APPENDIX -I

INDO-PAK AGREEMENT

Agreement on the prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the Contracting Parties,

Reaffirming their commitment to durable peace and the development of friendly and harmonious bilateral relations;

Conscious of the role of confidence building measures in promoting such bilateral relations based on mutual trust and goodwill;

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each party shall refrain from undertaking, encouraging or participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility in the other country.

2. The term "nuclear installation or facility" includes nuclear power and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, isotopes separation and reprocessing facilities as well as any other installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel and materials in any form and establishments storing significant quantities of radio-active materials.
Article II

Each Contracting Party shall inform the other on 1st January of each calendar year of the latitude and longitude of its nuclear installation and facilities and whenever there is any change.

Article III

This Agreement is subject to ratification. It shall come into force with effect from the date on which the Instruments of Ratification are exchanged.

Done at Islamabad on this Thirty-First day of December 1988, in two copies each in Hindi, Urdu and English, the English Text being authentic in case of any difference or dispute of interpretation.

(K.P.S. Menon) (Humayun Khan)
Foreign Secretary Foreign Secretary

For the Government of the
Republic of India

Government of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan

Source: Strategic Digest (Delhi), February 1989, p. 165.
APPENDIX - II

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Following is the Text of the joint communiqué issued at the end of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China, 19-23 December 1988.

At the invitation of Premier Li Peng of the People's Republic of China, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of the Republic of India made an official goodwill visit to the People's Republic of China from 19th to 23rd December, 1978.

Accompanying his excellency Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on his visit to China were Mrs Sonia Gandhi, Mr. Narasimha Rao, minister of external affairs of India, Mr. Dinesh Singh, minister of commerce, Dr. B. Shankaranand, minister of law and justice and water resources, Mr. K. Natwar Singh, minister of state for external affairs and other Indian officials.

Premier Li Peng and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi held talks in an atmosphere of friendship, candidness and mutual understanding.

President Yang Shangkun of the People's Republic of China, general secretary Zhao Ziyang of the Central Committee of the Communist Part of China (CPC) and Chairman Deng Xiaoping of the military commission of the CPC central committee had separate meetings with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

During his visit, the two governments signed the agreements on cooperation in the field of science and technology, the agreement relating to civil air transport, and the executive programme for the year 1988, 1989 and 1990 under the agreement for cultural cooperation...
Both the premier and the prime minister were present at the signing ceremony.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Mrs. Gandhi and their party also toured historical sites and scenic spots in Beijing, Xi'an and Shanghai.

During their talks and meetings, the leaders of the two countries had a wide exchange of views and ideas on bilateral relations and international issues of mutual interest. Both sides found such talks and meetings useful, as they enhanced mutual understanding in the interest of further improvement and development of bilateral relations.

The two sides made a positive appraisal of the cooperation and exchanges in recent years in trade, culture, science and technology, civil aviation and other fields, and expressed satisfaction with the relevant agreements reached between the two countries. They emphasised the scope that existed by learning from each other.

They emphasised that the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence, which were jointly initiated by India and China, which have proved full of vitality through the test of history, constitute the basic guiding principles for good relations between states.

These principles also constitute the basic guidelines for the establishment of a new international political order and the new international economic order.
Both sides agreed that their common desire was to restore, improve and develop India-China good-neighbourly and friendly relations on the basis of these principles. This not only conforms to the fundamental interests of the two peoples, but will actively contribute to peace and stability in Asia and the world as a whole. The two sides reaffirmed that they would make efforts to further their friendly relations.

The leaders of the two countries held earnest, indepth discussions on the India-Chia boundary question and agreed to settle this question through peaceful and friendly consultation.

They also agreed to develop their relations actively in other fields and work hard to create a favourable climate and conditions for a fair and reasonable settlement of the boundary question, while seeking a mutually acceptable solution to this question.

In this context, concrete steps will be taken, such as establishing a joint working group on the boundary question, and a joint group on economic relations and trade, and science and technology.

The Chinese side expressed concern over anti-China activities by some Tibetan elements in India. The Indian side reiterated the longstanding and consistent policy of the government of India that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that anti-China political activities by Tibetan elements are not permitted in the Indian soil.

