CHAPTER - V

TRIPARTITE AXIS OF UNITED STATES–CHINA – PAKISTAN:

THREAT TO PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA

You have to take chances for peace, just as you must take chances in War. Some say, that we were brought to the verge of War. Of course we were brought to the verge of War. The ability to get to the verge without getting into the War is the necessary art. If you cannot master it, you inevitably get into war. If try to run away from it, if you are scared to go to the brink, you are are lost. (1)

Stability in the international system is threatened when power itself becomes the dominant national interest rather than a means to an end. To fulfill national interest, action by any of the major powers inevitably involves the interests of the other members of the international system as well as subsystems in the area of action.

It is difficult to reverse the process. It is easy for individuals to say, "circumstances have changed, so I will adopt a different approach". Nations do not have the same freedom of action because they have made commitments and national decision makers do not readily change course, even when this is necessary for the pursuit of success. Therefore, major powers must devise and implement bold policy initiatives even when they entail uncertainty, and possibly much larger errors.

Since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the evolving United States-China-Pakistan axis threatened India as much as the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan threatened Pakistan. The alignment of convenience among the United States, Pakistan and China appeared to be part of a normative strategy directed against India and USSR. There was no common ground between the triangular axis, rather each was using the other to realise its own ambition.

Both Beijing and Washington have been obsessed with the anti-Sovietism. The growing friendship between India and Soviet Union particularly in 1970's was an eyesore and a major deterrent to Sino-US hegemony in the region. Pakistan, because of its strategic situation and strained relationship with India was being used as a pawn and became a recipient of massive US military and economic assistance. China's military muscle was growing and its statecraft generated pressures against many of the developing countries of Asia particularly neighbouring India. The US decision to provide Pakistan billions of dollars worth of military and economic assistance posed a serious threat to India which shared a long border with it. China had also rendered massive assistance to Pakistan to equip its army with latest weapons.

PAKISTAN AND THE CONTENTIOUS PAKHTUN ISSUE

The most important reason that drew the Afghans closer to the Soviets was Kabul's espousal of the Pakhtun cause. Throughout 1953-78 this occupied a central place in Afghan politics. The
Afghan support of the Pakhtun right to self-determination emerged with the British withdrawal from India and the partition of the sub-Continent. The subsequent border clashes with Pakistan and the closing of the border by the latter set the stage for developments that eventually led to the intensification of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. The Pakhtunistan problem which is closely interlinked with the Durand line issue has been a source of immense bitterness between the two countries.

The demand of Afghanistan has been that there should be a separate state for the Pakhtun speaking people on the Pakistan side of the Durand line. It justifies "its support for Pakhtunistan as a unsolved problem of the history of Afghanistan.

The Pakhtun people struggle began when they were separated from the Afghan State in consequence of the encroachment by the British Government". The other dimensions of the Afghan claims are: (a) The Pakhtuns were more akin to Afghanistan from the ethnic, linguistic, geographical, historical and traditional point of view (b) Internal and external constraints leading to negotiating the treaties with the British under duress and lastly, (c) Their rejection of Pakistan's contention that the majority of the NWFP population voted in favour of Pakistan in the referendum held in 1947.

On the other hand, Pakistan has periodically reiterated that (a) the Treaty of 1893 on the Durand line was the valid international boundary, which indeed ended Afghan Sovereignty over people and territory east of the Durand Line, (b) As Pakistan was the British successor in that region, it upheld all the treaties arrived at by the previous government, (c) Pakistan stood by the plebiscite of 1947 conducted in the NWFP, according to which the majority stood for the Union with Pakistan, (d) Pakistan vehemently opposed the notion that Pakhtuns are a nation by themselves; as they had no cohesive Unity. There were accusations and counter-accusations as both countries clashed over the interpretation of the contentious Pakhtun issue. This spilled over into the international arena when Afghanistan refused to vote for Pakistan's admission to the UN, as it did not recognize Pakistan's control over the NWFP. As relations worsened, the Pakistan government unleashed harsh and repressive measures against the Pakhtuns in the NWFP. The popular Pakhtun leader Badshah Khan was imprisoned. Consequently, the Afghan National Assembly, the Loya Jirgah, in 1949 refused to comply with any of the treaties, conventions and agreements arrived at with the British. Iran made a bid to reconcile the differences between these two countries but to no avail.

5. North West Frontier Province (NWFP).
6. Yadev, n.4, p. 65.
Due to Pakistan's preoccupation with India over the Kashmir Issue relations between the two neighbours were cold during the early fifties. Afghanistan, despite its strategic location was a forgotten factor in subcontinental politics. The second cold spell in their relations came when Pakistan in 1955 decided to integrate "all four provinces of West Pakistan into one Unit". A part of the reason was to off-set any further erosion of support for Pakistani nationalism in the disputed territory. In Afghanistan, this act was viewed with consternation. The tensions increased and there were reports of border clashes and widespread demonstrations took place in Kabul in favour of the Pakhtuns. In retaliation, Pakistan imposed an economic blockade on Afghanistan by terminating all transit trade through the Khyber pass and Karachi port. It was this that made Afghanistan turn to the Soviets for assistance. But here there was an added factor: the two countries shared a common frontier, which enabled the Russians over a period of time to provide Afghanistan with an alternative trading outlet and to break that country's dependence on Pakistan. All mediatory efforts by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Turkey failed. Relations reached a new low when on October 13, 1955 diplomatic relations were broken following the implementation of the "one Unit" scheme in West Pakistan. The division of support for the two countries approximated the contours of the superpower divide. SEATO (of which Pakistan was a member) countries supported the Pakistan. While the Soviets supported the Afghan stand on Pakhtunistan and Durand line. Only in 1956 was a break through achieved by

diplomatic relations and the transit agreement resumed. However, the position on Pakhtunistan and the Durand Line hardened, but the issues were put on the back burner for the time being. 8

However, Afghanistan signed a series of trade and aid pacts with the Soviets. As a result by mid 1970's with over $1.2 billion in aid and with 50 per cent of its trade with the Soviets, the latter emerged as the principle outside investor in the Afghan economy. Anyway, it was the American rejection of Daoud's request for military aid because of its commitment to an alliance with Pakistan and Iran that forced Daoud to turn to the Soviet Union for such aid. However the inevitable overdependence on the Russians and the protracted hostilities with Pakistan led finally to the dismissal of Daoud in 1963. The decade of 1963-73 was an era of experimentation in "new democracy" in Afghan politics and a greater liberalisation within the society. The government was largely in the hands of American educated Afghans, but this experiment was doomed from the very beginning. The new politics was truncated by ethnic and tribal rivalries and an arbitrary exercise of power by Zahir Shah who dominated the new assembly by handpicked rural notables. What is more, one third of its members were illiterate. The criticism about Afghanistan's growing dependence on foreign aid and lack of Socio-economic reforms grew both from with the state and without. But most important of all, the Baluchi self-determination issue once again made its appearance in the wake of the Bangladesh war 1971. It is in this context that Daoud

8. Ibid., pp. 43-44.
returned to power, but this time he was assisted by a group of left wing Parchamite army officers.9

After the coup in 1973, Daoud expressed support for Moscow's "Asian collective security plan" appointed pro-soviet leftists to government positions at local and national levels and lodged a protest against Iran's arms build-up. Initially under Daoud, Kabul drew closer to the Soviets with the latter pledging support for Afghanistan's natural gas industry, irrigation, roads and fertilizer factories. But on the whole, Moscow carefully balanced its support for the Afghan left that was badly divided between the Khalq and Parchamite factions, with that for the official government of Daoud. However, by 1975, Daoud began to get concerned with the state of overdependence on Moscow and began to resuscitate fence-sitting policies.10

CHANGE IN DAOUD'S ATTITUDE

Daoud's shifting to the right in both domestic and foreign affairs surfaced rapidly during 1977-78. He launched a purge of the pro-Moscow Parchamites from the army. At the behest of Moscow and fearing attacks from Daoud in May 1977 the two factions of the left the Khalq and the Parcham, abandoned their ideological and ethnic differences and merged into one party the PDPA (People's

10. Ibid., p. 54.
Democratic Party of Afghanistan).\textsuperscript{11} These moves were too palpable a reversal of Afghan neutrality for both the Soviet Union and the left in Afghanistan. The latter were alarmed. Daoud's pro-Iran drift also produced a significant change in the Soviet Policy towards the Afghan communist movement. In response to the changing alignment in world politics, and the emergence of Iran and other OPEC nations as an important power factor in the region Daoud began to woo them as a counterweight to the Russians. This was a dangerous turn of events for Moscow. Anxious to secure Iran's eastern borders the Shah offered $22 billion in aid to Kabul, a sum for surpassing the Soviet pledges to the Afghan seven year plan from 1976 onwards. The Shah also operated a busy SAVAK Station in Kabul to help Daoud root out the "communists". Under the Shah's influence Daoud even agreed to drop this militant support of the Baluchi and Pushtoon tribes and sought a peaceful solution of the border problem with Pakistan. He concluded a peace Agreement with Pakistan in March 1978.\textsuperscript{12} The directions of Daoud's policies were quite clear. He visited Egypt and India to arrange for expansion of military training programmes. The former had moved decidedly to the United States camp since 1970's and the later, under the Janta rule, seemed to have improved its relations with the United States much to the consternation of Moscow. Daoud was scheduled to meet President Carter in September 1978. Inside, Afghanistan the suppression of the communists also progressed apace. The Parcham leader Mir Akbar

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., pp. 105-106.

