CHAPTER VI

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"India cannot tolerate any footholds of foreign power in its country. We are anxious to give the people in these areas an opportunity to live their own lives and the right to change their future. We do not wish to interfere with their way of life. There are only two ways of bringing this about, through war or through diplomatic means. In pursuance of our ideals, we have ruled out war as a means of redress unless we are forced into one. The only alternative we are left with is the diplomatic method and we are pursuing it."

--- Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.

As discussed in the earlier chapter, the National Congress (Goa) employed direct action, that is, the use of satyagraha in 1946 as well as in 1954-55 to emancipate Goa from its colonial status. In addition to these direct actions that they pursued, they used other non-violent means, such as diplomatic parleys, to contest the fascist dictatorial rule. Simultaneously, they consistently and continuously urged the Government of India to intervene in this regard. Moreover, building up an alliance with different political parties from Goa as well as from the rest of India, to provide an effective challenge to the colonial rule, formed a very important element of their non-violent strategy. Besides operating with the above-mentioned internal forces, the NC (G) strived to utilise like-minded forces in Asia and Africa who were determined to get rid of the colonial rule.

Since the activities of the NC (G) were directly influenced by the Government of India’s foreign policy with Portugal, it is very crucial to analyse the role of the Indian Government vis-à-vis Goa’s struggle for freedom. The
following paragraphs will elaborate the endeavour of the NC (G) in this regard and, at the same time, will trace the efforts made by the Government of India to resolve the problem of the liberation and integration of the Portuguese occupied territories in India.

However, before we venture into the details of the Government of India’s efforts to resolve the Goa issue, it is vital for us to take notice of the views of veteran Indian leaders such as Gandhi and Nehru, and others, on this matter. Let us very briefly analyse the thoughts of these leaders regarding the Goa issue. When we analyse the various statements that these leaders made after the commencement of the 18th June struggle, it appears that the Indian leaders did not expect Goans to take up the issue of its independence from Portuguese rule on its own. In this context, Lohia had stated that Goans should first struggle to achieve civil liberties and that the question of its independence could be tackled later.²

It seems that Gandhi and Nehru were also of the opinion that the Goans should initially struggle only to attain civil liberties and that the larger question of freedom should be tackled later by Independent India. According to them, once India achieved its freedom from the British, the government of liberated India would take up the responsibility of ending colonial rule in the French and Portuguese occupied territories. With this view in mind, Gandhi had clearly advised Goans in these words: “Inhabitants of Goa can afford to wait for independence until much greater India has regained it.”³ Berta Menezes Bragança, an active participant in the 18th June 1946 civil disobedience movement, noted that it was Gandhi who had advised Goans not focus on the attainment of freedom from the colonial rule in the initial phase of the 18th June struggle.⁴ According to him, they had to concentrate on restoring civil liberties first and the issue of freedom of Goa “was the question to be solved by free India.”⁵ Therefore, Gandhi while extending his support to Lohia’s action of satyagraha, had also advised Lohia to refrain from entering Goa again. As Gandhi had pointed out to Lohia, once India was liberated, it would definitely take up the issue of freedom of the
Portuguese territories on its soil. Therefore, at this juncture, Goans could devote their energies to the restoration of fundamental liberties only and the demand for swaraj would be the next step that it could take with the help of the Indian Government.

It may be noted that this approach of the Indian leaders towards Portuguese occupied territories in India was very much in tune with their policy, which they had adopted during their struggle against the British. We have already seen in the earlier chapter that the Indian National Congress had resolved in 1934 to restrict its struggle only to those territories that were controlled by the British. Therefore, after 1934, they did not give any encouragement to such a struggle either in the princely states or in any other colonial possession.

It was widely felt that once British India was freed from colonial rule, the other Indian territories would automatically and inevitably revert to India. Therefore the Indian National Congress did not extend its support to or organise any powerful movements in these territories. It has been pointed out in the previous chapter, that the Goa Congress Committee led by T. B. Cunha, acting as a branch of Indian National Congress, had successfully worked to challenge the ills of the colonial regime with the support of Indian National Congress. Unfortunately, due to the Congress policy of limiting the struggle to British India only, it had received a serious setback.

Though the Indian National Congress had decided to restrict its struggle to British India, as a policy matter, it does not mean that their idea of freedom was confined to British territories alone. On the contrary, the notion of freeing the entire subcontinent reigned supreme in the minds of the Indian leaders. This was evident from Nehru’s statements made on 15th August 1947. In his speech, Nehru made reference to those Indian subjects who were still under colonial subjugation and could not share the happiness of liberated Indians. He had declared that these Indian were very much a part of, and would soon join, the Indian Union. Later,
while addressing the Goan rally at Bombay in 1956, he made it very clear that although the Indian struggle for freedom was confined to British territories alone, the leaders recognised the right of the Indian people to free themselves from colonial hold irrespective of whether they were under Portugal or France and their "idea of freedom included the whole of India."10

Therefore, while extending his support to the 18th June Action he had stated clearly "For us, Goa is as much a part of India as any other part, and the freedom of India inevitably includes the freedom of the people of Goa.... freedom there becomes part of our own struggle."11 The Indian National Congress, which met at Wardha in August 1946, also adopted a resolution regarding the Goa issue and extended its support to the struggle launched by the Goans.