With regard to the international situation, the two sides held that in the present-day world, confrontation was giving way to
dialogues, and tension to relaxation.

This is a trend resulting from long years of unswerving struggle by the peace-loving countries and people of the world against power politics. It is conducive to world peace and to the settlement of regional problems. It also facilitates the efforts of all countries, the developing countries in particular, to develop their national economies.

India and China will make their own contributions to the maintenance of world peace, promotion of complete disarmament and attainment of common progress.

His excellency Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi and their party expressed heartfelt thanks to the government and people of the People's Republic of China for the warm and friendly hospitality accorded to them.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi has invited Premier Li Peng to visit the Republic of India at his convenience. Premier Li Peng has accepted the invitation with pleasure. The date of the visit will be decided upon through diplomatic channels.

Source: Strategic Digest (Delhi), February 1989, pp.158-59.
QUESTIONNAIRE ON US - PAKISTAN - CHINA RELATIONS
AND THEIR IMPLICATION FOR INDIA's SECURITY

1. Asia's Strategic Importance :

Q 1.1. Why does the United States continue to devote so much
attention to Asia in the context of strategic and other
issues?

Q 1.2. Are there permanent American interests in Asia or is
America's evaluation of Asia's strategic importance
the result of a complex interaction with the Soviets?

Q 1.3. What are your projections for the future regarding
the strategic importance of Asia? Where would you
place India in this context?

2. Non-Aligned as a Factor in United States - Indian Conflictual
Relations :

Q 2.1. What is the American experience about the basic factors
which determine India's non-aligned policy?

Q 2.2. Which factors in Indian non-alignment are permanent
and which ephemeral?

Q 2.3. How far is Indian non-alignment an obstacle for the
attainment of U.S. goals in its economic, political and
strategic policies?

Q 2.4. How does India's non-block approach and her refusal
to join any military alliance affect American foreign
policy concerns?

Q 2.5. How does Indian non-alignment affect the realisation
of strategic stability within the Triangle formed by
Soviet Union, the U.S. and China?

Q 2.6. With the emergence of a new multipolar system of gre
powers, has Indian non-alignment become more acceptable
to the United States?
3. **New Delhi - Washington Divergence over Kashmir** :

Q 3.1. Kindly assess the strategic importance of Kashmir in the context of the US-Soviet Cold War?

Q 3.2. Has the US stand on Kashmir been part of a coherent American strategy towards South Asia?

Q 3.3. Are you aware of the strong suspicion in India that American policy on Kashmir is part of a plan to "balkanise" India?

Q 3.4. If India had accepted the US as a mentor would the American policy on Kashmir have changed?

Q 3.5. What judgement would you make on the future of the Kashmir issue? Will the US accommodate itself to the Indian political context on the Kashmir issue?

Q 3.6. Do you see any turning point in the US attitude to Kashmir in the context of the emerging regional configuration of power in South Asia?

4. **The Fall out of India's Policy over Korea** :

Q 4.1. Did the advent of the Communist regime in China make it imperative for the U.S. to have a new strategy within its Asian policy and if so, what was the implication for its policy for Korea?

Q 4.2. Did India's voting record in the U.N. and its not agreeing to condemn China as an aggressor in Korea affect U.S. Perception of India as a pro-Communist power?

Q 4.3. Did India's challenge to the U.S. global strategy during the Korean crisis lead eventually to the U.S. military alliance with Pakistan?

5. **The Dimensions of the U.S. - Pakistan Military Alliance** :

Q 5.1. Did the U.S. expect a genuine collective security arrangement with Pakistan or was its military aid to Pakistan simply intended to secure a client state in South Asia?
Q 5.2. Did the US-Pakistan military alliance which had an adverse effect on both US-India relations and India-Pakistan relations have an inner logic of its own, and if so, what was this logic?

Q 5.3. How far is U.S. policy a continuation of the earlier decision relating to the imposition of a military parity between India and Pakistan?

6. U.S. Military Role in the Indian Ocean:

Q 6.1. What were the political and military considerations which guided the U.S. after the British decided to quit East of Suez and created a "vacuum" in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal?

