CHAPTER THREE

THE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE BALOCH UNDER THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

The aim of this chapter is to describe the political status of Baloch after the Islamic Revolution (1979) in Iran. In order to understand the political situation of Baloch in post Islamic Revolution Iran, one needs to understand first the constitutional framework of the Islamic Republic. As a given foundation, it is in fact the constitution that initiates and defines the status of its subjects. Therefore, in connection with this, a brief analytical study of the constitutional structure enables us to understand better the political construction of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Then, the constitutional status of the Iranian Baloch shall be taken into view. The second part of the chapter deals with the socio-political status of Baloch in Iran. And, finally the chapter ends with a general assessment.

CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the constitution of the Islamic Republic bespeaking the cultural, social, political, and economic organs of the Iranian society is based on Islamic principles and precepts and reflects the true aspirations of the Islamic nation. The fundamental characteristic of the Islamic Revolution as compared with other movements in Iran during the last century is its ideological and Islamic character. The Muslim nation of Iran, after going through the anti-dictatorial constitutional movement and anti-colonial nationalization of oil movement learned this precious lesson that the
basic and clear reason for the failure of those movements was the fact that they were not ideological. The plan of the Islamic government based on the concept of ‘Velayat-e Faqih’ which means ‘Rule of the Clergy’, presented by Imam Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran. On the basis of the concept of ‘rule by the clergy and perpetual leadership’ the constitution would lay the ground for the realization of leadership by the fully qualified ‘faqih’ or ‘jurisconsult’, recognized by the people as their leader, and thus people’s affairs are entrusted to faithful Ulema or religious authorities who know of what is allowed and what is forbidden so that the jurisconsult may safeguard against any deviations by various organs of the state from their true Islamic functions.  

In Shia sect (Jafari Athna Ashari) of Islam in Iran, rule by the clergy and perpetual leadership, embodies the idea that until the appearance of Imam Mahdi (as is believed by Shia), the leadership of the Muslims rests with the representative of Imam or the clerics.

In any case, so far as the structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran is concerned, the major institutions of the Iranian Islamic State are: the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Guardian Council, Judiciary, Expert Assembly, Presidency, Expediency Discernment Council, Leadership, Armed Forces, and Ministry of Intelligence. Each of them has been explained in the following manner.

**Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis or Parliament)**

Before the Islamic Revolution, *Majlis* (Assembly) was the name of the lower house of the Iranian Legislature from 1906 to 1979. The upper house was the Senate. But, after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Senate was abolished and the Iranian legislature thus became unicameral. In the 1989 revision of the constitution, the 'National Consultative Assembly' became the 'Islamic Consultative Assembly' (Majlis-e Shora-ye Islami). Currently, the Islamic
Consultative Assembly has 290 members, five of whom represent non-Muslim religious minorities such as Zoroastrians and Jews each one member, one member for Assyrian and Caldean Christians, and one member for each Armenian Christians of north and south, who are popularly elected for a four-year term. The supervision of the elections of the Islamic Consultative Assembly is undertaken by the Guardian Council. The approbation and public supervision runs in all the stages and affairs of elections. The Assembly can force the dismissal of cabinet ministers by no-confidence votes and can impeach the president for misconduct in office. Although the Executive proposes most new laws, individual deputies of the Assembly may also introduce legislation. Deputies also may propose amendments to bills being debated. The Assembly drafts legislation, ratifies international treaties, and approves the national budget.

All Assembly candidates and all legislation from the Assembly must be approved by the Guardian Council. In this respect, anyone who is qualified for the Islamic Consultative Assembly is free to nominate his/her name as a candidate for the Assembly. In every city there is a Governor Office, and in this regard, after receiving the registered names of candidates, Governor Office would dispatch them to the Guardian Council’s branch of the respective provinces for necessary enquiries and investigations. After the approval of the Guardian Council, the people can vote for the candidates. The elections will be enforced publicly and directly with confidential votes. The power of the Islamic Consultative Assembly is restricted. For example, according to Article 72 of the constitution, the Islamic Consultative Assembly may not enact laws contrary to the principle and rules of the official faith of the country or the constitution. The issue shall be decided by the Guardian Council in the manner set forth in Article 96, or according to Article 73, which says "the interpretation of ordinary laws shall be within the competence of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, however,
this article shall not prevent the judges from interpreting laws while administrating justice." 

Guardian Council (Shoraye- Negahban)

The constitution states that with a view to safeguarding the rules of Islam and the constitution and to see whether the approvals of the Islamic Consultative Assembly are consistent with them or not, a council known as Guardian Council shall be established composed of twelve persons: Six jurisconsults (clerical Islamic canonists) who are appointed by the supreme leader or Leadership Council, and six more jurists (civilian jurists) specializing in various branches of law, elected by the Islamic Consultative Assembly from among Muslim jurists proposed to the Islamic Consultative Assembly by Head of the Judiciary, who himself is appointed by the supreme leader. Members of the Guardian Council serve a six-year term. Only in the first term, however, half of its members, as determined by lots, were changed after three years. The supreme leader is empowered to reinstate the Islamic canonist members of the Council after their six-year term is over.

The Guardian Council is charged to interpret the constitution of the Islamic Republic; to supervise elections of, and approval of candidates to the Assembly of Experts; the approval of candidates for the Office of Presidency; and to approve candidates for the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Without Guardian Council, the Islamic Consultative Assembly have no legal validity except in case of approval of credentials of its representatives and election of six jurist members of the Guardian Council. The clear implication of the presence of Guardian Council is that almost any kind of law or legislation passed in Iran directly or indirectly must be filtered by the Council. The Guardian Council is in effect an upper house of parliament with the power to vote out the lower
house's resolutions. It is assigned to check the laws passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, compare them with the provisions of the Islamic canon and the constitution, and ratify them, or return them to the Assembly for being amended.

**Judiciary**

A nationwide judicial system in Iran was first implemented and established by Ali Akbar Davar, the founder of modern judicial system of Iran and some of his contemporaries such as Abdol Hossain Teymourtash, who served as the first Minister of Court from 1925 to 1932, under the regime of Reza Shah. After the 1979 overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty by the Islamic Revolution, the system was changed drastically. The legal code converted into Shia Islamic law. According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic, the Judiciary in Iran is an independent power and is in accordance with the Islamic penal code. The entire legal system - 'from the supreme court to regional courts, all the way down to local and revolutionary courts' - is under the purview of the Ministry of Justice. But, in addition to a Minister of Justice and Head of the Supreme Court, there is also a separate appointed Head of the Judiciary. For the purpose of carrying out the responsibilities of the Judiciary in all judicial, administrative, and executive matters, the supreme leader appoints, for five years, a mojtahed meaning a doctor in religious law, as Head of the Judiciary, who is the highest authority of the Judiciary.\(^4\) He is responsible for the establishment of organizational structure of the judicial system; drafting judiciary bills for parliament; hiring, firing, promoting, and assigning judges. But, judges cannot be dismissed without a trial. Judiciary also conducts the election of the members of Guardian Council. In this regard, Judiciary chooses more than nine people and dispatch the list to the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and then the Assembly selects six of the candidates and Leadership selects six others.
The Ministry of Justice is the official authority to which all grievances and complaints are referred. The Ministry of Justice is in charge of administrating the ministry, as well as, coordinating the relationship which exists between Judiciary, Legislature, and Executive.

The courts in Iran are functionally classified according to their area of jurisdiction (civil or criminal), and according to the seriousness of the crime or the litigation. There are four civil courts: first level civil courts, second level civil courts, independent civil courts, and special civil courts. These courts attend to matters related to family laws and have jurisdiction over issues such as divorce, child custody, etc. Criminal courts fall into two categories: first and second level criminal courts. The first level courts have jurisdiction over prosecution for felony charges, while the second level courts try cases that involve lighter punitive action.

In addition to the regular courts, which hear criminal and civil suits, the Judiciary encompasses clerical tribunals, revolutionary tribunals, and the court of administrative justice. Clerical courts entrusted with the task of trying and punishing defiant clerics. Revolutionary tribunals are charged with the responsibility of hearing and trying charges of terrorism and offenses against national security. The Court of Administrative Justice under the supervision of the head of judicial branch is authorized to investigate any complaints or objections by people with respect to government officials and organizations.

The constitution also requires the establishment of a Supreme Court with the task of supervising the implementation of laws by the courts and ensuring uniformity in judicial procedures. The Head of Judiciary, in consultation with the judges of the Supreme Court, nominates the Chief of the Supreme Court and the Attorney-General, who must be a specialist in Islamic Law. As a matter of
fact, all judges in Iran under the Islamic Republic are certified in Islamic law, and most, but not all, are members of the ruling clergy.

**Experts Assembly (Khobregan)**

The constitution states that the law relating to the number and qualifications of the Experts, to manner of their elections, and the internal regulations pertaining to their meetings, shall be drawn up in the first term by the jurisconsults of the first Guardian Council, approved by their majority vote, and then finally ratified by the leader of 1979 Revolution (Khomeini). Thereafter, any amendment or review in this law and the approval of other regulations related to functions of the Experts shall be within the competence of the Experts themselves.  

