Chapter 4

Immanuel Kant

Kant’s philosophy is generally designated as a system of epistemology with transcendental criticism. In modern philosophy, Locke, Hume, and Kant caused some changes in the meaning of the being. In contrast to the ancients like Aristotle and Plato, who emphasized on the being qua being—the being-in-itself, Kant focused on understanding the relationships between the things in this world, which are dependent on the ability of our cognition. Kant tried to explain how it is scientifically possible to know things in their relationships to one another,
that all are dependent upon certain innate categories or ideas in human mind.

By this shift, then some philosophers particularly Kant, focused on epistemology - the ability of human cognition - instead of ontology, which the ancients emphasized to find out the nature of the being, the things-in-themselves. Reality and real being, therefore, turned from the being-in-itself and independent of men’s mind to the ability of men’s cognition.

On this chapter, what will be discussed is to show how the meaning of being shifted from the thing-in-itself to the thing-in-mind; in other words, how Plato’s idealism and Aristotle’s realism could render to conceptualism in Kant.

**Nature of Kant’s writings**

Immanuel Kant was born in East Prussia, on 22 April 1724; and died on 12 February 1804. The whole of his life was spent in his native providence. From 1740 he was a member of university of Kounisberg except for a short period during which he was a private tutor in various families. In 1755 he returned to Kounisberg and there he spent the reminder of his life.
His early works reflect his studies of Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and G.W. Leibniz (1646-1716), that were followed by a period of great development culminating in the Critique of Pure reason (1781, the Kritik der reinen Vernunft). This work inaugurated the period of his major writings. It is usually to distinguish two periods of Kant’s literary activity. The first, the pre-critical period, which extends from 1747 to 1781, the date of writing the Critique, the second, critical period, which extends from 1781 to 1794.

During the period 1747 to 1781 Kant was influenced by Wolff and Newton in Metaphysics and Physics. He was defender of Leibnitz’s opinion on “free will” which in that Leibniz said the will is not opposite to sufficient cause, and God has created the best world necessarily, because He is absolute perfect. Kant at that time was teaching Wolff’s modified form of dogmatic rationalism. That is to say, he made psychological experience to be the basis of all metaphysical truth, rejected skepticism, and judged all knowledge by the test of reason.
Towards the end of that period, however, he began to question the validity of the psychological basis of metaphysics and ended by losing all faith in validity and value of metaphysical reasoning. Some powerful thinkers like Hume who believed that metaphysics is a body of meaningless sentences also impressed him. Hume says in an often quoted passage that “If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance, let us ask; Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and confusion”.  

Kant in the “Dreams of Ghost-Seer, elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics” (1766- Pre- Critical period) had accepted Hume’s argument that metaphysics is waste of time, particularly three questions of God, freedom and immortality are the most controversial problems with no certain and clear judgments.

But after 1881 (critical period) he says that Hume’s acute critiques taught me that “whoever whishes to engage in a

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metaphysical inquiry must first be clear about the nature of the undertaking, especially the logical status of metaphysical propositions and the methods of establishing their acceptability. Before indulging in metaphysics we need a critique of reason to show how far or in what sense it is a possibility.\(^2\)

**What made Kant not to accept previous philosophy**

The apparent contradictions in metaphysics and Hume’s analysis of causation “awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumber”, and made him to criticize all human experience. His aim was to prepare an unshakable foundation in the metaphysical truth which Hume’s skeptical phenomenal had overthrown. Kant recognized that at that time there are two main problems: first, too much emphasis on the apriori elements of knowledge; and second, the empirical philosophy of Hume had gone too far when it reduced all truth to empirical or a posteriori elements. Then, Kant decided to solve these two problems by establishing his critical philosophy. We may understand better what especial character of Kant’s criticism is and what he meant, if we

\(^2\) Corner, *Kant*, P, 16.
consider how he opposes criticism to two other forms of philosophy, dogmatism and skepticism.

He explains his critical philosophy through what he means by dogmatism: “This critique is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in its pure knowledge, as science, for that must always be dogmatic, that is, yield strict proof from sure principles apriori. It is opposed only to dogmatism, that is, to the presumption that it is possible to make progress with pure knowledge, according to principles, from concepts alone (those that are philosophical), as reason has long been in the habit of doing; and that it is impossible to do this without having first investigated in what way and by what right reason has come into possession of these concepts. Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason, without previous criticism of its own powers.”

He believes this type of dogmatism will render to skepticism which in that the reality of all different things are denied.

“It is especially this last kind of skepticism to which Kant refers when he speaks of skeptics as “those nomads of the

intellectual world who will not permit any steady cultivation of the soil.” Such skepticism, as Bacon said, is itself dogmatism.”

2 A critical philosophy, in the sense of Kant, goes beyond the sphere in which a controversy is carried on, it is an effort to reach principles, which are prior not only to a particular controversy, but to all controversy. It is, as he describes it, a “criticism of the very faculty of knowledge”, the aim of which is to determine the most general condition of the knowable.

Therefore, we may know the things in this world by make certain assertions, independently of knowing their being. These assertions will not be altered or modified by increasing our actual knowledge, or by change of our view about those particular objects which are already known. We must determine how much of this knowledge is assigned to the apriori, and how much is related to a posteriori factors. Hence, in contrast to those philosophies he called his philosophy essentially “criticism”, because it is an examination of knowledge, and it is “transcendental”, because its purpose in examining knowledge is to determine the apriori, or transcendental, forms.

2. Edward Caird, Critical Philosophy of Kant, Vol. 1, p.4
Which metaphysics is possible?

Kant asked what sort of metaphysics is that alleged to be thus “purified by criticism and established once for all?” whether such a thing as metaphysics be all possible? If it be a science, how comes it that it cannot like other sciences, obtain universal and permanent recognition? If not, how can it maintain its pretensions, and keep the human mind in suspense with hopes, which never ceasing, yet never fulfilled? It is because in this field there is no standard weight and measure to determine “sound knowledge from ‘shallow talk’”\(^1\).