Q 6.2. What has been the United States' reaction to India's efforts at naval modernisation?

Q 6.3. What are the trends and tendencies that have affected U.S. goals, interests and policies in the Indian Ocean and led to maritime basing in Diego Garcia and the expansion of the Rapid Deployment Force?

7. United State's Military Role in the Persian Gulf:

Q 7.1. What are the considerations that guide US policy makers in the area of the Persian Gulf?

Q 7.2. Has Washington taken into consideration India's close interest in the Gulf on account of the linkage between the Indian Sub-continent and the Persian Gulf?

8. U.S. Policy of Non-Proliferation and India:

Q 8.1. How has the US directed its pressure on India to secure the objective of American nuclear non-proliferation policy?

Q 8.2. Has Washington taken into account India's threat perception from the Chinese nuclear programme?

Q 8.3. Has the US tolerated the building of Pakistan's Islamic Bomb in order to undermine India's strategic posture based on an increasing nuclear capacity with a weapon's option?
9. **U.S. Perception of Soviet Security Relationship with India**

Q 9.1. What is the American experience of the Soviet Union's security relationship with India:
   a. under Kruschev
   b. under Brezhnev
   c. under Gorbachev

Q 9.2. Has the United States re-evaluated its attitude to the Indo-Soviet security relationship after 1971?

Q 9.3. Does Washington expect any future divergence between India and Soviet Union in security matters?

10. **U.S. Attitude to India's Role in the Afghanistan Crisis**

Q 10.1. Did Washington expect India to play any special role at the onset of the Afghanistan crisis?

Q 10.2. Did India's inaction help to legitimise the Soviet presence in Afghanistan?

Q 10.3. How did Washington conceptualise Pakistan's role as a frontline state?

Q 10.4. What kind of role can India play in the Afghanistan context after Soviets have started the withdrawal of troops?

11. **U.S. Attitude to the Sino-Indian Dispute**

Q 11.1. What has been the U.S.'s reaction to the chain of developments since the Sino-Indian dispute erupted in 1962?

Q 11.2. Does the U.S. approve of the complex interaction between China and Pakistan aimed at putting India in a disadvantageous position?

Q 11.3. Does the U.S. expect a settlement to be achieved between India and China, and does it hope to gain from a Sino-Indian détente?
12. U.S. Views of India's Strategic Importance:

Q 12.1. What is the convergence and divergence in U.S. global strategic interests and Indian regional strategic interests?

Q 12.2. Does the US perceive India as having hegemonic ambitions in South Asia?

Q 12.3. How far does Washington's planning of the future US role in Asia take account of India's strategic importance?

13. U.S. Attitude to India's Treaty with the Soviet Union:

Q 13.1. Has the Indo-Soviet Treaty significantly prevented US access to India in economic, political or security matters?

Q 13.2. Does the US perceive India as part of an Anti-American coalition?

14. U.S. Views on Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace:

Q 14.1. Why did the Carter administration propose serious negotiations to the Soviet Union on the question of Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace?

Q 14.2. Could Brezhnev's proposals for a zone of peace in the Persian Gulf made in New Delhi in 1980 serve as a basis for negotiations?

Q 14.3. Is India's wish for total withdrawal of US and Soviet naval forces from the Indian Ocean at all feasible?

15. U.S. Views on Instability in the Third World:

Q 15.1. What are American expectations about an Indian role in removing instability in the Third World?

Q 15.2. How does Washington conceptualise changes that are likely to occur in the Third World as the world enters what Zbigniew Brzezinski has called the "post-post-war era"?

Q 15.3. How does the US intend to gain further prestige and influence in the Third World?
16. **U.S. Views on Global: War/Peace/Human Rights**

Q 16.1. What price is the US prepared to pay to avoid nuclear or conventional war?

Q 16.2. How is the U.S. fashioning its relationship with its allies, with the Soviet Union and China and with the Third World to ensure peace in a multipolar world?

Q 16.3. How are US goals, interests and policies affected by new perspectives in (a) Human Rights  
(b) Environmental Issues  
(c) Resurgence of the U.N. system

17. **U.S. - China Relations and India**

Q 17.1. In the Sino-American rapprochement of the 1970s was there anything inherently antagonistic towards India, threatening India's security?

Q 17.2. Or, is it the famous Indian 'tilt' towards Moscow which was growing stronger in the 1970s that brought the US-China relationship closer and tilted against India?

Q 17.3. What is the linkage factor in the Sino-American foreign policy, inviting the two against India?

Q 17.4. How do you react to US-Pak-China axis against India? Is it a myth or a reality? If it is not a reality, would you kindly explain it?

Q 17.5. China for some reasons is against India. Pakistan is fundamentally against India. The U.S. has various policy differences against India—some of them even of a basic nature—can these common factors form the basis of a US-Pak-China axis against India?
APPENDIX - IV

INDIA'S DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Defence Expenditure</th>
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<td>1984-85</td>
<td>6,661</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>7,987</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>10,477</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>14,500*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: STRATEGIC ANALYSIS (Delhi), Vol. XIII, no. 11, p. 1236.
This is the text of the speech delivered by K.C. Pant (former Minister of Defence of India, in the Government led by Rajiv Gandhi) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on 1 July 1989.

Even before India became independent, Jawaharlal Nehru, in his first broadcast after assumption of office as Vice-Chairman of the Viceroy's Executive Council, said on September 7, 1946 "we propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups aligned against one another which have led in the past to two world wars and which may again lead to disaster on an even vaster scale. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible... We seek no dominion over others and we claim no privileged position over other peoples". This was the basic tenet on which India's foreign and defence policies have been based over the last forty two years.

As India became free, on the midnight of August 15, 1947, the members of the Constituent Assembly of India took a pledge to dedicate themselves to this ancient land attaining her rightful place in the world and making her full and willing contribution to the promotion of world peace and the welfare of mankind.

Unfortunately, in spite of her ardent desire to promote international peace, especially in her neighbourhood, India has been involuntarily drawn into five wars involving her territorial integrity and national security. In 1947 Kashmir was invaded when it became a part of India on its ruler signing the instrument of
accession under the provisions of the Transfer of Power Act enacted by the British Parliament and accepted by a British Governor General. In 1962, the Chinese launched a massive attack across India's northern and north eastern borders. In April 1965, Pakistan attacked across the Rann of Kutch. In August 1965, Pakistan launched "Operation Gibraltar" and "Operation Grand Slam" against India and these have been chronicled in detail by Pakistani writers themselves. In 1971, the refusal of the Pakistan Army and West Pakistanis to accept the results of their national elections, which returned Sheikh Mujibur Rahman with a clear majority, and the unleashing of a genocide in East Bengal resulted in the entry of ten million refugees into Indian Territory and eventual escalation into a war. At the end of the war, East Bengal became sovereign Bangladesh.

It would not be out of place to recall that till 1962 India was spending less than 2 per cent of her GNP on defence. The military setback of 1962 and the compulsion of having to safeguard her western border as well as the long northern border involving varying terrains, such as snow clad peaks, thick forests, mountains, plain and deserts, necessitated the expansion of the Indian armed forces, resulting in the defence expenditure rising to around 3.3 per cent of GNP. The Defence budget remained stable at this level for nearly 15 years, till the early eighties. In recent years the Indian defence expenditure has been around 4 per cent of our GDP and yet remains one of the lowest among the nations of the world, including our immediate neighbours. In this context it may be observed that our economic growth rate, which for a long time hovered around 3.5 per cent. Moved up to over 5 per cent in the current plan, and is expected to grow to 6 per cent in the next
In the Indian context, defence and development are two sides to the coin of nation building. Long ago, Jawaharlal Nehru defined the equation of defence as defence forces plus the industrial and technological background plus the economy of the country and the spirit of the people.

This equation holds good even today. In other parts of the world, while there has been no war since 1945 hundreds of billions of dollars are spent on defence. On the other hand, India has been compelled to look after its defence in the light of our having had to defend our security on no less than five occasions in the forty two years since attainment of independence.

India has never believed in dividing the world into permanently frozen antagonistic blocs. Non-alignment and peaceful co-existence were vital components of our foreign policy long before the idea came to be accepted by other nations. India has constantly believed in foreign and defence policies built around enlightened national interest and not around ideologies, political or religious. As President George Washington had advised the fledgling American state in his farewell address, India avoided entangling alliances and did not join any military pact. Those who criticised India's non-alignment had evidently not understood that the largest democracy in the world was in fact emulating the model set by the second largest democracy, a century and half earlier!

The security problems of India arise out of four major factors:
(i) India's geography and geo-strategic location;
(ii) the prevalent strategic doctrines;
(iii) the dissonance between India and the countries around her; and
(iv) the inexorable drive of the weapon technologies pursued by industrialised nations and their selective arms proliferation policies.

All these factors are attributable to the attitudes and strategic doctrines prevalent in most of the world and the values and perceptions of the leading industrialised countries which determine the world strategic environment. It must be appreciated that while India herself does not subscribe to these strategic doctrines, it is not possible for her to ignore the belief systems of other countries - especially the most powerful ones in the world. Inescapably, the Indian defence policy has to be designed to take into account the realities of the existing world order even while continuing to work towards peace and cooperation, which are imperative if this planet is to survive as a habitable one.

It so happens that India has nuclear weapon powers in its vicinity. China shares our longest border. Very often this factor tends to be over-looked when India's security problems are viewed within the narrow context of the erstwhile British Indian Raj frontiers - what is today termed as the SAARC region.

British India had the best army in Asia. Britain was the super power of the world and British Navy was the most potent and versatile instrument of coercive diplomacy. At that time the British Raj in India tried to shape the strategic environment of
Afghanistan, Xinjiang, Tibet and, in Asia, from Suez to Malacca.

Today, the strategic environment of Asia is totally different. Technology has made the Himalayas a surmountable barrier. China, India, USSR, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan, all ranking populous countries, form a cluster in Asia. With its Central Command, encompassing part of South Asia, the USA and USSR are acknowledged nuclear weapon powers and Pakistan is believed to have acquired a nuclear weapon capability. Thus, the three largest nuclear powers in the world. USA, USSR and China, interact in our region and this strategic interaction is a vital factor in India's security calculations.

Let me now turn to the strategic doctrines prevalent in the world. The industrialised nations, which are also militarily significant powers, have adopted nuclear deterrence as their basic security doctrine. India does not subscribe to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. However, India just cannot afford to overlook the fact that three major nuclear powers operate in its neighbourhood and Pakistan is engaged in a nuclear weapons programme. If we are to influence these major powers and attempt to ensure that they do not indulge in nuclear threats then it becomes inescapably necessary for us to reckon with their nuclear deterrence concepts. As our Prime Minister said in the third UN special session on disarmament, "left to ourselves we would not want to touch nuclear weapons. But when tactical considerations, in the passing play of great power rivalries, are allowed to take precedence over the imperatives of nuclear non-proliferation, with what leeway are we left?"
India and other non-aligned countries have repeatedly proposed in the United Nations that the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons be outlawed. Over 136 nations have repeatedly voted for the resolution. India and the Soviet Union have jointly proposed that pending elimination, the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons should be banned. But seventeen militarily significant industrialised nations including three nuclear weapon powers, have consistently opposed these moves. It is proclaimed that nuclear weapons have preserved peace in Europe and therefore nuclear deterrence is salutary. Then, would it not be logical if some more countries get nuclear weapons so that the ambience of deterrence is increased all over the world, contributing to greater peace? This is not what we assert, but is it not the fall out of doctrines propounded by the leaders of certain nuclear weapon powers? Our Prime Minister has proposed a three phase programme of elimination of nuclear weapons. India, having demonstrated its nuclear capability, has exercised enormous restraint in not producing a nuclear arsenal. This has gone totally unappreciated by nations which assert their belief in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. India had proposed in 1965, and again in 1988, that there must be a reciprocity of obligations between nuclear weapon powers and the threshold nations. If the former would agree to a phased programme of elimination of nuclear weapons, the latter should not cross the nuclear threshold. Peace and freedom are indivisible so also human rights, war doctrines and weapons philosophy. Is it not ironical that those who would unhesitatingly dismiss the argument of dictators and fundamentalists that democracy and human rights are alright for phlegmatic cold climate people but not for people in
the developing world find nothing discriminatory in the argument that certain types of weapons are desirable and necessary for certain nations but not for others?