Members of the Experts Assembly would be selected from a government-screened list of candidates and then would be elected by direct public vote to a six-year term. In every province, some qualified clerics nominate themselves for the Experts. A list of these men goes to the Guardian Council, where after its approval, the people of every province elect their respective candidates, and after the election Experts Assembly can be formed. The constitution does not specify requirements for members of the Experts Assembly, leaving the Assembly itself to put limits on who may be a candidate. The Experts Assembly has passed laws to require all its members be experts in *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), authorizing the Guardian Council to vet candidates for *ijtihad* (becoming qualified for religious guidance) proficiency using written and oral examinations. Currently, the average age of its members is over 60 years, which results in many mid-term elections.

The Assembly of Experts is a deliberative body of 86 *mojtahids* (clerics practicing religious jurisprudence) which is charged with electing the Supreme Leader of Iran
and supervising over his activities. Current laws require the Assembly to meet for at least two days, twice annually.

According to the Iranian constitution, the Experts Assembly is in charge of supervising, dismissing, and electing the Supreme Leader. In the event of his death, resignation or dismissal, the Experts shall take steps within the shortest possible time to appoint a new Leader. Whenever the Leader becomes incapable of fulfilling his constitutional duties, or lobs one of the qualifications mentioned in the constitution or it becomes known that he initially did not possess some of the qualifications, he will be dismissed. The Experts Assembly, however, has never dismissed a sitting Supreme Leader, and as all of their meetings and notes are strictly confidential, the Assembly has never been known to challenge or otherwise publicly oversee any of the Supreme Leader's decisions.

The Experts are to review and consult among themselves concerning Islamic jurists possessing the qualifications of leadership. Constitutionally, these criteria include "Islamic scholarship, justice, piety, right political and social perspicacity, prudence, courage, administrative facilities and adequate capability for leadership." In the event, they find one of the jurists better versed in Islamic regulations, in the subjects of the religious jurisprudence, or in political and social issues, or possessing general popularity or special prominence for any of the qualifications of leadership, they shall elect him as the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Otherwise, in the absence of such a candidate, the Experts shall elect and declare one of themselves as the Supreme Leader.

The Experts Assembly gathers every six months. Activities of the Assembly include compiling a list of those eligible to become leader in the event of the current leader's death, resignation, or dismissal. This is done by the 107/109 commission. Monitoring the current leader to make sure he continues to meet
all the criteria listed in the constitution. This is done by the 111 commission. Members of Experts Assembly report to this commission about the issues concerning the current leader, and the commission can then order an emergency meeting of the Assembly. If the commission denies this, the members can ask the general assembly for a vote, and if most of the members of assembly decide, there will be an emergency meeting of the Assembly for discussing about the current leader. The meetings, meeting notes, and reports of the Assembly are confidential and not made available to anyone outside the Assembly, except for the sitting Supreme Leader.

**Presidency**

The President is the highest elected official in the Islamic Republic of Iran, second only to the Supreme Leader. According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the President is responsible for the functions of the Executive, such as signing treaties and agreements with other countries and international organizations. However, unlike many other countries, in the Islamic Republic of Iran the President does not have full control over foreign policy, the armed forces, or the nuclear policy of the Iranian state, which are under the control of the Supreme Leader.

Iran's President fulfills many of the classical functions of a 'head of state' such as accepting the credentials of ambassadors. Since a change in the constitution removed the post of Prime Minister and merged most of the prime ministerial duties with the President's in 1989, the once figurehead Presidential post has become a position of significant government influence. In addition, as the highest directly elected official in Iran, the President is responsive and responsible to public opinion in a way that the Supreme Leader is not. Although he is responsible to both people and the Supreme Leader, he is independent in his decisions and the policies of the government. The two terms of President
Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) serve as an example of how independently a President can act in the Islamic Republic. The relative democratic nature of his administration can be taken as an example, where a number of Iranian critics openly criticized some of the high ranking authorities of the Islamic Republic.

The President nominates the members of government to the Islamic Consultative Assembly. He has the power to dismiss any of the government members. He appoints the secretary of the National Security Council, as well as, the General Governors of the provinces and ambassadors of the Islamic Republic to other countries. Until recently, he had the power of appointing the mayors of cities, however, the power was given to the local assemblies of the cities, which are directly elected by the people and directed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

The President formulates the foreign policy through the National Security Council and after seeking Supreme Leader's approval. These policies are usually executed by Minister of Foreign Affairs in terms of general relationships with other states and by Secretary General of the Security Council.

According to the constitution, the President can be dismissed and removed from office in two ways. First, when a judge reports a criminal record for the President and in this case, the Supreme Leader has the power to remove him from office. The other way is when the Islamic Consultative Assembly decides about his political ineligibility and asks the Supreme Leader to remove him from office. This law was activated when the Islamic Consultative Assembly voted against Iran's first President, Abol Hassan Banisadr, and Ayatollah Khomeini removed him from office.

The President of Iran is elected for a four year term in a national election by universal adult suffrage for every one of at least 18 years of age. He is also
eligible for a second term. Candidates for the presidency must be approved by the Guardian Council (as noted earlier, six of the council's members are appointed directly by the supreme leader and six others can be indirectly appointed by the supreme leader). According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic, candidates for presidency must possess the following qualifications: Iranian origin, Iranian nationality, administrative capacity and resourcefulness, a good past record, trustworthiness and piety, and convinced belief in the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the official religion of the country, which is Shia Jafari Athna Ashari. It is also alleged that most of Iran's clerical elite demand that the candidate must be male, but this is still a contentious issue. Women have attempted to run for presidency before.

Within these guidelines the Guardian Council vetoes candidates who are deemed unacceptable. The approval process is considered to be a check on the President's power, and usually amounts to a small number of candidates being approved. In the 1997 election, for example, only four out of 238 presidential candidates were approved by the Guardian Council. Western observers have routinely criticized the approvals process as a way for the Guardian Council and Supreme Leader to ensure that only conservative and like-minded Islamic fundamentalists can win the office. However, the Guardian Council rejects such criticism, referring to the approval of reformists in the previous elections. The Guardian Council rejects most of the candidates, reasoning that they are not well-known and constitutionally qualified political figures.

**Expediency Discernment Council of the System**

In 1987, the extent of the doctrinal conflict between the Guardian Council and the radical elements of the Islamic Consultative Assembly had brought the legislative process and long-term economic policy formation to a standstill. After intensive consultations, in February 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini ordered
the appointment of a 13-member council known as the Expediency Discernment Council of the System (Majma-e Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam-e Jomhoori-e Islami). The role of the Expediency Council was to settle the differences between the views of the Guardian Council and the Islamic Consultative Assembly. In addition, the Expediency Council was given legislative authority, which enabled it to pass temporary laws, effective for a three-year period.\footnote{6}

Article 112 of the constitution states, the Expediency Discernment Council of the System shall be convened at the order of the Leader to determine such expediency in cases, where the Guardian Council finds an approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly against the principles of religious law (Sharia) or the constitution, and the Islamic Consultative Assembly in view of the expediency of the Islamic Republic of Iran is unable to satisfy the Guardian Council. The Expediency Discernment Council also may convene meetings for consultation in matters referred to it by the Leader and for discharging other functions laid down in the law. The permanent and mutable members of this Council shall be appointed by the Leader. Regulations related to the Expediency Discernment Council shall be prepared and approved by the members of the Expediency Discernment Council themselves and ratified by the Leader. On 18 March 1997, Ayatollah Khamenei appointed (the second leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran) 27 new members for five years and cleric Hashemi Rafsanjani as the Chairman of the Council, thus opening a new window to the functions of the Council. The major functions of the Expediency Discernment Council of the System are: First, making decisions in those cases where the ratification of the Islamic Consultative Assembly is not confirmed by the Guardian Council, and where the deputies insist on the implementation of the ratification. Second, consultation in those matters referred thereto by the Leader. Third, selection of a faqih (clerical Islamic jurist) member of the Guardian Council, as a member of the Leadership Council, in accordance with Article 111 of the constitution.
Article 111 of the constitution states, in case the Leader is unable to carry out his legal functions, or loses one of his qualifications mentioned in Article 5 and Article 109, or if it transpires that he did not qualify some of the conditions, he shall be dismissed from his position. Such decision shall be made by the Assembly of Experts as stated in Article 108 of the constitution. In the case of death, resignation or dismissal of the Leader, the Assembly of Experts shall be required to determine and declare the new Leader at the earliest. As long as the Leader is not declared, a council composed of the President, Head of the Judiciary, and one of the jurisconsults (faqih) of the Guardian Council chosen by the Expediency Discernment Council shall collectively discharge the functions of the Leader on a temporary basis. If one of them is not able to discharge his duties for any reason whatsoever during this period, another person shall be appointed by the Expediency Discernment Council in his place. If the Leader is temporarily unable to discharge the 'functions of the Leader' as a result of sickness or other accidents, the Council shall discharge his functions during such period.