Kant proposes this question that how mathematicians can determine which reply will be right to their unknown mathematical question and there are never any controversy among them. They can prove that reply must be derivable in accordance with certain well-defined methods of mathematical procedure. Without these methods there could be no science of mathematics. In a similar manner there are well-defined methods of natural science with which the acceptability of scientific hypothesis will be determined. But metaphysicians dispute about metaphysical problems such as God, freedom, immortality and so on in such way that they cannot without any

\(^1\) Paul Caurs, *Kant’s Prolegomena*, P.2.
controversy determine whether this or that account gives the right answers.

How it could be possible for metaphysics to find the same methods, which is used in mathematics and natural science to achieve the certainty. It is necessary to make clear which method is acceptable in metaphysics as those two other sciences.

“The examples of mathematics and natural science, which by a single and sudden revolution have become what they now are, seem to me sufficiently remarkable to suggest our considering what may have been the essential features in the changed point of view by which they have so greatly benefited. Their success should incline us, at least by way of experiment, to imitate their procedure, so far as the analogy which, as species of rational knowledge, they bear to metaphysics may permit.”

He concluded that as Copernicus made reverse his hypothesis and found out that it is fail to explain the movements of the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator and might have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and star

1. Kemp Smit, P. 21-22
to remain at rest. Therefore, Kant said that it is failure to assume all our knowledge must conform to objects. “We may have more success in the task of metaphysics if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge”.¹

Kant said that Hume’s critique of casualty was right. Hume proved that it is impossible for reason to think apriori and just by some concepts make a combination involving necessity, because in this world in consequence of one thing another can not necessarily has existence apriori. Therefore, Hume denied law of causation and ascribed it to the meaning of association. He concluded that reason has no power to think about casual relation objectively and necessarily, hence, there cannot be such thing scientifically in metaphysics.

Hume, Kant says, had no doubt that the concept of cause was useful and indispensable for our knowledge, but the question for him was whether the concept of cause could be thought by reason, apriori of all experiences, implying a wider application than the objects of experience. In other words, Hume says that “the metaphysical propositions are neither empirical nor analytical, therefore, they are meaningless. Propositions such as “God exists” are neither verifiable nor

¹. Ibid.
falsifiable by experiment or observation, nor whose denial is self-contradictory.

On this point there is almost general agreement between Kant and Hume, although “Kant does not accept Hume’s dictum of meaningful propositions. Kant knew to define a meaningful proposition according to empirical or analytical concepts would be a weak usage of criteria for the term “meaningful”, because normative propositions such as “pay your taxes” are meaningful, but they are neither empirical nor analytical”¹. Kant says we have a third class, which fall into neither of Hume’s two classes.

He says all concepts in metaphysics could not be empirical. Its principles must never be derived from experience, but beyond it, “and can not be analytical. Analytical proposition merely elucidate the meaning of terms and do not give any new knowledge, and cannot be denied without any contradiction.

Metaphysics, therefore, in the strict sense is possible as long as its apriori concepts in our understanding can be applied to our experience.

¹. Korner, P. 18
“This experiment succeeds as well as could be desired and promises to metaphysics, in its first part, the part that is occupied with those concepts apriori to which the corresponding objects, commensurate, with them, can be given in experience- the source path of a science.”

All mathematical cognition carries thorough certainty, i.e. absolute necessity, which therefore, rest upon no empirical grounds. Consequently it is a pure product of our understanding, and moreover is thoroughly synthetic.

Here, the question arises, namely: how it is possible to have apriori cognition? In all mathematical cognition we have those statements, whereas metaphysics has been satisfied with absolute concepts. It had been assumed that we are able to know all things can be seen as they are; all can come to our experience, in the relations which they really hold to each other; but, this way would end with many controversies discussions for metaphysicians.

A metaphysical problem may will be discussed scientifically if its impression arises from experience, and then applied to our sensible forms and categories in the faculty of

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1. Kemp Smith, P.23.
understanding. Some parts of this knowledge start from experience and some parts of that are what we receive through our own mind.

Hence, some metaphysical problems such as the problem of existence, the problem of soul - which cannot come to our experience may not be disputed in this sphere, but they are disputable in the practical philosophy. Therefore, it is clear that our limited knowledge cannot understand the nature of the things in themselves but just their phenomena.

Moltke S. Gram\(^1\) criticizes some interpretations about metaphysic of Kant that may not illustrate what Kant indented to offer. He says that one of those tendencies become clear in thought of Alois Riehl\(^2\), who argued that Kant in “"Kritik shows metaphysics can never be a discipline since its concepts have no application to experience”\(^3\), and all Kant has done is to show the impossibility of proof in metaphysics. Moltke continues that this type of interpretation naturally will be

\(^2\) Alois Riehl, *Der Philosophische Kritizismus: Geschichte und System* (3d ed; Leipzig: 1924-26)
\(^3\) Moltke, P., VIII.
exposed in Hertman Cohen\textsuperscript{1} who said that the propositions which Kant thought as possible of proof are presupposition of scientific and mathematical knowledge.

Gram believes Cohen cannot explain for example “why the propositions which Kant believes to constitute the presuppositions of extra metaphysical knowledge in fact contain such concepts as those of cause and substance- both of which traditionally belong to the domain of metaphysics. Gram concludes that by rejecting the possibility of proof in metaphysics we are forced to say that Kant implicitly rejects the propositions which he proves in transcendental analytic as metaphysical and the concept, which constitute the categories”\textsuperscript{2}.

Gram is right in defense of Kant who has discussed some concepts and judgments in his transcendental analytic and transcendental judgment as metaphysical concepts, because Kant proved their generality and necessity, but Gram may not show how Kant can apply this metaphysical knowledge to objects while there is big gap between what is in our mind and what comes from thing through experience to us, how certain knowledge from that or this thing is possible. According to

\textsuperscript{1} Hetman Cohen, kants Theories der Erfahrung (4d ed; Berlin: B. Cas irer, 1925).
\textsuperscript{2} moltke, Ibid.
which criteria Kant can come to this conclusion that what we think in our mind may truly be applied to the things in the world. Kant is right in saying that all our knowledge does not come through experience—here he tries to create a distinction between his doctrine and Idealism. Although all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that all arises out of experiences. For, our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through experience and what our own mind supplies for it.