Thus, from the above discussion, it is clearly evident that Indian leaders considered that it was the responsibility of the sovereign Indian Government to take up the issue of freedom of territories under Portuguese control. They felt that it was morally binding on them to solve the issue of foreign enclaves on the Indian soil.

Indian leaders had rightly gauged that the existence of princely states and foreign possessions on Indian soil was due to the goodwill and friendship of the British power and therefore once the British rule was put to an end, the liquidation of these powers would be a natural phenomenon. Speaking at a Goan rally in 1956, at Bombay, Nehru had confessed that they (Indian leaders) specially he himself was very much confident regarding the automatic and inevitable reversion of French and Portuguese enclaves after the end of British rule and had admitted that at that point of time it did not even strike him that "any controversy"12 would emerge regarding the French or the Portuguese enclaves.

If one had gauged the political trend in India at that time, the reinstitution of these territories, which belonged to India, appeared to be the most congenial approach that foreign powers such as France and Portugal could have adopted and
this would have been much appreciated by Indians who were striving to achieve national unity. Soon after India’s independence, France acted according to the expectations of the Indians. However, Portugal’s impudent attitude towards her Indian colonies dwindled the hopes of Indians to a find peaceful settlement regarding the existence of foreign rule over the enclaves.

Like the Indian leaders, Goan leaders, too, expected that once India was liberated from British colonial rule it would take up the issue of Goa. They argued that Goa was a part of India and Goans were as much Indians as other citizens of India. Moreover, the existence of the Portuguese state on the Indian subcontinent was a threat to India’s relentless efforts to end colonialism. Goans insisted that it was ethically obligatory on the part of the Indian Government to free them from the hold of Portugal and expected that India should immediately take up the issue of liberation of Goa. At this stage it is relevant to point out why India could not take up the issue of foreign enclaves immediately after it was liberated. As soon as India was freed, the nascent nation had to face a series of complex problems. Partition of India and communal problems that erupted on the eve of India’s independence exhausted the energies of the new Government. Moreover, the problem of integration of Princely States and that of Kashmir kept India occupied for quite some time. Besides these issues, the Government was faced with economic and constitutional challenges that forced them to pay less attention to these foreign pockets. Therefore, one can say that the question of French and Portuguese enclaves did not find place on India’s primary agenda.

After almost 3 years of patient waiting that Indian would take up the case of Goa, in 1950, NC (G) sent a memorandum to the members of Parliament to remind them of their responsibility and questioned whether it was to “India’s prestige to tolerate colonialism on her soil three years after achieving freedom from the British?” Their frustrations concerning the policy of the Indian Government regarding Goa was exhibited through the questions that they raised in their memorandum, such as “We ask, are we not Indians? Are we not part and
parcel of India? Did every little *taluka* in India fight separately for its freedom? Did not Mahatma Gandhi tell us in 1946 that we have nothing to fear, that we had strength of the whole of India behind us? Where is that strength now? Has it disappeared with Mahatma and is India really a free country without us? 17 Goans had thought that as soon as India was freed from the British rule it would take up their cause. However, these expectations of Goans could not fulfilled and therefore there was disappointment in the nationalist camp. 18

Nationalist activists from Goa demanded immediate action from the Indian Government in this matter. Yet, it appears that they admitted the fact that the main responsibility to work towards the liberation of Goa along with the efforts of the Indian Government lay with the people of Goa. They did not want to shy away from their moral responsibility of freeing their motherland. 19 However they were aware that the situation that existed in Goa was not in favour of any independent action by Goans without the strong support of the Indian nation. NC (G) explained their position and urged the Government of India to intervene immediately in the Goa case. 20

NC (G) made it a point to place before the Indian National Congress the difficult situation the Goans had to face regarding the struggle. When it met at Nasik, for its annual session, NC (G) appealed to them that Goan activists had to fight colonialism on two planes, one against those elements that were politically unconscious and lacked the knowledge of democracy and were unaware of its benefits completely. They had to challenge this political depression that was certainly the result of the Portuguese rule and simultaneously they had to combat a powerful and authoritative dictatorship that did not allow even an insignificant protest and undertook measures to quell the urge of freedom and liberty among its subjects. 21

Therefore it was just impossible for them to fight the colonial administration single-handed without the rest of India’s support. Completely
refuting the argument that the problem of the independence of Goa was "entirely a problem of the Goans to solve," they reminded the Indian National Congress of its past backing and demanded their active support to cause of liberation of Goa. They demanded that the problem of Goa should be considered equally strategic and significant as the issue of Kashmir that was receiving prime importance from the Indian Government.

Revealing to the delegates the strategic importance of Goa, in particular of its harbour at Mormugao, they warned that any further delay on the part of the Indian Government to solve it would only result in "one more opportunity for the enemy to consolidate its position" and this would be a bitter disappointment to all Goans. Moreover, they brought to the notice of the delegates that if the issue prolonged beyond limits then there was also fear of Goa falling prey to American imperialistic designs. Therefore, they asked the delegates to convince the Government of India to take immediate steps regarding the issue.

