CHAPTER - I

UNITED STATES - CHINA - PAKISTAN RELATIONS: IMPACT ON INDIA, HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Traditional patterns of alliances among states formed to ensure their mutual security against potential adversaries have proven inadequate either to promote security or to advance the probability of peace. Wars are no longer local affairs; conflict today often involves major powers and threatens to escalate as they vie to maintain or increase influence. Nor is geographic isolation any longer the basis for non-involvement with the world community. This policy failed the United States in the period between World Wars, the Red Chinese seems to have reached the conclusion in the 1970s that isolation is not possible.

The failure of alliance system to maintain peace and the inability of any one nation to dominate the international system today have placed increased emphasis on both international and regional security systems. The security systems of the present have a different orientation than those that existed before World War II. While military considerations remain important, they are no longer the only impetus. Much of the present emphasis has economic roots, recognizing that modern states are not self-sufficient and face a myriad of economic problems. International cooperation offers the only hope for solutions to shortages and maldistribution of food and raw material, friction caused by competing political systems, and potential dangers posed by environmental decay.¹

Concepts of international politics based solely on power nations pursuing their own interests, with opposing power blocks as the only deterrent and competing power blocs maintaining peace through mutual fear are obsolete. Power remains an important element (perhaps the most important) in relations among nations, but no state now has sufficient power to impose its will on the international community. Therefore, the self-interest of the mighty as well as the weak is best served through cooperative efforts to solve security problems be they military, economic or political.  

The famous axiom, "there are neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies but there is a permanent national interest in international relations", aptly applies to the geo-political developments that have occured in the Indian sub-continent, since the end of the second World War. The Indian sub-continent, comprising India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, has been subject to protracted alien rule, especially British colonialism for centuries.

The conclusion of the second World War led to three most spectacular developments - The decline of traditional colonial powers, the advent of newly independent countries and the emergence of Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union. The traditional powers like United Kingdom (U.K.), Germany, France and Italy had suffered heavy politico military reverses during the second World War which led to decline in their power. Consequently the territories under their occupation had also become unmanageable from military and political angles. Apart from this, most of these colonies especially India, had been agitating for attaining independence.

2. Ibid, p.221
India, under the British rule, comprised modern India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma. The consolidation of British rule in India from eighteenth century onward had been met with stiff resistance, especially in 1857 when the first war of independence was launched unsuccessfully. India's struggle for independence got a fillip with the emergence of Indian National Congress in 1885 which provided an organizational and political platform. It was through Indian National Congress, that leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Motilal Nehru, Madan Mohan Malaviya, Jawaharlal Nehru, C.R. Das and host of others pioneered the cause of India's struggle against British Colonialism. The advent of Muslim League in 1906 and assumption of its leadership by Mohd. Ali Jinnah provided a new turning point to the national freedom struggle in the wake of the fact that the Muslim League demanded a separate State for the Muslims in case India attained independence. The resolution adopted by the Muslim League in 1940 had demanded the division of India into Hindu and Muslim States. Rahmat Ali is generally credited to having coined the term "PAKISTAN" - a name which was later adopted by the Muslim League and other protagonists who favoured the division of India on communal lines and establishment of a separate state for the Muslims. By the time, the second World War ended, the chances of the Indian sub-continent attaining independence had brightened.

4. Sangat Singh, Pakistan's Foreign Policy (Bombay, 1970), p.4
The developments outside the Indian subcontinent had also taken dramatic turn in the immediate aftermath of the post-war period. The decline of traditional colonial powers had heightened the hopes of colonized countries which had been striving hard for shaking off the colonial yoke to become independent. The concomitant development was the advent of cold war between the United States and Soviet Union. During the war period, both Washington and Moscow fought shoulder to shoulder against the Axis powers. But as soon as the war ended, both emerged as rivals to each other for winning new spheres of influence by bringing the newly independent countries in Asia and Europe to their respective fold.

By 1946, the cold war politics between the super powers had clearly demarcated the division of world politics into two power blocs - one headed by the United States in which UK and other countries of Western Europe were its allies and the other one headed by the Soviet Union which was later joined by East European countries like Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. During that year, India was still a British colony but in the wake of the British decision to grant independence to India in August 1947, an Interim Government under Jawaharlal Nehru was installed. Nehru sensed the intensity of the cold war politics and its implications for independent India. Consequently on 17 September 1946, he declared: "We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one and other, which have led in the past world wars and which may again lead
to disasters on an even vaster scales."^5

Thus the Indian leadership especially Nehru had forseen the complications of cold war and it had been decided that India would keep away from the power politics of super powers and pursue an independent foreign policy. This became the cornerstone of India's foreign policy and by late 1950s, it came to be known as the policy of non-alignment.

The attainment of independence by India on 15 August 1947 was followed by the division of the sub-continent into two independent sovereign countries - India and Pakistan. The partition of the Indian sub-continent resulted in the outbreak of unprecedented communal violence on both the sides and the emergence of India and Pakistan as two independent countries did not give grounds for a possible scenario of cordial relations. As the Cold War had swayed Europe, similarly the sub-continent was in grip of cold war between India and Pakistan.

There arose problems like the question of evacuee's properties, the Indus river water dispute and the Kashmir question. Pakistan's hostile attitude towards India pushed Islamabad not only closer to Washington and Beijing but proved a potent decisive factor in determining India's foreign policy.

Since the main thrust of the present chapter is to ascertain the historical background of the US-Pakistan-China relations from August 1947 till the end of 1970, an assessment of bilateral relations

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with its tripartite and multilateral implications for India is called for.

THE LONG JOURNEY OF INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS UPTO 1970

With the relinquishment of Britain's Sovereignty in 1947, South Asia, inevitably India and Pakistan became focus of Super Power interests and continued to be the one throughout the hectic developments of the past four decades. The quest for influence on the part of external forces clearly bears on the area's problems.

The pattern of relations between India and Pakistan was inaugurated in an environment charged with conflict and discord, mutual distrust and suspicion. Both India and Pakistan pursued foreign policy conducive to their respective national interests. There was an extreme divergence in foreign policies of the two countries. India's foreign policy attracted "worldwide attention mainly because a large and important country was developing a policy independent of the two power blocs then forming". Nehru was the main architect of India's foreign policy and his voluminous, wideranging and often improvised assessment of international affairs yielded tremendous impact. During his speech at Columbia University in the United States in 1949, he made one of the most succinct statements summing up his ideas on Indian foreign policy:

India is a very old country with new urges and desires ... Inevitably she had to consider her foreign policy in terms of enlightened self-interest, but at the same time she brought to it a touch of her

idealism. Thus she has tried to combine idealism with nationalist interest. The main objectives of that policy are: the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major power or group of powers but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue, the liberation of subject peoples, the maintenance of freedom both national and individual, the elimination of racial discrimination, and the elimination of want, disease and ignorance which affect the greater part of world population. (7)

After attaining political independence, the primary task facing India was that of nation-building. Unless there was peace in the world, the task of accomplishing nation building was impossible. Nehru opined that "without peace, all our dreams are vanished and reduced to ashes". (8) The Indian emphasis on the linkages between India's quest for world peace and global necessity for, it entailed a basic differences between India's policy and that of most of other powers, especially those aligned on either side in the cold war. Nehru was convinced that power politics was the cause of wars and continued reliance on it could lead the world into another more terrible war. Thus Nehru wanted India to refuse to play the game of power politics and not to join either bloc, to keep itself free from military alliance of the great power groups that dominated the contemporary world politics. (9) This policy assumed the connotation of nonalignment during late 1950s. India emerged as one of the chief adherents of the policy of nonalignment, and this policy developed an inexorable momentum of its own.

However the case with Pakistan's foreign policy was different. According to a Pakistani scholar, Sarwar Hasan, the foreign policy of Pakistan has been "dominated by considerations of security and independence from its neighbour, India".10 Pakistani leaders, statesmen and even scholars have from time to time tried to project India as the only threat to Pakistan's existence. This fact is evident from the statements made by Pakistani leaders since the emergence of Pakistan. And this stance has influenced Pakistan's foreign policy especially towards India and is related to the many unresolved issues in the political arena of the sub-continent.

According to I.H. Qureshi, as renowned Pakistani scholar, "Pakistan believes that Indian hostility poses a far greater problem to them than Chinese expansion or Soviet threats, neither country having a dispute with Pakistan".11

During 1950s and 1960s Pakistan's leadership and media strained every nerve to raise the bogey of "Indian expansionism" and "Indian threat to Pakistan's existence" as the main plank of Pakistan's foreign policy for domestic consumption and in order to solicit arms and economic assistance from the United States, other Western countries and in late 1960s from China. President Ayub Khan wrote in his autobiography:

Could she (India) have any objective other than expansionism? The Indian theoreticians were claiming boundaries from Oxus to Mekong. We could not attribute everything to imperialists. India was not content with her present sphere of influence.\(^\text{12}\)

Similar stance was reiterated by Pakistan's press. Pakistan's leading daily *Dawn* in an editorial commented:

Having gained their independence late and become immediately obsessed with the idea of joining the rank of the World's Great Powers, the Indian ruling circles began to develop colonial ambitions. The idea "Vishal Bharat" or Greater India, is an expression of that ambition.... Thus eyes are also on Nepal, Ceylon, Burma and other parts of South East Asia, whence, according to Hindi political thinkers, Hindu culture already exists.\(^\text{13}\)

Such assertions by Pakistani leaders and the media were aimed at producing stereotypes and misperceptions regarding the image of India among the neighbouring countries.

Mohammed Ayub Khan even lamented that "had Pakistan not acted as a buffer state, Hindus would have by this time brought about Afghanistan, Iran and other Middle East Countries as well as Indonesia and Malaga under their domination.\(^\text{14}\) Thus while projecting India as a potential threat to the countries of South and Southeast Asia and Pakistan as an affront to Indian "expansionism" the Pakistani leaders were never tired of Indian threat to Pakistan's security. On 15 March 1966, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan Z.A. Bhutto said: "India cannot tolerate the existence of Pakistan,

14. Singh, n.4, p.47
India wanted to destroy Pakistan. In the destruction of Pakistan lay India's most sublime and finest dreams.\textsuperscript{15} A similar chord was struck by President Ayub Khan when he said on 16 March 1966: "The crux of the problem between India and Pakistan was that leaders of India had not yet reconciled themselves to the very existence of Pakistan".\textsuperscript{16} Similar view was expressed by Pakistani scholars. To quote I.H. Qureshi: "The fear of India has always dominated Pakistan's foreign policy. The eyes of Pakistan's are mostly on the problem of defence against India ... the immediate and continuing danger seems to come from India... and the history of Indo-Pakistan relations shows that India has made every effort to make it difficult for Pakistan to exist."\textsuperscript{17}

It is evident from the foregoing analysis that after their emergence as independent sovereign countries, both India and Pakistan followed divergent foreign policies. India followed a policy of nonalignment and projected new ways of thinking about maintaining international peace and security in terms of which it developed its attitude to national security. However, India remained the major obsession of Pakistan's foreign policy which pushed Pakistan into US sponsored military pacts. India remained nonaligned while Pakistan aligned with the western military alliances, and adopted their metaphors about its security policy. The partitioning of the subcontinent had created many problems and in solving them the human capabilities of the two countries were stretched to their limits. The princely states were given the option to either join

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\textsuperscript{15} Pakistan National Assembly Debates (Islamabad), 15th March 1966, p.496.

\textsuperscript{16} Morning News (Dacca), 17 March, 1966.

\textsuperscript{17} Qureshi, n. 11, p. 77.
India or Pakistan, and much of the restructuring of organisational arrangements with the princes were achieved in both countries through peaceful means. However Hyderabad, Junagarh and Jammu and Kashmir had not taken the final decision as whether to join India or Pakistan, and a catastrophe was waiting to happen over the fate of these princely states if preventive measures for conflict avoidance were not taken.

DISPUTE OVER THE ACCESSION OF JUNAGADH

The first dispute over the accession of the princely states arose over the small state of Junagadh in the Kathiawar Peninsula. It lay on the India's west coast of which about 80 per cent were Hindus and 20 per cent Muslims ruled by the Muslim Nawab who expressed his willingness to join Pakistan but India vehemently protested against his decision which was inspired by Pakistan to aggravate the issue. In early September 1947, Nawab of Junagadh made overtures to Pakistan for accession. On 12 September 1947 Nehru in a telegram to Pakistan's Premier, Liaquat-ali-Khan wrote: "A State is free to accede to either of the Dominions but the choice of state in regard to accession must, in our opinion, necessarily be made with due regard to ties of geographical contiguity". He further made it clear that India was prepared to accept any

democratic test in respect of the accession of Junagarh State to either of the two dominions, and "if the ruler of Junagarh is not prepared to submit this issue to a referendum and if the Dominion of Pakistan in utter disregard of the wishes of the people and principles governing the matter, enter into an arrangement by which Junagarh is to become a part of the Federation of Pakistan, the Government of India cannot be expected to acquiesce in such an arrangement."\(^{19}\) Despite India's warning, Pakistan accepted the accession of Junagarh on 15 September 1947. In view of Indian protest, by October 1947, Pakistan agreed to decide the future of Junagarh's accession by holding a plebiscite.

In the meanwhile, trouble had erupted within Junagarh and the Dewan of Junagarh asked for armed assistance from India complying with the request, Indian troops were sent to Junagarh who restored law and order in the state. Subsequently keeping in view the wishes of the local people, Junagarh acceded to India in November 1947. Pakistan tried to raise the issue in the U.N. Security Council but failed. Despite Junagarh's legal accession to India, "Pakistan still considers Junagarh as a part of Pakistan ..."\(^{20}\)

**TUSSLE OVER HYDERABAD'S ACCESSION**

The princely state of Hyderabad having an area of over 82,000 square miles had a population over 18 million majority of whom were

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19. Ibid, pp.64 ff.
Hindus. Its ruler, called Nizam of Hyderabad, was a Muslim. When the announcement of the plan for transfer of power was made on 3 June 1947, the Nizam of Hyderabad declared on 11 June 1947 that his state would not join either contemplated dominions.21 The state of Hyderabad was landlocked and it was dependent on India for surface transport. After the partition, the Nizam's Government and India reached an agreement on 29 November 1947 under which India was to look after Hyderabad's defence, communications etc. In view of the deteriorating law and order situation in Hyderabad, India had to resort to police action to restore normalcy. However in the later part of 1948, the Nizam's Government took the matter before the UN Security Council.

