Security problems in South Asia are a matter of special significance and concern for several reasons. The nature and structure of conflictual relations between India and Pakistan are affected not only by the tensions these two countries have failed to divorce from the process of adjustment of interests; their zero-sum competition is ominously affected by their expanding nuclear programmes and their generally accepted capability of nuclear arms production. The United States, the Soviet Union and China have invested heavily in political and military confrontations in the subcontinent. In 1972, the United States despatched the aircraft carrier Enterprise, and used nuclear gunboat diplomacy as part of the East-West threat system. The United States appears to be caught in a situation in which even its non-proliferation policy is sacrificed to what are rightly or wrongly believed to be its geopolitical interests in Pakistan. Although the Soviets did not exploit revolutionary impulses in South Asia in the same manner as elsewhere in the Third World, yet Soviet postures which brought stability in certain areas eventually split over to cause an upheaval in Afghanistan which did not help in constructing a more benign order in Southwest and South Asia. The range of issues in China's relationship with South Asia reveal a number of continuing political and security problems and contributed to both increase of tensions and weaponry, the Pakistan-U.S. alliance, the widening of Sino-Pakistan relations and the perceptions of mutual interests by India and the Soviet Union resulted in the erection of a security order in the South Asian region which inhibited the restructuring of military postures between India and her antagonists towards defensive principles. The South Asian Security problematic as it
emerged from the experience of 1971 to 1981 can be addressed in the context of (a) obstacles in the process of rapprochement between India and Pakistan on account of their failure to move to alternative positions, i.e., the Prisoner's dilemma, in which although both New Delhi and Islamabad are aware of the possible payoffs from moves towards a new security system in South Asia, yet there is grave and continuous uncertainty whether either Pakistan or India will choose to "cooperate" or "defect". (b) the failure to develop SAARC as a genuine network of political contacts which would reduce the importance of primitive action-reaction strategies and begin the process towards redundancy of military structures. (c) Since the military and political confrontation between the external powers i.e. U.S., China and Soviet Union never reached a certain threshold, in South Asia, as it did elsewhere in Europe and East Asia, the inertia of political interests developed during 1971-1981 still continues to dominate and no new proposals for the 1990s have led to any radical transformation of the military and political situation in South Asia.

This study is intended to contribute to a re-examination of prevailing assumptions which prevented a "security community" in the sense in which Karl Deutsch defines it emerging in South Asia during the decade 1971-1981. In this context a security community exists when reciprocal relations "exist among independent states which do not expect or fear the use of force in relations between them". India's security managers could not allay mutual suspicions with Pakistan and could not initiate a new era of order-building in South Asia although in 1971 India appeared to have a clear and realistic idea of a future political agenda. India was interested
in preventing great power intervention in the region and in securing cooperation with her neighbours through a re-examination of prevailing assumptions. In 1989, in an important speech at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (see Appendix V), the Indian Defence Minister Mr. K.C. Pant had to concede that "the dissonance between India and the countries around her" was one of the major factors influencing India's security perceptions. The lack of effective confidence building measures with Pakistan and China and the regional and international ramifications of India's adversary relations with them have prevented New Delhi from taking advantage of the erosion of Cold War ideologies. The prospect of war with Pakistan has prevented the knitting together of the economies of South Asia on lines which have led to integration of societies in other continents. Chinese foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution produced strains on India's security policy which were reduced only by 1971. But China's invasion of India's ally Vietnam in 1979 reawakened India's traumas and put it again on high alert. It was only in 1981 that India and China again resumed serious negotiations and established several working groups. While in Europe it was possible to take advantage of the Helsinki process to deal with the roots of conflict and progress to confidence building measures and arms reductions, a major obstacle to regional cooperation and security arrangements was India's alarm at United States-Chinese-Pakistani efforts to undertake joint defence equipment development and the continuing psychological impact of the 1959 US-Pakistan security agreement and of the 1971 deployment of the USS Enterprise. India, therefore, insisted on managing its own security and denied the need for any conceptual
reassessment which would detract from the fundamental and pervasive change which the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war had achieved. India does not have the capacity to control the flow of arms into Pakistan from the United States and China, but India's defence planners are determined to deny Pakistan the ability to deploy its naval forces in future as they did successfully in the 1971 war. In a broader context India's development of regional order values and practices is definitely impeded by her earlier experiences and the proliferating security threats during 1971-1981 and results in the predominance of "worst-case" scenarios in security planning. The logic of India having achieved predominance in military power in South Asia should lead it further to a logic of regional security which would not only depend upon India's real power projection capabilities but also on securing a major redefinition of political-strategic interests of other powers, especially the United States of America, so that the mutual interactions of threat perceptions are developed within a strategic structure of security which can harmonise South Asian realities with the emerging diplomatic, strategic and economic patterns of world politics.