Unless nuclear proliferation by the industrialised nations is halted and reversed and an effective move is made towards their elimination, it will not be feasible to think of preventing the proliferation of nuclear and other sophisticated weapons. India has repeatedly made her position clear that she is for the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world. India does not accept the thesis that nuclear deterrence is good for preserving peace in some parts of the world, but that other nations should not have such weapons. Such an argument itself poses security threats to the nations of the world. India, with one sixth of the world's population, and situated as it is within a cluster of some of the most powerful nuclear nations, adopts a global approach to the problem of nuclear weapons. Radioactive clouds do not recognise regional borders. The same arguments apply to various kinds of sophisticated non-nuclear weapons as well, such as ballistic missiles.

Another important issue is the dissonance between India and countries around. India has chosen to be secular, democratic, federal and to give linguistic autonomy to its states. India has been able to accommodate Communism within its democratic framework and two of our states are governed by Marxists within the parliamentary order. They get elected in free and fair elections and go out of office if they are voted out, as happened in Tripura last year. While recently Pakistan has moved towards a democratic framework and Sri Lanka has been democratic for the last four decades, our other neighbours still tread a different path. The
developing nations who got decolonised after 1945 are in a state of turbulence because of the problems arising out of nation building. This was the case in Europe and North America too for three centuries and finally the international rivalries exploded into two world wards. Denial of democracy and representational government, lack of human rights, discrimination, fundamentalism, uneven development etc., all these factors have caused instabilities in the developing nations while they are attempting to evolve into stable nation-states. India having accepted liberal democratic secular values, has demonstrated a stability and political maturity which has confounded many of its critics.

Many of the security problems in South Asia arise out of this contraction between liberal democracy on the one hand and militarism, authoritarianism of various types, and religious fundamentalism on the other.

Some of the regimes have sought to reply on external linkages to sustain militarism, authoritarianism and status quo at home. Here again, India's stand is clear. She stands for democracy. It is not quite clear whether the nations which practice democratic values at home do not succumb to the temptation of supporting various kinds of authoritarianism elsewhere in the world, purely for reasons of strategic expediency.

Our security policy has also to take into account the engine of technology in advanced countries, which producers successive generations of sophisticated weapons. Strategic doctrines of great powers as expounded in the document "Discriminate Deterrence" advocate provision of high technology weapons to allies in the developing world. There has been a long history of introduction of high technology weapons on a discriminatory basis to selected
countries to shape the strategic environment in a particular region. India is compelled to take this possibility into account both in regard to its own R&D and its weapon acquisition programmes. One of our grave concerns emanates from the fact that long range Naval missiles are available to various countries in the Indian Ocean area. These missiles, fired from submarines, can pose serious threats to our shore installations such as atomic power plants, chemical plants etc. Consequently, we are compelled to pay increasing attention to anti-submarine warfare.

It is our view that war is no longer a viable instrument of policy, as envisaged in the nineteenth century. Vietnam, Afghanistan, the various anticolonial wars, the recent Iraq-Iran war and the happenings along the West Bank have established that it is costlier to keep an alien people under occupation than to invade a territory. Military power as a component of overall strength is fast losing its earlier pre-eminence, when compared to economic and technological power. The popular media have of late tended to sensationalise India's military role. One has only to look at the voting record at the UN of our neighbours and compare it with ours to get a clear understanding of how much our neighbours feel intimidated by our military power. Our roles in Sri Lanka and Maldives were responses to calls from our neighbours in difficulties. India has no desire to play the role of a regional policeman. The role of our armed forces is strictly defensive and is meant to safeguard the autonomy of our decision making and our development processes, particularly in the political and social development sectors, and to ensure that the turbulence in the countries around us does not spill over into our territory. Militarist regimes often interpret the Indian defence
effort on the basis of the historical experience of the major
nations of the 18th, 19th and the first half of the 20th century
and tend to ascribe various motivations to India on the basis of
conventional wisdom. Most of the western strategic literature, with
its emphasis on military power, also contributes to this kind of
perspective and the elites of the developing nations around India
are also influenced by such literature. This is quite
understandable since India has a self-contained civilisational and
philosophical tradition, distinguished from the great civilisations
to its north, west and east. Gandhiji's Satyagraha and Nehru's
non-alignment are products of this tradition. One has to take note
of the fact that it is this distinguishing civilisational feature
which has enabled India to internalise parliamentary democratic
values and made the Indian Army an apolitical institution, both
achievements unfortunately somewhat rare phenomena in the
developing world.