Following a rapprochement between Nizam and the government of India, the former withdrew its complaint from the Security Council in September 1948. However in October, November and December 1948, Pakistan tried to revive the question of Hyderabad in the Security Council and even sought to participate in it.22 India argued that since Hyderabad was an integral part of India and thus a domestic question, the UN had no jurisdiction.23 By 1949, the question of Hyderabad's accession to India was finally settled but Pakistan made futile attempts to make political capital out of it.

21. SCOR, n.18, 4th year, 1949, meeting 28, p.27.
22. Ibid, pp.35 ff.
COMPLEX BACKGROUND OF KASHMIR QUESTION

The question of Kashmir has been the main irritant in Indo-Pakistan relations since 1947. Because of its strategic location, Kashmir occupies immense geo-political significance, situated in the north of India, it has Pakistan in the West, Afghanistan to the North-West, Soviet Union to the north and China and Tibet to the northeast. The State of Jammu and Kashmir assumed its present geographic shape in 1846 when the then Maharaja Gulab Singh who already had Jammu, Ladakh, and Baltistan, purchased Kashmir Valley from the British.

Following the transfer of British power to India and Pakistan in August 1947, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir did not take an immediate decision, with regard to the future of the state. During the later half of 1947, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir signed a "standstill Agreement" with Pakistan and he offered to sign a similar one with India but the latter did not accept his offer. Recalling this situation, Nehru later on informed the Constituent Assembly, "Nevertheless, we did not like to put any sort of pressure on the state to accede to the Indian Dominion, because we realised

that Kashmir was in a very difficult position. We did not want a mere accession from the top but an association in accordance with the will of her people ... no speedy steps were taken by us, although Kashmir has entered into a standstill agreement with Pakistan soon after the 15 August".28

In the wake of communal frenzy having overtaken the entire subcontinent into its grip, the situation in Jammu region was also fragile. Pakistan had imposed economic blockade to compel the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan. The situation deteriorated when a well organised rioting took place in poonch area against Maharaja's administration.29 The state troops, comprising mainly Hindus, took stern action against the local Muslims.30 The situation soon assumed the communal hue and cry which was followed by the riots spread all over alongwith the Kashmir-Pakistan border.

Keeping in view the fluid situation, Pakistan sent armed Razakars and regular troops across the border into Kashmir in October 1947. As Josef Korbel has described the situation. "The invasion was easily incited by the stories brought into the North West Frontier Province by Muslims fleeing before the terror of Dogra troops in Kashmir".31 Although the frontier tribesmen carried out the invasion, there was official Pakistani complicity in its

31. Ibid., pp.75 ff.
orchestration. As Major-General Akbar Khan, who was the Director of Weapons and Equipment at the Pakistan Army General Headquarters at the time of the events has written that the invasion into Kashmir was launched with the connivance of the Pakistan army.\textsuperscript{32}

The Maharaja of Kashmir fled from Srinagar to Jammu and called for military help from India, but Indian leaders and Lord Mountbatten said that Indian forces would be sent only if the Maharaja acceded to India. Left with no choice, Maharaja did so on 26 October 1947.\textsuperscript{33} Consequently the Indian troops landed in Srinagar and the invasion was vacated. Thus the Pakistan's intentions to take Kashmir by force were clearly frustrated. But Pakistan was not to sit idle and as the impending danger of fresh Pakistan attack loomed large, it necessitated the continued presence of Indian troops in Kashmir.

\textbf{INDIA'S APPEAL TO U.N.}

Keeping in view the gravity of the situation, India appealed to the United Nations on 1 January 1948 to call upon Pakistan to respect its international obligations and cease giving support to invaders in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{34} With a view to avoid any possible suggestion that India had utilized the situation in Kashmir for its own political advantage the Government of India made it categorical that "once the soil of the state had been cleared of the invaders and normal conditions restored, its people would be free to decide their future

\textsuperscript{33} Baronds, n.6, p.40.
\textsuperscript{34} SCOR, n.l8, Third Year, Supplement, S/628. November 1948, p.139.
by the recognised democratic method of a plebiscite or referendum which, in order to ensure complete impartiality, might be held under international auspices.\(^{35}\)

Pakistan in its reply, informed the Security Council on 15 January 1948 that it was not giving any aid and assistance to the invaders.\(^{36}\) However Pakistan statement admitted that a certain number of independent tribesmen and persons from Pakistan are helping as volunteers to the Azad Kashmir Government in their struggle for liberty.\(^{37}\) On the question of Kashmir's accession to India, Pakistan said that it was obtained by "fraud and violence".\(^{37}\) The subsequent deliberations in the Security Council led to the acceptance of cease-fire in Kashmir by both India and Pakistan and by July 1949 the cease-fire line was demarcated.

Since 1948, the question of Kashmir had been on the agenda of the UN Pakistan insisted on the implementation of India's promise of holding the plebiscite and harped on indispensability of Kashmir for Pakistan's survival.\(^{38}\) In 1951, it was argued that "Indian control over kashmir would give India a complete stronghold over the economy of West Pakistan".\(^{38}\)

However Pakistan had no confidence in any plebiscite conducted under the auspice of India, while India was determined to maintain

\(^{35}\) Ibid, pp.142-143.

\(^{36}\) SCOR, n.18, Third Year, Supplement, S/646 November 1948, pp. 67 ff.

\(^{37}\) Ibid, p.68.

its position of strength and prevent the issue from being decided on the religious basis. Till April 1954, India was nonetheless willing to hold plebiscite, but for Pakistan's endeavours to introduce cold war in the region, the Kashmir question would have been resolved long ago. In March, 1956, India flatly refused to hold plebiscite claiming that the offer had elapsed, and could not be kept open for all the times. 39 /

The Security Council debate over Kashmir resulted in a pervasive interest of both the US and the Soviet Union in the issue and made both India and Pakistan look towards the Super Powers for moral and political support. United States and other Western countries supported Pakistan. Soviet Union came to India's rescue. As William Barnds has observed: "Each became dependent upon outside support and susceptible to outside influence in ways that still affect not only them but the pattern of world politics as well." 40

CONFLICT OVER RANN OF KUTCH

At the time of partition, the border between the Sind province of Pakistan and the princely state of Kutch was not clearly defined, thus, leaving the scope for claims and counter claims by two successor Dominions - India and Pakistan. The marsh land of Rann of Kutch, comprising an area of 3,500 square miles is situated roughly north of the 24th parallel on the Indo-Pakistan border. 41

40. Barnds, n.6, p.43.
In 1956, Pakistan maintained a police post at Chhad Bet which was dismantled by Indian troops. In 1960 both New Delhi and Islamabad discussed this along with other mutual issues but no settlement was reached. Between 1960 and 1965, no progress could be made to settle the Rann of Kutch issue. Pakistan's claim to the Rann of Kutch was based on the plea that it was either a landlocked sea or a boundary lake to which the principles of international law applied, and that therefore, the boundary between the two countries ran through the middle of the Rann. India argued that there was no dispute regarding the Kutch boundary, since the former princely state of Kutch had always been in possession of Rann in its entirety and since in any case it was not an island, sea or lake, to which the principles of international law applied.  

42. For Pakistani viewpoint, see, The Indian Society of International Law, The Kutch-Sind Border Dispute Question: A collection of Documents with Comments (New Delhi, 1965).  


In early months of 1965, the situation in Rann of Kutch became serious when Pakistan moved its troops across the India border supported by tanks and armoured vehicles. Indian forces also moved in, to counter the Pakistani challenge and during the first of April 1965, a fierce battle was fought in the Rann of Kutch area. The Pakistani forces suffered heavy losses and with a view to avert a full scale war, Pakistan made a three point proposal to India envisaging: (i) immediate ceasefire, (ii) restoration of the status quo; and (iii) negotiations to settle the Rann of Kutch dispute.  

India did not take the Pakistan proposal seriously because latter's troops were still on the territory. Finally the British peace initiatives succeeded in evolving an agreement between India and Pakistan which was signed on 30 June 1965. In terms of the agreement, the issue of Rann of Kutch was referred to an international tribunal which finally awarded 3200 square miles to India and 350 miles to Pakistan. Though a major armed conflict between the two countries was averted, this lull proved short-lived.

**INDO-PAKISTAN WAR, SEPTEMBER 1965**

By middle of August 1965, Kashmir had become the nerve centre of Pakistan's armed incursions against India which led to the flare-up of full scale war between India and Pakistan by the first week of September. Before analysing the September 1965 war, it deems appropriate to briefly assess the developments from early 1950s till 1965 with regard to Kashmir.

After the ceasefire agreed on 1 January 1949, the United Nations appointed UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNICIP) to mediate on Kashmir. Pakistan was interested in replacing the Azad Kashmir forces with Pakistan regular army and simultaneously wanted the withdrawal of all Indian troops from Kashmir. While India insisted on the withdrawal of Azad Kashmir forces from the "entire Kashmir

44. Dawn, n.13, 1 July 1965.
46. Ganguly, n.26, p.64
region" before entering into any discussion without withdrawing its own troops. The UNICIP's mediatory effort failed and in August 1949 it suggested the possibility of arbitration by an international tribunal. Pakistan agreed to it but India rejected the proposal.

According to Sisir Gupta:

India was not opposed to arbitration in principle; but the reference to arbitration ought to be on a precise and defined issue. An important part of India's case was that the proposal to arbitrate without defining the issue would completely put the clock back. India and Pakistan would once again appear as equals in a case, whereas Pakistan's violation of international law had been proven earlier and had been accepted by the commission. (47)

Consequently, the UNICIP recommended that a single mediator be appointed. The UN sponsored one man mediation efforts under McMaughton, Owen Dixon and Frank Graham also failed to find an acceptable solution to the Kashmir issue. Sisir Gupta has aptly summed up the situation: "From the earliest UN discussions to the UNICIP, to Owen Dixon, to Frank Graham, the UN concern was to effect demilitarization in the state without defining the rights and the obligations of the two parties in the state". (48) In the wake of the failure of UN mediation, India and Pakistan, sought to resolve the dispute on a bilateral basis. During the bilateral discussions, Pakistan insisted on holding a plebiscite or referendum in Kashmir while India opposed it. India rather argued that holding of elections in Jammu and Kashmir since 1952 was a sort of plebiscite under which

47. Gupta, n.24, pp. 194 ff.
the people of Kashmir had expressed their will to remain with India. Hence there was no need of holding plebiscite or referendum in that state. Pakistan showed its reluctance to accept the Indian version and reiterated its earlier stand. Thus these divergent approaches led to a stalemate which still continues.

After the Rann of Kutch episode, Pakistan made well calculated move to launch military attack on India under "operation Malta". The entailed an overall strategy for the invasion and eventual seizure of Kashmir while "the Gibralter Force" was the term given to the invading forces. According to Asghar Khan, the entire Pakistan strategy was based on three premises:

It was assumed that wide spread support existed within occupied Kashmir to make such a guerilla campaign a success. It was also considered unlikely that, as a consequence of this action, India would be inclined to attempt a large scale military offensive against Azad Kashmir territory. Lastly, the possibility of India crossing the international frontier in the East and West Pakistan was ruled out.

In early August 1965, Government of India complained of firing by Pakistan forces across the Indo-Pakistan border. Seeing that Pakistan was building up pressure in Jammu and Kashmir by frequent attacks, Indian forces launched attack on the Western sector through Lahore on 6 September 1965. The war continued uptill fortnight and following the peace initiatives undertaken by the UN Secretary General

49. Hari Ram Gupta, India-Pakistan War of 1965, (Delhi, 1967), p.71
51. Korbel, n.30, p.338
and both the Super Powers, a ceasefire was declared by India and Pakistan on 23 September 1965. The Indian decision to declare ceasefire was made more on political grounds than military one because of the increasing pressure from US and United Kingdom. The continued military debacles led President Ayub to accept ceasefire: "These military debacles greatly undermined Ayub's will to fight".

After the ceasefire, it was necessary to restore normalcy. Consequently, with the good offices of Soviet Union, both India and Pakistan signed an agreement at Tashkent, "which is known as Tashkent Agreement on 10 January 1966". The operative part of Tashkent Agreement required the termination of the state of war and "all armed forces of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 25 February 1966 to the positions they held prior to 5 August 1965 and both sides shall observe the ceasefire terms on the ceasefire line". The two countries further agreed to build mutual relations on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other, to discourage hostile propaganda against each other, to resume normal diplomatic ties etc. Thus the Tashkent declaration had opened the way for normalization of relations between India and Pakistan provided it was sincerely implemented.

53. Ganguly, n.26, p.90
54. Khan, n.50, p.97
55. The full text of Tashkent Agreement see, Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi), January 1966, p.9. Also see Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), Vol.19, no.1, First quarter 1966, pp.97 ff.
56. Ibid.
During 1966, both countries made some efforts to mend their mutual relations but Pakistan soon changed its stance by reviving the Kashmir issue as the main plank of Pakistan's policy towards India. It also sought to diversify its contacts with West European countries and China to acquire arms and economic assistance. The spirit of Tashkent agreement soon evaporated and by the close of 1960s the Indo-Pakistan relations had again touched the low ebb. Pakistan was leaning more towards the United States and People's Republic of China while India in order to counter the threat of Washington-Beijing-Islamabad axis was drawn more closer to Moscow.

**PAKISTAN ALIGNS WITH AMERICA**

President Franklin Roosevelt of the United States had urged the British Government during the second World War to expedite the process of enfranchising the Indian sub-continent, but the vast majority of American people knew practically nothing about Pakistan when she emerged on the world map. The very small minority, including officials, which did know something, felt unhappy about the new state partly because it had come into being on the basis of religion and partly because, while the American themselves had fought a civil war to keep their country United, few dominant Indian Muslims had struggled successfully to divide their country.

