CONCLUSION: LESSONS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR INDIA'S SECURITY

The South Asian Security Problematic: A Framework for analysis and Reflections on Experience

The previous chapters provide insights into the process of conflictual relationships which made South Asia an area of protracted regional crisis. We now turn to the study of the potential for progressive change by relating the experience of political and military competition to optimal alternative situations.

Our study suggests a framework analysis which while focussing primarily on the positions articulated by India, Pakistan, China, United States and the Soviet Union in the course of the period 1971-1981, would also visualise alternative situations which would bring about substantial changes in attitude of policymakers in South Asia and in the external decision-making centres could recognise shared and complementary interests. The application of Leon Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance suggests that there is a good chance of limiting the classic dangers of South Asian political and military history of the decade 1971 and 1981 if national security issues can be tackled in a manner which copes with "dissonance". In place of rationalisation and distortion South Asian decision makers have an opportunity after the global East-West relationship has undergone a sea change, to develop option-appraisal on a fresh basis. Even the deep rooted sources of the protracted India- Pakistan predicament can be reopened and reviewed to learn from past mistakes and restore balance and consistency. The United States along with the Soviet Union and China can also overcome the inertia which prevails in vast military establishments which have a vested interest in linkages with Third World countries to carefully structure transitional arrangements.
In the new framework neither US, Soviet Union or China should claim to be the primary arbiter of events in South Asia. India and Pakistan, themselves can open the door to fundamental change in South Asia if they can recognise mutual vulnerability as an essential ingredient in structuring responses.

The Removal of Cold War Constraints from Conflict Management to Exploration of Peace Prospects

The end of the global ideological struggle has not yet provided the opportunity to relate the factors favouring security cooperation to the larger question of how the vacuum of international (east-west) tension will be eventually filled. The internal security dilemmas of the Soviet Union have not helped Moscow to focus on questions of international order to the extent Gorbachev would have wished when he started with his new thinking. The optimistic view of United States - Soviet cooperation in security matters is balanced by the many technical and theoretical questions about the manner in which the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was handled as a test case of the post Cold War Order. There is no necessary or inevitable association of what has happened in West Asia with what may happen in the absence of stabilisation in South Asia. There, are, however, practical questions of utmost importance which if not attended to, can provoke a sequence of actions leading towards irrational acts and choices. A summary review of the evidence provided in this study helps to direct attention to the urgent steps which are needed to move towards responsible foreign policies related to core interests of security and survival.

Those who celebrated the demise of superpower rivalry must be wondering whether the world in its revised shape is a better place to live in. In this conflict few things have been sadder than the
spectacle of Mikhail Gorbachev rushing out plan after plan, emissary after emissary, beseeching George Bush to relent but all the peace proposals were treated not more than waste papers.

What is the substance of the Iraq syndrome, which has now replaced the Vietnam syndrome? The United States concretely hopes that the divisions sown among and within Arab and Muslim nations by the war will endure. For the first time the Arab-Israeli axis of conflict which dominated western Asian politics for 40 years, has been now overshadowed by intra-Arab conflicts. More broadly, the Iraq syndrome signals the return of American political and military hegemony of a global scale. The United States has already enjoyed the exquisite pleasure of seeing Soviet economic and military strength crumble along with the accompanying decline in the appeals of communism and socialism. The US had successfully subdued anti-imperialist movements in Latin America and Africa. Most of Asia too, including China, India, Pakistan and Vietnam, posed no obstacle to US designs.

The United States may no longer be number one in terms of economic performance of technological knowhow. However, the fact that it has been reaffirmed number one in military might—and that its leaders are quite unabashed in ordering the use of force which would weigh heavily in perceptions and therefore, in the equations of international power politics. No matter that American troops in Iraq were in effect mercenaries financed by Germany, Japan and Saudi Arabia. "American public opinion had to be persuaded to see the war as a more—perhaps a better term is religious-crusade".

The fears of a Pax-Americana too are not realistic. Most attention has been paid to Gorbachev's troubles at home, but not
enough to the domestic economic crisis of the United States. The United States is as much under objective pressure for restructuring or perestroika. The relative decline of America's global economic position has been accompanied by the growing inability to be productive at home and compete abroad. The massive budget and international trade deficits, a banking system teetering on the verge of collapse, and the rapid decline or even abandonment of such core industries as automobiles, steel and consumer based electronics, the United States is in deep economic crisis—hardly a recipe for sustaining global military superiority. There is no denying the pressure on Washington to reconfigure its global strategic position. Nor can one ignore the severe domestic constraints on the use of military power abroad.

In fact, it is transparent from the above mentioned factors that in 1990s we are moving into a world with no recognisable hegemony. It is a world in which power—economic, political and military is increasingly fragmented, Germany and Japan are economic giants but remain strategic pygmies. Russia and China are military powers without the economic clout. The United States is certainly the most balanced of all the great powers, but it is in no position unilaterally to determine the structure of a new world order. It needs widespread international support even to lead, let alone dominate. It is by recognising the internal and external limitations of its power that the Bush Administration was successful in the Gulf.

Anyway the breakdown of the cold war as a result of the far reaching changes in Soviet ideology and policies has clearly
had a vast political impact on the global order and the States that constitute it. The environment with its sweeping changes in US-USSR relations, the democratic wave in Eastern Europe, USSR and other socialist states, the dismantling of the troops of the cold war, offer a far greater scope for rapid development and cooperation than ever before. A new global order led to the emergence of the new correlation of forces.

China and India would be the most important military powers in the developing world and it is in the interest of both as well as other developing countries that they not only grasp the dimension of these changes but make best use of them to complete the task of nation building and industrialisation rapidly. It opens the prospects for creating a more democratic, peaceful and egalitarian world system than the one that exists.

