Chapter - 4

ŚĀBDABODHA-A DISTINCT FEATURE OF VERBAL KNOWLEDGE

4:1- Introduction

We all knew that everyone uses language for communication. On hearing a sentence, all of us get the verbal comprehension or śābdabodha. This śābdabodha or comprehending the meaning of a sentence has been understood differently by different schools of thought. This comprehension is quite complex and involves the role of cognitive faculties and human understanding. Whenever any communication through sentence is achieved, the different parts of a sentence are comprehended one by one. But the meaning of the sentence depends upon its totality. The sentence is an ordered succession of words and the process of apprehension is, therefore that of succession, but the meaning of a sentence depends upon the total sentence and not upon any individual words that constitute a sentence.

All the systems of thought agree in one point that different parts of a sentence are not comprehended together and they are got in a succession one by one. They agree that when there is the process of comprehension, there is always succession and never simultaneity. In their opinion, at first one perceives words as such and
then he recognizes the same as possessing the functional relation of word and meaning. Once the words are cognized to possess the functional relation, the same can be used to refer to the particular meanings and there after, with the help of the recollection of the meanings referred to, we obtain verbal cognition.

Consider the sentence 'गाँध अनया (bring a cow). Here at first one perceives the word 'Gāṁ' (cow) and then the word अनया (bring) as such. Then he recognizes a word as possessing, a functional relation with its meaning. Firstly the word 'गाँध (cow)' can be used to refer to the 'cow-individual' and from the word '-अनया (bring)' the action of bringing respectively and thereafter with the help of the recollection of the meanings referred to, (ie cow individual and bringing) the verbal cognition of 'गाँध अनया, is obtained.

4:2 - Concept of Šābdabodha

This is a common experience that firstly we hear a sentence and then we understand its meaning. This sentence is composed of words and these words have got potentiality and through this they are capable of expressing definite meanings. In Indian philosophy, such cognition of meaning is called Šābdabodha. This term is translated as verbal knowledge or verbal cognition in English. Hence we can say that to explain the comprehension of the syntactic and semantical relations among various individual word meanings or vākyārthānvayabodha, Indian epistemologists have used the term verbal cognition or Šābdabodha. These epistemologists together agree that this cognition is obtained by first recollecting the individual word meanings and then comprehending the relations among them. Thus, verbal cognition is a result of the knowledge of the words and hence, it is different from perception, inference, comparison etc.
In Sanskrit, Verbal knowledge is expressed by different words like śābdabodha, 'anvayabodha', 'saṃsargabodha' or 'vākyārthabodha'. The expression śābdabodha is also known as śābdajñāna and similarly vākyārthabodha is also known as vākyārthajñāna. Of these, the term śābdabodha means knowledge arising from words or from a sentence. Anvayabodha or saṃsargabodha means knowledge of the relation of the meaning of words. Vākyārthabodha means knowledge of the total meaning of a sentence or the total relational idea conveyed by a proposition. From the explanations of the different names of the same term śābdabodha, we come to a point that śābdabodha is the valid knowledge (pramāṇa) coming from śabda as its source or means(pramāṇa).

All the systems of thought universally understand that śābdabodha is not different from the anvayabodha. Therefore they agree that verbal cognition is the apprehension of a synthesis or relation of meaning caused by words. The object of verbal knowledge may thus be described as a connection of one word meaning with another, it is obtained by first recollecting the individual word meanings and then comprehending the relations among them and it is the result of the knowledge of the words. Because of this particular character, verbal knowledge differs from other knowledge such as perception, inference, smṛti etc.

In Indian philosophy, discussion on śābdabodha according to different epistemologists will mainly follow the three inter related stages of account. Of these, the first is about the nature of a sentence. The second is about the meaning of a sentence and the third is about understanding the meaning of a sentence. In this process, understanding the meaning is the final stage; and this understanding of the meaning of a statement is called śābdabodha. So in the context of śabdapramāṇa,
the śābdabodha or valid knowledge is viewed as the phala or result. Thus we can say that śābdabodha is the process of comprehension of the meaning of a sentence or an expression as understood by the listener. The meaning of a sentence is defined in three ways:-

1. Relation of the meaning of the words (padārthānāṁ saṁsargaḥ).

2. One principal meaning qualified by many subordinate meanings (Anēkaguṇabhūtapadārtha viśiṣṭaḥ ekaḥ pradhānapadārthaḥ).

3. The connected state of meanings (padārthānāṁ anvitāvastha)

All these three signify verbal knowledge, recollects their meanings by means of the knowledge of the significatory functions and arrives at the knowledge of their relation.

In Viśvanātha's Nyāya Siddhānta Muktāvali, the concept of śābdabodha is obviously an epistemological issue. In the first kārika of śābdakhaṇḍa (padajñānaṁ tu karaṇam) Viśvanātha introduces śābdabodha as the 'phala' of the 'padajñāna' which is the karaṇa. The term 'karaṇa' here means pramākaraṇa. Pramākaraṇa means pramāṇa ie a source of valid knowledge. Thus according to Viśvanātha, verbal cognition arises only through the knowledge of words. In his opinion, the knowledge of words (pada-jñāna) function as an instrument (karaṇa), the process (Vyāpāra) is the presentation of the meanings of the words (padārthopasthitiḥ), the knowledge of meaning (sakti) generated by manifold factors like fitness etc: are auxiliary causes or helpful (sahakāri), then the product (phala) is the verbal cognition (śābdabodha). Here we can see that with the help of the above mentioned Kārika, Viśvanātha explained the complete process of verbal cognition; and he also try to
show how the šābdabodha as an effect results from the operation of some principal cause along with certain auxiliary ones.

So we can conclude that the understanding of the meaning of a statement is called šābdabodha and this šābdabodha as the valid verbal knowledge is the pramāṇa and śabda is the pramāṇa i.e the chief instrument for the attainment of the valid knowledge.

4:3 - Derivation of the Term Šābdabodha

The term šābdabodha -may be derived in this manner-

(i) Śabdasya ayaṃ śābdaḥ; Śābdaḥ bodhah śābdabodhaḥ.

(ii) Śabdādāgataḥ śābdah; Śābdāscassāu bodhasca Śābdabodhaḥ.

(iii) Śabdasaṃbandhi yaḥ bodhaḥ Śābdabodhah.It means the knowledge pertaining to or coming from a sabda.

(iv) Śabdānāmayaṃ Śābdaḥ

Or

Śabdale nirvṛttaḥ śābdaḥ; Śābdaścīsaṃ bodhasca śābda-bodhaḥ.

ie. Comprehension or import that pertains to words\(^1\)

(v) Śabdājjīyaṃnāhaḥ bodhah Śābdabodhaḥ.

It means that the cognition arises from words\(^2\)

4:4 - Definition of Šābdabodha

Śābdabodha is the cognition of the meaning of a sentence. It has been defined as the cognition effected by the efficient instrumentality of the cognition of the
Thus the meaning of a sentence is called the verbal cognition\(^4\). According to Prof. G.M. Bhattāchārya, verbal cognition is the meaning of a sentence and it is the successful communication between hearer and speaker\(^5\). Dr. Veluri Subha Rao gave the meaning of verbal cognition as comprehension or import that pertains to words\(^6\). Thus the understanding of the meaning of a statement is called, Āśābudrabodha. The word ‘Āśābudrabodha has also been defined as 'the cognition resulting from the recalling of things derived from words'\(^7\). In other words the cognition of the meaning of a sentence or vākyārthajñāna is thus the knowledge of the relation between one object and another presented by the meanings of words\(^8\). Verbal knowledge means knowledge of the meaning of a sentence, ie. the knowledge of the relation of the meanings of words, ie. Padārthasaṃsarga jñāna eva vākyārthajñānaṃ.

Etymologically speaking Āśābudrabodha can be explained as the cognition resulting from the words that are being heared or uttered (ie śabdācchrutājjayamano bodha≈). Āśābudrabodha literally means that cognition which arises from words\(^9\). An adequate sentence (pramāṇa Vākya) is a sentence with a meaning and corresponds to the English notion of a sentence. The meaning of such a sentence is called the Āśābudrabodha or Āśābdajñāna\(^10\). Viśvanātha defines it as that cognition which arises through the knowledge of words\(^11\). He explains that the knowledge of words or Padajñāna functions as the instrument or karaṇa, the process or Vyāpāra is the presentation of the meanings of the words or Padārthopasthiti, the product or phala is the verbal cognition or Āśābudrabodha and the knowledge of meaning or śakti is the auxiliary or Sahakārikāraṇa.

