PARLIAMENTARY systems are seminally dependant on majoritarian support for their sustenance and viability. In case such support is not forthcoming it depends on legislative support, whatever much it can garner in order to form coalitional arrangements. In much of the parliamentary democracies be it in Europe or elsewhere, the cardinal principle that executive is responsible to the legislature is followed (with very few exceptions). This has made it mandatory for executives to form executive coalition where a majority party is not in a position to gain majority after an election. Europe has had a long tradition of such coalitional experiments. It also needs to be emphasised that the ability of a government to win votes of confidence is thus the key to its ability to remain in office. We may think or a government that can do this as a viable government; but it should be also known that a viable government need not be an effective government.

Coalitions are formed for a variety of causes. They are realities' that we have to live with today. The theory regarding them (which is outlined in the earlier chapter) will be applied to coalitional systems, country by country and analysed. We would also highlight any exceptions and/or dysfunctional ties to such theory in our study. For e.g., it is well known that,
'minimal winning coalitions' the type of which Riker had advocated are not found in real situations. There is also the finding that legislative parties which are not part of the executive coalition retain some or even considerable control over government policy making.

We would have to closely monitor the gamut of data available on parliamentary systems to find insights to the 'extreme corporatism' that are the highlight of consensual systems especially in Europe, which as Luebbert suggested is the 'institutionalised pattern of cooperation between interest groups and the executive of the central government in the formulation, implementation and administration of public policy.'

Another discovery, among others, is that in coalitional systems elsewhere, policy bargaining in consensual systems takes place outside the legislature. Similarly, minority governments are more likely in consensual democracies, because legislatures are, in such systems, less important.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Majority situations</th>
<th>Minority situations</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Surplus majority</td>
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<td>Govt.</td>
<td>coalition</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
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</table>

Note: The period surveyed is from post World War II till 1987.

GOVERNMENT COALITIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES

A significant activity of observers is to explain which parties will succeed in getting into the government have been at the heart of most accounts of coalition bargaining. In the West most coalition theorists of yesteryears concerned themselves with predicting the membership of coalition cabinets, while most early empirical analyses of coalition set out to test the predictions inherent in the large body of theory. Coalition theories are able to make unambiguous predictions that the coalition which forms will be possible or not. Thus though theories of coalition formation have much to add to our understanding of the politics of coalition in the West, yet the reality of European coalition cabinets provides an interpretative challenge to coalition theories that otherwise would fail to be applied to their objective situation.

A. THE OCCURRENCE OF MINORITY GOVERNMENTS

We find that legislative majorities in West especially in Europe are 'minimal winning coalition or lead to the formation of such coalitions. But, only to an extent. We do not find that minimal winning coalitions shedding surplus majority nor do we espy the fact that if any member leaves, then the coalition ceases to control a majority in the legislature. (This has something to do with the shift from pure rewards to concerns for policy motivations) Hence,
we discover that larger coalitions, in the European context having more legitimacy and authority than smaller ones.

In contrast to the theories highlighted in an earlier chapter, which have tended to treat minority and surplus majority governments as deviations we observe that empirical discussions of European coalition cabinets show that both minority and surplus majority executive coalitions are in practice as much the norm in European politics as minimal winning coalitions. Both by empirical and theoretical considerations then, minority governments can be viable in the right type of circumstances.

Many authors have observed the reality of frequent minority coalition cabinets and they have drawn similar inferences from the empirical reality. An analysis of coalitions formed in various European countries from 1945 onwards till 1987 shows some very interesting highlights. Firstly, about one-third of all governments are minority governments, while another quarter have surplus majorities. Second, only 40 percent of government which form when there is no single party control or majority are found to be minimal winning coalitions. Thirdly, it is seen in the twelve political systems that there is incidence of both minority and surplus majority governments in them, though the frequency found varies from country to country and there are considerable differences among them.

We also find, fourthly, that there are countries that almost always have minority governments, for e.g., Denmark. On

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Table No. II.2
FREQUENCY OF EUROPEAN COALITION CABINETS, BY TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Cabinets</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% of cabinets in Minority situations</th>
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</thead>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Surplus Majority coalition</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minority situations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surplus Majority coalition</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority government</td>
<td>73</td>
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<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>218</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Majority situation is one where one party controls more than 50% of the legislative seats.

Minority situation is one where no party controls more than 50% of the legislative seats.

The period surveyed is from post World War II till 1987.
the contrary, there are countries like Luxemburg and Germany that never have such minority governments. Fifth, we also observe that three political systems namely Germany, Italy and Austria are cases where majority parties have on occasion formed coalitions with others to create surplus majority governments (formed in the wake of World War II background as governments of national unity). Sixth, there are others, like Finland and Italy, in which surplus majority governments are very common. (See Table II.1)

Visualising this we need to go into further details, country wise to get a proper view. (See Table No II.2) Out of the 218 coalition cabinets that have occurred in this period of 1945-1987, we find a very different spread of minority – majority coalition situations in the twelve countries studied for this purpose. Interestingly, there were 73 Minority governments in it, i.e., roughly 33%.

Theorists have tried to account for this phenomenon broadly in two ways. Some empirical theorists have tried to modify the office seeking approach to governmental formation in order to explain the European case trying to view majority govt. as the norm and looking for systematic patterns of observed deviation from this. Others have highlighted policy at centre stage, in order to give a comprehensive account of minority government in Europe.

It is clear however, despite Herman and Pope & Taylor and Laver's accounts of Minority government they do not offer any real explanation of why some governments seem to be able to get by with just short
of a majority of seats in the legislature while others cannot. Minority government is more or less impossible to explain on the basis of office-seeking assumptions. They do not pay attention to configurations of policy positions in the party system. More important accounts of minority government emerged when policy driven interpretations of government formation surfaced (namely the work of Gregory Luebbert and Kare Strom). Strom expounded a rational choice theory of minority government formation based on the motivation of parties to influence policy making in the national assembly of the countries. Moreover, parties always looked at the possibility of maximising their long term and short term benefits. These assumptions brought explanation of minority government to the fore. Strom maintains that Parties look at "policy influence differential" between government and opposition. Parties are conscious of the fact that the greater the opportunities for parliamentary opposition to influence legislative policy-making, the lower the benefits of governance for them.

A second reason for minority government emerges from the cost of governing, seen in terms of anticipated electoral losses. "Government incumbency tends to result in subsequent electoral losses. A decision to remain in opposition temporarily implies no lack of interest in governing in the long run, but

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rather a willingness to wait for more favourable circumstances." This explanation of minority government advanced by Strom is an advancement of the office-seeking model to introduce the idea that the actors may be trying to maximise their payoffs over the longer, rather than the shorter term.

Strom has posited that in addition, the availability of formal institutional structures that allow the opposition to influence policy seems to help us account for the frequency of minority governments in Norway, Italy, Sweden and 'France. There are quite many ways in which opposition parties may impact on government policies. It may also use non governmental organisations such as interest groups labour unions, farmers' organizations for putting pressure or use legislative structures such as standing committees etc.

Luebbert believes on the other hand, that the occurrence of minority governments in Europe is due to certain structural properties of the political systems inherent in them. For classification as 'consensual democracies' he chooses an important group of countries such as Sweden, Denmark and Norway; while Finland is placed in an 'unconsolidated' system because of its "rough transition to democracy". He believes that consensual systems are characterized by 'extreme corporatism' and such systems offer extra parliamentary mechanisms for influencing policy outputs. The Opposition therefore does impact on government policy and thereby increases the changes of minority governments. He says that "...the existence of well-developed consensus-

5 Strom, K. ibid. p.212.
building mechanisms and the normative commitment to their use means that ultimate policy outcomes will be generally satisfactory, whether reached in cabinet, parliament, or outside of both; the leaders of the party forming a government have little incentive to create majority governments, if they must do so at the cost of policy sacrifices ...because policy concessions will not then be party-to-party concessions and therefore highly risky for party leaders, but will... be concessions among the interest groups (they will be) consequently much less threatening to party leaders.6

In other words Luebbert opines that in these countries or consensual systems as he calls them, policy bargaining takes place outside the legislature. Leaders of legislature are firm on policy matters though allowing a minority govt. to negotiate directly with interest groups. Thus, minority governments are more likely to form in such democracies because legislatures in such systems are less important. The leaders of opposition parties allow their associated interest groups to do the dirty work of policy bargaining and making the inevitable policy concessions that are inescapable. All the Scandinavian countries, including Finland have such a system. Thus Luebbert's initiative in pointing the correlation between corporatist extra parliamentary policy bargaining and minority government is quite illuminating.

In a nutshell, what the theorists have stated herein above is that minority government may be viable, in exceptional cases, because in the peculiar

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6 Luebbert, G. supra p.68.
set of policy preference, no coalition of outside parties can agree on a replacement. Minority govt. is surely an exceptional development or a deviant product of particular local circumstances or in terms of much longer-term considerations. In reality, it is difficult to conceive this as occurring in practical political arena. We find, outside of Europe, no such example. If one considers only office-seeking motivation then all the parties that may be in a political system, out of office hardly get anything. They therefore are united by the desire to get the government-in office out of power, and instead get themselves reinstated in its place. Hence, minority governments are ejected out in the common day experience. The cases of Scandinavian countries certainly is an exception to this.

B. THE OCCURRENCE OF SURPLUS MAJORITY GOVERNMENTS

We have indicated earlier that according to the extant theory of coalitions, if parties are motivated by their desire to gain power and access to office then coalitions must control a majority of seats; but such majority would induce a tendency for coalitions to shed surplus members than are absolutely necessary to control a legislative majority (this is predicted by the office-driven coalition theory). Surplus members are considered passengers who have to be rewarded but, who contribute nothing to the success of the government. In Europe we see a contrarian trend. Just as minority governments in Europe show a tendency to occur in certain political systems and not in others, so we find that surplus majority governments occur much more often in Finland, Italy and Netherlands. Table NoII.1 shows that in the 1945-1987 period out of 46, some 39 surplus
majority coalitions occurred in these three countries. It needs to be highlighted that in Finland and Italy both minority governments and surplus majority governments are relatively common.

The reason for such surplus majority is that in conditions where party discipline is not effective; parties tend to amass surplus majorities as these provide insurance against unauthorized defections by factions in undisciplined parties. Another reason could be the desire to form a government of national unity (as observed most such coalitions were formed in the post world-war II period). But, obviously these could not be adequate reasons for explaining the formation many of the surplus majority governments which have occurred in reality. For example, the 'pentapartito' coalitions formed in Italy from 1981 onwards cannot be explained.

Unless we take into account policy outputs a satisfactory theoretical interpretation cannot be evolved. Luebbert has theorised on the issue of surplus majority arguing that such governments are more likely in competitive party systems such as Belgium, Netherlands, Ireland, Israel, Germany etc, which are dominated by a single party. He defined a dominated system as one "... in which party leaders assume that no majority government is possible in the foreseeable future that excludes a particular party."

Elaborating the case of Israel where the dominant position of the Labour Party till 1974 made it an indispensable member in all governments, he says that the dominant party has an initiative to add surplus members as a shield to protect itself from the blackmail of other coalition partners.

"A minimum-winning government would contain no excess parties, and the

\[7\] G.Luebbert, supra p.72.
withdrawal of one party would bring down the govt. This situation permits of a kind of blackmail of the dominant party. For a party can threaten to leave the government at will, and thus compel the dominant party to choose between making concessions or renegotiating the entire government agreement. The leaders of the dominant party can avoid this dilemma if they can form a government that includes one or more unnecessary parties, none of which can bring down the government by itself. 8 This neat theoretical assumption holds but not entirely. Its standpoint that a surplus majority coalition is not harmed by the withdrawal of a non-pivotal player is not entirely correct. In some countries say for example, Italy there are constitutional requirements (or wide established norms or conventions) that if there is change in the legislative majority formed by coalition partners, though not jeopardizing the government, the government has to resign and re-form. This happened in the 'pentapartito' example of Italy. In 1987 the 'pentapartito' coalition formed by Goria fell as a result of the withdrawal of PLI a small party that was not necessary to the government's majority. Yet as per the constitutional norms, the government had to resign and even though the same government was formed again, by the same five parties under the same Prime Minister.

Hence, contrary to Luebbert's assertion sometimes passengers can inflict problems even in surplus majority cabinets. Moreover, it is also seen that there are countries such as Finland and Italy where both minority

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8 Luebbert, G. supra. p.79.
governments and surplus majority governments are common. Here then we may term them as departures from minimal winning status. Luebbert is firm that "In a dominated system the only opportunity a party has for influencing public policy is by participation in a coalition." This means that the notion of policy viability views opposition parties as instrumental factors capable of influencing both types of governments be it minority or majority governments and Luebbert concedes that minority or majority governments are two sides of the same coin and both are likely to occur, when there is a single dominant party.

Our survey of theories has shown that in the context of Europe, there could be governments formed where the members do not control a legislative majority. It is also seen that executives add surplus members over and above those needed for a majority control over the legislature. Thus it can be said as is expressed by Laver and Schofield that there is no single winning post that is applicable to all systems and in all circumstances. Yet many theories do give fundamental role to the majority winning criteria and empirical accounts treat minority governments as pathologies or deviations to be decries. But it is well known by now, that coalition bargaining in Europe is often constrained by a wide range of institutional and behavioural factors. Resultantly, not all possible combinations of coalitions may form.

Well, why? As has been said, "Coalition bargaining in Europe, in short, does not take place in the sterile conditions of a laboratory; it takes place in the dirt of a real political world in which all things are never equal. This means

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Luebbert, G., supra. p.73.
that we should not expect too much from the theories that deal with coalition formation and formation of real government coalitions in Western Europe. Theories of coalition formation have much to add to our understanding of the politics of coalition in Europe, while the reality of European cabinets provides an interpretative challenge to coalition theories that could otherwise be arid and irrelevant.¹⁰

Thus, the conditions of institutional and behavioural (decision making, policy etc.) interplay which differs in different countries tend to foist conditions on the functioning of coalitions in European context.

Upshot

The formation of governments' over the years in Europe due to coalitional arrangements have been the focus of attention of both theorists and empirical researchers. It is noteworthy that now much more is known about coalitional theory than the concept developed in Riker's classic model of 1963 and something more richer and complex conceptualisation has emerged over the years and still is in the process of evolution. However, most of the progress on the theoretical front has been concentrated on legislative coalitions and work on executive coalitions is of recent vintage (for e.g., M. Laver & N. Schofield's work). Further, most work on the coalitions in Europe has been essentially empirical in nature and many insights that have been added to coalition theory has been the

work of deductive theorists who have kept a close eye on the results of practical inductive work. Indeed, this interaction of deductive theory and empirical analysis of government coalition formation has been productive, though there are outstanding issues of coalitional analyses that have to be resolved. There is no doubt that we know now much more about formation of coalitional governments in Europe and elsewhere.

It is now known that in most experiments of democracy across the world the majority of coalitions have been ones that have developed some ideological underpinnings; especially in Europe, where there are clear ideological and identifiable social schisms and the level of clear identifiable and distinct ideological constituencies of political parties is recognizably stable. There, within the boundaries, payoff maximisation has a great role, and as has been noted above, not majority coalitions but minority coalitions have become the fashion.

II

A TYPOLOGY OF COALITIONS IN EUROPE

Taking the characteristics of coalitional systems of Europe, we may classify them into neat types, though it is always not so easy to fit them in
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>TYPOLOGY OF EUROPEAN SYSTEMS</th>
<th>FREQUENCY OF GOVERNMENT TYPE</th>
<th>MEDIAN PARTY INCLUDED</th>
<th>LARGEST PARTY INCLUDED</th>
<th>NO. OF NON MAJORITY SITUATION</th>
<th>AVERAGE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF PARTIES</th>
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<td>Largest party included</td>
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Note: The period surveyed is from post World War II till 1987.

such typologies. There are three broad categories, which may be used for classification of coalitional systems elsewhere. These are:

a) Bipolar systems

b) Unipolar systems

c) Multipolar systems

a) Bipolar systems:

In Germany and Austria, notably bipolarity in the political system exists. Both these countries have effectively speaking two and a half party systems where there exist two bigger parties and a much smaller party which may be effective in upholding the balance of power. This gives birth to situations where governments have a tendency to swing from one pole to another.

In Austria the parties according to their ideologies from the left to the right are the Socialists (SPO) the People's party (OVP), and the Freedom Party (FPO). In the case of Germany there is a difference of opinion regarding the left-right ranking and it is not settled. Some observers like Inglehart and Klingemann, Sani and Sartori have opined that the parties follow this particular order from right to the left: Social Democrats (SPD), Free Democrats (FPD) Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU).
b) Unipolar systems:

Such systems are noticeable by a presence of a dominant party that is confronted with many weaker parties. In countries like Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Luxemburg, Iceland such systems are found. If we see Luxemburg, the parties are Christian Socials (CSV), Democratic Party (DP), Communists (KPL), Socialists (LSAP). The CSV is considered as the median party.

