CHAPTER - II

PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES ALLIANCE AND INDIA'S SECURITY PREDICAMENT

From the very beginning United States placed a higher priority on certain strategic considerations that were only peripherally concerned with developments in South Asia itself. However, the United States policy of the selection of Pakistan as the regional focal point can be understood, within the context of American strategic objectives. Pakistan's strategic location, on the boundary of both the USSR and the PRC, greatly commended itself to the United States for use in its containment policy. "Indeed, Pakistan was seen as directly augmenting U.S. capability. The military might of Pakistan was taken to be the measure of America's military power on continent..." Increase in Pakistan's military capability was seen as a natural corollary of the U.S. global power equation. In the context of US-Soviet military competition being a country in the right location at the right time, Pakistan's militarisation thus emerged to have utility for U.S. policy. It was a marriage of convenience but one that both partners sought quite eagerly at the initial stage.

United States main concerns in South Asia have been related to the activities of the Soviet Union and Communist China in the area and to the possible spillover effects of internal Weaknesses or disturbances. For example, the United States was most concerned when the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971 led to the breakup of Pakistan, the emergence of India as an ever more dominant regional power, and closer relations between India and the Soviet Union. This put the

United States for the first time being on a curious parallel track with China.

In the early 1970s, once again the American opening to China introduced subtle changes in the geopolitical scenario, throughout the South Asian region for all the powers involved leading to some modifications in the United States role in South Asia.²

The pattern of Pakistan's relationship with the United States had witnessed both cool off and warming up stages up to 1968 as analysed in the preceding chapter. The year 1969 proved significant for Islamabad because the global developments obtaining at that period proved instrumental in opening up new vistas of rewarming phase in Pak-US relations which gathered impetus during the succeeding years.

Year 1969 was significant both for Islamabad and Washington, in Islamabad, General Yahya Khan assumed the power during that year while in Washington, Richard N. Nixon assumed the Presidency of the United States. A Study of their respective roles is indispensable to an appreciation of future developments in the subcontinent.

The Nixon Administration after assuming power, was busy in recasting US global and Asian policies catering to the needs of the new international system which by 1970 "had become much more complex".³ In the wake of Sino-Soviet schism, the two communist giants had fallen apart territorially at bilateral level and ideologically in

the international arena. Besides, China had also become a nuclear power. And the US cold war alliance system laid in shambles and the American power was deeply committed against a nationalist-communist force in Vietnam. Above all the USSR had attained nuclear weapon parity with the United States.4

During 1969 and 1970, President Nixon's Asian policy was dominated by a gradual U.S. disengagement with Beijing. This process which was evidently coterminous with the "reinstatement" of the Soviet Union as necessarily the main rival of the United States, began under the so called 'Guam' or 'Nixon' doctrine and by the beginning of 1971 the United States and China were both ready to undertake its complement - the improvement of Sino-American relations as a means of improving the position of both states against their common rival.5

It was against this background that the Pak-US relations entered the re-warming phase which accentuated as the years rolled on. The advent of Nixon Administration had heightened Pakistan's hopes of the reversal of Kennedy-Johnson era and augmentation of US economic and arms assistance to Islamabad. In May 1969, the US Secretary of State, William Rogers, visited Pakistan and the latter availed the opportunity of seeking an augmentation in US assistance to Pakistan. Consequently when the Aid Pakistan Consortium met in Paris to consider Pakistan's case, the American delegate strongly supported Pakistan's case for increase in assistance.6 On 1 August 1969, President Nixon paid a brief visit to Pakistan. During the visit President Nixon

4. Ibid, pp.16 ff.
reportedly reminded Pakistan's leadership about some role the former had played in cementing friendship between the two countries, and assured them that now as President, with somewhat more influence, he was going to work for the cause of the same friendship. According to a press report, President Nixon during his Pakistan visit promised President Yahya Khan that he would take necessary steps for the resumption of arms supply to Pakistan. However it was not until October 1970 when President Yahya Khan visited Washington that the formal announcement in regard to resumption of US arms assistance to Pakistan was made by the United States. On 8 October 1970, a few days prior to the arrival of President Yahya Khan in the United States, it was announced in Washington as an exception to the general policy that the United States had decided to sell to Pakistan "several items of military equipment to replace equipment previously supplied".

According to a report published in the New York Times, the US would supply to Pakistan twin-Jet, B-57 Canberra Bombers, F-14 Jet fighters, and armoured personnel carriers.

PAKISTAN PLOY AND SINO-US RAPPROCHEMENT

Pakistan played a crucial role, with a focus on immediate advantage, in reconstructing the Sino-US rapprochement. During the late 1960s, the contemporary international developments had led to

realignments between the big powers in the wake of widening Sino-Soviet rift. It was bound to affect the big powers relationship with regional powers. Beijing in view of its disenchantment with Moscow was throwing gestures to win US support as a leverage against Soviet Union. At the same time the policy-makers in Washington were in search for a means to wriggle out of Vietnam. Thus there were seemingly convergent trends both in Beijing and Washington, which if encouraged further, could lead to a Sino-US thaw.

On the other hand, the growing Soviet influence in the subcontinent, especially in Pakistan, in the post-Tashkent period, was causing concern in US as well as in China. Washington was tempted to play the China card in its relations with the Soviet Union. The Sino-Soviet schism led China move towards the United States, in order to counter the pressure being built by the Soviet Union while the US was eager to normalize its relations with China so as to facilitate the extrication of its forces from Indo-China. Thus the Soviet-US convergence of interests on South Asia vis-a-vis China which had emerged during early 1960s had now started giving way to the Sino-US convergence of interests vis-a-vis Soviet Union. The Sino-Pak "entente-cordially" which until late 1960s was regarded as an irritant in Pak-US relations, came to be regarded as useful by the Nixon Administration. Pakistan seized this opportunity to gain favour both from Washington as well as Beijing. During his brief stopover in

Pakistan in early August 1969, President Nixon had reportedly indicated to President Yahya Khan that the former would like to use Pakistan as a channel of communication between China and the United States.  

In early November 1973 when the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, visited Pakistan, he recognised the role played by Pakistan in helping Sino-US rapprochement. He said: "We are grateful to our friends from Pakistan for having arranged the trip for the first time to China." Thus Pakistan emerged as a common link between the triangular Washington-Islamabad-Beijing axis, although there was still a long way to go in freeing Sino-US relations from the previously frozen position.

UNITED STATE'S ASIAN POLICY: FOCUS ON BANGLADESH CRISIS

The deterioration in the law and order situation in the erstwhile East Pakistan, now called Bangladesh, coincided with the advent of Nixon Administration and latter's policy of attaching significance to Pakistan in US Asian policy after 1969-70. The bitter experience of the Vietnam war prompted Nixon to formulate the "Nixon Doctrine" which pledged that the United States would help its allies to fight their wars on their own but would not any more itself fight their wars for them. Thus during the first two years of its administration,

Nixon followed a low key foreign policy towards South Asia. Even if the Nixon Administration wanted to play a high profile policy in South Asia, the principal lever of influence had to be military assistance. This, in turn, would have required the dismantling of a series of self-denying ordinances on military aid and no American policy maker could advocate such steps without respecting Washington's delicate legislative-executive relations, the various interests and goals of bureaus and departments, budgetary and physical constraints and American public opinion. The Vietnam war had brought all these inherent difficulties to the surface. 18

The Nixon Administration was pre-occupied with Vietnam, rapprochement with China, and SALT agreements with Moscow and the developments in Pakistan in early 1971 could not attract serious attention of Washington. However Wilcox has opined that "eighteen months before the Bangladesh crisis exploded on 25 March 1971 the public and private agencies in US began to compartmentalize their appropriations and the policy makers in Washington saw American interests as simply to ensure, if possible, that the constitutional crisis should be resolved peacefully". 19 President Nixon in his annual Report to the Congress submitted on 25 February 1971 observed that the problem in Pakistan was more difficult than elsewhere in the region because "the difficulties are compounded by the need to harmonize the interests of two regions which are physically separated

and widely diverse in social and traditional patterns.  

By March 1971, the American press while giving wide coverage to events in erstwhile East Pakistan, generally concluded that a civil war leading to the break up of Pakistan seemed unavoidable. 

On 7 April 1971 Washington urged Pakistan to "seek a peaceful accommodation of the problem". The same day, Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, described the developments as an "internal matter" of Pakistan. 