**Salient Features of India's Foreign Policy**

Here it is worthwhile to take note of India's foreign policy under the stewardship of Nehru. Nehru's eminent leadership in India's struggle for freedom and his experience of functioning as the Minister of External Affairs in the Interim Government, that was formed in 1946 just before India's liberation, made him aware of the basic issues that would predominate India's foreign policy in future. Moreover, Nehru was very deeply influenced by the Indian cultural traditions and therefore it was but natural that Indian foreign policy evolved by Nehru exhibited the traditional Indian thought process. Moreover, protection of national interest was the main concern of the newly formed Indian nation. Thus these were the factors that shaped the Indian foreign policy of Panchseela, the belief in the five principles of peaceful co-existence, which included respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, no aggression, non-interference
in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefits and peaceful co-existence.

Nehru’s main stake was peace, to see that social equality was established throughout the world. Peace could be established only when the people who were still subjugated were freed as peace and freedom were inseparable from each other. Therefore, he strongly stood against colonial exploitation that endangered human liberty and led to human suffering. Nehru was clear regarding the basic tenets much before he assumed the leadership of independent India. In fact when he headed the provisional Interim Government itself, on 7th September 1946, Nehru stated the main objectives on which the Independent India’s foreign policy would rest. He said, “we believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflicts and war. We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and people and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunity for all races.”

Besides peace and freedom, Nehru strongly believed in non-alignment and was in favour of adoption of peaceful methods for resolving international disputes. Speaking at Columbia University on 17th October 1949, Nehru had defined the main objectives of the international policy as

“The pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major power or a group of powers, but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue, the liberation of subject peoples, the maintenance of freedom, both national and individual; the elimination of want, disease and ignorance which affect the great part of the world’s population.”

Nehru had furthered declared, “Opposed as we are to colonialism everywhere, it is impossible for us to tolerate the continuance of colonial rule in a small part of India.”
Resurgent India regarded continuation of western imperialism on Asian and African territory as an anachronism. Therefore, as soon as India became independent it launched tirade against colonial exploiters. It used the United Nations platform and thus took the role of a champion of freedom and peace. It opposed Portugal’s admission to the UNO. Vijaya Laxmi Pandit put forward strong arguments against its entry, as Portugal was an authoritarian state and still a colonial power. This was a violation of basic principles of the UN Charter.

Against this background it was but natural for India to take up the issue of the French and Portuguese enclaves that were symbols of decadent colonialism. It has to be noted here that at this juncture India was not in a favour of taking recourse to any coercive activity. As a strong believer in the policy of peaceful negotiations Nehru aimed at solving this problem in a friendly spirit. As mentioned earlier, the Indian Government approached France first and Portugal a little later.

Soon after India’s independence, the Governments of India and France started negotiations for a satisfactory solution of the problem of French settlements on the Indian mainland. On the eve of the British departure, the IVth Republic of France had declared that the people of French India themselves would decide whether they wished to join the Indian Union or remain with France. They left the decision to the people of India and this was evidence of recognition of the right of re-union of its Indian enclaves with the Republic of India as a natural and legitimate issue. The stand of France regarding their territories in India was definitely democratic that confirmed the historical and liberal traditions of the French. This positive approach made possible for both the countries to open negotiations with each other. The discussions between them headed towards fruitful conclusion and on 8th June 1948 both India and France declared jointly that the people of French pockets could decide their future status through a referendum.
Overwhelmed by the French response, the Government of India decided to approach the Portuguese Government to arrive at a peaceful settlement. While addressing a political conference at Sitapur in Uttar Pradesh, on 21st August 1955, Nehru declared,

"We are convinced that a peaceful approach to the Goa question is the right one, not only from the point of view of Goa and India but also because of the larger issues and the foreign policy that are never pushed with so much success." 30

It appears that Nehru at this stage did not take into consideration the form of Government that existed in Portugal. He was unable to take into account the psychology of a dictator who would not easily accept democratic principles. Sardar Patel, the then Defence Minister of India, who believed in a realistic approach towards the integration of Indian territories under control of European colonial powers, and had successfully integrated Princely states like Junagarh and Hyderabad, had advocated the use of force to integrate Goa with the rest of India. He was fully convinced that a dictator like Salazar would not pay any heed to such idealistic moves of Nehru. One finds that Patel’s judgement regarding Salazar was confirmed, as events were to show later. Nehru himself admitted his mistake of not taking into account the nature of the Government in Portugal. 31

Salazar and Goa

Soon after India’s independence, José Albano D’Souza a prominent Goan from Bombay who later became Mayor of Bombay, met Prime Minister Nehru to offer congratulations on behalf of the Governor-General of Goa on the attainment of freedom by the Indian Union and at this time the issue of Goa did crop up in their talks. Later, he took appointment with the Indian Prime Minister to discuss the Goa issue. Since Nehru was a strong believer in peaceful negotiations he had expected the Governor-General of Goa, or some responsible representative of his, to meet him to discuss the whole situation “in a, so to say, heart to heart talk.” 32
Therefore, José Albano wrote to the Consul General of Portugal in Bombay and gave a detailed account of what had transpired between them and made valuable suggestion to the Consul General of Portugal in Bombay that José Bossa, the Governor General of Goa who was out of India at that time, on his return to India "should make arrangements for the interview with Pandit Nehru and get the whole Question settled as amicably as possible."