The majority members of the Expediency Discernment Council (34 members) are from the conservative parties and it has sided with the conservative Guardian Council in many of its disputes with the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Members included a number of ayatollahs (ayatollah means sign of Allah or God), as well as, many hojatoleslams (hojatoleslam means authority on Islam), one rank below ayatollah. Since 1989, the Expediency Discernment Council has been advising the Supreme Leader on matters of national policy. In August 2001, the Supreme Leader of Iran called on the Expediency Council (country's main arbitration body) to resolve a dispute between the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Judiciary. Ayatollah Khamenie wanted the Expediency Council to settle the political standoff between the Islamic Consultative Assembly, which was dominated by the reformers, and the Judiciary, which was
controlled by the conservatives. The issue was about Parliament's (Islamic Consultative Assembly) refusal to approve conservative candidates to vacancies at the Guardian Council. The dispute arose when reformers in the Islamic Consultative Assembly opposed the appointment of at least two conservative candidates, saying they were politically biased. Conservatives were anxious not to lose control of the Guardian Council, fearing that President Mohammad Khatami (the then President of the Islamic Republic from 1997 to 2005) and his reformist allies would then be able to push through political and social reforms. In 2005, the Council's powers were expanded to act as a supervisory body for the government. In fact, the Expediency Discernment Council's power increased significantly when cleric Hashemi Rafsanjani joined it.

**National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran**

It is also called as 'High / Supreme National Security Council', which is an institution founded in the course of 1989 revision of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The National Security Council has been established with an aim to safeguard the Islamic Republic of Iran's national interests, its sovereignty, and territorial integrity. According to chapter 13 of the constitution, the responsibilities of the National Security Council are: to determine the national defense/security policies within the framework of general policies lay down by the Leader; to coordinate political, intelligence, social, cultural and economic activities in relation to general defense/security policies; and to exploit material and non-material resources of the country for facing internal and external threats. Commensurate with its responsibilities, the Supreme National Security Council has established sub-committees such as defense subcommittee and national security sub-committee. The sub-committees are headed by the President or one of the members of the National Security Council appointed by the President.
Limits of authorities and functions of the sub-committees are laid down by law and their organizational structures are approved by the National Security Council itself. Approvals of the National Security Council shall be enforceable after ratification of the Leader. The members of the Council consists of: Heads of the three Powers (Executive, Legislative and Judiciary), Chief of the Supreme Command Council of the Armed Forces, the official in charge of the Plan & Budget Organization, two representatives nominated by the Leader, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Intelligence, a Minister concerned with the subject, and the highest authorities of the Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.  

**Leadership**

The post of Supreme Leader was created in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran as the highest ranking political and religious authority of the country, in accordance with the concept of Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists. More powerful than the President of Iran, the Leader appoints the heads of many powerful posts - the commanders of the armed forces, the director of the national radio and television network, the heads of the major religious foundations, the prayer leaders in city mosques, and the members of national security council, who are dealing with defense and foreign affairs. He also appoints the chief judge, the chief prosecutor, special tribunals, half of the members of the guardian council, and can influence the chief judge for the other six members of the guardian council – the powerful body that decides both what bills may become law and who may run for President or Parliament, etc.

Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 till the current time (2008), Iran has had only two Supreme Leaders, first Imam Khomeni the founder of the Islamic
Republic of Iran who died in 1989 and second one Ayatollah Khamenei who is still in power.

As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Leader is elected by the Assembly of Experts. This Assembly is in charge of overseeing the activities of Leader and also has the power to dismiss him. As the title indicates, the Supreme Leader is regarded as the ultimate head of the Islamic Republic of Iran, above that of Iran's President. According to the constitution, he has the final say in national and international policies of the Islamic Republic, controls the armed forces (Army, Revolutionary Guards, Police), and controls the state broadcasting corporations, etc. Although President of Iran who is elected by the public vote is head of the government, he is not the head of the state. In 1989, as noted earlier, the Prime Minister's office was merged with the figurehead President's office to form the current post of President of Iran, but certain executive powers such as commandment of the armed forces and declaration of war and peace remain in the hands of the Supreme Leader.

The major functions and responsibilities of the Supreme Leader are noted down in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the following way: delineation of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after consultation with the Nation's Expediency Discernment Council; supervision over the proper execution of the general policies of the systems; issuing decrees for national referendums; assuming supreme command of the armed forces; declaration of war and peace, and the mobilization of the armed forces; appointment, dismissal, and acceptance of resignation of: the jurists on the Guardian Council, the supreme judicial authority of the country, the head of the radio and television network of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the chief of the joint staff, the chief commander of the armed forces of the country, the supreme commanders of the armed forces; resolving differences between the three wings of the armed forces and regulation of their relations; resolving the problems,
which cannot be solved by conventional methods through the Nation's Expediency Council; signing the decrees, formalizing the elections in Iran for the President of the Republic by the people; dismissal of the President of the Republic, with due regard for the interests of the country, after the Supreme Court holds him guilty of the violation of his constitutional duties, or after a vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament) testifying to his incompetence on the basis of Article 89 of the Constitution; and pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts within the framework of Islamic criteria on a recommendation (to that effect) from the head of the Judiciary. The Leader may also delegate part of his duties and powers to another person.  

**Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran**

According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, which today consist of three main components: the regular Military or Army (artesh); the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Forces with its paramilitary Basij militia; and the Law Enforcement Forces. The regular Military and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Forces are subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, which is headed by Admiral Ali Shamkhani, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard officer, who is considered sympathetic to the country's conservative hard-liners. These organizations are responsible for defending Iran's borders and providing for internal security. The Law Enforcement Forces are formally subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, and play a key internal and frontier-security role. 

The division of Iran's combat forces between the regular Military and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps dates to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, when the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was formed in order to maintain internal security, safeguard the ideological purity of the Revolution, and counterbalance
the regular Military. The new clerical regime distrusted the regular Military because of its association with the deposed Shah and saw it as a potential counterrevolutionary force.

For this reason, relations between the regular Military and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have been characterized by ambivalence, mistrust and at times outright hostility. This distrust was also a major factor behind large-scale purges of the Military after the Revolution and the formation of a political-ideological directorate which ensures clerical oversight of the Military by placing personal representatives of the Supreme Leader in all major commands. These activities are all part and parcel of the regime's efforts, dating to the early days of the Revolution to Islamicize the armed forces. Such parallel structures are characteristics of the Islamic Republic, where throughout the government the authority of conventional political and military institutions is checked by that of revolutionary Islamic institutions. Thus, the powers of the President are circumscribed by those of the Supreme Leader; that of the Islamic Consultative Assembly; by the Guardian Council; by those of the regular Military; and by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Paradoxically, this arrangement has been a source of both stability and tension within the Islamic Republic. In October 1998, however, at the height of the crisis with Afghanistan, Ayatollah Khamenei created a new position namely 'supreme commander for the regular military.' This step put the regular Military on a par with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for the first time (the latter has had a supreme commander since 1981), and represented an upgrading of the importance of the regular Military. It derived from recognition of the fact that in the event of a war with Afghanistan, the regime could not rely on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps alone but would have to rely on the regular Military to bear the brunt of the fighting. The interests of the state thus made such a step imperative. The dual structure of the armed forces, however, remains intact, and is likely to
do so as long as the current regime survives, as it reflects a fundamental organizational principle of the Islamic Republic, rooted in the political logic of the regime.  

As of 2006, the **regular Iranian Military** was estimated to have 350,000 personnel (220,000 conscripts and 130,000 professionals). According to Articles 143 and 144 of the constitution, the Military of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall be responsible for safeguarding the independence, territorial integrity and the Islamic Republican system of the country. The Military of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall be an Islamic Army, which is an ideological, and people's army, which shall recruit competent individuals faithful to the objectives of the Islamic Revolution and ready to make sacrifices for attaining the same.

In 1979 the Military was a largely mechanized and armored force of about 285,000 troops; organized in 3 corps, with headquarters in Tehran area, in Shiraz in the south, and in Kermanshah near the Iraqi border. There were additional plans for a fourth corps to be established in Chabahar of Balochistan.

With regard to the **Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps**, as pointed earlier, before the 1979 Revolution, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, relied on military might to ensure national security and to safeguard his power. Afterwards, the new Islamic authorities, headed by Ayatollah Khomeini, realized that they need a powerful force committed to consolidating their leadership and revolutionary ideals. The clerics, therefore, produced a new constitution that provided for both a regular Military, to defend Iran's borders and maintain internal order, and a separate Revolutionary Guard, to protect the country's Islamic system. Hence, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps formed in May 1979 as a force loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The role of this military and intelligence force is to
protect the ideals of Iran’s Islamic Revolution and its achievements, as it is stipulated in Article 150 of the constitution. In this regard, Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a former CIA analyst says, the Revolutionary Guards Corps was created as a “counterweight to the regular Military, and to protect the Revolution against a possible coup.” Khomeini’s revolutionary government, which toppled the US-backed regime of Shah (Mohammad Reza Pahlavi), was seeking to avoid a repeat of a successful 1953 coup that ousted another revolutionary government…

The Revolutionary Guards Corps possess its own large and capable intelligence agency and reports directly to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although Iran’s President appoints military leaders of the Guard, he has little influence on day-to-day operations. Like the Ministry of Intelligence, the Revolutionary Guards' intelligence unit operates both within Iran and abroad. The main role of this force is to maintain national security. The force is believed to have staff in embassies of the Islamic Republic of Iran around the world, from where it allegedly conducts intelligence operations and organizes training camps and arms shipments for foreign militant groups which Iran supports, such as Hezbollah. The Revolutionary Guards also has responsibility for Iran's strategic missile force of Shahab missiles and is thought to control the country's suspected nuclear weapons program.

According to a report by BBC, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps is estimated to have 125,000 active troops, boasts its own ground forces, navy, and air force, and oversees Iran's strategic weapons. Despite having 200,000 fewer troops than the regular Military or Army, the Guards are considered the dominant military force in Iran and are behind many of the country's key military operations. In March 2007, it was the Guards' navy which sparked a
diplomatic stand-off with the UK by detaining 15 British sailors and marines patrolling the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab waterway separating Iran and Iraq.  

According to an English report in Los Angeles Times, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards has quietly become one of the most significant political and economic powers in the Islamic Republic, with ties to more than 100 companies, which by some estimates control more than $12 billion in business and construction. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps has its hand in a broad and diverse variety of activities such as dentistry and travel, and has become the dominant player in public construction projects across the country. Across Iran, public projects involving pipelines, roads, bridges, oil, and gas are dominated by the Guard’s engineering arm.  

The Guard presides over a multibillion-dollar income stream outside the scrutiny of Iran’s Parliament or the national budgeting process. For example, the controversial uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, which came to light in 2002 was developed under close supervision by the Revolutionary Guards without disclosure under the Parliament’s public budgeting process.  

The Financial Times estimated that about 30% of their operations are business-related, generating an estimated $2 billion in annual revenues.  

Under the leadership of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a former Revolutionary Guard commander, the force has extended its reach in the Cabinet e.g. 14 of 21 members are former Guard commanders. Former officers also hold 80 of the 290 seats in the Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament). The Guards also have a powerful presence in civilian institutions and control the Basij Resistance Force (an Islamic volunteer militia of about 90,000 men and women and a mobilizational capacity of nearly one million). The Basij or Mobilisation of the Oppressed, are loyalists to the Revolution who are often called out onto the streets at times of crisis to use force to dispel dissent. The
Revolutionary Guards' power and influence is such that the U.S. government has designated it a "proliferators of Weapons of Mass Destruction." 24

**Ministry of Intelligence & Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran**

Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979) maintained power through a state security organization, SAVAK. His overthrow led to the establishment of the world's first major Islamic theocracy under the rule of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. Thus, a new form of 'police state' was born in contrast to the Soviet, Nazi, or nationalist models --- a state in which security forces are often directed toward the enforcement of religious law.25 As a matter of fact, the concept was to create a new intelligent system to replace SAVAK, Iran's intelligence agency during the rule of Shah. But, it is unclear how much continuity is between the two organizations. While, their role is similar, their underlying ideology is radically different.

The formation of the Ministry was proposed by cleric Saeed Hajjarian (a well known Shia political figure) to the government of Mir Hossain Mosavi (the last Prime Minister of Iran from 1981 to 1988, at the time of Ayatollah Khamenei's presidency, then a change in the constitution removed the post of Prime Minister) and to the Parliament. There were debates about which branch of the state should oversee the new institution. Finally, the government could get the approval of Ayatollah Khomeini to make it a ministry, but a restriction was added to the requirements of the minister, needing him to be a *majtahed* or a scholar of Islamic law. The Ministry was finally founded on August 18 of 1984 abandoning many small intelligence agencies that were formed in different governmental organizations.26

The Ministry of Intelligence & Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran, is an important part of the government's security apparatus, which is well funded and
equipped. With a large budget and extensive organization, the Ministry of Intelligence is of the most powerful ministries in the Iranian government. In the entire country, the Ministry of Intelligence holds its various divisions and subdivisions. The Ministry of Intelligence operates under the direct supervision of the Supreme Leader. It is not accountable to either the cabinet or the parliament and has a secret budget.

Although the exact number of the agents or personnel of the Ministry of Intelligence is not clear, a report by Mahan Abedin claims that the Ministry of Intelligence has around 15,000 officers and support staff, who, unlike the former SAVAK, are all civilians. The Ministry's foreign intelligence directorate boasts around 2,000 officers whose top priority is intelligence gathering in Central Asia, Pakistan, Iraq, the Sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia. 27

Another source reports, the personnel of the Ministry of Intelligence are also attached as diplomats in the Iranian embassies and consulate offices around the world, or are attached as Ministry of Guidance & Propaganda representatives. 28

Many of Iran’s diplomats have a record of previous service with the Ministry of Intelligence, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or with other security agencies. The Ministry works in coordination with the Foreign Ministry in missions carried out abroad, making particular use of the Iranian embassies worldwide as hubs for gathering intelligence and diplomatic passes for agents involved in mission. Internally, agents of the Ministry are rigorously tested before they are given security clearance and trusted enough to take part in sensitive security operations. Many of the members, who themselves were handpicked from other security agencies inside the country, are first to ensure their loyalty to the Islamic Republic and its Supreme Leader. Only the most
loyal cadres are inducted into the organization. Throughout the years, on a number of occasions, the Ministry has gone through internal purges, whereby agents showing weakness or disobedience conveniently disappeared or committed suicide. From 1997 to 1998, after a series of gruesome murders of the Iranian dissidents by the Ministry, which were disclose to the public, the then deputy Intelligence Minister (Saeed Emami) was jailed and later committed suicide in prison.

This Ministry is responsible for intelligence collection to combat any kind of potential or real threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran. In an interview in July 2006 published by Mehr News Agency, Ghulam Hossain Mohseni Ejei, (Intelligence Minister) said that the United States has the greatest motivation to fight against the Islamic Republic of Iran. They are making numerous efforts to foment insecurity and tension in Iran and have allocated a large fund for this purpose, which is beyond the $75 million officially approved by the U.S. administration. They have used much more money than that and have specifically set up educational classes to train spies. In this respect, a number of Iranians have been either detained or executed. On the arrest of Ramin Jahanbegloo, a university professor, the Intelligence Minister noted that he was arrested on suspicion of assisting the U.S. in its efforts to provoke a velvet revolution in Iran. However, the Intelligence Ministry has yet to complete its investigations on him. 29

The Intelligence Ministry of the Islamic Republic has devised various strategies to combat internal and external measures taken against Iran's Islamic system. Through its organized intelligence activities, it can identify the elements and inform the relevant officials. In areas such as Balochistan more attention is given, because government believes that the U.S. is trying to use ethnic groups and various non-governmental organizations to fight against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Concentration of Power in the Islamic Republic of Iran

The above-mentioned characteristics of different powers, as a matter of fact, seem like a well-designed course of a circle form. Inside this circle, there is an essential and central institution which is dominated over the entire system, indicating that political power is concentrated in one place i.e. Leadership. For example, the supreme leader appoints six jurisconsults of the Guardian Council (one of the most powerful institutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran). Six other jurists of the Guardian Council are elected by the Islamic Consultative Assembly from among Muslim jurists proposed to the Islamic Consultative Assembly by Head of the Judiciary (Judiciary chooses more than nine people and dispatch the list to the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and then this Assembly selects six of the candidates), whereas the Head of Judiciary himself is appointed by the Leadership. In addition, the very Islamic Consultative Assembly who can select the other six members of the Guardian Council cannot be formed without the authority of the Guardian Council. The credentials of the Islamic Consultative Assembly must be ratified first by the Guardian Council itself (all legislations passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly shall be also sent to the Guardian Council). Again, the Guardian Council itself cannot be formed without the direct or indirect authority of the Leader, as noted above. Interestingly, the nominees for the Experts Assembly must be approved and accepted by the Guardian Council (the Guardian Council, as explained above, is the result of direct and indirect authority of the leader). The Experts Assembly then can select the Leader. The formation of the Experts Assembly itself is as a result of an indirect authority of the Leader, as elaborated above. The clear implication is that the Leadership, which is above Judiciary, Executive, and Legislature, and appoints the heads of many powerful offices such as the commanders of the armed forces, the director of the national radio and television network, the heads of the major religious foundations, the prayer
leaders in city mosques, and the members of national security council, who deal with defence and foreign affairs, etc., holds absolute power and overshadows the entire political system. In brief, the essence of the Islamic Republic of Iran is founded on a theological concept that refers to Allah’s total power. As stated earlier, in Shia sect (Jafari Athna Ashari) of Islam in Iran, rule by the clergy and perpetual leadership, embodies the idea that until the appearance of Imam Mahdi (as is believed by Shia and inspired by Islam), the leadership of the Muslims rests with the representative of Imam or the highly qualified clerics.

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF BALOCH IN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

Iran is a multi-national and multi-ethnic country comprised of six nationalities including, Persian, Baloch, Kurd, Turk, Turkman, Arab, as well as, other linguistic and tribal groupings like Lur, Gilaki, etc. Nowhere in the constitution of the Islamic Republic are these groups referred as minorities. Actually, under the Iranian Islamic constitution these above mentioned groups are all referred as one Iranian nation.

Although there are no accurate data as to the population of Iran’s different ethnic or national groups, one of the reliable scholarly literatures in 1983 tended to agree that the Persians have been a slight minority comprising about 45 percent of Iran’s sixty million population, who are the largest and dominant nationality. As noted in the second chapter, the Baloch population of Iran in recent years has been estimated between 3 to 4 million, who constitute one of the minority groups in Iran. Formally speaking, the only recognized minorities under the Islamic Republic, according to the constitution, are religious minorities, who are Iranian Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians. In this respect, Article 13 says, "the Iranian Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians shall be the only
recognized religious minorities, who within the limits of law shall be free to carry out their religious rites and practice their religion in personal status and religious education." 31 Therefore, from the constitutional point of view, the Baloch under the Islamic Republic cannot be considered a minority, simply because the constitution does not recognize them as a minority group. But, contrary to the theoretical aspects of the constitution, the Baloch in Iran are a minority group. Various international human rights organizations and many writers whether Baloch or otherwise, in their reports on human rights violation, refer to 'Baloch' as a minority group in Iran.

With regard to the case of Baloch in Iran, as the matter of this study, the Baloch within Balochistan do not enjoy full religious respect as promised by the constitution. Most of the sensitive politically oriented ceremonies pertaining to the Sunni Baloch, hardly are allowed to be carried out as desired by the Baloch clerics. For instance, in the early 2008, Maki Religious School & Mosque of Zahedan had intended to organize a congress for the late Molana Abdol Aziz (the former Baloch religious leader in Iran), as a sign of tribute. However, government opposed the plan and suggested the Sunni clerics must not act independently and that they can organize this congress provided government must supervise the event. But, Baloch clerics did not accept government’s suggestion rather voiced that they do not allow government to interfere in their religious matters.32 However, concerning other religious activities such as religious education and Sunni missionaries within Balocistan itself, usually the Baloch clerics do not encounter with restrictions from central government. In this regard, different ordinary Sunni religious schools in cities like Iranshahr and Saravan can be taken as example. These theological schools are free to bring up and educate their own students according to their own jurisprudence.
As far as the Balochi language and literature is concerned, it has not been in active use, though it is allowed by the constitution. Article 15 of the constitution states, the common and official language and script of the people of Iran is Farsi. Official documents, correspondence and texts, as well as, textbooks must be in this language and script. However, the use of local and ethnic languages in the press and mass media or the teaching of their literatures in schools, along with Farsi shall be free. Article 19 of the constitution adds, the people of Iran, of whatever tribe and clan, shall enjoy equal rights, and color, race, language, and the like shall not be a privilege. In contrast with the above noted articles, the use of Balochi language as a local and ethnic language in the press and mass media except in a few recent cases like one or two student periodicals, has been rarely used in the Iranian Balochistan. Teaching of Balochi language and literature at schools has never been used in the history of Iranian Balochistan. In fact, the use of Balochi language in Iran is highly restricted to some cultural and social activities. For example, Balochi language is used in a few student’s periodical or local newspapers. It should not be forgotten to add that for most of the Iranian Baloch of recent times, there have not been a motivational force to take care of their Balochi language. Thus, this has led to a state of an absence of efficiency in Balochi literature. Besides, the Balochi language and literature cannot be used in formal and official communications, because except Farsi, which is the official language, other local and ethnic languages cannot be used in official documents, correspondence, texts, and textbooks, as noted in Article 15 of the constitution.

With regard to party politics as exist in western democracies, the Baloch like other Iranians such as the Kurds or Arabs practically are not allowed to form political associations or political parties of their own. It is because establishment of political parties by the Baloch may be considered a potential threat to the essentials of the Islamic Republic. Article 26th of the constitution has referred to
this issue, where it says that it shall be allowed for the Iranian people to form parties, societies, political or professional associations provided they do not violate the essentials of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Due to the following reasons the Baloch cannot have political parties. First, the official faith of Iran is Shia Jafari Athna Ashari, which is eternal, as well as, considered one of the essentials of the Islamic Republic, while overwhelming majority of the Baloch are Sunni Muslims. Second, the ruling Shia believes in perpetual Imamat and leadership and its fundamental role in the perpetuation of the Islamic Revolution, which is different from the belief of the Sunni Baloch or is in contrast with the ideology of the Sunni Baloch. However, a number of the educated Baloch have their membership in the various branches of the centralized political parties in Balochistan. Such political parties or organizations whose number is around 220 have been given legitimacy to operate, but not as an opposition to the religious system of governance. These parties can operate in accordance with the policies of the Islamic Republic. They are separated between two factions: the conservatives (extremist and ultra-religious right-wing parties) such as the Islamic Society of Engineers, Combatant Clergy Association, Islamic Coalition Party, Association of Islamic Revolution Loyalists, Moderation and Development Party, etc. And, the reformist political parties (moderate religious right-wing parties) such as, the Association of Combatant Clerics, Islamic Iran Participation Front, National Confidence Party, Executives of Construction Party, Society of Forces Following the Line of the Imam, Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, Islamic Labor Party, and so forth.

As noted earlier, a number of the educated Baloch are also among the members of such political parties, however, except in the period of elections such as presidential election or city council election, in the normal course these Baloch members are not much active in the politics of Balochistan. Therefore, they
exercise no influence over the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Balochistan. They are unable to articulate the interest of Baloch in the center unless a party favorable to the Sunni Baloch enjoys a strong position in the center or wins the presidential election. Such a development, however, has not been taken place so far. The Baloch members of such centralized political parties are usually under the influence of their Baloch clerics, who are indirectly active in the politics of Balochistan under the umbrella of a few powerful Sunni religious schools such as the Maki Sunni Religious School in Zahedan, which runs by cleric Abdol Hamid Ismaelzahi and his team. This religious institution, in fact, has turned into an informal political force within the state system.

With respect to formation of non-political entities such as non-governmental organizations, religious associations, cultural associations, economic societies, and business organizations, the Baloch are allowed to run such kind of entities. Considerable number of these associations particularly economic ones can be found in Balochistan such as commercial firms and construction companies.

In regard to public employment, many of Baloch particularly the educated ones are employed of government, however, mostly at low and medium level positions. There are many Baloch in Balochistan, who are employed at various governmental institutions such as, health care, schools, universities, etc. But, few of them hold satisfactory positions. In recent years, however, especially from the year 2000 onwards the Islamic Republic became a bit more flexible in its policies towards the Baloch for their employment, for instance, some of the educated Baloch have been appointed to higher administrative offices in Balochistan, who occupy positions like administratorship, directorship, and headship of some public institutions such as Office of Social Affairs, Municipal Office, Faculties, etc. All such positions are, of course, restricted to provincial level only and not beyond. Also, recently most of the members of the Islamic
Consultative Assembly from Balochistan such as cities of Chabahar, Iranshahr, Zahedan, Saravan, and Khash have been mainly Baloch, who represent their respective cities at the Islamic Consultative Assembly in Tehran. The number of Baloch members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly in 2008 has been around five people, who represent their respective cities --- Zahedan, Chabahar, Iranshahr, Saravan, and Khash, at the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Baloch, like the rest of the Iranians if qualified for the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis-e Shora-e Islami) are allowed to nominate their names as candidates for this Assembly. Although there is no legal restriction for women, the Baloch women so far have not been able to contest or win elections. The major reason lays in the traditional set up of the Iranian Balochistan, where because of their femininity Baloch women cannot be considered suitable people for such purposes, as holds by the Baloch clerics, the ruling elite of the Balochi society of Iran. In this respect, the Parliamentarian election of 2008 can be taken as an example, when Borhanzehi, a Baloch woman was approved by the Guardian Council to contest election, but did not enjoy the support of her Baloch clerics. Apart from the constitutional law in which a member of Consultative Assembly must comply with some fundamental rules such as to defend the Islamic constitution, safeguard the achievements of the Islamic Republic, respect its essentials, etc., the other basic requirements, according to the recent regulation, which one can register his/her name as a candidate are, age and post-graduation degree. A candidate must be thirty or above thirty, as well as, holding a Master degree for a fresh candidate is necessary. In cases, previous members who have no academic education but would like to apply again for membership, there are no restrictions, since they are already experienced people in the field. In every Balochi city there is a Governor Office, and in this regard, after receiving the registered names of candidates, Governor Office would dispatch them to the Guardian Council’s branch of the respective provinces for necessary enquiries and investigations. After the approval of the Guardian Council, candidates
would be elected by the people for a four-year term. Guardian Council is authorized to reject the competency of a candidate on the grounds of lack of competency. This policy is even applicable to the candidates once approved and got elected as a Member of the Islamic Consultative Assembly in their previous terms. For example, in 2008 the lack of competency of Dr. Bagher Kurd (an Iranian Baloch former member of the Islamic Consultative Assembly representing people of Zahedan) was declared by the Guardian Council. The justification for such rejected files is usually declared to be expediential.

With respect to the key governmental positions such as governorship, ambassadorship, ministership, presidency and leadership, the Baloch so far have not been able to occupy such high rank offices. The reason behind this fact has been noted clearly in the constitution itself. In this respect, Article 115 of the constitution has listed a number of conditions for the Office of Presidency, most important among them is, "candidates eligible for such office must be among the distinguished religious and political personalities who must be also true and faithful to the essentials of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the official faith of the country". Among other qualifications for the Office of Leadership, which are described in Article 109, the important qualifications that prevent non Jafari Athna Ashari believers from acquiring the status of Leadership under the Islamic Republic are "those academic qualifications necessary for issuing decrees on various issues of religious jurisprudence, as well as, fairness and piety necessary for leading the Islamic nation, a nation based on the ideology of Shiaism." These articles are indicative of the fact that a Sunni believer or any other religious minority such as Zoroastrian cannot run for the Office of Presidency or Leadership in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Hence, it can be deduced from the constitution that in comparison with the Shia ruling class, the Sunni Baloch or other religious minorities, in high level politics, are not treated equally. It is because, other than Jafari Athna Ashari faith, as the faith of ruling class, the rest of religions, as well as, the Sunni followers are not recognized as official religions or faiths of Iran, and thus cannot enjoy the privilege which is enjoyed by the official faith. On this account, the Sunni Baloch constitutionally are not authorized to occupy high-level offices such as those of Leadership and Presidency unless they convert themselves and sincerely accept the official faith and then prove their efficiency and prudence which is required by the law. Similarly has been the case with other sensitive positions such as governorship, ministership, and ambassadorship, though restriction on such positions for non Jafari Athna Ashari believers has not been formally mentioned in the constitution, such discrimination can be inspired from the constitutional law. The history of the Islamic Republic in the last twenty nine years shows, in the normal course since the Revolution of 1979 no Sunni Baloch has been able to occupy such a position. The founders of the Iranian Islamic constitution have justified this political discrimination. Whatever political and social rights and liberties provided for the rest of the Iranians including the Baloch must be with due observance of the principles of the Islamic Republic. Under the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran every thing shall be based on Islamic principles, as has been described by the ruling Shia of Iran in the constitution of the Islamic Republic.

BALOCH ELITE IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

Every human society consists of different groups such as, politicians, doctors, engineers, clerics, technicians, merchants, and many other classes, which make up a proper society. So far as the structure of elite class in Balochi society is
concerned, there are three major classes. The tribal masters or chiefs who constitute the chieftaincy group, the Mullahs or religious instructors who constitute the clergy group, and the politicians, state employees, managers, doctors, professors, and the intelligentsia that constitute the educated group. These three groups actually influence, lead, and direct the Baloch in Iran, each of them has its own way of influence over the Baloch masses.

**Baloch Tribal Chiefs**

A Baloch tribal chief supervises over a group of families who have a feeling of comity and loyalty towards their chief, and occupying a common territory and following similar customs and traditions. Under such traditional system people usually follow custom rather than state law, and they cherish their customs, norms, and old tradition and implement over these with lot of pride. In Iranian Balochistan like the Pakistani Balochistan, the power and wealth of tribal leaders and chiefs have been derived and collected from their own resources such as lands and perquisites that established by tradition among the isolated and largely illiterate tribal communities of Balochistan. Prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, one of the most important assignments of Baloch tribal chiefs was to establish a link between Baloch masses and the central governments. In those years, due to lack of modern communication, technological advancement, facilities, and inaccessibility, for exercising of authority over Balochistan, central governments heavily depended on tribal chiefs and leaders. But, the Revolution of 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic state in Iran gradually lessened the power and influence of the tribal chiefs. Although Reza Shah tried to eliminate the role of the tribal chiefs in Balochistan, his strategy failed. The central government of Pahlavi went for establishment of governmental institutions as official channels for communicative purposes with the Baloch. Reza Shah’s government pursued a
policy to replace that traditional method of communication with the Baloch, which was performed through chieftainship, with a modern one like army institution or ministerial figures. Realizing this change, in order to win the side of the regime, Baloch tribal chiefs tried to show a positive face to Shah’s administration. They tried to prove their sense of loyalty to the Shah of Iran. Besides, Balochistan’s typical geographical situation along with its complex social set up later on made the regime understood that the presence of governmental institutions were not enough to tackle security problems in Balochistan. Reza Shah’s government, therefore, accepted the fact that without the support of Baloch tribal chiefs, governing Balochistan would be a painstaking mission. For the same reason, government again tended to rely on the tribal chiefs and take them seriously useful in mediating and solving security and political matters in the Iranian Balochistan. Among the celebrated Baloch tribal chiefs and leaders who had played a vital role in cooperating with the regime for the purpose of preserving security in Balochistan under the administration of Shah, following figures such as Eido Khan Rigi, Mir Hooti Khan Mirlashari, Eisa Khan Mobarak, Karim Bakhsh Sayedi, Shah Jahan Khan Kurd, Jehind Khan Yar Ahmadzehi, Jumeh Khan Ismaelzehi, and several others can be referred as example.

In his book published in 2005, Ghasem Siasasr writes, in the early months of 1963, the Shia clergy along with the people of Iran were thinking about the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime. Therefore, it was natural that they would oppose all factions sided with the regime. Hence, since the Baloch Hakums and Khavanin (old title for the chief of a big tribe) remained to be in favor of the regime, they encountered with hostility and animosity from the Shia clergy. Anyhow, from 1963 to 1978, in disapproval of an active presence of Baloch tribal leaders, the Shia clergy followed a slow and gradual policy, and finally in a firm and straightforward manner, they strongly opposed Baloch tribal leaders and labeled
them as those sincere to oppressors... After the Revolution of 1979 the conditions forced Baloch tribal chiefs to leave political scene in Balochistan of Iran.  

Since its establishment, the Islamic Republic of Iran gradually started emasculating Baloch tribal chiefs. It may seem necessary to add that the Iranian Balochistan is comprised of two major divisions: Sarhad region, where cities like Zahedan and Khash are situated, and Makoran region, where cities such as Saravan, Iranshahr, Chabahar, etc., are situated. The tribal chiefs of Sarhad region seem to be more influential over their respective tribes, that is to say, the Baloch of Sarhad are more loyal towards their tribal chiefs, whereas tribal leaders of Makoran do not have that much influence over their respective tribes. Under the Islamic Republic of Iran, however, with respect to chieftaincy’s influence on different Baloch tribes, Baloch tribal chiefs, have become generally disorganized, and directly or indirectly have been placed under the control of the Islamic intelligence services. Today, this group in Balochistan of Iran has ceased to function politically. Baloch tribal chiefs are loosing their popular social bases. Their new generation, for instance, their sons and close folks are joining the ‘educated Baloch’, another Balochi class. Under the title of 'educated Baloch' in fact they can save and promote their social esteem.

Baloch Sunni Clerics

Ideologically, Balochistan of Iran, in general, is a Deobandian dominated society. Deoband is a city in Uttar Pradesh state of India. In his thesis ‘An Investigation of Religious Schools in the Province of Sistan & Balochistan’, Ghulam Hossain Jahantig, an Iranian university lecturer and expert in the affairs of Sunni branch of Islam writes, controversial issues such as determining land boundaries, product distribution, and inheritance share rights were widespread.
in some parts of Balochistan. Dahan village, a part of Bent was one of these places. People who used to administer over such problems were known as Mullah or Ghazi who belonged to the senior section of the society but lacked sufficient knowledge in resolving such matters satisfactorily. Given this situation, perhaps motivated a want for appropriate people to tackle these problems appropriately. Nearly, hundred years ago, for the sake of religious education, some of Baloch youth went to Deoband Daarol Olom in India, which is a prominent theological school and could best serve the purpose of these fascinated Baloch. They spent approximately 15 to 18 years gaining Islamic education. After graduation, they returned to Balochistan, where gifted the Balochi society with a religious scholarly movement. They brought with themselves the knowledge that was taught to them by the well-known Sunni Hanafi Scholars of Deoband. Thus, they began to indoctrinate and promote Shah Waliollah Dehlavi’s thoughts in Balochistan of Iran. It is asserted that around 43 renowned Baloch religious scholars have been educated from Deoband school of India, including Abdollah Molazadeh, Ghazi Abdolsamad Sarbazi, Shamsodin Mollazadeh, Abdol Aziz Mollazadeh, Dadol Rahman Raisi, Abdol Vahed Seyedzadeh, Mohammad Shahdad Maskanzehi, Gul Mohammad Mollazehi, Mohammad Eisa Shahnavazi, Abol Aziz Saadati, Mohammad Omar Sarbazi, etc. More than 15 others who have been educated from Panjáb and Sindh of Pakistan are also regarded as Deobandian. Abdol Hamid Ismaelzahi (the current religious leader of the Sunni Baloch), Ghamarodin Mollazehi (the principal of Shamsol Olom School of Iranshahr), Mohammad Ghasem Ghasemi (a mufti, means a Sunni cleric who can issue decrees), and Mohammad Yousef Hossinpour (the principal of Einol Olom School of Gosht), are among the major Baloch Sunni clerics under the Islamic Republic of Iran. And, among those who have been educated in Saudi Arabia are Allahwardi, Abdol Samad Saadati and so forth. This account indicates that the presence of these Sunni clerics in Balochistan had been a facilitative factor, which found its way to influence the
largely illiterate Balochi community of Iran. In fact, the Islamized environment of Balochistan owes its progress to the efforts of these people who developed a number of Sunni religious schools in there. These schools developed by Baloch clerics to such an extent that today for the sake of religious studies, Baloch usually do not opt for foreign madrasas or Islamic schools, rather they tend to stay in for theological education, while in the pre-Islamic Revolution period, the number of Sunni theological schools in Iran were handful and Baloch used to go and pursue their studies in countries like Pakistan, India, and the Gulf states. \(^{40}\)

In the pre-Islamic Revolution Iran, Baloch clerics were, to some extent, under the influence of their tribal chiefs and this was because of economic dependency on the chieftainship. Few of Baloch clerics had maintained their relationship with Shah’s regime, however, that did not allow them to enjoy a stable status. The most prominent Baloch cleric was Molavi Abdul Aziz who lived in Zahedan. It has been asserted that cleric Abdul Aziz had tried to establish a constructive relationship between Baloch and the monarchical regime, but he had failed to do that mainly because the regime did not regard him as a reliable person. Nevertheless, cleric Abdul Aziz succeeded in enhancing the social prestige of Baloch clerics in Balochistan. One of his major works for the interest of Baloch clerics was the establishment of some Sunni religious schools affiliated to the Maki Religious School of Zahedan. \(^{41}\)

Strictly speaking, because of the fundamental ideational differences, majority of Baloch Sunni clerics under the Islamic Republic are politically passive and have remained indifferent towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. Hardly, a few of Baloch clerics can be considered as the real supporters of the Islamic Republic. However, in order to survive and keep satisfactory status under the Islamic Republic, most of the Sunni clerics expediently have remained as supporters of
the Islamic Republic. For example, cleric Abdol Hamid Ismalezahi, the religious leader of the Sunni Baloch in Iran, in a number of reports or interviews with the media has declared that the Sunni work for unity and fraternity and pray for and support the Islamic Republic of Iran. In another instance, cleric Mohammad Is-haaq Madani, the official Counselor of the President in Sunni Affairs more often than other Baloch clerics stands by and supports the Islamic Republic of Iran, as it is evident from most of his formal talks. 42

Pir Mohammad Mollazahi, an Iranian Baloch political expert, has classified the Baloch clergy under the Islamic Republic into the following three major groups: isolated clerics, opposer clerics, and partisan clerics.

The isolated group is in majority. Although this group does not agree with the ruling Shia ideology, it is passive. In case of an open antagonism against the Islamic Republic, this group may seize an opportunity to unleash its anger and attack the government. Most of the clerics in this group follow and obey Deobandian ideology. This school holds anti-Shia tendency, thereupon a lack of trust is rooted between the dominated Shia clergy of Iran and the Deobandian followers. The opposition group of Sunni clergy stays outside Iran. Those who are inside the country usually do not disclose their hostile feelings. It cannot be assessed clearly to what extent they enjoy a popular support within Balochistan of Iran. 43 However, in this regard, cleric Abdol Rahim, the younger brother of the late cleric Abdol Aziz (the first religious leader of the Iranian Baloch), recently has established a television program in London. On this program from London, he publicly and strongly criticizes the Islamic Republic of Iran and its ideology. Evidences show majority of Baloch in private support his program. With reference to the partisan group, a few of Baloch (Sunni) clerics openly support the Islamic Republic. Such a support is based on the personalized oriented
interests. Because of their association with the ruling Shia clergy, these clerics usually do not enjoy a popular support in Balochistan.

The Educated Baloch

The term ‘educated Baloch’ here refers to those Baloch who hold standard university education or qualification including university professors or academists, teachers, politicians, state employees, and the intelligentsia, who are active in socio-political affairs of Balochistan. Actually, the educated Baloch as a group can be considered a fresh group. As a class, they began to develop in 1970s and therefore they can be seen as a flourishing force. During the administration of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (son of Reza Shah), the educated Baloch gradually began to appear. Indeed, this new group of Baloch was devoid of any remarkable status both politically and socially. Unlike the tribal chiefs, who enjoyed a social status and were counted upon by the central government, or the Sunni clerics who enjoyed a popular support (particularly in post Islamic Revolution), the educated Baloch as a newly arrived group was deprived of such advantages. As pointed earlier, Balochistan has been a traditionally dominated land, where both tradition and religion has played essentially a vital role. Lack of educational institutions throughout the decades was very much obvious and destructive to the society especially in pre Islamic Revolution period. As a result of this, in comparison with tribal chiefs and Sunni clerics, the educated Baloch arrived very late. In addition, the educated Baloch such as the intelligentsia or academists though few in number mainly had been engaged in scientific and academic activities rather than politics. Therefore, time and condition did not side with Baloch academists, and hence they failed to play their due role in politics. Among the Baloch academicians a few notable figures can be referred to in the following way. For example, Dr. Rahmani, a physician who took asylum in London right after the Revolution. For several years, he
used to cooperate with BBC on medical programs for the Iranian nation. Dr. Rahmani known as Dr. Saravani finally was allowed to return Iran. Rahmani probably was the first highly educated Iranian Baloch; Dr. Danesh Narooie, a university professor who became the first Governor General of Sistan & Balochistan province, however, for a short time; Dr. Gamshadzehi, who was the first Iranian Baloch Chancellor of Sistan & Balochistan University (for a short time), and Dr. Pir Mohammad Maleki a highly educated Baloch from an American university in Texas, and some other highly educated Baloch.

In a way or other, generally it can be claimed that the 'educated Baloch' are the product of the Islamic Republic. In pre-Islamic Revolution, the number of Baloch university professors or academicians was limited to approximately less than ten people. Although compared with that of the other ethnical groups such as the Iranian Kurds, the number of Iranian Baloch academists is still unsatisfactory. But, so far as the entire group of the educated Baloch is concerned, in comparison with Balochistan of pre 1979, their number has increased remarkably after the Revolution. In 2008, the overall number of the Iranian educated Baloch in Iran including professors, teachers, state employees, managers, politicians, and post graduate students, estimated to be between 10,000 to 12,000 people.

Today, many of the educated Baloch such as state employees and politicians are in contact with government independently. But, such relationship is mainly restricted to the settlement of personal affairs. As a group, they are not organized orderly, as is the case with Baloch clerics. The educated Baloch in general are under the influence of their Sunni clerics. However, the general status of the educated Baloch is developing. The overall educational policies of the Islamic Republic, irrespective of some rigid educational policies mentioned in chapter two, have been for the interest of the Baloch, and hence it has
considerably changed the status of Balochi society of Iran for good. Historical facts and figures before the 1979 Revolution and after the Revolution clearly prove this development. 45 At least, it can be foreseen that in the future, the educated Baloch can be considered the most influential social class towards the development of Balochistan. At a glance, a comparative study on the membership of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament) in the following manner can illustrate the future influence of this class.

- In Pahlavi era, Baloch tribal chiefs were the only representatives from Balochistan at the National Consultative Assembly (parliament).

- In the early years of the Islamic Republic, mostly Baloch clerics from Balochistan representing the Baloch at the Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament). For example, in the first course (1980-1984) of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, cleric Hamed Dameni represented the people of Khash; cleric Nazar Ahmad Didgah represented the people of Iranshahr; and cleric Mohammad Is-haaq Madani represented the people of Saravan.

- In the recent times, mainly the educated Baloch from Balochistan represent the Baloch at the Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament). For example, in the sixth course (2000-2004) of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Dr. Bagher Kurd, a Baloch academician represented the people of Zahedan (within the Balochi society); Masoud Hashemzehi, an educated Baloch represented the people of Khash; and Jahandideh, a Baloch teacher represented the people of Saravan.

Although the number of these Baloch members of Parliament presently is five, the educated Baloch represent two major cities out of five major cities of
Balochistan. Example can be taken of Zahedan where Dr. Payman Forozeh, a Baloch academician represents the people of Zahedan (within the Balochi society) and Saravan where Dr. Jamshidzahi, a Baloch physician represents the people of Saravan. It can be predicted in the close future, the educated Baloch may represent the entire Balochi society of Iran at the Islamic Consultative Assembly or Parliament.

GENERAL ASSESSMENT

What is apparent in Balochistan of Iran is that the Baloch tribal chiefs have been emasculated and their new generations are transforming into the educated class. The educated Baloch are disorganized and thus are not in a united arranged form. This newly arrived group, to a great extent, is under the influence of Baloch Sunni clergy group. Baloch clergy holds a dominated position over the entire Balochi society of Iran. Interestingly, despite their religious differences with the ruling Shia clergy, the Baloch (Sunni) clerics as an established reality still play a major role in the politics of the Iranian Balochistan. It is because of their ideological power, which has created a strong popular base for them, which in turn makes the Islamic Republic to count upon them. But, 'ideological power' cannot be regarded as the only reason for their influence. The other major reason behind this is the result of the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the Baloch, as shall be elaborated in chapter six of this study.

Irrespective of the aforementioned stratification of the Iranian Baloch into the three major groups of tribal chiefs, clerics, and the educated, the Baloch, in general have had a low degree of participation in social and political activities both at provincial, as well as, at national level. Within Iran they do not have political associations. Although few of them are the members of some centralized political parties such as the Islamic Iran Participation Front, they are
unable to leave an impression on the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Balochistan.

At the national level, there is only one Baloch cleric, Molavi Is-haq Madani, who holds a formal status, as the Counsellor of the President in the affairs of the Iranian Sunni sect. At the provincial level due to pressures from Baloch, recently from the year 2000 onwards, there have been some changes, for instance, a small number of the mayors have come from the educated Balochi group. This is evident in cities such as Saravan and Iranshahr.

With regard to social associations, few non-political associations or NGOs exist in cities like Zahedan such as 'the Youth Association of the Voice of Justice' (Anjoman-e Javanane Sedaye Edalat). This association was established in 2001. One of its major aims was to invite the responsible provincial figures to discuss and answer the social and economic issues concerning Balochistan, as well as, to organize Balochi concerts, etc. In Tehran, there is only one Balochi cultural association, which is a semi-active body, mainly belongs to the different groups (engineers, politicians, state employees, Baloch clerics, academists, students, etc.) of the Balochi population in Tehran.

With reference to student associations, the Baloch students hold some unions such as Baloch Students of Shahid Rejayee University in Tehran and Baloch Students of Sistan & Balochistan University in Zahedan, whose activities are restricted to organizing graduation ceremonies and publication of periodicals such as ESTOON and DAAZ which are academic, cultural, and social periodicals. These periodicals are allowed to publish their articles in both Persian and Balochi languages.
With regard to press and media activity, in general, the Iranian Baloch are totally passive at the provincial level let alone the national level. Within Balochistan, there are only a few Baloch journalists who are hardly in contact with the national or foreign media. Mahmoud Berahoiynejad, a Baloch journalist have been advised by the intelligent agents to stop his journalistic activities particularly when he had been interviewed on several occasions by the foreign based Persian media such as Voice of America (VOA), Radio Farda, and BBC.

By and large, an overall perception indicates that the Baloch in Iran have been suffering from social and political discrimination and that such discrimination has figured them into a minority group, as claimed by majority of the foreign based political experts. As a result of these developments, insurgency occasionally has been regarded as another option for the Baloch, a political phenomenon that has been a matter of great concern for the Islamic Republic of Iran, as shall be discussed in chapter six of this study.
REFERENCES & NOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE


(2) Ibid., p. 25.

(3) Ibid., p. 29.

(4) Ibid., p. 44.

(5) Ibid., pp. 32-33.

(6) *Global Security*, globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/edc.htm

(7) For more, see, Articles 5, 108, 109, and 111 of the constitution, as well as, see the responsibilities of Expediency Discernment Council or that of Leadership in *the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (with all amendments up to 1989)*, edited by directorate-general of International Agreements 1995, translated by M.Z. Samimi Kia, Office of Print & Distribution of D.G.S.L.R.

(8) *Global Security*, globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/edc.htm


(10) Ibid., pp. 33-34.

(11) See, the Leadership section, in *the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (with all amendments up to 1989)*, edited by directorate-general of International Agreements 1995, translated by M.Z. Samimi Kia, Office of Print & Distribution of D.G.S.L.R.


(13) In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the missions of Iran's armed forces are formally defined. The role of the army is defined as "guarding the independence and territorial integrity of the country, as well as, the order of the Islamic Republic," the role of the IRGC is defined as "guarding the Revolution and its achievements."


(16) *BBC*, "A Profile of Iran's Revolutionary Guards," (26 October 2007), news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7064353.stm


(19) *BBC*, "A Profile of Iran's Revolutionary Guards," (26 October 2007), news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7064353.stm

(20) *Los Angeles Times* (online, 26/08/2007), Kim Murphy, "Iran’s $12-billion Enforcers."

(21) Ibid.

(22) *BBC*, "A Profile of Iran's Revolutionary Guards," (26 October 2007), news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7064353.stm

(23) *Los Angeles Times* (online, 26/08/2007), Kim Murphy, "Iran’s $12-billion Enforcers."

(24) *BBC*, "A Profile of Iran's Revolutionary Guards," (26 October 2007), news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7064353.stm


(26) *Nationa Master*, nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Ministry-of-Intelligence-of-Iran


(28) *Global Security*, globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/vevak.htm

(29) *Mehr News Agency* (online),"Iranian Intelligence Ministry closely monitoring foreigners' subversive activities: Minister;" (Tehran, 2006); See, also *Payvand's Iran News* (online, 07/03/2006).

(30) For more on the Iranian ethnic population, see, the introduction part of the *Iran & Its Nationalities: The Case of Baloch Nationalism*, Pakistani Adab Publication, (Karachi, 2000), by Mohammad Hassan Hosseinbor.

(32) In this regard, a meeting took place in the residence of cleric Abdol Hamid Ismaelzahi, the present religious leader of the Sunni Baloch in Iran. This meeting was attended by 14 Baloch including, cleric Abdol Hamid, cleric Ahmad Naroyee, cleric Mohammad Ghasemi, Engineer Asoodeh, Dr. Bagher Kurd, Dr. Mohammad Reza Taheri, Dr. Hossinbour, etc. The meeting was between the Sunni (Baloch) clerics, Baloch politicians, and Baloch professors. The meeting held on 17/03/2008, 8:30 to 10:00 p.m., Residence of Molana Abdol Hamid, Zahedan, Balochistan, Iran. I (Ahmad Reza Taheri) accompanied Dr. Mohammad Reza Taheri and attended the meeting.


(34) Estoon, a cultural and social periodical belongs to the Baloch students of Sistan & Balochistan University. See its sixth vol., fifth year 2008 or Ordibehesht-e 1387; Daaz, another academic and cultural periodical belongs to a group of Baloch students of Shahid Rejayee University in Tehran. See its 2+2 number, Year 2008 or Khordad-e 1387. Perisan & Balochi


(36) For more about "a list of political parties in Iran," see en.wikipedia.org


(38) Ibid., pp.61-62.


(40) Ibid.

(41) Ibid.
Cleric Abdol Hamid Ismaelzahi (a Baloch Sunni cleric & the Director of Makki Religious School of Zahedan, Balochistan of Iran), *official Site of the Sunni Community in Iran*, SunniOnline.com, 2008; Also, see various reports and interviews of cleric Mohammad Is-Haaq Madani (a Baloch Sunni cleric & the Counsellor of the President of Iran in the Sunni Affairs of the country) which are published by different state broadcasting media such as *Aftab News* (Aug 9, 2007) and *Quds News* (17/03/2007). Persian

Interview with *Pir Mohammad Mollazehi (a political expert on Middle East & Balochistan)*, on 07 August 2006. The interview was conducted by Ahmad Reza Taheri at Shahrak-e Gharb, Tehran, Iran. Balochi

A number of well-known highly educated Baloch political activist of the present time in exile are: Gulam Reza Hossinbor (the previous Secretary General of Rastakhiz Party under the administration of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in Sistan & Balochistan. Reza Hossinbor based in London is currently a political activist against the Islamic Republic of Iran); Dr. Abdolsatar Doshoki (a Baloch physician and political activist based in London); Dr. Taj Mohammad Berisig (a researcher and political activist based in Sweden); Dr. Mohammad Hassan Hossinbour (a researcher and lawyer based in Washington), etc. However, some of the contemporary Baloch highly educated figures preferred to stay in Iran and also remained inactive in politics. They are, Dr. Rahmatollah Hossinbor, Dr. Mohammad Reza Taheri, and so on. In fact, a number of such instances can be found in/from different towns and cities of Balochistan.

For an account of the educational status of Baloch in Iran, see the chapter two of this research, *The Socio- Economic Profile of the Baloch in Iran*. 

109