However the US Ambassador in India, Kenneth B. Keating, while addressing a press conference at Bombay on 15 April 1971 remarked that "the phrase internal affairs is overdone and the international community could not remain indifferent to the events in East Pakistan under the cover of internal affairs". The prominent Senators like Edward Kennedy, Muskie, Mondale, Brooke and Hatfield wanted to ensure that the US arms supplied to Pakistan were not used against the people of East Pakistan. In this regard a spokesman of the US State Department said that though the arms embargo with regard to Pakistan imposed in 1965 was modified in 1966-67 to allow supplies of non-lethal materials and since 25 March 1971 no new export licenses have been issued. By the end of May 1971, the domestic pressure

23. Ibid.
24. Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 16 April 1971.
on Nixon Administration with regard to the developments in Pakistan had increased to compel the adoption of a more positive attitude. Consequently, on 12 June 1971, the Administration came out with a public appeal urging both India and Pakistan to use restraint and work for peaceful political accommodation of the East Pakistan crisis.26

However there were press reports that despite the declared embargo on supply of US military equipment to Pakistan since 25 March 1971 three Pakistani ships were being loaded with spare parts and other military supplies at US ports.27 However the Nixon Administration defended its position by claiming that Pakistani ships carried equipment under export licenses issued before 25 March 1971.28

Without taking a serious note of domestic or international public opinion, the Nixon Administration continued providing economic aid to Pakistan. On 30 June 1971 the US signed two agreements with Pakistan to provide latter aid totalling $4.3 million.29 During July-August 1971, domestic opposition to the Nixon Administration's policy towards the sub-continent became stronger. In mid-July the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee voted to cut off economic and military aid to Pakistan until the normalcy was restored in East Pakistan.30 "Senators like Saxbe and Fulbright strongly criticized

Nixon Administration's pro-Pakistan policy" but there was no immediate substantial change in US policy towards the subcontinent. It was only in late October 1971 that Henry Kissinger could find time to devote much attention to the bloodshed in East Pakistan. The resultant impact of this "attention" was explained by Henry Kissinger at a press conference on 7 December 1971 in which he gave a background of Nixon Administration's policy towards the Indian subcontinent during September-November 1971. He claimed the success of American representatives in making contact with exiled Bangladesh leaders in August, September and October in Calcutta. They found the Bengalis willing to talk with Pakistani officials on a political solution but alleged that the proposed talks broke down because of India. According to Kalb and Kalb, "Kissinger felt obliged to justify President Nixon's action. He convoked a backround session for the White House Press which meant that he could not be quoted". It proved to be a pointless precaution. Senator Barry Goldwater got hold of the Kissinger transcript and placed it in the Congressional Record, much to Kissinger's chagrin.

Nixon Administration's tilt towards Pakistan and its bias against India in 1971 was first exposed by columnist Jack Anderson. However Henry Kissinger in 1979 published a retrospective

34. Ibid.
self-justification and spirited defence of his and President Nixon's policies. But Christopher Van Hollen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asian Affairs during 1969-72 has observed that "many of Kissinger's assumptions and conclusions are incorrect".

An independent study commissioned by the US Congress to inquire into the conduct of foreign policy making with regard to South Asia during 1975 also revealed that the events of 1971 showed lack of institutional coordination.

From Washington's viewpoint, the American secret opening to China in 1971 was more significant than the Bangladesh crisis. It did not want to lose Pakistan as a channel of communication between Washington and Beijing. The US reactions to events in South Asia were considered primarily in the light of the impact of ongoing process of Sino-US rapprochement in the global strategic competition between the US and the USSR. Thus, according to Henry Kissinger, "Pakistan was favoured as an earnest of US goodwill to China, which had befriended Pakistan against India, and as a demonstration of US reliability as an ally or partner". However, Rudolph and Rudolph have called it "global parochialism" that blinkered Nixon and Kissinger's perceptions of reality and warped their judgement of events.

in the Indian subcontinent.\textsuperscript{41}

According to Surjit Mansingh, "Nixon-Kissinger's South Asian policies were also moulded by their antipathy towards India in general and Mrs. Indira Gandhi in particular".\textsuperscript{42} Though Nixon and Kissinger deny basing their decision on personal prejudices but their critical attitude and dislike for India was evident to their contemporaries in the United States, and were responsible for a range of factual errors.\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{UNITED STATES GEOPOLITICAL PERCEPTIONS AND THE INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1971.}

The background developments leading to the outbreak of Indo-Pakistan war are analysed in the third chapter. Here it suffices to say that on 3 December 1971, Pakistan made a pre-emptive strike on India's major airfields and simultaneously launched ground attacks all along India's western borders. India also retaliated the same day by striking at important Pakistani air bases in West Pakistan and India's ground and naval forces also moved into action. On 4 December 1971 India's Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi declared that "the war in Bangladesh had become a war on India and the latter had no option but to meet the challenge of Pakistan".\textsuperscript{44}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} Lloyd I. Rudolph and Sasan H. Rudolph, \textit{The Regional Imperative} (New York, 1980), p.23.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Surjit Mansingh, \textit{India's Search for Power} (Delhi, 1984), p.86.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Bruce Mazlish, \textit{Kissinger} (New York, 1976), p.247.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's broadcast to the Nation, 4 December 1971, \textit{Bangladesh Documents} (Delhi, 1972) Vol.1, p.209.
\end{itemize}
Pakistan's President Yahya Khan said on 4 December 1971, "we will have the sympathy and help of all our friends and nations who are on the side of Justice and peace. They will undoubtedly severely condemn Indian aggression and support our right to defend our country". It was a clear hint to Pakistan's hopes of getting support from China and the United States.

The Security Council met on 4 December 1971 to assess the situation and to consider the deteriorating situation which had led to armed clashes between India and Pakistan. The stand adopted by United States and China in the Security Council was diametrically opposed to that of the Soviet Union. In the Indian perception, the US draft resolution introduced in the Security Council equated the aggressor-Pakistan, with the victim of aggression-India. It called for an immediate withdrawal of the forces to their own sides of the India-Pakistan borders and an immediate cessation of hostilities. The US claimed to adhere to steps to help normalize the situation in the subcontinent, which included suspension of the issuance of all future munition-list licences to India; stopping to issue any new licences and renewing existing ones to India; cancellation of several licences worth $2 million, that had already been issued to India including the cut off in development loans; and cancellation of all

45. Ibid, p.211.
47. Ibid, p.70.
outstanding licences for shipment of military equipment to India.\textsuperscript{48} On the other hand, Washington kept up its economic and military assistance to Pakistan. Obviously it appeared to New Delhi that the embargo was unilaterally imposed against India.

On 4 December 1971, Henry Kissinger reportedly, told a White House session: "The exercise in the UN, is likely to be an exercise in futility. The UN itself will in all probability do little to terminate the war. Nothing will happen in the Security Council because of Soviet vetoes. The whole thing is a farce."\textsuperscript{49} The US draft resolutions in the Security Council simply proposed an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of troops on Indo-Pakistan borders without making any reference to the Bangladesh crisis.\textsuperscript{50}

Seeing that its diplomacy at the UN was not paying expected dividends, Washington then resorted to blackmail the general diplomacy against India to boost up the sagging morale of Pakistan.

Jack Anderson reported the formation of the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) in the White House which included experts from the Pentagon, Department of Defence, CIA, National Security Agency etc.\textsuperscript{51} Washington was faced with the dilemma as what should it do to save something from the wreckage of Pakistan in the east and even more important to safeguard Pakistan in the West from being

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{48} Statement by the Minister for External Affairs in Lok Sabha, see Lok Sabha Debates, (New Delhi) vol.9, 3 December 1971, cols. 196-97.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Quoted in Jack Anderson, "The Washington Merry Go Round", Washington Post (Washington), 14 December 1971. See also Kalb and Kalb, n.32, p.260.
\item \textsuperscript{50} See texts of the US draft resolution S/10416, dated 4 December S/10446, dated 13 December 1971 and S/10459 dated 16 December 1971, in Bangladesh Documents, n.30, pp.334, 350 and 357-58.
\item \textsuperscript{51} See Jack Anderson's article in Daily Telegraph (London), 10 January 1972.
\end{itemize}
overwhelmed. The available evidence shows that United States was willing to do whatever it could, including naval intervention, to help Pakistan. General Westmoreland was reported to have said that 'there was no means of evacuating West Pakistan forces from East Pakistan, particularly in view of the Indian Naval Superiory which could imply a US naval intervention under the guise of rescue operation'.

In view of the military debacle being suffered by Pakistan, the United States, with a view to build up psychological pressure on India and to boost the morale of Pakistan, on 9 December 1971 despatched a naval task force from the Seventh Fleet of South Vietnam, spearheaded by the aircraft carrier "Enterprise" and consisting of an amphibious assault force, four guided missile destroyers, a guided missile frigate and a landing craft. It passed through the Straits of Malacca on 10 December and entered the Bay of Bengal on 12 December 1971. Henry Kissinger is reported to have told the WAG meeting on 9 December 1971, "I'm getting hell every half an hour from the President that we are not tough enough on India. He just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants me to tilt in favour of Pakistan".