What we can ask from Moltke for his defense of Kant is that how this combination may be possible between two different types of knowledge which have no relationships to each other. Knowledge of our faculty of understanding in our mind has no relation with the things, which come to our experience. More importantly how we can say that this combination of knowledge from our mind and our experience may be applied to the things in the world outside of our mind. What certainty in our knowledge permits us to apply it to that thing in out side of our mind? How can we explain some particular characteristics in the object such as possibility and existence that exist in the things out of our mind?
Moltke Gram discusses of the other most important tendency in interpretation of Kant’s doctrine, which is radically incomplete as an account of his philosophy. Martin Heidegger\(^1\) reinterprets Kant, claiming that doctrine of Kant is not just an epistemology but rather ontology. Ontology as Heidegger discusses is “the endeavor to make being manifest itself.” The fundamental importance of Kant’s ontology for Heidegger is the ontological status of the human in the world.

Heidegger\(^2\) gave more importance to the transcendental imagination rather than the understanding, because he thought the prominence of time in Kant provides more importance for imagination than reason. Imagination according to time is able to syntheses empirical knowledge and understanding. The imagination through the time determines the relation of presentations. It has the power of schematics which through it concepts are collectively organized and applied to empirical experience in such way that we can develop a unified view from the world. He believed because of temporal character of the imagination we can provide foundation for metaphysics.

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\(^1\) Martin Hridegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1929).

\(^2\) Moltke. P.vIII
Heidegger also discusses about the notion of Dasine and Being-in-the-world. Experiences not only can occur within some epistemic limits, but rather because in the way Dasine engages with the world can “open it up”. The instructor of the world is tied up to the structure of Dasine, in other words Dasine occurs in the world as much as the world occurs in Dasine.

Heidegger tries to reach to his point according to Kant’s analysis of man’s finite cognition. He says Kant analyzed that man has finite cognitive capacities to grasp the being and thus has no reliable means to understand the nature of every thing in itself. Heidegger takes this Idea to show that man has become finite in the world.

But if we are to agree with Hildegger and follow his interpretation of Kant, then we disregard that Kant argued to restrict the range of application of metaphysical propositions to prove whether they are scientifically true or false. And this reminds us of our finite cognition not just man’s place in the world.

Also with his interpretation we lose the situation in the critique which Kant makes morality possible. This is because Kant in his Pure reason provides for us such situation that in
which we can all participate, while Heidegger’s Dasine can only experience the word in each individual case.

Possible metaphysics through a priori synthetic judgments

It was determined that Kant, in contrast to Aristotle and Plato who emphasized on being qua being- the being itself, he appreciated to understand relationships between things in this world which are dependent on our cognitive ability. The only way to prove one thing is false or true-like mathematics and natural science- is to understand it through the judgments. Therefore, to achieve a scientific metaphysics, it is necessary to restrict the range of application of metaphysical propositions to those things, which can come to us through experience and applied to categories, which are apriori. To explain Kant’s cognitive system in more details we start from his division of judgment.

Kant does not accept the Hume’s dichotomy of meaningful propositions, because he believed that we possess
one more class of judgment, which is apriori. Metaphysical cognition must consist of apriori judgments.

Kant classifies judgments into analytic and synthetic. “In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought (I take into consideration affirmative judgments only, the subsequent application to negative judgments being easily made), this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something, which is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it. In the one case I entitle the judgment analytic, in the other synthetic.”¹

For example¹, in the judgment that: all bodies are heavy, ‘heavy’ as predicate is contained in the subject “all bodies”, that is to say, the assertion that ‘all bodies are not heavy” is a contradiction in terms, on the other hand, in the judgment that “a body is white” the predicate “white” is not contained in the subject “a body”, that is to say, the assertion that a body is not white, is not a contradiction in terms. It amplifies my

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² Ibid, P 49.
knowledge by adding something to my concept. The former proposition is thus analytic, the latter synthetic.

“Analytic judgments express nothing in the predicate but what has been already actually thought in the concept of the subject, though not so distinctly or with the same (full) consciousness.¹

Further, for Kant “all analytical judgments depend wholly on the law of contradiction, and are in their nature apriori cognitions, whether the concepts that supply them with matter be empirical or not. For the predicate of an affirmative analytical judgment is already contained in the concept of the subject, of which it cannot be denies without contradiction.”²

Examples are such as every father is necessarily male, or two plus two equals four. It is of course true that these judgments have a kind of dependence on experience and we formed them as a result of certain experience but they are independent from experience logically. It means it is not necessary other judgments or things entail them to make them

¹. Paul Carus, P. 14.
². Ibid. P, 15.
true, even though if there were no other objects, they would be true. They are independent logically of any judgments.

Judgments, which are not a priori, are a posteriori. Aposteriori synthetic judgments have empirical origin and amplify our knowledge. There are also apriori synthetic judgments, which spring from pure understanding and reason. These two last judgments both cannot spring from the principle of analysis, i.e. the law of contradiction.

Kant believes in the synthetic apriori judgments that predicates are not contained in their subjects and logically are independent of all judgments, can describe sense-experience. Mathematics, moral thought and natural science consist of these synthetic a prioi judgments.

By some examples it will be clear what Kant regarded as synthetic apriori judgments. Consider this arithmetical judgment that the addition of 5 to 7 yields 12. “we might, indeed, at first suppose that the proposition 7+5=12 is a merely analytic proposition, and follows by the principle of contradiction from the concept of a sum of 7 and 5. But if look more closely we find that the concept of the sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing save the union of the two numbers into one,
and in this no thought is being taken as to what that single number may be which combines both. The concept of 12 is by no means already thought in merely thinking this union of 7 and 5; and I may analyze my concept of such a possible sum as long as I please, still I shall never find the 12 in it. We have to go outside these concepts, and call in the aid of the intuition, which corresponds to one of them, our five fingers, for instance, or, as Segner did in his “Arithmetic”, five points, adding to the concept of 7, unit by unite, the five given in intuition. For starting with the number 7, and for the concept of 5 calling in the aid of the fingers of my hand as intuition, I now add one by one to the number 7 the unites which I previously took together to form the number 5, and with the aid of that figure (the hand) see the number 12 comes into being. That 5 should be added to 7, I have indeed already thought in the concept of a sum = 7+5, but not that this sum is equivalent to the number 12. Arithmetical propositions are therefore, always synthetic. This is still more evident if we take larger numbers. For it is then obvious that, however we might turn and twist our concepts, we could never, by the mere analysis of them, and without the aid of intuition, discover what (the number is that) is the sum.”

Natural science (physics) contains apriori synthetic judgment, which will be clear by some examples.\(^1\) “In all changes of the material world the quantity of matter remains unchanged” or “in all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be equal.” “These both propositions are necessary synthetic and in their origin apriori.\(^2\)” For in the concept of matter I do not think its permanence, but only its presence in the space, which it occupies. I go outside and beyond the concept of matter, joining to it apriori in thought something which I have not thought in it. The proposition is not, therefore, analytic, but synthetic, and yet is thought apriori; and so likewise is the other propositions of the pure part of natural science.”\(^3\)

Kant thought that as apriori synthetic judgments in mathematic and physics are possible, then concluded that metaphysics, as science, is possible if it contains of apriori synthetic judgments. “For, its business is not merely to analyze concepts which we make for ourselves apriori of things, and thereby to clarify them analytically, but to extend our apriori knowledge. And for this purpose we must employ principles which add to the given concept something that was not contained in it, and through

\(^1\) Ibid, P. 54  
\(^2\) Ibid.  
\(^3\) Ibid.
apriori synthetic judgments venture out so far that experience is quite unable to follow us, as, for instance, in the proposition, that the world must have a first beginning, and such like.”

Thus he concluded that the realm of scientific metaphysics restricts to apriori synthetic judgments and if we extend our knowledge beyond that, it results into a state of uncertainty and contradiction.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant sets out to show that the notions of pure mathematics are a priori and how they can refer to objects. In Transcendental logic he makes it in two parts: Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic. In the former he sets out to show that some non-mathematical concepts (i.e. metaphysical concepts) are a priori and how they can nevertheless refer to objects. In its first part the ‘Analytic of concepts’, it undertakes to survey the whole field of elementary apriori concepts, in its second part, ‘Analytic of Principle’ all the synthetic a priori judgments in which these concepts are applied. In later he discusses of the improper and fallacious application of such concepts, which violates this

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1. Kemp Smith, B, 18. P. 54-55
2. Kemp Smith, B 82, P 96-97
condition in particular with their illusory application to things in themselves.

How cognition operates

Sense - knowledge

The first thing that Kant does in his study of cognition is to distinguish between material or content, and the form of sensation. He starts from material of our sense-knowledge, which comes from experience. The form is not derived through the senses, but is imposed on material or content by mind, to make that material, or content, universal and necessary. The form is apriori and independent of experience. “Our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from itself”¹ He continues that the most important forms of sense-knowledge, the conditions of all sensation, are space and time. They are independent of experience and even of all impressions of sense. “It is possible to show that pure apriori principles are indispensable for the possibility of experience, and so to prove their existence a priori. For whence could experience derive its

¹ Kemp Smith, B 2, P 42.
certainty, if all the rules, according to which it provides, were always empirical, and therefore contingent? Such rules could hardly be regarded as first principles.”¹

Space and time

The notion of space and time are not abstractions from perception, but apriori particulars or ‘pure forms of perception.’ Because of them, it is important to ask whether the apriori forms of sensation extend the domain of sense-knowledge, and carry us outside the narrow confines of the material, or data, of senses. He replies that they cannot. They can not affect quality or quantity of our knowledge. The data of sensation presents only the appearance of things; therefore, all sensation is confirmed to knowledge of appearances. Sense-knowledge cannot present the nomen, the reality of the things.

“And it is only the form of seasons intuition by which we can know objects only as apriori, but by which we can know objects only as they appear to us (to our senses), not as they are in themselves.”²

¹. Ibid. B 5, P 45.
². Paul Carus, P. 35
Then, space and time are mental entities in the sense that they are applied by the mind to the data of experience; they are strictly subjective and purely mental, and have no objective entity, except in so far as they applied to the external world by the mind.

In the preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*¹ he compares his idea with the fundamental idea of Copernicus who instead of unprofitably assuming that the firmament turned round the observer made the observer turn round and kept the star still. “A similar experiment can be tried in metaphysics, as regards the *intuition* of objects. If intuition must conform to the constitution of the objects, I do not see how we could know anything of the latter apriori, but if the object (as object of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility.”²

**Imagination and schematization**

Now we have understood that how experience occurs in particular instances. We recognize thing through their

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¹. Kemp Smith, B xvii, p. 22
². Ibid.
presentations in intuition and concepts of understanding. Then, question arises that how these types of cognitions are organized by themselves in such way that they do not show anything more than a collection of conflicting and senseless instances. Kant believes that coherent sensation knowledge of the world is possible if we consider the way in which experience occurs to us, or the way in which concepts apply properly to presentation. How we achieve cognition of new object and add new experiences to it. To find answers for these questions we must look to Kant’s treatment of the power of judgment, pure imagination and doctrine of schematization.

**The Understanding**

Kant shows that thought begins with judgment. “Judgment is to apply concepts or to unify presentations. The material of judgment in the faculty of understanding is sense intuition, and these materials take place by the imposing of the forms of space and time on the data of sensation. There must be forms of judgment, as there are forms of sensation, which are imposed by the understanding 1”. These forms do not come from experience at all, but they are apriori. These forms of judgment are the categories. Kant expresses clearly the

1. S. Corner. P. 49
difference between perceptual and objective empirical judgments while the latter have objective reference and general validity.

“All judgments of experience (Erfahrungsurtheile) are empirical (i.e., have their ground in immediate sense perception) vice versa, all empirical judgments (empirische Urtheile) are not judgment of experience. But, besides the empirical and in general besides what is given to sensuous intuition, particular concepts must yet be super-added-concepts which have their origin quite apriori in the pure understanding, and under which every perception must be first of all subsumed and then by their means changed into experience.”

Objectivity

Kant distinguishes between judgments of experience which have objective validity with judgment of perceptions which have subjective validity. “The latter require no pure concept of understanding, but only the logical connexion of perception in a thinking subject. But the former always require, besides the representation of the sensuous intuition, particular

1. Paul Carus, P. 55
concepts originally begotten in the understanding which produce the objective validity of the judgment of experience.”