The dominant party is found more clearly in Sweden, Norway where a large social democratic party exists in the face of a collection of small parties. In Norway, the Labour Party (NA) faced 4 small right-wing parties for most of the post war period and was in the median position till 1965. Since then the Liberal Party (Venstre) has gained prominence and holds the median position. In Sweden first it was the Social Democratic Party (SD) and later the Agrarian/Centre Party has held the median position. In these countries the high frequency of minority governments (as may be seen from Table No.II.1) occurring almost 11 times out of the total of 15 in Norway and 15 times out of 16 in Sweden -is interpretable in terms of the position of Social Democrats at the median of the left-right scale of ideological positioning. In Iceland the rightist Independence Party faces People's Alliance (PA), Social Democratic Party (SDP), Progressive Party (PP). The PP occupies the median position here and has been in power except for the 1959-1971 period. In Denmark, we find the Social Democratic Party (SD) facing some small right wing parties such as the Radical Liberals (RV), Agrarian Liberals (V), Justice Party (DRF), the Conservatives (KF) and left wing parties
such as the Socialist People's Party (SF), Communists (DLP). The Radical Liberals have occupied the median position. In Ireland, Fianna Fail has the median position, between Labour on the left and Fine Gael on the right.

c) Multipolar systems:

The process of coalition formation, the nitty gritty of coalition bargaining etc in these systems is highly intricate and complex because of the innumerable number of parties involved. The sheer number of parties is not the criterion, but the effective number of parties is the important factor. That is, if one party has a overwhelming dominance and captures 96 percent of the seats whereas the other four parties can lay claim to only 1 percent each, this is obviously less like a 5 party system where each party can claim 20% of the mandate. In effect we have to see the effective party strength. Hence not the number of parties, but the effective number of parties should be our criteria for distinguishing a multipolar system. Secondly, in a multipolar system one observes greater level of polarity in ideological positions.

Such examples may be found in Italy, Netherlands, Finland, Belgium etc. We may find herein that usually the largest party generally holds the median position and is able to control government policy. In Italy, the Christian Democrats (DC) have tended to occupy the median position and have come to be in almost every government. In Belgium the Christian People's Party (CVP-PSC) has been at the median position except for a short period when the Francophone
Democratic Front (FDF) occupied this position. The CVP-PSC was in every post-war Belgian government, save for those formed in 1946 and 1958.

In the Netherlands, the Catholic People's Party (KVP), followed by the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) after 1913 has occupied the median position and been in government. In Finland, the median position is always occupied by the Centre Party, though the median position was challenged by the Social Democratic Party in 1958.

The above shows that in multipolar systems usually a large or dominant party is able to influence coalition formation because of a host of reasons connected with the nature of party system, local factors historical reasons and other extraneous reasons like the state of factionalisation. The type of coalitional system that emerges, thus depends on a variety of variables, and this needs to be noted in each context.

Typology - an analysis

In bipolar systems such as in Austria and in Germany, the coalitional bargaining system is simple clear-cut and unchanging. If there is any change in the results of internal elections in political parties, it is almost certain not to produce any changes in the bargaining logic, which seemingly remains dominated by the fact that any two-party coalition is viable in the country. Hence, the bargaining solutions, once settled upon, may well be more stable in these systems than in others.
In unipolar systems such as Ireland and Luxemburg, a dominant single party can effectively call the shots from the centre of the system. Changes in election results or policy shifts will not affect this and we find a situation which is similar to bipolar systems of Germany and Austria, where there are few incentives to break up a coalition and form another one in its wake as a result of exogenous changes in the coalitional environment.

However, in unipolar systems of Norway and Iceland where the strong party is some distance away from the centre of the policy space, we find much more alteration in coalition membership. This does not necessarily produce less stable government because the two bloc party system that tends to emerge pits a government with one set of incentives against an opposition with another set of incentives, all of which are unlikely to change during an inter-election period. We may consider them as falling into an intermediate status, in terms of potential cabinet stability, between bipolar and multipolar systems.

The multipolar systems such as Italy, Finland etc, posit a complex pattern of party weights and policy positions generating a distribution of bargaining power that is vulnerable to slight changes. Therefore, coalitions in multipolar systems are much less stable than those in others, since there are many more changes in the parameters of the system (changes in the opinion poll ratings of parties for e.g., ) that can change its bargaining logic and thereby create incentives for political leaders to unpick and change a particular deal even after a coalition may have taken office. In bargaining systems that are not multipolar, it takes a major change in the parameters of the system to create incentives to renegotiate the coalition.
As indicated elsewhere, coalitions form in politics in different countries, in response to differing stimuli, conditions, locale and party-specific conditionalities etc. Hence, the same set of conditions may or may not spawn a coalition in every country. It is unfailingly noted however, that coalitions are an attempt to share power, almost universally and/or to improve prospects of parties' themselves and of polities as well. Hence coalitional arrangements are an attempt to overcome the problems thrown in by an unclear mandate, fractured or ruptured consensual systems and are inextricably linked with the nature of party systems, the type of political edifice, the psychology of voters, electoral laws and other extraneous considerations that changes from country to country.

We analyse here a few countries which have had coalitions over the years:

**Italy**

A highly factionalized coalitional culture exists here. Analysts have differing views on the reasons for this occurrence, but a major factor behind it is the fact that almost all the parties in Italian politics are "... continually plagued by a compulsive formation of internal factions and the number of factions, their
component and their political lines are in a constant state of flux. Their differences are very well known and so organizationally structured that they are openly acknowledged by the parties. All the factions are accommodated in the government, by tradition. In any formation of a coalition, the 26 or more cabinet seats and the 60 or more sub-cabinet posts are distributed not only by party but by party factions.

Moreover, "because factions extend their power out of party and into the governing institutions, disagreements among them are carried into the government itself. As a result, governments have been completely paralysed and on occasion have fallen because of factional disputes." The dominant party, the Christian Democrats (DC) has been described by Irving as "not so much a party as a coalition of factions... the DC be seen as a uniquely Italian phenomenon - a coalition of mini-parties run by an(unique) oligarchy' of factional leaders ... a ship whose crew is in a permanent state of mutiny." An universally held view is that in Italy, the chaotic and disordered methods of candidate selection leaves no power in the party hierarchy to reinforce discipline or change" the factional character of its legislative representation. Other parties, in order of importance are the Communists (PCI), the Socialist party (PSI), Neofascists (MSI), the Social Democrats (PSDI), Liberals (PLI). The above applies almost in similar measure to


other parties. The PSI, for e.g., as the main coalition actor on the non Communist
left in Italy has been incapable of producing a unified, coherent strategy at the
national level, when it has come to power. Bettino Craxi has to some extent ironed
out the inherent contradictions, yet the PSI has split and recombined several times
over the issue of collaboration with the communists. There are "significant internal
conflict over personal ambitions and intense battles over preference votes remain
much the same." 14 Thus the potential remains for major splits within the party.

Between 1945 and 1987, in Italy some 35 coalitions came to power. Even afterwards, the legacy of coalitions continue. A recent development has added to the complexities of intra-party politics with the emergence of a new legislative party, the Greens.

Thus in the Italian context one observes that disputes between faction within the parties are supposedly more significant, and can lead to rise and fall of governments, than disputes between parties, which is the normal assumption of coalition theory, as discussed earlier. It is in this context, that finding a unitary actor premise in coalitions in Italy is so difficult. In Italy, out of the 35 coalitions that have come to being till 1987, there were only 4 cases of majority situations scenario after elections. The bulk i.e., 31 cases were Minority situations cases where there were only 6 Minimally connected winning (Axelrod's phrase) cases. MCW theory of Axelrod suggests that such coalitions arise when parties coalescing have a single dimension of ideology and being ideologically

14 Wertman, D. "Italy: Local Involvement and Central Control", in M.Gallagher &
M.Marsh (eds.) Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective, London: Sage, 1988
p.152.
### Table No: II.4.

**AVERAGE DURATION (IN MONTHS) OF EUROPEAN COALITIONAL CABINETS, BY TYPE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Single-party majority</th>
<th>Minimal winning</th>
<th>Surplus majority</th>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The period surveyed is from post World War II till 1987.

Source: M.Laver & N.Schofield *-ibid.* p.152.
connected would mean that all members are adjacent to each other.\textsuperscript{15} Hence this indicates that there was a large internal area of conflict and less give and take in the coalitions that are found in Italy. Further, it is seen that the coalition cabinets in Italy had an ephemeral longevity—on an average not more than 17 months\textsuperscript{1} if they were minimal winning or surplus majority cabinets and only 9 months\textsuperscript{1} in the case of minority cabinets. (see Table No.II.4)

Netherlands

In the Netherlands there are numerous parties. In fact parties keep forming after splintering from older established parties. The Dutch parties however observe coherent parliamentary cohesiveness and they go into and come out of coalition cabinets as unitary actors. One may find here that different parties coalesce into a different party, if the need arises The Anti-Revolution Party, The Christian Historical Union and the Catholic People's Party first formed an electoral alliance and then fully integrated themselves into a new political party, namely, the Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA), \textsuperscript{16} in 1980.

\textsuperscript{15} See M. Laver and N. Schofield -supra, Table no. 5.4 p.100 for the statistics quoted here.

It faces the rightist VVD party and the PvdA, now rechristened as Democratisch Socialisten '70-or the DS-70, PRR etc., on the left. The CDA has maintained the median position and most of the coalitions have been formed with the CDA in the lead. In the Netherlands electoral proto coalitions have held sway. Mostly all Dutch parties have fallen a long way off the number required to attain a parliamentary majority on their own and since "the ultra proportional electoral system does not manufacture extra seats for the larger parties, coalition building is an utterly intrinsic part of the party system. This means that the main thrust of coalitional bargaining gets under way well before elections are held, rather than after they are over, and that electoral proto-coalitions make it easier for the Dutch electorate to evaluate post-electoral coalition options. In the CDA, we have the example of an electoral coalition that became a political party, a clear case both of the interaction between the politics of coalition and electoral competition and of the ambiguities about the precise bargaining status of the actors that can arise as a consequence."

Due to this maturity of the Dutch political culture, perhaps one finds that the Dutch have the maximum longevity of their coalition cabinets. According to Table no.II.4 the Dutch average 34 and 31 months respectively, which is the average duration for which their cabinet lasted when formed under coalition governments. This compares well with the highest figure in Europe, (this pertains to coalitions formed with minimal winning and surplus.

\[17\] See Laver, M. & N. Schofield \textit{supra} p.236.
majority political assimilation) which creditably goes to Germany, thus coming a close second.

Germany

Another multi-faceted player in Europe, Germany is known for its Bipolar coalitional system. It has a comparatively simpler party and coalition system than found in many European states. One finds the CDU/CSU which is an electoral alliance rather than a party which along with / or the FPD has been the median party in all coalitions in Germany.

The FDP has a rather regimented set up with strong party allegiance, whereas other parties such as the SPD, otherwise a united party has been deeply divided over policy issues. The flexibility of the FDP's bargaining strategy has enabled it to remain in office for a longer period of time though being smaller in size than the SPD or the CDU/CSU. It has with wanton abandon, switched coalition partners without any internal crises, quite unlike the SPD where internal factionalism has fractured its ability to bargain and negotiate in coalitional contexts.

For example right from 1961 onwards, the FDP has been involved and figured in all coalitions formed in the country. In 1961 and 1965, the FDP and CDU formed coalitional government. In 1969, 1972, 1976 and 1980, the SPD and FDP formed coalitions. In 1983 and thereafter the FDP has figured in coalitions formed in Germany. If one sees the average duration or tenure of coalitions, German cabinets formed by coalitions have shown the greatest longevity.
According to Table no.II.4 they come close to 49 months for surplus majority and 33 months for minimal winning categories -by far the highest tenure in Europe.

Finland

A rigid party discipline in Finland has ensured that factional disputes within parties have taken place in an environment of tight party discipline in the Finnish legislature. As a result intra party divisions have been transformed into formal divisions and most of the coalitional actors in Finland have split "at one stage or the other in the country's political history. In an environment of multipolar politics nearly all parties have split. The Finnish Social Democratic Party (Suomen Sosidemokraatinen Puolue) splintered., and the Social Democratic League of Workers and Smallholders was formed in the fifties'. Another significant split occurred in the Centre Party (Keskustapuolue) in 1970 broke up and the Finnish Rural Party was formed out of it Later the Finnish People's Unity Party was formed by a split from within the Finnish Rural Party itself. The Finnish Constitutional People's party was created from among the factions of the Swedish People's party and the Conservatives group.

Hence we see that in Finland " a situation in which party splits are not only common, but form an integral part of the coalitional process, with factions that have split from one another going into and out of coalitions at different times, and with splits arising in the first place because of the various coalitional Possibilities on offer. The rigid party discipline typical of the Scandinavian system encourages this process. A consequence of (this is) that we may treat each party as a unitary actor at any single point in time, though it is particularly important in the
Finnish case to take party splits into account in any dynamic account of the system. Not surprisingly, the average duration of the coaltional cabinets formed in Finland have been of a shorter duration. The average tenure have been for 19 months and 15 months for minimal winning and surplus majority cabinets. (See Table no. II.4) Interestingly, the number of coalitions that have taken place in the country has been substantial. Table no. II.2 shows that no less than 32 coalition governments have been formed which is only second to Italy's tally of 35. Hence there has been a greater churning of coalitions in Finland.

Belgium

The nature of party system in Belgium is sui -generis, in many ways because, firstly the political parties are more like extended families rather than political groupings. ; secondly, it is difficult to consider them as unitary actors when they form coalitions. It is well known that erstwhile political activity generated by the language issue had split each of the three Belgian parties, between 1968 and 1978. Each of the three main parties had presented linguistic fronts to voters and the Catholic Party had become the Christian People's Party, earlier . In the wake of the location of franco-phone Catholic University at Louvian, this party split into the CVP and PSC, in 1968.

The Liberals split into PLP and Pvv following upset in the 1972 polls and later into PL, PLP and the PVV in 1973( PL and PLP recombined later to

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18 See Laver & Schofield - supra p.224.
form the PRL in 1979). The Socialists also split in 1978 into the PS and VS over the proposal for a common front on the language issue that would include each of the main French speaking parties.

These parties cannot be considered as as unitary actors because apart from their feuding nature, they represent very substantial sectors or well organised estate groups (called 'standen' in Belgium) from which they receive support and sustenance. For eg, the CVP has 'standen' of workers (called ACW) farmers (called BB) and business people (called NCMV). The position of these estates within the party is highly institutionalized and individual estates effectively control the nominations of party candidates at the elections. For instance, in 1985 47% of CVP representatives belonged to the ACW, 12% to the BB and 27% to the NCMV.

The CVP-PSC has dominated most of the post war coalitions in Belgium. Budd says the composition of coalition cabinets has been affected by factions within the CVP. The ACW is the major support base of the CVP and with the main affiliated organization of the ACW being the Flemish Christian Trade Union Movement and with the majority of CVP voters identifying with the working class the ACW has oriented the CVP towards centre-left coalitions, with the socialists.¹⁹

The PSC also contains two major factions representing manual and non manual workers as well as the Alliance Agricole Belge, representing French

speaking farmers without being officially recognized by the party. There has been politics of competition between these factions which has been more bitter and complex than the one that takes place within the CVP and has involved the formation of movements such as the Democratic Chretienne that linked one PSC faction with members of other parties and pitted these against the other PSC faction. Thus a very strange scenario arose where members of one party were acting against members of other parties. This should certainly raise doubts about the ideal that the Belgian parties were unitary actors.

It is fair to believe that the Belgian party system although multipolar is a difficult case and in a class by itself. As is certain we face difficulties if we insist upon retaining a very hard-nosed operational definition of a party, then we may regard even the Belgian parties as unitary actors. If we treat the 'families' as if they were parties it remains the case that these families have thus far gone into and come out of coalitions together, while none has yet been in the positions of being half in and half out of government. Links between language wings of the same family may be loose in some cases, but they are not yet loose enough for one wing to go into office without the other. Given the immense upheavals that have been seen in recent Belgian politics, however, even this possibility clearly cannot be ruled out."^20

Although a multiparty system, it is not surprising to find that in Belgium it is single party majority that has clocked the maximum duration of time, in terms of months (namely 46 months) when forming governments. In contrast, the coalition cabinets had very little longevity; namely 12 and 25 months

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20 See Laver and Schofield- supra p.221
in case of minimal winning cabinets and surplus majority cabinets (See Table no. II.4).

**Denmark**

Another multipolar system, its politics was dominated by four mainstream parties until 1973, viz, the Radical Liberals (RV), Social Democrats (SD), Conservative Party (KF) and the Liberals (V). These parties were highly cohesive and disciplined, following the Scandinavian adage of strict party discipline.

The major parties in this multipolar system are the Danish Communist Party (DKP) from which the Socialist People's Party emerged, which became Denmark's most influential parties. The Social Democrats are the second major group who entered into a coalition with the Socialist People's party (SFP) during 1966-1968. The SFP further splitted and the Left Socialist group came into being in 1967. The splintering of the Left parties and the Social democrats' unwillingness to take the Socialists as partners in coalitions brought the emergence of the Radical Liberals. "The turbulence and shifting pattern of inter-party cooperation that characterize the parliamentary system during the years before 1973 can to a large extent be traced back to the conflict between the executive and
the parliamentary party of the Socialist People's Party between 1966 and 1968.\textsuperscript{21}

New parties came up on the political scene after 1973. The Christian People's party and Mogens Glistrup's Justice Party, in particular have had factionalisation within their ranks, more so because the new parties are not as rigidly organized as the older parties and have shown a greater tendency to divide.

Yet the culture of legislative party discipline hasn't got modified as of now. Fitzmaurice talks of the 'iron party discipline in Parliament'.\textsuperscript{22} Pederson opines that "coalition formation in parliament is still facilitated by the considerable cohesion of party groups ...the traditional norms of parliamentary conduct have been preserved and upheld with only minor infringements."\textsuperscript{23} It is evident that the rules of old parliamentary practice are still in operation.

As Laver & Schofield remark poignantly, the nature of representation has been characterized by this reality in Denmark. They say that "the threshold, for electoral representation in Denmark presents few major penalties for formation of new parties in general and for party splits in particular. Thus, while each of the parties functions relatively coherently as a unitary actor at any point of time, the possibility of splits and new parties is ever present in

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{21} Pederson,M. "The Danish 'working multi-party system' : Breakdown or Adoption?" in Hans Duvalder (ed.) \textit{Party Systems in Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, Netherlands and Belgium}, London : Pinter, 1987, p.37.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{22} See Fitzmaurice,I, "Coalitional theory and Practice in Scandinavia" in Pridham,G. (ed) \textit{supra} 1986, p.274.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{23} Pederson,M. \textit{supra} p.37.}
Denmark, a strategic environment that clearly likely to have a major impact on the politics of coalitions. 24

It is interesting that only minimal winning cabinets have been formed in Denmark (no surplus majority cabinets), which have posited an appreciable average tenure of 43 months on average. (See Table no.II.4).

Austria

Austria is a prime example of a bipolar political system where the Socialists (SPO) and the People's Party (OVP) are the torch bearers. The SPO however is the more homogenous of the two whereas the OVP is coalitional in structure being an association of federations. It has been stated by observers that this however, does not reflect on the coalitional process because "no federation controls the party. The party leaders thus must be brokers who can command the respect of the various federations, without being dependent on anyone of them. During the coalition period, the party leaders were Figl (OBB) < Austrian Farmers' Federation>, Raab (OWB) < Austrian Business Federation >, Gorbach (OABB) < Austrian Workers' and Employees' Federation>, and Klaus (OWB). Whenever the party leadership changed hands from one federation to another, that federation became the key one. The major party quarrels were over economic policy and the

distribution of the various cabinet posts.\textsuperscript{25}

Thus the OVP is a party within which there is considerable competition to control the leadership but where once the issue has been settled, the leadership wields extensive control. Muller has noted that the OVP has a dual character, when in opposition and when in power. When out of power and in opposition the party is dithering over a spate of dissension within it; but when it is in power the party leadership successfully steps up its management skills and ensures the rigid control of the leadership. Hence we find a difference in the unitary actor status of the party. Further Franz Horner has provided insight into the impact of intra party politics on party policy. He believes that the Basic programmes (Grundsatzprogramme) of the main parties show this well. These are "only changed after substantial debate and a special party convention, and may remain in force for decades. They are not keyed to a particular party leadership, not to a particular election. Examples are the OVP Salzburg Programm which was unanimously accepted at the party conference in Salzburg in November 1972, the Neue Programm adopted by the SPO at a party conference in May 1978 in Vienna; and the FPO Bad Ischlaer Programm adopted in 1968.\textsuperscript{26} Thus the basic programmes, which lay down the philosophy of the party in quite elaborate fashion require extensive discussion at all levels of party, election manifesto and certainly are not based on the whims of autocratic centralised party leadership.


We can therefore say that the "various features of the Austrian political scene suggests that, for coaltional purposes at least, the main parties can be treated as unitary actors without doing too much violence to reality. The OVP, a party that does have pronounced internal factions, tends to have one faction firmly in control at only one time, party policy positions are derived within the general scope of broadly agreed and wide ranging Basic programmes, while campaigning is a matter for party professionals."²⁷

In Austria, some 13 coalitions have been formed (see Table no. II.1) of which the single party majority cabinets have shown the longest longevity, followed by minimal winning cabinets at 46 months and 42 months respectively (see Table no. II.4) This signifies that despite the special conditions in the party system coalitions tend to last longer in Austria.

Wolfgang Muller has analysed the controversial decisions of the Socialist party and reached the conclusion that the Socialist party was a formidable pillar in the coalitions formed till 1966 after which the era of grand coalitions ended, in Austria. Thereafter, the importance of the Socialists recede. Muller has made the point that both electoral and policy concerns were central to its withdrawal from the coalitions and that the preference of the various party leaders corresponded closely to their personal incentives.²⁸ Hence a party's self effacing decisions can lead to its gradual withdrawal.

²⁷ See Laver & Schofield, supra p.218.
Ireland

Though an unipolar system, Ireland has two main parties - the Fianna Fail and Fine Gael both of which are strong organizationally with good party discipline binding the two. Largely the Irish parties have tended to run on personalist line, which has meant that their internal disputes are focused largely on personalities rather than on policies. Divisions have indeed occurred between them and within them, as also in the other two parties that exist in Ireland, (the total number of parties is four) but they act as unitary actors when it comes to coalition bargaining.

To give an example how divisions take place, it would be noteworthy to recall the role of Desmond O’Malley, who was expelled from Fianna Fail for fomenting dissent within the party, over the party’s Northern Ireland policy. O’Malley went to float a new party, the Progressive Democrat party which attracted parliamentary defectors mostly from Fianna Fail and votes from Fine Gael, doing surprisingly to get 14% vote share in its electoral debut in 1987.

The coming of Progressive Democrats has transformed the politics of coalition in Ireland by offering a new partner to Fine Gael for coalitions. All the parties have an authoritarian structure organizationally. Yet despite that, factional quarrels and the prospect of coalition with defectors who have left the party to form another party is a major source of conflicts in the system.
The Labour party which is a left wing party, the Fine Gael and the Fianna Fail which is operating in an important median position are the main coalition candidates and coalitions have been formed in and around Fianna Fail at the centre. It is to be noted that "overall, while internal party politics is at least as lively in Ireland as anywhere else, the parties as constituted tend to function as unitary actors. Major divisions have resulted in party splits, on the Scandinavian model, but the legislative voting discipline of the parliamentary parties is very tight, allowing Irish governments to operate successfully with what, in European terms, have been wafer thin majorities. Discipline in particular is strong in Fine Gael and Fianna Fail, parties which clearly can be committed to coalition strategies by their leaders alone. ...If we take a more dynamic perspective, however, intra-party politics and coalitional behaviour quite definitely interact with a clear potential to transform the party system."^29

In a recent work, Michael Marsh and Paul Mitchell have after examining a series of Irish coalitions in the 1980s, come out with serious organizational differences between the various parties. Till now, it was thought that their organizational coalescence was an accepted fact. They show that the decision, making process within the Irish Labour Party made it difficult for their leaders to pursue coalitions with the Fine Gael at the cost of policy compromise. Also, the personal incentives of the Fianna Fail Prime Minister Charles Haughey played a

major role in the party's unprecedented 1987 decision to forge a government coalition with the Progressive democrats.\textsuperscript{30}

Ireland has had some 12 coalitions according to our Table no.II.2, of which in terms of longevity, the single party majority governments have clocked the maximum, namely 49 months; followed by the minimal winning cabinet governments with 42 months. (Please see Table no.II.4).

\textbf{Luxemburg}

It has possibly one of the most straight-forward coalition systems. The political system is dominated by the Christian Socialist Party (CSV). However, the most important party split in Luxemburg has taken place in the Socialist Party (LSAP). The unipolar system has actually four parties. The LSAP split in 1970, to give rise to the Social Democratic party. This later assimilated into the CSV, in 1984. The Luxemburg Communist party (KPL) is a centralized pro-Soviet party. It has remained aloof from the politics of coalition as it is not prepared to make ideological compromise. Hence power sharing has taken place between the aha the LSAP.

The LSAP is influenced by the party congress which has the final power over all organizational matters, including framing the ideological position. An overview of the system would suggest that the parties in Luxemburg, with the exception of the LSAP split, can probably be treated as unitary actors for

the purposes of coalition. The reigning importance of party discipline is inherently strong and the orderly nature of politics of coalition here has little confusion regarding the important actors in the system.

Norway

Norway has an unipolar system where there are clearly well defined 'two bloc' politics. Due to this a situation of two party politics is created and where there is definite inducement for the parties not to split.

Karen Strom has talked about the relatively speaking, high degree of control that leaders exercise over their parties, while Fitzmaurice lays stress on the 'iron party discipline in Parliament.' Valen has stated that the coherence of the Norwegian parties arises because legislators accept the norm of party discipline rather than because they respond to punishments or threats.

The Labour Party (NA) which faced erstwhile four parties mostly right wing till 1965 was holding the median position. After that, the

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31 Strom, K. “Deferred Gratification and Minority governments”, *Scandinavian legislative Studies Quarterly* v.11, no.4 (1986) p.589

32 Fitzmaurice, G. *ibid.*, p.274.

33 Valen, H. “Norway, Decentralisation and group Representation” in Gallagher & Marsh (eds.) *ibid.*, p.231.
Liberal Party (Venstre) gained prominence and holds the median position. The European Community referendum in 1972 caused significant party system change, giving the Socialist People's party a surge of support as it opposed Norway's accession to the EC. However this has died down and the EC issue did not produce any serious splits within the main parties. Political parties clearly function in Norway more as unitary actors than do those in most of the other West European systems. This is the result of general consensual norms accepted by the legislators than of any specific set of constraints on their freedom of action.

Most of the cabinets formed in Norway have been single party majority cabinets. They have lasted for the average duration of 48 months whereas coalitional cabinets formed by minimal Winning criteria have been in operation only for an average period of 37 months (see Table No. II.4).

Sweden

In Sweden also, like in Norway, we find the operation of 'two-bloc' politics and it has helped to maintain party solidarity. Here, the Social Democrats have traditionally received good support at 'the hustings; but it has always received a level of support which is just below than the tally required for a majority. Hence, three bourgeois parties the Conservative, Centre (earlier known as Agrarian party) and the Liberal parties have combined to it oppose the Social Democrats.

Tight party discipline and a stable party system has meant that, in parliamentary terms, the parties can be treated as unitary actors for coalitional purposes. Strom for example, has stated that like Denmark and Norway on the their respective organisations. However, the manner in which there is close
The interrelationship between interest groups and parties suggests that the autonomy of Swedish parties to make purely tactical coalitional arrangements is severely constrained. In Sweden, actors outside the party system have a major importance in the politics of coalition.

Here, first it was the Social Democratic party (SD) and later the Agrarian / Centre Party have held the median Position. Sweden has shown a lesser tenure for its coalition cabinets that have been formed till 1987 - namely, an average of 24 months for minimal winning and 30 months for minority governments. (See Table No.II.4).

IV

SOME LESSONS FROM OUR SURVEY

We have found from our study of governments of various countries a few broad rubrics which are going to be of continuing relevance for democratic systems in the future.

Firstly, as we enter the portals of a new century we find that there is a broad consensus on the legitimacy of democracy as a form of government in all societies where people are free and where they express their opinion through franchise systems. The continuing relevance of the democratic systems is more because it is best suited to meet new challenges with time and give representation to a wide variety of voices, dissenting or discordant with the majority opinion.
representation to a wide variety of voices, dissenting or discordant with the majority opinion.

Secondly, there is also considerable agreement in both established as well as in unstable or unconsolidated democracies that political parties are essential to the working of the democracies. Majoritarianism doesn't always mean the rule of majority party, it may well mean a coalition government's rule in the changed political circumstances that are observed all over the world. The countries' we have surveyed show very clearly that coalition governments, including the minority government coalitions have equal chances of survival as a majority party dominating the power stratum, if a culture of power adjustment is its hallmark.

Thirdly, a lesson that should be learnt, especially for those forming coalition cabinets in India is that a greater level of political sagacity and maturity is required to run and operate minority coalitions. A higher degree of accommodation, tolerance and power sharing is required in a polyglot or pluralist society where the various components especially the leftouts (those outside of the consensual process), the minorities, the dispossessed are the neglected, deprived groups and their formations, regional or non-national, localized political parties have to be parts of the coalition government.

Fourthly, in coalitional systems, policy bargaining takes place, for the most part, outside of the legislature. Hence, in the context of minority coalition government systems legislatures become less important and the level of negotiation, articulation between parties constituting the coalition...
formation and their comfort levels or adjustment level becomes very important. Hence there is a great correspondence between give and take and permanence or consolidation of coalition systems.