However, as we are aware, the Government of Portugal did not take into account this suggestion and exhibited an obstinate attitude. Soon after India's independence, Salazar delivered an important speech in the Portuguese National Assembly on 25th November 1947, in which he analysed the internal and international politics including Portuguese territories in India. In his speech, Salazar stated, "if geographically Goa is India, it is Europe socially, religiously and culturally." Salazar persistently and fiercely propagated this myth. He argued that they no longer had any colonies in Asia and Africa but what they had were overseas provinces of metropolitan Portugal. Goa was an integral part of the unilateral Portugal spread over Europe, Asia and Africa, with its centre in Lisbon. Goans, like other Portuguese citizens in the metropolis, had same citizenship rights. For Portugal, Goa was not just an extension of Portuguese language, culture and religion but it was a link between Europe and the East.

On 10th August 1948, Salazar delivered a radio speech in which he expressed, "In the seas and lands of the East, Portuguese India represents a well defined type of culture and civilisation a characteristic of western expression." According to him, it was the "meeting point and connecting link between the East and the West." Salazar wanted to preserve "the Rome of the Orient" that had transformed itself into such a position due to the efforts of Portuguese rulers who had not only promoted the Christianisation of Goans but had also lusitanised them.
When the Indian Government approached Portugal with a wish to establish diplomatic relations between India and Portugal, the Portuguese Government had categorically declared, "The real interest of our diplomatic relations with that country rests on the existence of our *Estado da India* and not its liquidation." However, as far as the Indian government was concerned, the Goa issue formed a part of their basic international policy that was based primarily on the uncompromising rejection of colonialism in all forms and in all places.

Though Salazar made tall claims that Goa was an integral part of Portugal the fact remained that Goa was a colony of Portugal in the Indian soil, which was a violation of India's territorial integrity and her natural geographic unity. Goa's separate existence in spite of the emergence of India as an independent nation was definitely conforming to non-logical arrangement of the sixteenth century colonial ventures and therefore existence of Portugal's presence on Indian territory in the modern political context was an affront to the right of Indians to be freed from colonial shackles. Therefore, Nehru had stressed that the Goa issue could be discussed only after the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Portugal. Thus, we find that right from the beginning the objectives of India and Portugal basically differed. On one hand, India wished that Goa would be integrated with the Indian territory through diplomatic moves whereas, on the other hand, Portugal did not give importance to India's claim that Goa was a part of India and made every possible effort to convince the world community that Goa was part and parcel of Portugal and hence the question of its merger with India did not arise at all.

Thus one finds that Portugal was harping on arguments that were based in the colonial policies of the 16th century and was not ready to accept the new ideas of liberty and nationalism that were sweeping the Asian and African continents.
Against this background, India took the lead and opened a Legation in Lisbon in early 1949 with the sole purpose of establishing contact for a negotiated settlement of Portuguese India. According to the critics of Nehru, the establishment of a Legation in Portugal meant failure of Nehru to assert India's sovereignty over Goa. By even agreeing to discuss the matter, they accused him of surrendering the unequivocal rights that India had already established over Goa.

However, Nehru felt that by opening a legation in Portugal, India had taken a step forward to open talks with Salazar in order to solve the Goa issue. But he failed to realise that the policy of peaceful negotiations that the Government of India had adopted depended chiefly on the response of Portugal. As rightly envisaged by his critics it would be impossible to pursue such a policy if Portugal refused to co-operate with India, as later events were to prove.

On 27th February 1950, the first aide-memoir regarding Goa was sent to the Portuguese Foreign Ministry in which the Government of India explained that the main objective of the nationalist movement, which had led to the emergence of India as a free nation, was the achievement of historical and cultural unity of India which had "throughout the centuries transcended political frontiers such as those demarcating the French and the Portuguese possessions in India." 39

It further stressed that the popular feeling in these territories was for union with the free Republic of India. Since this "movement for union was a part of the historical process which sought urgent satisfaction", 40 the Government of India was approaching its Portuguese counterpart through the aide memoir with a request for an immediate start of negotiations regarding the future of Portuguese colonies in India. The Government of India further declared that once the "principle of reunion was accepted the ways and means to achieve it could be devised by friendly consultation between the Governments of Portugal and of India." 41
The Portuguese Government displayed their arrogance by not replying to the Indian note for nearly three and half months. They sent a note to the Legation of India in Lisbon on 15th June 1950 in which they totally disagrees with the Indian Government and rejected India’s request to start talks on the Goa issue.