The international situation is undergoing a great flux. The
military component of power is becoming increasingly less
significant than the economic and technological aspects. The
powers of the great nations have tended to diffuse.

An increasing number of middle tier powers are becoming
meaningful actors in the international scene. The ideological
divide is narrowing. Marxism-Leninism is undergoing a profound
transformation. The world is coming to increasingly understand
that non-military threats to security - the population explosion,
adverse consequences of climatic changes, destruction of rain
forests, toxic wastes, the debt problem, sluggish economic growth,
religious fundamentalism and ethnic parochialism pose much greater
threats to the security of nations than mere military threats.
Development, population control, poverty alleviation, attention to ecological problems, cultivation of a secular and tolerant approach and democracy constitute a strategy package which can meet the real threats that humanity faces. Non-alignment, dissolution of military blocs, elimination of nuclear weapons and mutually verifiable control over military R&D and a move towards an integrated world view are the vitally needed steps.

We, in India, are aware that these attitudinal changes are not likely to come about overnight. However, we are optimistic that such attitudinal changes are bound to take place. Slavery, colonialism, denial of civic rights, the stand that women were biologically unfit to take political decisions and govern, the belief that nuclear wars can be fought and won, the assertion that non-alignment is immoral neutrality and such other attitudes have been consigned to the dustbin of history. Authoritarian exploitation, faith in religious fundamentalism and a belief that peace can only be built upon nuclear deterrence will hopefully go the same way.

I belong to a civilization which holds "Ekam Sat. Viprah Bahudha Vadanti" (Truth is one, the learned expound it in many ways). Even while waiting optimistically and patiently for such inevitable attitudinal changes to take place, we have to safeguard our democratic way of life from miscalculated adventurism.

It is our hope that democracy will prevail. Once this comes about and the movement towards arms reduction in Europe blossoms into a worldwide trend towards the elimination and reduction of nuclear weapons and other sophisticated arms, we shall be able to reduce our defence effort and devote scarce resources to accelerate our development.
To bring about this process we need the understanding and support of the democracies of the world. We urge them to pause, reflect and review their past perceptions and world view nurtured during the cold war period and calculate their cost-effectiveness in retrospect. The Soviet Union has embarked upon "new thinking". The "Gentler and Kindlier World" that President Bush visualises is what the entire international community must strive for.

Let us start a dialogue on how to promote a gentler, kindlier and more democratic world which will move towards a non-violent, nuclear-weapon-free international order and ensure a habitable planet for the generations to come.
Annexure i of Appendix III

Individuals and Organisations with whom discussions were held on the basis of the Questionaire:

Dr. Abdul Majeed Mandi
Member, Social Welfare Committee
Karachi.

Dr. Adam Meyerson
School of International and Public Affairs
Columbia University
New York

Dr. Allen W. Thrasher
Director
Asian Division
Library of Congress
Washington D.C.

August A. Imholtz Jr.
Editor in Chief
Special Collections
Congressional Information Service
Washington D.C.

Carmen Ballard
Carmegie Endowment for International Peace
New York

Dr. Caroline J. Beeson
Director
South Asian Affairs
International Division
Peace Research Institute
Washington D.C.

Craig M. Karp
Afghanistan Analyst
U.S. Department of State
Washington D.C.

Dimitri K. Simes
Professional lecturer at the John Hopkins University
School of Advanced International University
Annexure i of Appendix III

Ernst B. Haas
Research Professor of Government at the
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