Though the events in June 1989 in China have left a large question mark over the nature of Chinese interaction with the world. The basic transformation in the East-West relations and the profound changes in the European socialist world have boxed China into an uncomfortable corner, forcing the ageing leadership in Beijing to revive ideological rhetoric of the past in defending the indefensible. The antics of Nixon/Kissinger notwithstanding and despite the eagerness of the Bush Administration to return to business-as-usual with Beijing, it is unlikely that the sino-US relationship would ever return to the past peak. Sino-US relations are today at their worst since the 1971 rapprochement Western sanctions on loans, high technology and military and scientific
contacts have seriously hurt China, compounding its economic and political crisis. Secondly, the radical transformation in the Soviet Union, East Europe, the end to state socialism and one party dictatorship in these countries has raised the pressures for democratisation in China manifold. The ideological legitimacy that the socialist bloc by its very presence and apparent success provided to the CPC's monopoly on power has collapsed, driving the party state in China to increasingly rely on the military and other coercive institutions to stave off the internal and external pressures to democratise; At a moment of its deepest political and economic crisis since liberation, the CPC needed not only a peaceful external environment, but the ideological support of the East and the economic backing of the west to stay in control. Both of these are no more available. The result has been to heighten economic, political and ethnic pressures internally. Tibet and Xinjiang are increasingly unstable with revolt movements growing. The students, workers and intellectuals are alienated.

CPC's denial of the due democratic rights to the people of China is also irritating United States vis-a-vis US's support and publicity to such movements including military help to Taiwan has been also big hurdle in Sino-US relations.

The Sino-American rapprochement was a classic case of two sides coming together in the face of a common threat which subsumed the far greater contradictions which were inherent in the views of the American and Chinese leaders. Once the common threat became not so common and not as threatening either, the
contradictions surfaced to bedevil the course of the relationship. What is interesting however is that the Soviet-American detente on this occasion did hasten the process of Sino-Soviet normalisation. At any rate, Chinese indirectly benefited from the outcome of the superpower talks on arms control which went a long way in clearing up the ground between China and the USSR, viz., the elimination of the SS-20 missiles from Asia under the December 1987 INF agreement between the US and the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the Afghanistan.

To improve its strategic environment and to overcome some of its external problems, China has over the past two years made a concerted effort to strengthen ties with the "Third World" and top Chinese leaders have visited Africa, Latin America, South Asia, even while efforts have continued to normalise relations with the USA. Since the second half of 1989, a series of high level Chinese delegations have visited India. Deputy Premier Wu Xuequian came in September just before premier Li peng visited Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh to underline China's policy of peaceful coexistence and its desire to improve relations with India. Chinese pronouncements have stressed that in Southern Asia it would like to see a stable environment and support all efforts to settle problems bilaterally through negotiations. It did not recognise the Peshawar based rebel Afghan government and refused to back the Pakistani campaign to internationalize the Kashmir problem. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen during his visit to India not only pushed for widening Sino-Indian ties but also clarified that China wanted India and Pakistan to settle their disputes bilaterally,
under Simla agreement. The Sino-Indian summit of December 1988 and the Sino-Soviet summit of May 1989 were major milestones in framing a foreign policy conducive to China's developmental needs.

Conflict and Threat Perception: Structure and Linkage in South Asian Security

The security perceptions of both Pakistan and India have been shaped by both internal and external considerations. The two countries emerged as independent actors on the international stage after great communal violence in which millions of men, women and children became refugees. Although negotiations and agreements were arrived at for reducing mutual vulnerability, the situation that prevailed in the state of Jammu and Kashmir had far reaching implications for impeding efforts at bilateral cooperation. Action-reaction theories can largely explain the lack of policy coordination between the two states and the dynamics of undesirable arms races. The structure and linkage in South Asian security reflected the mutual increase in Super power engagement in the Indo-Pakistan conflict and the ramifications of India's security concerns with China. Even with the shift away from the confrontational patterns of behaviour between the Soviets and the Americans, conceptual rethinking has not gained ground in South Asia.

The benign development of the international environment is yet to penetrate into the subcontinent. The Soviet-American detente, the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian normalisation would eventually have some positive impact in the region, by removing the external stimuli for regional conflicts but the sources of tension
are essentially indigenous. The critical one is the religious ideological basis of the state in Pakistan and its commitment to the two-nation theory. It faces an identity crisis. Is it a "homeland" for Indian Muslims or an Islamic state? Neither it could formulate the constitution of Islamic laws to be followed in Pakistan nor could it become "homeland" for Indian Muslims because there are/ Muslims in India than there are in Pakistan. Besides, it is generally forgotten that the emergence of Bangladesh in any case, quite effectively dispelled the notion of religion necessarily being the basis of a state. Homeland concept dictates constant efforts as pariy with India. Since India is ten times her size, Pakistan perforce has to seek external help to maintain parity. Inability to achieve parity makes her feel insecure. Thus the factor of insecurity is woven into the very foundation of the Pakistani state. Security threat perceived by Pakistan is a product of hostility and quest for parity.

While some of the international leverage it could bring to bear on the subcontinent would diminish as a result of detente, it retains those linked to pan-Islamism. Pakistan, which was the artificially created Islamic nation thought that it being the "land of the pure", it could lead the pan-Islamic movements. In 1949, it organised the Islamic Economic conference in Karachi where Liaquat Ali Khan expressed the need for economic collaboration amongst Muslim states. He said, "Pakistan has one and only one ambition: to serve Islam and humanity". 1 Progressive Arab States

who were founding members of the Non-Aligned movement opposed the Pakistani desire for leadership of the Muslim World and preferred to view international relations from a non-bloc angle be it the blocs of the two super powers or the proposed Islamic bloc. The issue of the Palestinians was the most important issue for the Arabs, Israel and implicitly the United States, were looked upon as aggressors. The non-aligned movement gave strong support to the just cause of the Palestinian struggle. Initially Pakistan supported the Palestinian cause, but the breaking point came with the decision of Karachi to join the Baghdad pact. This way to the Arabs, Pakistan had broken ranks in the paramount struggle against Israel and its supporters over the decision of Pakistan to join the Baghdad pact as both an alliance with West and also as a step forward to Islamic Unity came to naught. The breaking point was over the Suez crisis, when Pakistan sided with the West. Why Ayub became pro-US was because CENTO offered power and political realities. He blamed the Pan-Islamists as being "no more than a bunch of busy bodies dabbling and interfering in the affairs of others on the pretext of Universal Muslim brotherhood". ²