Portugal, while rejecting the Indian claim that there were popular sentiments in Portuguese India in favour of merger with India, stressed, “the people of Portuguese India enjoyed liberties and privileges much identical with those recognised in any other part of Portuguese territory”.42 They further argued that Portuguese India enjoyed these privileges “from time immemorial”. Therefore, “the dominant feeling is of and cannot cease to be more natural, of loyalty to the state of which they are proud of being citizens.”43 They further said that citizens of Portuguese India’s expression of loyalty and patriotism towards Portugal was the result of four and half centuries of peaceful, juridical, political and cultural historic process which had integrated Portuguese India with the Portuguese nation. Therefore, the Indian claim that was invoked in the aide memoir was “void of bases”44 and therefore according to them Goa was a question that “cannot be discussed and much less acceptable”45

The Government of India was disappointed with this response but nevertheless it did not consider this note as a final disposition on this issue and continued its efforts to pursue the adamant Portuguese Government. The Government of Portugal was flooded with representations; however it did not pay any heed to these friendly notes. According to Portugal, Goa was already enjoying wide prerogatives with the Portuguese empire than the Indians could get from the British. While addressing the National Union, the only official political party, Salazar reviewed the happenings in India.

He admitted that the events in India provoked great perturbation in the minds of some citizens of Portuguese India. “Creating aspirations which are nothing but mirage”,46 according to him “Goa can only choose between being a
province within Portugal or a small district in India with a complete overthrow of existing conditions." Thus as mentioned earlier, the Portuguese Government totally rejected India’s request to start talks.

The position of India with regard to Goa was firm; Nehru was determined to solve the problem through peaceful negotiations with Portugal. Portugal, on the other hand, was placing hurdles in the path of such a solution. Salazar was not at all ready to recognise the Indian claim on Goa and continued to emphasise that Goa was a part of Portugal, which it would never relinquish. Salazar threw a challenge to the Indian Prime Minister. According to Salazar, there were three possible solutions to the Goa problem. One was by violent means and the remainder entailed the use of pacific methods. Salazar acknowledged Indian military superiority when he wrote “it cannot be doubted that she (India) has the means to take possessions against such resistance as the Portuguese forces there might be able to offer.”

The second alternative according to Salazar was to ignore the Goa issue, which was not at all possible as Goa was geographically linked with India. As far as Salazar was concerned, the “only genuine solution” of the problem of India was to practise her professed doctrine of peaceful co-existence. He stated, “It is possible that after this attempt and our firmness in the matter, the Government of India may, for sometime abandon this question with the excuse of the principle of non-violence.” This was because he was confident that India would not take the extreme step of sending its troops into Goa to liberate it. Salazar was right in thinking this for till the end India was not in favour of the use of force in Goa. On 28th March 1951, Nehru explained his Government’s policy towards Portuguese India that rejected war as a means to solve the Goa issue and reasserted the pursuance of Government of India’s policy of bilateral talks with Portugal in this case.
As we have seen in the preceding paragraphs, India was attempting patiently and diligently to arrive at a peaceful solution to the liberation of Goa. These attempts were not showing any signs of producing satisfactory results. Portugal gave cold shoulder to the aide memoir, which was sent in 1950, by saying that Portuguese India was an integral part of Portugal and felt no need for mutual negotiations. This indifference on the part of the Portuguese Government and the constant pressures from the nationalist circles in India, prompted the Indian Government to send a reminder on 14th January 1953 which recommended that the only solution to this problem was the direct transfer of Portuguese possessions, which ensured the merger of Goa, Daman and Diu with the Indian Union at an early date.\textsuperscript{52}

The Indian Government, refuting Portugal's assertion that there was no popular sentiment in Portuguese India, pointed out the political conditions in which Goans lived. It mentioned the lack of civil liberties and suppression of Goans that had led to the building of public opinion for the merger of Goa with the rest of India. India reiterated that as a sovereign Republic it would not tolerate political barriers within its territory that were a mere accident of history and therefore it "earnestly hoped that Portuguese government will agree to the opening of negotiations for the direct transfer of these territories to India."\textsuperscript{53} It further suggested that the principle of direct transfer should be accepted first and that this should be followed by a defacto transfer of the administration.\textsuperscript{54}

The response of the Portuguese government to this note was the same as before. It reiterated its unwillingness to discuss the Goa question. Portugal's blatant unwillingness to continue any further discussion on the Goa issue compelled the Indian Government to draw the curtain on the policy of bilateral talks and to close its legation in Lisbon since it had ceased to be of any practical utility.\textsuperscript{55} Thus, the Indian Government for six years reasoned, argued and used peaceful methods all without any positive result and finally on 11th June 1953 it closed its Legation in Lisbon.\textsuperscript{56}
The news of the end of negotiations between India and Portugal did not in any way surprise the NC (G) as it was fully convinced right from the beginning that the policy of peaceful negotiation was nothing but a "waste of time." Since NC (G) was aware of the Portuguese attitude they had expected this development. Therefore the NC (G) welcomed the Government of India’s decision to abandon the policy of diplomatic manoeuvrings to secure Goa’s freedom. According to them it indicated "the conflict between Government of India and Portugal over the Goa case was inevitable." Since NC (G) was aware of the Portuguese attitude they had expected this development. Therefore the NC (G) welcomed the Government of India’s decision to abandon the policy of diplomatic manoeuvrings to secure Goa’s freedom. According to them it indicated “the conflict between Government of India and Portugal over the Goa case was inevitable.”

And as hopes of accomplishing some concrete results through diplomatic channels had been “blasted”, it called on the people of Goa to take up the initiative to challenge Portuguese imperialism through the medium of direct action.

NC (G)’s Response to “Myths and Reality”

As the Government of India was exchanging friendly notes with the Government of Portugal and refuting its claim that Goa was an extension of Europe on Indian Territory and that there were no popular sentiment favouring the merger of Goa with India, NC (G) ensured that its activities were directed to support India’s efforts to reach a peaceful solution.

On 25 August 1949, NC (G) wrote to Salazar and appealed to him to leave Goa as “good friends.” It expressed hopes that the Government of Portugal would consider its demands and agree to set free all political prisoners, withdraw expeditionary forces stationed in Goa, grant civil liberties to the people and finally withdraw from Goa. Simultaneously, it carried vociferous campaigns against Portugal’s fictitious propaganda and false assertions regarding Goa.

Through various methods they countered the “myth” propagated by Salazar. Various pamphlets, booklets were published giving the correct picture to the world regarding the Goa issue. A series of articles were published in Goan...
Affairs, the bulletin of NC (G). In one of the article, the President of NC (G), K. L. Sanjgiri, wrote that Goans were subjected to ruthless repression and had continuously appealed to the Indian Government, expressing their desire to integrate with India. 61

In order to expose the false claims that Portugal was making at the international level, Sanjgiri wrote to the editor of Financial Times, London, that it was an irrefutable fact that Goa “historically, geographically, culturally and last but not the least, ethnographically belonged to India.”62 He further stated that Albuquerque’s conquest of Goa, in 1510, was a mere accident of history and, did not entitle Portuguese rulers to cling on to Goa. He further elaborated on the fact that the whole world was witnessing the end of colonialism in the Asian subcontinent and existence of European power in Goa was not in tune with the modern aspirations of the people. Pointing out the illegal occupation of Abyssinia and Czechoslovakia by Mussolini and Hitler, respectively, he argued that if Portugal was allowed to retain Goa then “it must be said that Mussolini too was entitled to rule Abyssinia and Hitler Czechoslovakia.”63

In a letter addressed to Salazar on 15th August 1949, NC (G) demanded the withdrawal of colonial rule from their motherland. They asked Salazar to recognise the trend of events in India that favoured the rise of nationalism among the people of India. It further asserted that Portuguese as well as other territories under foreign rule had full right to achieve freedom and integration with the Indian nation. As mentioned earlier, Salazar had criticized the political events that were taking place in India, which proved to be a source of inspiration for Goans to rise against colonialism as “mirage”. NC (G) very strongly refuted this claim and asked Salazar to take cognisance of the present “century of the emancipation of people.”64

As the Indian Government was trying its level best to establish friendly relations with Portugal, NC (G) was also attempting to put forward its case to the
world by exposing the factual conditions in Goa. In their appeal to the UNO, the NC (G) explained how the colonial authorities were curbing the struggle by misusing power and position. They revealed to them how people of Goa were forced to sign statements in favour of the colonial regime.

These suppressive tactics of the rulers were aimed to present a false picture to the world and thereby prejudice the world opinion against India. Since Portugal was an aspirant to the membership of the UNO, the NC(G) appealed to the UNO to take cognisance of its activities in its colonies.

As Portugal continued to act in an indifferent manner and deliberately delayed to respond positively to the efforts of the Government of India, the NC (G) went ahead to demand an army intervention in Goa as in Hyderabad. In their memorandum entitled, “Appeal to Members,” that they addressed to the members of the Indian Parliament, they felt that Portugal was taking undue advantage of India’s peaceful efforts.

Therefore, although it had full faith in India’s efforts to solve the issue through peaceful negotiations, in retaliation to Portuguese insolent behaviour, they demanded that the Indian Government should sever diplomatic relations as “the democratic policy of the Indian Government is not understood by the Portuguese Government and is even deliberately interpreted as weakness on the part of India.” Therefore, it urged the “Government of India to fix a date on which the problem of Goa was definitely solved. Blaming Salazar for Goa’s imbroglio, the NC (G) suggested that the Government of India should take steps like economic sanctions against Portugal. As the economy of Goa was completely dependent on the rest of India, it asked the Government to stop all commercial relations with Goa such as investments of Indian capital in Goa and ban anti-Indian newspapers in the Indian territories, especially in Bombay, as retaliation against Portuguese ban on the circulation of Indian newspapers in Goa.
Pandit Nehru’s desperate attempts to solve the Goa issue through friendly talks and Salazar’s unyielding approach towards it had stirred Goans as well as other Indian citizens residing in India as well as in foreign lands. The state of affairs between India and Portugal had begun to draw their attention, they were genuinely concerned about the whole situation. And were in favour of an early solution of the issue. They were very much aware that what was preventing the integration of these territories in the Indian Union was Salazar’s audacious behaviour. The arrogant approach of Portugal of denying that their possessions in India were an integral part of the Indian nation stood as a stumbling block to the liberation of these territories. Their genuine concern regarding the Goa issue and their expectations that the issue of Goa should be solved at the earliest found expression in the letters that they penned to the Portuguese Premier.

Applauding Nehru’s efforts to solve the Goa issue by bilateral means, Polyar Lobo, a Goan Catholic advocate practising in the Supreme Court, wrote to Salazar expressing his mind on the issue. Stating that being a Goan Catholic he believed that he had a special claim to address Salazar and draw his attention to the “present trouble” that was going on in the Portuguese possessions in India. While praising Nehru for his sincere anti-colonial views that emphasised “freedom for all colonial people” in the world, Lobo appealed to Salazar’s catholic spirit in these words. “Your Excellency is an ardent Catholic. I sincerely believe that negotiations for a peaceful settlement can be opened with a view to granting independence to the Portuguese possessions in India.” Criticising Portugal’s desperate attempts to hang on to a “small empire” in India that was “more of a burden than an advantage to her” he brought to Salazar’s notice the views of the church on political liberty. Quoting an extract from a report that was drafted by a group of Catholic bishops that acknowledged “the right of peoples to self government” as a legitimate right who had extended their support to “every constructive effort to achieve the same”, he urged Salazar that “some agreement, be in a peaceful manner reached by which Goa and the other possessions in India be granted their independence.” 71
R. N. Puri, an Indian national residing in the United States of America, addressed a letter to the Portuguese Premier, Salazar, on 17th April 1954, in which he expressed his appreciation for India's patient peaceful approach regarding Goa. And at the same time criticizing the inflexible approach of Salazar he warned Salazar regarding the changed times. He urged Salazar to accept the fact that India was experiencing the new tide of national awakening and cautioned him that he had “no right to possess any part of India or stay in India without the consent” of the then Indian Government.

Moreover, he pointed out Goa's strategic and significant place in the context of India's defence and at the same time brought to the notice of the dictator the incapability of Portugal to defend their enclaves in the wake of an armed attack from those countries whose interest were inimical to those of India. He suggested to him that his actions to test India's patience were not advisable as it was not possible for a foreign power to stay in India forever as “sooner or later India will get back all her lands from the foreign nation. Therefore, he cautioned Salazar to “better get ready to talk with Nehru,” to “respect the rights of the people of India and come forward to discuss to relinquish its tiny Indian settlement”.

A month before the launch of mass Satyagraha action that was undertaken by the nationalists from Goa as well as from the rest of India, Salazar was flooded with such letters. S. A. Sundaram Mudliar, working as Secretary-General of a company, M. T. S. Marican, in Bangkok (Thailand), had addressed three letters to the Portuguese Government that went unanswered. Heavily criticizing the myths that were propagated by the Portuguese legation in Bangkok by distributing pamphlets to that effect, he had asked Salazar to discuss the Goa Problem in the National Assembly and come to a satisfactory solution as soon as possible. Further, expressing in strong words that Portugal should not take advantage of the patient policy that India had been following towards the issue, he warned the Portuguese Government that “If Indians wanted to aggress and capture they
would have done so within 24 hours.\textsuperscript{75} However, since the Indian Government believed in peaceful persuasion, such situation had not arrived. Therefore he had urged Salazar not to try India's patience and to give up his "adamant persistence" on the Goa issue or else "the consequences would prove bitter and eventually end in an unhappy way." He demanded the immediate "transfer of power" of these territories to the Indian Government.\textsuperscript{76}

**Efforts in Collaboration**

**Goan Political Conference**

Many political parties were working towards the achievement of freedom with lack of coordination which resulted in dribbling away the energies of these parties. This was the main impediment in achieving the set goal of liberation of Goa. Countless efforts were made to bridge these divides among political organisations and to bring them under one umbrella that would enable them to pose a united front against their common enemy. Forging unity among various political parties was the main challenge before the nationalists who worked for the liberation of Goa.\textsuperscript{77}

The NC (G) took the first step towards this issue in 1947 and a Political Conference was organised in Bombay. Its main aim was to bring the various groups on a common platform to offer a united challenge. At this conference an earnest appeal was made that the political workers working towards freedom of Goa should keep their differing political opinions and their ideologies at bay and should strive to focus on the independence of Goa.\textsuperscript{78}

This aim was reiterated in the second Political Conference held in 1950. Indian socialist leader, Jayaprakash Narayan, while inaugurating the Goan political conference in Bombay advised Goans to unanimously resolve their differences and organise an effective struggle against the Portuguese rule. An attempt was made to chalk out a definite plan of action in which all Goans,
irrespective of political affiliation, would join hands and progress with "one voice" to demand the end of Portuguese colonialism. Later in 1951, K. L. Sanjgiri made an unsuccessful attempt to unite the divergent forces and had called for a joint meeting on 16th December 1951, "to have heart to heart talk and to exchange view points" and thus to sink differences.

However, these efforts to forge unity among them proved to be futile as the confusion among the Goan political parties surfaced often and that created a very poor image of the struggle in the eyes of the people. This had a very negative impact on the struggle and the chances of reaching their goal became feeble.

The Goa Action Committee:

In 1953 when T. B. Cunha arrived in Bombay he tried to unite these political groups and tried to present a cohesive front. He formed the Goa Action Committee that included NC (G), The Goan People’s Party, the United Front of Goans and other organisations. It aimed at the synchronization of the activities of different bodies and groups through a solitary establishment with a common plan of action and propaganda. The activities of the committee included propaganda through press, joint meetings, display of posters, demonstrations, pouring of nationalist literature in Goa establishing link between workers in Goa and the rest of India, mobilisation of Goans in Goa, as well as those residing in Bombay by establishing contact with Kudds, the Goan clubs in Bombay, to seek support from the Indian political parties. In order to intensify the struggle in Goa, the Committee planned to carry propaganda in the border areas to organise satyagrahas inside Goa and also lead marches from the neighbouring states to Goa.

It also established a Goa Information Bureau that helped to spread information regarding Goa to the Government of India and to the people from India and abroad. Azad Goem, a Konkani fortnightly with its English edition,
Free Goa, was launched as a part of the Committee's activity. Later when the NC (G) gave a call for nationwide satyagraha in 1954-55 the activities of the Goa Action Committee proved to be fruitful in harnessing the support of the Goans for this cause. However, as the satyagraha activity was discontinued after the mass satyagraha of 1955, owing to Government of India's decision to ban the entry of the satyagrahis in Goan territory, once again factions among these political parties surfaced.

The Goan Political Convention

Another attempt to bring together the different political organisations and to pool together the resources fighting against the colonial rule was made in 1959 and a Goan Political Convention was organised in October 1959 to discuss new means to bring about the early liberation of Goa, Daman and Diu. NC (G), AGD, the Goan Liberation Council, and the Goan People's Party met on 24th May 1959 and on 3rd July 1959 to work out the basis on which this convention would be shaped. In order to offer an integrated struggle it was proposed that to all the above-mentioned parties should merge into NC (G). However, there was a very strong objection from all those parties except NC (G) regarding this proposal. There was also another suggestion that asked to freeze all the activities of these organisations temporarily till the liberation of Goa and a new organisation consisting of all the old parties could be formed.

Although some of the organisations were inclined towards this suggestion the attempt to form the new organisation remained on paper and a decision to organise a political convention of Goans as well as rest of Indians, irrespective of their political and their non-political affiliations, was taken. The convening Committee of the Goan Political Convention was composed under chairmanship of Divakar Kakodkar. The other members were S. R. Nadkarni, August Alvares, S. S. Carvelho, Mussolini Menezes, Gilman Fernandes, Zotico D'Souza, J. M. Pinto, Nicolão Menezes Cajetan Lobo George Vaz and others.
The convening committee appealed to all nationalists from India to participate in the Goan Political Convention and asked them to enrol as delegates to the convention. The delegates who wished to join it had to sign a pledge that stated, "I believe in the Freedom of Goa and its integration with India." It further stated that those who wished to participate in the Convention would work towards bringing about the early liberation of Portuguese territories in India. This gathering focused on inviting national as well as international attention to the urgent necessity of withdrawal of Portuguese from the Indian subcontinent. It also aimed to put forward their demand that those Goans who were residing in India in very large numbers should be regarded as Indian nationals and would be given citizenship rights in India and were to be allowed to participate in the democratic process of the country.

It also stressed on the renewal of the struggle inside Goa as well as in the rest of India to eliminate Portuguese rule "through all means open within the power of Goan People." Simultaneously, it intended to seek the vigorous assistance of the Afro-Asian countries to participate in the struggle to eliminate the menace of colonisation. V P. Krishna Menon, the defence minister of India, who later became inaugurated the Goan Political Convention, who later became.

The deliberation held at Goan Political Convention proved to be fruitful as it concluded on the positive note of establishing a National Campaign Committee for Goa. It was decided that this committee would consist of political workers from different organisations that were working for the liberation of Goa as well as it would also include members of political parties from the rest of India. It organised various meetings and also celebrated national days to spread the word to national solidarity between Goans and the rest of Indians. On the eve of Goa's liberation the National Campaign Committee for Goa made a commendable effort to mobilise the support of people both within India and from outside for a speedy solution to the Goa issue. It was due to the efforts of the Committee that finally the Government of India decided to take army action to liberate Goa.
NC (G) and Political Parties from India

Right from its inception, the NC (G) drew inspiration from political parties from the rest of India. As we are aware it was the socialist leader Ram Manohar Lohia who brought up the issue of Goa to the fore by initiating the 18th June Action. One finds that socialist leadership extended guidance and support to the NC (G) throughout the struggle. The historic meeting that brought the Gomantak Congress and Goa Congress together to form the NC (G) was organised under the guidance of Ashok Mehta. Peter Alvares, a Goan, who became the president of NC (G) in 1953 was the leader of Praja Socialist Party and was very active in Bombay. He took up the strings of Goa’s struggle and as we have discussed in the earlier chapter and elevated the issue of independence of Goa to the national level.

When Goans, as well as the rest of Indians, launched an all India struggle in 1954-55 to oust the Portuguese the Indian political parties such as Praja Socialist Party, The Communist Party of India, and the Jansangh, Forward Block, Revolutionary Socialist Party, Hindu Mahasabha, Sheikari Kamgar Paksha, