CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION
Chapter VIII

Conclusion

"Freedom can never be had by begging. It has to be got by force. Its price is blood. We will not beg freedom from any foreign country. We shall achieve freedom by paying its price... We shall pay the price of our freedom with our blood... By doing so, we shall lay the foundation stone of national unity."

--- Subhash Chandra Bose.

In 1498, Vasco da Gama’s epoch-making journey opened a new chapter in the history of the world. On one the one hand, it brought glories to Europe and on the other it proved to be critical for the Asian, African and American continent. These regions, for the next three-four centuries experienced the colonial domination of Europe in the political, social, cultural and economic fields. The process of establishment of European dominance over these regions by turning them into subservient cultures gave way to what can be termed as colonialism.

Colonialism was manifested in the settlement of territory, the exploitation of its resources, and the politico-economic and socio-cultural enslavement of the colony that was often accompanied by violent exploitation of the local population.

What was the motive behind the invasion of the unknown foreign lands by Europe? The European countries justified their actions by promoting the theory of white man’s burden, that God had bestowed on them the great task of “civilizing” the “ignorant savages” of the colonised lands. This so called civilizing mission thus became the main argument in favour of legitimisation colonization.

Balandier George, while pointing out the basic characteristics of colonialism states that it reflects the domination of an alien minority that asserts
its racial and cultural superiority over a materially inferior local majority. According to him it is the contact between a machine oriented civilisation with Christian origin, a powerful economy and a rapid rhythm of life and a non-Christian civilisation that lacks machines and is marked by a backward economy and a slow rhythm of life and thus it is the imposition of the first civilisation upon the second.²

This foreign rule resulted in economic exploitation, deprivation of freedom of faith, suppression of culture of the people of the occupied land and deprivation of basic rights. Colonialism does not result only in economic misery but it also leads to socio-cultural degrading as Nicholas B. Dirks puts it that colonialism is a "cultural project of control."³ It is not just the result of the power of superior arms, military organisation, political power or economic wealth but as of cultural onslaught on the locals through which colonialism is nurtured, sustained and strengthened as happened in Portuguese Goa.

As has been discussed in Chapter II, Afonso de Albuquerque introduced the policy assimilative policy of mixed marriages between the Portuguese and the Goan population to strengthen the Portuguese hold by producing an obedient and servile progeny, loyal and faithful to the royal crown in Portugal.

The policy of miscegenation was accompanied by attempts to convert "pagan" souls into Christian souls through brutal means. Conquest of Goa by the Portuguese brought Goa under a Catholic monarch. Portugal had claimed that their main aim in embarking on the conquest of the East was to spread the word of Christ. Therefore Padroado Real (Royal Patronage) and the Papal Bulls conferred on the state the exclusive right to subjugate the territories to spread the Christian faith.

Thus Portuguese policy did not restrict itself only to conversion of locals to Christianity but this meant denial of traditional Indian way of life and adoption of the lusitainian culture. Conversion was the first step towards this cultural
onslaught. The Goa Inquisition prohibited the converts from practicing the Indian way of life. They had to forgo their Indian names, dress, customs and manners. Like all other colonial power, the Portuguese made use of education as tool to promote the colonial control. Education was used to de-link the local population from their original culture and to impose an alien culture on them. The policy of evangelization, and assimilation had devastating effects on the local population and led to the denationalisation of Goans as been argued by T. B. Cunha, the foremost nationalist, vehemently attacked this policy of mass conversions that led to the brutal sacking of the locals.

The policy of religious intolerance as well as racial discrimination that was practiced by the Portuguese was responsible for raising the banner of revolt by the locals against the foreign oppressor. The local resistance continued well into the twentieth century when the struggle of Goans to emerge free from the subordinate colonial status and join the sovereign republic of India took a significant turn.

The freedom fighters, with whom I interacted, while stating the nature of Portuguese colonialism spoke about poor economic opportunities, neglect of education backward social conditions. For them freedom was a matter of self-respect and self rule and only if they had self-power they could think to "create a new Goa". Restoration of basic civil rights denied to them by Salazar, freedom from Portuguese colonial rule and reintegration with Indian Union were major aims of the national movement launched in Goa and cultural freedom that would weed out the denationalised characteristic of the colonial state. According to them, Goa's struggle was a "movement of the people" that aspired to be freed from colonial shackles. It was to gain fundamental rights that were denied to them by Salazar's dictatorship. Moreover it was a part of the broad-based struggle launched by the Indians as well as rest of Asian and African nationalists against western colonialism.
Nationalism was the most powerful force that dominated the mid-twentieth century. Third world countries it emerged as the most significant sentiment as response to colonial onslaught of the West. The Third World countries that toiled under the subjection of European imperialism rose with their full strength to challenge the unjust colonial domination. These countries influenced by the ideal of self-rule, experienced tremendous growth in political consciousness and were fired with the spirit of nationalism. Nationalism to Carlton J. Hayes is as a "fusion of patriotism with a consciousness of nationality," that constitutes a historical process that establishes the modern political institution of a nation. To Hans Kohn "it is the first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness...the individuals identification of himself with the 'we-group' to which he gives supreme loyalty". Anthony H. Birch has defined nationalism as a political doctrine that describes loyalty to the state. It is a political movement that based on nationalist ideal aimed to attain and defend national integrity.

Though liberation and self-determination are universal phenomenon, each nation encounters them in its own particular way. Manifestation of nationalism differs widely according to regions, history, cultural traditions and social structure. All these factors play a significant role in shaping the nature of national consciousness.

National self-awareness is chiefly a sense of affinity with a definite social ethnic community, an awareness of one's relation to the material and spiritual requirements of its progressive development. It depends on the historical level of the community and its individuals.

As mentioned earlier, nationalism in Asia and Africa based itself on a feeling of collective grievances against foreign rule. It sought freedom from the oppression inflicted on them by the alien rule. The ideology of nationalism emphasised the fact of foreign rule itself is an affront to human dignity. Thus here
the national question was historically fused with a colonial question. The assertion of national identity was therefore a form of struggle against colonial exploitation. Nationalism thus developed as a movement of opposition to colonial rule accompanied by the movements for the nation building.

Nationalism as an ideology asserts itself in three stages. Stirrings are the first stage wherein nation becomes aware of itself as a nation suffering from oppression. With this political awareness people begin to refute alien "myths" notions and foreign ways. It is the period that seeks to revive the local cultural identity by casting away the imposed identity of foreign rule. In the second stage the politically conscious people raise the banner of struggle to achieve independence from the colonial rule. Acts of peaceful protest, demonstrations violent manifestation of anger against foreigners is expressed very vitally in this stage. The third stage of nationalism involves consolidation of nations self-respect. For example, nation that has achieved independence strive to consolidate and maintain its national integrity.

If one analyses India's independence struggle based on these three stages it is realized that the socio-religious movements that promoted cultural revivalism formed a part of the first stage of nationalism which was followed by the actual struggle for independence that was launched with violent as well as non-violent methods. The third stage of Indian nationalism began with independence. India's attempt to consolidate itself by integrating the princely states and liberating the remaining Indian territories from the French and the Portuguese hold aimed to maintain the national unity of the country.

In India nationalism emerged as an organised political movement to further the aims and the interests of the people of India vis-à-vis imperial exploitation of European powers. The Indian national struggle was a reaction to the repressive policy of the British Indian Government, their racial arrogance and economic disparities. Though initially it was confined to the elite community, the
doctrine of nationalism in due course of time spread in the Indian subcontinent taking recourse to different techniques, sometimes-violent methods and at other times, constitutional means. Large number of people joined the Indian national Movement. By mid-twentieth century Indians witnessed two parallel movements, a revolutionary movement organised by those who believed in gunpowder nationalism and a non-violent satyagraha by Gandhi.

The sense of solidarity of people assumed a mass character. Nationalist like Aurobindo Ghose, Bankim Chandra conceptualized Indian nationalism as a mother who was in chains of British oppressors. Furthering a vision of free and united India Aurobindo Ghose stated a free and united India will be there and the mother will gather around her sons and wield them into a single national strength in the life of a great and united people.

It is generally stated that the spirit of nationalist consciousness was a British legacy. Indian nationalism was a by-product of British rule. No doubt British rule generated the high spirit of nationalism and there is ample evidence that it was British colonial exploitation that inflamed the flames of nationalism. However to say that national consciousness was entirely a British product is entirely wrong. This sense of national solidarity was present in ancient India. The concept of Bharatvarsha- united India was the basic feature of ancient polity and culture. Bhismaparva of Mahabharata highlights the spirit of national consciousness. Indian Vedas, epics, puranas echoed the sense of patriotism and political consciousness that stressed on the ethical ideal of the well being of the people and freedom of the country that was threatened by aliens. This was called Svadharma. Ancient Indian patriotic conception revolved around the Mother-cult Janani-bhakti, devotion of oneself to the mother earth the sacred land.7

The intense devotion to Bhutadhatri, the earth mother is expressed in “Bharathavakya” in Mudraraksha of Vishakadatta. The poet has stressed on an urgent emergency of giving protection (avanavidhi) from the aliens, that is
We brought *HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW* to India 40 years back. Since then we hold all readers of *HBR* in high regard and as such we don't want you to miss the action.

**HERE IS YOUR LATEST ISSUE OF HBR FOR MAY 2006.**

To monitor and to improve on the delivery system we request you to please tick mark the following details, sign and affix your rubber stamp and simply return it to us by post or fax it on our Fax No. (022) 22026547.

We look forward to your support in this effort to improve the service
Geeta

1) Azad Gomantak T. -?
2) Role of Satyagraha in Indian struggle.

D - 228
Mlecchhas, to her. Therefore, I would like to refute such claims that nationalism, as a principle was imported from Europe. According to me spirit of nationalism formed a basic principle of Indian cultural polity. However, whenever the freedom and independence of Bharatvarsha was threatened this spirit erupted as a volcano to challenge the enemy of the country.  

As mentioned earlier, the Indian national movement that developed to oust the colonial European powers from the Indian soil and to build a free and united India made use of peaceful as well as violent methods to achieve their goals. In fact before the advent of Gandhi and the experiment in the use of satyagraha technique, the violent revolutionary movement formed the mainstream of the national struggle. Both these methods of protest, that is satyagraha and violence were adopted by the Goans during the course of the territory's struggle for freedom from colonial rule during the period, 1946 to 1961, through the agency of organizations such as NC (G) and the AGD.

The present thesis was conceptualized with a view to analyse Goa's struggle for freedom with reference to the multifaceted responses of the National Congress (Goa) and the Azad Gomantak Dal to the colonial regime while undertaking a critique of the Portuguese colonial regime in the context of which Goa's anti-colonial struggle was launched in the twentieth century. The thesis therefore makes an evaluation of the reaction of the Salazarist dictatorial regime to the nationalist struggle in Goa and an assessment of the impact of the struggle on the Government of India. Finally, it has examined the factors that ultimately resulted in the Indian Army's "Operation Vijay".

On 19th December 1961 "Operation Vijay" was successful in freeing the Indian subcontinent from European colonial hegemony. Goa had joined the anti-imperialist movement when the national struggle for independence against the British had reached its peak. At that very crucial juncture, when the British were planning to leave the Indian territory, Lohia kindled the torch of direct nonviolent...
action against Portuguese colonialism, thus bringing it into the national mainstream crusade for freedom.

The process of decolonisation of Goa, with two parallel movements that the Goans simultaneously launched, one of nonviolent pursuit through the method of *satyagraha* and other with the technique of gunpowder nationalism, has been focus of much debate and discussion. Therefore, in this thesis an attempt was made to analyse Goa's struggle in detail in the context of the methods and techniques used by NC (G), the non-violent organization, as well as AGD, the militant underground organisation.

**WAS NC (G)'s adherence to non-violence a tactic or principle?**

NC (G) was a united front that represented all Goans who believed in nationalism. Therefore, even those ideological currents were permitted to function within it that were committed to non-violence as a tool but did not believe in it as an ideology. For example, Vishwanath Lawande who was disillusioned with the method of non-violence was not only accepted in the organisation but was entrusted with the work of General Secretary in 1950. Of course this was a strategic move to strengthen anti-Portuguese forces. The other very prominent example that could be cited is of Peter Alvares, the leader of *Praja Socialist Party*, who became president of NC (G) in 1953 and worked diligently to make the Goa issue a national issue and organised the 1954-55 *satyagraha* with support of *Goa Vimochan Sahhayak Samiti* that was constituted of non-Congress activists who were Socialists, Communists, Royists, activists of *Janasangh*, *Bajarang Dal* and others.

A very positive feature of Goa's struggle during 1953-55 was its ideological and organized open-endedness. It assumed the dimension of a broad anti-imperialist movement of an entire Indian people. It included within its ranks widely divergent ideological and political tendencies that could freely participate against the imperialists. This ideological openness thus enhanced the possibility
of transforming Goa’s struggle into a political expression of the historic movement of all anti-colonial forces and it acquired an all-India character. The NC (G) adopted non-violence as a tactic and not necessarily as a principle. As has been already discussed in Chapter V, satyagraha was used as a means to pressurize the Government of India to take up the case of Goa. I have elaborately brought out this aspect of the organisational strategy in the above-mentioned chapter where the views of the then President of NC (G), Peter Alvares, have been analysed to indicate that for them non-violence was just a means; its strategy did not have a “purely non-violent approach”.  

Therefore the satyagraha action of NC (G) could not reach the level of satyagraha movement conducted by Gandhi to fight the British. According to Madhav Bir moral aspect involved in non-violence could not be obtained. While criticising the satyagraha action conducted in Goa’s struggle he had confessed that the activists working towards it “wanted a short-cut.” He has further stated that they did have “patience to wait and see the awakening of the people which is an inherent necessity in a non-violent struggle.”

It appears from the above statement that the satyagrahis who participated in the action were not “convinced satyagrahis” and as non-violence was the only means that was acceptable to the Government of India, NC (G) had to adopt it. Further one can come to the conclusion that if the Government of India had given the green signal to NC (G) to adopt violence as a method “NC (G) would also have accepted violence.”

In a sense these statements can be backed by the fact that if one takes note of the participation of the satyagrahis that joined the nonviolent struggle they belonged to those political parties such as Praja Socialist Party, Jana Sangh and others of the non-Congress front. Peter Alvares, a Praja Socialist activist, led the NC (G) during the 1954-55, period. Therefore, when mass satyagraha action of 1954-55, after having world-wide reaction did not compel Nehru to send in armed
forces for reasons already discussed in Chapter V, and the Government of India's strict decision to ban satyagraha as a strategy adopted to solve Goa issue, NC (G) toyed with the idea of establishing a "revolutionary Council". In their joint letter, Peter Alvares and T. B. Cunha, taking the existing political conditions into account and the reluctance of Government of India to take concrete action regarding Goa, had expressed their mind "to raise a cadre of Goan resisters". At the same time they had told Nehru that they would take care "not involve the Government of India" and would "respect its policy." It appears from the above-mentioned facts that some members of the NC (G) were toying with the idea to drift away from its non-violent policy. This became a reality when a group of former NC (G) members that included Urselino Almeida, Augustus Alvares, Shivaji Desai, Jayasingrao Rane, Ramesh Hodarkar and others formed the Goa Liberation Army in 1956. GLA carried extensive violent actions on the Goa front that nearly rocked the Portuguese authorities.

While discussing this issue with me, Lawande reacted very strongly regarding the formation of GLA and stated that this organisation had Peter Alvares's "blessings". According to him the very existence of this group was in "contravention" of the principle of non-violence that NC (G) had advocated. He further questioned that if finally NC (G) supported the formation of a violent organisation then why did it not accept AGD as its wing and expelled it in 1954. He called Alvares "patron" of GLA and said that it was formed when Alvares realised that the satyagraha action would not produce the "right" results. He accused the NC (G) leadership of creating a division in the struggle by introducing a group based on violent means when the AGD believed in the same strategy. He also referred to the clash between these two groups and stated that due to this "a number of actions of the AGD had to be suspended inside Goa."\[14\]

On the issue of "Patronisation" of GLA by NC (G), Madhav Bir has stated that NC (G) did not directly support GLA. Flaviano Dias has also subscribed to this view and had stated that the members of NC (G) who wished to follow the
“other path” were told to leave the organisation. “We had adopted non-violence as a method constitutionally, how we would allow those persons to continue in our organisation who wished to follow violent means?” He further said that Urselino Almeida, Augustus Alvares and all others were asked, “to leave the party.” Bir has also pointed out that the members of GLA were no longer with NC (G) and the formation of GLA was “not the decision of the general body” of the NC (G). Based on the above-mentioned facts one can come to the conclusion that although NC (G) had constitutionally adopted non-violence as a means to achieve its end, its workers in their individual capacity supported violent method.

This was because they were skeptical regarding the use of satyagraha as a means in a dictatorial set-up.