Those days in the Arab states Non-Aligned was the wave and Nasser's early adoption of non-alignment ruled out sympathy for Pakistan, which was an ally of the United States and by extension, a supporter of Israel. Therefore, Pakistan had to limit itself to promoting pan-Islamism only among the Conservative Arab

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states, which were under the United States security umbrella. Well, power politics had put the ideological commitment in the back seat which was best amplified by Pakistan Prime Minister Suhrawardhy while replying to the question "Why don't we (the muslim countries) get together rather than be tied to a big power like the UK and America?" He replied, "My answer is that Zero plus zero plus zero still equals zero. We have therefore, to go farther a field rather than get all the zeroes together because they will never be able to produce anything which is substantial". ³ Often "identity crisis" bedevils Pakistan which turns to the Islamic countries of West Asia, but remains India-oriented and geographically in South Asia. A typical example of this: forget-me not approach was to point out that Pakistan "possesses a pivotal position in the four sub-territorial systems. South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia and the Arab littoral states on the Asian continent". ⁴

Pakistan is the fourth largest recipient of US aid, after Israel, Egypt, and Turkey, having been pledged $3.2 billion in a six-year military and economic aid package beginning in 1981". ⁵ Pakistan plays a critical role in US security planning in the region. Pakistan is a major exporter of military man power,

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"it has some 40,000 - 50,000 military personnel stationed in 22 countries in the middle East and Africa". 6

By highlighting Pakistan's potential military-security, Islamabad was constantly sending signals to Washington of its unique setting for looking after United States interests in the region. In return, Islamabad wanted military-cum-economic aid and the latest weaponry to attain military superiority in relation to India. On the other hand, by wooing the Saudies, it hoped to keep its influence in the region.

In 1971 the dismemberment of Pakistan not only produced significant changes in the orientation of its foreign policy, but it coincided with tremendous changes that were taking place in the world. Particularly with the end of "Nasserism", the Saudis by 1970s emerged as the clear leaders of the conservative Arab and Muslim states of the region. Why the Americans propped up the Saudis is the significant question to ask? With a huge oil potential the Saudis along with the Iranians, who also had large oil reserves, were designated as the "twin pillars" of the United States regional security arrangement for the middle East under the Guam Doctrine announced by President Nixon in 1969's oil power was becoming the number one issue for the US and the regional security arrangement was to keep the region stable and for oil exports without interruption to beef up the two regional policemen arsenals, the United States began a massive military aid programme. The trebling of oil prices in 1973 considerably

increased the clout of the Saudis as they emerged as one of the largest donors of aid to other Muslim countries and along with Iran, became the engine for economic development of Middle East. The earlier divisions between the radical and conservative Arab states vanished and economic development became the dominant theme and new emphasis on Islamic Unity. While Bhutto was courting the Saudis and other Middle Eastern States, Pakistan's relations with the United States began hitting new lows. Pakistan's geographical location was low priority for the United States with creation of the two pillar policy formulated under the Guam Doctrine. Expression of this lowering of strategic importance of Pakistan was reflected in the intense pressure that the US administration put on the nuclear issue and human rights question. Soon after the relations between the two countries began going downhill, Bhutto was cementing his relations with the Saudis, Iranians and Turks. More than concern for Islamic Unity, Pakistan's foreign policy before, during and after Bhutto has been to create strategic alliances with the countries to counter India's military "dominance of the region".

In 1979 and onwards the collapse of the Shah of Iran's regime and the Afghan invasion by the Soviet Union produced an altogether different equation. Firstly, replacement of Iran by Pakistan as the United States "listening post" in the region. Secondly, the growth of Pak-Saudi relations. With the resumption of US arms supplies to Pakistan in the wake of the Afghan crisis, Pakistan's trading of military advisors and personnel and deserving facilities proved mutually beneficial. United States had almost unanimous support within the Arab World on the Afghan issue.
In an effort to build a new nexus for stability in the region, US encouraged Pak-Saudi military cooperation. The Pak-Saudi military agreement envisages the possibility of the transference of $1 billion a year in aid for the troops. This new strategic relationship has been strengthened in the post-Berlin Wall period.

In the recent Kuwait crisis, Pakistan, initially, was reluctant to send its troops but the "coincidence" of the dismissal of Benazir government with tacit United States approval and the decision to send troops to Saudi Arabia under severe American pressure "to defend the holy places" clearly shows the direction in which Pakistan's Gulf policy has travelled. Defending Pakistan's decision to send troops as having a limited objective of preventing defilement of Islam's two holy places, General Aslam Beg is reported to have boasted while dealing with the ramifications of this decision on the security of Pakistan. He said, "I have a big force and I can mobilise a bigger reservist force within days.... Pakistan's entente with the Saudis and Washington would deter India from attacking Pakistan." 7

Well there is no doubt about the tremendous upsurge of anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. The pertinent fact is that not only at popular level but also within the ruling Pakistani establishment fairly strong anti-Americanism persists. This has less to do with the Gulf war's aftermath than with the dispute with the US over Pakistan's nuclear policy that has led to the

suspension of American military and economic aid. According to Thomas P. Thornton:

the turbulent Pakistan could look abroad for some source to blame for its problems, and the United States would be second only to India as a suspect. Anti-Americanism is endemic in Pakistan-based beliefs that the United States manipulates Pakistani politics, was responsible for the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, introduces corrupting influences into Pakistani society, opposes the country's nuclear aspirations and is dominated by a Jewish lobby that is anti-Islamic and hence anti-Pakistan. This anti-Americanism is unfocused politically, but it can be dramatically mobilized. The mob attack on the United States information service building in Islamabad in February 1989, like the much more destructive assault of the US embassy compound a decade earlier, are vivid reminders of how Anti-Americanism can be fanned. (8)