However during 1948 when the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan was discussed in the Security Council in great detail, the discussions showed that Americans had began to take interest in Pakistan.

The militarily weak Pakistan, in order to deal with India from
a position of strength, looked for outside sources to bolster her power. She found the United States ready and willing to give her the military and economic assistance. Washington sought in return bases from which the United States could organise its intelligence gathering, in its confrontation with the Soviet Union and China.

Therefore, the pattern of relationship between Pakistan and the United States presented a complementary aspect to each other. The cementing bond, between the two was Pakistan's desire to seek security against the alleged aggressive intentions of India and the desire of United States to take advantage of Pakistan's strategic location for containing communism in Asia. In the immediate backdrop of the conclusion of the Second World War, United States and Soviet Union had emerged as rivals to each other. The United States under the Truman doctrine had declared the global containment of communism as the main plank of its foreign policy. South Asia because of its strategic location and geographic proximity to the Soviet Union, coupled with the fact that in the wake of British retreat from the region, the Soviets could try to fill up the "power vacuum" had assumed considerable strategic significance for the US. /

The US policy of containment was elaborated by George F. Kenan the foremost expert on Soviet affairs, in The American diplomatic establishment:

The Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western World is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy. If the United States were
successful in this, it would force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection that it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way promote tendencies which must eventually fluid, their outlet in either the break up or the gradual malicious of Soviet power. (57)

The advent of communist regime in Beijing in 1949/ and the Korean crisis of 1950 proved instrumental in further argumenting the strategic significance of South Asia in US foreign policy. India, even prior to attaining its independence had declared its opposition to military alliances and committed itself to pursue an independent foreign policy, while in the post-partition period, Pakistani leadership had not made any such bold commitment. Thus the containment of the Soviet Union became the first consideration in the Asian policy of the US as it had in its European policy and the U.S strategic discourse with Pakistan was framed within the concepts of containment. (58)

Until 1949, India received more consideration in US policy towards Asia than Pakistan. It was Jawaharlal Nehru who got the invitation to visit the United States rather than Liaquat Ali Khan, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan. And Nehru visited the United States in October-November 1949. This preference accorded by the US to India irked the leaders of Pakistan, because "the primary objective of Pakistan's foreign policy has been to strengthen its

position vis-a-vis India.\textsuperscript{59} The anti-communist underpinnings of Pakistani policy were designed to produce specific outcomes of U.S. Policy.

The then Pakistani leadership made security against India the major plank of Pakistan's foreign policy and under the pretext of so-called "Indian threat" it articulated its perception of "the need for arms".\textsuperscript{60} Aware of United State's search for allies for its own reason, the leaders of Pakistan expressed their determination to resist communism.\textsuperscript{61}

In July 1949, Iskander Mirza, Secretary to Pakistan's Defence Minister, visited the United States with a view to establishing mutual contacts. He paid tributes to the US military power as the guarantee of peace in the world.\textsuperscript{62} However, initially such statements failed to evoke positive US response in favour of Pakistan vis-a-vis India. The US President, Harry S. Truman emphatically declared: "The United States had no desire to win the favour of Pakistan at the cost of friendship with India,... We stand ready to help Pakistan in all appropriate ways which might naturally benefit our two countries and the world and we have profound hope for the continuing peaceful and constructive collaboration between Pakistan and her sister dominions and other countries".\textsuperscript{63} Thus until the end of 1949, there was no remarkable development in bringing US closer to

\textsuperscript{60} Sarwar, n.58, p.120.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid, 24 July 1949.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid, 9 October 1949.
Pakistan. The advent of a communist regime in People's Republic of China (PRC) in September 1949 and developments in Korean Peninsula and US failure to get any firm commitment from Nehru regarding anti-communist policies during latter's visit to the US in October, 1949, made Washington reconsider its policy towards the Indian subcontinent. Pakistan which had unequivocally accepted the American leadership in international affairs and had adopted an anti-communist stance found favour with the US policy makers for their future strategy.

In May 1950, Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's Premier, paid an official visit to Washington. Liaquat Ali Khan during his visit tried to convince the Americans about his country's desire to come closer to the United States. The US policy of alliance might have been in Liaquat Ali Khan's mind when he said: "... it was for more important to have a certain mutual appreciation and respect ... than merely to do it in a business like way as if making a deal. There is no question of a deal".64 That Liaquat Ali Khan's visit to the US had been instrumental in bringing both countries closer, is evident from the fact that in 1949 Washington had refused to sell armaments to both India and Pakistan because of tense relations between the two,65 while in 1950 Pakistan could succeed in purchasing ammunitions from the United States without any hindrance.66

Another dominant factor which might have prompted the U.S. policy makers to be inclined towards Pakistan was the US strategic stakes in the oil rich Muslim dominated Middle East and its vulnerability to Soviet penetration. It was believed in the US that the territorial aspiration of Soviet Union extended to the South of its national territory in the direction of the Indian Ocean.\(^{67}\) Besides, the oil reserves of the Middle East also attracted both super powers. While expressing the interest of the Western Powers in the Middle East, Barton wrote: "Today oil counts for much strategically, without Muslim support, the oil supplies in the Middle East may well fall into communist hands."\(^ {68} \)

Consequently, the United States mooted the policy of regional collective security to preserve its strategic stakes. John Foster Dulles the then US Secretary of State expounded this policy in a more elaborate manner:

> The cornerstone of security for the free nations must be a collective system of defence. They clearly cannot achieve security separately. No single nation can develop for itself defensive power of adequate scope and flexibility. In seeking to do, each would become a garrison state and none would achieve security... Without the cooperation of allies, we could not even be in a position to retaliate massively against the war industries of an attacking nation. That requires international facilities.\(^{69}\)


Thus, the United States felt the necessity of forming regional military alliances. Washington concentrated its attention on countries, geographically, contiguous to Soviet Union - Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. While the first three fell in line with the US strategy but Afghanistan refused to do so, Pakistan could provide the US with military bases with take off points within striking distances of Soviet atomic plants and other was installations, "which has no doubt been a major consideration from the start in the Pakistani aid programme by the U.S."  

In February 1951, the Pakistani statesman, Zafrullah Khan expressed the hope that pacific defence pact might come into being and if it could, "Pakistan would be in it". A Pakistani scholar has claimed that it was only after the India's concentration of troops on Pakistan's borders in July 1951 that their Army Chief of Pakistan Mohammad Ayub Khan started thinking of having a military alliance with the United States.  

But in fact Pakistan was willing to do anything to qualify for the supply of arms from any source to be used against India.  

The advent of the Republican administration in Washington in January 1953 with John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State raised the hopes of the Pakistan of early alliance with the United States.

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70. Harrison, n.64, p.21.
74. Ibid, p.68.
Subsequently, the US Secretary of State visited Pakistan from 23 to 24 May 1953 to explore the feasibility of an alliance on his return to the United States, Dulles said: "One of my clearest impression was that of the outstanding and sincere friendship which the leaders of Pakistan feel for the United States ... they will resist the menace of communism as their strength permits." It was during this visit that Dulles developed the idea of "Northern tier" involving Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Dulles told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that indigenous forces should be built up in non-communist countries in Asia and that in such a programme Pakistan should play an important role.

Dulles's visit to Pakistan was followed by the visit of General Mohammed Ayub Khan to Washington in October 1953. It was reported that Ayub had gone to the US "to get millions of dollars worth of US arms for Pakistan". Subsequently, the US Vice-President, Richard Nixon visited Pakistan in the beginning of January 1954 and on his return to the United States Nixon was believed to have broached to President Eisenhower the necessity of making alliance with Pakistan as a counterforce to the confirmed neutralism of Jawaharlal Nehru's India.

76. Sinha, n.29, p.118.
77. US Senate, 83 Congress, Second Session, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Statements by Secretary of States, John Foster Dulles and Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, 1954), pp.7-9
79. Cited in Harrison, n.64, p.17.
In the wake of the newly emerged goodwill with the United States, Pakistan anticipated massive arms aid. On 22 February 1954, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali, announced that Pakistan had requested for arms assistance from the United States. Washington promptly accepted the request of Pakistan for military aid. With a view to assuage Indian resentment, the US President Eisenhower, on 26 February 1954, wrote to the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, a personal letter, assuring that any request for military assistance would receive his "most sympathetic consideration". Nehru declined the offer pleading that since the main preoccupation of the US policy was to contain communist powers, India did not want to take sides. Nehru also regarded US assurance as meaningless even if well-intended and implicitly suggested that India's opposition to military assistance was based on calculation rather than on principles. He further added: "If we object to military aid being given to Pakistan, we would be hypocrites and unprincipled opportunists to accept such aid ourselves." In the meanwhile, United States was also persuading the "Northern Tier" countries to have bilateral military, economic and cultural alliance with a view to assert its supremacy in the region. Accordingly in April 1954, Pakistan and Turkey signed a bilateral treaty of military, economic and cultural alliance.

83. Ibid, p.328.
84. Ibid.
PAKISTAN'S MEMBERSHIP IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA TREATY ORGANISATION (SEATO) AND CENTRAL TREATY ORGANISATION (CENTO)

Pakistan became a forward ally of the United States in 1954, when she joined the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation along with the United States, Britain, France, Thailand, Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. The Agreement envisaged that Pakistan would use American assistance exclusively to maintain the internal security arrangements and measures and without the prior consent of the US, it would not devote such assistance to the purpose other than those for which it was furnished.

The US-Pakistan military alliance was viewed with serious concern in India. During December 1953, when the negotiations between Pakistan for the mutual defence agreement were just in progress, Nehru said: "Anything of this kind [Military Aid] that may happen in the neighbouring country, whatever that neighbouring country might be, would be of great interest and concern to us... Obviously if military aid comes to Pakistan from the United States of America, it upsets all kinds of balance, the present existing equilibrium and all that?" 87

Though ostensibly, United States wanted bases and areas of influence in Asia and to check the growth of Communism by cultivating


Pakistan simultaneously, by arming Pakistan Washington was building up pressure on India to abandon its policy of non-alignment and join the US camp. As Henry Kissinger put it: "We cannot permit the balance of power to be overturned for the sake of allied unity or the approbation of the uncommitted, for the condition of any future cooperation with them is the maintenance of a strategic balance between US and the Soviet Union". In India it was believed that under the facade of military aid, US and Pakistan were collaborating to harass India by debunking its policy of non-alignment and forcing it to come to terms with them.

The onset of mid 1950s witnessed augmentation in US strategic stakes in Asia especially in the countries of "Northern Tier" and Southeast Asia. In the wake of French defeat in Indo-China, the American policy makers, being convinced that they could not replace France by indigenous forces, mooted the idea of regional military organizations involving local powers under US auspices. Underlying the strategic significance of Southeast region for the US, the Secretary of State, Dulles said: "The area has great strategic values. Southeast Asia is the most direct and developed sea and air route between the pacific and South Asia. Communist control of South East Asia would carry a grave threat to the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand with whom we have treaties of mutual defence. The entire West Pacific area including so-called "off-shore" island chain would be strategically endangered".

90. New York Times n.61, 26 June 1954.
On the other hand, Pakistan with a view to come more closer to the United States, tried to prove its geographic proximity to South East Asia and its consequent willingness to serve the US objectives. It was argued in Pakistan that "East Pakistan coastline opening on the water that separates the pacific from the Indian Ocean lies close to Burma, Malaya, Thailand and Indo-China. These countries are Pakistan's first line of defence against an attack from the East." 91

By August 1954 it had become certain that the United States was seriously contemplating to create a military alliance in South East Asia. The Dawn expressing the willingness of Pakistan to join the proposed regional alliance, wrote that the people of Pakistan were anxious to play their role, "in the global strategy for peace and defence against aggression by international communism". 92 Subsequently when on 8 September 1954 South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was signed at Manila, Pakistan was one of the eight members. 93 The text of the SEATO Treaty contained nine articles and one preamble. 94 Article II, III and IV envisaged provisions regarding defence of the area. It provided for the mutual cooperation among member states, individually or collectively to resist armed attack.

The formation of SEATO was followed by the signing of Baghdad

93. Others included, USA, U.K., France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand.
Pact concluded on 23 September 1955. Its members included Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Britain. Following the July 1958 coup in Iraq, the latter withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and it came to be known as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Though the United States formally did not join CENTO but it was the power behind the alliance.

Pakistan's membership of these regional military alliances was alarming for India. When the SEATO was established, Nehru said: "positively it has little contributions to make [to security]. Negatively it has definitely added to the tensions and fears of the situation". In the similar vein, Nehru strongly opposed the establishment of CENTO: "Any approach by military pact like the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, was a wrong approach. It was a wrong approach which set in motion all the wrong tendencies ... and in a sense tended to encircle us from two or three directions".

It is worth mentioning here that Nehru did not believe that the United States, by rendering arms aid to Pakistan, intended to cause trouble to India, because he had been assured by the US authorities that the American sponsored regional alliances were not directed against India. However, he doubted Pakistan's motives especially when Pakistani spokesmen on many occasions had stated that Pakistan's objective in entering a defence agreement with the

United States and in joining military pacts and alliances was to strengthen Pakistan against India.\textsuperscript{98} It was in this context that Nehru felt that US military assistance encouraged Pakistan's aggressiveness and consequent augmentation in tension between India and Pakistan. He told the Lok Sabha on 13 March 1958: "The military aid to Pakistan by America is a step towards war, not peace, not only towards a world war, but a step which will bring war right to our frontiers ... it is an anti-Asian step.\textsuperscript{99}

Though the United States had cultivated Pakistan for strategic considerations, Pakistan's main objective in coming closer to the US and its active participation in SEATO and CENTO was designed to strengthen its position vis-a-vis India, both militarily and politically. Pakistan used SEATO and CENTO to mobilise support in favour of Pakistan's stand on Kashmir issue. In March 1956, when the Central Council of SEATO met in Karachi, Pakistan raised the Kashmir issue. India protested that SEATO group had no locus standi to deliberate on issues which affected Indo-Pakistan relations.\textsuperscript{100} However Pakistan justified its action of raising Kashmir issue. As Dan Haendel observed that such Pakistani behaviour clearly indicated that it had joined an "alliance with the US primarily in order to arm itself against India and to secure its support over Kashmir".\textsuperscript{101}


\textsuperscript{99} Lok Sabha Debates, n.95, Vol.27, 12 March 1958, Col.6153.

