four River and Six Mountain protection Army’ of the Khampas. What was more worrisome for China, according to the report given by Eric S. Margolis:

The CIA organized regular air drops of weapons and supplies to bands of Khampas warriors fighting Chinese occupation in eastern Tibet. India by then finally aroused to the Chinese threat joined the effort, directing its foreign intelligence agency, the RAW to co-operate with the CIA in supporting Tibetan residence efforts. This was one of only a few known instances when the normally adversial CIA and RAW worked together. It was even a rare example of co-operation, albeit

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72 Nischal Nath Pandey, No.1, Pp. 150-51.
chilly and very limited, between the RAW and Pakistani intelligence; the latter was aiding the US in the effort to supply Tibetan rebels. Bases for Tibetan guerrillas were established in the Indian protectorate of Sikkim and in Nepal, which was equally concerned by the looming Chinese threat.\textsuperscript{73}

Another incident, that made China worried, was the flight of the 17\textsuperscript{th} Karmapa Lama via Nepalese territory. Nepalese and Chinese intelligence, once again failed to get the information, and the Nepalese soil was so significantly exploited for the escape. All the above mentioned episodes prove that, there is international interest in Tibet, which remains to be one of weakest points of China. To add up to the worries of China, this disturbed area of China, Tibet, has the border with Nepalese districts of Sindhupaschowk, Dolakha and Rasua and Dolpa. Dolpa, a hub of the Maoist of Nepal, has 90 percent dwellers of Tibetan-Mongolian clan. With Maoist wishing to divide Nepal in lingual subdivisions would further disturb the Chinese. So the Maoist insurgency spreading day by day was a matter of concern for China. Because the Maoist effect in Tibet could not be ruled out if Nepal was not able to control the situation.

Apart from Tibet, there are some more areas that make China’s interest on Nepal in this regard. For China, from a strategic point of view, Nepal is a butter zone to avoid direct confrontation against India. This also makes China interested in protecting the territorial integrity of Nepal to maintain its buffer status. In this context, the International Bureau Chief of the Communist party of China assured Nepal that, “any foreign

\textsuperscript{73} For details see Eric S. Margolis, War at the top of the World, (New Delhi, Roli Books, 1999), P.90.
conspiracy to disintegrate Nepal will be appropriately dealt with China. In relation to Tibet, China feels Nepal as a geographical and cultural buffer between Tibet and Tibetans living in India. As strategically the state of Nepal is important for two Asian super powers, India and China, similarly Nepal is also important from the energy point of view for the two energy seeking nations. Like India, China also has its own interest in accessing the energy resources of China. As observed by a Nepali scholar, the future cooperation between Nepal and China could be, in terms of, construction of a bypass from Brahma-Putra through the Arun River which can permanently solve the water dispute in this region.

To sum up the Chinese interest of friendly relationship with Nepal one would find the following three common areas. First, a friendly Nepal would help secure the Chinese Tibet interest. In this regard the Nepalese government, irrespective of the regimes has protected the Chinese national interest over Tibet. It is sense making that while criticizing India’s hidden agenda of playing the Tibet card, Beijing extends its generous appreciation of Kathmandu’s effort to curb the Tibetan political agitation in Nepalese districts bordering Tibet. Secondly, as mentioned above, many times, the Nepalese soil has been used not only by the Tibetans but also some other powers for anti China activities. So the armed struggle by the Khampas supported by the CIA and RAW made China understand the relevance of Nepal for its border security. And moreover, the presence of US in Nepal, these days, is basically designed to encircle China. Hence China has to have a friendly relation with Nepal in order to make its border with Nepal secure. Thirdly, a

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friendly Nepal provides China with an opening overland pass into the South Asian subcontinent where India has for long dominated. This connection promises to expand China’s leverage in the Greater Himalayas and further the sub-continent as a whole. Among visible gains is booming economic interaction with this vast area. Which encouraging echoes inside Nepal, Beijing considers to extend its Tibet Railway to the Sino-Nepalese border in the near future and project it to be part of a vital passage into South Asian hinter lands. 

Sino-Nepal Relation: A Historical Account

When, China has the above mentioned interest of its relation with Nepal, Nepal has more than one reason to have a friendly relationship with Nepal. The state of Nepal, sandwiched between two giant neighbors, has had to work out its destiny between these two. So far as Nepal’s relation with China is concerned, many times, it has developed under the light of an anti-Indian sentiment of the Nepali regimes.

As India is considered as a dominating neighbor inside Nepal, geographically and otherwise also, Nepal continues to depend on India than any other country especially than China. So, in course of time, a sense of over dependency on India made the Nepalese rulers feel insecure about India. So in the late 1950s for the first time Nepal, under the kingship of king Mahendra tried to lessen Nepal’s dependence on India. In the later stage after hip, his son king Birendra, also slowly tried to improve relations with China which

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was very much welcomed by the later. In fact, more than lessening the dependence on India it was a bargaining tactics by the Nepali rulers, so that, the state of Nepal could make the most of its national interest from both the countries. Annexation of Tibet, war against India in 1962 made China feel the importance of Nepal during that time. So this co-incidence of Chinese and Nepali interests was epitomized by Mao-Zedong’s comments to a Nepali delegation in August 1964 when work on the first modern road linking Nepal with China was just under way. Mao said to the Nepali delegation that, “once these roads are open, India may be a bit more respectful towards you”

So far as the Sino-Nepal relation is concerned, it grew steadily closer during the regime of King Birendra in Nepal. And during this time, Nepal, became one of the major recipients of Chinese assistance. Between 1956 and 1989, China provided Nepal with grant assistance for 42 projects, 36 of which were completed by the latter year. Since 1981 Chinese firms also had bid for various contracts projects. By the late 1989 Chinese farms had signed 85 contracts. Worth US Dollar 137 million for work in Nepal, five Chinese companies’ maintained offices in Kathmandu and more than 1000 Chinese workers and experts were working in Nepal. When from China’s point of view assistance towards Nepal was based on mutual understanding and respect, New Delhi viewed this as attempts of King Birendra to dissolve the special relationship between India and Nepal. When there was developing a feeling of distrust between India and Nepal, China became even closer by supporting the proposal of Nepal to declare Nepal as a ‘Zone of Peace’ in

1975. With the support of China Nepal could push the proposal in various international forums.

The close and friendly relation between China and Nepal grew even stronger in the subsequent years to such an extent that, ultimately Nepal had to face the worst kind of economic crisis it had ever experienced. There were many reasons of the economic blockade imposed by India over Nepal which caused economic crisis, but the most important reason was the purchase of arms from China by Nepal in 1988. According to a treaty, Nepal has to purchase arms only from India or with the consultation of India, if India fails to deliver the required demands of Nepal. As alleged by Nepalese government, since India government could not meet the demands of Nepal in 1972, 1976 and 1980, king Birendra of Nepal reportedly ordered to purchase arms from China in 1988. And finally Nepal purchased arms from China; certainly the purchase of arms from China by Nepal was a matter of concern for India. As a respond to the “unfriendly behavior” of Nepal India imposed an economic blocked on Nepal in 1989. Perhaps this was the only time when China could not support fully fledged to Nepal in a crisis. According to diplomatic sources in Beijing, China quietly advised Kathmandu in late 1988 not to expect China to provide an alternative to Nepal’s economic connection with India, saying that the difficulties of transportation between Nepal and China and the serious financial constraints China then faced ruled out such a possibility. By April 1989 an agreement with China and Nepal for supply of fuel and food had been signed. And Chinese tankers and other trucks began to deliver supplies to Kathmandu by early May. Again in

\[\text{John W. Garver, opcit, P.959.}\]
November 1989, China extended a support in terms of US dollar 13.6 million grants to Nepal for the construction of new projects.

In this context, there arises a question, why China did not come for a direct confrontation with India against the economic blocked against India. The rapid deterioration of China’s relations with the western democracies in 1989 would have dissuaded Beijing from running the risk of confrontation with India at that point. One of the Beijing’s diplomatic responses to the decline of its ties with the west was to push an improvement of relations with the third world of which India was an important part. Though China was not confronted with India directly, but it came out of a criticism against this act of India. in October 1989, vice premier Wu Xueqian in New Delhi said that, “China sincerely hopes that the South Asian countries will handle their mutual relations in accordance with the Five principles of peaceful co-existence and strengthen their co-operation in a spirit of equality and mutual benefit.” China did not stop there. Li Peng in his official visit to Kathmandu assured Nepal that, China would offer moral support and support in other fields according to its own strength. He went on to say that “It has always been China’s steadfast policy to develop good neighborly and friendly relations with every country in South Asia. No matter what happens in the international situation China will always support Nepal and other South Asian countries in their efforts to safeguard independence and sovereignty.”

79 Ibid. P.965.
80 FBIS, DR/CHI,16 October, 1989, P.7, as mentioned in John W. Garver, No.75, P.966.
Besides the above and assistance to the Nepalese government, the question arises why despite of all its help and assistance to Nepal, China never tried to establish a democratic form of government. The answer was China was well aware of the fact that, any democratic government in Nepal would be closer to the democratic countries like India, US and the UK. That would make China sideline and ignored by the elected government of Nepal. It was also proved that the elected government in Nepal often lost their control over the Tibetan refugees in Nepal. Hence China found democracy in Nepal as a threat to its oppressive rule in Tibet. Secondly, in return of the help extended to Nepal, China was successful in making the kings of Nepal suppress the Tibetan refugees. For instance, king Mahendra suppressed the voices of Tibetan refugees in Nepal, and stopped any political activities of them against China in 1960s. Later on, king Birendra also eliminated the Khampa rebels fighting against the Chinese rule in Tibet in 1970s. Thirdly, not only the king but the ruling elites of Kathmandu also reciprocated in having a pro-China stand. The ruling elite could realize, India, as supportive of pro-democratic forces, was a threat to the autocratic regime of Nepal. On the other hand, close links with communist China was less threatening to Nepal’s autocratic monarchy.

**China’s Response to Maoists of Nepal**

So far as China’s response to the Maoist insurgency of Nepal is concerned, it seems to be a commonsensical perception that, China might support the Maoist of Nepal, since they claimed to have followed the ideology of Mao-Tse-Tung. China was the first country to distance itself from the Maoists of Nepal. China never, throughout the insurgency movement, recognized the Maoists of Nepal as the ‘Maoist’. Rather the official version
of China made it clear that, the Maoist of Nepal never followed the ideology of comrade Mao, and by claiming themselves as Maoist they give a bad name to great comrade Mao-Tse-Tung. Though the Maoist had tried to have support from China, they remained unsuccessful. because, in view of the amicable relations between Beijing and Kathmandu, the recognized status of the Maoists as anti-government rebels prevented it from mastering support and solidarity from China despite an ostensibly shared ideology and declared values\textsuperscript{82}. One hand China distanced itself from the Maoists of Nepal and on the other hand, it had been very careful in branding the Maoists of Nepal. Unlike India, China never called them as terrorists. Rather China very customarily branded them as anti-government militias or groups. So it is clear from the above discussion that the initial response of the Chinese government towards the Maoist insurgency in Nepal was very casual. It maintained its stand that, this was an internal problem of Nepal and since China believed in the policy of non-interference, it would rather suggest the government of Nepal to deal with the situation.

Unlike the initial response, China was very firm and clear in its stand against the Maoists of Nepal. There were many factors why China very firm and clear against the Maoist of Nepal. First, the involvement of the USA into the affairs of Nepal was an alarm for China. The instances of both India and the US working together to help Nepal, recalled the happening of Khampa armed struggled against it. Secondly, the recognition of India’s special relationship with Nepal by US’s Assistant Secretary of state Rocca was a matter of concern for China. Thirdly, with all these developments happening in Nepal

\textsuperscript{82} Zhang Li, No. 76, P.5.
by US and India, China tried to make it sure that the Chinese influence over Nepal did not go to the vain.

In regard of Sino-Nepal relation to curb down the Maoist of Nepal, king Gyanendra visited China in July 2002. During his visit, for the first time, Chinese president Jiang Zemin made it quite clear that Beijing supported the king and the Nepalese government to crack down on the anti-government militants and condemned the violence-smacking terror of all kinds. He also showed his belief saying that, the king and the administration would be competent to maintain peace, stability and development in this Himalayan Kingdom. At the same time, the spokes person of China’s foreign ministry stated that, the Chinese government as well as any Chinese agencies/organizations had developed no connection with the Nepalese anti-government militants called the Maoists, despite their naming themselves after the late Chinese Charismatic leader Mao-Zedong. According to him, China’s genuine desire was to see a scenario governed by peace, order and development within the neighbor. However, in this meeting the Chinese spokesperson did not mention what kind of help and assistance China would provide to crackdown the Maoists of Nepal. Just two months before Gyanendra’s visit to China, the former Chinese ambassador to Nepal, Wu Congyong made a comprehensive statement on China’s policy against the Maoists. He said, “The insurgency had created unprecedented difficulties, especially the declaration of the state of emergency in November 2001 due to the deteriorating security situation. China is

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83 Ibid. P.2.
much concerned about this, and has given a timely response and firm support to His Majesty’s Government to quell the insurgency from the very beginning.

With its commitment to Nepal, China continued to extend its help to Nepal to crackdown the Maoist. The Chinese assistance included military hardware, financial support and other logistic helps. In 2004, Nepalese army chief, General Pyar Jung Thapa visited China. There he signed an agreement with the Chinese counterpart on undertaking security co-operation. During that visit China promised to deliver military hardware and logistic support and to exchange intelligence. What was more interesting in regard to Chinese assistance to Nepal against the Maoist was that, even after the king dissolved the parliament and took over the power, China also supplied 18 truckloads of arms to Nepal irrespective of international pressure on the Nepalese king. By supplying lethal weapons to Nepal, China not only demonstrated its disregard for suppression of democracy, civil liberties and human rights, but also disrespected the international pressure on the Nepalese king to establish democracy. In this regard, as a gesture of support of king’s takeover of power, Chinese president Hu Jintao met king Gyanendra in Jakarta (The Asian-African Summit 2005), voicing China’s recognition of Kathmandu’s effort to stabilize the situation. In one hand China kept on assisting the monarch to fight against the Maoist, on the other hand China stucked to the point that, the Maoist problem, as an internal affair should be solved by Nepal itself. China always tried to escape from direct involvement in the affairs of Nepal in relation to Maoist insurgency. In this regard,

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answering a question, whether the international criticism against the king’s behavior in 2005 was interference into the internal affairs of Nepal, he said,

“Different parties made comments on the latest development in Nepal, expressing their views and opinions. That’s what we have also noticed.

But as a close neighbor of Nepal or South Asian countries, we believe the current peace, stability and development are of great significance. We sincerely hope the Nepalese people can develop their country with national reconciliation and social stability. In essence these matters should be decided by the Nepalese people themselves. What we can do is to sincerely wish them social stability, economic development, national reconciliation and steady progress of their nation.”

This shows China’s Nepal policy vis-à-vis Maoist insurgency contrary to its action. At the same time there arises a question why China did not supported the Maoist rather it supported the monarch. First, so far as China’s support to the Nepalese monarch is concerned, one would find, China has two reasons to support the monarch. First, it has a fear, as mentioned earlier, if the democratic forces come to the power, they may be titled towards India and other democratic countries. Second, the Nepalese monarchs have reciprocates with China in many cases, especially, in not allowing the Tibetan refugees in Nepal to have any activism against China.

Coming to China’s anti Maoist stand, there was more than one reason. First, as widely, recognized, Beijing has for long abandoned the practice of exporting revolution

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88 As cited in B. Raman, India and China: As seen by Maoists-part-ii, *South Asia Analysis Group*, Paper No. 1250, 12.02.05.
towards developing Afro-Asian nations and there is no rationale and no sign to revive this code of conduct as far as its own national interests are concerned. Thus, China’s declining to evolve ties with the Maoists seems not so much being averse to its ideology, and populist approach as the necessity of pragmatic diplomacy. Secondly, China would definitely not want the Maoist insurgency spreading especially in the bordering areas of Tibet. Otherwise, there would be a chance of the insurgency spreading into Tibet along with the Nepalese in search of safety and livelihood. Thirdly, with the insurgency spreading day by day, and the use of modern weapon both the insurgents and the Royal Nepalese Army, China was worried, if they sneak into Tibet and instigate a Khampa movement kind of situation. Hence these were some of the reasons why China had an anti-Maoist stand.