This study seeks to provide what has been missing in the scholarly background literature in terms of relating security management and response options for a country like India to the established priorities on account of international systemic causes. In a specially designed questionnaire, (See Appendix III) the implications for India's security were examined in the context of 1. Asia's strategic importance 2. Non-alignment as a factor in United States - Indian conflictual relations 3. New Delhi - Washington Divergence over Kashmir 4. The fall out of India's policy over Korea 5. The dimensions of the U.S. - Pakistan military
The international situation is undergoing a great flux. The military component of power is becoming increasingly less significant than the economic and technological aspects. The powers of the great nations have tended to diffuse. An increasing number of middle tier powers are becoming meaningful actors in the international scene. The ideological divide is narrowing. Marxism-Leninism is undergoing a profound transformation. The world is coming to increasingly understand that non-military threats to security - the population explosion, adverse consequences of climatic changes, destruction of rain forests, toxic wastes, the debt problem, sluggish economic growth, religious fundamentalism and ethnic parochialism pose much greater threats to the security of nations than mere military threats. Development, population control, poverty alleviation, attention to ecological problems, cultivation of a secular and tolerant approach and democracy constitute a strategy package which can meet the real threats that humanity faces. Non-alignment, dissolution of military blocs,
elimination of nuclear weapons and mutually verifiable control over military R&D and a move towards an integrated world view are the vitally needed steps. We, in India, are aware that these attitudinal changes are not likely to come about overnight. However, we are optimistic that such attitudinal changes are bound to take place. Slavery, colonialism, denial of civic rights, the stand that women were biologically unfit to take political decisions and govern, the belief that nuclear wars can be fought and won, the assertion that non-alignment is immoral neutrality and such other attitudes have been consigned to the dustbin of history. Authoritarian exploitation, faith in religious fundamentalism and a belief that peace can only be built upon nuclear deterrence will hopefully go the same way.

The significance of India's defence capability can only be comprehended if India's foreign policy is analysed within a broader and comprehensive foreign policy framework. India's political and security dilemmas have, therefore, been examined by constantly relating them to a historical overview of India's efforts to overcome the protracted structural and perceptual crisis in South Asia. While the Prisoners' Dilemma game has suggested the combination of shared and antagonistic interests between India and Pakistan, the theory of cognitive dissonance directs attention to the balance sheet of diplomatic success and failure between India and the United States. India's vital relationship with the Soviet Union and her troubled history with China are viewed as part of the process of military-strategic parity in the former case and the result of the inherent uncertainties of the situation in which the two Asian giants found themselves launched into a political and military logic which they imperfectly understood.

The research design of this study therefore deals with the pursuit and fulfilment of goals in a world of excessive expectations and dangers and also points to implementation strategies which may answer the needs of moderate and realistic expectations in a world which is trying to create a new
international consensus and security structure.

The opening chapter in the study considers the problem posed for India by the strategic and technical changes which effected the security structure which India faced in relation to United States, China and Pakistan. The various patterns and processes of change which transformed the military-political situation in the subcontinent provide the definitional criteria for Indian conduct in security affairs.

The second chapter on Pakistan-United States alliance examines the consensus over foreign and security policies of an otherwise fragile defence and security cooperation. The sources of perpetual distortion between India and the United States can be related to contextual and casual features of the Pakistan - United States relationship in a number of ways.

The third chapter on Sino-Pak relations draws conclusions about the positive political gains from their mutual cooperation and points to the absence of a framework of security required by the societal nature of South Asian order.

The fourth chapter raises central questions about India's political choices and military options which gave Soviet conduct greater capabilities in South Asia than it otherwise would have had. The mutual acceptance of their respective rights by New Delhi and Moscow helped to define national interest and international security for India in a way which had important consequences for short term benefits.

The fifth chapter explains the forms and consequences of the security challenge posed to India in 1971-1981 in terms of the
persistent strategic and political conceptions which developed primarily because the United States subordinated other dimensions of its foreign policy to the fractiousness of the Cold War.

The final chapter conceptualises change in India's security relationships by challenging narrow assumptions, particularly the retrograde aspects of super power relationships between themselves and with South Asia.

Although India will always insist on managing its own security, yet the experience of 1971 to 1981 in fact points to the need to discover structural alternatives. Although this study has mainly been concerned with confrontation, yet its final conclusion points to the need to reassess and retool the security mechanisms for stable and peaceful relationships in South Asia.