**Whether the NC (G) activities constituted an open action or operated as an underground venture from 1947 to 1953?**

After analysing the meaning of satyagraha, its components and the basic features of the satyagraha struggle with special reference to its relevance to the Indian National Movement as well as its application in Goa’s struggle for freedom, one is forced to ponder over one of the most important questions regarding the potentiality of satyagraha. Whether satyagraha as a political technique can be successful to challenge a totalitarian form of Government? Can people living in a dictatorial set-up apply satyagraha to fight injustice and oppression inflicted on them by an authoritarian Government? Gandhi very strongly believed in the universal applicability of satyagraha. As we are aware, one of the worst effects of the First World War in Europe was the rise of fascist dictatorships. Italy, under the tyrant Benito Mussolini, and Germany under Adolph Hitler, was forced to submit to totalitarianism.

Gandhi had very strong faith in the goodness of human nature. According to him even dictators were basically human beings and had feelings of tenderness and affection. As one of the basic aims of the satyagrahi is to win over the heart
of the wrongdoer, one wonders what effect such self-suffering would have on an authoritarian personality. Gandhi expected that even Jews could effectively use the weapon of satyagraha to challenge the Nazi menace. However the sufferings of the Jews had very little effect on the Nazis and Hitler continued with his brutalities in spite of the non-violent submission of Jews to him.

As we are aware, one of the main characteristics of the non-violent struggle is that it is an open movement and the use of secret methods is avoided in its practice on moral grounds. Gandhi who introduced the methodology of non-violent struggle to Indians always insisted that the use of satyagraha was to be done openly and had outrightly rejected the use of secret methods as he very strongly believed that the infiltration of secrecy in an open struggle tends to demoralise the public.

Most of the scholars who deal with the question of universal applicability of satyagraha have raised serious doubts regarding the success of satyagraha against authoritative dictatorships. They argue that satyagraha as a technique can be used only in a relatively liberal set-up and not in totalitarian states. Karl Jasper, in his work, *The Future of Mankind*, has stated that satyagraha as a political weapon cannot be successful in challenging dictatorial regimes: In the struggle against totalitarianism Gandhi’s procedure would not be a political way, but a way to certain doom Because no echoes would reach the public no political consequences would result. Against a terror that knows no restriction by legal or conscientious qualms, sacrifice is futile in so far as it remains outside the communication of human activities

Lohia had strongly advocated the use of open direct action as he very rightly believed that only open non-violent direct action would lead to psychological and attitudinal changes among the people of Goa. The very basic attitude of the people, that was characterised by fear, submissiveness, feeling of apathy towards socio-political life and general inertia among the people, that was
the result of the long colonial rule. This had to be replaced by courage, righteousness and active political participation on their part. Therefore, he decided to break the unjust laws openly so that his demonstration of confidence and daring would inspire in others confidence and willingness to challenge the oppressive system of which they were victims.

The open technique of struggle was very much needed to break the chain of weakness that had been deliberately induced by colonial masters. Building up of a strong will power by openly challenging the dictatorship would definitely lift their public image. This enhancement of dignity and respect was equally necessary to boost the morale of the general public and would ultimately result in popular awakening. Lohia, a man of action, hated the passive approach of the unawakened people and rejected the idealism of Gandhian thought and believed its practical utility that all action should be aimed at the expression and organisation of the people’s will and at reconstructing the nation in whatever manner possible.

Therefore Lohia had also placed an elaborate programme that non-violent activists of NC (G) could take up along with the disobedience of unjust civil laws in order to paralyse the colonial administration. In an open letter to the Goans, Lohia elaborated on this programme that included mass resistance, peasant *morchas*, demonstrations against custom duty on rice, picketing of liquor shops, mobilisation of students and women, organisation of strikes and non-payment of military taxes. Lohia had also indicated that the people could form *Gram Panchayat* and Voluntary Corps so that they could challenge the Government by establishing parallel Government of the people.

He had suggested that NC (G) should prepare at least 200 volunteers who were ready to follow a *satyagrahi* who had defied the ban and had addressed a public gathering. Further he had advised them to form propaganda units comprising of one speaker, a singer and two others who could go to the villages
and create mass awareness among the people and activate them by holding meetings, by raising slogans and singing patriotic songs. As we have seen Chapter II, the totalitarian regime deliberately created an atmosphere that installed fear and submissiveness among its subjects. Therefore, in order to throw an open challenge at such a regime, strong moral strength and courage on the part of the people was required. Creation of strong will power in the minds and hearts of the people was the most important duty of the leaders. Therefore, Lohia had volunteered to challenge the colonial authorities as he had rightly thought that his action would help Goans to regain their lost confidence. The fearless situation was created only for a short term and the people of Goa could not cast off their fear of the Portuguese rule totally due to the repressive policy unleashed by the regime.

However after reviewing the working of NC (G) in the light of above-mentioned suggestions made by the leaders one finds that NC (G) could not continue its programme of open non-violent movement. Satyagraha as socio-political action argues that its application requires certain prerequisites such as comprehensive planning and preparation. "Widespread publicity and propaganda conducted without secrecy required in an ideal satyagraha campaign would be impossible under the circumstances obtaining in monolithic authoritarian states" in which each and every aspect is controlled by the state. Since satyagraha is the truth force, every action of the satyagrahi is based on truth. This very characteristic of satyagraha does not permit a satyagrahi to indulge in any kind of secret activity or underground action. Gandhi, as a true satyagrahi always declared his plan of action to the people as well as the British authorities. He always notified to the concerned authorities well in advance the reason behind his action and would reveal place, date, time and the names of the participants who would be willing to offer satyagraha. Gandhi had declared his schedule of the civil disobedience struggle to the authorities well in advance pointing out the objectives that prompted him to take such an action to defy laws. But can such
openness be successful in a totalitarian set-up? Once the authorities learnt about such action they would naturally react to it in a most forceful manner.

By 1947, NC (G) as an open organisation became completely defunct. Shifting its main office to Bombay it continued to act in Goa secretly, in an underground manner as it was desperately trying to survive in the wake of repression that it faced. It could not continue its open direct action. We have noted that even when it was carrying out its civil disobedience actions, nationalists like P.P. Shirodkar, who made voluminous efforts to organise it, had used secrecy as a means to counteract the vicious methods adopted by the colonial authority. Its meetings were organised secretly and the activities were carried out clandestinely. The workers of the organisation were given the task of establishing contacts in villages. However, they were clearly instructed not to undertake any propaganda or such other activity and were advised to avoid open means.

Now the major question that haunts us is why did the nationalists resort to such a policy? Was there any other better option available to them that would prevent the infiltration of secrecy in a non-violent struggle? Most of the nationalists who were questioned by me on this issue opined that there was no other option left to them other than resort to secret methods. The Portuguese regime was not a liberal regime and therefore it had adopted all sorts of measures to crush the struggle such openness is impossible in a fascist or dictatorial set-up. Staying in Goa openly and operating from here meant nothing but giving an invitation to Portuguese wrath, arrests, long imprisonment and deportation to either Portugal or its colonies in Africa. This would not serve their purpose.

Therefore they preferred to live outside Goa, unarrested but at the same time carrying on their crusade through other means such as forceful propaganda activities which they carried on through newspapers, journals as well as other non-violent measures.
The use of secrecy can prove to be harmful to the movement in the long run, however, if we look at the conditions in the Portuguese colonial regime, that was a fascist dictatorship; one can argue that the NC (G) had no other option than the use of secret means. However, the dictatorial regime rests on political violence, which permeates fear in the minds of people by controlling the strings of socio-political and economic life. In this regime there is no scope for any democratic tradition nor does it offer any opportunity for true expression of opinion through any medium such as the press. It does not allow any kind of political or socio-cultural organisation. In such a rigid atmosphere how far can the peaceful non-violent technique be nurtured and popularised. This type of non-violent action could be a failure due to practical difficulties. Since the main aim of satyagraha is to awaken the spirit of self-rule among the people, satyagraha acts contrary to the basic nature of a forcible state. Therefore such states would take every step to curb non-violent action.

Gandhi's non-violent actions were successful because they were performed against the background of the relative freedom that the British administrators granted to the colonies. Thus so it appears that although satyagraha was regarded as a universal method to combat injustice by Gandhi, many rejected this idea and emphasised that satyagraha as a political tool would not be practised successfully in restrictive societies specially under dictatorship. State Governments make use of repressive systems to “terrorise” their own citizens. The Government employs state machinery; specialized agencies to systematically unleash terror on the population. The use of secret police to murder, torture and use other means of repression is well known in political history. The totalitarian regimes were notorious for having such organisations that could destroy the slightest political or cultural dissent. Their main aim was to liquidate political opponents that they termed as “enemies” of the state. The Portuguese colonial state employed systematic terror that included police terror, martial terror as well as ideological terror on Goans for more than four hundred years of their rule. The study of repressive terrorism of the state that was very
relevant and necessary for our understanding of Goa’s struggle for freedom in the right perspective is elaborately dealt in Chapters II, III and IV and the thesis has tried to bring to the fore a detailed analysis of the totalitarian regime’s methods to spread terror to suppress the will of the people.

As the regime was authoritative in nature, moral principles like truthfulness, openness would not work for the benefit of the organisation. Therefore the use of secrecy was the strategic answer to challenge the wrath of Portuguese colonialists. This was the most practical solution. Its decision to shift its headquarters to Bombay and operate in Goa clandestinely can be justified in the light of the situation that existed in Goa.

One has to note that in the initial period of the struggle, nationalists definitely followed the principle of non-violent direct action that Gandhi and Lohia had set before them. They took recourse to secret methods thanks to the authoritative regime. Unfortunately the Portuguese colonial authorities in Goa were unable to understand the nature of the struggle and acted in a completely dictatorial manner. We have already seen that as the organisation was formed, Laxmikant Bhembre who offered to perform satyagraha as a part of Dashdainik Satyagrahas had written a letter to the Governor-General of Goa well in advance and had explained to him the aims and objectives of the organisation. Simultaneously, he had also declared to the Government the schedule of his action that included the place, time and even date of the event.

However, as the authorities took advantage of these details to arrest the satyagrahis on the spot and not allow them to address the gathering, it was decided not to reveal such details of the action to the authorities. NC (G) conveyed this decision to the authorities in an appeal in which they declared that from now onwards they would not declare the plans and activities of their workers openly. As mentioned in earlier paragraphs, NC (G) had shown its willingness to sit across the table with the Governor-General of Goa to discuss various issues.
regarding the socio-economic and political conditions of Goa. However, the Governor did not respond to their demands, and on the contrary declared NC (G) as an illegal organisation. The regime that had denied them basic civil rights and imposed extreme political conditions on the people of Goa was not at all politically wise in responding to the call given by the non-violent satyagrahis. Therefore, to deal with them in secrecy seemed the most suitable way in the given totalitarian conditions.

Activists of NC (G) like Madhav Bir, Narayan Bhembre, Purushhotam Kakodkar, P.P. Shirodkar, V.N. Mayekar, Flaviano Dais and others while discussing the issue of secrecy adopted by the NC (G), pointed out that there was no other option left for them in the existing political conditions of Goa:

"Portuguese regime that prevailed in Goa had completely created an atmosphere of fear. We were living in such circumstances where not even four persons could get together even for a casual talk in any public place. Citizens were not allowed to be in groups even on the road side." 19

Sharing the above views, Narayan Bhembre said,

"After sunset even two people could not come together as they were suspected of carrying out anti-national activities. The authorities had full power to interrogate and detain them till they were convinced that they were not ‘Jai Hindistis.’" 20

Flaviano Dias, who worked with Peter Alvares incognito during 1954-55 satyagraha struggle, stated that in such conditions only underground activities could be carried out in the strictest possible secrecy without letting your right hand know what your left hand was doing. NC (G) workers entered Goa in disguise, assuming different names, and the leadership took care not to reveal the details of one worker to others who were working inside Goa. This was done to
avoid group arrest. The NC (G) activists who came to Goa to work had to take oath of secrecy to avoid trouble.

The NC (G) therefore operated from its underground centres in Goa fearing that open action in Goa would root out its foundation completely. It not only took resort to secret means to operate within Goa but also adopted the same even while operating in India. For example, the annual session of the NC (G) that was held in 1950 at Belguam was held “in camera” and the names of its president and the executive members were not revealed to the public. Why did a non-violent organisation like NC (G) take such steps? The reason was that the nationalists feared that if they had organised the annual session openly, the Portuguese authorities would depute P.I.D.E agents to get details of its working and would go for a rapid witch-hunt of political suspects endangering the work of underground activists in Goa.

Therefore, to be on the safer side, the nationalists took care to announce only certain names that included V.N. Lawande as general secretary of the organisation. As we are aware that Lawande had founded the AGD and carried out underground activities in the territories. He was charged with bank robbery and his associates like Narayan Naik, Prabhakar Sinari were arrested and sentenced to heavy imprisonment. Fortunately, Lawande managed to escape from Goa and had returned to the non-violent struggle in 1948. Therefore, announcement of his name would not cause harm to the organization. However, the names of others were kept secret to avoid arrests. It seems that the actions of the NC (G) were completely influenced by the fear of the colonial authorities. When one analyses the techniques of non-violence in the context of Indian freedom struggle, one has to take note of semi-hegemonic nature of British rule in India that was not based on authoritative principles to some extent was democratic in nature that gave scope for creation of certain civil institutions.
As we are aware, a movement by definition must not only have leadership but a support base and a time frame. Only after these characteristics are met with can sustain itself. Moreover, a mass movement has to be based on the urges of the people and mass consciousness that has to be tapped for the cause. The leadership cannot create a movement at will and stimulate and persuade the masses to join it if the later are bereft of an awareness of their plight. However to sustain such action what is required is the continuous flow of people’s participation in the action. In the absences of a second batch of leadership it becomes difficult to rope in masses into the action. As we have already analysed the response of the Goans was quite volatile during the course of 18\textsuperscript{th} June direct action and people in large numbers participated in open defiance by way of \textit{morchas}, demonstrations, \textit{prabhat} ferries that defied Portuguese colonialism. However, the initial enthusiasm subsided as the colonial authorities resorted to dictatorial means to suppress the struggle. Arrest of the leaders and heavy punishments and deportation left Goans leaderless and in a confused state of mind. It became very difficult for the non-violent agitators to establish a correct relation between popular consciousness and its transformation into an organized struggle against colonialism in the absence of top leadership. It was 18\textsuperscript{th} June action that finally led to the establishment of NC (G) which continued with its non-violent strategy to challenge the Portuguese colonial regime as been already discussed elaborately in Chapters III, V and VI.

Thus, by introducing secrecy into a non-violent direct action the organisation was able to survive but at the same time it struck at the very basic characteristic of non-violent discipline, that is, fearlessness. This resulted in the alienation of persons who were becoming sympathetic to the struggle when it was operating openly.

Failure of the nationalists to weed out fear from the minds of the general public was one of the major drawbacks of the non-violent struggle. The people of Goa were scared of the repressive regime and did not come forward to support
those who performed individual satyagraha. Ravindra Kelekar, a veteran Gandhian of the territory who has vividly described the scene of individual satyagraha in his autobiography has admitted the fact that in the face of police atrocities and lathi charges on the satyagrahis, the people did not come forward to support the satyagrahis and remained as mere spectators. He has revealed that was a strong believer in the of nationalist ideology, he also watched the event like a “coward.” According to him this was the result of the long colonial rule that had made Goans “spineless.”

Laxmikant Bhembre has pointed out that one of the main causes that led to the failure of the struggle in 1946 was the existence of fear regarding the Portuguese colonial rule among the general public. The Government took due advantage of this to spread false propaganda that people were happy with the colonial regime.

As NC (G) adopted secrecy as its strategy, it refrained from undertaking the programme chalked out by Lohia. The satyagrahis followed the individual defiance but failed to convert it into a mass movement.

However some limited attempt was made under Shirodkar’s leadership to establish contacts in villages, distribute pamphlets gathering information about the development of the village. Portuguese colonialists had introduced a ban on all nationalist material. The infiltration of secrecy also had an adverse effect on participation of women in the struggle. As we have already seen in 18th June action open non-violent action participation of women was a striking feature. Women had a very volatile participation in processions, march and had played a very significant role in the open action. Goa Seva sangh’s attempts to mobilize women under the leadership of Pramilatai Jambawalikar saw the overt participation of women Vatsala Kirtani, Lalita Kantak, Jivan Karapurkar and others were very vocal in protesting against the regime. Later as the dictatorship tightened its grip over nationalists it did affect their participation openly. For
example, at Londa when NC (G) was established women could not attend the meeting. Since it was difficult even for men to cross the border and be present at the meeting, attendance of women was "out of questions as it was an impossible task." 22 One finds that the use of secrecy was responsible for forcing women to play a supportive role. In spite of such adverse conditions women came forward and contributed to the struggle, some by donating their gold ornaments and other valuables for the funding of the struggle others by staging individual satyagrahas in utmost difficult conditions. Sudhatai Joshi, Sindhatai Deshpande, Sashikala Hodarkar and others very strongly put forth a women front against he Portuguese colonialism.

As mentioned earlier, it shifted its office outside Goa. Bombay became their main centre of activity. It was from Bombay that they carried out a strong campaign against the colonial regime. During 1947-1953 the satyagraha action had come to a complete halt as Nehru, who was pursuing policy of peaceful settlement with Portugal thought that such activities might create complications. In 1954, NC (G) under the presidency of Peter Alvares re-launched the satyagraha action with full vigour. The 1954 action successfully ignited the urge of independence among Goans as well as among non-Goans who resided in the rest of Indian sub-continent. As mentioned earlier, they flooded the country with propaganda material. The press in the rest of India also gave wide publicity to the Goa question. In this second phase of satyagraha action the people from the rest of India supported Goans who were fighting for the liberation of their homeland. This when Gove Vimochan Sahayyak Samiti gave a call to launch mass satyagraha they enthusiastically plunged themselves into the struggle demonstrating their nationalist feelings. The mass satyagraha action of 1955 created a world wide impact against the continuation of Portuguese colonialism on the Indian soil. Although it did not realise the aim of liberating Goa, it was successful in bringing political pressure on Nehru’s Government.
Nana Saheb Gore held the view that “the satyagraha of 1955 created a two way impact, one was that those who were struggling in Goa got an assurance that they were not alone, they did not look upon themselves as a separate entity. They were assured of the fact that there were people across the borders who were supporting them. Secondly it was a call for people through out India. By nationalizing the Goa issue satyagraha launched by NC (G) tried to bring about moral pressure upon Salazar through non-violence.”23 The most important contribution of NC (G) was that it continued the struggle right from 1946 to 1961. Of course the organisation had to face up and downs. In the initial period itself, a group led by Lawande broke away, later the organization faced the problem of disunity. In 1953 during the tenure of Peter Alvares a group led by Laura D'Souza broke away from the main organization and formed NC (G) II and called itself as the “legal and legitimate NC (G).” However in spite of internal dissensions and disunity it pursued its goal of challenging the Portuguese colonialist. In the wake of rampant repression by the dictatorial regime NC (G) used various strategies to combat the wrath of Portuguese rule. Its use of secrecy, though failed to mobilize masses inside Goa, through its propaganda tactics, negotiations and networking with organizations from Goa as well as from the rest of India as has been discussed in Chapters V and VI put forward a strong united front against the Portuguese and launched the 1954-55 satyagraha. “This created a big uproar not only in India but also in the international circles. The 1955 satyagraha exposed the nature of Portuguese colonialism in India that was based on cruelty and barbarity”. The massacre of unarmed satyagrahis unmasked Portugal and invited strong reaction from the international forum. Later when satyagraha action came to an halt, the NC (G) took initiative to mobilize international support. Afro-Asian Solidarity movement took up the cause of Goa and demanded that Portuguese colonialism should be put and end to as a prelude to the end of colonialism in Afro-Asian countries. The sacrifices of 1955 satyagraha, the international reaction that it created forced Nehru t change his foreign policy and he who was unwilling to take steps to liberate Goa with an armed action now “Operation
As has been discussed in the thesis, aggressiveness is a basic instinct of human nature. Throughout the history of development of human life violence has played a predominant role. It is the spontaneous reaction of the human being to express discontent, anguish, resentment towards an unwanted situation. The use of violent behavior could be manifested as personal reaction or as a planned, organized action in a political realm. The use of force is employed by a discontent group or by an individual to draw attention of the political authority towards specific demands or to show resentment. Violence is a basic feature of history of human life manifested through wars and revolutions. Political violence is a significant technique to achieve certain definite aims that aspire at redressing or changing the existing socio-political or cultural order.

Most the anti-colonial movements in the world engaged themselves in violent means to achieve political aims. The Indian national movement was also not an exception to this rule. The policy of petition and prayers as well as bullets and bombs flourished together in India and ran parallel to each other.

Thus here we are confronted with an important question, that is, is terror a basic feature of revolution? In order to search the answer to this question one has to review the concept of revolution. The dictionary meaning of the term revolution is a “great upheaval” or a “radical change,” which has significant impact on the history of mankind.

Generally terms like revolution and terror are use in conjunction with one another. Violence is common feature of revolution as the changes that are being aimed at are often sought by extralegal means because normal channels of political influence are being short-circuited. Terror, the atmosphere of fear and despair brought about by threats or acts of violence, sabotage, or property spoliation, either deliberately or accidentally engendered, is a common ingredient in revolution.
However one has to consciously note that the use of violence on a large scale is inadequate to term it as revolution if it fails to bring about the new beginning. According to Hannan Ardent “where the liberation from oppression aims at least at the constitution of freedom”24 we can call it a revolution. The Indian revolutionaries described revolution as a living force that indicated the eternal conflict between the Old and the New, Life and Living Death, between Light and Darkness.

Paul Wilkinson in his treatise on political terrorism has identified six categories of revolutionary terrorism. They are as follows: (1) Organisation of pure terror in which terrorism is the exclusive weapon, (2) revolutionary and national liberationist parties and movements in which terror is employed as an auxiliary weapon, (3) guerilla terrorism-rural and urban, (4) insurrectionary terrorism, (5) the revolutionary Reign of Terror (6) international terrorism.25 Since our main scope of the study is the analysis of struggle for liberation from the colonial yoke in Goa’s struggle for freedom, while the AGD used violence as a means openly and NC (G) who had adopted peaceful nonviolence means constitutionally but in the later stages of struggle did extended its secret support to GLA a revolutionary organisation that also used terror used by the colonial regime on the people of Goa.

In Defense of Violence:

Here the question arises is whether the use of violence or terror is ethical? Is it rational to use it to redress the grievances? Hannah Arndt has called violence a “perennial ghost”26 that universally haunts the conscience of civilized humanity. Brian Crozier, while condemning the use of terrorist’s acts has called terrorism the weapon of the weak. According to him, the activist in a desperate situation often uses it and is generally a useful auxiliary weapon rather than a decisive one. One cannot generally predict final result of the violent acts. Those who strongly refute the use of violence say that unprecedented use of violence often leads to an
uncontrollable situation and may lead to major catastrophe and loss of human life. Therefore, the use of terrorism is socially as well as politically unacceptable as the terrorist actions are often atrocious and psychologically damaging.

Although some have condemned the use of violence as a political tool, the legitimacy of employment of using violence against a hated foreign invader seems to be almost unquestioned and was accepted as a political means to oust the colonial oppressor. George Sorel exalts violence as a “life Force”. Jean Paul Sartre’s introductory note to Franz Fannons famous treatise entitled Wretched of the Earth declares violence as the rebel’s weapon. And for Fannon violence is the “cleaning force in history.” According to him the use of bloodiest violence was the only practical method of smashing the ruthless and vicious dominance of European racialism. The most popularly and widely used justification for the use of violent means by political activists is self-defence.

The other justification is the morality of Just vengeance, or ‘an eye for eye and a tooth for a tooth’. The European imperialism in Asia and Africa was built on the foundations of terror and violence; therefore the most effective means of retaliation was “counter-terrorism”. For Sachindranath Sanyal, an the active member of Hindustan Republican Army, shedding of blood for the sake of motherland was just like “a surgical operation” in which in order to get rid of the unwanted growth the blood is spilled. The Manifesto of the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association stated, “We believe in Violence, not as an end in itself but as a means to a Noble End.”

Militant revolutionaries of Bengal declared their open and unequivocal support to the use of violence against the British imperial power. According to them, these acts of violence were a part of the “righteous war” which Lord Krishna had justified in Bhagawat Gita. They argued that it was the prime duty of the children of the mother nation to slay the enemies of the nation. This ideology was propagated by the revolutionary organization Yugantar.
Madanlal Dhingra who shot Curzon who was responsible for the partition of Bengal in 1905 in his court statement clearly stated that “I believe a nation held in bondage with the help of bayonets is a state of perpetual was and since guns are denied to me, I drew forth my pistol and attacked by surprise.”

The votaries of violent act in justification of their acts promoted the theory of lesser evil, that is, the use of limited violence. According to them the political system that they had to confront with is so ruthless and uses unlimited force to exterminate the voice of dissent that it cannot be challenged by conventional means and in such a political condition what one requires is the use of violence to destroy it, but the violence that they use is much less than violence used by the state.

Futility of other means

The argument of ‘futility of other means’, declares that the imposition of state control to suppress their voice of dissent leaves them no other means other than the use of violence against such Governments. According to Ernest Gellner, nationalist violence mainly grows out of embedded mistrust between the state government and the nationalist forces. Waves of nationalist violence almost always emerge in the wake of significant nonviolent contestation and chains of precipitating events usually escalate into violence. He further states that in most of the cases where nationalism takes a violent turn, state institutions themselves initiate violence directly as a way of consolidating authority against the nationalist challenges. They further claim that only such strategy is successful against such regime as no open means of agitation is possible in such conditions. The method of constitutional agitation or any other democratic means is unsuccessful in such a political system when state repression is the order of the day. Kenyan leader, Tom Mboya, while defending the violent Mau Mau movement against the British put forward a similar argument. According to him, the question in such cases was not whether it was wrong to employ violence but what bothered him was the fact that
for how long strong nationalists feelings could be expected to remain silent where there was no constitutional channel through which the nationalist could achieve their objectives. They justify the acts of violence as “pure deeds of revolution designed to bring down an evil and corrupted political and social order.”

The revolutionaries do not use violence without trying peaceful means. They try all other means to redress their grievances “he asks for them, pleads for them, argues for them, wills to attain them with all the Soul-force at his command....”. However, peaceful agitations are trampled under the iron heels of terror by the ruling Government. In such situation finally revolutionaries are left with no other choice then to resort to physical force and they believe that this is the only right and just way to deal with repressive regimes. AGD based its militant underground struggle on the above-mentioned arguments as has been elaborately discussed in chapter IV.

One can state that NC (G) and AGD had some similarities, such as, both used underground techniques in the territory of Goa. However both openly organized activities in the rest of India such as propaganda activities, conduction meeting, organising session’s, negotiations and networking and harnessed national as well as international support. If one analyses the aims of both the organisations, that are more or less similar in nature one finds the influence of the policy of Government of India under Nehru who had adopted a socialist pattern to develop India. As far as their final aim was concerned both wanted the Government of India to launch a military attack on Goa and free it from the shackles of colonialism. However basic difference in them were the methods that they adopted NC (G) constitutionally adopted the legitimate way of nonviolence the policy that was accepted by the Government of India and was in tune with the policy of Panchsheel and peaceful negotiations on the contrary AGD adopted violent means to protest against the colonial regime that was dissimilar to the policy followed by the Government of India who refused to support the use of force in any kind until 19th December 1961.
As far as AGD was concerned it was a secret underground militant organisation that had made use of armed attacks and guerilla strategy to combat the totalitarian regime. Secrecy was the essence of its existence as we have already pointed out. The AGD emerged as a distinct organisation on the Goa front only after 1954, though theoretically it was formed on 18th June 1947. Its formation was kept secret and its existence was not known beyond certain circles and in the initial period it had assumed a code name Valmiky. Its actions of looting Government treasury office at Mapusa as well as attack on a van carrying bank cash flared up Goan struggle when nonviolent action was going through a trying period. The direct open action that NC (G) had initiated had almost come to a stand still and the armed actions of AGD did break the pause. Most of AGD's founder members were arrested and fortunately Lawande had a narrow escape. Due to the setback that it received in its embryonic stage, Lawande rejoined NC (G) and assumed post of General Secretary of NC (G). However, while in the NC (G) he worked to build AGD as a militant organization and raised a cadre of comrades.

The systematic training through various camps that were organized by Lawande in guerrilla warfare proved to be significant in the recapture of Nagar Haveli. In 1954, when NC (G) announced the restart of its open nonviolent action the differences between Lawande and Peter Alvares came to the fore. This led to the expulsion of Lawande from NC (G) as stated in Chapter VII. This proved to be a blessing in disguise as now Lawande and his associates took up a challenge of liberating the Nagar Haveli. AGD's aim in exposing the invincibility of Portuguese colonial power was successful.

Their aim was restricted to creating the situation of unrest in Goa by paralysing the Government machinery. They believed that counter terrorism was the only answer to the authoritative rule that prevailed in Goa. With its activities such as attacks on police outpost, custom chaukis, assassination of pro-Portuguese elements Government bureaucrats it tried to weaken the Portuguese regime and
tried to create terror in the hearts and minds of Portuguese elements. *AGD* did not aim at an armed revolution or a *coup* that are a part of violent strategy used by revolutionaries in the world. This would require mass support and in order to do that mobilisation of masses to a greater extend had to be taken up.

Its violent actions helped tremendously when there was a lull in the movement. It did boost the morale of the activist working to end colonialism. *AGD* did not aspire to liberate Goa on its own, as it was an impossible task without the support of Government of India but it was successful in pressurizing the Government of India to take up armed action against the Portuguese colonialist. *AGD*’s success of liberation of Nagar Haveli had positive effect on the *satyagraha* struggle and had uplifted the moral of satyagrahis. Its partnership with NC (G) in its effort to mobilize the like-minded organizations Goan as well as Indian political parties was successful in establishing The National Campaign Committee of Goa that later culminated into the Afro-Asian Solidarity movement and set Goa on the road of freedom. This does not mean that *AGD* lacked a support base. It worked from the hinterlands and from the border areas and their activities of targeting the Portuguese with guerrilla tactics required a support base that was provided to them by the local communities such as *Dhangars Gawada and Kunbi*. However as they did not aim at armed rebellion the question of mass mobilisation did not arise. *AGD* was aware that such a mass upsurge in Goa was not possible in wake of civil liberties. The only means available to them to spread the word was communication through literature, radio and such other means that were inadequate as most of the material that it pumped in Goa was confiscated and destroyed. They did their best to circulate literature. *AGD* leader agreed that they received a very limited mass support. Therefore they restricted their activity to guerilla tactic or hit and run tactic in which they expected people of Goa to share relevant information or provide for a hideout for the workers. Lawande stated, ""We did not aim to acquire a mass participation in the kind of activities that we were indulged in."" *AGD* became agile on the Goa front only after Government of India banned the *satyagraha* action and carried out
maximum actions during this period between 1956-61 when nonviolent direct action had almost come to a stand still. When Government of India planned to attack the Estado da India in 1961, AGD with its attacks on the border posts could clear the way for the Indian army to penetrate into Goa and could harness mass support for the army action.

Like revolutionary parties, AGD also used violent means as an auxiliary weapon and not as an exclusive mean as been discussed while analysing the nature of activities. Along with armed action they laid great stress on propaganda machinery. Azad Goa Radio, bulletins like Jwala, Kranti, Navajeevan, Amcha Ladha and number of leaflets that they distributed throughout Goa to disseminate the concept of nationalism is exhaustively dealt with in the above-mentioned chapter. Moreover the cultural committee of AGD was quite active in spreading the word about history of Goan unrest by staging plays on early revolts such as Pinto revolts, Rane revolt and also the then current nationalist movement in their play called Jalata Goamantak. Therefore one can state that Sinari’s suggestion of naming AGD as Azad Gomantak Dal and not Azad Gomantak Fauz as Lawande had suggested seemed to be correct as we analyse the nature of the activities of the AGD that were not only limited to army action but had a broader connotation.

This issue has been considerably analysed while discussing the establishment of AGD in Chapter IV. Sinari had perceived this aspect of the militant organisation and though their ideal was Subhash Chandra Bose’s Azad Hind Fauz they decided to address the militant organisation as Azad Gomantak Dal.

As has been already stated that AGD with the help of RSS activists was successful in their guerilla attack on NagarHaveli. Then why AGD was unable to replicate such kind of action in Goa. In context of Goa, Government of India followed a very ambiguous policy. From time to time it declared that the struggle for Goa should be restricted to Goans only. On the one hand it was all the time
stating that Goa was a part and parcel of India but on the other hand it did not want to support the political organization directly or indirectly, as it feared that such action would be misjudged by the international world as deliberate incitement of the Goa issue, or a shift in the policy of *Panchsheel* that India advocated from time to time. Government of India was not against non-violent agitation raised by Goans but had strong objection for participation of non-Goans in it and this was the major challenge before the NC (G) to convince the Government of India that since Goa was a part of the Indian subcontinent the freedom struggle of Goa could not be restricted only to Goans but it formed a part of India's struggle against colonialism. The passport and the visa system that was made compulsory by the Government of India during economic blockade aggravated this contradictory policy. The "non-cooperation" of Government of India especially during Nagar Haveli episode was vividly described by Mohan Ranade who stated that the then Bombay Government headed by Morarji Desai went to the extent of releasing the Portuguese police that were captured by he nationalists.\(^3\)\(^0\) He further stated that the *AGD* activists were not allowed to carry arms openly to Silvasaa after their successful capture of Naroli which they had to clandestinely. According to him Government of Bombay feared that "this conclave would fall in the hands of communist group"\(^3\)\(^1\) led by Godavari Parulekar.

Lohia did not favour the use of violent means to achieve socio-political changes and had playing a game advocated the use of non-violence to Goans specially in the Indian context according to Lohia Indian political conditions were more favourable for the effective use of non-violence to achieve justice and he felt that deliberate use of violence may be self defeating in the Goan context. As far as *AGD* was concerned this prediction of Lohia came to be true as events were to later prove. One finds that *AGD* that used violent means had to face challenge on two fronts one against Portuguese authoritative regime and the other the Government of India that did not favour existence of an organisation on Goa front. There were no instances that can be cited that made difficult for *AGD* to
pursue its violent technique without the support of Government of India. Border Security Force on the Goa India border created hurdles for AGD to carry arms into Goa and many times there were tiffs between them. Therefore arms had to be smuggled into Goa. This was one of the reason that AGD had to carry out their actions with limited arms and ammunitions and therefore their actions were limited to attacks on police out post, custom chaukis, mines, political murder and others and could not engaged in a mass rebellion that would require large consignment of arms and ammunitions plus mass mobilization.

AGD activists have vehemently criticised this policy of Government of India and has blamed it for not "cooperating with it." This was one of the reasons why AGD that had successfully liberated Nagar Haveli could not employ the same technique in Goa. Narayan Naik expressed his unhappiness towards the Indian border police who not only created hurdles for AGD but also created division among AGD activists by encouraging groups in AGD. He blamed I. G. P. Nagarwala for creating a rift in AGD especially between Lawande and Sinari that led to a split in AGD. Sinari broke away from AGD and established Rancour Patriotica a militant organisation that carried out number of actions in Goa.

Serious differences arose between Sinari and Lawande on the issue whether help of Nagarwala should be taken to pursue the struggle. It was a fact that without support of border police, AGD could not function. Therefore Sinari felt that if Nagarwala was sympathetic towards a group led by him he should make utmost use of it to strike at the Portuguese. Lawande blamed Nagarwala for creating a faction in AGD by providing help to certain persons in AGD and responding in a negative fashion towards others. The situation worsened and in AGD there were two groups Pro-Nagarwala and anti-Nagarwala that finally led to split in the party. After successful recapture of Nagar Haveli, AGD was in possession of a large number of arms and ammunitions as well as state treasury. With these resources they could have easily built a strong-armed cadre that could have attacked Goa as well and the issue of Goa would have taken a different turn.
in 1954 itself. However, Government of India compelled AGD to surrender arms and ammunitions as well as financial resources.

This was a set back to AGD in a way because later when it became active on the Goa front it had no major weaponry with it and the commandos of AGD had to launch attacks on police outpost to procure arms that were needed for an armed attack. Lawande while discussing the issue of support of Government of India to his organisation mentioned a incident that had occurred when Lawande as a part of delegation of Goan leaders, had met Nehru in 1953, at this meeting Nehru made a reference to violent struggle that was launched on Goan front and clearly stated that such a struggle would not be very helpful and had advised Goan delegation to carry the Goan struggle through non-violent means. According to Lawande shift in Government of India's policy regarding the Goa's struggle came when Dadra and Nagar Haveli was liberated. In 1955 when Lawande, Shamrao Lad and Kashnath Sanzgiri called on him after the successful liberation of NagarHaveli Lawande noticed that Nehru did not lay “stress on the non-violent movement”.

For nearly fourteen years the Government of India had repeatedly pursued the Portuguese Government to unlock the stalemate on the Goa issue and open negotiations for the peaceful reintegration of Goa with its motherland. These diligent attempts of the Indian Government met with very little success as Portugal indignantly turned down every offer to settle the Goa issue by bilateral means. The dictatorial regime had very bluntly refused to accept that Goa was a part of India and shared national aspirations with the India, on the contrary it had always stated that Goa was an overseas province of Portugal with all the characteristics of lusitanian culture that was the result of more than 451 years of Portuguese rule over it. In his radio speech delivered on 12 April 1954, Salazar had refused “cessation of Goa and the Portuguese citizenship of its inhabitants” and had asserted that Portugal “will watch over its defence to the limit of our force.” Moreover, Salazar had tried to drag the Goa issue into cold war politics.
Salazar who had declared a moral interest in Goa, and the lofty ideal of pan lusitanism displayed treacherous attitude when regarding Goan struggle that had reached its peak and there was considerable shift in the Government of Indian’s policy when stated thing of making use of force to get rid of Portuguese rule. On the eve of Goa’s liberation there was a fear among Goans that the Portuguese army might carry a “scorched earth policy” regarding Goa. Salazar had hinted this on the 26th anniversary of his dictatorship; that if Portuguese were forced to evacuate Goa nothing would remain except a ravaged, deserted land.36

This was confirmed as the Nazi trained chief of staff of Expeditionary Force of the Portuguese, Major Alves, had declared much earlier that “Goa will be reduced to shambles the same way as Guernca, Lidice and Rotterdam”.37 Freedom-fighters Naguesh Karmali, Flaviano Dias, Prabhakar Sinari, Trivikram Shankhawalkar, P. P. Shirodkar, Madav Bir, Ramkrishna Nayak and others, while discussing this issue, stated that the Portuguese had planned to blow up the territory of Goa. Police had confiscated the stock of landmines and placed them under important buildings, prominent places, land routes, bridges etc. Bombs were placed even in post offices at border areas in Pernem, Cancona and other places.

There is a popular belief in Goa that the last Governor-General of Goa, Vasssalo e Silva, a “true gentleman”, rejected Salazar’s orders to blow the place and had “saved Goa”. However, Vassalo e Silva as well as the last military in charge of Goa, Col. Martins, had to pay the price for “their good deeds” as they were court-martialed by the dictatorial regime and were sentenced to heavy punishments. The family members and relatives of these persons whom I contacted during my stay in Lisbon narrated to me the humiliation that they had to undergo when surrendered Portuguese army-men and bureaucrats returned to Portugal after allowing “safe reintegration of Goa with the motherland.”38
Vassalo e Silva’s letter dated 22nd February 1962, that he wrote when he was detained at Ponda by the Indian army, reveals the feelings that he had developed during his tenure as the Governor-General of Goa. He states that he is writing this letter “in a very sad situation” and “bitterness of tragic days at the end of 1961 has taken a deep root in my soul.”... Calling Goa a “charming land” he further states, “Whose population so good and hospitable forever conquered my heart.” Regarding the faint response of the Portuguese to “Operation Vijay” he states that he had suffer painfully “the certainty of our impotence... which the destiny had in reserve, that nothing could deviate its course which had no remedy.” This was the time when “I realized from close and with a bleeding soul that we could not, nor should not honestly go further” and decided to surrender to the Indian army although he was fully aware of the “sad realities” that awaited them in Portugal.

The fear expressed by Goans regarding the scorched earth policy was not unwarranted as is evident through the “last message” that Salazar sent to Vassalo e Silva on 14th December 1961. Though this message was set in a code language the Indian secret service station at Moscow decoded it. This last message exposed the true colours of the so-called philanthropic nature of Portuguese colonial rule in Goa. This message clearly shows that Salazar’s pride refused to accept any kind of negotiation through peaceful means though he was very much aware that Portugal’s victory with the Indian Army was an impossible venture. Therefore he asked his solders to choose death and not to give up Goa at any cost. This reflected the psyche of a dictator who preferred to slaughter his army men just to maintain “his shaken prestige”. As we are aware Portuguese armed forces surrendered without much fight to the Indian army. It appears that one of the reasons behind their weak response was the unhappiness of Portuguese armed forces with the dictatorship and therefore they might have refused to “fight in the conditions which gave them neither honour nor glory.”

463
Salazar was toying with the possibility that the Indian Government would succumb to international pressure and would deviate from its peaceful stand. Therefore he was mobilizing international “friends” like USA, UK, Brazil, South America, Spain, and the NATO signatories to dissuade Government of India from military attack. He personally contacted President Kennedy of USA to pressurise Nehru to call back the Indian Army. In addition to this, an exhaustive use of international media was made by Portugal to project India’s action on Goa as uncalled “aggression”. It was V. K. Krishna Menon, the then defence minister, who strategically convinced Nehru that the troops had already been sent and could not be called back as he had no means of communications.

As the Indian army moved closed to Portuguese possessions in India Salazar ordered his defense forces to retaliate with “extreme violence”. He said, “I do not foresee possibility of truce nor Portuguese as prisoners as they will not be surrendered navy and Mariners either victorious or dead.” Moreover he wanted to do this in order to prolong the war with the Indian army for “at least eight days” so that Portugal would get sufficient time to mobilize international troops against the Indian army. Salazar’s message clearly indicates that Portugal was deliberately provoking the Indian Union to “mount military operation” that would create “world scandal” and would not be termed as a simple police action. This is evident when we take notice of series of incidents that had flared up as the year 1961 was coming to an end.

Portuguese had increased the patrolling of Portuguese warship Afonso de Albuquerque near Karwar in spite of Government of India’s continuous representations regarding this matter. Further, On 17th November 1961, a Portuguese garrison that was stationed at Anjediva islands near Karwar, opened fire on the “Sabarmati”, a passenger liner that operated between Bombay and Mangalore. The other act of provocation was attack on fishermen at Mazali who had set their fishing boats on high seas near Karwar leading to serious injury and death of Atmaram Kochrekar fishermen by profession. This incident of 24th
November 1961 that took life of an innocent civilian had provoked an angry response and was condemned severely by Indian leaders. Moreover, there were rumours that Portugal was planning to organize naval exercises of SEATO powers in the Arabian Sea that would include US, UK, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran. 

Portuguese Government continued with its threatening messages that it broadcasted on Radio Goa to bomb the Indian cities if India continued with its decision to launch an army action in Goa.

The Indian Government that was tackling the Goa issue very patiently and diligently since 1947 had to act in response to the adamant attitude of the Portuguese colonial mindset. One has to note that after the mass killing of nonviolent satyagrahis and inhuman treatment that these nonviolent soldiers received from the Portuguese, Nehru did not succumb to gunpowder politics and had pursued peaceful measures like economic blockade to pressurize the Portuguese Government. It declared its decision to stick to the principle of Panchsheel, the cornerstone of Indian foreign policy in case of Goa.

Morarji Desai, while asserting the peaceful approach towards Goa when the issue of Goa was taken up in discussion in the Bombay assembly, had categorically stated "that Government of India cannot launch war against the Portuguese Government it would be "wrong" and "would be against our fundamental policy." Nehru had tirelessly adhered to nonviolence from 1947-1961 and asserted that the Goa issue must be solved through peaceful means. He also rejected any move on the part of NC (G) to continue the launch satyagraha or peaceful entry into Goa after the horror of 1955. Peter Alvares and T. B. Cunha had jointly appealed to Pandit Nehru to grant permission to continue the nonviolent satyagaraha action that NC (G) had launched in 1954-55 that was banned by the government of India. Replying to their appeal, Nehru rejected any such action that would be considered as adventurism in the international world. Expressing his concern regarding Goa he stated "I know and am much distressed by conditions in Goa and by the suffering of the people there. But, I do not think
that this would lead us in to what might be considered adventurist action." For India, the Goa issue was significant as it was the "unfinished business" of ending colonialism and achieving national unity. To all Indians it was "natural finale to the movement of Indian freedom struggle that was launched against foreign rule a hundred years back." By December 1961 Government of India realised that the Portuguese colonial regime was based on undemocratic principles and would not relinquish Goa on their own. The only solution left with the Indian Government was to use force to drive them from the Indian soil. The event that boosted morale of India was UNO resolution passed in December 1960 that upheld the right of freedom to colonial countries from their colonial master. The Un General assembly had already condemned Portugal fro its continued statements that Goa Daman and Diu were its provinces. The UNO resolution appointed a special committee to look into the matter and in December 1960, Un General Assembly resolved that Goa Daman and Diu were not part of Portugal as claimed by that country. All these factors made India's case very strong. Though Nehru wanted to avoid use of force and was upholding nonviolent policies, one has to remember that India was a sovereign nation with a well-equipped armed force. The nature of the salazarist dictatorship compelled it to send in army. V. K. Krishna Menon had informed the Security Council that "even through our people are a peaceful lot, as a state we have never abjured force to preserve our sovereignty and national dignity".

However Indian army action of 19th December, 1961 on Portuguese Estado da India was looked by Portugal as an "Invasion of the Territories of Portuguese State of India" that was written in campo de prisoneiros de Alparqueiros as well as in Lisbon after referring to the reports of Commandants of group of P. E. I., G. F., Chefs do Repartição do Q. G. and of other services that existed in other camps. The report dated 29th July 1962 alleges that Government of India led a "forced attack with their qualitatively and quantitatively superior armed forces" on Portuguese military forces that were "diminutive and ill-equipped". He further states that this act of the Indian Union
"exposed and ridiculed the preaching of peace policy of Nehru." Regarding the victory of Indian military forces over Portuguese military he states, "Portuguese forces spared no efforts" to retain Goa however their efforts did not meet with success as probably "destiny also wanted the same."\textsuperscript{55}

And Thus "Operation Vijay" began and was completed by 19\textsuperscript{th} December 1961. The last Governor General of Goa, Vassalo e Silva, in his capacity as the Commander in chief of Armed forces of Portuguese state of India signed surrender treaty of "unconditional surrender." Pandit Nehru sent his congratulatory message to Major Gen. K.P. Candeth in which he extended "warm congratulations"\textsuperscript{56} to the India army and applauded the action that it cared "with efficiency, courtesy and Humanity."\textsuperscript{57} Thus the noble task of ending colonialism on the Indian soil was achieved and Goa Daman and Diu were reverted to the motherland with this was Completed the Indian National Movement in the true sense of the term.
Notes and References

1 Statement of Subhash Chandra Bose.


5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.


9 Ibid.

10 Personal communication with Flaviano Dias.

11 Personal communication with Madhav Bir.

12 Ibid.

13 Personal communication with P. P. Shirodhkar.

14 Personal communication with August Alvares.

15 Personal communication with V. N. Lawande.

468
Personal communication with Madhav Bir.

Personal communication with Flaviano Dias

Personal communication with Madhav Bir.

Personal communication with Purshottam Kakodkar.

Personal communication with Madhav Bir, Narayan Bhembre, Purushotam Kakodkar, P.P. Shirodkar, V.N. Mayekar, Flaviano Dias and others.

Personal communication with Narayan Bhembre.

Personal communication with Ravindra Kelekar.

Personal communication with Madhav Bir.

Personal communication with Nanasaheb Gore.


Personal communication with V. N. Lawande.
30 Personal communication with Mohan Ranade.

31 Ibid.

32 Personal communication with V. N. Lawande.

33 Ibid.


35 Ibid.

36 Personal communication with Nagesh Karmali.


38 Personal communication with Family members of Vassalo e Silva.

39 For further reference refer to the letter of Vassalo e Silva, the last Governor General of Portuguese State of India, Appendix XXI.

40 The last message of Salazar, Salazar’s Archives AOS/CO/UL/NE-18A. p. 2, Torre do Tombo, Lisbon. For further details refer to Appendix XX

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.
45 Personal communication with Prabhakar Sinari.


47 Personal communication with Jyoti Despande.

48 The Economic blockade failed as Portuguese Government brought goods via sea and air route.


50 Joint letter of Peter Alvares and T. B. Cunha to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, 16th October 1956, for further reference refer to Appendix XVIII.

51 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s reply, 27th August 1956, for further reference refer to Appendix IXX.

52 *Kesari* 19th December 1961, p. 2.


55 Ibid.

56 Congratulatory message of Prime Minister of India Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to General K. P. Candeth, 20th December 1961.

57 Ibid.
RE-INTEGRATION OF GOA WITH THE INDIA UNION

“Operation Vijay”
Model of NRP Afonso de Albuquerque at Museu de Marinha

Portuguese Army Surrenders
Treaty of Surrender, 19th December 1961
Indian Armed Forces

National Flag Hoisting Ceremony held at Adil Shah's Palace Panaji
The Times of India: Goa back with Motherland

A BACK WITH THE MOTHERLAND

AN FLAG OVER PANJIM
ROCLAIMS LIBERATION
OF COLONIAL TERROR

Bhuri Accepts Surrender Of
Portuguese: G.-G. Has Pled
NG FUGITIVES FAIL TO SET
OF DYNAMITE CHARGES

West Evades Issue

476
Jubilant crowd celebrating Goa's Liberation, 19th December 1961