He presents two examples to illustrate the matter: when we say: ‘The room is warm’, we have a subjectively valid judgment, which is not always for all person as I find it now. It is a relation of two sensations to the same subject to me, and that only in my present state of perception.” When I say: ‘All the sides of a square are equal’ its validity is not limited to the subject or to its state at a particular time. “What experience teaches me under certain circumstances; it must always teach me and everybody.” In this sentence relation affirmed to exist between the subjects and predicate is necessary and universal. Therefore, their necessity and universality must be apriori, and this is the criterion of objectivity of judgments.

“Therefore, objective validity and necessary universality (for everybody) are equivalent terms, and though we do not know the object in itself, yet when we consider a judgment as universal, and also necessary, we understand it to have objective validity. “By this judgment we cognize the object

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid. 57
3. Ibid.
(though it remains unknown as it is in itself) by the universal and necessary connexion of the given perception.”

He explains if we can list all forms of objective empirical judgments that are possible we can produce a complete list of categories. This list had on the whole already been provided, and I have found a clue.” The work of the traditional logicians here needed only some slight modification. The thesis that to each of the different logical forms there corresponds one category, and controversially, to every different category one logical form, is in the words of Kant ‘the clue for discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding.”

Corner believes that it is doubtful to list of all possible logical forms of objective empirical judgment and Kant made mistake in his list. Moreover it is not true that we cannot form any new apriori concept, because one of them is white head’s concept of four-dimensional events, which falls outside the Kantian scheme of categories.

Thus, knowledge of an object involves perceiving it and judging it correctly, that is falls under a concept, which

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1. Ibid. 56
2. Corner, P.49-50
3. Ibid.
involves a category. “All perceptions, which are possible for us, are sense-perceptions (aesthetic); therefore, the thinking of an object as such by means of a pure concept of understanding can become knowledge only in so far as it refers to object of senses. Sense-perception is either pure perception (space and time) or empirical perception of that which, by sensation is immediately presented in space and time as real.”

Then, application of categories to objects, which are not given in perception, can not come to any knowledge. Any attempt of metaphysicians to achieve knowledge in this manner is contradiction and failure.

To apply a category is to confer objective reference by unifying a manifold or pure perception. “It is impossible to confer objectivity a judgment unless the bearer of this objectivity, the object as opposed to mere collection of subjective impressions is produced in perception. Unless we confer objectivity by applying a category there is no object in perception. Unless we produce an object in perception by unifying a pure manifold there is no characteristic of objectivity. More than the production of the objects in perception and application of a category are two aspects of the same process.”

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1. Kemp Smith B 147, P. 186.
2. Corner, P. 54
Kant expresses this point in this way “The same function which in a judgment gives unity to the various presentation, also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various presentations in a perception which generally expressed, is called “the pure concept of the understanding”.

Then he forms the list of the twelve forms of judgment to the twelve categories. To show in detail how he extracts a category from each of the different logical forms of judgment or how he completes table of twelve categories, which is not now in our aim. In general his way to derive the categories embodied in a logical form is that “take any objective empirical judgment of this form and find the concept, the omission of whose application with turn the given judgment into a merely perceptual one. Since every objective empirical judgment has, as regards its form, quantity, quality, relation and modality, there must be four concepts which will have the above effect.”

It becomes clear that application of Categories is right and moreover that the applicability of the Categories is a necessary condition of objectivity of experiences, and applied Categories to object is necessary condition to make objects, as

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1. Ibid
2. Ibid
they are thinkable. We will evaluate objectivity in Kant latter, when we compare his Categories with Aristotle’s Categories. Now the question arises: how the concepts of understanding will apply to judgments of empirical intuition? To reply this question we should know the function of imagination and schematization.

The imagination produces three types of synthesis: figurative synthesis, intellectual synthesis (synthesis of understanding) and transcendental synthesis.¹ All these three types of synthesis are transcendental in such way that they provide the apriori bases for many types of cognition, but the transcendental synthesis of imagination is the synthesis of the original apperception. “Both productive and reproductive synthesis of imagination is temporally oriented; the former is anticipatory in character whereas the latter is retrospective and has to do with memory. Both the figurative and intellectual syntheses of imagination are temporally determined in so far as they are made possible by the synthetic unity of original apperception. The imagination is utterly marked by temporal determinations and relations²”. This will be important when we are looking at Mulla-Sadra’s steps cognition.

¹ Kemp Smith, B 151, P. 164
² Ibid.
Imagination is able to make schema. What is schematizing? “Schematization is the functional framework in which the concept of understanding is applied in judgment to empirical intuitions. It is the understandings procedure with Schemata.”\(^1\) But what are schemata? What role do they play in schematization? A schema is a sensible condition, produced by the imagination; by it objects can be applied to concepts through experience. It “aim not an individual intuition but at unity in the determination of sensibility.”\(^2\) In essence, it is a collection, held in thought, of possible images or cognitive determination according to concepts. Kant uses the example of triangle: Now imagine whatever of a triangle would ever be adequate for the concept of a triangle. Without the schema of triangle that triangle would never reach to the concept of universality which makes that concept true for all triangles, but always is limited to only a part of this sphere. The Schema of the triangle can never exist anywhere but in thoughts, and is a rule for determining our intuition in accordance with such and such a general concept.

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\(^1\) Ibid, B 179, P. 182
\(^2\) Ibid.
How does Schematization work? We learn to affiliate a certain number of images or objects with a certain concept, thus creating a structure in which the engagement with particular new experiences becomes possible and manageable. The schema contains as many images as we have in our imagination to carry out productive syntheses, we can anticipate future experiences. This is what enables us to properly judge in cognition even when we are encountering new objects, “without being limited to any single and particular shape offered to me by experience, or even to all possible images that I can exhibit in concreto.”

Thus, Schemata are organized as a collection of images that exist not only as conglomerate based on past experience but also as a rather open-ended system which can be expanded with new experiences by the power of judgment. Schematization amounts to being “a product of productive imagination’s empirical ability.” Kant characterizes it as a mysterious skill.

Experience as a whole occurs in the faculty of the imagination, its entire character appears in the form of possibility as much as it does in actuality. Here Kant ties the notion of time and temporality into schematization. He says, the

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid, B 181, P. 183
schemata “are nothing but apriori time determinations according to rules; these rules, according to the categories, deal with the time series, the time order, and finally the time sum total in regard to all possible objects.”¹

He explains that “although the schemata of sensibility first realize the categories, they at the same time restrict them, that is, limit them to conditions which tie outside the understanding, and are due to sensibility. The schema is, properly, only the phenomenon, or sensible concept of an object in agreement with the category… we conclude that the categories in their pure significance, apart from all conditions of sensibility, ought to apply to things in general, as they are, and not like the schemata, represent them only as they appear… Therefore, the categories without schema are merely function of understanding for concepts; and represent no object. This (objective) meaning they acquire from sensibility, which realize the understanding in the very process of restricting it.”²

¹. Ibid, B 185, P.
². Ibid
Conclusion

Kant’s theory of experience shows that experience itself occurs coherently because of the apriori forms of sensations and the categories. The role of understanding faculty is limited to make the presentations regular. The use of pure reason stands over and above experience as a condition according to which practical decisions become possible. Then, the question arises: is the idea of a coherent world can be possible without the reason? If we suppose that the imagination is at the center of a theory of experience, how we can talk about a useful set of regulative principles concerning existence and being. In other words, if the structure of experience corresponds so closely to the structure of the subject, and if experience occurs largely in terms of a productive synthesis of the imagination, then how we can produce any objectively valid notions about morality and freedom? If reason itself is a regulative faculty and if it only comes into action because of an imaginatively synthesized which makes experience unified, then how does it really comes into our concrete experience of the world?
Evaluation of objectivity in Plato, Aristotle and Kant

The problem of the correspondence of concept to reality or objectivity of our knowledge, in its strict sense does not appear in the Greek philosophy as it is a distinct problem in contemporary philosophy. Non-emergence of “objectivity” as topic in Greek philosophy does not mean they rarely discussed it or they ignored it. The point is that what is important for Aristotle and Plato is not to consider relationships between things in propositions, which can be false or true.

The classical philosophy emphasizes absolutes, essences, definitions, Categories- the things-in themselves. Aristotle defines truth “to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”\(^1\) and Plato says that truth is ‘being in itself’, ‘absolute, independent’, i.e., ‘the idea’.

In modern philosophy it is supposed that science has been succeeding to arrive to uncontroversial achievements, and if same way follows by philosophy, would bring same result. Because of this new prospective in philosophy searching for meaning of true in the things in themselves shifted to recognize

\(^1\) Metaphysics, 1011.b
the truth in relationship between propositions, and it becomes the most fundamental problem in philosophy. Naturally by changing the subject, evaluation of it necessarily will change, although there is the same criterion for it to find what real and true being could be. Generality and absolutely is a necessary condition for our true knowledge and real being. It is, indeed, a bridge between our concepts and reality, i.e. objects.

Then, what is generality and absolutely in the Plato, Aristotle and Kant. To find out this answer will conduct us to understand the problem of ‘objectivity’ in their philosophy. In Plato’s philosophy the real must posses the attributes of necessity, universality, unity and immutability that there is in our intellectual representations and either in the nature. As the sensible world contains only the contingent, the particular, the unstable, it follows that the real exists outside and above the sensible world. Plato calls it *idos*, idea. The idea is absolutely stable and exists by itself, isolated from the phenomenal world distinct from divine and human intellect. They are real and all sensible things bestow their existence as much as they participate in ideas.

Plato makes a hierarchy of knowledge corresponding to hierarchy of being. Wise people are responsible to distinguish
difference between knowing sensible beauty from the meaning of beauty in general, then they have to ascend from general beauty to the idea of beauty which is unity with Good and One in the apex of being. What is necessarily absolute in reality is conceivable in thought with all its characteristics. Real philosopher through a physical and mental program struggles to ascend from inferior life to superior life by understanding sensible things, mathematical objects then, the ideas of those things.

In Aristotle real is not, as Plato says, some specific entity such way that the sensible world is only the shadow of that; it dwells in the sensible world. Individual substance (this flower, that book) alone has reality, it alone can exist. The universal is not a thing in itself, it is immanent; it is immanent in individuals and is multiplied in all the representative of a class. As to the form of universality of our concepts (flower, book) it is a product of our subjective consideration, which springs from sensitive knowledge.

The objects of our representations can be called substances (ὁνσια) when they designate the fundamental reality (flower) which have some accidental determinations (smell, color), but these are substances. The attribute of universality
that affects the substance as in thought does not belong to the
substance (the-thing-in itself), it is the outcome of our sensitive
knowledge and function of reason. What is outside includes
particulars which reason can understand their multiply under an
absolute class. Categories bring multiple characteristics of
things under one class. Any character of a particular thing
which comes to reason through experience can be understood in
thought as absolute. His aim, in contrast with Kant, is to
understand the things-in-themselves, in other words, our
cognition power is subjected to the objects and is able to
understand them in their reality.

Classical explanation of cognition and how it could be
certainly true did not satisfy Kant. He considered three classes
of judgments: analytic, synthetic, synthetic a priori. Analytic
judgments which are the result of analysis (taking-apart) of
subject and predicate without immediate reference to
experience; to deny opposite of analytic judgment makes
contradiction. Synthetic judgments are the result of a synthesis
(put together) of the facts or data of experience and denial of it
does not render contradiction. Thus, “Rain is wet” is an analytic
judgment and “This flower is red” is synthetic judgment. Kant
says analytic judgments do not advance knowledge at all, since
they always remain within the concepts (subject and predicate)
and make no advance beyond the data of concepts. Synthetic judgments have no scientific value, since, coming as they do from experience, they must be contingent and particular. He, therefore, proposes to introduce a third class, namely, synthetic apriori judgment, which are synthetic, because the content of them is supplied by synthesis of the facts of experience and apriori, because the form of universality and necessity is imposed on them by understanding independently of experience. Kant presents one example that “Every effect must have a cause.” Our concept of “effect” and “cause” are supplied by experience; but the universality and necessity of principle is derived from the apriori endowment of the mind, named category of casualty.

**Evaluation of objectivity**

Kant created categories and schema to explain the objectivity which is given to perception, but he could not transfer from structure of mind (idealism) to objects. He says it is scientifically impossible to know what the things outside of mind are, because we know them according to structure of mind.
and in that structure there is no place for substance or phenomen.

Experience can not give necessity and universality to judgments- due to its particular nature- nor do the understanding, because its main activity is to apply representations to categories without understanding them. He referred to the power of understanding faculty in make judgments as a talent or a skill that must be developed rather than learned or thought. Objectivity in Kant is overlapped with subjectivity and he could not pass from conceptualism to realism.

He determined the function of mind to bestow objectivity to phenomena through categories and schematization. They serve to confer universality and necessity to our judgments. Categories bring divers sense intuition under some degree of unity. To apply a category is, thus, to confer objective reference by unifying a manifold of pure perception. Without applying a category and schemata to perception there is no objectivity and no object in our perception. We produce an object in perception by unifying them under one category. Production of the object in perception and application of a category are two aspects of the same process. But they do not extend our knowledge. For
while “representations (or intuitions) without the categories would be blind, the categories without representative, or intuitional, content would be empty.”¹

Kant believes that we are bound to the limited knowledge covered by our sense-experience. Space and time do not widen that limitation and increase our knowledge nor do the categories and schema. Universal and necessary representations are in our mind (apriori form) and have no contact with external thing. By space and time we produce all sensible impressions and they cannot be obtained from experience, which is individual and contingent; they are schemata, which arise from our mental organization.

Consequently, we have no warrant for establishing a real correspondence between the worlds of reality as Aristotle tried to explain it and world of mind as Plato tried to illustrate. Therefore, knowledge which is possible to acquire by the understanding is confined to the appearance (phenomena) of thing and does not extend beyond it to things-in-themselves (phenomena) and its objectivity is accordance to structure of mind (categories and schema).

¹ Kemp Smith, B 76. P.93
The problem of the correspondence between the concept and reality does not arise in Plato and Aristotle’s thought. Plato thinks that the sensible world is a state of becoming and multitude, and is a shadow of Ideal world, which is not in a state of universal and real being. Plain existence of shadows depends on their participation in the ideas, and knowledge of them is not reliable in contrast to Ideas, which are true and real. From one aspect we may call Plato’s views as exaggerated realism, because he believes in universal as real world of being, but from other aspect we may call his thought as idealism, because what he believes as real being has no place in this world.

We may say that when Aristotle explains the fundamental principle of universal as the absolute reality is affected by Plato, but when he says that it is a universal, which exist only, in particular, breaks away from Plato’s idealism and in this situation Aristotle may called a realism. On the other hand, he may be idealism, because he elaborates particular in accordance of matter and form, which form is “ultimate reality that from which the entire universe follow… and as the form is the universal.”\(^1\) He is entangled in idealism namely the “thought, the universal, reason, is the absolute being, the

\(^1\) W. T. Stace, P.281,
foundation of the world. Besides there are more universal concepts such as possibility and existence which he called them categories”¹ - a common predicate which attaches to many objects of a class - that he did not explain them.

**What is being in Kant**

In the *Republic* Plato defines ideas as real beings and the source of this world. They are such existence that can exist in their own, apart from particulars of sensible world. Ideas are universal, unchangeable, stable, fixed and abiding. They are real being while the things in the world of sense are subjected to becoming and therefore, not real.

Aristotle explains real being as being qua being which he called οὐσία (substance). “By being qua being, Aristotle means, first of all, objective reality.”² Whatever has existence is substance or modes of substance. “Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is neither predicate of a subject nor present in the subject, for instance the individual man or horse. But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary

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¹. Ibid
substances include; also those which as general, include the species.”¹ Then he distinguished between primary substance, which is individual and secondary substance, which are species and genus. For Plato, universals (idea) are primary substance, while for Aristotle individuals are primary substance, which can be seen and touched, such as: this man and that flower.

Kant does not accept that the being may be universal entity, as Plato said, or, might be individual existence, as Aristotle mention. He, indeed, has shifted the discussion about absolute, essence, substance- thing-in itself- to relationship between things in propositions. He argues the being in the judgments, and the real being change to concepts, truth in the world shifted to true and false in statement.

He rejected² this argument that existence is contained in—material or immaterial- a thing that is possible. He says, we must ask: Is the proposition that this or that thing (which, whatever it may be, is allowed as possible) exists, an analytic or a synthetic proposition? If it is analytic, the assertion of the thing adds nothing to the thought of the thing. In that case, the thought, which is in us, is the thing itself, or we have

¹. Ibid
². Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason, Selected From Section 4, The Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the existence of God.
presupposed an existence as belonging to the realm of the possible and have inferred its existence from its internal possibility which is a mere tautology. He says that use of words or predicates alone does not necessarily imply the existence of their referents. We cannot prove existence by means of the use of language. Being is not a real predicate, that is, a conception of something that added to the conception of some other thing.

An analytic statement can transfer to a valid formula of logic, because the concept of predicate is inherent in the subject. For instance: “That body is extended” is an affirmative analytical judgment, which the predicate is already contained in the concept of the subject, and it cannot be denied without contradiction. Therefore, it is a necessity judgment and apriori that through experience we don’t get it. He continues that in the things in this world we can not find the conception of existence necessarily. When we posit a thing has an existence, we indeed, posited that thing with all its predicates in the conception of the subject and assumed its actual existence and this means repeated the predicate. If, then, we say that this thing exists, is synthetically, then, the predicate of existence can be denied without contradiction.
“‘Being’ is obviously not a real predicate, that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the conception of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The small word “is” adds no new predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject.”¹ He gives an example that a hundred real dollars contains no more than a hundred possible dollars. For, as the latter indicate the conception, and the former the object, and if we suppose that the content of the real hundred dollars is greater than the concept of the hundred possible dollars, I have got a conception that do not express the whole subject, and would therefore, be an inadequate concept of it. Clearly, a hundred real dollars can affect my financial position than mere concept of them. For, a real hundred dollar that actually exists, is not analytical conception, but it forms a synthetically and additional conception (which is a determination of my mental state) and its objective reality- this existence- is apart from my conceptions, but does not increase the concept of the hundred dollars.

“By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing- even if we completely determine it. We do not

¹. Kemp Smith, B 627, P. 504
make the least additional to the thing when we further declare that this thing is. Otherwise, it would not be exactly the same thing that exists, but something more that we thought in the concept, and we could not, therefore, say that the exact object of my concept exists.”

He concluded that the proposition God is omnipotent, on that the word is indicates no additional predicate. We have two concepts (God and omnipotence) which have a certain object or content. The word is, is merely a copula that relates the predicate to the subject. “When I say “There is a God”, we attach no new predicate to the conception of God, but only posited the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit it as being an object that stands in relation to my concept. The concept of both must be one and the same, otherwise it stated, the real contains no more that the merely possible.”

Evaluation

Kant was completely aware that the predicate “is” must be different from the subject in synthetic propositions and

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1. Ibid. B 628, P 565
2. Ibid.
existence may not be same concept as subject. He says:
Whatever, therefore, and however much, our concept of an
object may contain, we must go outside it, if we are to ascribe
existence to the object.”

First of all we must say that we agree with Kant that
whenever we analyze the meaning of an object with all its
characteristics, it is obvious that meaning of the existence is not
contain in its object, otherwise we may not ask whether that
ting exists or not. Existence and other characteristics are two
different concepts in our thought, but they combine one concept
in the real world. Hence, we agree with Kant that existence
does not add any concept to the object in the real world,
because their combinations are compositions by way of
unification and not as Kant supposes by way of annexation.
There is a difference between the concepts of existence with
concepts of other characteristics of that object only in the
thought. Existence is not inherent in the concept of object;
otherwise the object does not need any cause for its existence.
Hence, existence is not just a copula.

Second, we agree with Kant that existence does not add
any concept to its object in the real world, but it increase our

1. Ibid, B 629, P. 506.
knowledge; if we come to know that things exists or does not exist our knowledge of that thing and its relation in things in universe will be extended.

Third, Kant made a false start when he assumed in his criticism of speculative reason that whatever is universal and necessary in our knowledge must come from the mind itself, and not from the world of reality outside us. And, because of this prospect, objectivity becomes subjective in his philosophy. While he believes in synthetic talent that enabled him to build up a system of thought, he did not consider that in the analytic quality we are able to observe what actually takes place in the mind. Finally, in a thought that reduces all philosophy to an examination of knowledge to observe what actually takes place in the mind is a serious defect.

Summary

At the beginning of this chapter it is said that what will be discussed in the following section, is to show how the meaning of the ‘being’ has been changed from the ‘being-in-itself’, ‘being qua being’, in Plato and Aristotle to ‘know things
in their relationships to another things’ in the philosophy of Kant.

Kant discussed why he did not accept two classification of judgment from Hume, and how we have third judgment called apriori synthetic judgment. He poses arguments against dichotomy of Hume and offers one more class of judgment, which is basic for metaphysical cognition. He explains: ‘Analytic judgments’ express nothing in the predicate but what has been already thought in the concept of the subject, though not so distinctly or with the same (full) consciousness. They are logically independent from experience and depend on the law of contradiction. ‘A posteriori synthetic judgments’ have empirical origin and amplify the knowledge. They are not absolutely and necessarily true, because they depend on experience.

In ‘synthetic apriori judgment’ predicate is not contained in its subject and yet are logically independent of it and describing sense- experience. Metaphysic, as science, is possible, if it contains apriori synthetic judgments. For, the duty of Metaphysics is not only to analyze concepts which we make for ourselves apriori about things, but it must extend our apriori knowledge. And for this purpose we must employ principles,
which add to the given concept something that was, not contain in it.

Kant believes that experience itself occurs coherently, because of the a priori forms of sensations, categories and the act of imaginations. The power of faculty of understanding is to make presentations regular and the use of pure reason is above experience as a condition which practical decision becomes possible. But we have to ask from Kant that how the idea of a coherent world is possible without reason,? How are we to talk about a useful set of regulative principles about being and existence? In other words, if the structure of experience corresponds so closely to the structure of the subject and if experience occurs largely in terms of a productive synthesis of imagination, and reason is only a regulative, then how we can have any notion of morality and freedom. If reason is a regulative faculty and only comes into action because of an imaginatively synthesized, then how does it really act into our concrete experience of the world?

Then, he explains the problem of objectivity according to two different judgments and makes distinguishes between judgments of experiences, which have objective validity with judgment of perception, which have subjective validity. Then
Kant makes clear that application of categories is right and moreover that the applicability of the Categories is a necessary condition of objectivity of experience, and applied Categories to object is necessary condition to make objects, as they are thinkable. For Plato and Aristotle, there is correspondence between the thought and the object. For Aristotle truth is what that is and what is not that is not truth. Plato said truth is the absolute, independent being, the Idea. By Kant truth and not truth become true and false in judgments, because the criteria of the knowledge shifted. Universal and necessary representation has no contact with the object since they are produced by the structure of our mind. Space and time, in which we make all our sensible impressions, cannot be obtained from experience; they arise from our mental organization. Hence, we have nothing that can be correspondence between the world of reality and the world of mind.

At the last part it is discussed that Plato said real being is Idea and Aristotle declared it is ονσια. Kant said the use of words or predicates alone does not necessarily imply the existence of their referents. Being is not a real predicate that is a conception of something, which is added to the conception of some other thing. When we posit a thing real, we posited a thing with all its predicates in the conception of the subject and
assumed its actual existence and this means repeated the predicate, logically being is merely the copula of a judgment. The word is does not add anything to the predicate. We should first say that Kant is right that the predicate “is” or existence must be different from the subject. The meaning of existence is not containing in its object, otherwise we may not ask whether that thing exist or not. Existence and the characteristics are two different concepts in our thought but they combine one existence in the real world, because their combinations are composition by way of unification. Second, if existence does not add any more meaning to the predicate it may add our knowledge of the things in the universe even though if we declare they are not exist. Third, Kant made a false start when he assumed that whatever is universal and necessary in our knowledge must come from the mind, because he did not consider what actually take place in the mind accordance to the things in the real world.