According to Laugākṣi Bhāskara, the meaning of a sentence (Vākyārtha) consists in the mutual relation or saṃsarga of the meanings presented by the word\(^12\).
Jagadīśa opine that in this relation one meaning is correlated with another. The Ritualists insist that syntactico-semantical relations as superstratumness (ādheyatva) are referred to by the words.

According to the Grammarians, it is in the form of subject-predicate or uddeśya-vidheya relation.

Bhāṭṭamāmsakas opine that the relation is one of synthesis.

4:5 - Process of Śābdabodha

Śabda implies human speech and it may be understood as linguistic utterances. These utterances are made by a speaker who is the member of a linguistic community and the listener listens to those utterances. Then 'how does this linguistic utterance generate awareness or knowledge of an object in a hearer's mind? or how is śābdabodha attained'? This is an important question and this question leads us to the mechanism or the process involved in 'sabdabodha'. This process of śābdabodha can be described as follows: At first one perceives words as such and then he recognizes the same as possessing the functional relation of word and meaning. Once the words are cognized to possess the functional relation the same can be used to refer to the particular meanings and thereafter, with the help of the recollection of the meanings referred to, verbal cognition can be obtained.

For example, consider the śābdabodha or verbal cognition of a sentence 'bringing a cow'. Firstly a man perceives the words 'gāṃ' (cow) and ānaya(bring) as such and then he recognizes the same words as possessing the functional relation of word and their meaning. Once the words 'gāṃ' and 'ānaya' are cognized to possess the functional relation, the same words can be used to refer to the 'cow individual'
and to the 'action of bringing' respectively and thereafter with the help of the recollection of the meanings referred to ie cow individual and bringing, the verbal cognition of 'bringing a cow' (gāṃ ānaya) can be obtained.

The above mentioned process assumes the following steps:-

(i) The speaker makes linguistic utterance with a view to communicate some knowledge or information to a hearer.

(ii) The hearer belongs to the same linguistic community as that of the speaker and thus both share the same linguistic competence.

(iii) The utterance is normally expressed through the form of a sentence composed of words or a word only.

(iv) The hearer correctly recognised each word of the sentence.

(v) The hearer as a consequence could establish the meanings or objects associated with each word\(^\text{18}\).

With the help of the above mentioned five steps, we can describe the process that leads to śābdabodha. Here the hearer is having knowledge of the connected meaning of the utterance, which made by the speaker and thereby, he comes to know what is being communicated to him by the utterance.

### 4:6 - Various Stages in the Process of Śābdabodha

In order to have a clear idea of the śābdabodha theory, the various stages of śābdabodha may be studied. While comprehending the meaning of any sentence, firstly we cognise the word, then its potentiality or śakti and from both of these; but together the recalling of meanings is effected and thus verbal import is
engendered. With the help of the above mentioned process or prakriyā of śābdabodha, the different stages of the same can be generally described in this manner-

(i) First there is knowledge of the relation of word such as 'cow' with the objects signified by them.

(ii) When some body says: 'Bring the cow', then the meaning of the word 'cow etc'. is remembered.

(iii) Such remembrance is caused by the relation of the word with its meaning. One relative reminds the other.

(iv) With the help of the knowledge of expectancy(ākāṅkṣa) etc; the meaning of the sentence(vākyārtha) becomes known.

In the opinion of Kanāda Tarkavāgīṣṭha, the steps of verbal cognition are as follows:-

eg:- 'ghaṭam ānaya' or 'Bring a pot'.

(i) First, the knowledge of the word 'ghaṭa' (adau ghaṭapadajñānaṃ).

(ii) Second, through the knowledge of the word 'ghaṭa' the observer observes the presence of pot(ghaṭapadajanyā ghaṭopasthitā).

(iii) Then the knowledge of the accusative case affix - 'āṃ' (tatō ampadajñānaṃ).

(iv) With that accusative case affix, the knowledge of accusativeness (āṃ padajanyakarmatvopasthitih).

(v) After these, the knowledge of pitcher (ghaṭa) arises, which is qualified by karmatva (accusativeness) and having relationship with
substratumness, then we know the meaning of 'ghata'- 'This is a pot' (tato ghaṭo yam ityākaraka karmatva viśeṣyakādheyatva saṃsargaḥ ghaṭaparākāraka śābdabodhaḥ).

4:7 - Central Nucleus of a Sentence

After the discussion of the process of śābdabodha, it is very important to discuss 'the central nucleus of a sentence or what is the most important word in a sentence?', because the meaning revolves around the nucleus of a sentence.

Epistemologists like Grammarians, Ritualists and Logicians have proposed three main linguistic theories regarding the central nucleus or principal (chief) qualificand (mukhyaviśeṣya) in śābdabodha. Of these, Grammarians accepted verb as the main substantive. But in the view of Mīmāṃsakas, meaning of the finite verb (ākhyātartha) is the most important word while according to Naiyāyikas nominative case is the main substantive.

4:7:1 - According to the Vaiyākaraṇas, it is the verb (kriyāpada) which possess an important place in a sentence. Hence they define a sentence as that which possess a finite verb. In their opinion, verb is the central axis around which the other words perform their functions as auxiliary. Hence verb or kriyā is the chief substantive (mukhya viśeṣya) and the kartā (agent or doer) serves as its qualified or adjective (viśeṣana). They pointed out that mukhya viśeṣya in verbal cognition is always the meaning referred to by the verbal root. This theory is based on the fact that verbs are held to refer to root-meanings as the principal element ie bhāva-pradhānām akhyātaṃ.

For eg:-In the sentence 'Caitro grāmaṃ gachati (Caitra goes to the village). Here going (gacchati) is the action, referred to by the verbal root 'gam' (go) is the
chief qualificand of all relations. Consequently, all other meanings, referred to by various words in the same sentence, relate directly or indirectly to the action 'going'. Here the word 'village', referred to by the accusative word 'grāmaṃ', is related to the 'object' or abode (āśraya) referred to by the accusative case ending '(aṃ)' through the relation of identity. The same object is related to the effect 'contact' one of the two meanings referred to by the root 'gaṃ' (go) through the relation of occurrence. Again, the contact is related to the action 'going' the second of the two meanings referred to by the same root (gam) through producing :- where as Caitra, the meaning referred to by the nominative word 'Caitraḥ', is related to the agent (kartṛ) one of the two meanings referred to by the conjugational ending (ti) through identity. Further, the abode is related to the action 'going' through occurrence. Thus, the cognition is that the action 'going' which produces the contact, occurring in the object 'village' has Caitra, the agent, as its abode (grāmābhinnāśrayavṛttisāṁyogajanaka vyāpāraḥ eka Caitrābhina kartṛvṛtiḥ).

Grammarians hold that such a theory is necessitated by the fact that in impersonal passive statements such as 'Caitreṇa supyate' (slept by Caitra). Here they have accepted the verbal cognition such as the action 'sleeping' has 'Caitra as its agent' wherein the action 'sleeping' is the chief qualificand.

Another example 'Rama brings a pot'. (Rāmaḥ ghātāmānayati). This sentence as an act or process of activity leading to the bringing of a pot by Rama.

Consider the statement 'paśya mṛgo dhāvati' (behold the animal is running) consisting two verbs; namely 'behold' and 'runs' express the action 'beholding' and 'running' respectively. Here the action 'running' which has the animal as its agent, functions as the object; whereas the beholding functions as the chief qualificand.
Thus, the cognition produced is that the beholding has the running as its object which in turn, has the animal as its agent. So we can say that only grammarians theory explains satisfactorily the verbal cognition produced from this statement.