\textsuperscript{100} B.N. Jain, "U.S. Arms Policy towards Pakistan: Implications and New Directions", in Pandav Nayak, ed., Pakistan, Society and politics (Delhi, 1984) p.129.

Pakistan's policy of aligning itself with the United States fetched numerous politico-strategic gains for Pakistan. In the first place, by acquiring a disproportionately strong position than its size and resources would have permitted, Pakistan not only sought to lessen the power inequality between itself and India but also to acquire an edge over India in military knowhow and wherewithal. Secondly, the US military aid helped Pakistan to alleviate the burden of defence expenditure while the economic aid bolstered up the domestic economy during the loan period. Thirdly, Pakistan received diplomatic support over Kashmir from the United States and its Western allies. Fourthly, by virtue of its alignment with the USA, Pakistan was drawn closer to the arena of big power politics and "this emboldened Pakistani leaders to think big".

The advent of Ayub regime in Pakistan in 1958 was looked upon with favour in the United States. The beginning of 1960s marked change in the international developments which had its impact on the subcontinent vis-a-vis great powers. In view of the Chinese forward policy towards the Himalayas, United States showed increased interest in the subcontinent. In March 1959, Pakistan and USA signed an agreement of cooperation for security and defence. Article I of the agreement provided: "In case of aggression against Pakistan, the government of the United States of America... will take such

103. M.B. Naqvi, "Our Foreign Policy, Assumptions, Motivations and Frustrations", Pakistan Observer (Dhaka), 14 August 1966.
appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon... in order to assist the government of Pakistan at its request".\textsuperscript{106} India criticised the new Pak-US agreement as aggravating the tensions and accentuating the differences between India and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{107}

In view of the growing Chinese manoeuvring in Tibet in 1959, United States expressed its concern over the impending communist threat to the subcontinent while Pakistan's preoccupation continued to be in the Indian context. Even when in May 1959, President Ayub of Pakistan, offered India a plan for joint defence of the subcontinent against external threat, he did not forget: "But prerequisite to such an arrangement is the solution of big problems like Kashmir..."\textsuperscript{108} India regarded Pakistan's offer of joint defence as "ridiculous and full of contempt". India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said on 4 May 1959: "I do not understand when people say 'let us have a joint defence' -- against whom? Are we to become a member of the Baghdad pact or the SEATO or some other alliance? We do not want to have a common defence policy: The whole policy we have pursued is opposed to this conception".\textsuperscript{109} Thus India rejected Pakistan's offer of joint defence against external threat.

On the other hand, United States viewed the Chinese

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{106} \textit{Department of State Bulletin}, n.82, n.94, pp.395-401.
  \item \textsuperscript{107} Cited in Choudhury, n.20, p.252.
  \item \textsuperscript{108} \textit{Dawn}, n.13, 11 May 1959.
  \item \textsuperscript{109} \textit{Statesman} (New Delhi), 5 May 1959.
\end{itemize}
developments in Tibet with grave seriousness and tried to help build up India's defence. Another concomitant development was the emergence of the Democratic majority in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which became very vocal in its criticism of Pakistan, putting the Republican Administration on the defensive, and more so, because there was not even a single Republican Senator who shared Pakistan's concept of the "alleged threat to its security from India."

The U-2 incident made both Pakistan and United States to become more cautious. On 14 May 1960, Soviet Union charged Pakistan with providing facilities to foreign military planes carrying out aggressive acts against the Soviet Union. Pakistan, however, chose to reject the Soviet protest. While denying its any complicity in the execution of flights intended to gather military intelligence over Soviet territory, Pakistan rather accused Soviet Union of gross and repeated violations of Pakistan's air space.

However, Pakistan being disenchanted with United States in view of latter's friendly overtures to India in the wake of Sino-Indian hostilities, made efforts to normalize its relations with Moscow. As Werner Levi has pointed out:

110. For details see, M.S. Venkataramani, "The U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and India, 1958-59", India Quarterly (New Delhi), January-March 1960, pp.51 ff.

111. U-2, an American reconnaissance plane, which flew from Peshawar base and was shot down while it was flying over Soviet territory on 1 May 1960. For details see, Raghunath Ram, Soviet Policy towards Pakistan (New Delhi, 1983), pp.101-2.


A shift in sympathies and a reappraisal of policies in Pakistan favouring the Soviet Union resulted not so much from positive measures in Soviet-Pakistan relations as from growing Pakistan's dissatisfaction with American policies and actions.\textsuperscript{114}

The advent of John F. Kennedy as President of the United States was viewed by Pakistan's press as being instrumental in dislodging Pakistan in the US vis-à-vis India.\textsuperscript{115} Reports about President Kennedy's intention to offer unilateral arms aid to India were in circulation in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{116} Pakistan's uneasiness about the shift in the US policy towards India turned into consternation when at the conclusion of his visit to the South and South-East Asian regions, the US Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson, disclosed at a press conference in Washington D.C. that "he had urged Mr. Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, at Mr. Kennedy's request to extend his leadership to other areas in South East Asia."\textsuperscript{117}

With a view to assuage the ruffled feelings of Pakistan, the date of President Ayub's visit to United States was advanced from November to July 1961.\textsuperscript{118} During his visit to the United States in the second week of July 1961, President Ayub made it clear that the US military assistance to India would "put a tremendous strain on Pakistan-American relations".\textsuperscript{119} President Ayub's visit proved instrumental in procuring military equipment including twelve F-104 jet aircraft for Pakistan. As President Ayub wrote in his Autobiography that as far as Pakistan was concerned, it wanted a decrease in the flow of US economic aid to New Delhi and some sort

\textsuperscript{115} Pakistan Times (Lahore), 22 January 1961.
\textsuperscript{116} Dawn, n.13, 10 June 1961.
\textsuperscript{117} The Times (London), 1 June 1961.
\textsuperscript{118} Washington Post (Washington D.c), 21 June 1961.
\textsuperscript{119} New York Times, n.61, 14 July 1961.
of veto over American arms supplies to India.\textsuperscript{120}

The outbreak of Sino-Indian hostilities in the autumn of 1962 made Pakistan's simmering discontent with the United States burst into open like a torrent. India wanted to withdraw its troops from Kashmir, but it could only do so if Pakistan would give an assurance that it would not attack India. The Anglo-American military assistance to India was criticized by Pakistan. India assured Pakistan that it would utilize the given equipment only against China and not against Pakistan.\textsuperscript{121} In order to convince Pakistan, New Delhi agreed on 14 November 1962 to provide facilities to the US observers to oversee the use of equipment against China only.\textsuperscript{122} India also signed similar agreement with the United Kingdom on 27 November 1962.\textsuperscript{123} It was only then that Pakistan formally assured the Western countries that it would not attack India during the Sino-Indian war.\textsuperscript{124}

However Pakistan felt piqued over the fact that India received US military assistance without any formal alliance with the US, so as to allow India to continue to receive military aid from Soviet Union as well, "which Americans regarded to be in the Western interests".\textsuperscript{125} However there was a little respite for Pakistan when United States exerted pressure in 1963-64 on India in re-opening the Kashmir question leading to a series of talks between India and Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{120} Mohammad Ayub Khan, \textit{Friends, Not Masters: A Political Autobiography} (Lahore, 1967), p.139.

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{The Hindu} (Madras), 13 November 1962.

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{New York Times}, n.61, 18 November 1962.

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{The Hindu}, n.121, 28 November 1962.

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{New York Times}, n.61, 6 November 1962.

At the same time, Washington was aware of Pakistan's honeymoon with Beijing. Pakistan seemed not to be disturbed by American concern over growing Sino-Pakistan entente but remained adament and early in 1956 ruled out any possibility of improvement in Pakistan-US relations so long as the United States "continued to supply arms to India". 126

The year 1965 proved decisive in fathoming the depth of US-Pakistan relations. Receipt of US arms assistance by India in the wake of Sino-Indian hostilities had been cried wolf by Pakistan despite India's assurance of not using American equipment against Pakistan. The crisis of 1956, first in April and then in September that year in which Pakistan used American equipment against India despite the assurances given by Eisenhower, Dulles and their successors, exposed Pakistan's theory and practice.

In April 1965, during the Rann of Kutch crisis, Pakistan deployed American patton tanks. The Government of India drew the attention of US Government in this regard. 127 Washington looked helpless to control the misuse of military equipment supplied by it to Pakistan. 128

Following the outbreak of armed hostilities between India and Pakistan in early September 1965, the United States imposed an embargo on arms sales to India and Pakistan.

Pakistan's acquisition of arms from the United States was determined by its alliance with Washington and the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreements of 1954 and 1959. The arms acquired by Pakistan from early 1950s till 1970 are shown in the following table:

**Table 1.1**

Arms Supplies to Pakistan by USA 1954-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Supplier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Lockheed T-33A</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-58</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>NAF-86F Sabre</td>
<td>USA, MAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lockheed RT-33A</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Martin B-57B Canberra</td>
<td>USA, MAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Martin RB-57 Canberra</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-62</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Cessna O-1 Biradog</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Bell 47</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-62</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Sikorsky S-55</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lockheed F-104B</td>
<td>USA, Probably Refurbished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Lockheed F-104A Starfighter</td>
<td>USA, Ex-USAF, Probably Refurbished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Grumman MU-16A</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lockheed C-130E Hercules</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kaman HH-43B Huskie</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Cessna T-37B</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lockheed G-130E Hercules</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Supplier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>M-41 Bulldozers etc.</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>M-24, Chafflee</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>M-4 Sherman</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-60</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>M-47 and M-48 Patton</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-65</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>M-113</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>M-36</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-64</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>NWC Sidewinder</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ARMoured Fighting Vehicles**

**Missiles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Supplier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Coastal Minesweeper</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Coastal Minesweeper</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Coastal Minesweeper</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Coastal Minesweeper</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tug</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Coastal Minesweeper</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Oiler</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Coastal Minesweeper</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Naval Vessels**

Source: SIPRI, Yearbooks 1970-75: World Armaments and Disarmament (Stockholm)
Pakistan's inclination to have an alliance with the United States with a view to acquire military assistance was motivated primarily to have military parity with India and to a lesser degree to serve as a bulwark against the spread of communism in Asia. Pakistan's strategic location because of its geographic proximity to Soviet Union and People's Republic of China and its utility in the US strategy of propping up Northern Tier countries -- Turkey and Iran, motivated US to build up Pakistan's arsenal.129

Pakistan started receiving massive US military assistance under the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme (MDAP) concluded in 1954. Most of the data remained classified till 1973.130 This secrecy was maintained because Article 1, para 5 of the MDAP inter alia provided: "The Government of Pakistan will take such security measures as may be agreed in each case between the two Governments in order to prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified military articles, services or information furnished pursuant to this Agreement.131

Between 1954 and 1965, the US military assistance to Pakistan amounted to $2 billion which included logistic facilities, communication


130. Harpreet Mahajan, Arms Transfer to India, Pakistan and the Third World (New Delhi, 1982), p.250.

facilities, military warehouse and training facilities.\textsuperscript{132} Pakistan also received $ 565 million in defence supporting assistance and economic assistance.\textsuperscript{133}

The US communications base at Peshawar, from where the U-2 took off in January 1960, with its extensive network of surface as well as aerial communications was an important facility to monitor air and ground signal traffic. According to Col. Rama Rao, Pakistan used this facility to monitor Indian signal traffic.\textsuperscript{134} Estimates for 1956-60 suggested that Pakistan received bulk of $ 517 million US military assistance, $ 309 million of PL-480 assistance and $ 387 million of MSP project and non-project aid from the United States.\textsuperscript{135} A part of the MSP fund was used for the construction of the Gilgit Road in the so-called Azad Kashmir which has given Pakistan a strategic advantage to have a link up with Kara Koram highway constructed with the Chinese assistance.

It was disclosed during the 1973 US Congress Hearings that Pakistan had received $ 630 million grant in military assistance for weapons, $ 19 million for defence support assistance and some $ 55 million worth of equipment in cash on concessional basis between 1954 and 1965.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{132} Cited in Col. Rama Rao, "Arms Supplies to Pak", in Seminar on American Arms to Pakistan (New Delhi, 1970), p.2.

\textsuperscript{133} US Congress, 90th Session, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings before the subcommittee on Near Eastern and Southern Asian Affairs Arms Sales to the Near East and South Asian Countries (Washington, D.C., 1967), pp.50 ff.

\textsuperscript{134} Rama Rao, n.132, p.5.

\textsuperscript{135} Harrison, n.89, p.23

\textsuperscript{136} Mahajan, n.130, p.264.

Despite the conflicting figures with regard to the worth of military assistance which Pakistan obtained from the United States from 1954 till 1965, it can safely be surmised that the United States was the major supplier of arms to Pakistan during the said period as shown in Table 1.1.

Despite the declared US embargo on sales of arms to Pakistan and India in the wake of the outbreak of Indo-Pakistan hostilities, Pakistan continued to receive US arms from the third countries. It was also reported that during the Indo-Pak conflict of 1956, American advisers to the Army and Air Force were in Pakistan and the US continued to provide arms to Pakistan, secretly, through third countries in spite of the ban imposed in 1965.138 Pakistan acquired through third countries military hardware worth $ 200 million, including F-86 fighters from West Germany through Iran and a sizeable number of Patton tanks through Turkey and Italy with the full knowledge of the Pentagon.139 The official statements denied any knowledge of that transfer till the tanks were actually seen in Pakistan.140

The United States was reluctant to let Pakistan wean away from its sphere of influence. Soon after the guns fell silent on

139. Ibid.
Indo-Pakistan border, Washington started wooing Pakistan. During the third week of December 1965, President Ayub Khan visited Washington and both countries spoke warmly of the mutual friendly ties. The resultant impact was that the embargo on sales of arms to Pakistan was partly lifted to permit the sale of non-lethal items on cash or credit basis subject to a case by case review, comprising spare parts for previously supplied American equipment.

India opposed the US move on the ground that both India and Pakistan had signed a truce agreement at Tashkent and the source of tension had been defused temporarily. Thus fresh shipment of arms to Pakistan would lead to escalation of the tension. However, Washington defended its action on the ground that such a move was designed to stem the influx of Chinese arms into Pakistan. With a view to counter Indian criticism, United States modified its policy of sale of arms on 12 April 1967 to resume the sale of non-lethal arms to both Pakistan and India. The principal objective of the US in lifting the embargo was to "control the disruption of the influence of America in the subcontinent".

The installation of Richard Nixon as President of the United

143. Statement of Indian Prime Minister cited in Times of India (New Delhi), 25 May 1966.
States in 1969 brightened the hopes of developing a thaw in Pakistan-US relations because of Nixon's tilt towards Pakistan. At that juncture, Indo-US relations were at their low ebb.147 The Nixon Administration initiated the policy of rapprochement with its traditional communist adversaries - Soviet Union and China. Pakistan which by 1969, had cultivated close relations with Beijing was deemed as a politically useful link in Washington's policy of rapprochement with Beijing. It was inevitable for the Nixon Administration to appease Pakistan by augmenting the flow of arms and economic assistance to the latter. In 1970, Pakistan acquired military hardware worth $15.40 million from the United States at a throw-away price as the market value of these arms was estimated to be $150 million. The deal included 18 supersonic interceptors, 7 B-57 bombers, F-104 jets and 300 armoured personnel carriers, which were termed as "replacements".148

India expressed its strong resentment over the supply of US arms to Pakistan. Indian Government pleaded that these arms would disturb the peace and stability of the Indian subcontinent as "aggressions committed against India in the past by Pakistan were made possible by the US arms".149 India also tried to convince


Washington that it would trigger a fresh spurt to the arms race in the
subcontinent. However, United States tried to pacify the Indian
opposition by assuring the Government of India that the arms deal with
Pakistan was an exception and intended only to replace some of the worn-
out equipment. India was not convinced by US explanations and
remained skeptical about the ulterior US motives.

Pakistan being haunted by its concept of "threat from India"
sought massive military assistance from the United States during 1954-
1970. The major emphasis of Pakistan was to build up and modernize its
Air Force. It received F-86s, B-57 Canberra and F-104 planes with
sidewinder air to air missiles. The table 1.1. reveals that by 1963,
United States had replaced the earlier British models and Pakistan's
Air Force had become completely dependent on United States for supplies
of spares repairs and maintenance.

The Indian Air Force had numerical superiority but was tacitly
inferior to that of Pakistan. As compared to Pakistan's arms obtained
from the US, India had only six squads of Hunters, 4 squads of Mysteres
and 3 squads of Canberras -- all subsonic aircraft without missiles.

In the similar way, Pakistan had also become dependent on the
United States for equipment required for its armed forces.

By 1965, Pakistan had 6 infantry divisions and two armoured
divisions. In terms of manpower, India's strength was four times more

152. K. Subrahmanyam, "The US Arms to Pakistan in the Context of Indo-
US Relations", in Seminar on American Arms to Pakistan, IDSA
than that of Pakistan. However, if Pakistan's military and that of so-called Azad Kashmir were added, the ratio was 2:1.153 Besides, bulk of the Indian army was deployed on Indo-China border, and it could not divert those troops to face any eventuality from Pakistan. Thus Pakistan had numerical advantage over India in terms of manpower as well. The armoured vehicles especially tanks -- Patton, M-24, M-4 and M-41, and heavy artillery which Pakistan received from the United States were superior to those of India. Pakistan was in possession of 105 mm and 165 mm US guns with variable Time Fuses (V T Fuses) against 5.5 guns and 25 pounders of World War II Vintage in the Indian Army.154

Keeping in view the size and requirements of Pakistan, its strength of deployment of tanks was better than that of India. US supplied Patton tanks were superior to Indian Centurious. Pakistan had 2:1 advantage in gunfire range, more manoeuvrability, and night operational advantage with the use of infra-red equipment which the Indian tanks lacked.155

However the myth of US tanks was exploded in the Rann of Kutch scuffle in April 1965 and latter in September 1965 during Indo-Pakistan hostilities. But Pakistan's equipment loss in the 1965 war was compensated by the United States without causing any strain on Pakistan's resources while India had to divert its domestic resources to maintain its defence requirements.

154 Subrahmanyan, n.152, p.19.
155 SIPRI. n.153, pp.490 ff.
BILATERAL PAKISTAN-CHINA RELATIONS

Pakistan and China share a common frontier of about 400 miles, between Sinkiang and territories to the north of Kashmir, including Hunza, Nagar and Baltistan. Pakistan's relations with People's Republic of China (PRC) present an interesting case study in international relations. Kautiliya's dictum "my enemy's enemy is my friend" is aptly applicable in this context. Relations between India and Pakistan were marked with mutual distrust, suspicion and even exchange of hostilities since partition of the subcontinent. China being geographically contiguous to both India and Pakistan was bound to influence the developments in the subcontinent.

Both India and China having shared economic and cultural relations for centuries, also renewed the age-old ties when India attained independence. The advent of communist regime in China in September 1949 did not affect the traditional pattern of friendly ties between India and China. Pakistan's eagerness to have close relations with the US led it to endorsement of global containment of communism.

Until the late 1950s, Pakistan's relations with China had not entered a "takeoff" stage. However, when Sino-Indian relations started declining in 1959 culminating in armed skirmishes in October 1962, Pakistan was drawn closer to Beijing. During this period, Pakistan had got disenchanted with the United States because of

latter's arms assistance to India. Thus during 1960s, Sino-Indian relations deteriorated while Sino-Pakistan relations took new strides forward thus proving the aptness of Kautilya's dictum.

EARLY PHASE OF CHINA AND ALIGNED PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS

When Pakistan came into existence in August 1947, China was passing through civil war between the Nationalist forces and Communist forces. In 1948, Pakistan decided to establish diplomatic relations with Chiang Kai-shek's regime but due to financial difficulties, ambassadors between the two countries could not be exchanged. The advent of communist regime in September 1949 in the forum of the People's Republic of China was recognized by India immediately while Pakistan accorded recognition to the new regime in Beijing on 4 January 1950. While announcing its decision of recognition, the Pakistani Government hoped that "friendly relations between China and Pakistan will be cemented in all spheres of mutual advantage". Pakistan's decision to recognize China was perhaps guided by geo-political and economic compulsions. Already sharing uneasy relations with India and Afghanistan, Pakistan could not afford a hostile great power like China in the neighbourhood. A Pakistani scholar has observed that Pakistan's decision to recognize China was marked by enlightened self-interest because "in view of India's

militancy... and passive hostility of the Afghan Government, Pakistan did not want another great neighbour to be its enemy." 159

The formal diplomatic relations between the two countries were established in April 1951, while ambassadors were exchanged in November 1951.160 Only in September 1950, Pakistan supported China's admission into the United Nations, and after joining the US sponsored military alliances, Pakistan voted with the United States until 1960 for the postponement of the consideration of China's admission into the U.N.161 During the Korean crisis, Sino-Pakistan trade boomed and under the barter deal, China supplied coal in exchange of raw jute and cotton from Pakistan.162

During 1954, Pakistan concluded a bilateral defence agreement with United States and also joined US sponsored SEATO and CENTO with a view to win over the Americans. Pakistan Government had shown its aversion to communism and "in July 1954 imposed ban on the Communist Party of Pakistan".163 As Beijing was aware that the formation of SEATO was directed against China, it hoped that Pakistan would not join any US-sponsored endeavour "to create split and


162. Aziz, n.159, p.76.

antagonism among the Asian nations".164

Between 1954 and 1959 Beijing had to deal with non-aligned India and aligned Pakistan. On the one hand, China valued India's friendship but at the same time Chinese understood that "only India could be their possible rival for influence in Asia".165 Perhaps Chinese were convinced that Pakistan with its membership of SEATO and CENTO could not pose any threat to China and they ignored this while dealing with Islamabad. As the Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai later disclosed on 10 April 1963 that in view of certain assurances received from Pakistan right from 1954, China appreciated Pakistan's objective of gaining political and military ascendancy over India in joining SEATO and CENTO, otherwise "Pakistan had no other motivation in joining the pacts".166

The Bandung Conference held in April 1955 provided the first opportunity of personal contacts between Pakistan's Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Bogra and his Chinese counterpart, Zhou Enlai. Mohammed Ali Bogra in his speech at the Conference praised China while the Soviet Union was criticized. He said: "We have the friendliest relations with China: China is not certainly imperialistic. It has not brought any other country under its heels".167 The Chinese premier in his address criticized United States and the formation

164. New China News Agency (Beijing), 5 August 1954.
166. Pakistan Times (Lahore), 11 April 1963.
of SEATO as a step against China but did not refer to Pakistan's membership of SEATO.\textsuperscript{168} While speaking before the political Committee of the Bandung Conference on 23 April 1955, Zhou Enlai disclosed that Premier of Pakistan had assured him that Pakistan's membership of SEATO and other military alliances was not directed against China.\textsuperscript{169}

Despite its cordial relations with India during 1954-59, China adopted an attitude of noninvolvement in the Kashmir issue. As Zhou Enlai declared on 10 April 1963: "Even when we were on friendly terms with India we took an attitude of non-involvement in the Kashmir issue".\textsuperscript{170} Thus, China, aware of its basic interests, kept its options open with Pakistan for future manoeuvres.

In the succeeding three years from 1956 to 1958, there was no major achievement in Sino-Pakistan relations but for the exchange of visits and commercial dealings. In October 1956, Pakistan's Prime Minister visited China. During his visit, the Pakistani Premier was assured that his country's membership of SEATO posed no bar to friendly relations between the two countries.\textsuperscript{171} In December 1956, the Chinese Premier paid a return visit to Pakistan and the joint statement issued on 24 December 1956 reiterated that there was no real conflict of interests between the two countries.\textsuperscript{172}

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\textsuperscript{168} Ibid, pp.57-58.
\textsuperscript{169} Cited in S.M. Burke, "Sino-Pakistan Relations", Orbis (Philadelphia), Summer 1964, p.393.
\textsuperscript{170} Pakistan Times, n.166, 11 April 1963.
\textsuperscript{171} Pakistan Horizon, n.55, June 1956, p.119.
\end{flushright}
These developments did not arouse any suspicion in India because India at that juncture was engrossed in the slogans like Hindi-China Bhai Bhai (the Indians and the Chinese are brothers).

Following the advent of military regime with Mohammed Ayub Khan at the helm of affairs in October 1958, there was no noticeable improvement in Sino-Pakistan relations until the end of 1960. President Ayub was more inclined towards the United States.

The Chinese action of March 1959 in quelling the revolt in Tibet was condemned by Pakistan. While addressing the General Assembly, Pakistan's representative said:

The Tibetan people are our close neighbours. For hundreds of years, they have been pursuing their traditional way of life. They have the right to choose the way in which they wish to live. Equally it is the duty of the rest of the world to respect their choice. (173)

Beijing protested to Pakistan over latter's stand on Tibet in a strong protest note handed over to Pakistan Government on 21 July 1959.174

When the Ayub regime concluded a comprehensive bilateral defence agreement with the United States in early March 1959, Beijing condemned it as an act of blackmail and "double edged weapon directed against China, as also such nationally independent neighbouring countries as India, Iraq and Afghanistan".175 Pakistan's offer of joint defence to India against external threat was criticized

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by China which branded the proposal as an attempt of "sowing discord in the relations between China and India and agitating for cold war."

In October 1959, Pakistan's President announced that he would approach China to re-define the border between the Pakistan occupied Kashmir and the Chinese region of Sinkiang but Beijing did not respond to Pak overtures.  

**INDO-CHINA WAR IN 1962 AND PAKISTAN**

India had shared traditionally friendly and cordial relations with China and even after the emergence of communist regime in Beijing, the relations between the two countries remained steady. Until the couple of years before the close of 1950s, all seemed well between India and China. In 1954 New Delhi and Beijing signed a treaty on Tibet which also envisaged five principles of peaceful co-existence. These principles were further reiterated at the Bandung Conference in 1955. Both India and China wished to be seen as a major international forces "for Nehru it was the continuation of a role; for Zhou Enlai it was a comparatively new part".

By the close of 1950s, Sino-Soviet schism had widened and Soviet Union was coming closer to India. Besides, with the advent of Kennedy Administration, United States also made further efforts to normalize its relations with India. During this period, China laid claim over the Indian territory which included the erstwhile North

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177. Khan, n.12, p.117.
East Frontier Agency (NEFA), now Arunachal Pradesh, a part of Ladakh and certain other areas. The Chinese claim encompassed 50,000 square miles over Indian territory as shown in maps. India drew the attention of Chinese Government to these maps but the latter gave evasive replies. China also refused to recognize McMahon Line as valid. From 1959 onwards series of meetings between India and China were held with a view to settle the border issue. China insisted on its claims while India refused to accept them. This led to escalation of tension culminating in outbreak of armed hostilities between India and China in the third week of October 1962. India suffered a military debacle.

Pakistan seized this opportunity and started wooing People's Republic of China. The Sino-Indian War proved a watershed in the Sino-Pakistan relations. With a view to win Chinese favours, Pakistani press started blaming India for the confrontation. The Pakistani leadership tried to underplay the ramifications of Sino-Indian conflict by terming it as a local and limited conflict. As Mohammed Ayub Khan wrote:

The American thought as a result of the conflict between India and China something important and fundamental.... To me the whole thing looked a military absurdity. Conquest of even a portion of India in Ladakh and Assam would not only expose the Chinese to US intervention and nuclear war, putting a tremendous burden on their transportation, resources and economy. (184)

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181. Ibid, p.52.
184. Khan, n.120, pp 159-60.
Pakistan strongly opposed the Western military aid to India in the wake of the Chinese attack. It was argued that China posed no threat to India's security and the augmented Western military assistance to India would be used against Pakistan.\(^{185}\) The leadership in Islamabad even declared that Pakistan would not collaborate with India against China, even if Kashmir dispute was resolved.\(^{186}\)

In the aftermath of Chinese invasion on India, Pakistan was convinced that split between New Delhi and Beijing had come full circle. Similarly, the Chinese leadership also felt assured of Pakistan's "permanent" hostility towards India despite the Western pressures. Hence the circumstances allowed "Enemy's enemy is my friend" was perpetuated as the mode of discourse and decks were cleared for close Sino-Pakistani entente-cordiale.

**BEIJING-ISLAMABAD BOUNDARY AGREEMENT TOWARDS CLOSER RELATIONSHIP:**

Both Beijing and Islamabad initiated steps to come closer to each other in the aftermath of Sino-Indian War. China, by normalizing its relations with Pakistan, was interested in establishing its credentials as a "peace-loving" country caring for the security of smaller countries in the region. While Pakistan tried to consolidate the newly attained Chinese friendship as the sheet anchor of its policy against India as well as a signal to the West that it had discovered an alternate "ally".

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\(^{185}\) Pakistan Times, n.115, 1 November 1962.  
\(^{186}\) Dawn, n.13, 29 November 1962.
Accordingly, Pakistan concluded a boundary agreement with China on 2 March 1963 under which Pakistan ceded a portion of "Azad Kashmir" to China. President Ayub Khan termed the agreement as "the first step in the evolution of relations between Pakistan and China." India protested to both China and Pakistan stating its position that it would not agree to any arrangements or agreements about a territory which was under "illegal occupation of Pakistan." Both Beijing and Islamabad rejected India's protest. The Indian Government alleged that Pakistan had not given away only 2050 square miles of territory but also 11,000 square miles according to the data of the Survey of Pakistan.

OBSERVATIONS

The Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement portended serious strategic implications for India and helped China to have a direct access to Kashmir by enabling it to attack Kashmir by land from the Kara Koram pass and from Ladakh. It also provided direct Chinese air link to the Gilgit airfield and it also seemed to have bolstered the morale of Pakistan. Islamabad presumed that any attack by India on Pakistan would bring China to its rescue. Pakistan's then Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto declared on 17 July 1963:

189 For texts of Indian protest notes sent to the Government of China and Pakistan, see Jain, n.187, pp.65 ff.
An attack from India on Pakistan is no longer confined to the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan. An attack by India on Pakistan involved the territorial integrity and security of the largest state in the Asia and therefore this new factor brought in the situation a very element and a very important factor. I would not at this stage like to elucidate any further on this matter but suffice this to say that the national interest of another State itself is involved in an attack on Pakistan. (191)

In February 1964, the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited Pakistan. The joint communique issued after Zhou's visit expressed the hope that Kashmir question would be resolved in accordance with "the wishes of the people of Kashmir".192

CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE INDO-PAK WAR OF 1965:

When India and Pakistan exchanged limited armed hostilities on the Rann of Kutch dispute in April 1965 and full scale war in September 1965, China had come closer to Pakistan. In early March 1965, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan visited Beijing. The joint communique issued after the visit, while reiterating the desire of both countries to strengthen their friendly relations, reaffirmed the Chinese stand that the Kashmir dispute should be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir.193

Along with exchange of high-level visits, China was also

helping Pakistan in the construction of strategic border roads along the Indian border. In September 1964, Pakistan disclosed that the Chinese had already built their part of the Sinkiang-Gilgit road up to the last Chinese post.\textsuperscript{194} In September 1964, a high level Chinese Defence delegation headed by Chief of the Chinese Air Force paid a visit to Pakistan and held secret talks with Pakistan's Defence officials.\textsuperscript{195}

During February and early March 1965 when Pakistan had started taking provocative measures in the Rann of Kutch area against India, the Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi said on 6 March 1965 that his country would assist Pakistan if called upon to do so.\textsuperscript{196} When the Rann of Kutch conflict was going on, the Chinese Press coverage was favourably inclined toward Pakistan.\textsuperscript{197} A Chinese statement released on 4 May 1965 on Rann of Kutch dispute charged India for pursuing "chauvinist and expansionist policy".\textsuperscript{198}

During the first week of September 1965 when Indo-Pakistan armed hostilities broke out, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, was present in Karachi. China expressed its firm support to Pakistan and warned India that "it must bear responsibility for all the

\textsuperscript{194} Asian Recorder (New Delhi), Vol.X, 1964, p.6128. Also see The Times (London), 10 October 1964.


\textsuperscript{196} Dawn, n.13, 7 March 1965.

\textsuperscript{197} Xinshua Press Release (Beijing) of 22 April 1965, quoted in Pakistan Times, n.166, 24 April 1965.

\textsuperscript{198} Xinshua News Agency (Beijing) 5 May 1965.
consequences of its criminal and extended aggressions". With a view to build up psychological pressure on India, China sent a protest note to the former on 8 September 1965 demanding the dismantling of "aggressive military structures" along the Sino-Indian border and "stop all acts of aggression and provocations". While the Pakistani leaders were expecting that China would mount physical pressure on the Sino-Indian border to help Pakistan gain strategic advantage, but the Chinese move was limited to issuing verbal warning to India. In the wake of the perplexing strategic disadvantages, President Ayub Khan appealed to the Chinese Government "to do something". But the Chinese Government issued only "ultimatum" on 20 September 1965 asking India to dismantle "aggressive military works" on Sino-Indian border and when on 20 September 1965 Pakistan accepted the ceasefire, the ultimatum became inoperative.

Thus during the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965, China provided only moral support to Pakistan by issuing ultimatums to India, thus showing Pakistan to be much more simplistic in its assumptions about the consistency of Chinese support.

The Tashkent Agreement had envisaged a new thaw, though


temporary, in Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union. Washington, being engrossed in Vietnam war, had adopted a lukewarm posture in South Asia. In the wake of Sino-Soviet schism gaining momentum, Beijing viewed the Tashkent Agreement as a step towards augmentation of Soviet influence in Pakistan. Thus with a view to counter Soviet influence, and keep Pakistan under Chinese sphere of influence, Liu Shao-qi, a top ranking Chinese leader visited Pakistan in March-April 1966. The visiting Chinese leader while assuring Pakistan said: "The Pakistan people can be rest assured that when Pakistan resolutely fights against foreign aggression in defence of its national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the 650 million Chinese people will stand answeringly on their side and give resolute support and assistance."

There was no major outcome of Liu's visit to Pakistan because the latter was more interested in gaining strategic advantages from newly attained entente with the Soviet Union. At the same time Islamabad could not afford to lose China's friendship especially in the wake of US embargo on arms sales to India and Pakistan in the aftermath of Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. However, the Chinese suspected US-Soviet move to wean Pakistan away from China. This stance was made known to Pakistan during the visit of Pakistan's Commerce Minister, Ghulam Faruq to China on 28 July 1966 by Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, who said:

I can say with certainty that this scheme of [of joint India-Pakistan opposition to China] the United States and Soviet Union will not be countenanced by the people of our two countries, nor by our two governments. No force on earth can undermine the friendship between the Chinese and Pakistani peoples. (204)

Thus during the post-Tashkent period -- January 1966 till the end of 1968, though there were no major strains on Pakistan-China relations but at the same time, Pakistan tried to normalize its relations with the United States and Soviet Union. Pakistan was treading on a "triangular tightrope" by having simultaneous relationships with the United States, China and Soviet Union.

Between 1966-68 there were bilateral exchange of visits between the leaders and officials of the two countries. China also supplied economic and arms assistance to Pakistan. According to an estimate, Pakistan by January 1968 had received 30 MIG 17s and 60 MIG 19s from China. Besides this, 7000 assault guns and about five hundred 60 mm mortars were also given by China to Pakistan. 205.

The year 1969 was marked by domestic changes both in Islamabad and Beijing. In Pakistan, A.M. Yahya Khan, the Chief of Army Staff, took over the reins of power on 31 March 1969 from Ayub Khan. And in 1969, People's Republic of China was also emerging out of the ravages of Cultural Resolution. Thus both countries were embroiled in their respective domestic affairs during 1969 and there was almost little scope for making any headway in Sino-Pakistan relations under these circumstances.

205. Indian Express (New Delhi), 16 January 1968.
General Yahya Khan's assumption of power coincided with the growing resentment among the people of erstwhile East Pakistan against the government. Even in West Pakistan, the popular upsurge against Ayub regime had been gaining ground since 1968. Under these circumstances President Ayub Khan handed over the reins of power to General Yahya Khan on 25 March 1969.\textsuperscript{206} The main cause of the upsurge against Ayub regime was the popular demand for socio-economic and political reforms in Pakistan the unfulfilment of which ultimately turned into a demand for adoption of parliamentary form of government and the holding of general elections based on adult franchise.\textsuperscript{207} General Yahya Khan in a national broadcast on 26 March 1969 declared that he was determined to restore law and order in the country and thus pave way for the establishment of constitutional government.\textsuperscript{208} He further added that it would be the task of the elected representatives to provide "a workable constitution and final solution to all political, economic and social problems that have been agitating the minds of the people".\textsuperscript{209} President Yahya Khan\textsuperscript{210} held consultations with more than 30 leading politicians representing various political parties in both wings of Pakistan to defuse the ongoing crisis.\textsuperscript{211} The resultant impact of these negotiations between President Yahya Khan and the opposition leaders was manifested with political activities were allowed in Pakistan from 1 January 1970.\textsuperscript{212}

\textsuperscript{206} Dawn, n.13, 26 March 1969.
\textsuperscript{208} Dawn, n.13, 27 March 1969.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{210} General Yahya Khan became President of Pakistan on 31 March 1969 and henceforth he will be referred as President Yahya Khan.
\textsuperscript{211} G.S. Bhargava \textit{Pakistan in Crisis} (New Delhi, 1971), p.191.
\textsuperscript{212} See \textit{Dawn}, n.13, 2 January 1970.
in July 1969. It is worth mentioning here that Air Marshal Nur Khan's visit to China was at such a time when Sino-Soviet schism had reached its Zenith and Beijing had vehemently criticized the Soviet proposal for collective security in Asia.\(^{216}\) Besides, Pakistan had also developed "close" relations with the Soviet Union especially after the Tashkent declaration.\(^{217}\) It was but natural that the Chinese leadership might nurse apprehensions about Pakistan endorsing the Soviet proposal for collective security in Asia. It was in this background that these issues could crop up during Air Marshal Nur Khan's visit to China.

The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in a banquet hosted in honour of the visiting Pakistan's leader criticized the Soviet plan for forging collective security in Asia as a new step to "rig up a new anti-China military alliance aimed at aggression and expansion against Asian countries".\(^{218}\) The Soviet advice to the Asian countries to forge "Regional Economic Co-operation" was denounced by Zhou Enlai as a trap for "luring Asian countries and gradually placing them within the Soviet sphere of influence".\(^ {219}\) With a view to allay Chinese misapprehensions about Pakistan's endorsement of Soviet proposal of collective security in Asia, Air Marshal Nur Khan said: "Where such understanding is lacking and, furthermore, where differences exist on fundamental issues, any talk of regional co-operation on economic


\(^{218}\) SCMP, no.4459, n.216, 22 July 1969, p.18.

\(^{219}\) Ibid.
Though President Yahya Khan had assumed power on 31 March 1969 but it was not until 5 May 1969 that the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai congratulated President Yahya Khan. While recalling friendly relations between the two countries, the Chinese Premier expressed his country's desire to further strengthen friendly and good neighbourly relations with Pakistan.\(^{213}\) While reiterating Chinese support to Pakistan, Premier Zhou Enlai said that the Chinese government and people would, "as always firmly support the just struggle of Pakistan government and people to oppose the foreign aggression and interference and will firmly support the Kashmiri people's just struggle for their right to self-determinations.\(^{214}\)

Within a fortnight after resuming the power, President Yahya Khan declared on 10 April 1969 that there would be no major departure in the foreign policy of Pakistan and reiterated that Pakistan's friendship with China would continue to grow.\(^{215}\)

**THE DEPUTY CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR'S VISIT TO CHINA**

Air Marshal Nur Khan, the Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator paid an official visit to the People's Republic of China.

\(^{213}\) Ibid, 6 May 1969.

\(^{214}\) Ibid. See also *Hindustan Times* (Delhi), 11 April 1969.

\(^{215}\) *Dawn*, n.12, 11 April, 1969.
or other issues is unrealistic." Thus Nur Khan tried to convince his Chinese hosts that Pakistan did not approve of Soviet proposals for regional economic co-operation as well as collective security in Asia. The Pakistani leader was shrewd enough to assure the Chinese leadership of Islamabad's support for Beijing's induction into the United Nations. He said that Pakistan had firmly supported and would continue its efforts "for the right of the people's Republic of China to be seated in the United Nations.  

Air Marshal Nur Khan also handed over a personal letter from President Yahya Khan to Premier Zhou Enlai which envisaged Pakistan's desire to strengthen its relations with People's Republic of China. Referring to Air Marshal Nur Khan's visit to China as being contributory to the strengthening of friendly relations between China and Pakistan, the Chinese Premier said on 16 July 1969:

... Sino-Pakistan friendship is based on the solid foundation of the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence and that no one on earth can undermine it. Imperialism, modern revisionism and their lackeys have once again failed in their recent scheme to want only sabotage Sino-Pakistan friendship.  

There is no exaggeration in pointing to the contextualised logic by which Pakistan also wanted to improve its relations with China at a time when the United States was also planning for a Sinó-US rapprochement.

221. Pakistan Observer, n.103, 14 July 1969.
When Yahya Khan assumed power in Pakistan, the latter was not acquiring "adequate arms supplies either from the United States or from the Soviet Union". Thus President Yahya Khan sent a Pakistani delegation under the leadership of Lt. General Hamid Khan, Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan army to China in October 1969. It was reported that Beijing had sounded Pakistan that the visit should be utilized for concrete negotiations on arms supply.\(^{224}\) The Pakistani delegation led by Lt. General Hamid Khan consisted of three high ranking military officials, two foreign office officials and four journalists.\(^{225}\) "Beijing attached tremendous significance to this visit. Lt. General Hamid Khan had an audience with Chairman Mao Zedong".\(^{226}\) The visiting Pakistani delegation was assured of military assistance by Beijing.\(^{227}\)

Again in May 1970, Air Marshal A.R. Khan, Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Air Force, visited China.\(^{228}\) Subsequently a delegation consisting of Navy officials of Pakistan under the leadership of Pakistan's Naval Chief Vice-Admiral Muzaffar Hasan visited China in September 1970. During its visit the Pakistani Naval delegation discussed the problems of Pakistan Navy with their Chinese counterparts and explored the possibility of Chinese help in strengthening and re-equipping the aging naval fleet of Pakistan.\(^{229}\)

\(^{224}\) "Pakistan: Wooing Peking Again", Link (New Delhi), 12 October 1969, p.22.
\(^{225}\) SCMP, no.4512, n.216, 8 October 1969, pp.30-31.
\(^{226}\) Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 21 October 1969.
\(^{227}\) The Hindu, n.121, 4 October 1969.
\(^{228}\) Hindustan Times, n.214, 5 June 1970.
These visits of Pakistan's defence personnel to China proved instrumental in procuring Chinese arms and equipment for Pakistan. An agreement was signed between China and Pakistan under which the former agreed to supply 2 to 3 "W" class submarines to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{230} By middle of 1971, Beijing had supplied to Pakistan 100 T-59 tanks, an unspecified number of OSA class petrol boats and some MIG-19s.\textsuperscript{231} Between 1965-1971 Pakistan received $200 million worth arms aid from China and at this $45 million worth of arms were supplied in 1971.\textsuperscript{232}

**PAKISTAN'S PRESIDENT YAHYA KHAN'S VISIT TO BEIJING:**

Pakistan's President, Yahya Khan, paid an official 5-days visit to China in November 1970. He was accompanied by a 15-member team comprising economic and defence experts. On his arrival in Beijing on 10 November 1970, President Yahya Khan was given a warm welcome.\textsuperscript{233} The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in his welcome address said that he was regretful for having not visited Pakistan since 1966 and expressed hope that as soon as he got an opportunity to visit abroad, Pakistan would be one of the first countries he would visit.\textsuperscript{234} President Yahya Khan's avowed objective of visiting China was not only to strengthen Sino-Pakistan relations but also to secure economic and military assistance from Peoples Republic of China. While speaking at a banquet given in his honour, President Yahya

\textsuperscript{231} Ibid, p.158.
\textsuperscript{232} Mahajan, n.130, p.264.
\textsuperscript{233} Pakistan Observer, n.103, 11 November 1970.
\textsuperscript{234} Ibid, 12 November 1970.
Khan said on 11 November 1970 that Pakistan's friendship with People's Republic of China was not based on expediency but "governed by the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence". In his speech, the Pakistani President expressed his country's gratitude to Beijing for latter's support during Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965 and endorsement of Pakistan's stand on Kashmir. He also wanted to convince the Chinese leadership that Pakistan had adopted a tough posture against India especially in respect of Kashmir. The Vice Chairman People's Republic of China, Tung Pi-Wu, while reiterating Chinese support for government and people of Pakistan "in the just struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national dignity, reaffirmed its support for the Kashmir people in their just struggle for the right to self-determination". During the Cultural Revolution, Beijing had abandoned the practice of issuing joint communiques after the visit of foreign dignitaries but this practice was resumed after Yahya Khan's visit when a joint communique was issued on 14 November 1970. In the joint communique, the Chinese side expressed its willingness to render economic assistance to help Pakistan attain economic development and self-sufficiency. Beijing also reiterated its support to Pakistan on the question of Kashmir. The Pakistani side while expressing gratitude for Chinese economic, military and political support, also affirmed that the legitimate rights of the PRC in the United Nations should be restored as soon

236. Ibid.
239. Ibid.
as possible. "The most significant outcome of Yahya Khan's China visit was that, China promised to provide $ 200 million interest free loan to Pakistan". 240

OBSERVATIONS

It is evident from the above analysis that the pattern of Pakistan-China relations got initiated at a lukewarm pace in early 1950s and gathered momentum only during the close of 1950s. The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 provided a watershed in Sino-Pak relations which got further impetus in the succeeding years. The main reason of Pakistan's coming closer to China was its fear of India and consequent search for seeking arms parity. Between 1961 and 1963, when India acquired arms assistance from the United States, Pakistan, an old ally of the United States and member of US sponsored alliances like SEATO and CENTO, got disenchanted with the US and started moving closer to China.

Pakistan, during the period under review, gained substantially in political and economic terms, by its friendship with China. During the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965, China provided morale support to Pakistan and in the wake of US embargo on arms sales to Pakistan and India, China met some of Pakistan's requirements. In the post-Tashkent era, especially between 1966 and 1968, Pakistan's relations with Soviet Union registered little improvement while its relations with the United States remained at low key.

However, in the wake of Sino-Soviet schism attaining its zenith by 1969, and the Soviet proposal of forging collective security

240. Ibid.
in Asia involving India and Pakistan, China did not want to lose Pakistan. Consequently, both Beijing and Islamabad warmed up their relations while India moved closer to Soviet Union.

ENDURING INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS

India's relations with Moscow continued to attain new dimensions with the passage of time. Unlike Pakistan which had "close" and on occasions "cool" relations with United States and China. The pattern of India's relations with Soviet Union had remained smooth and steady during the period under review. "Though the diplomatic relations between India and Soviet Union were established on 13 April 1947"241 even before the former had attained its independence, but there have been appreciation and goodwill towards Moscow among some leading luminaries of India's struggle for freedom. Jawaharlal Nehru had on many occasions lauded the achievements of Soviet Union during 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. As early as in 1928, Nehru paid glowing tributes to the USSR by underlying its anti-imperialism: "... Soviet Union stood as the greatest opponent of imperialism and its record with the nations of the East has been just and generous".242 During the Second World War, the active Soviet role in the fight against facism was Nehru's admiration who wrote in 1944:

We thought of the United States of America and even of some eastern countries which were forging ahead. But most of us had the example of Soviet Union, which in two brief decades full of war and civil strife and in the face of what appeared to be insurmountable difficulties had made tremendous progress. Some were attracted towards communism... (243)

However, Nehru's admiration for Soviet Union's achievements could in no way be interpreted that India would align with the Soviet Union after attaining independence. After the establishment of diplomatic relations, Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit took over as India's Ambassador to Moscow in early August 1947. On reaching Moscow she said: "India has a special link with the Soviet Union since both India and Russia have shown a capacity to blend and harmonise races and civilizations". 244

India after attaining independence in August 1947, was planning to recover from the ravages of partition and in the domain of foreign affairs it had declared the policy of keeping away from power politics of great powers and pursuit of independent policy. Soviet Union was also struggling hard to recover from the ravages of the Second World War and at the same time locked in a severe cold war politics with the United States and Western Europe.

Until mid 1950s, there was no break through in Indo-Soviet relations. There were psychological barriers both in New Delhi and Moscow which prevented the normalization of relations between the two countries. The stalinist Russia regarded India as a semi-colony and Indian leaders as reactionaries and "lackeys of Anglo-American

The psychological barriers lurking in the minds of some Indians about Soviet Union have been summed up by the former diplomat K.P.S. Menon aptly: "Some Indians still suffered from the fear, relic of British days, that the USSR was out to turn the world red by hook or crook; and many Russians thought that India was nominally free, it was economically bound hand and foot to the chariot of western imperialism". 246

By 1952 the developments unfolding on the international scene indicated a change in Soviet policy especially with regard to India. In 1952 Stalin granted an interview to Indian Ambassador Dr. S. Radhakrishnan and in 1953, K.P.S. Menon, India's Ambassador to Moscow was also granted an interview by Stalin:

The position of so large a state as India is of great importance for strengthening peace in the east. India has made a considerable contribution to the efforts of peace-loving countries aimed at ending the war in Korea, and relations with India are growing stronger; cultural and economic ties are developing. We hope that relations between India and the Soviet Union will continue to develop and grow, with friendly co-operation as the keynote. (248)

Following the death of Stalin, there were further signs of Change in Soviet perceptions of India.

New Delhi and Moscow signed first trade agreement in December 1953. The terms of the protocol provided India with certain advantages not generally available under similar agreements with western countries because it included payment to be made in rupees, the use of Indian shipping etc.

The post-Stalin leadership in Moscow was inclined to have a flexible policy towards the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. They were also convinced that the isolation imposed on Soviet Union in the wake of cold war could be eased by expanding relations with the newly independent developing countries. During this period when Soviet leaders were making gestures to India and Pakistan for exploring the scope of expanding the mutual relations Pakistan had joined the US sponsored military alliances like SEATO and CENTO. India declined to join the military pacts and was determined to pursue the policy of non-alignment. Soviet Union was perturbed over Pakistan's joining of the military alliances because it brought cold war to a southern neighbour. According to the then Soviet Prime Minister, SEATO was aimed at the "preservation and consolidation of colonialism, suppression of national liberation movements and interference in the affairs... of the Asian countries thus Moscow had become skeptical.

India's opposition to colonialism, support for national liberation movements and steadfast commitment to the policy of non-alignment was appreciated by Moscow. This common approach on

broader international issues proved instrumental in bringing the two countries closer to each other. In February 1955, Moscow agreed to build a major steel plant for India at Bhilai. \(^{251}\)

The year 1955 envisaged the beginning of a new phase in Soviet policy towards the Indian subcontinent. Prime Minister Nehru's visit to Moscow in June 1955 was followed by the return visit of Soviet leaders -- Bulganin and Khrushchev to India in December 1955. The Soviet Premier, Bulganin denounced CENTO and SEATO as aggressive military alliances and as manifestations of "colonialism in a new form". \(^{252}\)

N.S. Khrushchev viewed Pakistan's membership of military alliances as against the national interests of the latter and added: "We say frankly that we never have supported and never shall support the parties to the Baghdad Pact, or to any other alliance directed against the Soviet Union.... It is therefore our task to weaken this belligerent alliance, one of the hotbeds of possible warlike ventures". \(^{253}\)

During the visit of Soviet leaders, both countries also signed agreement on economic cooperation which called for an expansion in the volume of trade over what had been provided in the December 1953 agreement and the Soviet help in oil exploration and the installation of hydro-electric projects in India. \(^{254}\) At this juncture,

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252. N.A. Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev, Visit of Friendship to India, Burma and Afghanistan (Moscow, 1956), p.112.
the Soviet policy vis-a-vis India was motivated less by the ideological opportunities attendant to the country's pattern of internal development than by its strategic importance in cold war terms.255

The subsequent years until the close of 1950s witnessed rapid growth in economic co-operation between India and Soviet Union. The total trade turnover between the two countries which stood at $1.6 million in 1953 had risen to $94.6 million by the end of 1958. Soviet Union also provided long term loan and grants-in-aid to India on moderate interest rates.

MOSCOW AND INDO-CHINA WAR IN 1962.

Until the early years of the second half of 1950s, India's relations with China were friendly and cordial while its relations with Moscow were being shaped. Moscow and Beijing had essentially cordial relation and interactions characterised by a high degree of ideological conformity.

By 1956, the ideological differences between Moscow and Beijing had started surfacing which by late 1950s and early 1960s had completed full circle. The post-Stalin leadership in Moscow had adopted "peaceful coexistence" as the main plank of Soviet foreign policy towards the newly developed countries of Asia and Africa.256 The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU had underlined the essence of peaceful co-existence with the emphasis that the socialist system


was much stronger than the capitalist system and therefore it would be able to keep the warlike propensities of the capitalist system in check and attain "ultimate victory by peaceful means". However Chinese leadership differed with the new stance in Moscow's international affairs. Beijing while reiterating the pursuit of traditional Marxist-Leninist line termed the new stance in Kremlin as "revisionist". Along with the ideological difference, there also developed differences on certain areas along the Sino-Soviet boundary, culminating in the Sino-Soviet rift.

In the wake of these developments, growing Indo-Soviet friendship was irritating for Beijing because of the growing Sino-Indian differences over border issue. In 1959, armed skirmishes took place along the Sino-Indian border. The Soviet Union in a statement issued in early October 1959 observed that such events tended to "discredit the idea of peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems and are likely to prevent the Asian solidarity in the fight to consolidate national independence". The Soviet neutrality over these incidents was taken to signify "an implicit tilt towards India."

Interestingly Soviet Premier N.S. Khrushchev's visit in February 1960 coincided with the tenth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Friendship. Between 19 September 1959 to February 1961, Moscow

257. Ibid.
259. Litwak, n.255, p.79.
pledged economic assistance worth $500 million to India. By the beginning of 1960s, Soviet Union had also started providing military assistance to India. In 1961, Moscow gave 20 IL-14 transport aircraft for use in Ladakh, presumably against China. During 1961-62, negotiations between New Delhi and Moscow for additional Soviet defence equipment including 26 MI-4 Hound helicopters and 16 AN-12 heavy air freighters were completed. However, China opposed Soviet arms aid to India on the plea that such aid should be given exclusively to the socialist countries.

When the armed hostilities broke out between India and China on 20 October 1962, there was no immediate reaction from Moscow. It was on 25 October 1962 that the Soviet daily Pravda in an editorial characterized as constructive China's peace proposal for a ceasefire along the Line of Actual Control. The Soviet support for Chinese proposal which had been rejected by India might have annoyed New Delhi at that time but the Soviet move was fully explicable in the wake of Cuban Missile crisis. Moscow was clearly hoping to maintain unity within the socialist camp "so as to enhance its bargaining power vis-a-vis the United States".

MOSCOW'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS INDO-PAKISTAN WAR, 1965

In the wake of the abatement of the Cuban crisis, it appeared

264. Litwak, n.255, p.79.
as if cold war politics was subsiding. The growing US-Soviet entente had its impact on the political developments in the sub-continent as well. In view of the Sino-Soviet schism, Moscow wanted to wean Pakistan away from China. Accordingly in 1964, Soviet Union provided economic and technological assistance to Pakistan. There was also change of leadership in Kremlin and following the ouster of Khrushchev, the new set up headed by Leonid I. Brezhnev assumed the reins of power in Moscow, but there was no change in Soviet policy towards India.

During late 1964 and early months of 1965, Pakistani leaders visited Moscow. In January 1965, the then Pakistan's Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto visited Moscow where he held talks with Soviet leaders on international relations in general and on Soviet-Pakistan relations in particular. 265 Bhutto's visit was followed by President Ayub Khan in early April 1965. The joint communique issued after President Ayub Khan's visit to Moscow spoke warmly about mutual relations between the two countries without making any Soviet comment on Kashmir. 266

It was during this period that dispute over the Rann of Kutch erupted between India and Pakistan. Moscow adopted a neutral posture on the issue and a Soviet statement issued by Tass on 8 May 1965 expressed the hope that "India and Pakistan will solve their

266. Ibid, 12 April 1965.
differences through direct negotiations... such a solution will benefit not only the people of India and Pakistan but also the general cause of peace.  

While commenting on the above Soviet statement, The Times of London wrote:

"It goes to confirm that Russia's policy on the subcontinent is changing, turning from its previous cut and out commitment to India's case over Kashmir and everything at issue with Pakistan to a more wary and detached stance between the two neighbours, perhaps even to non-alignment." (268)

When Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Prime Minister of India visited Moscow in mid May 1965, his talks with the Soviet leaders failed to elicit any firm commitment to India vis-a-vis Pakistan. The Indo-Soviet joint communique issued on 19 May 1965 significantly omitted specific reference to Kashmir and Rann of Kutch -- two issues on which India required Soviet support. It was evident that Moscow did not want to displease Islamabad.

In early September 1965, when armed hostilities between India and Pakistan broke out, Moscow instead of adopting non-Partisan attitude, rather expressed its unhappiness over the deterioration in relations between India and Pakistan. An authoritative statement published in Pravda observed: "We will not discuss here which of those versions [Indian and Pakistani] most accurately reflects the course of events. The main thing is to find a path for immediately stopping the bloodshed and ending the conflict." (269) The Soviet leaders asked both India and Pakistan to end the hostilities. The

267. Tass (Moscow), 8 May 1965.  
268. The Times, n.194, 10 May 1965.  
mediation efforts by both Washington and Moscow within the UN Security Council were motivated by the fear of Chinese intervention on behalf of Pakistan. 270

After both India and Pakistan had accepted the cease-fire, Moscow offered its good offices to negotiate a settlement between New Delhi and Islamabad. The Soviet Union while laying stress on the need of resolving the Indo-Pakistan conflict emphasised that it involved its own security interests because of the geographical proximity and strategic location of the scene of the conflict. 271 It was on 4 September 1965 that Moscow made first offer of its good offices to resolve the Indo-Pakistan dispute and the same offer was repeated on 19 September 1965 in the wake of Chinese ultimatum to India. The Soviet leaders played notable role from November 1965 until early January 1966 in persuading both India and Pakistan to come to a negotiating table under the Soviet auspices. The Soviet efforts bore fruits when India and Pakistan agreed to hold negotiations at Tashkent on 4 January 1966. 272 When the leaders of both India and Pakistan arrived at Tashkent on 4 January 1966 for negotiations which lasted unto 10 January 1966, there were many issues on which both countries differed. However, with the constant efforts undertaken by Soviet leaders, both India and Pakistan concluded an agreement on 10 January 1966 which came to be known as Tashkent Agreement or Tashkent Declaration.

270. Litwak, n.255, p.85.


The operative part of the Tashkent Agreement called for the termination of the state of war between India and Pakistan. It announced that India and Pakistan had agreed that "all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 25 February 1966 to the positions they held prior to 5 August 1965 and both sides shall observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-fire line". The two countries further agreed to build mutual relations on the basis of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other and to discourage propaganda hostile to each other.

Pakistan's President Ayub Khan hailed the Tashkent Conference as a "very good and fruitful meeting" and attributed its success to the untiring and commendable endeavours of the Soviet Prime Minister, Mr. Kosygin. India's Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri expressed the view that "tangible results" had been obtained towards restoring genuinely peaceful relations between India and Pakistan. He further hoped that the normal peaceful relations would promote "the cause of peace in Asia and throughout the world".

The Soviet Premier, Kosygin, expressed the opinion that the Tashkent Agreement marked a new stage in the development of relations between India and Pakistan: "It establishes peace, normalizes diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan, settles

273. Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi), January 1966, pp.9-10. Also see, Pakistan Horizon, n.55, vol.19, no.1, First Quarter 1966, pp.97-100.
276. Ibid.
many other questions arising from their conflict and paves the way for a reduction of military expenditure by both countries".  

The United States welcomed the Tashkent Agreement. Even prior to the finalization of the agreement, the US had held that the success of Tashkent would contribute to peace in sub-continent and check Chinese ambitions in the area.  

It was evident that Washington endorsed the peace initiatives undertaken by Moscow in respect of resolving the Indo-Pakistan dispute.

Until 11 January 1966, after the conclusion of the Agreement, Beijing had made no official comment. The New China News Agency reported on 11 January 1966 the summary of Tashkent Agreement along with the news of the death of Indian Prime Minister. A couple of months after the Tashkent Agreement, the Chinese leader Liu Shaoqi during his visit to Pakistan (26-31 March 1966) did not make any reference to the Tashkent Agreement but reiterated his country's support for Pakistan especially on Kashmir issue. China's efforts during the Tashkent negotiations and afterwards seemed to "prove to the world that Tashkent [Agreement] had in no way affected Sino-Pakistani relations and that on the contrary China and Pakistan were getting even closer to each other.  

However, the Tashkent Agreement provided an opportunity for Moscow to normalize its relations with Islamabad. During 1966-68 Moscow gave economic and military assistance to Pakistan. In April 1968, Soviet premier Kosygin paid a five day visit to Pakistan which resulted in the conclusion of functional economic agreements. It has been reported that the total amount of military assistance provided to Pakistan by Moscow prior to 1971 came to only $10 million. The Soviet assistance both economic and military, to Pakistan was perhaps determined by leadership in Kremlin in keeping in view the Indo-Soviet friendship and at the same time Moscow wanted to wean Pakistan away from Chinese sphere of influence.

In 1969 more significant developments occurred at the international, regional and national levels which had far-reaching impact on the contemporary international relations. These developments -- sharpening of Sino-Soviet rivalry, Soviet proposal for collective security for Asia, thaw in US-Soviet relations, thaw in Sino-US relations, domestic changes in India and Pakistan etc. The resultant impact was the emergence of US-Pakistan-China axis. The data relating to the Soviet arms assistance to India during the period under review is as follows:

Table 1.2

ARMS SUPPLIES TO INDIA BY SOVIET UNION 1955 - 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Supplier</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>IL-14</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Gift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>IL-14</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1961</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>An-12</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Mi-4</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>An-12</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>MiG-21</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>An-12</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Mi-4</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>On deferred Payment</td>
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<td>1965-67</td>
<td>(90)</td>
<td>MiG-21</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Direct Purchase</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>On deferred payment</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Tu-124</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>HAL/MiG-21 FL</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-70</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>SU-7B</td>
<td>USSR</td>
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Missiles

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<td>1963</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>K-13</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>To arm MiG-21</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Item</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Landing craft &quot;Polechny Class&quot;</td>
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<td>1967</td>
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<td>Fast Patrol Boat Pluchat Class</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Submarine tender Modifier &quot;Ugra type&quot;</td>
<td>USSR</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1968)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fast Patrol Boat Poluchat Class</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Submarine &quot;F&quot; Class</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Frigate &quot;Petya&quot; Class</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Submarine &quot;F&quot; Class</td>
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**Naval Vessels**

**Armoured Fighting Vehicles**

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<tr>
<td>225</td>
<td>T-55</td>
<td>USSR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Indo-Soviet military cooperation commenced in real terms with the beginning of 1960s. However during the later half of 1950s, Moscow had gifted 8 Ilyushin IL-14 commercial transport aircraft. In the wake of Sino-Indian border skirmishes, India made endeavours to acquire weapons from different sources to meet its defence requirements especially along the Himalayan borders. During 1960-61, India purchased Mi-4 Hound helicopters, IL-14 transports and Antonov An-12 heavy air freighters from the Soviet Union, for supply operations in Ladakh region.
In view of the report that Pakistan was to receive F-104 supersonic aircraft, India started negotiations with the Soviet Union for the procurement of MiG-21. During 1962 Moscow supplied Mi-4 and An-12 aircraft to New Delhi. During 1963, India acquired 6 MiG-21 combat aircraft from Soviet Union. Soon afterwards, both countries signed an agreement for the licensed production of MiG-21 in India. Another advantage accruing to India from this agreement was that payment to Soviet Union had to be made in Indian currency. The deal also strengthened Indo-Soviet friendship and it was welcomed in view of India's conflict with China since the latter did not possess anything faster than MiG-19s.

The conclusion of the MiG-21 deal with Moscow prior to the outbreak of Sino-Indian hostilities had given rise to speculations that Moscow would back out when the Sino-Indian war broke out in October 1962. But contrary to these speculations, Moscow supplied MiG-21s to India in 1963. It was reported by the end of 1964 that India had received 12 MiG-21s under the terms of the August 1962 agreement.

In 1964, USSR extended $300 million loan to India for the purchase of fighters, helicopters and light tanks. According to a report Soviet military assistance to India had been approximately $40 million which included ground to air missiles, radar training

284. Mahajan, n.130, p.199.
equipments and mobile and fixed launching installations. Thus by 1964, India had diversified its sources of arms acquisition.

In the wake of military confrontation with China, India got economic aid and arms from other countries as well especially United States and UK. However, their terms and conditions were rigid as compared to that of the Soviet Union. In 1965, India accepted favourable terms for the purchase of "perry" class frigates from the Soviet Union. Moscow also supplied PT-76 and T-55 tanks to India. The USSR also provided landing crafts, fast patrol boats, submarines, frigates; torpedo boats, ASW destroyer and missile patrol boats to India.

OBSERVATION

It emerges from the foregoing analysis that the Indian subcontinent assumed strategic significance in the foreign policies of Washington, Moscow and Beijing because of the tense relations between New Delhi and Islamabad. The very beginning of Indo-Pakistan relations was marked by hostilities between the two countries over the question of Kashmir. Pakistan viewed India as a threat to its security and with a view to have arms parity with India, Pakistan joined US sponsored military alliances like SEATO and CENTO.

In the perception of the United States, Pakistan, because of its geographical proximity to Soviet Union and China, could serve

as a useful link in US's cold war strategy. Whereas Pakistan regarded its association with the United States as advantageous for supply of arms and an ally against India.

The Sino-Indian war and its aftermath brought Pakistan and China closer to each other. While India though got some arms supplies from the United States and other Western countries, could not align with them. However India came closer to Soviet Union. In the wake of Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, Pakistan's relations with China improved. Soviet Union remained neutral in matters affecting Indo-Pakistan relations. Rather Moscow's relations with Islamabad improved during 1966-68 period. The Soviet objective of normalizing its relations with Pakistan was to wean away the latter from China.

During the later half of 1960s, Sino-Soviet schism widened. While during this period, United States made efforts to normalize its relations with Moscow as well as Beijing. By 1970, the prospects of normalization of Sino-US relations had brightened.

**EMERGENCE OF TRIANGULAR AXIS: THREAT TO INDIA'S SECURITY**

Thus the prospects of the emergence of triangular Axis between United States, Pakistan and China against India had become visible in the early 1970s. When Islamabad served as a go-in-between in the evolving rapprochement between Washington and Beijing. The hard realities of cold war had dawned on the United States which realized its wastefulness and thus by late 1960s evinced anxiety in improving relations with the communist giants. Washington had a direct access to Moscow especially after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and thus the mutual desire between United States and Soviet Union to improve their relations led to détente in the beginning of
1970. On the other hand relations between Moscow and Beijing which had started deteriorating in early 1960s and culminated in the exchange of border skirmishes in 1969 resulted in Sino-Soviet schism. Thus China had been isolated. Washington deemed it a golden opportunity to woo China as well. Consequently Washington started looking for a go-in-between to help facilitate its negotiations with Beijing. Pakistan whose relations with China had become fairly good tried to take strategic advantage of the situation by offering its good offices for a Sino-US rapprochement and it did succeed when in November 1971 the US Secretary of state paid a secret visit to Beijing with the help of Pakistan. The ruling clique in Islamabad during that period was faced with civil resistance in the erstwhile East Pakistan region and had tense relations with India. The Novel ploy of Islamabad in playing an intermediary role between the United States and China was intended to enlist their support in tiding over the internal crisis in East Pakistan and to have a strong affront against India. On the other hand, both Washington and Beijing were grateful to Islamabad and hence they assured the latter their full support, because their common desire was to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in South Asia by consolidating Pakistan. Thus the complementary and supplementary roles of each other brought them together to force US-Pakistan-China axis. By the close of 1970s, the triangular axis had been further cemented. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan changed the political strategic complexion of the sub-continent. Pakistan raised the alarm of threats to its security in the wake of Afghan crisis and in return got sophisticated weapons from both the United States and China. India, because of
its past experience, has expressed serious concern over induction of sophisticated weapons into Pakistan. The coming into being of the US-Pakistan-China axis and the active countermeasures by India require study in depth in order to articulate the rationale underlying political choices priorities and potentials in South Asia.