According to Jack Anderson, the objective of the US in sending its naval force into the Indian waters was to make 'a show of force' and through such a 'provocative naval deployment' to

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52. Ibid.
54. Anderson, n.51.
i) Compel India to divert both ships and plans to shadow the task force;

ii) Weaken India's naval blockade against East Pakistan;

iii) divert the Indian aircraft carrier 'Vikrant' from its military mission; and

iv) to force India to keep planes on alert thus reducing their operation against Pakistani ground forces. (56)

The US tactics of building up psychological pressure on India by deploying naval task force was acknowledged by Z.A. Bhutto in his interview with c.L. Sulzberger of the New York Times: "If there had been no US intervention, India would have moved hard against Azad Kashmir and also on the southern front of Sind". 57

While the Indo-Pakistan war was nearing a decisive stage, Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, wrote a letter on 15 December 1971 to President Nixon telling him that "it was the failure of the US to exercise any restraint on the military Junta of Islamabad that was responsible for the tragedy of Bangladesh". 58

In the wake of the surrender of Pakistani forces in Dhaka on 17 December 1971 and emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign independent country, the US geopolitical perceptions about the region underwent a change and India's pre-eminent position as a regional power was recognized.

57. Reported in Dawn, n.6, 14 February 1972.
Defending his role during the Indo-Pak war of 1971, Henry Kissinger has recalled in his memoirs that the US decisions during that period were a counter to the Soviet Union's "highly inflammatory role". He said: "We have to act in a manner that would give pause to potential Soviet adventures elsewhere especially in the Middle East". Kissinger also told newsmen that Nixon would cancel his forthcoming visit to Moscow until India was restrained.

Thus it is revealed from the above analysis that Nixon Administration was closed, and insensitive towards India and had completely tilted in favour of Pakistan (due to the main objective to foreclose opportunities for the increase of communism) during the Indo-Pak war of 1971. In its strategy of treating Pakistan as a significant communication channel in Sino-US rapprochement, Washington tried to appease Islamabad even at the cost of risking its strategic interests in the region and alienating India. The seemingly legitimate justification of its actions by the Nixon Administration was neither credible nor potentially useful for a coherent framework for future strategic and political developments in South Asia.

**UNITED STATES FLOW OF INFLUENCE AND NEW PAKISTAN**

After the dismemberment of its Eastern wing, in December 1971, only Western wing remained intact to be known as "New Pakistan". In early 1972, Z.A. Bhutto assumed the reins of power

60. Ibid, p.198.
in Islamabad. The new geopolitical realities in South Asia envisaged a noticeable change in US policy towards the region with acknowledging India as a major power and it was presumed in the Indian circles that the US would do nothing to create an artificial parity of military strength between India and Pakistan. 62

Between 1972 and 1974, the Bhutto Administration was more preoccupied with pressing domestic issues like the release of Pakistani POWs held in India, restoration of Pakistani territory under Indian occupation and reconstruction of the war ravaged economy of Pakistan.

United States supported the normalization of India-Pakistan relations because the encouragement of turmoil would have invited the involvement of outside powers. 63 However Bhutto while continuing cordial relations with the United States, despite Pakistan's disillusionment with the security pacts and his election pledges of withdrawal from CENTO, sought to revive the pacts, hoping that the Indo-Soviet treaty might induce Washington to infuse a new life in the waning alliances. 64

Bhutto's keen interest in strengthening the alliances and his reactivation of Pakistan's role in CENTO after years of passivity

failed to evoke even passive response in Washington.\textsuperscript{65} Soon after Bhutto's suggestion, the US State Department announced on 14 February 1972 that Washington had no intention to negotiate a new military agreement with Pakistan.\textsuperscript{66} In the beginning of 1973, the Nixon Administration expressed its strong interest "to see Pakistan building a new future helping to consolidate its integrity as a nation", but President Nixon declared in unequivocal terms that the US would "not join in any grouping or pursue any politics directed against India".\textsuperscript{67} Thus the Nixon Administration acknowledged India's growing power and its role as "essential to peace and stability in South Asia".\textsuperscript{68}

Pakistan enjoyed the US sympathy for its demand of release of POWs held in India. The Sino-American joint communique issued on the conclusion of President Nixon's visit to China in February 1972, called for "the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir".\textsuperscript{69} The prominent US Senators like Charles Percy, Mike Mansfield, Huge Scott and Hubert Humphrey urged the Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi for an early repatriation

\textsuperscript{65} Bhutto's interview with New York Times (n.7), reported in The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 14 February 1972.
\textsuperscript{67} US Policy for 1970s, n.63, p.8.
\textsuperscript{69} Mitchel Lous, United States Policy towards South Asia (Washington, 1973), p.22.
of Pakistani POWs. In November 1973, Washington contributed $2 million to facilitate the repatriation flights of strained Bengalis from Pakistan and Pakistanis from Bangladesh. With a view to ease tension in the region Washington accorded recognition to Bangladesh and lifted the suspension on the flow of $87.6 million development loan to India.

The United States also helped Pakistan in tiding over its financial crisis arising in the wake of war. The American aid which was suspended during the Bangladesh crisis was resumed after President Nixon notified the Congress that Pakistan was no more in control of Bangladesh. Between January 1972 to May 1973, Washington not only rescheduled the repayment of debt worth $50 million to Pakistan but also provided assistance worth $300 million. In terms of separate loan agreements signed during this period, the US committed $120 million to facilitate the imports essential for Pakistan's industrial and agricultural growth. Washington also offered $124 million in food under PL-480; $5 million in technical assistance and $45 million to support the Indus Basin development programme. Equally crucial at that juncture was US flood disaster relief fund for Pakistan which included aid of $30 million, 16,000 metric tons of wheat, 40,000 tons of edible oil and a loan of $18 million on emergency basis to raise wheat production in the country.

71. Aslam Baig, United States Relations with Pakistan (Lahore, 1974), pp.203-205.
72. Dawn n.6, 20 February 1972.
74. Ibid, p.21.
UNITED STATES ARMS ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

Bhutto Government was very eager to procure sophisticated weapons from Beijing, Washington and other sources with a view to make up for losses Pakistan had incurred during the Indo-Pakistan war in December 1971. However in view of US embargo on arms supplies to Pakistan imposed during the Bangladesh crisis, Islamabad tried to build up pressure on Washington to lift the embargo. As a tactical move, Pakistan accorded recognition to the Communist regimes in North Vietnam, North Korea and in May 1972 Bhutto in a letter addressed to President Nixon expressed Pakistan's concern over the Vietnam war. On 7 November 1972, Pakistan served a notice to terminate its membership of SEATO. In view of Pakistan's close relations with Beijing, its membership of SEATO had lost much of its relevance. Pakistan's leaving SEATO did in no way affect the pattern of Pakistan-US relationship.

In March 1973, Nixon Administration suddenly announced its decision to resume supply of arms to Pakistan. Washington tried to give the impression that it was not revocation of the embargo decision but it was to fulfil its commitment undertaken long before the war of 1971. With a view to appease India, Washington also announced that India could also purchase "communication equipment" worth $ 91 million and providing $ 87.6 million in economic aid.

75. For text of Bhutto's letter to President Nixon, see Dawn, n.6, 25 May 1972.
The decision to resume arms supplies to Pakistan was taken by Washington in its overall decision to supply arms to Iran and other countries of the Gulf region. President Nixon's statement that the United States was not "giving" but "selling" arms especially in case of Pakistan had acquired specific significance. This showed US readiness to continue arms supplies to Pakistan, although it was developing a more complex and subtle relationship with India.

During 1973, Pakistan got 7 Martin B-57 Canberra bombers, 12 Northrop F-5 fighter planes, 6 Lockheed G-104 fighter planes, 4 Cessna T-37 trainer planes, 300 M-113 armoured personnel carriers. According to SIPRI Yearbook, 1980 the orders were placed by Pakistan in October 1970 and deliveries were made in 1973 by the United States.

Even the avowed objective of Bhutto's visit to the United States in September 1973 was to acquire latest sophisticated weapons for Pakistan. While addressing a press conference in Washington on 19 September 1973, Bhutto pointed to his country's need for modern "red hot weapons". In the backdrop of Bhutto's proclaimed belief in socialism and his past criticism of United States, Bhutto's assumption of power in 1972 might have created some misgivings in Washington. But Bhutto's visit to US in September 1973,

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79. SIPRI Year Book of World Armaments and Disarmament (Stockholm, 1980).

as he himself stated, proved instrumental in "eradicating the differences" that existed between the countries. President Nixon assured strong US support for "Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity which is a cornerstone of American foreign policy". The joint statement issued after Bhutto's visit to Washington reiterated "warm support for the process of reconciliation underway in South Asia and for the resolution of other outstanding issues through peaceful means".

Thus Bhutto's visit to the United States proved instrumental in putting Pak-US relations on a smooth level despite the differences between Islamabad and Washington over arms supply and divergent approaches during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Pakistan's open support to the Arabs did not evoke any overt resentment from Washington but the US Congress did take a serious view while deliberating on the policy towards arms supplies to Pakistan. As Bhutto later remarked: "We are also told that Pakistan's pro-Arab policy has made the Senate sensitive to arms assistance to Pakistan".

Pakistan assumed added significance in US policy towards Middle East in view of Arab oil embargo and Pakistan's growing entente with Arab countries especially Saudi Arabia. During his visit to Pakistan in November 1973, the then US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, remarked that Pakistan could play "an important and useful

83. Ibid, p.483.
role in the task on which we are engaged - settlement in the Middle East". 85 Despite the difference of opinion, both Kissinger and Bhutto agreed to undertake in their own way, major efforts towards lasting "peace in the Middle East". 86

The ostensible purpose of Kissinger's visit to Pakistan could not be ascertained immediately and four years later, Bhutto, however, claimed that Kissinger had tried to dissuade Pakistan from hosting the Islamic Summit meeting. 87 The pressure, if any, was resisted as evidenced from Pakistan's continued solidarity with the Arabs and the holding of the Islamic meeting at Lahore in 1974. 88 In the emerging world situation, the commonality in dealing with the Middle Eastern problems, between U.S. and Pakistan was in certain respects quite limited.

India's peaceful nuclear explosion in May 1974, however, became a handy ploy to plead its case for soliciting more arms from the United States. Thus Islamabad impressed upon Washington the need to revoke the arms embargo otherwise the former would have to consider developing its own nuclear capability. The US Defence Department's "first public listing of its technical assistance contracts with foreign countries", as declared in February 1975, revealed that in 1974, the Pentagon had contracted to render assistance to Pakistan for the modification of HH-43-B bomber into HH-43-F fighter planes

for $47,509. The United States had developed suspicion of Pakistan's requirement of conventional weapons provided Pakistan was willing to place its automatic reactors under international supervision to prevent the secret production of nuclear weapons. In early February 1975, Islamabad while playing on Washington's susceptibilities, argued that embargo was in effect "a discrimination against a steadfast ally." During his visit to the United States in the early days of February 1975, Bhutto pleaded for the lifting of embargo supply of arms to Pakistan. The US President, Gerald Ford said that "the question of lifting the ban would receive active consideration". However the joint communique issued, after Bhutto's visit omitted any mention in that regard except reaffirming the US support for Pakistan's integrity and independence.

In the wake of Washington's assessment of its own strategic requirements and Pakistan's policy of pressure and persuasion, the United States finally agreed to lift ban on sales of arms to Pakistan on 25 February 1975. Announcing the decision, the Under Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Joseph Sisco, provided the rationale for such a step because India was receiving weapons from the Soviet Union and had its own arms industry, while Pakistan "an ally of the US had been denied this in as far as the US is concerned". Robert Anderson, a spokesman of the State Department said that

90. Shrivastava, n.76, p.34.
92. Ibid.
93. Morning News n.80, 6 February 1975.
Washington's decision to lift the embargo in case of Pakistan aimed at bringing the US policy in consonance with that of U.K. and France. 95

The US decision to lift the embargo on arms supplies to Pakistan taken in February 1975 was the result of a calculated strategy to further US strategic interests in the Gulf region and South Asia by building up Pakistan as a reliable and dependent ally of United States. The only sacrifice Washington had to make was to provide arms to Pakistan. The policy makers in Washington were also apprehensive that in case US did not accede to Pakistan's request for arms supplies, the latter would seek other channels because of its quest for having defence parity with India. Thus stance was evidenced from the testimony of Vice Admiral Bay Poef, US Navy Director Defence Security Agency, before the Congress Foreign Affairs Committee on 18 July 1974:

As far as Pakistan is concerned, she is going to need to modernize her equipment and she does not have many places to turn. If the United States is not responsive, she will be driven to going to some places else. It has been my experience in this programme that if the countries feel they need military equipment in their own security interest they are going to get it one way or another. (96)

According to Mehrunisa Ali, a Pakistani scholar, the developments in Afghanistan in the wake of July 1973 leading

95. Ibid, 28 February 1975.
to the increase in Soviet influence and troubles in Baluchistan also contributed in US decision to lift arms embargo against Pakistan.\footnote{Mehrunisa Ali, n.64, p.42.} According to a press report, the Shah of Iran had also persuaded Washington to render arms assistance to Bhutto Government.\footnote{Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 28 February 1975, p.24.}

The US decision was acclaimed in Pakistan. \textit{Dawn} in an editorial expressed the view that the decision "marks a return to commonsense and realism".\footnote{"An Anomaly Rectified" (editorial), \textit{Dawn}, n.6, 26 February 1975.} Pakistan's President, Z.A. Bhutto, while welcoming the US move, called it a contribution to the stability and security of the region.\footnote{Ibid, 26 February 1975.} With a view to allay India's misapprehensions, the US State Department said that the United States would ensure that the sales of arms to Pakistan would not contribute to an intensification of an arms race in the subcontinent.\footnote{New York Times, n.7, 26 February 1975.} However, secretary of State, Henry Kissinger remarked: "Maintenance of embargo against a friendly country with which we have an allied relationship while its neighbour India was producing and acquiring a billion dollar worth of arms a year was morally, politically and symbolically improper" \footnote{The Pakistan Times, n.65, 27 February 1975.}

On 25 February 1975 President Ford was asked at a Press Conference in Florida as to why the United States was "selling" arms to Israel as well as Arabs, to Pakistan as well as to
India. He was further asked whether such sales were prompted by the state of American economy or he regarded them as "immoral". President Ford categorically denied any linkages between the sales of arms to other countries and the state of American economy. He further added:

...We do not have a policy of selling arms to other nations if that country feels that it has an internal security problem and No.2 if it is necessary for one or any other countries to maintain their national integrity or security. We believe that in many areas of the world, a proper military balance is essential for internal as well as external security of the various countries. And where other nations, such as Soviet Union does sell or give arms to one country or another, if any other country feels that for its own security it needs additional equipment and has the cash then we feel that it is proper to make a sale from the US to that country. (104)

It is evident from the above statement that even without naming India and Pakistan President Ford was justifying the lifting of arms embargo against both the countries. However the noteworthy point in President Ford's above statement was that the arms were to be sold to Pakistan and not provided on grant basis as in the past.

President Ford's statement also reflected a new shift in American policy of arms transfer to other countries. On 25 February 1975 Senator Gaylord Nelson furnished the following statistics in the Senate:

104. Ibid. Emphasis added.
TABLE 1-I

DECLINE OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN
1970-74

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Military Assistance (in $ billion)</th>
<th>Foreign Military Sales (in $ billion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Congressional Record (Washington, D.C), vo.125, 26 February 1975, P.S. 2653.

It is evident from the above table that the level of US military assistance was gradually declining and in 1974 it was the lowest during five years while the level of foreign military sales was on increase reaching $ 8.2 billion in 1974.

According to Senator Nelson the decision of lifting ban on arms sales to Pakistan was taken "without sufficient Congressional consideration". He further added that such a decision would obviously "have a great impact on the US-Indian relations, India-Pakistan relations and the stability of the area". 105 Without delving into the debatable question whether the lifting of US embargo would result in an arms race in the region, senator Nelson asked "should not the Congress have an opportunity to discuss the policy in this and similar instances". 106

106. Ibid.
The decision to undo the ban on arms sales to Pakistan taken by Ford Administration failed to arouse any significant opposition within or without the Congress. The only notable exception appeared to be Congressman Fortney S. Stark, who in a speech in San Francisco criticised Ford Administration's policy towards India and accused it of assuming the role of a "merchant of death selling guns and playing superpower games". The American press took no serious note and only a small number of newspapers commented on the decision. The New York Times reported on 2 March 1975 by quoting "informed officials" as saying that the US arms sales to Pakistan "will be limited to modest quantities of defensive weapons and the storm in India will blow over as that becomes clear". The new US Ambassador-designate to New Delhi, William Saxbe, who was then in Bangkok en-route to his new post, said on 26 February 1975: "At this time American people are saying let India worry about herself we have our problems too". He further speculated that the American decision to sell arms to Pakistan could have been made in order to solve economic and energy problem.

Following the lifting of arms embargo on the supplies of US arms to Pakistan the latter tried to procure sophisticated weaponry from Washington. According to press reports by early 1976, Pakistan showed interest in buying military hardware worth $ 90 to 100 million. Apart from an arms deal for TOW anti-tank missiles worth $ 28 million, Pakistan also sought to procure 110 A-7 fighter planes.

108. For details see, Editorials on File (New York, 1975)
110. Quoted in Indian Express (New Delhi), 27 February 1975.
Following table shows the arms assistance rendered by United States to Pakistan during 1971-79 period:

**TABLE I-2**

**US ARMS ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN, 1971-79**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>ORDERED</th>
<th>DELIVERED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIRCRAFT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Martin B-57 Canberra</td>
<td>Bomber</td>
<td>]</td>
<td>]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Northrop F-5 Freedom Fighter</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>All ordered</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lockheed F-104 Starfighter</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>]</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Cessna T-37 GOIN Trainer</td>
<td></td>
<td>]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>M-113 Armoured Personnel Carrier</td>
<td></td>
<td>October 1970</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>M-113 A I ICV</td>
<td></td>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>- APC</td>
<td></td>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>- CPB</td>
<td></td>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MISSILES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>840</td>
<td>AIM 9 J AAM</td>
<td></td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1977 420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sidewinders</td>
<td></td>
<td>1978 420</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>BGM - 71 A TOW ATM</td>
<td></td>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350</td>
<td>DIM - 9 P AAM</td>
<td></td>
<td>1978 20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1980 350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAVAL VESSELS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gearing Destroyer</td>
<td></td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1977 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** SIPRI Year Book 1971-1980.
It is clear from the above table that the bulks of arms supplies which Pakistan acquired from the United States in 1973 was the result of orders placed in October 1970. In 1976, Pakistan ordered for the supply of 840 AIM-9 J Sidewinder missiles. During 1977, 420 were delivered to Pakistan and the remaining in 1978. During 1976, Pakistan also urged the United States to supply 200 BGM-71 A TOW anti-tank missiles. During 1976, Pakistan placed orders with the US Navy for the supply of 2 "Gearing" destroyers which were delivered in 1977.\textsuperscript{113} In 1978, Pakistan ordered for the acquisition of an unspecified number of M-113 AI type armoured personnel carriers and 350 AIM-9 P type missiles which were delivered by 1980. In November 1976, the US Defence Department had recommended the sale of A-7 fighter aircraft to Pakistan but the Carter Administration cancelled it owing to Pakistan's refusal to rescind the nuclear deal with France.

In the event of Jimmy Carter assuming the American Presidency in 1977, "Pakistan loomed fairly small on the policy horizon" of United States.\textsuperscript{114} In the brief foreign policy section in his campaign autobiography, Jimmy Carter had lumped Pakistan with China, Kampuchea and Vietnam where "our government's foreign policy has not exemplified any commitment to moral principles".\textsuperscript{115}

Pakistan's request for the acquisition of 110 A-7 ground attach

\textsuperscript{113} Morning News, n.80, 12 September 1977.
\textsuperscript{114} Thomas Per y Thorton, "Between the Stools: United States Policy Towards Pakistan During the Carter Administration", Asian Survey (Berkeley), vol. XXII, no.10, October 1982, p.959.
aircraft from the United States was still pending when Carter entered the White House. The Secretary of State during Ford Administration, Henry Kissinger, had offered Pakistan the A-7 as inducement for the latter to abandon its nuclear plans. However the Carter Administration cancelled the deal in early 1977.116

On 19 May 1977, Carter Administration announced a comprehensive policy on arms transfer to its military allies which contained two basic ingredients:

(i) The Administration would view arms transfer as an exceptional foreign policy implement... that the transfer contributes to other national security interests;

(ii) It would utilize arms transfer to promote our security and the security of our close friends. But in the future the burden of persuasion will be on those who favour a particular arms sale, rather than those who oppose it. (117)

It was evident from the above announcement that Carter Administration’s policy of transfer of arms to the allies of the United States became an integral part and indispensable instrument of its global strategy. However in case of Pakistan, Carter Administration’s policy was not governed by the above mentioned criterion. According to Thomas Perry Thorton, the US policy towards Pakistan during the Carter Administration years had three main aspects:

(i) There were few countries where as many "new" global concerns interest as in Pakistan, and these concerns were at the fore during the earlier Carter years;

(ii) Pakistan has always been of some significance in terms of older global issues related to US-Soviet security concerns and in the latter part of the Administration, these came to the fore;

(iii) There were several important regional issues impinging on the US-Pakistan relationship. (118)

Carter Administration did not adopt liberal attitude towards Pakistan as far as the supplies of US weapons to that country was concerned. The major stumbling block in the process was Pakistan's reported attempts to acquire nuclear capability. The following table shows the arms assistance acquired by Pakistan from the United States during 1970-1979 period.

**TABLE I-3**

**US ARMAMENTS ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN (1970-1979)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>ORDERED</th>
<th>DELIVERY AND NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) AIRCRAFT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Martin B-57 Canberra Bomber</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Northrop F-5 Fighter</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lockheed F-104 Fighter</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) MISSILES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>840</td>
<td>AIM-9 J Sidewinder AAM</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1972 : 420</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>BGM-71A TOW ATM</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350</td>
<td>AIM-9P AAM</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1979 : 20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1980 : 320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) ARMoured VEHICLES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>M-113 Armoured Carrier</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-113-AI ICV</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-113-AI CIB</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D) NAVAL VESSELS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>&quot;Gearing&quot; Destroyer</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1977 : 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** SIPRI Year Book 1970-1980

It is evident from the above table that Pakistan acquired strategic weapons during the Nixon Administration. During 1973 Pakistan got 7 Marton B-57 class bombers, 12 Northroo F-5 fighter planes and 6 Lockheed F-104 fighter planes. Besides, United States also supplied 300 M-113 Type armoured vehicles to Pakistan during 1973.\textsuperscript{119}

During 1976, Pakistan ordered for the supply of S 40 AIM-9 J missiles which were delivered by 1978. Pakistan also asked for 200 BGM-71 A TOW missiles in 1976. During the same year Pakistan placed order with Washington for the supply of 2 "Gearing" class destroyers which it acquired in 1977. Islamabad's request for supplying 350 AIM-9P class missiles in 1978 was acceded by United States and during 1979 it got 20 and the rest in 1980.\textsuperscript{120}

It is evident from the foregoing analysis that Pakistan's relations with United States registered new strides in the beginning of 1970s under the Nixon Administration. During the Bangladesh crisis and Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, United States rendered moral diplomatic political and weapons support to Pakistan. However this pattern underwent a change in 1977 following the advent of the Carter Administration. In the wake of reports about Pakistan's intentions to go nuclear, the Carter Administration slowed down the flow of US arms to Pakistan. This factor is analysed in detail in the succeeding fifth chapter. However the developments in Afghanistan took dramatic turn during 1979 culminating in the Soviet armed intervention in December 1979 which changed the old pattern of Pak-US relations and Pakistan

acquired added strategic significance in 'safeguarding' the US strategic interests in South-West Asia.

In conclusion, a brief overview is given below for three specific policy-making realities affecting US-Pakistan relations which have adversely effected India's security:

(a) **SUPER POWERS RIVALRY IN INDIAN OCEAN REGION: IMPLICATIONS ON INDIA'S SECURITY**

Pakistan's military alliance with United States (due to the containment policy) enabled and invited United States to explore further area's of influence in the region. Particularly China's rift with USSR and rapprochement with the United States in 1970s had also emboldened and strengthened strategic interest of United States to spread its bases in the area. All indications convey that even though United States interest in the Indian Ocean surfaced in the 1960s, it was not until the 1970s that serious thoughts were given by the policy makers in Washington toward building a permanent facility in the area which would serve the nation as a major naval and air base. As a result of Indo-Pak War in December 1971, "the aircraft carrier Enterprise headed a task force including an amphibious assault ship, the Trippoli, with a battalion of 800 marines, three guided missile escorts, four destroyers, a nuclear-attack submarine, and an Oiler".121 As things turned out, this force entered the Bay of Bengal and was deployed in the Indian Ocean until January 1972. In 1972 early, the jurisdiction of the United States 7th fleet was extended to the Indian Ocean.

121. Arvind Chowdhry, Prospects of Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia (Delhi, 1980), pp.22-23.
In 1971, when Indo-Pak War started there were four Soviet warships in the Indian Ocean, the largest being a relatively old destroyer, none of which had any surface-to-surface cruise missile capability. In early 1972, this force was strengthened by 16 warships, (so that for a brief period) there were 20 combatants present in the Ocean, some surface-to-surface missile capability, four of the Soviet extra warships, 13 surface vessels and 7 submarines. These were sent to the Ocean after the United States Navy had dispatched a task force there, headed by the aircraft carrier Enterprise. The Indo-Pakistani War led, therefore, to record force levels for both the United States and the Soviet Union. 122

In October 1973, during the global alert called by President Nixon with a view to challenge the potential Soviet Military intervention in the Middle East Conflict, the United States dispatched to the Indian Ocean the aircraft carrier Hancock accompanied by four destroyers and an oiler. Though during the same period there were already the aircraft carrier Oriskany with four destroyers and an Oilier. At that time, the Soviet Navy had four to six war vessels in the area, sent in additional ships to bring her force to a level of ten surface combatants and four submarines. 123 The littoral States of the Indian Ocean do not individually or collectively command even the semblance of sufficient naval strength to act as a deterrent to the actions of any great power from the outside. The military presence of extra-regional power has been increasing in the Indian Ocean region. At an early date,

123. Dinesh Pahwa, India's Role in the context of Indian Ocean Security (Bombay, 1988), pp.56-68.
the countries of the region had called for declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, and the UN General Assembly, had repeatedly called for keeping the Indian Ocean free of extra regional military forces and nuclear weapon deployment, however, a great deal of Western and Soviet strategic thought has been applied to justify the continued presence and, in fact build-up of extra regional military forces in the Ocean. Their main objective centres on the contention that the UN proposal contradicts the prevailing international Law on the freedom of Navigation on the high seas for all ships.\textsuperscript{124} As Pravda stated it in February 1977:

\begin{quote}
The Soviet Union is prepared to participate with all interested states on an equal basis in the search for a favourable resolution of the question of creating a zone of peace in this region of Indian Ocean .... However, such measures should take full account of the generally recognized norms of international law concerning freedom of navigation in the open sea and the associated need for business calls at the port of coastal states, as well as freedom of scientific research. \textsuperscript{125}
\end{quote}

Obviously when things have been said and done, certainly it indicates the great powers interest to preserve freedom of navigation in the open Sea because it is crucial to enable them to indulge in such strategic exercises as testing of sophisticated weapons, calls at ports of coastal states, and keeping a close watch on each other's activities to make certain that no threat exists to their interests as well as the interests of some of their client states. For as uncomfortable as the thought might be for some of the littoral states,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid, p.95.
\end{flushright}
it has to be recognized that continued bickering and even warfare among many of the coastal states had led to some of them readily accepting super-power client status. According to Braun:

There is of course, more to it than meets the eye of the conventional strategist. The Indian Ocean, by its very geographical location is of special significance to both superpowers with regard to the latest technological devices in military strategy, both underwater and in the air, including satellites (such as the British-American Skynet communications system). Ships are part of this strategy of threat-deterrence-vigilance, and in such a context conventional bases such as Simons-town are likely to lose much of their importance. (126)

Even if Washington did not propose to match Moscow for every ship day at sea or in port, but it could be expected that neither party would permit the other to hold a monopoly in this sphere. It could be consequently assumed that the navies of two powers will be much in evidence in foreseeable future in the Indian Ocean. In March, 1977 President Carter, however, expressed interest in complete demilitarization of the Ocean. This was followed by the setting up of a joint United States - Soviet Commission which was assigned the responsibility to chalk out a plan to allow a gradual demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. Nothing has surfaced so far to indicate that any progress was made by the commission. Rather the United States has deployed early 1979, a naval task force of one to two aircraft carrier battle groups in the northern reaches of the Arabian Sea, ostensibly to keep the sea-lanes open for oil traffic considered vital for western interest. The deployment (not counting the United States Middle East Force of naval warships permanently deployed in the persian Gulf

ever since 1949) really took place nearly nine months before Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and a year-and-a-half before the Iran Iraq war erupted. As it is, this mighty naval-air-marine armada, has failed to protect oil tanker traffic (of even non-belligerent states) being attacked and hit by the two adversaries in a apparently indiscriminate offensive. So far, over 150 oil tankers are believed to have been hit, almost entirely by weapons supplied by the west, which is supposed to be critically dependent on West Asian oil. For more than ten years, the danger of closure of the Straits of Hormuz has been held out as a serious threat affecting vital interests of the US and the West in terms of uninterrupted oil supplies. The US has also established its Central Command, a Major unified military command specifically for military operations in the region. It has established an extensive network of bases, facilities and access to facilities in a large number of countries and islands in the region. Other Western powers have been providing support to this collaborative coalition strategy. The classic example, of course, is that of Diego Garcia leased out by the UK to USA as a military base after evicting 1200 citizens from the islands group. The other major facility available to the US is at Masirah (Oman). Many nonaligned countries of the region have provided base and access facilities to the superpowers. This has brought superpower rivalry and competition into the region, coupling it to local disputes and conflicts. In the Indian view, the presence of extra-regional military forces in the Indian Ocean coupled and linked to the regional security problems

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127 Pradeep Pahadi, Super Power Rivalry in Indian Ocean (Delhi, 1989), pp. 53-54
constitute a major source of threat to peace. The Soviet warship presence in the Indian Ocean, appeared to be transient in nature. It had come down in 1985 to half of that in 1980 (from an average of 330 to 146 shipdays per month).\textsuperscript{128} However, this may have been in a large measure be due to the restricted power projection capabilities of the Soviet Union. At the same time, US presence may be expected to increase further.

\textbf{IMPLICATIONS}

Rapid growth of military expenditures, force expensions, sophisticated arms and military technology sought in pursuance of perceived security needs beyond what may be rationally judged as legitimate needs, does not necessarily provide security and stability. The littoral countries of Indian Ocean seeking to obtain superior military power, thus, may be concurrently nurturing the roots of insecurity and conflict rather than peace in the Indian Ocean. There is every likelihood at the same time, of these states losing their freedom of action to the control exercised by the donor countries in the area of high technology. Particularly, the security that a state may be by buying at colossal investment may prove to be grossly inadequate because of this control and develop serious vulnerabilities in critical areas of military capability.\textsuperscript{129} Due to the ever increasing danger, India has been in the forefront in the campaign to restrict the presence of the super powers but she could acquire very limited influence over the tenor of events in the Indian Ocean and to secure her interests in the area. Indian Ocean is of vital importance

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid, pp.62-63.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid, pp.71-72
particularly to India. India has a coastline 4,000 miles long that borders on the Indian Ocean, a coastline as long as India's land frontier. It is the longest in the world facing navigable waters, and it is more vulnerable than the land frontier.... India's major trade and communication routes traverse the Ocean. As a developing nation, India depends on exports of foodstuffs and raw materials (such as jute and jute products, tea, cashew nuts, ores and metals, shellac, oilseeds, and mica) to earn the foreign currency needed to import equipment and technology in such key areas as mining, electric power, railroads, oil drilling, and textile machinery. While her total import-export trade of some $7 billion may not be impressive by itself, when put in proper context the picture leaves no doubt in one's mind that trade routes of the Indian Ocean are the lifelines of India. 130

In strategic terms, India is one country that needs no reminder, that her fate as a truly sovereign entity is inextricably woven with the winds that will blow from the Indian Ocean. If the Indian Ocean is controlled by a single naval power, the will of that power will dominate India. That is what India suffered for two centuries and that is what India overthrew after a long and bitter struggle—not completely in 1947, but as late as 1961 in Goa. 131 Thus India does not wish to see the Indian Ocean dominated by any single power.

Since the super powers seem to be in no hurry to change the status of things as they exist, such attitudes can only guarantee continued rivalry and naval competition. The littoral states of the Indian Ocean particularly India observes this as a potentially dangerous situation fraught with terror, tension, conflict and possibly

130. Pahwa, n.123, p.65.
131. Ibid, p.78.
warfare which is continuously increasing. The prospect of the Indian Ocean as a zone of conflict rather than one of peace looms ever larger, unless definite steps are taken.

(b) THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN: IMPACT ON US POLICY IN THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT

In the mid-1970s the United States began applying pressure on Pakistan when the Indian peaceful nuclear explosion took place in May 1974, Bhutto took advantage of the opportunity. He said, "Pakistan's nuclear option, was under constant review and was dependent on whether Washington supplies Pakistan with sufficient conventional weapons".132 After the 1971 Indo-Pak War, imposed arms embargo was lifted by the United States in February 1975. United States did not support Pakistan's intentions is clear from the fact that in February 1976 voted in favour of the Pakistani IAEA agreement embodying these controls when it came before the Board of Governors and appeared prepared to go along with the sale on those terms.133

It was during the Carter era that Senator John Glenn strengthened the Symington amendment (June 1976). The latter held that US economic and military assistance was to be withheld from any country that delivers or receives nuclear enrichment or reprocessing equipment, materials or technology unless all nuclear facilities of the recipients are under international IAEA safeguards (Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act). Senator Glenn in August 1977 amended Section 669 by Separating the provisions dealing with

enrichment and reprocessing. Section 669 was to deal exclusively with enrichment while a new Section 670 was introduced to deal with reprocessing. Aid was to be cut from any country receiving reprocessing equipment irrespective of safeguarded facilities. Aid was also to be cut for any non-nuclear weapon state, which was not a party to the NPT (Non-proliferation Treaty) detonating a nuclear device. Both Sections 669 and 670 included provisions that the amendments might be waived by the President of the United States should he conclude that it was in the national interest to do so. The Carter administration used this Glenn/Symington authority to cut off some economic and military aid to Pakistan after it was revealed that Pakistan was building a nuclear enrichment plant at Kahuta.134

Following the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan, the perceptions of the Carter Administration shifted rather dramatically. The President Carter declared that Soviet occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan. This would threaten the security of all nations, including the United States.135 As part of the U.S. response, Carter promised military equipment, food, and other assistance to help Pakistan to defend its independence and its national security against the seriously increased threat from the north. Because the Soviet invasion shattered the basic premise of the status quo in East-West relations, and since the fall of the Shah of Iran had not only sensitized Washington to the vacuum in U.S. policy in the area. But also vitiated the regional leaders concept both the White House and the State Department recognized the need to mend fences with

Islamabad. United States adopted a two pronged approach, (a) aid package for Pakistan would be put together along with a reaffirmation of the sometimes nebulous U.S. commitment to Pakistan's territorial integrity. (Any aid for Pakistan would mean making an exception in Pakistan's case of the Symington-Glenn amendment which the law allowed).

(b) Knowing that India would react negatively to this move, the State Department would go ahead and approve two pending Indian requests for shipment of enriched uranium for Tarapur. Approval of the Indian request meant that the Carter administration would ignore the fact that a ban on nuclear fuels for India (because of its refusal to accept fullscope safeguards) was to become effective in March 1980. An intensive lobbying effort was launched by the administration on both these aspects and U.S. policy. 137

Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christoper answered with regard to Pakistan questions dealing with the impact of proposed aid for Pakistan on the Carter nonproliferation policy this way: "We will not put aside the nuclear issue with Pakistan because it is a basic principle of this administration--but it is only one of several foreign policy issues". Hence, he argued, aid to Pakistan was necessary disagreement over nonproliferation notwithstanding. 138

Senator Charles Percy, who would have had a major part to play within the Senate in passing any aid package for Pakistan.

137. Ibid, p.95.
offered his opinion that aid to Pakistan was indeed necessary (along with aid for Afghan rebels), in the absence of which the Soviets would "go through Baluchistan to oil fields in the Middle East". Given these conditions, Senator Percy (who had previously backed controls on nuclear proliferation) felt that Washington should make an exemption to its nuclear policy and accept Pakistani assurances (assuming they would be forthcoming) that it would not manufacture a nuclear weapon nor would it transfer sensitive nuclear technology elsewhere. The senator stated that he had told the State Department that he would be willing to sponsor or co-sponsor a bill on aid to Pakistan and had also told the same to the Pakistani ambassador in Washington. He expected that the aid bill would pass the Senate.  

These sentiments were echoed by Senator John Glenn, who had previously taken a very hard line against Pakistan on nonproliferation. He acknowledged that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had precipitated the need for the U.S. to review various strands of its foreign policy. On the one hand, the United States had longstanding and highly important nonproliferation interests and objectives which it was seeking to pursue in its nuclear relations with India and Pakistan. On the other hand, long term U.S. interests in maintaining stable political and security interests in Southwest Asia had been accentuated by the Soviet aggression and the need for a clear U.S. response to it. The United States had been seeking to revive and strengthen that country's ability to defend its borders against Soviet incursions from Afghanistan.

139. Ibid, pp.52-54.
140. See Burt, n.134, p.25.
A basic change in U.S. perceptions occurred as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Even though senior State Department officials, e.g., Thomas Pickering, assistant secretary, Bureau of Oceans, International Environment, and Scientific Affairs, and Peter Constable (who had served in Pakistan) senior deputy assistant secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NESAA), wished to emphasize the need to help Pakistan, they added two caveats: (a) "At the same time we have informed the government of Pakistan that we remain deeply committed to our nonproliferation policy", and (b) "We have expressed to Indian leaders our desire for good relations with India". 141

Peter Constable stated that in discussions with Washington, Islamabad had offered two "significant assurances" on its nuclear programme. These dealt with the fact that Pakistan would not develop a nuclear weapon and that it would not transfer sensitive nuclear technology to other countries. However, beyond these two specific issues the U.S. was unable to do much more. Thomas Pickering (assistant Secretary) acknowledged the limitation on U.S. ability to "influence the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan". 142

Statements by the Department of Defence also reflected the basic dichotomy of the U.S. position that "nuclear proliferation is now in the background". 143 The secretary of defence, Harold Brown, summed up U.S. concern for stability in South Asia and the security of Pakistan in light of the Soviet pressure in Afghanistan: "We also are concerned, however, with the problem of nuclear weapons

142. Ibid, p.68.
143. Ibid, p.75.
proliferation, even as we work to safeguard the legitimate security interests of the regional states". 144

Congressional sources repeated the same argument: "The U.S. is concerned about Pakistani nuclear activities and had sought to discourage Pakistani acquisition of nuclear weapons. Future Pakistani requests for purchase of significant military equipment will be evaluated in light of those concerns as well as in terms of the external threat engendered by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan." 145

Senator Glenn was particularly anxious that India subscribe to IAEA safeguards prior to any further shipment of fuel. Because, he said: "India's hesitancy about going on with IAEA safeguards after the past performance of previous administration is not very encouraging," 146 a position completely in keeping with his earlier statements to a Pakistani correspondent and not dissimilar to Carter's statements when he was a candidate. The Carter administration's response on the issue of supplying enriched uranium fuel for India's Tarapur reactor was a matter of some urgency in light of events in Afghanistan. While senior State Department officials and the president himself felt it important to continue the fuel shipments to keep New Delhi placated, others were less sanguine. 147

Pakistan followed these developments very seriously and seeing in them the application of Carter's triple standards, it was aware that during 1978-80, the two-year grace period allowed India, two

large shipments of enriched uranium fuel (running into tens of tons) had already been made. Then, in September 1978 and August 1979, India had applied for another two shipments. For Zia, the processing of these Indian requests was another test of the seriousness of Carter’s commitment to nonproliferation. Previously, when he had complained to Washington about the one-sided sanctions against Pakistan, the answer had always been that until March 1980, India was not subject to controls and that only Pakistan was a test case. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) turned down the new Indian fuel applications in May 1980, saying that they did not meet statutory criteria since fullscope safeguard requirements applied to any export beginning after March 10, 1980, irrespective of when the shipment had been planned to occur.\footnote{148} The applications were then referred to the President, who could authorize the exports, subject to review by the Congress. The criteria for overruling the NRC were based on the President finding that withholding the fuel would seriously prejudice U.S. nonproliferation objectives or would otherwise jeopardize its common defense and security. In June 1980, Carter invoked just such a predicament to overrule the NRC and to authorize the new shipments to India. Curiously, the most substantive arguments offered by Carter for this glaring breach of his self-avowed stance on nuclear nonproliferation were as follows: first, the United States had already shipped more than 200 tons of enriched uranium fuel to India’s Tarapur reactor, which was, in principle, subject to some limited safeguards. To deny the additional fuel shipments (which were, in any case, not immediately needed for running the reactor

since India still had substantial quantities stockpiled) would, Carter argued, be foolhardy because then the Indians would reject and violate even the limited safeguards and thereafter openly reprocess the spent fuel to recover explosive plutonium from it — which in turn would further undermine the U.S. nonproliferation objectives. Second, both the president and the State Department contended that supplying India with fuel for Tarapur in the absence of full-scope safeguards would actually support U.S. non-proliferation policy.149 According to this argument, supplying fuel would buy time for the U.S. to convince India to accept international safeguards in the future, otherwise, warned Secretary of State Muskie: "If one party to an agreement abandons it, the other party surely is free not to feel bound by it".150 Third, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and events in Iran had affected U.S. security interests in South and Southwest Asia deeply. The shipment of fuel to India was therefore "the best way to influence India to adopt policies beneficial to U.S. interests".151 In Islamabad, however, this line of reasoning sounded unrealistic. At the very least, it appeared to be double talk, congressional response to Carter's overruling of the NRC was music to Islamabad's ears. Despite intense lobbying by the White House, the House of Representatives voted 298 to 98 in mid-September 1980 to uphold the NRC decision and to disapprove the shipments. However, after President Carter personally telephoned several senators from Air Force One, the Senate voted 48 to 46 to approve the sale of 38 tons of additional enriched uranium fuel to India on September 24, 1980. During the more than seven hours

149. Ibid, pp.102-105.
of debate proponents of the sale used the president's arguments to support their case.152 Opponents of the sale, Senator Glenn foremost amongst them, said: "If we back down at the first test, especially in the case of India, the country with the worst history of any of our trading partners, what does that do to the credibility of our nonproliferation policy".153 Several other senators opposed the sale on the ground that administration had criticized the Swiss nuclear exports to Pakistan. Calling their attitude strictly legalistic, Senator Boschwitz of Minnesota said: "It was a contradiction, on the same day in which we are criticizing Switzerland, to support the sale to India".154

Despite the shipment of fuel, India complained of delays (even though Indian stockpiles of fuel for Tarapur already covered a full ten-year period) and notified the U.S. that they would proceed to reprocess spent nuclear fuel from Tarapur. This Indian decision had to be made by Mrs. Gandhi herself, since she was the final authority for the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. In an interview in August 1977, Mrs. Gandhi had lamented Prime Minister Desai's near "dismantling of the Indian nuclear program" and his susceptibility to Carter's nonproliferation policies. The response of Senator Glenn and other to Indian threats was summed up in the following words: "So much for appeasement. The United States had continued to send India additional nuclear fuels precisely to head off the threatened reprocessing of previously supplied fuel. If every shipment is

153. Ibid, p.27.
154. Ibid, p.29.
eventually followed by the threat of blackmail, why keep tossing good fuel after bad?" General Zia commented after his October 1980 visit to Carter that the entire treatment of Tarapur had put the Pakistani nuclear case "on a higher plane".  

UNITED STATES FAILURE TO INFLUENCE THE NUCLEAR POLICY OF PAKISTAN

In Washington's handling of the nuclear issue, there were problems of style as well as substance, which it considered to be one of utmost importance to its foreign policy. A high level U.S. team comprising National Security Adviser Zbignew Brzezinski and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited Pakistan in February 1980. They held out prospects of increased aid, while down playing the prospects of such a treaty. They warned also that a Pakistani nuclear test would spell the end of any U.S. assistance.

During the subsequent discussion, Pakistan was adamant on the nature of commitment. Actually U.S. military team visited Pakistan as the Brzezinski visit was drawing close. Number of lists have been drawn up consisting of what the U.S. was prepared to extend and what Pakistan needed, the discrepancy being enormous. Both sides have maintained their positions and an impasse was reached that followed in the monotony. However, the situation changed when Ronald Reagan succeeded Carter in 1981.