4:7:2 - The Mīmāṃsakas also emphasis the importance of the verb and they agree with the Vaiyākaraṇas in holding that it is the action which constitutes the central meaning of a sentence\textsuperscript{29}. They hold that in injunctive and other statements, optative and other verbal affixes (akhyāta) must be accepted to refer to a productive activity (bhāvana). Also, they hold that finite verbs such as 'he ought to make oblations' (yajeta) must be analysed as 'he ought to do the making of oblations (yāgam karoti). Consequently, each finite verb refers to an action such as 'making oblations' and activity (bhāvana or vyāpāra) such as 'doing' or 'making'.

Mīmāmsakas considered such productive activity must be the central point or chief qualificand in verbal cognition produced from sentences; and all other meanings referred to by the words in a sentence are directly or indirectly related to the productive activity.

For eg:- Consider the sentence 'Caitra goes to the village' (caitro grāmaṇ gachati). Here the nominal base (grāma) refers to the village; the accusative case ending (aṣṭi) refers to the power called objectness (karmatva śakti) which is an undivisible property. Other nominal base 'Caitra' refers to the agent 'Caitra' and the nominative case-ending refers to the number (singularity etc) ie-' ekābhinnā Caitravṛtti kartṛtā nirūpikā grāmaniṣṭa karmatā nirūpikā ca yā kriyā tadanukūla bhavānā. Similarly, the root 'pac' in the finite verb 'pacati' (Caitraṇa tanḍulaṇ pacati) refers to the action 'cooking' and the conjugational ending 'ti' refers to the productive activity. From these examples, the syntactico - semantical relations involved in the
referents can be described in the following manner:- The meaning of the accusative base, the village, is related directly to the objectness through the relation of occurrence and indirectly through the objectness to the activity; and the same objectness is related directly to the action 'going' through the relation of conditioning and indirectly through the action to the impellent force. Here the meaning of the nominative base, ie 'Caitra', is directly related to the activity through the conditioning of agentness occurring in him. Thus the verbal cognition produced from the statement is that the impellent force or productive activity is conducive to the action 'going' which is conditioning both the objectness occurring in the village and the agentness occurring in the single Caitra.

So we can say that Ritualists establish a different theory by interpreting the rule in this manner- akhyātā ie verbal endings refer to the productive as the chief qualificand; and this interpretation confirms to the established convention that between the meaning of base and inflectional endings, only the latter is the qualificand ie productive activity is the chief qualificand in verbal cognition and hence in the opinion of Ritualists, predicate is the most important factor in the analysis of sentence meaning.

4:7:3 - In the opinion of Logicians, meaning of the finite verb (ākhyātārtha) is the most important part and they laid emphasis on one point that the chief substantive (mukhyā viśeṣya) is the 'kartā' (doer) which is in nominative case(pratamānta) ie the subject of a sentence is the most important part of a sentence. According to them, all other words including the verb are only subsidiary to it and qualify it in some way or other (ie directly or indirectly).
For eg:- 'Caitra goes to the village' (Caitro grāmaṁ gachati). Here Caitra, the agent is the substratum of the activity conducive to the 'going' which in turn, is conditioning the objectness occurring in the object 'village'. According to Logicians, conjugational endings refer to the productive activity only in the cases where the agent happens to be an animate such as 'Caitra'. But where the agent is an inanimate, such as a chariot in 'Chariot goes' (ratho gachati) the same refers through established indication to only an operation (Vyāpāra). Here, the cognition is that the chariot has an operation that is conducive to the action of 'going'. Similarly in passive construction too, Logicians hold that the chief qualificand is the meaning referred to by the nominative word. For eg:- Village is gone to by Caitra (Caitreṇa grāmo gamyate). Here the instrumental case 'ena' after the word 'Caitra' refers to the activity ie the agentness. The root 'gam' (to go) as usual, refers to the action 'going' and the conjugational ending (te) refers to the objectness, which is, in this case, the effect 'contact': where as the nominative base 'grāma' refers to the object 'village' and the nominative case ending (aḥ) simply refers to the number 'singularity'. Thus the cognition produced is that the village, has the objectness that is produced by the action 'going', resulting from the productive activity ie agency occurring in Caitra.

From all these, we can say that while the verb is all important for the Vaiyākaraṇas and Mīmāṃsakas, it is not so important for the Naiyāyikas. In their opinion, verb is not a necessary part of a sentence and they attach a greater importance to things and lay stress on the noun. These kinds of differences in attitude leads to the different ways in which they interpret the meaning of a sentence.
4:8 - Two Types of Śābdabodha

Before mention the various theories of śābdabodha, it is better to have an idea of the two divisions of śābdabodha - the Khaṇḍaśābdabodha and the Akhaṇḍaśābdabodha.

In the first variety, the import is produced as a whole and in the second variety, the import is produced by parts. Of these two, the former is a stepping stone to the latter. Because in order to understand the meaning of the whole sentence, it is necessary that one should know the meaning of parts. Therefore we can say that the cognition of the meaning of the entire sentence or akhaṇḍa vākyārthabodha is dependent upon a knowledge of the parts or khaṇḍavākyārthabodha.

4:8:1 - Khaṇḍaśābdabodha (Verbal Import by parts).

Consider a sentence:- 'Caitrah Hariṃ bhajati' (Caitra worships Hari). Here Caitra, Hari and Worship - these are the three words comprising the sentence. In this sentence the word 'Caitra', denotes the person 'Caitra', the word 'su', the case affix denotes number etc, the word 'Hari' denotes Hari, the word 'am', case affix denotes objectness or 'karmatva' the root 'bhaj' means activity favourable to love and Tiṅ, the verbal affix, denotes activity or 'kṛti'. Such understanding of the meanings of individual words in a sentence is called khaṇḍaśābdabodha or verbal import by parts.

4:8:2 - Akhaṇḍaśābdabodha (Unitary Import).

To illustrate Akhaṇḍaśābdabodha, we take the above mentioned example- 'Caitrah Hariṃ bhajati' (Caitra worships Hari). Here 'Caitra' is the substratum of the activity favourable to love which has Hari for its object ie 'Hari karmaka
prītyanukalāyāntā Caitraḥ'. This type of śabdabodha is Akhaṇḍaśābdabodha or unitary import.

Of these two divisions of śabdabodha, the akhaṇḍaśābdabodha alone is śabdabodha in the true sense and the other one khaṇḍaśābdabodha is resorted to only for the sake of explanatory clarity. Therefore we can say that the khaṇḍaśābdabodha has only secondary position while the akhaṇḍaśābdabodha becomes the chief position.

From the above we can say that verbal cognition by parts (sakhaṇḍaśābdabodha) is to be effected or perceived before verbal cognition by unity (akhaṇḍaśābdabodha) can be produced. Consider the sentence 'Caitraḥ taṇḍulam pacati' (Caitra cooks rice). This sentence consists of the three words namely 'Caitraḥ' 'taṇḍulam' and 'pacati'. None of these three independent words convey any complete idea. But the sentence consisting of the same three words can convey the complete idea of 'Caitra cooking the rice' since all the three meanings are related to each other. This phenomenon of why only sentence conveys a complete idea is explained by Indian epistemologists by their theory of śabdabodha. So according to Indian theories of meaning, firstly the individual words denote their respective meanings and then the individual word -meanings are comprehended as having syntactico - semantical relations with each other.

Hence we can conclude that in Ancient India, the problem of the unit of speech or to the study of the problem of meaning, we find two main approaches : the khaṇḍapakṣa and the akhaṇḍapakṣa. Dr. K. Kunjunni Rāja pointed out that we can roughly analogous these two views are to the Association theory and the Gestalt theory in psychology. According to the khaṇḍapakṣa or the analytical method, a word is
considered as an autonomous unit of thought and sense, and language studies are
made on the basis of words, and the sentence is taken to be a concatenation of words.
Also the study of meaning in India first started by taking word as the unit of speech in
all the schools of philosophy, and this is the reason that the thing meant or referent is
called the meaning of a word\(^3\) ie padārtha (padasya arthaḥ) in Sanskrit. Likewise the
Sanskrit term 'nāmarūpa' which stands for the world of things also suggests the view
that objects can be comprehended by means of their names or their visible shapes, and
that the name and the shape constitute the essence of a thing.

4:9 - Different theories of śābdabodha

Indian thinkers have keen interest about the process through which sentences
uttered by one person produce verbal knowledge or sense in another person who
listening to it. Regarding the nature of this verbal comprehension arising from a
sentence, there are different theories came into existence. These theories differ
according to the structural peculiarities of different languages.

We all knew that when we hear a sentence, we have some sense. All the
systems think whether this sense arise directly from the words syntactically related
in the form of sentence or through the meaning of the words comprising the
sentence. Here arise this question: "How does the synthesis take place?, are the
words synthesised (anvītā) before or does the synthetic construction take place
later?" To solve these problems, different systems have brought forth different
theories. This synthesis of words help us to understand the meaning of a sentence.

Among the different theories of śābdabodha, Mīmāṃsakas (the advocates
of padavāda) brought forth two conflicting theories namely 'anvitābhidhānavāda'
and 'abhīhitānvayavāda' These schools believe in the existence of individual words but differ in regard to their meaning. Bhartṛhari, the famous grammarian accepted as an 'akhaṇḍa- vākyā sphoṭa' or 'sphoṭavāda'.

Jayantabhaṭṭa, the famous old Naiyāyika introduces the theory known as 'tātparyavāda' and Navya Nyāya school accepted 'saṃsargamaryadāvāda' and it is the same as the 'tātparyaśakti'.

Among the Rhetoricians, Mukulabhaṭṭa accepted the theory of 'samuccayavāda' and Āṇandavardhana 'accepted 'dhvani - theory'.

4:9:1 - Anvitābhidhānavāda

Among the two theories of Mīmāṃsakas, the first view ie it is the synthesised concepts that give rise to the expression is known as Anvitābhidhāna vāda.

This theory is initiated by Kapila and elucidated by the Prābhākaras.

Prābhākara and his followers accept the Anvitābhidhāna theory and they maintain that the words expressed are already related together and they collectively generate the meaning in an automatic way. This view is known as anvitābhidhānavāda35. In other words, the words themselves convey the connected sentence meaning gradually step by step.

'Anvitābhidhāna' is a compound word analysed as 'anvitānāṃ abhidhānam'5 (expression of things ie meanings), as they are syntactically connected.

In the opinion of C.D. Bijalwan, the literal meaning of 'Anvitābhidhāna vāda' is the theory of expressions of the correlated36.
Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas opine that words themselves convey their meanings (anvita-pada-rthas) and their mutual relation, so that the 'pada-rthas' conveyed by padas do not convey the 'vākyārtha' ie there is no 'abhihitānvaya'.

In their opinion, the individual words do not convey any meaning except in the context of a sentence, and a word must always be associated syntactically with an injunctive verb. The sentence is the unit of speech, though the word which is the product of analysis from the sentences can be considered as the unit of language.

According to this theory, from the very beginning, the meaning of the word is understood as related to some other thing. Hence there is no need of postulating an additional synthesis or construction over and above the related meanings. In their opinion, an isolated word is mere a abstraction.

For eg:- the word 'cow'. By practical usage or lokavyavahāra one can know the meaning of the word 'cow'.

ie someone says "Bring the cow"-then there is a cow is brought. After this the same man says:"Take away the cow"- Then the cow is taken away. A child stand near by becomes acquainted with the meanings of such words as, 'bring' 'take away' 'cow' etc.

Prābhākaras and his followers opine that this understanding of the meanings of these words happened by means of observation of such behaviour of bringing and taking away ie 'āvāpodvāpa'.

So they conclude that a word like 'cow' is never used in isolation and according to them, the meaning of a sentence (vākyārtha) is nothing but the related meaning. For eg:- the word 'cow' must always be related to some other word like
'the cow is white'
'the cow is grazing'
'bring the cow'
'feed the cow' and
'milk the cow' etc.

Thus the word 'cow' always stands is some relation to other concepts.

Thus the anvitābhidhānavādins add that primary capacity (śakti or abhidhā - vṛtti) of a word lies in denoting a related meaning and this theory has been formulated by Prābhākara and has been elaborated by Śālīkanātha Mīśra.

So we can say that the theory of 'Anvitābhidhāna' is primarily derived from the behaviour of man. Because in normal behaviour, man uses sentences for the purpose of communication; and not isolated and unconnected words. Without already knowing the nature of a sentence, one cannot collect isolated words into a sentence. The Prābhākaras elucidate this theory by laying particular stress on the natural method by which children learn the meaning of words. When a child hears a sentence uttered by one elder to another and observes the action, he understands the whole meaning by the whole statement. Though there are many words in a sentence, the unity of sentence - meaning is achieved through the unity of purpose.37

4:9:2 - Abhihitāvavāda

The term 'Abhihitāvaya' is itself significant. It means 'abhihitānāṁ padarthānaṁ anvayaḥ' which literally means38 'the theory of correlation of the expressed'39 or 'agreement of those things that are expressed by word's40.

According to this theory, the words convey their meanings individually and the meaning is obtained by the mutual relationship of words. Here, though the
meaning of individual words can also be comprehended separately, but as far as the sentence - meaning is concerned, it comes out by the association of words and their meanings constitute the sentence.

Among the Māmāśakas, Kumarila Bhaṭṭa and his followers accept the 'abhihitānvaya' theory and in their opinion, all words convey their own meanings separately. i.e. each word first presents only a general concept as indicated by the denotative power (śakti) of the word. The Bhaṭṭas maintain that the sense of a sentence is derived through the meaning of the words. The meaning of a sentence, according to the Bhaṭṭas is a concatenation of the individual items expressed by the words.

Kumarila says that before apprehending the total meaning of the sentence, we must have pre-acquaintance with the independent words taken in isolation. When such independent words bearing cognized independent meanings come together in a sentence, those independent meanings are caught in syntactical relation and thereby we get the total meaning of the total sentence.

In their opinion, a sentence is nothing but a get together of independent words arranged in a syntactical structure, and the syntactical meaning is nothing but a get together of independent meanings, organised in the syntactical meaning structure. In short, a sentence is a structure of related words and a sentential meaning is a structure of related meanings.

This theory may be called some sort of brick and mortar theory of sentential meaning. Because brick, mortar, iron and cement are the constituents of a building structure, but mere accumulation of these elements do not go to form a structure.
The building is a structural organisation, in which the constituents are to be arranged and organised in a certain way and thus the constituents must enter into a certain type of mutual relation.\textsuperscript{41}

Here the separate meanings are first conveyed by separate words, and then the words and their meanings are grasped as entering into the syntactical relation. The separate word meanings cognized in the syntactical relation constitute a defined new meaning (\textit{viśiṣṭaḥ ekarthaḥ}) which is the essential meaning and which as such is the distinct object of verbal cognition. Thus, those who advocate the 'Abhihitānvyavāda, are inclined to make association (saṁsarga) as the meaning of a sentence\textsuperscript{42}.

Consider a word 'cow' denotes only a cow- in- general (go-sāmānyya) as unrelated (ananvita) to another word.

They opine that the different words become related together by a synthetic construction or saṁsarga maryādā.

The meaning of the sentence arises from a synthesis or anvaya of the words. This anvaya is take place in accordance with rules of ākāṅkṣa or expectancy, āsatti or juxta position, yogyatā or compatibility and tātparya or intention of the speaker. This view is that which is expressed or abhihita is construed by mutual synthesis of words or parasparika anvaya is, known as abhihitānvyaya - vāda.\textsuperscript{43}

They maintain that the primary denotative power ie šakti or abhidhā - vṛtti of words is to reveal only a general content or svarupa mātra and not the relational aspect (apekṣābuddhi). The meanings when strewn together like a garland of flowers give rise to a verbal cognition. The different words in their job and cease functioning
and the meanings thus got are synthesised and generate a knowledge of the meaning of the sentence.

Kumarilabhaṭṭa conceives that the function of words continues up to the cognition of the sentential meaning. The knowledge of 'padārtha' is the mediating operation (vyāpāra) through which the meaning of the sentence is communicated by the padas. Just as fuel cannot directly do the cooking, but only through the flame of fire, so padas cannot directly communicate vākyārtha, but only through the padārthas, as remarked Kumarila.

So we can conclude that according to abhihitānayavādins, the constituent words of a sentence present only their isolated meanings, which are combined according to syntactical rules (ie juxtaposition etc.) and the meanings are then brought under a synthetic or constructive process which gives the intended meaning.

4:9:3 - Sphoṭavāda

It is Bhartṛhari, the author of Vākyapadīya, who is the first Grammarian to have presented a systematic treatment of the conception of sphoṭa. According to Bhartṛhari, words have no reality of their own. The entire sentence is to be taken as an indivisible, integral unit, and its meaning is also an instantaneous flash of insight (pratibhā) or intuition, which has no parts. The indivisible sentence is analysed into words and further into roots and suffixes but this division is not real. In his view, the sphoṭa has so many parts. Therefore, Bhartṛhari accepted an 'akhaṇḍāvakya - sphoṭa'. The existence of words in language is on a par with the avidyā stage.
Therefore, in the view of the grammarians, sentence is a single undivided utterance and conveys its meaning in a flash. According to them, only such indivisible sentence-essence is real and all other varieties of verbal essence (sphoṭa) such as syllable-essence (varṇa sphoṭa), word-essence (pada sphoṭa) are its subsidiaries. And such a sentence essence is manifested in the mind of the listener through the knowledge of the utterance of the last syllable which is pregnant with the impression created by the succession of preceding syllables such as cai + traḥ + pa + ca + ti. They hold that assumption of such a unique sentence-essence is necessitated by the fact that words, which are mere combination of syllables (Varṇasamūha) are momentary (ie instantly perishing) in nature and therefore cannot be held to be real.

Also since quickly perishing entities are impossible to perceive, words become incompetent of possessing any functional relation (vr̥tti) through which they can refer to meanings. Thus, only indivisible sentence-essence has the competence to possess functional relation so that the same can reveal the meaning to the listener. In this way each sentence (essence) has a peculiar ability to create a newer and newer awareness.

So we can conclude that Grammarians is of opinion that the sentence has a peculiar capacity and through that capacity it is capable of expressing meaning.

ie 'vākyasya vākyartho śaktih'

4:9:4 - Tatparyavāda

After rejecting all other theories, Jayantabhaṭṭa, the author of Nyāyamañjari introduces the theory named as - "Tatparya - vāda".
Among the Old Naiyāyikas, Jayantabhaṭṭa was the first Naiyāyika, who elaborately threw light on the concept of sentence - meaning or he who discussed the theories of verbal comprehension in detail.

This tātparyaśakti is the same as the samsargamaryadā-vāda accepted by the Navya- Nyāya school.

Among the Rhetoricians, Ānandavardhana refutes tātparya as an anti-dhvani theory. In the opinion of Abhinavagupta, tātparya is that the words by their primary power (abhidhā) refer to isolated word - meaning and the synthetic relation of these words is conveyed by another power known as tātparya.

Bhoja follows Ānandavardhana and the Tatparya vādins. He divides tātparya into three types namely ābhidhīyamāna (expressed), pratīyamāna (implied) and dhvani rupas or suggested.

According to Jayanta, 'Tātparya' is the power of word which conveys a related meaning of the word contained in a sentence. Words by their primary power, known as 'abhidhā' denote their primary meanings. But on being used in a sentence, they have an additional power which continues to work until the meanings are presented to our consciousness as being in relation with one another in a sentence.

He opine that we utter words with the object that they will merely communicate their own primary meanings. In other words, we utter them with the intention of communicating the meaning of a sentence.

Jayanta quotes Kumarila to state that as sticks of wood burn in order to perform their main task of cooking. Similarly, words engage themselves in communicating the meaning of a sentence.
Jayanta tries to elucidate the point in a figurative manner. He says that when we compare understanding as a creeper, knowledge is its main root, the arrangement of words is its bright sprout, the impressions left by the experience of all antecedent sounds are its broad leaves, the meaning of words which have been expressed are its full blown blossoms and the excellent meaning of a sentence is its delicious fruit.

Jayanta rejects both abhihitānvayavāda and anvitābhidhānavāda and prefers a third view according to which words convey the sentence meaning by their cumulative effect or samhatya karitā to the tātparyaśakti of words.

Tātparya, virtually is a modified form of abhihitānvaya. But Jayanta has given it to the status of an independent theory.

So we can say that according to Jayanta, words express their isolated word-meanings through the power abhidha, but as far as the sentence is concerned, it is accomplished through another power, known as tātparya. In his opinion, neither anvitābhidhāna nor adhihitānvaya can explain the exact nature of verbal comprehension. To dispel the confusion created by the Mīmāṃsakas, Jayanta initiates a new thinking in this field of learning. Not only he rejects both the Mīmāṃsa theories, but has propounded a new theory known as tātparyavāda.

From all these we can conclude that Jayanta, as K.K. Raja also observes was the first to bring forward the theory of tātpaya as a separate vṛtti.

4:9:5 - Saṃsarga - maryāda-vāda

This theory is the contribution of the Navya- Nyāya school; and it is the same as the tātparya śakti. According to this theory, the sentence - meaning is obtained because of the juxtaposition of meanings. This sentence - meaning appears
in the verbal understanding in the capacity of a relation. The meanings presented to the mind get connected as per the capacity and compatibility. This theory is very close to the theory of the Bhāṭṭas in the sense that the meanings themselves have the capacity to connect themselves.

In their opinion, the meaning of a sentence is the relation that exists among the substances recalled by the several words in it. Hence, the relation between each pair of things denoted by words in a sentence is understood by means of syntactical connection.

e.g: - 'Caitraḥ pacati'

Here the word 'Caitra' means the Caitra as the 'doer' and the word 'pacati' means 'cooks'; which signifies- 'viklittyanukulakrti' means that activity favourable to softening. This meaning is obtained by the syntactical connection or by saṃsarga.

Saṃsarga means the connection of the one substance 'Caitra' with the other substance activity (favourable to cooking) Both of these substances are recalled by the respective words, supplies the meaning of substratumness. The combination of the two words is capable of producing the sense of substratumness. In other words it is the joint utterance of words that produces the particular meaning.

This saṃsarga is of two types:

1. Bhedasaṃsarga (Differential relation)
2. Abhedasaṃsarga (Non- differential relation)

Saṃyoga (the relation of contact') is included in the variety of bhedasaṃsarga; and samavāya (inherence), viṣ ayā-viṣayībhava (its cognition) and
ādharādheyabhāva (relation of a thing and its substratum) are included in abhedasamśarga.

**4:10 - Necessary Conditions of Śabdabodha**

Indian thinkers together agree that the words convey their individual meanings either through Śakti (Abhidhā), Lakṣana or if and when necessary through Vyañjana. But the process does not end here. Because the words shall have to fulfill certain conditions in order to give us a relational thought in the form of a vākyārtha.

In order to convey the collective meaning of a sentence, the words require the aid of some accessory properties.

There are different opinions among the scholars in the choice of these conditions; and hence the number of the essential conditions varies for the right understanding of a sentence.

The necessary conditions of verbal cognition are enumerated to be three namely

(i) Ākāṅkṣa (syntactical expectancy)

(ii) Yogyatā (semantical competency) (compatibility)

(iii) Āsattī (contiguity) (proximity)

Some consider Tātparya (speakers intention) also to be a necessary condition.

**4:10:1 - Logicians 'View point**

Keśava miśra, the author of Tarkabhāṣa has given a definition of the sentence⁵⁶ is-
"Vākyāṁ tu ākāṅkṣā- yogyatā sannidhi-matām padānāṁ samūhaḥ"

According to this definition, mere collections of words cannot be considered as sentence or vākya. But there should be ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and sannidhi (āsatti) among the words and these are the essential factors for the right understanding of a sentence.

In the opinion of Viśvanātha, the knowledge of each of the four conditions, namely Āsatti, Yogyatā, Ākāṅkṣa and Tātparya is to be obtained prior to the realisation of the śābdabodha from a proposition.

He adds a fourth requisite, tātparyajñāna (knowledge of the intention of the speaker) to the list of conditions for right understanding of a sentence.

But Jayantabhaṭṭa regard 'tātparya' as the separate vṛtti.

4:10:2 - Vaiyākaraṇas' View point

Among the Vaiyākaraṇas, Paṇini is known for his insistence on the capacity (sāmarthya) of words. This 'capacity' is the capability of meaning of words to get united. Hence this capacity or sāmarthya is actually an ekārthībhāva or unification of meanings.

Patanjali, the author of Mahābhāṣya explains this sāmarthya of Paṇini in the sense of vyapekṣa which means that the mutual connection pertaining to the meanings of words in a sentence.

Jaimini compares this 'ekārthībhāva' to 'arthaikatva' and 'vyapekṣā' to 'ākāṅkṣā'.

Bhartṛhari wants a group of mutually expectant words to give a single idea.
4:10:3 - Mīmāṃsakas' View point

Ākāṅkṣa (expectancy), yogyatā (compatibility) and Sannidhi or Āsatti (contiguity) are the conditions for the understanding of the sentence-meaning were first promulgated by the Mīmāṃsakas and later on taken up by all other systems of philosophy with slight modifications.

Among the Mīmāṃsakas, Kumarila adds two more conditions to his primarily accepted Ākāṅkṣa, namely 'Yogyata' and Āsatti (sannidhi or sannidhāna)

Later Mīmāṃsakas, more or less, come to follow Kumarila's position.

Prābhākaras also admit the involvement of Sannidhi, Yogyatā and Ākāṅkṣa in giving a śābdabodha.

After this, one more fact called Tātparya (intention of the speaker or the purport of the sentence) was added to the above mentioned three factors by both Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras.

4:10:4 - Ālaṃkārikas' View point

In the opinion of Ālaṃkārikas, the admission of the earlier three conditions is universal.

Among the Ālaṃkārikas, Abhinavagupta regard 'Tātparya' only as a separate vṛtti.

4:10:5 - Vedāntins' View point

Vedāntins also accept all the four conditions of śābdabodha as such.

4:10:1:1 - Ākāṅkṣa (expectancy)

Ākāṅkṣa is the foremost requirement for the right understanding of a sentence.
The word ‘Ākāṅkṣā’ is derived from the root 'kāṅkṣa' means 'to desire' or 'to expect something'.

In the classical texts of Nyāya and other schools of philosophy, it is identified with the syntactic property but on the part of the listener it is just the incompleteness of an utterance.

According to K.K. Raja, ‘Ākāṅkṣā’ is accepted as an essential condition for the unity of a sentence 68.

e.g.: If some one says merely a word 'bring', then the meaning will not be complete.

Bring what? It can be a book, a pen, a cow, a cloth etc. In the same way, if only 'cow' is uttered that also expects something more whether 'to bring', 'to be fed' or 'milked' etc. But when we say 'Bring a cow' (gāṃānaya). Here the two words 'bring' and 'cow' help each other to make a complete sense. This mutual expectancy of one word to another is known as ākāṅkṣa.

From the above example it is clear that any word taken singly or separately is not self-sufficient. So in order to convey a full sense it requires to be aided or supplemented with the help of some other word.

According to Viśvanātha, the word without which another word is unable to convey the full meaning of a word is expectant to another word without which it cannot convey its meaning is called the ākāṅkṣita pada ie the desired or required word 69.

In the opinion of Annapāṭṭa, expectancy is 'the inability of a word to convey the whole meaning of the sentence, that inability is caused by the absence of some other word.'
ie Padasya- Padāntara- vyatireka- prayuktānvaya- ananubhāvakatvam ākāṅkṣā.

For example: If some one says simply 'ghaṭam' then a desire at one created to know what about the jar and it is satisfied only when we utter some such words as 'ānaya' which can complete the sense. This desire to know, is called ākāṅkṣa.

So we can say that the sentence 'ghaṭam ānaya' conveys four notion- ghaṭa (a jar), ampratyaya (the objective relation), ā + nī (the act of bringing) and the termination of imperative, second person, singular. (the command). If any of these notion is absent, the sense remains so far incomplete.

This view of Annaṃbhaṭṭa clearly explained in Nyāyabodhinī commentary.

Annaṃbhaṭṭa's definition of ākāṅkṣā is further modified by Viśvanātha, that if a word 'x' cannot become syntactically connected with the rest of the sentence without another word 'y' then 'x' has expecctancy (ākāṅkṣā) for Y.

Keśavamiśra has accepted only three requisities regarding the sentence, but he has given only the counter example of ākāṅkṣa and has not given specific definitions of the three requisities.

According to Udayana, expectancy is neither equivalent to universal concomitance (avinābhāva) between concepts, nor inquisitiveness of the hearer. It is really equivalent to that element which is capable of giving rise to the supposed inquisitiveness of the hearer.

So Udayana's Ākāṅkṣā is understood as a jijñāsā which means that the desire to know the meanings of words uttered along with after knowing the meaning of a particular word.
Kaṇḍatarkavagīśa gives an example- 'ghaṭaṁ ānaya'. He says that here the word 'aṁ' has the expectancy in it because without it, the word 'ghaṭa' cannot produce the Karmatava. Hence 'aṁ'- padatva' is the expectancy in the word 'ghaṭa'⁷⁶

In Tattvacintāmani, Gaṅgeśopādhya defined ākāṅkṣa as the accompaniment of one string 'x' with another string 'y' in such a way that 'x' would not generate cognition of the meaning unless accompanied by 'y' ⁷⁷.

Thus, in his opinion, so long as there is incompleteness of the expressed meaning, there is Ākāṅkṣā. The great Grammarian, Nāgeśa says⁷⁸ that ākāṅkṣā is the desire on the part of the listeners on hearing a word in a sentence to know the idea which can be related to its meaning in order to get a complete sense.

In his opinion, ākāṅkṣā is on the part of the listeners and not on the part of words or their meanings. Only in a figurative sense, this expectancy is attributed to the words and their meanings.

Among the Mīmāṁsakas, Nārāyaṇa bhaṭṭa speaks of the necessity of admitting Ākāṅkṣā as an essential factor. Otherwise, we shall be required to recognise a syntactical relation even in the bare string of words like cow, horse, man, etc⁷⁹.

Viśvanātha, the famous Ṛaṅgkārika conveyed the same idea that Ākāṅkṣā is the absence of completion of an idea (the understanding of a meaning)⁸⁰.

The Mīmāṁsaka-s explain this ākāṅkṣā, not only on the basis of the syntactic incompleteness of the sentence, but also on the basis of the psychological incompleteness of the idea⁸¹.
According to K.K. Raja, "words are mutually expectant or a word is said to have 'ākāṅkṣā' for another if it cannot without the latter produce knowledge of its inter connection is an utterance".

4:10:1:1:1 - Types of Ākāṅkṣā

There are two types of ākāṅkṣa- 'Utthita' and 'Utthāpya'. Of these two, 'utthita' expectancy is actual and natural expectancy of one word for the other to make a complete sense.

eg:- 'the door' (dvāram) Here close (pidhehi) etc. is understood.

The second one is utthāpya. This is the potential expectancy which could be roused if necessary.

eg:- 'The moon rises' (Udayati candra≈) Here the noun 'Kumudabāndhava' also appended is made to agree with the verb. This is a case of avoidable expectancy, sometimes considered a literary fault.

4:10:1:2 - Yogyatā

Yogyatā is probably the single most important necessary condition of śābdabodha.

This yogyatā is variously translated as 'compatibility', 'competency' 'consistency' 'congruity' and 'coherence' etc. Bertrand Russell, while discussing the significance of sentences, explained a certain kind of possibility, named as - 'syntactic possibility' which is the essential factor for a sentence; otherwise 'The moon is made of green cheese' will be considered as a sentence.

Therefore, the more appropriate translation of 'yogyatā' may be 'syntactical possibility'. From this, it is clear that compatibility is not the semantical approach, but completely connected with the syntax.
In a very simple way, the words constituting a sentence should be mutually compatible. A typical example of incompatibility is 'vahinā siṃcati' (sprinkles with fire). The act of sprinkling or irrigation can be done with the help of water, and not with fire, which has the potency to burn and not to irrigate. Thus the function of the verb 'irrigates' becomes imperative by the word 'fire' which has been used in the instrumental case (karaṇa kāraka). The two words 'fire' and 'sprinkles' which are of a conflicting nature clash together or cancel each other's meaning. This stultification of meaning makes the sentence non-sensical. The combination of the two words is so incongruous or incompatible then it does not carry any sense. There is an obstruction of meaning (artha-bādha) and consequently there is no cognition (arthopala-badhi). Hence the words should be fit enough to be combined together. This fitness of words is called yogyatā ie non-obstruction of meaning.

Thus Annaṁbhaṭṭa defines Yogyatā as the 'non-contradiction of meaning' or 'non-obstruction of meaning. In his opinion, a word is said to have 'yogyatā' with another, when the meanings conveyed by the two are not inconsistent with each other. Thus, the above example 'Vahinā Siṃcati cannot be the correct sentence, because the notions of fire and sprinkling are inconsistent and incompatible with each other. Similarly these sentences also are meaningless 'jalena dahiye', 'māṃsaṃ piṭati', 'paṅguḥ dhāvati' etc.

According to Viśvanātha, 'the connection of the meaning of a word with that of another is competency.'

According to Bhāṣā pariccheda - the compatibility of the meaning of a word with that of another is called competency. But the author of Manikaṇḍa refuted in
this way - 'the non- contradiction of the mutual relationship between the two word
- meanings that are correlative in the syntax'.

Jayanta defines semantical competency as the possibility of the syntactico-
sementical relation of one referent to the other. Gangeśā refuted many theories
and defined 'yogyatā' as the logical compatibility or consistency of the words in a
sentence for mutual association.

Gadādhara modifies the definition by stating that yogyatā is the word's
reference to the meanings which are semantically not contradictory ie are
compatible (abādhīrthakatvam).

In the opinion of Viśvanātha, the famous Ālaṃkārika, yogyatā is the absence
of hindrence of obstruction in respect of mutual relation of the things denoted by
the words.

Of the Grammarians, Nāgeśa understands yogyatā as possession of such
attributes by two or more things as make their mutual relation possible.

Among the Mīmāṃsakas, Prabhākaras understands yogyatā as the suitability
of words to have syntactical relation with other words of the same sentence. The
knowledge of this yogyatā occurs to the mind of the speaker and the listener in a
particular context on the strength of the previous experience of seeing the words
to be in such relations.

Kumarila Bhaṭṭa and his followers admit yogyatā as an essential factor for
having a śābdabodha as they hold that there can be no śābdabodha in sentence like
'Vahninā Siṅcati' obviously for lack of yogyatā between the words 'Vahninā' and
'Siṅcati'.

4:10:1:3 - Āsatti or Sannidhi (Juxta position)

The third requirement of an adequate sentence is āsatti or proximity, Āsatti is also known as sannidhi or sannidhāna. This is the juxta position or unintervened occurrence of two words. Āsatti or contiguity is the utterance of words in a sentence form by a single person without abnormal delay -

ie Padānāṁ availambena uccāraṇaṁ sannidhiḥ or 'Anvayapratiyogyanuyogi - padayo ravyavadhānaṁ āsattiḥ'

The knowledge derived from such an utterance causes verbal cognition.

It is defined as the contiguity (temporal when uttered spatial when written) between words.

Sannidhi is the utterance of an expression without introducing time gap more than necessary. 'Sannidhānaṁ tu padasyāsattirucyate.'

For example, when someone utters the word 'gām' (cow) in the morning, and 'ānaya' (bring) in the evening, the cognition of gām ānaya (bringing a cow), that conditions the objectness of cow, is not produced as such an utterance lacks contiguity; or it will not be able to convey the meaning. The meaning of the words 'gām ānaya' or 'bringing a cow' can be understood only if the words are co-uttered (sahoccārita). This type of co-utterance (samabhivyāhāra) of words is known by the name of āsatti or sannidhi.

If there is an intervence between bring and cow or those words uttered at intervals of three hours, each cannot constitute an adequate sentence. Here the intended meaning is not clear. Thus, it is the condition that words in a sentence should be contiguous in time.
'āsattiśca - avyavadhānena padajanyapadārthopasthitī.

Not only this, that the meaning of two words should be individually incomplete and must possess the potency for satisfying their mutual wants, but they also be presented in close proximity, just to show that these are the two meanings that are also meant to be combined or construed together

eg:- 'girirbhuktamagnimān devadattena'99(hill, eaten, fiery, by Devadatta)

This sentence is wrong because though the words are meaningful but still they lack contiguity.

The correct order of this sentence should be 'girī bhuktaṁagnimān Devadattena (The hill has fire) and bhuktaṁ Devadattena (It has been taken by Devadatta) Therefore said that - āsattī - anvaya pratiyogināṁ yaugapadyena padajanyopasthitī100 which means that contiguity is the presentation ie remembrance of the correlations of the syntax conjointly caused by words.

4:10:1:4 - Tātparya (Intention)

In addition to these three essential conditions of śābdabodha, some Logicians like Viśvanātha add a fourth requisite 'tatparya' (intention) as an essential factor in the meaning of a sentence.

Tātparya is defined as the utterance of the word with the intention to make known a certain meaning-

'tadarthapratītičchayā uccaritatvaṁ'

Viśvanātha defined tātparya as 'vakturicchā tu tātparyam parikīrtitam'101,

Among the Logicians, Gangeśopādhyāya and Viśvanātha, hold that intention (desire) of the speaker or vaktṛtātparya is the fourth requisite along with ākāṅkṣa'
'yogatā' and 'āsatti' for verbal comprehension. Knowledge of it is very essential in such cases where a word has more than one meaning.

For eg:- the sentence 'Saindhavam ānaya' can mean either 'Bring salt' or Bring a horse'. Here the speaker's intention that enables one to choose the appropriate sense under the given circumstances. Because the word 'saindhava' refers to more than one meaning such as 'a type of horse' or salt'. Therefore verbal cognition becomes impossible unless the listener knows exactly what the speaker intends to convey ie whether the horse or salt.

Similarly a statement - 'ayameti putro rājñāḥ puruṣopārayatām'. Here the word rājñāḥ (of the king) can be construed with either the word 'putraḥ' (son) or puruṣah (man), exact knowledge of the speaker's intention as to which word 'rājñāḥ' should be construed with, becomes absolutely necessary.

So we can conclude that the words should be pronounced with a view to convey the desired sense. Because if a parrot utters the words, 'Bring a cow' it cannot be regarded as a sentence in the proper sense of the term. This is the reason that there is no intention to convey the meaning there.
## Notes and References

1. Philosophy of sentence and its parts - p.1
2. NSM-p-115
3. TS-p.39
4. Vākyārthaṅānam śābdajñānam- ibid. p.54
5. Navya Nyāya; Some logical problems in Historical perspective : p.85
6. Philosophy of sentence and its parts - p.1
7. Padajanya padārthopastitijanya bodhaḥ śābdabodhaḥ - BR. p. 190
8. Ekapadārthe' para- padartha- Saṃsarga- Viṣayaka jñānam -VV
9. Śabdājjāyamānahāḥ bodhaḥ - NSM. p. 115
10. Mullati, L.C.OP. Cit. p.42
11. NSM. p. 115
12. Padopasthitānāṃ Mithāḥ Saṃsargaḥ vākyārthaḥ- TK
14. Theory of word, sentence and sentence - meaning- p. 31
15. śābdikāḥ tu padārthānām Mithāḥ anvayarupa uddeśya - vidhaya bhava sambandhaḥ iti āhuḥ - TP
16. vākyārtharūpayavayaviśaṣṭa padaṃ śaktiḥ iti bhāttāḥ āhuḥ - ibid.
17. The philosophy of language - p. 119
18. The word and the world - p.49
19. Prathamaṃ gavādi padānāṃ gavādi padārtheṣu sambandhaḥ - VV
20. tataḥ kālāntare gāṁ ānaya iti ukte gavādi padebhyaḥ gavādiṁ arthān smarati-
ibid

21. Padasya Padārtha smārakatvam ca eka saṁbandhijñānam aparasaṁbandhi
smārakam-vv

22. ākāṅkṣādījnānataḥ tadanantaram (gokarmānukūla kṛtīmān tvamīti) buddhiḥ
jāyate - ibid

23. BR- pp. 191-93

24. Dhātvartaka khyāṭi vrddhāḥ śabdabodho bhavati- KT.p. 297

25. ākhyātārtha - mukhya- viśeṣyakaḥ bodhaḥ- ibid


27. eka tiṁ vākyam - MBH

28. eka tiṁ artha mukhya viśeṣyakabodha jaṅaka padasamūhaḥ-NK

29. Kriyārūpaḥ vākyārthaḥ - ibid

30. ekābhinna caitra vṛtti kartṛṭā nirūpikā grāmāṇiśṭha karmatā nirūpikā ca yā
kriyā tadanukūlā bhāvanā

31. ākhyātārtha- mukhya- viśeṣyakaḥ bodhaḥ - KT pp. 297-98

32. grāmāṇiśṭha saṁyoga jaṅaka gamanānukūla vyāpārāśrayaḥ caitraḥ

33. J. Brough - Some Indian theories of meaning; TPS, 1953, p.163

34. anvītānāmeva abhidhānam - NK

35. anvitasya parasparamilitasyaiva abidhānam iti anvītabhidhāna vādaḥ - ibid.

36. Bijalwan. C.D-Indian Theories of knowledge based upon Jayanta's Nyāya
Mañjari. p.245
37. VMV : p.2
38. NSM - p.364
39. Bijalwan C.D op.cit. p.246
40. Subha Rao Veluri- Philosophy of sentence and its parts - p.94
41. Sphoṭa siddhi - p.96
42. Saṃkhātapakṣe parasparānvaye padārthavaśādādhikyam saṃsarga sa vākyārthāḥ - PR under VP.II. 42
43. abhihitasya kathitasya parasparam anvayaḥ iti abhihitānvayavādaḥ- NK
44. Padāni hi svam svam padam padārtham abhidhaya nirvṛtta vyaparāṇi. atha idanīm padārthaḥ jñātaḥ sataḥ vākyārtham gamayanti - SB
45. Vākyārthimatyaye teṣāṃ prāvṛtttau nāntarīyakam |
   pāke jvāleva kāṣṭhānāṃ padārtha-pratipādanam iti || - SV, Kārika - 343
46. ākāṅkṣāyogyatāsannidhivaśāt vākṣyamāṇasvarūpāṇāṃ padārthānāṃ samanvaye tātparyārthaḥ - KP.p. 9
47. (i) Iyer, K.A.S- Pratibhā as the meaning of sentence' POC; 1940; p.326
(ii) Kaviraj, Gopinath- The Doctrine of pratibha in Indian philosophy ABORI, 1924
48. Sphotātmake Vākye pratibhā lakṣāṇe vākyārthe vākyavākyārthayoh adhyāsarūpaḥ sambandhaḥ- PR Under VP.II.2
49. Vākye Uktānvya viśayā śaktiravatiṣṭate - LM.p.418 II. 4-5
50. Bhoja, Śrṅgārprakāśa - Madras, p.152
51. Raja, K.Kunjunni - Indian theories of meaning; p.221
52. Väkyärthimataye teśāṃ pravṛttayau nāntarīyakaṃ |
   Pāke jvāleva kāṣṭhānāṃ padārtha pratipādanam iti ||
   - SV; Väkyādhikaraṇa, karika-343

53. NM- p.373

54. Raja, K. kumjunni- Indian theories of meaning; p.221

55. V.N. Jha, contribution of Nyāya system to Indian thought structure - p.55

56. TB.p 121

57. āsattiryogyatā - ākāṅkṣā - tātparya jñānam iṣyate-kār; kārika/ - 82

58. Samarthāḥ padavidhiḥ AS- p.2.2.1

59. prthagarthānāṃ ekārthī bhāvaḥ samartha vacanam - kāthāyana's vārttika-1

60. MBH on V above under p.2.1.1

61. MS 2.1.46

62. VP 2.351. p.45

63. ākāṅkṣā sannidhānam ca yogyatā ceti ca trayam - TV.p. 445

64. VM p.5

65. Vākyaṃ syād yogyatākaṅkṣāsattiyuktāḥ padoccayaḥ - SDII.1.p.27


67. VPB- p.80

68. Raja, K. Kunjunni- 'Ākāṅkṣā- the main basis of syntactic unity, ' A.L.B
   Vol.21, 1957, p.284

69. Yatpadena vinā yasya ananubhāvakatā bhavet ākāṅkṣā - NSM - p.302
70. TS - p.52

71. avyavahitottaratvādisambandhena yat-pade-yat-pada-prakāraka jñāna -
vyatirekaprayuṅktō yāḍṛśa - śābdabodhābhavaḥ tāḍṛśa śābdabodhe
tatpade-tat-padatvam- ākāṅkṣā
Nyāyabodhinī, comm.on TS, p.53.

72. yena padēna vinā yatpadasya anvayā-na-nubhāva-katvaṃ tena padena saha
tasya ākāṅkṣā - NSM. p. 127

73. ākāṅkṣā yogyatā sannidhiścavākyārthajñāna hetuḥ - TB

74. ata eva 'gauḥ āśvaḥ puruṣo hastīti' padāṇi na vākyaḥ paraspārākāṅkṣā virahāt
TB, p.121

75. ākāṅkṣā padārthaḥ tarhi kaḥ? jijñāśaṃ prati yogyata sa ca pada-
smārita tadāksiptayoḥ avinābhāve satī śrotari
tadutpādyasaṃsargaṃvagamaṃprāgabhāvaḥ - N.kus; p.398

76. Ucyate - yatpadaniṣṭha - yatpada vyatirekaprayukta - tātparya viṣayībhūta
yāḍṛśāṅvaya - bodhopadhāyakavābhavaḥ tatpadasya tatpadattvam
tāḍṛśāṅvaya bodhe ākāṅkṣā - BR.p. 195

77. abhidhāna paryavasānām ākāṅkṣā yasya yena vinā na svārthāṅvayanubhāva
- katvam tasya tadapasyya vasānām. TC.p. 208

78. PLM - p.33
Sā caikapadārtha jñāne tadarthāṅvayayogyārthasya yajjñānaṃ
tadviṣayecchā

79. gaurāśvaḥ puruṣo hastītyākāṅkṣārahite eṣвиha/ anvayādārśanāttavadākāṅkṣā
parigṛhyte MM. p.99
80. nirākāṅkṣasya vākyatve' gaurāśvaḥ puruṣo hastī ityādināmapi vakyatvam syāt SD II

81. anvityābhidhānārthamuktārthaghaṭanāya vā pratiyogini jijñāsā yā sākāṅkṣeti gīyate. VM. p.7

82. Raja, K. Kunjunni - Ākāṅkṣa:-The main basis of syntactic unity; ALB, Vol.21, 1957, pp. 282-95

83. VPB IV 4 & 7

84. LM - p. 505

85. Russell, Bertrand - An enquiry into meaning and Truth; p.170

86. Arthābadho yogyatā -TS.p.52.

87. eka padārthe' para - padārtha saṃbandho yogyatā-NSM-p.126

88. Padārthe tatra tadvattā yogyatā parikīrtita - Kār; Kārika - 83

89. tatrāṃvaya - pratiyogi - padārthayoh paraspara - saṃsargābādho yogyatā iti kecit- MK.; p.70

90. bādhaka pramāvirahō yogyatā - TC; p.262

91. yogyatā padārthānām parasparasaṃbandhe bādhābhāvaḥ. Padoccaisyaitadabhāve' pi vākyatve 'vahninā siṃcati' ityādyapi vākyam syāt. SD. p. 27

92. Yogyatā ca... sekānvayaprayojakadravadravyatvābhāvāt PLM. p. 75

93. kiṃ punaridaṃ yogyatvaṃ nāma yat sambandhārhatvaṃ sambandhārhamiti kathamavagamyate. sambandhitvena dṛṣṭatvāt VM. p.9

94. MM p. 99
95. TS. p.52

96. Datta, D.M; The six ways of knowing p. 313

97. Kār; kārika. 83

98. Ved. pari; IV-10

99. BR. p. 203

100. MK; p.70

101. Kār; kārika - 84