Khibar was murdered on 17 April 1978. This precipitated a confrontation between Daoud and the Communist Party. He was acting more like a traditional Afghan ruler than a modernizer. He became more repressive at home but also more friendly towards Iran, Pakistan and United States, thus alarming the Soviets and leading to Khalq and Parcham factions to reunite. So, the stage was set for the April 1978 coup and the emergence of a communist government in Afghanistan. When he ordered mass arrests, the resulting moves and countermoves finally resulted in his execution along with his entire family. The communists were thus brought to the centre of Afghan politics, under Noor Mohammed Taraki.

The first nation to extend diplomatic recognition and economic aid to the new Taraki regime in Kabul was the Soviet Union. Afghanistan, having a traditional and tribal society and its people being followers of Islam, the Marxist ideology was alien imposition. The advent of Saur Revolution in Kabul in April 1978 was not a welcome move for the majority of Afghans. Thus it was but natural for the people of Afghanistan to resist the imposition of communist rule. The upsurge in people's resistance against the communist regime in Kabul got impetus during the winter of 1978-79. There also developed a network of guerrilla training camps and supply routes across the Durand line in Pakistan. Thousands of Afghans opposed to the new regime took shelter in neighbouring Pakistan, Iran and their number increased with the passage of time.

Along with the augmentation in people's resistance to the new regime in Kabul, the factional rivalry between Taraki and Amin also sharpened. The developments took dramatic turn during the second week of September 1979 and on 15 September 1979, when the Afghan Revolutionary Council announced that Taraki had asked "to be relieved from party and State Government on health grounds" and Hafizullah Amin took over as the new President of Afghanistan. 

Since the day of Amin's assumption of power, the relations between Kabul and Moscow though cordial on surface looked experienced a sharp decline in reality. On 17 September 1979, the Soviet leaders Brezhnev and Kosygin, while sending congratulatory message to Amin expressed the confidence that "fraternal relations between the Soviet Union and the Revolutionary Afghanistan will be further developed successfully on the basis of Treaty of Friendship". The monotonous message lacked the usual Soviet warmth. Another factor indicative of Soviet disenchantment with Amin was that Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin after visiting India in early October 1979, on his way back to Moscow did neither stop over at Kabul nor send the usual message of greetings.

Prior to his assumption of power as President, Hafizullah Amin as a Foreign Minister and later as a Prime Minister under Taraki, had seldom shown his disenchantment for Moscow in his public pronouncements. On 22 July 1979 he said: "Any person and

15. Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 5 October 1979, p.12.
17. Fred Thomas, War and Revolution in Afghanistan (California, 1982, pp. 34-35.
any element who harms the friendship between Afghanistan and Soviet Union will be considered the enemy of the country, enemy of our people and enemy of the revolution. We will not allow anybody in Afghanistan to act against the friendship of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. However, at the same time he also seemed worried about the increasing Soviet presence in Afghanistan. On 17 July 1979 he said: "Those who boast of friendship with us, they can really be our friend only when they respect our independence and our social and pridelful traditions". According to Beverly Male, Amin was too much of a realist to imagine that the PDPA could survive without Soviet assistance and in any case too good a socialist to wish to see relations with the Soviet Union deteriorate further. Some western political analysts hold that Moscow was anxious to draft karmal as Taraki's successor and it could be done only after eliminating Amin, and such planning was done in mid-August 1979. Between September and October 1979, the number of Soviet experts and military advisers in Afghanistan increased manifold. By that time the Afghans had lost control of the essential levers of power to 1500 or more Soviet officials in the civilian ministries and between 3,500 and 4,000 Soviet officers and technicians in the Afghan armed forces. By October 1979 more

than 4,000 officers and non-commissioned officers of the Afghan army had been purged for political reasons.\textsuperscript{23} When in late October 1979, a major offensive was conducted by Afghan army against Afghan Mujahideen\textsuperscript{24} in Pakhtia province, along the Durand Line South of Kabul, the Soviet military personnel commanded, ran logistics and provided air power for the Afghan army.\textsuperscript{25}

SOVIET TRANSGRESSION IN AFGHANISTAN.

By the beginning of December 1979, the Soviet Union started pouring in Soviet troops on Afghan soil and by 6 December 1979 there were battalions about 2500 Soviet troops.\textsuperscript{26} Suddenly on 14 December Soviet troops began to land at Kabul airport, and other airbases at Bagram, Shindad and Qundhar and this airlifting of troops continued for two days around the clock.\textsuperscript{27} On 27 December 1979, Kabul Radio announced the fall of Amin Regime and installation of Babrak Karmal as the new head of the Government in Kabul.\textsuperscript{28} At this time there were about 80,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan and by January 1980 their strength grew to over 120,000.

\textsuperscript{23} The Economist (London), 17 November 1979, pp. 68 ff.

\textsuperscript{24} Mujahideen means freedom fighters.


\textsuperscript{26} M. Iqbal Hussain, Soviet Policy towards South Asia (Islamabad, 1984), pp. 21-24.


\textsuperscript{28} Radio Liberty Research, n. 22.
The Soviet Union justified sending its troops to Afghanistan as fulfilment of a request made by the Government of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in terms of the Afghan-Soviet-Treaty of Friendship signed on 5 December 1978. In this regard an announcement made on 27 December 1979 through Kabul Radio said:

Because of the continuation and expansion of aggression, intervention and provocations by the foreign enemies of Afghanistan and for the purpose of defending the gains of the saur Revolution, territorial integrity, national independence and the preservation of peace and security and on the basis of the treaty of friendship, good neighbourliness and co-operation dated 5 December 1978, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan earnestly demands that the USSR render urgently political, moral and economic assistance including military aid to Afghanistan. The government of the USSR has accepted the proposal of the Afghan side. (29)

The continued presence of over 120,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan resulted in the augmentation of exodus of Afghan refugees seeking shelter in Pakistan and Iran and exacerbation in guerrilla activities between Afghan Mujahideen operating from Pakistan territory and the Afghan army assisted by Soviet troops.

US ATTITUDE TOWARDS AFGHAN PROBLEM

The United States which saw the Afghan intervention as a dangerous challenge to its interests reacted strongly. It did this in three ways: It sought to pressurize Russians until their forces were withdrawn to punish them for their transgression; and warned them against future aggression, while building US military capabilities to deter other attempts to change the balance of forces

29. Kanan, n. 27, pp. 24ff.
between them. President Carter suspended grain shipments, the sale of high technology and had the United States boycott the summer Olympics to be held in Moscow. He announced, in what has since then come to be known as the "Carter Doctrine" that America would repel with force any attempt by an outside power to gain control of the Gulf region. He further announced the establishment of a "Rapid Deployment Force" and the strengthening of the naval forces in the Indian Ocean, made pointed overtures to China, including a willingness to sell arms to that country, decided to secure bases in Kenya, Egypt and Somalia extended aid to Pakistan and staged regular airflights of B-52 in the Gulf region. The Afghan crisis was a turning point in the super power rivalry. What began as an urgent reflex to Soviet intervention had under Reagan acquired the dimensions of a full-fledged policy of constructing a "strategic entity" stretching from Islamabad to Ankarah. Its principal purpose was to halt any further Soviet move towards the Persian Gulf and the region, of South West Asia. The Reagan Strategy for the Gulf pre-supposed that, (a) The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as well as the collapse of the Shah of Iran were a result of serious weakness in the United States political and strategic position in the world (b) This was brought about by Carter's policies which were characterized by a wrong-headed


approach to human rights, reduction of arms sales and support of nationalists and revolutionaries over allies. For instance, Carter's criticism of the Shah's repressive policies was seen as the principal reason for his collapse. Similarly, withholding arms sales and denying support to Zia on account of his human rights record was cited as the main cause which weakened the American position in Pakistan. The two-Iran and Pakistan together-than lacking US Presence in South West Asia, created a power vacuum that the inherently expansionist USSR could not resist filling in. (c) The USSR was not only expansionist, its Afghan move was the first step in its objective to dominate the region of the Gulf and South West Asia, since it could then deny the "Free World" not only access to the rich oil fields but secure these for its own use, particularly since by 1985 it was supposed to experience severe energy shortages. (d) The Soviets not only sought to establish global hegemony but also possessed the necessary military power to do so. The intervention in Afghanistan was the first step in that direction.32

PERCEPTION OF SOVIET UNION'S OBJECTIVES

The above mentioned perceptions of United States were based on the "power Vacuum" thesis which was defective as a level of analysis and hence failed to provide a comprehensive key answer to the question of Soviet intervention. It was likely that the Soviet move to control Afghanistan was its response to the adverse developments in West Asia throughout the 70's. The wave of Islamic fundamentalism that swept through Iran to Afghanistan could have

spilled over to the Soviet Union's Asian minorities living on the Russian-Afghan border. The United States-China-Pakistan ties since the Bangladesh crisis almost a decade ago were unacceptable and the Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan were part of its counter measures. It was also an attempt to secure a position in the region that would place the Soviets geopolitically in a better situation to prevent what was not in their interest and to promote developments that would at least counteract future US policy. In other words, the Soviets had not embarked on a grand plan to physically conquer the region. But they did not want to be caught without bases and allies if the situation were to change. The great significance of this region, both political and economic was not in dispute. But no one could show with certainty that the USSR had decided to provoke a crisis here and boldly moved to establish regional dominance. They did however recognize as much as the United States, the importance of South West Asia in any super power interaction, whether of conflict or co-operation and felt compelled to secure what advantage they could.