156. Ibid, p.31.
Soon after taking office, the Reagan administration began negotiations with Pakistani President, Gen. Zia, for the US military and economic aid programme for larger than the one that had been proposed by President Carter. An agreement by June was reached on a six-year $3.2 billion aid package including sale of 40 advanced fighters bombers. In 1981, the congress granted a six-year exemption from the Symington Amendment in approving the aid. Prior to its amendment in 1981, under Section 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act, Pakistan was ineligible for assistance because of its import of enrichment equipment. This injunction was removed by the congress, permitting the $3.2 billion aid to it. 158

The Reagan administration warned Gen. Zia in 1982 that United States aid would be jeopardised if Pakistan began to extract plutonium from spent fuel at its unsafeguarded New Labs reprocessing Plant. Pakistan had made considerable progress in the enrichment field by 1984 as Dr. A.Q. Khan declared the Kahuta plant had succeeded in producing enriched uranium. Subsequently Gen. Zia confirmed the point but said that "non-weapon grade material had been produced". In June 1984, in a speech Senator Cranston declared that Pakistani's nuclear weapon programme was continuing, and Reagan administration officials also confessed this. Even ACDA Chief Kenneth Alderman warned against the "dangers of Pakistan's nuclear programme". 159 However, the US-Pakistan ties remained cordial. There were reports

158. Ibid, pp.31-33.
of the United States in fact offering a nuclear umbrella to Pakistan, provided Pakistan gives up the nuclear option. President Reagan sent a letter to President Zia in September 1984, expressing strong US concern over Pakistan's continuing nuclear activities and threatening grave consequences in the event of Pakistan enriching uranium to more than the specified five per cent. But an amendment moved by Senator Cranston to the continuing resolution appropriating monies for fiscal year 1985, that would have cut off aid to Pakistan unless the President certified that it was not developing a nuclear explosive or acquiring technology and material for detonating a device which was rejected by the Senate. 160

Yaqub Ali Khan, Pakistani Foreign Minister, visited the United States, on November 16, assuring the Reagan administration of Pakistan's willingness to limit the output of the Kahuta facility, as a reply to Reagan's letter. Gen. Zia said in February 1985 that Pakistan had acquired enrichment to a grade necessary to run the plant... less than five per cent. On March 13, 1985 the Reagan administration agreed to supply Pakistan with sophisticated air-to-air missile to bolster its defence against Soviet and Afghan incursions. 161

While approving aid for Pakistan in 1985 the Key House Subcommittee and Senatorial Foreign Relations Committee adopted an amendment seeking to restrict Pakistan's Nuclear Programme. While the Senatorial Committee noted that aid could continue as long as the

160. Ibid, pp.35-36.
President determined that it did not yet possess a nuclear device, the House Subcommittee adopted an amendment to suspend aid to any non-nuclear weapon state that violated US export laws in order to obtain equipment for the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device. The provision gave the President a broad discretion to waive the application.\footnote{162}

The Soviet Union on June 21, 1986, in its series of warnings on Afghanistan, for the first time warned Pakistan against developing nuclear weapons. The United States reported by warning the Soviet Union not to interfere in Pakistan's affairs. However, when Pakistan's Prime Minister Junejo visited Washington in July 1986, the United States expressed concern over the Pakistani nuclear programme.

On Pakistan's success in producing weapon-grade material amid reports of the nuclear activities including those of the US intelligence, President Reagan certified in October 1986 that Pakistan "does not presently possess a nuclear explosive device".\footnote{163} A Pakistan-born Canadian Arshad Parvez on December 18, 1987, was convicted in Philadelphia for attempting to export beryllium, a metal used in nuclear weapons to Pakistan. The verdict in the case made clear that the jury believed that the material was intended to support Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. The government of Pakistan has denied any involvement in the episode. Nevertheless, in mid-January 1988, President Reagan determined that Pakistan had violated the Solarz Amendment.\footnote{164}

\footnote{162. Ibid, p.65.}
\footnote{163. Ibid, p.73.}
\footnote{164. Mehta, n.159, pp.36-38.}
The President simultaneously waived the cut-off in the provision, however to permit continued assistance to Pakistan.

The Carnegie Endowment concludes the report, prepared by a task force of 16 specialists:

In sum, on several occasions, the United States has backed away from enforcing the sanction of an aid cut off against Pakistan. Permitting the waiver of Symington Agreement through legislation in 1981 and again in 1987; waiving the Glenn Amendment by Presidential Action in 1982 declining to react to the production of highly enriched uranium in 1986 and 1987 to avoid suspension of assistance even though Pakistan had apparently acquired the wherewithal for its first nuclear devices; and waiving Solarz amendment in early 1988, despite pending that Pakistan had attempted to smuggle material out of the United States to be used in the manufacture of nuclear explosive device. (165)

The conclusion drawn from the above stated facts can be summarised about the phantasy that the United States is interested to implement the non-proliferation measures stands exploded. Despite concrete evidence, United States was enforced to relinquish its own rules in 1981 and even again in 1987. It was completely misleading to say that United States have now no 'say' they never had in this particular affair. Though its role was minimal during the earlier stages that too due to the modesty of the Pakistani nuclear programme itself but afterwards Pakistan was never ready to give up the option. In terms of achieving the so-called success of non-proliferation objective vis-a-vis Pakistan by getting the French deal cancelled proved reverse, when it turned Islamabad successfully into adopting the other route to the nuclear weapons, namely enrichment.

Actually the main problem remains that United States is not interested to practice itself what it preaches, therefore restrictions on new aspirant nations would solely lead to intensify the proliferation which is certainly dangerous but how can one ignore the basic fact that so-called super-powers are the main culprits to initiate this arms race fraught with terror, and everlasting enemy to the development for the underdeveloped countries.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

Due to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan has been able to achieve an unprecedented "leap frogging" in the type of weapons that they have been able to obtain from the United States. In its arsenals Pakistani military machine is now capable of packing more destructive power than ever before. Always, there has been a correlation between the level of its military might and perceptions towards India. Pakistan has again started belligerently voicing its opposition to India's perceived pre-eminence in the region due to the increase in its punching power. With the modernisation of weapon systems taking place, war in the subcontinent would have to be viewed from a different angle. The so-called 'arc of crisis' has infused into the subcontinent a dangerous and ominous element.

On the one hand far from dissuading Pakistan from the nuclear weapons course, the United States through persistent use of waivers, mainly as a result of Pakistani pressure, has turned a blind eye to the rapid progress that has been made in the field. Secondly the pattern of aid which flows from the United States have raised the levels of sophistication of the weapons and as a result the sphere
of war has been enlarged. Besides, by giving this type and quantum of military aid to Pakistan, there has been a spiralling of the arms race in the subcontinent, leading to the continuous tension, particularly can effectively challenge the emerged leadership of India in the region.

The dangerous implications for India are far and wideranging. The earlier war could have been localised for lack of capabilities now that situation has changed it would be expanded to engulf a larger area, causing more destruction and therefore requiring larger arsenals and defensive systems. The induction of the F-16s and the advanced air-borne early warning systems can cause enormous damage to Indian airfields deep inside Indian territory, oil, nuclear installations and military depots. With the proposed deployment of the E-2c Hawkey airborne warning and control system, the sophistication of defence system would have jumped to a higher plateau. The Hawkey is capable of controlling 250 targets and 30 independent engagements. Its transmission and radar degree can frustrate a surprise attack of Indian army. Most of these type of weapons and 80 per cent of Pakistan's army based on the Indian frontier are targeted towards India. As the destructive capabilities increase there is going to be a mutual corresponding movement between India and Pakistan to keep the nuclear option open.

167. Ibid, p.79.
Perhaps both India and Pakistan in the near future would be accepting the theories of nuclear deterrence which they continuously denounced for a long time as sole justification for newer and more powerful nuclear weapons by the United States and USSR. Though both the Super Powers have agreed to resolve the Afghan Problem but the Pakistani adventure of using an international crisis (like creating intentionally trouble in Kashmir and Punjab) to beef up its military might may acquire a momentum that would be difficult to stop, though it would not be that easy this time. Because it seems, that after the successful settlement of Afghanistan, in South-Asian politics there could be opposition to any further aid to Pakistan as global concerns for this area would be a low priority item in the United States Foreign Policy. Thus the post Afghan settlement scenario seems to be difficult for Pakistan in respect of obtaining arms from United States. Therefore, it is quite conceivable that Pakistan would like the crisis to continue further in Afghanistan or else it would see to it that it creates trouble elsewhere as is already actively involved in Punjab and Kashmir due to the well known fact of its successful foreign policy which is always linked to the crisis. In the region this would not only increase tension but also lead to a fuelling of the arms race that would change the tenor in the relations between India and Pakistan. Anyway, any dangerous type of activity would force India to upgrade its military might so as to negate any change in the existing military balance of South Asia. Indian decision-makers are fully aware of the urgency and intensity of Pakistan's "post-Afghanistan" militarism, and would not hesitate to take active counter measures.