Pakistan looked to the Muslim world from its earliest days as its preferred ally and support but due to the lack of response from most of the Muslim countries and the perceived threat from India overrode these preferences in the Early 1950s and resulted in the US alliance. However in the following decade Pakistan came to realize that the US relationship was not reliable in dealing with the Indian threat, it reached out elsewhere: first to China and for a while to the Soviet Union, then again to an increasingly self-conscious Islamic world as the most important relationship in Pakistan's domestic politics. Diversification has been a constant phenomenon in Pakistan's foreign policy, even in the 1980s during the years of close US-Pakistan relations, when Pakistan realized that only US can counter a threat from the Soviet Union. Now with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan there is great support for lessening America's role in Pakistan and relying instead

on China and Iran. Though Iran is opposed to the Saudi-US relationship; and the emergence of Saudi Arabia as the leader of Islamic world with its financial clout. Iranians expressed displeasure at Pakistan's stationing of troops in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s. Now they might be coming out with strong displeasure for Pakistan's support and active involvement in the US policy towards the Persian Gulf in the recent Gulf crisis and agreeing to participate in the Islamic task force. Besides, China and Iran have politically tilted in favour of Kremlin's regional policies. Also very interestingly, the Jammat-e-Islami, of all parties, has started saying that the 'evil empire is no longer the Soviet Union but the United States. Yet it remains to be seen as to what extent and in what way, the United States would be able to prevent interaction of China-Pakistan-Soviet-Saudi ties vis-a-vis the existing pattern of China-Pakistan-Saudi-US relations. It also remains to be seen as how long Mr. Sharif is going to stay in his chair as, no wonder many are already fearing the return of martial law. Mr. Sharif is being accused by Ms Bhutto of 'paving the way' for renewed military rule and, according to some newspaper reports, Air Marshal (retired) Asgher Khan has written to army leaders to take over.

Pakistan's instability threatens the security of India. India and Indians have suffered acutely due to Pakistan's exploitation of Kashmir for domestic reasons. Kashmir shield is useful as a diversionary tactic whenever faced with a domestic crisis. However, after a year and half of violent conflict, it is clear that Pakistan's strategy has not succeeded. There has been little
support in the international community also. At the UN, Iran and Saudi Arabia were the only two (out of 46) Muslim countries to speak up with any conviction in support of Pakistan's position. In contrast, the United States and UK including China have given clear indication of their support for the bilateral resolution of the problem within the framework of the Simla agreement. In order to neutralise Pakistan's manoeuvres with India only positive option open is, that India must accelerate its efforts to improve relations with China, United States, and Iran rather than dwell on stale ideas that have bedevilled its foreign policy over the last forty years. India must set its sights beyond Pakistan and aim to participate, if not influence, events in south east and southwest Asia.

The gulf region itself is a hectic area of activity as various actors put forward plans to stabilise its structure, rehabilitate war-ravaged Kuwait and Iraq, and ensure longterm supplies of oil at reasonable prices. Each desires primarily to serve their own interests. South Asia is conveniently situated to help with this problem. It can contribute adequately and quickly with security forces due to its trained manpower, familiar with the gulf will in any case be indispensable for reconstruction and rehabilitation, which ever major companies obtain the contracts. The triumph of the US-led forces in the Gulf suggests that there will be some disturbances in the balance of power in West Asia. This is an opportunity for India to play a meaningful role in the post war order. India has been deeply involved, both politically and emotionally, in the Arab-Israeli question, since the last few decades. Today that question has been marginalised and reduced
to the settlement through peaceful negotiations unlike the past decades when Arabs had rejected the very concept of negotiated settlement with the Jews. While the Arabs, including the PLO leaders, have changed their stance particularly after the recent gulf crisis, Indian policy still has to reflect that changing mood vis-a-vis the basic Arab-Israeli question. An updated appreciation of Arab-Israeli relations becomes essential if India has to frame its West Asia policy on a sound footing.

The world is changing, and India needs to change with it. There has been an economic revolution of unprecedented proportions in the South, which has seen some countries move from poverty to riches within two decades. India certainly needs to cast aside obsolete ideas and take advantage of the new opportunities created by the globalisation of the world economy. But such policy changes must be based on our internal convictions of what is good for us, not fear of foreign mandarins. The need to maintain an independent line of thinking must not come in the way of a radical overhaul of old policies that have left us poor while so many other Asian countries have pulled ahead. However experience has shown the feasibility of our taking an independent line even in agencies long considered unipolar, such as the World Bank and IMF. Mr. Ronald Reagan opposed India, $5-billion-dollar IMF loan in 1981, but could not succeed. Mr. Richard Nixon cut off US aid to India during the 1971 War, and put pressure on the World Bank to do likewise, instead, aid from the Bank actually increased. This was because multi-polarity always existed even in such US-
If India has failed to get American capital, technology and marketing skills, it is most of the time because of self-imposed hurdles, not those raised by the United States. India will need some financial accommodation in its transition to a more open, trade-based economy, but such accommodation is available from international agencies. The US can help too. But once the new reforms are seen to be serious, world capital will flow in on its own.

There are several developments around India's strategic environs extending from the South West to the South East of Asia. India having become militarily involved in her immediate environs will be looked upon with considerable suspicion not only by her neighbours but also by countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia. But one of the ways of extending her options in foreign policy would be to cultivate some of the economically rich countries of ASEAN, and checkmate China, in a era of normalisation of relations between Beijing and Moscow only by adopting a hard headed and realistic approach to the relations with the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan and the United States. Can India effectively maximise the options in foreign policy and effectively secure the strategic environment which is undergoing rapid changes. The Soviets and the Chinese because of their geographical proximity to the Asia-Pacific region are making enormous efforts to derive the benefits of this

region. India remains mired in the China Pakistan tangle. Change and transformation in the world are brought about essentially by the exercise of power. Tomorrow's challenges and today's threats cannot be adequately met by dogmatic adherence to past policies. Therefore, India's size, resources population and geo-strategic location impose a set of parameters on its security strategy. Essentially the strategy should be shaped in a global framework rather than a regional or local (sub-continenetal) one. This is not to suggest that India has a global role to play; but it is only a recognition of the fact that in a world of increasing interdependencies and a 'shrinking globe' no country, however small or remote, can possibly pursue a national strategy to the exclusion of the international system. Least of all a country like India: the largest democracy and the second most populous country in the world. As it is, the relational factor in support of national power and strength requires a global orientation for the security doctrine. Indeed this was the approach of Jawaharlal Nehru in the early formative years of the Nation-State and later that of his successors. Any tendency to restrict national strategies only to regional/local issues dilutes the concept of comprehensive security by limiting the perspective to the region and exaggerating the sense of insecurity of India's smaller neighbours. This creates tendencies for them to seek countervailing power balance through strategic linkages with the great powers to alleviate the perceived vulnerability. The process hardly serves the interests of India's security in any sense. An excessive regional essentially subcontinental emphasis tends to lead to a search for 'parity' by some of the smaller neighbours, and efforts to hamstring a
naturally larger power through concepts and proposals like regional non-proliferation, balanced force reduction and so on. Thus a subcontinental approach to issues and problems creates an artificial sense of insecurity among the neighbours and at the same time places greater demands on resources for security.

Balance of Power Considerations, divisive National Interests and Unfulfilled Security Needs

While the antagonistic power blocs fueled the potential sources of conflict and economic, political and social cooperation could not provide the basic building blocks for durable strategies in South Asia, the conceptual change and political reorientation which resulted from the emergence of India as a regional power after the 1971 India-Pakistan war could only be seen in terms of "balance of power" considerations. The formal negotiations leading to Simla agreement could not uncover and dialogue the basic suspicious although a more pragmatic spirit prevailed for a while. The divisive national interests were not replaced by a regime which could create a stable security dialogue.

Although India gained acknowledgement of its special position from not only the Soviet Union but also the United States and China, the Indian doctrine did not introduce any comprehensive proposals for the unfulfilled security needs of Pakistan. The effect of retrograde developments became visible immediately, after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan which showed that India did not have a comprehensive strategy designed to create a stable equilibrium in South Asia.
It is necessary to change our style of functioning vis-a-vis our neighbours. Initiatives for changes in traditional relationships strengthened by mutuality of strategic interests systematically. If we have no expansionist designs - so far we can see the Government of India never thinks on those terms - and we are convinced that the security strength, Unity, Integrity and prosperity of our neighbours are in our vital interests - we have always said so - then our information policy should be geared in sensitising the elite in our neighbourhood to their own objective national interests. Because it is important to have the capability to have information about our neighbours and ability to influence opinion shaping in those countries - not necessarily in favour of India but in ways as to highlight objectively their own risks and interests. Our neighbours are aware that systemic threats to them do not arise from this country, but from elsewhere, and this country is bound to secure them from such threats however provocative their behaviour towards us may be. Therefore, there must be a deliberate effort at avoiding excessive rhetoric on security issues in our dialogues with our neighbours even as we plan our modernisation of defence capabilities and their peace and wartime deployment patterns. A modernised defence capability appropriately deployed within our own territory may be worth many treaties with our neighbours.

Once India is seen to be in a different league in terms of power and capability, Indians would be able to exercise power to deal confidently with the US, USSR, China which will lead our neighbours to discover all the common civilisational and cultural heritage they share with India and they do not share with others.
One of the problems we face vis-a-vis our neighbours is our inability to conduct prolonged negotiations with them on issues of mutual interest in secret and without the issues being brought into the open and subjected to slants and twists by the media, academia and politicians. One has to learn a lot from the prolonged US-Chinese and Chinese-USSR negotiations conducted over years without the glare of publicity. The basic requirement for doing that is a continuity in policy planning and personnel, on both of which grounds we have fundamental weaknesses. It will perhaps be possible to have greater mutual understanding on security issues vis-a-vis our neighbours if our dialogue with them is more intensive, regular, sustained, systematic, coherent and less publicised.

The present moment in the subcontinent offered an opportunity to explore some of the salient features of a possible design for strengthening peace and security in South Asia. The current movement in the triangular relationships of the three major powers, United States, Soviet Union and China, who were closely involved in the region, offered a favourable moment to consider a viable strategy for peace in this area. A positive turn in the international situation has taken place, the mutual interest expressed by the Soviet Union and China to improve their relationship and the readiness on the part of United States to promote more constructive and positive relations with the Soviet union. Normalisation of relations among the major powers is a key to bring peace in South Asia because a strategy for peace and security in South Asia cannot be designed without taking into account the interest and concerns of two super powers and China.
in this region. This is not to say that the three major powers would have to be accommodated at the cost of the interests of the regional states. The respective interests are, however, by no means irreconcilable. Principles of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence to which the South Asian countries are committed, provide a basis for a viable strategy for peace and security in the region, which would at the same time be compatible with the interests of the three major powers. The central strategy for peace and security in South Asia should be the creation of an environment of mutual understanding, trust and confidence through co-operation in areas of common and vital interest having no political undertone, at least at the initial stage, thus laying the foundation of enduring peace and stability in the region.

India, Pakistan and China are the three forces whose nuclear and defence capabilities shape the destiny of South Asia. The Soviet Union is the only major power that geographically borders the region, whilst the other major power, the United States, makes its presence felt in the region through its naval vessels deployed in the Indian Ocean. However, the Indo-Pakistan China tangle has intense strategic significance for South Asian security. Our major security concerns, China and Pakistan, are both nuclear weapon powers today. It is futile to argue whether Pakistan has already become or is to become a nuclear weapon state. They have, according to United States intelligence, achieved 90 per cent enrichment capability and have tested the trigger device. Before making a nuclear weapon one does not always need a test explosion. The first Bomb dropped on Hiroshima, the Uranium bomb, was not previously tested. On July 16, 1945 the test carried out at
Almagarado was a plutonium bomb - the type dropped on Nagasaki. Those who still entertain doubts about Pakistani nuclear capability confuse themselves and do not want to think through the problem.

India has emerged over the last four decades as an autonomous centre of power in the global system and by launching the 'Agni' ballistic missile in May 1989 it has taken a giant step into the missile age, much as she did by firing the SLV rackets. It has been suggested that the Agni be made mobile and deployed with non-nuclear warheads. This strategy can at best provide partial deterrence, against China, that has upgraded its command, control and communications besides deploying scores of missiles including ACBMs.

India articulates the stand of global disarmament even as its regional actors proliferate nuclear weapons and missiles. The time has come for the decision makers in New Delhi to evolve a viable policy in regard to nuclear weapons alternatively, resort to active diplomacy so as to achieve regional arms control.

It is worth considering whether the political atmosphere of the subcontinent is conducive to fruitful discussion about a strategy for peace and security in South Asia. In spite of divergent security perceptions among the countries in the region, a peaceful atmosphere prevails. If we keep China, an extra regional power, the possibility for disturbance of peace lies mostly in a confrontation between India and Pakistan. Other countries can add marginally to the tension in the region by furthering extra-regional connections, but Pakistan remains India's only major
security concern due to the military aid that it receives from the United States and China. Pakistan fears India's strength, which outclasses it in nearly every comparison of power. To confront this threat, the former has placed a tremendous emphasis on developing its defence structure, and now seeks nuclear capability. Atomic power, Pakistan believes, can neutralise India's supremacy of size, military capability and levels of industrialization.

Evolutionary Perceptions about Conflict, Stability and the Nature of Security in South Asia

The contextual concerns which have dominated foreign policy formation in India and Pakistan have not favoured security cooperation and have not helped the process of exploring and achieving stability. The United States military assistance to Pakistan, and Pakistan's efforts for closer ties with China and the urgency with which it had pursued a Pan-Islamic framework of political relations have not provided any incentives for security cooperation with India to emerge. Inspite of the deep rooted concerns on each side about the other's basic intentions, the new trends of change in the political climate has made cooperative responses more feasible. The new Sino-Soviet initiatives can contribute to a more general understanding of the conditions and processes that favour reduced adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is designed to create a more stable equilibrium in Soviet-Pakistan relations and can provide the Soviet Union with a rich agenda in dealing with Islamic Third World countries. The Afghan imbroglio will only be laid to rest after more bargaining and bloodletting
but Pakistan can no longer define its role as that of checking Soviet expansionism. Soviet attitudes are clearly in the direction of achievement of political stability in Southwest and South Asia.

The ominous nature of the Indo-Pakistan conflict has not diminished over the past forty years. Three wars have not yet purged the fear and furore from the subcontinent, as more perilous threats have arisen. Rampant paranoia, heightened by nuclear proliferation, trouble in Punjab and Kashmir and external powers interference still continues. Within the next few years a nuclear confrontation could occur between India and Pakistan. Each has a nuclear development programme and an animosity for the other which could lead to war. Their conflict stems from fear much more than anything else, as each nation competes for power and influence in South Asia and views the other as a threat to its own ambitions. The United States, the Soviet Union and China have also over the last forty years heightened and inflamed tensions further, as India and Pakistan have allowed themselves. All these years major powers concern was fulfillment of their strategic interests only rather than to work for peace between the two main countries of South Asia, which would have never helped their interest. Now, since the things are in better shape at the global level comparatively, therefore, it would benefit both the countries to turn away from this threatening trend and pursue a course which would enable the realization of peace and security. Indians and Pakistanis can resolve their conflict peacefully, but it requires more than the bipartisan effort of the two antagonists; only with the co-operation of the United States, the Soviet Union and China, can India and Pakistan strive towards lasting peace on a
non-aligned, non-nuclear sub-continent. This goal is desirable because it frees the region from the struggle of the major-powers and the danger of nuclear annihilation which threaten to consume the sub-continent.

Mutual paranoia will subside if India and Pakistan realize common interests and demonstrate non-aggressive intentions. A good starting point for this endeavour is Kashmir. A settlement in this northern region, the subject of dispute and war since partition, is a pre-requisite for peace on the sub-continent. Once accord is reached on this contentious issue the spirit of co-operation could move forward.

Economic co-operation which unites the fates of India and Pakistan would reduce the likelihood of the two going to war. Furthermore, peace between them would enable the use of much needed finance, currently spent on their militaries, to strengthen other sectors of their economies. Logical co-operative projects are those which seek to secure adequate supplies of energy and food, two major concerns of developing countries in the late 20th century. India, though poor and underdeveloped, has abundant natural resources, in addition to the third largest pool of scientific and technical manpower in the world. It is able to compete to some extent with American, Soviet and Chinese aid to Pakistan, of course major powers aid to both countries should continue, but for the sake of strengthening the sub-continent as a whole rather than dividing it.

According to Mr. Richard N. Haass,
South Asia has all too often been a venue of conflict. It remains a region where enormous resources are devoted to preparing for conflict. India, with the world's fourth largest army, devotes some 16 per cent of its budget to defence. Pakistan meanwhile allocates more than one fourth of all government spending to its military. Among the developing regions of the world, South Asia enjoys the uncertain distinction of possessing the fastest rate of growth of military spending. ... The key to regional stability remains relations between India and Pakistan. South Asia's two most powerful states. The reasons for rivalry between these states are many, and are deep rooted. Where the sources of potential conflict can be negotiated on territorial disputes. ... Both sides can expect to benefit from the result. (10)

Foreign Policy Doctrines in Transition: Limiting the Escalatory Dynamics of Security Dilemmas

Given the context of the Soviet "de-ideologisation of foreign policy" and "defensive doctrines," several confrontational issues which were high on the political agenda all over the world have receded into the background. In South Asia confrontational issues still dominate attention, but there is a certain inevitability about the implications of the world wide efforts to limit the escalatory dynamics of security dilemmas. While foreign policies are still concerned with strategic and ideological content which in the case of South Asian countries cannot be described as optimal, doctrinal commitments have lost their credibility for managing the new relationships that are coming into being. For a considerable time there will be a period of transition till influential decision-makers are able to generate support and remove obstacles to cooperation.

10. Text of the address by Mr. Richard N. Haass, Special Assistant to US President and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs, National Security Council before the Asia Society, US and South Asia, 11 January 1990, p. 4.
While many of the original dilemmas will persist, South Asian countries can engage in modest and cautious activity towards complementary action to advance the peace process in the region.

Therefore, to lessen the tensions India and Pakistan should initiate increased trade as well as cultural and educational exchanges which could be effective to break down the walls of mistrust. Besides cooperation against terrorism which is the most important area where both countries would benefit. There should be firm commitment by both the governments to work against individuals and groups who are involved in fomenting separatism and violence in the other, would be an important step. Similarly, sharing of intelligence and joint police-military patrols on relevant border areas and also there is the potential to cooperate on narcotics enforcement.

Confidence building measures could be extended to other areas by the two governments who could continue efforts to establish special procedures and dedicated communication links to facilitate communications in times of tension. Such understandings, by building trust and reducing uncertainty, should help avoid accidents and incidents occurring in some or the other form. Other confidence building measures in nuclear field would also be useful. A bilateral ban on the testing of nuclear explosive devices in any environment would be a major milestone, besides arrangements to exchange visits of observers to one another’s nuclear facilities. Worth considering are bilateral consultations on doctrine, safety, command and control. All above mentioned confidence building measures are feasible than only when India would continue her efforts to bring peace between the two countries.
otherwise conflict has always been to the great advantage for Pakistan. While recognising the India's potentiality Mr. Richard N. Haass said:

In meeting South Asia's challenges, India as the region's largest and strongest state, bears special mention both economically and militarily, India has resources at its command for beyond those available to any other South Asian state. But with these resources comes a corresponding responsibility. The Indian government is aware that if Indian power is to be welcomed and constructive rather than feared and resented beyond its borders, it must use its strength wisely and fairly and not for narrow national advantage. India could help allay concerns by providing an explanation of its purposes and intentions to its neighbours as well as others with legitimate interests in the region. (11)

He further added:

The United States stands ready to assist South Asians as they enter the 1990s. ... We are similarly prepared to assist economic growth be it through aid, investment or trade, which transfers know-how as well as capital. ... We are also prepared to contribute to regional stability. This is nothing new. We have long promoted and suggested ways to enrich a dialogue among the region's states. Moreover, South Asia and Pakistan in particular, has been a principal recipient of US security assistance for years. ... But such participation on our part in South Asia cannot be maintained apart from consideration of its consequences or developments in the region more broadly. We begin with a recognition of India's position in the region. Our desire is to work with India so that its substantial capabilities are developed and used in manner that serves not only our bilateral interests but also those of all the people and countries of South with which we enjoy friendly relations. ... We have no desire to exacerbate the rivalry between India and Pakistan, indeed, our policies aim at encouraging improved relation between them. (12)

11. Ibid., p. 5.
12. Ibid., p. 5ff.
While keeping in mind the American willingness and ability to affect regional stability in South Asia particularly to improve relations between India and Pakistan who are holding key for the regional stability. America could play a major role in facilitating it. American influence, in at least one respect, has an edge over that of the Soviets and Chinese, unlike the other two, the United States poses no direct threat of invasion to the sub-continent. Americans would do well to recognise their advantage and seize this opportunity, but do so only with purpose and commitment. If the basis of the conflict can be resolved, then the outside or major powers rivalry and nuclear proliferation which feed on it may be put to an end.

Pakistan wants nuclear weapons because India has them, China because the Soviet Union has them; and the Soviet Union because the United States has them. India, however, is unlikely to deploy nuclear weapons against Pakistan, because India considers China to be its nuclear competitor. Still, Pakistan is more likely to direct nuclear weapons against India than against any other country.

Should India and Pakistan eliminate their mutual fear, at least the latter may not feel it needs nuclear weapons if India is no longer a threat. Ideally, both India and Pakistan should agree to a ban on nuclear weapons production, though such a promise would be difficult to keep as long as outside nuclear threats remain.

It is the responsibility of the United States to co-operate with the Soviet Union in establishing effective policies which limit
production of nuclear weapons, and enhance communication between themselves. The secrecy which enveloped nuclear weapons production in 1960s caused the United States and the USSR to expect the worst from each other. The resulting acceleration of the arms race and sophistication of nuclear weapons was detrimental to the security of both parties.

To prevent a repetition of this tragic history between other nuclear antagonists it is worth considering arms agreements between the Soviet Union and China, China and India, and India and Pakistan. The ever-increasing production of nuclear weapons should be checked immediately, before irreparable destruction is effected. As these weapons spread to less stable countries the likelihood of their use approaches certainty.

The other major threat to the sub-continent great power rivalry, should also be eliminated. The dangerous pattern of alliances it kindles has been previously stated. The United States, the Soviet Union and China would do well realize that their own security would be enhanced if they helped to develop a non-aligned sub-continent.

The Imperative of Moving from Short Term Security to Long Term Stability

Even with the decline of the Cold War, the South Asian countries interactively continue to foster militarisation and are nowhere near adopting a process of change into a stable peace order in the Subcontinent. The process of militarisation can only
be understood as the problem of a geopolitical arena where short term security interests are being pursued to the detriment of long term stability. The features which were induced by United States - Soviet confrontation continue to shape the logic of security and will lead to the emergence of conflict situations of a malign nature unless the fundamental problems of strategic choices are closely related to the general structure of Soviet adaptiveness and American reassertion. After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, the competitiveness and instability of superpower global rivalry resulted in paradigmatic shifts in foreign and security policies effecting South Asia. The United States took this development further by unilateral measures like the Rapid Deployment Force and the building up of Pakistan as a frontline state. The techniques used by Washington for reconciling various national interests in South Asia were clearly inadequate. The difficulty of constructing a coherent stance on the issue of Pakistan's nuclear programme arose from the "compulsions of continuing military aid to Islamabad. While a description of United States politics and decision-making is beyond the scope of this study, it bears emphasis that the central feature of flexibility in the future course of development requires an American strategic response which transcends the United States - Pakistan Strategic Orthodoxy of the 1980s.

Role of United States

The United States should reassess its relationship with Pakistan and should check whether its aid is properly utilised for the targetted purpose or is diverted towards something else which is not desired by the US. This will cause Pakistan to
modify its behaviour, possibly including a reduction of its agitation activities against India. According to Thomas P. Thornton,

American arms were provided, however, in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; with the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan's concerns are overwhelmingly with India. The United States will have to reassess its security assistance program in that context. The United States has no stake in the India-Pakistan rivalry.... One of the virtues of Washington's military supply of Islamabad, for some Pakistanis, is the fact that it drives an ever thinner wedge between the United States and India. That however is Pakistan's agenda, not ours... our relations with Pakistan cannot be conducted solely in a bilateral context. Pakistan cannot be conducted solely in a bilateral context. India is the dominant regional power and is effectively in a position-by itself or with Soviet support - to exercise a veto over many things we might want to do in South Asia. Pakistan, on its part, has shown considerable skill in de-railing our policy initiatives towards India... while both Pakistan and United States recognize the importance of their relationship, each must recognize its limitations. Pakistan is neither an area of high priority interest for the United States nor an instrument of US policy.... Ideally, our South Asia policy should grow out of our relationship with India, even more than with Pakistan. (13) (sic)

The United States should also reassess its relationship with India. For too long it has squabbled with India. It is not expected from the world's two largest democracies, with all their common interests, to be constantly at odds. The United States must recognize India for what it is the strongest and most influential country in South Asia; as such India has an important role to play in the development of the region. If India is to aid the future development of Pakistan then the United States should discuss its plans towards Pakistan with India. Indian approval of American aid to Pakistan is not necessary, but the latter's present

development by the United States should be co-ordinated with India as much as possible. Likewise, US intentions toward India should be discussed with Pakistan. Such co-ordination would help to create the necessary atmosphere of predictability and confidence between the two countries.

Besides, the United States should reassure the Soviet Union and China that its co-operation with India and Pakistan is intended not only to serve American interests, but to develop on the sub-continent a healthy neutrality in the interest of all, because doubts and fears, such as those plaguing India and Pakistan, afflict the United States, the Soviet Union and China as well. If the super powers co-operate in establishing this neutrality, then the mutual suspicions which currently make South Asia a hotbed of tension may be diminished. Of course, this would require strong treaties and commitment to follow sincerely. It is best to start with guarantees of neutrality for South Asian areas such as the Indian Ocean. In his speech in New Delhi in December 1980, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev proposed that "the United States and the USSR avoid military build-up in the Indian Ocean".¹⁴ Though this proposal seems to be unthinkable but in the past there were many things existing about which one could never think to change such as, even for US and USSR coming together to normalise their relations through the process of peaceful negotiations and particularly realization of the value of peace and security.

¹⁴. Maya Chaddha, Superpower Rivalry in Asia (Delhi, 1987), p. 43.
The United States should prepare itself for the inevitable changes. It should be prepared to take advantage of possible contentions between India and the Soviet Union, however close Indo-Soviet relations may be now, they could change in the coming years as the two compete for markets and influence in South West Asia, and also if India normalises her relations to USA and plays her role as a significant power at the global level. Meanwhile, India may rectify its differences with China, whose East Asian interests do not directly conflict with its own. The Soviet Union may become desperate if it feels surrounded by China, India and United States but Soviet apprehension may be allayed due to the normalization of relations with all the concerned.

At the same time, the United States should do nothing which legitimizes Soviet or Chinese control in South Asia. A non-aligned South Asia, promoted by the great powers in an atmosphere of peace, would not only make the Indo-Pakistani conflict less volatile, but would also relieve the fears of encirclement of all involved. Pakistan's by close relations with India, India's by closer ties with Pakistan and China, China's closer ties with Soviet Union, those of Soviet Union, by non-alignment on the sub-continent and normalization of relations with the United States. It cannot be resolved in a matter of months or a year. However, this enmity can be overcome, or at least a modus vivendi reached if proper efforts are undertaken by all concerned. History points to the examples of the collapse of communism, reunification of Europe, normalization in the relations of superpowers etc. India and Pakistan can make peace too but only with co-operation, not interference from the outside. The United States, the Soviet Union,
and China must join in a monumental effort to build a strong, stable, non-aligned and non-nuclear South Asia. If they fail to do so, the consequences could be far-reaching and severe.

Evaluating U.S. policy dilemmas, Richard N. Haass has concluded:

there is a limit to what we Americans can do to affect regional stability in South Asia. For better or worse, South Asians themselves and in particular Indians and Pakistanis... as well as others, will need to develop their dialogue and through its arrangements that build confidence and promote regional stability... Quite rightly, South Asia's future is largely in its own hands... I truly believe that South Asia is on the threshold of a new era. The future is potentially great... but for this future to become reality, the peoples and governments of South Asia must put behind themselves the tradition of violence and extremism within and between countries. I have confidence that a democratic South Asia can do just that. (15)

The advantages of enhanced role in South Asia for India is so self-evident... and does not need elaboration here. The time for decision is limited, as the opportunities will not wait for ever. It would, however, be unwise merely to regret the past or to hold post mortems as to where to place blame. Looking forward there are positive avenues to be explored. India should be among those actively looking for the answers.