The Soviets were worried about the external intervention but were taking a non-alarmist view of the US involvement in Afghanistan. In fact, the Afghans were sending unmistakable signals to the US in July 1979 for better Afghan-US relations. For instance, the US Embassy in Kabul noted that on 4 July 1979 the Afghan Government representation on reception in Kabul was high even compared to the receptions at other "free-world" Embassies... the government controlled Kabul Times had a positive and "friendly" editorial on the US-Afghan relations observing that US-Afghan relations were "normal". Besides, US intervention in Afghanistan
through Pakistan was noted,\textsuperscript{33} but there was nothing to suggest that the adversarial dealings of the US and the Soviets in Afghanistan could not be moderated at an operational level.

\textbf{CHINA-UNITED STATES ALLIANCE: INFLUENCES ON SOVIET STRATEGIC PERCEPTIONS}

The normalization of relations between China and the United States and the talks about the sale of technology and arms was the serious development that had altered the strategic environment confronting the Soviets. China's overtures to the West although sprung fundamentally from its own sense of military and economic vulnerability made the Soviets feel that they were being uncomfortably trapped. The USSR was aware that the United States-China alliance could be highly dangerous to its own security. It would free China to make bolder moves in pursuit of its interests in South East Asia. The signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty in August 1978 with a clear cut warning to the Soviets contained in the "anti-hegemony" clause, the invasion of Vietnam in early 1979, the sustained support to Pakistan, were all evidence of the fact that China's hostility towards the Soviets would continue unabated. China had moved promptly to counter the growing Soviet presence in Afghanistan as a part of its resistance of what it believed was "Soviet Imperialism". In early 1979, China not only extended support to the Afghan rebels camped in Pakistan but also tried to establish a Muslim republic of Pamir on the Afghan territory of Badakhan and the Wakhan corridor.\textsuperscript{34} This republic would have

\textsuperscript{33} Arvind Gupta, "Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan", \textit{Strategic Analysis} (Delhi), March 1990, Vol.XII, IDSA, p. 1245.

\textsuperscript{34} Ahsan Murtiza, \textit{Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan} (Islamabad, 1985) p. 154. See also Dev Murarka, "Afghanistan, A Review...
adjoined Xinjiang (Sinkiang) and the Pakistan held territory of Kashmir. Although this attempt bore no fruit Soviet fears of Chinese intentions could not but increase. They were seriously concerned also about the significant campaign in the Xinjiang province and felt that if Amin was allowed to pursue his secret overtures to the West, Afghanistan would have become a dangerous security risk to the Soviets. Especially since it together with Xinjiang would have extended the Soviet Union's hostile frontiers by 2,500 kilometers. Though China was not perhaps the main factor as the Afghan crisis reached its climax in 1970, it significantly influenced the perceptions of the strategic problems confronting the Soviet Union at the end of the 70's.

INTERNAL CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR PAKISTAN

Pakistan took full advantage of the internal conflict in Afghanistan to project itself as a "frontline state" against the spread of communism. When the central authority crumbled in Afghanistan, it provided Pakistan the necessary excuse to openly give aid to the Mujahideen, who were motley groups banded together under the nomenclature freedom fighters and who controlled 23 out of the 28 provinces on the eve of the Soviet invasion in December. It was certain that such a concerted bid to usurp power in an armed

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35. Ibid., p. 129

struggle would not be possible without the aid of a neighbouring country. Iran was in a throes of a crisis itself and would not have actively supported the Mujahideen. It was the military regime in Islamabad that had continued the Bhutto policy of aiding the rebels. By becoming a conduit for arms to the rebels and supplying and training the rebels on their own, they were as much responsible as the Taraki and Amin regimes towards fomenting bloodshed in Afghanistan. Other pro-west states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia started bankrolling them. The US increased the quantum of its military-cum-economic aid to both the rebels and Pakistan.\(^{37}\) Strategically this anti-communist stance helped Zia to get legitimacy from the Islamic states and the US. Detente had all but broken down with the two superpowers again competing for spheres of influence in the third world. In this scenario the Soviet intervention must be viewed as the outcome of both tactical and strategic interaction.

The Soviet presence in Afghanistan presented a unique opportunity for Pakistan to closely link itself with the West in order to get massive doses of aid-military and economic to restore its old equation vis-a-vis India. It also gave enough reasons to the West to give legitimacy to the military regime of Zia. Pakistan had advanced certain reasons as to why the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan:

(1) It was a major step in the "known" long run Soviet "Plan" to penetrate Baluchistan and advance to the Arabian Sea;

\(^{37}\) Murtiza, n. 34, p. 180.
(2) Soviet and Afghan efforts to organise Baluch dissidents, as both were resentful on the fact that Baluchistan was not being given its due recognition as a full-fledged province of Pakistan;

(3) The Soviet move was a response to the deteriorating conditions of the Amin government and it essentially was an defensive effort to retain Afghanistan within the Soviet Sphere of influence. 38

Pakistan has persisted in putting forward this view point in order to keep in tune with American thinking on the subject. The object was two fold: To emphasize that Pakistan was a bastion of anti-communism and therefore needed help to defend its borders; and Pakistan would more than willingly play its role in keeping the cost of Soviet occupation high, but for a price. The price was military aid to modernise its armed forces to counter Indian threats and dominance.

At the initial stage response from the Carter to the Pakistan gambit was slow and unsure due to the existing problems the administration had with Pakistan on the issue of human rights and its nuclear programme. Therefore, the aid quantum was limited. But Pakistan was bargaining from a position of strength due to having the leverage of its close relations with China. It scoffed at the $400 million package as "peanuts". Brzezinski on a visit to Peshawar is on record as saying "that the $400 million was only a beginning of the American response to threat posed by the Soviets" and he further expounded that "the US is committed to safeguarding

38. Gupta, n. 33, pp. 72-73.
Pakistan in terms of the 1959 Mutual Security Agreement against the danger from the north".  

To put pressure on the United States to give more aid to Pakistan in an effort Zia stated that "all doors for a dialogue with Moscow must remain open". The advent of the hardline conservative administration in the United States changed the nature of the United States-Pakistan nexus. Reagan looked at the Soviet intervention purely from the superpower point of view. Regional balances were ignored. This change of policy led to the beefing up of the Pakistan armed forces, whose shopping list was prepared keeping the Indian side in mind. The Mujahideen were given substantially larger does of aid. The weapons and the military where-withal was much superior to the earlier supplies.

THE AFGHAN CRISIS AND THE CONFLICTUAL FALL OUT FOR PAKISTAN

The Pakistanis gained short term benefits by raising the stakes for the occupation of Afghanistan. In the process the undeclared war had dragged on and it had brought in its wake problems that would have to be confronted and kept in mind while trying to achieve any success in placing a government favourable to it in Kabul.


40. Ibid., p. 91.
The Afghan crisis resulted in serious problems for the Pakistan which is largely ascribed to the short sighted policies that its leaders have pursued to gain immediate and short term gains. These problems could be categorised broadly into five areas - economic, strategic, social, political and foreign policy.

The price economically that Pakistan has had to pay has been quite enormous as the cost of putting up the refugees has gone up considerably. In 1973, following Daoud's coup, refugees have sought asylum in Pakistan. In 1978, after the overthrow of Daoud, there were over 100,000 refugees. The Pakistan-based refugees grew to about 400,000 by the time the Taraki-Amin factions were fighting. Over 20,000 refugees have been coming into Pakistan every month after the Soviet invasion according to the Pakistani estimates. According to one estimate, the cost for looking after 2.4 million refugees is around $1 million a day. Large concentration of refugees have led to serious social strains.

To go into business, especially real estates and transport undertakings, the Afghans have used their surplus capital. Prices have as a result sky rocketed and created tensions among the local population. Besides many Afghans have illegally obtained Pakistani documents (work permit etc.) which has compounded the unemployment problems, as they are willing to work for lower wages.

42. Ibid., pp. 63-64.
than Pakistanis as a compulsion for survival and are thus taking jobs that would normally go to Pakistanis.  

Socially, economic problems have led to social problems as there is a great feeling among the local population that the privileges given to the Afghans are grossly unfair, especially when the ordinary Pakistani cannot avail of them. The outbreak of sectarian violence is another problem which haunts Pakistanis. This has been spurred by the change in the existing social balance in a region. For example, in the Kurram Agency, the refugees outnumbered the locals and in the sectarian clashes over 200 died.

Above all more dangerous in Pakistan is the drug problem which has become a major issue with the borders becoming porous leading to assorted criminal activities. By 1987, the number of addicts was placed at 6,57,842. With the arms among the local population, the crime rate has gone up considerably. Much of these arms are siphoned off by Pakistani officials and sold in the black market. The local arms industry, already formidable, has also grown to keep pace with the demands of the Mujahideen.

43. Murtiza, n. 34, p. 186.

44. Ibid., pp. 123 ff.


46. Basant Chatterjee, "Insurgency of Drugs in South Asia", Political Affairs (Delhi), no. 12, December-January 1988, p.25.
The economic and social problems have led to the political problems in turn that have afflicted Pakistani Society. The free availability of arms in the Pakistan issue, whenever it comes for discussion in the future, would be a significant factor as any repression by the authorities would lead to protracted urban terrorism. In the perceptions of the political parties the Afghan problem and its consequences to Pakistan has already produced a cleavage. Political parties are openly critical of the government's handling of the situation. Particularly, there has been an increasing politicisation of the refugee problem and they have been openly used in the domestic political process. Through the method the Peshawar based resistance groups have gained a dangerous clout in local politics.

In the areas bordering Afghanistan the concentration of the refugees has gravely disrupted socio-economic life there, because with the passage of time, these refugees have settled for good in the areas in which they were harboured. One such area is Baluchistan where the population of refugees accounts for 10-12 per cent of the total population. Fears have been expressed by many Baluch leaders that if the influx is not stopped the Baluchis would be in a minority. From the foreign policy point of view, Pakistan has been able to drum up support for its position in all international forums. But finally with Gorbachev's decision to withdraw from Afghanistan now Pakistan needs to assess the long term costs of the policy of maximising short term gains, it may

47. Ibid., p. 31ff.
be forced to pay much heavier internal price in the long term. the exorbitant change in circumstances has not always been taken into account in the clash of political ambitions in Islamabad.

**US ARMS ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN**

A day after Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and installation of Babrak Karmal as the new head of government in Kabul, the U.S. President, Jimmy Carter in a telephonic message to President Zia-ul-Haq on 28 December 1979 said that the former was reviewing the way the US could help counter the Soviet threat to Pakistan and assured him of US support.  

On 31 December 1979, National Security Adviser to Carter Administration, Zbigniew Brezezinski said that he had been authorized to reaffirm a 1959-bilateral agreement with Pakistan under which the US would take appropriate action "including the use of armed forces" to protect Pakistan if it was eventually attacked.  

During the third week of January 1980, President Carter in a televised interview said that the United States would "use force if necessary to protect Pakistan against Soviet attack".  

Subsequently in his state of the Union Message on 23 January 1980 President Carter urged the US congress to reconfirm the 1959

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executive agreement with Pakistan. The Carter Administration informed many congressmen on 31 January 1980 about its intention to enter into a long term military support relationship with Pakistan.

The Congressional sources later said that originally the Carter Administration had thought of seeking only an emergency "one time exemption" from the Symington Amendment barring Pakistan any US assistance because of its nuclear weapons programme but later, it ultimately sought the repeals of the ban on aid to Pakistan without any time limit. In mid January 1980, Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi during his visit to Washington asked for the upgrading of 1959 executive agreement to a treaty level and the supply of F-16 combat aircraft. However Washington declined Pakistan's request for upgrading agreement to a treaty level owing to the problems of gaining assent by the Senate.

Consequently, the Carter Administration adopted three major gestures towards Pakistan:

(i) Reaffirmation and congressional endorsement of the US-Pak Executive Agreement of 1959.

(ii) A package offer of economic and military aid of $400 million for a period of two years.

(iii) Acceptance (however "reluctantly") of the Pakistan demand


53. Richard P. Cronin, "Pakistan's capabilities to Meet the Soviet ...
for supply of sophisticated F-16 Combat aircraft.  

Pakistan's President, Zia-Ul-Haq rejected the aid package as "Peanuts" and justified his rejection on grounds that the $400 million offered by the United States would not purchase security but rather would "buy greater animosity from the Soviet Union, which is now much more influential in this region than the United States is...."  


The Reagan Administration made Pakistan a key element in its effort to build a strategic consensus of states facing the threat of Soviet expansionism. Pakistan seized the opportunity and

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realised that strengthening its position and helping the Afghan Mujahideen were complementary.

During the second week of June 1981, the US Under Secretary of State James Buckley visited Pakistan. The Joint statement issued in Islamabad on 15 June 1981 after James Buckley's visit stated that Pakistan and the United States agreed on an approximately $3 billion American aid package covering 5 years. Ultimately on 16 September 1981 Pakistan announced that the US had agreed to supply $3.2 billion worth of US arms and defence related economic support to Pakistan including 40 F-16 combat aircraft. While defining a wider security role for Pakistan, James Buckley, Under Secretary of State, told a congressional sub-committee on Security Assistance on 16 September 1981:

A strong stable and independent Pakistan is an essential anchor to the entire South West Asian region.... We are actually aware of the vital stakes the United States and the West have in the volatile South East Asia.... The Soviet Union continues to resort to ultimation, subversion and outlay aggression in pursuit of its ambition to become the ultimate arbiter of the entire region. We are seeking nothing more and nothing less than to help restore stability to South West Asia and to protect our interests in the Persian Gulf in part by enhancing our ability to project our military power to the region, but more, most particularly by helping the indigenous nations, develop their own capabilities to defend their own interest... Pakistan is test case of this approach to regional security. (60)

Subsequently in December 1981, the US Congress passed legislation authorizing the first increment of $100 million in economic


assistance for fiscal year 1982. The same legislation explicitly
linked US assistance to the threat from Soviet forces in Afghanistan,
and waived the application of the Symington Amendment in Pakistan's
case until 30 September 1987.61 The following table shows the
weapons procured by Pakistan from the United States during 1980-
86.

TABLE 5.1
PAKISTAN'S ACQUISITION OF WEAPONS FROM UNITED STATES: 1980-
1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date of Order</th>
<th>Date of Delivery</th>
<th>Numbers Delivered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>403</td>
<td>F-16A Fighter</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>C-130B Hercules Transport</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Model 20 A AH - IS Helicopter</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

61. Richard P. Cromin, "Congress and Arms sales and Security
Assistance to Pakistan", in US Congress House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Congress and Foreign Policy - 1981
| -- | Model 20 A | Helicopter | 1982 | 1985  | 8   |
| AH - IS | 1986 | 4   |
| -- | G-134 Mohawk | Recce | 1983 |

(B) MISSILES

| 1005 | BGM-71 A ATM | 1981 | 1983 | 100 |
| TOW | 1984 | 240 |
|      | 1985 | 300 |
| 35   | M-88-AI AR.V | 1981 | 1984 | 15  |
|      | 1985 | 20  |

| 24 | M-901 TOW APC | 1981 | 1984 | 12  |
|    |              | 1985 |      | 12  |
| 500 | AIM-9 L AAM | 1985 | 1985 | 100 |
| 2030 | BGM-71 C TOW | 1985 |
| 100 | FIM-92 A Stinger Port-SAM | 1985 | 1985 | 100 |
| 16 | RGM-84 A Harpoon SA ShM | 1985 |

(C) ARMOUR EAD VEHICLES

| 36 | M-109-A2 155 mm SPH | 1982 | 1984 | 18  |
| 88 | M-109-A2 155 mm SPH | 1985 |
| 40 | M-110-A2 203 mm SPH | 1981 | 1982 | 20  |
|    | 1983 | 20  |
| 110| M-113-A2 APC | 1985 |

The above table makes it evident that under the aid package deal sanctioned by the Reagan Administration, Pakistan acquired sophisticated weapons from the United States between 1981-1986.

In 1981, Pakistan urged the United States for the supply of 40 F-16 combat aircraft. Accordingly in 1981, Pakistan got 2 F-16, during 1983 it had 6 and between 1984 and 1985 it got 30 more F-16 combat aircraft. The two remaining F-16 aircraft were delivered in 1986. During 1981 Pakistan requested Washington for the supply of 2 C-130 B class transport planes which were delivered to Islamabad during the same year. Again Pakistan ordered 10 Model 20 a AH-IS type helicopters in 1981 which were delivered in 1985. In addition, Pakistan asked the United States in 1982 to supply unspecified number of Model 20A AH-IS helicopters. Accordingly United States supplied 8 helicopters in 1985 and in 1986.

In 1983, Islamabad urged for the supply of G-134 Mohwak reconnaissance plane for surveillance.
During 1981, Pakistan asked for the supply of different type of missiles from Washington. It placed an order for 1005 BGM-71 A TOW anti-tank missiles. Accordingly the United States supplied 100 missiles in 1983, 240 in 1984 and 300 in 1985. Again in 1985, Pakistan placed orders with Washington for the supply of 203 C BGM-71C TOW anti-tank missiles: 24 in 1981, Pakistan also asked for 35 M-88-AI ARV which were delivered during 1984-85. Another order of 24 M-901 TOW APC was placed with Washington by Pakistan and the deliveries were made in 1984-85.

Pakistan has also tried to acquire air to air, surface to air and surface to ship missiles from the United States. In 1985, Islamabad ordered for the supply of 500 AIM-9L air to air missiles and the United States supplied 100 missiles in 1985. Besides, during 1985 Pakistan also placed order for 100 FIM-92 A Stinger class surface to air missiles and during the same year United States delivered 100 missiles of this class to Pakistan. In 1985, Pakistan also placed order with Washington for the supply of 16 RGM-84 A Harpoon class surface to ship missiles.

Pakistan's acquisition of armoured vehicles from the United States during this period included various types of guns and tanks. In 1981, Islamabad placed order for the supply of 64 M-109-A2 155 mm SPH class guns and in 1985 32 such guns were delivered to Pakistan. Apart from these in 1982 Pakistan placed an additional order of 36 155 mm guns of the same class which were delivered by the United States in 1984-85. Islamabad placed an additional order of 88 155 mm guns in 1985.
In 1981, Pakistan asked for the supply of 40 M-110-A2 203 mm SPH class guns and these were supplied by Washington during 1982-85.

In 1981 Pakistan's order for 75 M-198 155 mm guns was delivered in part during 1984-85. In 1985 Islamabad placed an order for the supply of 110 M-113 A2 APC class. Pakistan also procured 100 M-48-A5 MBT tanks during 1982-83. Again in 1984 Pakistan placed an order for the supply of unspecified number of M-48-A5 tanks and in 1985 about 25 such tanks were delivered by Washington.

Besides, Pakistan acquired one Arcadia class destroyer in 1983 and one gearing class destroyer in 1984 from the United States.

During 1987, the Reagan Administration pledged another $4.02 billion US military and economic aid package for 1987-93 period for Pakistan. This aid package includes 1.8 billion for military purchases. Reports indicate that Pakistan was likely to acquire about 100 more F-16 combat aircraft from the United States.  

Reports also indicate that the US authorities had agreed to transfer "some knowhow of technology" for establishing hardware manufacturing facilities. The new military sales arrangements were reportedly discussed in detail during the visit of the US Assistant Secretary of Defence, Richard Armitage to Islamabad in January 1988.

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sources said that negotiations were in progress between China, a Pakistan private company and a US firm-Mac Donald Douglas, for establishing facilities in Pakistan for assembling Hawkeyes to meet the requirement for a sophisticated radar system. 65

INDIA'S GRAVE CONCERN TOWARDS US AID TO PAKISTAN

The US Administration's decision to induct sophisticated arms into Pakistan to enable the latter to counter the impending threat from Soviet Union along the 1200 miles Pakistan-Afghan border has been seriously viewed in India as a direct threat to its own security and territorial integrity. India has not only registered strong protests with the United States over the supply of sophisticated weapons like F-16 combat aircraft to Pakistan but has also challenged the US rationale behind such moves.

Carter Administration's decision to provide sophisticated weapons to Pakistan in the immediate aftermath of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan coincided with Mrs. Indira Gandhi's return to power in India during the first week of January 1980. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi expressed India's grave concern over the proposed $400 million US military and economic assistance to Pakistan and rejected President Carter's assurance that the proposed aid was designed to improve the general security environment in the region. 66 While addressing a press conference at Trivandrum on

18 January 1980, Mrs. Gandhi said that because of the US decision to expedite arms aid to Pakistan the danger had come closer to "our borders". The Indian Government told the US Ambassador in New Delhi that the proposed American arms aid to Pakistan was unacceptable to India because it could only lead to exacerbation of tension in the Indian sub-continent. P. V. Narasimha Rao, the Foreign Minister told the Lok Sabha on 23 January 1980 that India's major concern regarding the Afghan issue was the proposed US arms aid to Pakistan. While expressing India's grave concern over the induction of US arms into Pakistan, he further said that it "could convert the South Asian region into the theatre of great power confrontation and conflict".

There was difference of perception between India and the United States in the wake of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The United States perceived the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as a direct challenge to the US position as a superpower and to the US strategic interests in the Persian Gulf region, which prompted Washington to strengthen its Gulf allies, especially Pakistan military. However, India viewed seriously "the intervention of outside forces and the induction of armaments in the region" which subjected the countries of South West and South Asia

67. Text of the Press Conference in Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, India's Views on the Afghan Situation (hereafter, India's Views), (New Delhi, 1980), p. 44.


to big power rivalry, a phenomenon to which India was strongly opposed.\textsuperscript{71}

The US decision to induct sophisticated arms into Pakistan came at a time when the process of normalisation of Indo-Pakistan relations had been progressing. India feared that such a move would upset the process of normalization. India's Foreign Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao told Lok Sabha on 1 April 1981 that the American supply of arms to Pakistan would disturb the strategic harmony and security environment of the sub-continent and to expect change in the US determination to arm Pakistan to the teeth" would be "hope against a hope".\textsuperscript{72}

A similar stance was reiterated by India's Ambassador to the United States, K.R. Narayan while addressing a press Conference in Washington on 19 May 1981 he said:

Our stand is that the kind of weapons that Pakistan is acquiring can only be used against India. Security of Pakistan is an asset to India.... We do not believe that the type of weapons proposed to be given to Pakistan would enhance Pakistan's security.... It was wrong to compare the defence requirements of India with those of Pakistan in the same way as it would be wrong to compare the defence needs of the US with those of Cuba.\textsuperscript{73}
Consequently in view of overwhelming Indian concern of US decision to supply sophisticated weapons to Pakistan, the Reagan Administration, while continuing the supply of sophisticated weapons to Pakistan, also tried to convince India that its supply of arms to Pakistan was not directed against India. Officials of the US State Department argued that the supply of American arms to Pakistan was in the context of the military presence of Soviet Union in Afghanistan and consequent upon its relevance to the security of the entire Gulf region and it was no longer intended to weaken or alienate India. An Official of the State Department observed:

We explained to Indians that whatever we may do for Pakistan is not directed against India or India's legitimate interests. We do not approach our relations with India and Pakistan as a zero-sum game. We want good relationship with both and we think it is possible. (74).

The officials of the US Department of State in their conversation with Indian officials appreciated India's "grave concern" over the supply of American arms to Pakistan but simultaneously reiterated that military assistance to Pakistan was in sequel to the impending Soviet threat. A spokesman of the US State Department said on 18 April 1981 that a weak Pakistan could only serve the interests of Soviet Union: "A strengthened Pakistan in closer relationship with the US poses no threat to India and indeed should contribute to the overall security of the subcontinent.... We certainly would not wish to see an arms race in the subcontinent". 75

74. Indian Express (New Delhi), 19 April 1981.
75. Ibid.
However India was not convinced by the US logic of justifying the supply of sophisticated weapons like F-16 combat aircraft to Pakistan, "was eventually straight and viewed it as a simple case of the United States seeking to undermine Indian hegemony in the sub-continent". 76

India refuted the Reagan Administration's contention that sophisticated weapons like F-16 combat aircraft, Howitzer stinger and Harpoon missiles supplied to Pakistan were solely meant for the use against the Soviet threat emanating across the Afghan border. In this regard, the annual report for 1985-86 of the Ministry of Defence of India aptly observed:

The second negative development is the untramelled flow of arms into Pakistan from the United States on the ground that these are required by Pakistan in view of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Most of the land-based weapon systems inducted cannot be used in Pakistan's northern or western theatres and are obviously meant of use against India. The strengthening of Pakistan's Navy by supplies of sophisticated Weaponary can have no relation to the situation in Afghanistan. (77)

Besides India, even some Western strategic thinkers and analysts have questioned the rationale behind the channelling of the US sophisticated weapons into Pakistan under the cover of security threat from the Soviet Union. Selig S. Harrison, a strategic analyst and a senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International peace expressed the view that US F-16 combat aircraft


and 155 mm Howitzers were not suitable to the Afghan frontier. He further suggested that F-16s were irrelevant in controlling and combating internal insurgency. Harrison further warned that the US arms policy would not only disturb the strategic autonomy of India but would also result in further deterioration of bilateral Indo-US relations.78

Despite all such wise counselling, the Reagan Administration rather justified its move to supply sophisticated weapons to Pakistan and made efforts to ally India's misapprehensions. While seeking the endorsement of House, Foreign Affairs Committee for the supply of F-16s to Pakistan, the US Under Secretary of State, James Buckley, discounting the fear that this would spark an arms race in the sub-continent, said:

India possesses a very large, well-trained military establishment and provides it with a decisive superiority over Pakistan in the air as well as on the ground. Given the large number of advanced aircraft which the Indians already have or will receive from the Soviets and the United Kingdom, they will emerge six years from now with an even greater edge over the Pakistan's notwithstanding the addition of 40 F-16s to the latter's inventory. In fact, they should then have an advantage over Pakistan in terms of modern fighter aircraft, of about six to one.79

Similarly Jean Kirkpatrick, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, during the visit to New Delhi in August 1981 dismissed


the argument that US weapons being supplied to Pakistan posed any threat to India. 80

With a view to soft peddle India's discomfiture over the supply of American sophisticated weapons to Pakistan, Washington offered to sell arms to India as well. During the last week of January 1980, the former US Defence Secretary, Clark Clifford during his visit to Delhi raised the issue of sale of US arms to India. 81 On 4th February 1980, the National Security Adviser to the Carter Administration, Zbigniew Brezzinshki during his visit to Islamabad said that Washington was willing to consider sales of weapons to India if that could reduce New Delhi's dependence on other suppliers and enhanced its security. 82 A high-level defence team led by the Indian Defence Secretary, visited Washington in the middle of October 1980 to negotiate for the supply of TOW missiles and M-198 howitzers but the deal could not mature because of US supply condition unacceptable to India. 83 However the negotiations between India and United States on striking an arms deal continued during 1981 and until the mid of 1983 without any tangible outcome. The issue was even discussed during the visit of US Secretary of State, George Shultz to India in late June and early July 1983. In reply to a question in this regard, Shultz said:

81. See Department of State Bulletin, n. 60, Vol. 80, no. 2037, April 1980, p. 60.
82. Times of India, n. 62, 5 February 1980.
The question was discussed and whether there will be actual sales is an open question. Certainly the United States is prepared to make such sales and from the stand point of India, of course, they will speak for themselves, but the question was discussed, and to the extent that there have been many misunderstandings about the conditions under which the United States makes sales, I have tried to clear those up. (84)

Since then various negotiations have been conducted between India and the United States for the sale of sophisticated weapons to India but the US sales conditions and controls being disadvantageous to India, have led to all such negotiations ending in fiasco.

Keeping in view the uninterrupted supply of sophisticated American weapons to Pakistan despite repeated Indian protests, it is logical to assume that United States did not care that it was upsetting the strategic and military balance in the region, it rather tried to distract India's attraction, attention by offering sale of US weapons. It deliberately imposed difficult sale conditions knowing that India would not accept them. This policy was illustrative of the discriminatory manner in which the U.S. initiatives were taken, as far as India was concerned.

CHINA'S ARMS ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

When Soviet intervention in Afghanistan occurred in the end of December 1979, the Sino-Pak Relations had reached their zenith and China had emerged as the single largest supplier of weapons to Pakistan.

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had further been instrumental in consolidating the Pakistan-China axis. As the United States had declared its decision to provide massive military assistance to Pakistan in the aftermath of Afghan crisis, speculations were rife in decision-making circles about Pakistan's coming closer to Washington. In an interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave of Newsweek on being asked in the event of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan whether Pakistan would keep the distance from the Super Powers or would move closer to the United States, Pakistan's President, Zia-ul-Haq said: "I am in favour of a third option. The cornerstone is our relationship with China. They have given us tremendous moral and material strength". Such a statement by President Zia on that occasion envisaged Pakistan's belief in relying on China in the wake of Afghan crisis. When Carter Administration offered the package deal worth $400 million to Pakistan, the latter rejected it as "peanuts". President Zia was certain that Pakistan's rejection of American offer would compel Washington to reconsider its decision. And in case it did not happen then Beijing would come to its rescue. When US Secretary of Defence Harold Brown visited Beijing, he was advised by the Chinese leaders not to "look back at India for it was not India but Pakistan that was the main stabilizing factor in South Asia. They insisted that the United States give maximum aid to Pakistan".

86. Stephen Yurkov, Peking Plans for Asia (Boston, 1983), p. 70.
During his visit to the United States in March 1980, the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin has reportedly asked the US officials to exercise patience over Pakistan's rejection of "peanuts". Within a short time, United States had revised its offer of aid package to Pakistan to $3.2 billion which was accepted by Islamabad. Thus it is evident that US-China-Pakistan axis had ripened into a grand strategy of consensus building.

In the wake of the Afghan crisis, China, because of its geographic proximity with Pakistan and Afghanistan, started enhancing its strategic interests in the region. According to the Kabul government, between 1980 and 1985, at least 50 centres and 20 special bases have been set up inside Pakistan along with the Pak-Afghan border where subversive groups have been imparted training by Pakistan military instructors under the guidance of American and Chinese advisers. The Karakoram highway is used as conduit for the supply of Chinese weapons to Afghan "rebels". Chinese military officials frequently visited these rebel based camps and collaborated with their Pakistani counterparts, although the Sino-Afghan border does not extend more than 70 kilometres. During his visit to Pakistan, the Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua while addressing a Press Conference in Karachi on 22 January 1980 said:

88. V.D. Chopra, Pakistan and Asian Peace (New Delhi, 1985), p. 103.
89. Ibid., p. 105ff.
Through its flagrant invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has escalated its aggression and expansionism to a new stage which not only posed threat to peace and security in the Gulf region, South Asia and Asia as a whole but also endangers world peace and security. (90)

While emphasising the new dimensions of the Sino-Pak co-operation, the Chinese Foreign Minister further added: "China and Pakistan have agreed to strengthen their friendship and cooperation in various fields. They will keep in touch and continue their consultations with each other and some follow-up actions will be taken to increase their 'cooperation'. (91) The Afghanistan crisis proved a boon in disguise for Pakistan because it exploited the situation by raising the bogey of Soviet threat to build up its own military arsenal. As V.D. Chopra has aptly observed "Pakistan is using Afghanistan as an alibi for acquiring the US arms and be regarded as a 'front line' state in Asia". (92)

China had been the single largest supplier of weapons to Pakistan during the decade of 1970s. Between 1970 and 1982, Pakistan received 800 tanks, more than 25 naval vessels, about 300 planes, surface to surface missile batteries, light weapons and ammunition. (93) Following table shows the acquisition of weapons by Pakistan from China.

90. Xinhua News Agency (Beijing), 23 January 1980, p. 29.
91. Ibid.
92. V.D. Chopra, n. 88, pp. 104-5.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date of Order</th>
<th>Date of Delivery</th>
<th>Number Delivered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Q-5 Fantan A</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Q-5 Fantan A</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
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<td>20</td>
<td>CSA-1</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>T-59</td>
<td>MBT</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to SIPRI sources as shown in the above table, Pakistan placed order for 52 Q-5 Fantan-A fighter aircraft with China in 1982 and it received 30 in 1983 and remaining 22 in 1984. Besides acquiring these aircrafts, Pakistan placed order with China for the supply of another 100 Q-5 Fantan-A fighter aircraft in 1984. During 1985, China supplied 26 Q-5 Fantan-A aircraft to Pakistan.
Besides during 1985, Pakistan also acquired 220 CSA-I surface to air missiles from China. Besides, between 1980 and 1986, Pakistan received 350 7-59 MBT tanks from Beijing.

On the eve of Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua's Pakistan visit in January 1980, President Zia was asked by newsman whether Pakistan would ask for the Chinese weapons, he replied, "we do not have to ask Chinese friends for military assistance. They have already been giving military assistance". In 1980, Pakistan received 40 F-6 bis, 2 submarine chasers, 2 Romeo Submarines and 20 batteries off SAM-6.

During 1981-82, Pakistan received 67 F-6 bis. China has also supplied Pakistan reconnaissance Vehicles PT-76, armoured carrier, BTR, 85 mm and 100 mm guns and 1000 mm anti-aircraft guns. In 1982-83, China is reported to have supplied to Pakistan a large number of F-6 and F-7 fighters and TU-16 and TU-4 ground attack bombers. Pakistan also received 16 Haiying Sh. Sh.M Missiles in 1984. Pakistan again received 4 Huanghan Class FAC in 1984. Apart from this, China's military assistance ranges over the technical upgrading of defence production factories and installations which helped Pakistan to overhaul tanks, guns and aircrafts. In 1985, the Pakistan Ordnance Factory at Wah started production of 12.7 mm anti-aircraft guns with assistance provided

97. Cited in V.D. Chopra, n. 88, p. 76.
by China. Pakistan also acquired assistance from China for establishing Pakistan Aeronautical complex at Karma, about 75 kms, from Islamabad where among others F-6 Rebuild Factory is situated.\(^{99}\) China has also helped Pakistan establish a tank rebuild factory near Amelpur to replace Patton tanks in Pakistan by T-54 and T-59 tanks. Besides, there has also been a frequent exchange of the visit of military delegations between 1980 to 1986 between Islamabad and Beijing. In March 1981, a military delegation led by Lt. Genl. Jilani, Pakistan's Secretary of Defence, visited China. Again in September 1982, General Iqbal Khan, Chairman of Pakistan's Joint Chiefs Staff Committee paid a ten days visit to China.\(^{100}\)

Thus it is evident from the above analysis that China has contributed enormously to build up Pakistan's conventional arsenal. There has been a growing military collaboration between the two countries. China has not only provided weapons but also technical know how to help Pakistan to establish tank and aircraft rebuild factories with a view to attain self-sufficiency.

**INDIA'S RESPONSE TO PAKISTAN'S ARMS BUILD-UP**

The massive acquisition of sophisticated weapons by Pakistan from United States and China on the pretext of impending danger to its security in the wake of the continued presence of more than 1,20,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, has posed a serious threat to India's security and territorial integrity. Since the acquisition


\(^{100}\) Ibid., pp. 105-106.
by Pakistan of F-16 combat aircraft, Harpoon missiles and other sophisticated weapons from the United States had not only upset the Indo-Pak military balance but also enabled Pakistan to have weapon superiority and strategic advantage over India, the latter also procured weapons from the Soviet Union, France and United Kingdom and other countries.

**TABLE 1.3**

**INDIA'S ACQUISITION OF WEAPONS FROM SOVIET UNION 1980-1986.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date of Order</th>
<th>Date of Delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AIRCRAFT</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>An-32</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>MIG-23</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1981</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>MIG-25</td>
<td>Fighter/Interceptor</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foxhound</td>
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<tr>
<td>--</td>
<td>MIG-25</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--</td>
<td>MIG-29</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>21-20</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>2L-76 Candid</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Ka-27</td>
<td>Helix</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hi-P 1985

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Mi-24 Helicopter 1984

Hind-D

10 Mi-26 Halo Helicopter 1985

(MISSILES)

---

AA-5 AAM 1980 1980 29

Ash 1981 140

1982 140

1983 140

---

AT-3 Segger ATM 1980

---

SA-9 Landmob 1981 1981 40

Gaskai SAM 1982 40

1983 40

(36) SA-N-I Sh.AM 1977 1980 12

Ship 1982 12

1983 12

36 SA-M-4 Sh.AM 1978 1983 12

1984 12

1986 12


1982 12

1983 12

18 SSN-2 Sh.Sh.M. 1978 1983 6

Styx

(80) AA-7 AAM 1984 1986 30

Apex
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(160)</td>
<td>AA-8 AAM</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(200)</td>
<td>SA-8 Landmob</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gecko SAM</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ARMoured Vehicles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>BMP MICV</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T-74 MBT Tanks</td>
<td>1983</td>
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### Naval Vessels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kashin Destroyer</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Class</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nanuchka Corvette</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yevgenia MSO</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>TU-142 Recce/ASW</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Foxtrat Submarines</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kashin Destroyers</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nahuchka Corvette</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Natya Class MSO</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Taranful Class Corvette</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from the above table that in 1979 India urged the Soviet Union to supply 85 MIG-23 fighter planes. "In 1980 the first delivery of 10 MIG-23 planes was handed over to India and by 1983 the entire supply was over". In 1980 India asked Moscow to supply 95 An-32 cline class transport planes. In 1984 the first delivery of a An-32 was handed over to India and during 1985 another batch of 24 An-32 planes was given by Moscow to India. During 1981 India placed an order with the Soviet Union for the supply of 18 MIG-25 fighter-cum-interceptor aircraft. Accordingly by the end of 1982, Moscow has supplied 12 MIG-25 aircraft to India. In 1983, New Delhi requested Moscow to supply MIG-25 Foxhound fighter aircraft. The number was not specified. In 1984, India asked for MIG-29 fighter aircraft and in 1986 Moscow supplied India 10 MIG-29. MIG-29 is the most sophisticated aircraft manufactured by the Soviet Union and India is the first country outside the Soviet bloc to acquire this aircraft. During 1984, India ordered for the supply of 20 IL-76 candid class sophisticated transport planes from the Soviet Union. Again in 1985, India asked for the 20 IL-20 Soviet transport planes. Besides, New Delhi has also asked for Ka-27 Helix class helicopters in 1984 and in 1985 India got 3 such Helicopters. India's order for the supply of 100 Mi-17-Hip-H class helicopters in 1984 was partially met by Moscow and by 1985 India had received 30 such helicopters. Apart

102. Ibid, p. 379ff
103. SIPRI Yearbook 1986, n. 101, p 380
from this India has also placed orders for Mi-29-Hind D and Mi-26 Halo Class helicopters with Moscow. 104

Besides, India has also acquired and ordered for the acquisition of air to air, anti-tank, surface to air and ship to ship missiles from the Soviet Union. In 1980, India ordered for the supply of AA-5 Ash class air to air missiles. By 1983, India had acquired about 350 such missiles. These missiles are to be fitted in MIG-23s. 105

In 1980 India also placed order for unspecified number of AT-3 Sagger class anti-Tank missiles. During 1981 India had asked Moscow to supply an unspecified number of SA-9 Gaskai class surface to air Missiles. Between 1981-83, India acquired 120 SA-9 SAM missiles from Soviet Union. India had placed orders with the Soviet Union in 1978 for the supply of 36 SA-N-I ship to air missiles which were delivered during 1980-83. 106 These missiles are used in arming Kashin class destroyers. In 1978 India had placed orders for the supply of 36 SA-M-4 class missiles which were delivered between 1983 and 1986. 107 These missiles were to be used in arming Godavari class Frigate. Another order of 36 SSn-2 Styx Class ship to ship missiles placed by India in 1977 was completed between 1980-83. 108 These missiles were to be filled in Kashhin class destroyers. India received 6 more SSN-2 Styx, Shh.Sh.M.

104. Ibid., p. 378 ff.
106. Ibid., p. 380 ff.
108. SIPRI Yearbook 1984, p. 239.
missiles in 1983, orders for which were placed in 1978. These missiles are meant for use in Godavari class frigate.

In 1984, India placed orders with Moscow for the supply of AA-7 Apex and AA-8 Appid class air to air missiles. During 1986, India got 30 each class missiles.\textsuperscript{109} Besides India acquired 200 SA-8 Gecko class surface to air missiles from Soviet Union during 1984-86, orders for which were placed in 1982. In 1983 India also placed orders for 100 BMP MICV armoured personnel carriers and unspecified number of T-74 MBT tanks which were delivered during 1984-85.\textsuperscript{110}

India also acquired naval vessels from the Soviet Union. Between 1980-83 India acquired 3 Kashin class destroyers. In 1982, India again placed orders for the supply of three additional Kashin class destroyers. During 1982, India requested Moscow for the supply of 3 Nanuchka class Corvette and again in April 1984 India placed another additional order for the supply of 3 Nanuchka class Corvette. In 1983, India got 3 Yevgenia class Vessels from the Soviet Union.

During 1982, India had asked for 4 Foxtrat class submarines, and 6 Natya Class MSOs from the Soviet Union. In 1985 India placed order for the supply of 5 Taranful class Corvettes from the Soviet Union.

The afore mentioned analysis makes it evident that India has acquired sophisticated combat and transport aircraft, helicopters, different type of missiles and naval vessels from the

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{SIPRI Yearbook 1986};

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 81ff
Soviet Union. Besides providing military weapons Soviet Union has also allowed the licenced production of many weapons in India. Special mention can be made of MIG-21, MIG-23 and MIG-25, 7-72 tanks, "Atall" and "Segger" missiles and petya class frigates. There is no exaggeration in saying that Soviet Union has helped India to attain self-sufficiency in conventional weapons.

ACQUISITION OF WEAPONS BY INDIA FROM U.K.

India has acquired weapons from the United Kingdom as well. The types of weapons include, aircraft, missiles, helicopters and naval vessels. The following table shows acquisition of weapons by India from U.K.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date of Order</th>
<th>Date of Delivery</th>
<th>Date of Delivered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AIRCRAFT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(110)</td>
<td>Jaguar</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>18 (on loan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sea Harrier</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1984 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sea Harrier</td>
<td>Fighter/Trainer</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sea Harrier</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sea Harrier</td>
<td>Fighter/Trainer</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Sea King</td>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HAS-5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1986 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Seaking HAS-5 Helicopter</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Westland--30 Hel.</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B)</td>
<td>MISSILES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>Sea Eagle A Sh.M</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Sea Eagle A Sh.M</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is evident from the above table that during 1979, India had placed orders with United Kingdom for the supply of 110 Jaguar fighter planes, 6 sea Harrier fighter planes and 2 Sea Harrier T-4 training planes. In 1980 India received 18 Jaguar fighter planes on loan because the negotiations for the licensed production of Jaguars were in progress. The six Sea Harrier combat planes were delivered by UK to India during 1983-84. The two sea harrier T-4 training-cum-fighter planes were delivered in 1983. India had asked for the supply of 12 Sea King HAS-5 class helicopters from London which were delivered during 1984-86.\(^{111}\) In 1985, India placed orders for another 10 Sea Harrier fighter planes, and 20 seaking HAS-5 class helicopters. In 1986, India requested Britain to supply 21 Westland-30 helicopters.\(^{112}\) Besides between 1983-85, India also urged U.K. to supply unspecified number of Sea Eagle class ship missiles.\(^{113}\)

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112. Ibid., p. 388ff.
113. Ibid., p. 378.
INDIA'S ACQUISITION OF WEAPONS FROM FRANCE 1981-1986

India also procured weapons from France with a view to equip its armed forces with sophisticated weapons. The following table shows the weapons acquired by India from France.

**TABLE 1.5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date of Order</th>
<th>Date of Delivery</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AIRCRAFT</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Mirage-2000</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MISSILES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AM-39 Exocet</td>
<td>A Sh.M</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3700)</td>
<td>Milan</td>
<td>ATM</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MM-38 Exocet</td>
<td>Sh.Sh.M.</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>Super-530</td>
<td>AAM</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARMoured VEHICLES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AMX 30-155</td>
<td>SPG</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The above table reveals that in 1982 India placed orders with France for the supply of 40 Mirage-2000 fighter aircraft in India. Under this agreement the first 50 planes were to be assembled and the production of 60 was to take place. However the
option of licensed production of Mirage-2000 fighter aircraft in India was cancelled by France in early 1986. 114

Besides, India placed a bulk order of supply of 3700 Milan class anti-tank missiles with France. Between 1982-83, France supplied 300 Milan class missiles to India and negotiations for its licensed production in India have been finalized. 115 During 1982 India placed orders with France for the supply of different categories of missiles like AM-39 Exocet, MM-38 Exocet ship to ship missile and Super-530 air to air missiles. AM-39 Exocet missile are used in arming Jaguar fighter aircraft. The contract for these missiles was renewed in 1986. 116 The order for the supply of 240 Super-530 AAM missiles was placed in 1982 and these were delivered by France to India by 1986. These missiles are used in arming Mirage-2000 fighter aircraft. Besides, India also urged France to supply AMX 30-155 GCT class howitzers in 1984 to be fitted in Vijyanta tanks.

Apart from these, India has also placed orders for acquisition of 10 DO-228-200 class transport planes and 2 Type-1500 submarines from West Germany. From Sweden has obtained 400 Bofors Guns and RBS-70 class surface to air missiles.

114. Ibid., p. 373.
115. SIPRI Yearbook 1984, n. 101, p. 239.
The foregoing analysis reveals that Pakistan acquired its weapons mainly from the United States and China. The induction of sophisticated weapons into Pakistan had pretended ominous threat to India's security and territorial integrity. Consequently India also procured weapons mainly from the Soviet Union and also made purchases from United Kingdom, France, West Germany and Sweden to equip its armed forces with modern weapons to face any eventuality of war with Pakistan.

INDO-PAKISTAN MILITARY BALANCE

Acquisition of weapons by Pakistan mainly from the United States and China in the wake of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the induction of sophisticated weapons namely F-16 combat aircraft, stinger and Harpoon missiles from the United States and Q-5 fighter aircraft from China tilted the military balance in favour of Pakistan. However prior to the induction of these sophisticated weapons, the conventional military balance in the Indian subcontinent was more favourable to India as is evident from the following table:
## TABLE 5.6

**INDO-PAKISTAN MILITARY BALANCE 1979-1980**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Armed Forces</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Naval Force</th>
<th>Naval Vessels</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Combat Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>India</strong></td>
<td>10,96,000</td>
<td>950,000</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(including 2000 naval Air Force)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakistan</strong></td>
<td>429,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As is evident from the above table that during 1979-80, India had almost 2:1 edge over Pakistan in army and tanks. India's army was 950,000 as compared to Pakistan's 400,000. India had about 1900 tanks while Pakistan had 965 tanks. India's naval strength was 46,000 which included 200 naval Air Force while Pakistan's naval strength was mere 12,000 and it had no Naval Air Force. India had 64 naval vessels including aircraft carrier Vikrant while Pakistan had 46 naval vessels.

India too possessed aerial superiority over Pakistan. With its 100,000 trained air force personnel as compared to Pakistan's 17,000, India had numerical advantage of 5:1. During 1979-80, India had 620 combat aircraft as compared to 256 combat aircraft available with Pakistan. This shows that the overall military balance was in favour of India during 1979-80.

SOVIET INTERVENTION AS A SECURITY THREAT AND REGIONAL POWER ALIGNMENTS

The Soviet decision of intervention in Afghanistan was not without risks rather it was bound to involve other major countries accompanied with threat to the peace which profoundly affected the military and political balance in the region, particularly in South Asia. It had reversed completely the United States policy of balancing its interest between India and Pakistan. Also, the Soviet presence posed a new security threat for all the States bordering on Afghanistan: India, Pakistan, China and Iran. However, each faced a set of policy alternatives that placed them in direct conflict with the objectives of the others in the region. For instance, China as well as Pakistan saw their interests protected by a closer alignment with the United States. On the other hand India could not repudiate its economic and military ties with the Soviets. Also Iran had to pursue policies that sought a "negative equilibrium" designed mainly to keep both the super powers out of Iran.
The most decisive United States response to the Soviets consisted in the following policies:— Massive economic and military aid to Pakistan; greatly enhanced naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf along with the announcement of the "Carter Doctrine"; playing the China card. With the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979, Pakistan became a frontline state. Until then the Carter Administration's Pakistan policy was based on: (a) dissuading Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons in order to further its own commitment to the prevention of nuclear proliferation; (b) balancing the United States-Pakistan/India policy with a tilt in favour of the latter. Carter in his policy of promoting regional influentials recognized India to be the most formidable military and economic power in South Asia. The then Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, on his part has vowed to correct India's tilt towards the Soviet Union and bring it to the point of true equidistance. The United States wanted to encourage this policy. (c) Pakistan's record on democracy and human rights under both Bhutto and Zia was difficult to defend when compared to that of India. As a result, Carter had exerted tremendous pressure on Pakistan to correct its policies of internal repression and linked the sale of A-7 fighter planes to Pakistan's refusal to rescind on its nuclear agreement with France. Pakistan retaliated by pulling out of CENTO and declared its shift to the non-aligned forum.¹¹⁷

The Afghan intervention occurred at this juncture. It has been argued that Carter's position on human rights and support of nationalists over allies (India over Pakistan, support of the revolutionary regime in Nicaragua over Samaza) weakened the

the American position in South West Asia i.e., Iran and Pakistan. However it must be pointed out that as far as the soviets were concerned two factors in the situation were vastly more important than mere weakening of the United States position. (a) If the Khalq-Parchamite Party had not successfully seized power, and this they did without the active support of the Russians, a weakened Pakistan-US relations by itself was not enough of an invitation to invade Afghanistan; (b) similarly the fall of the Shah had created a great deal of instability in South West Asia. Whatever the underlying logic of the Soviet advance into Afghanistan, the White House began with the assumption that the Soviets were there and must be countered. Beginning with Carter (Zia rejected the offer of $300 million as peanuts), and then Reagan, the United States was committed to defend Pakistan. The renewal of the US-Pakistan alliance was, however, not without threat to the region.

The intervention also drew the United States and China closer together, which was a development that the Soviet dreaded most since it increased their sense of vulnerability. Secretary of State Haig visited China and gave a commitment to sell weapons in return for trade and listening posts around Soviet borders. This clearly indicated that what the Soviet feared had now become a reality. Also United States was bound to upgrade its presence in Pakistan. This was equivalent to a direct confrontation between the two in a new area of the world. The risks contained in that situation


119. Ibid., pp. 340ff.
could not be dismissed easily, particularly since China was also bound to co-ordinate its activities to counter the Soviet presence in the region.  

A close relationship with the United States willing to even sell lethal weapons to Peking was meant to offset the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The extent of Beijing's anxiety concerning Soviet intentions was obvious from its attempt to reassure Pakistan and signal a real willingness to negotiate with New Delhi. Above all China did not want a Soviet-India alliance emerging in South Asia. For this reason it sought to prevent any further upsets in the area since this could profoundly alter and even threaten its own position in the region.

India's Security policies have traditionally depended on three areas as buffers - the Indian Ocean, Tibet and Afghanistan. Over the years all three have ceased to be neutral zones. Between the two super powers the Indian Ocean has become an area of intense rivalry, Tibet is lost to China; and Afghanistan came under Moscow's protection. Since Pakistan was within the perimeters of the three buffer zones, it occupied the central place in India's defence and foreign policy. The emergence of India as the dominant power in Asia during the 1971 war had considerably eased the Pakistan problem. However, once again propped up by Sino-US arms and economic aid worth billions of dollars, Pakistan looms large on India's Security horizon. If Pakistan acquires nuclear capacity


121. Jain, n. 117, p. 35.
and if the United States is perceived as aiding and abetting this, Indian suspicious and reservations about US policy would be aggravated. India, therefore, had to maintain counter pressures against both US and Chinese moves. While New Delhi has firmly declared its opposition to the continued Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, it has also to confront the perennial problem of the long term Sino-American commitment to Pakistan and cope with its possible implications for its security. The Soviets have withdrawn from Afghanistan but there is no guarantee that China, particularly the United States will give up the policy of pressure and follow the Soviet timetable. In fact they might step up their support of the rebel forces in order to destabilise any pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. This could only again compel the Soviets to seek strategic prominence in Afghanistan. The strategic exploitation of Pakistan is an essential element in the Sino-US geo-strategic convergence. The security situation has become increasingly dangerous for India, even though accommodation between the two superpower has led to the improvement of the East-West relationship. New Delhi has to measure and evaluate the future relationship with Pakistan through a constant review of the consequence or regional destabilisation after "Afghanistan".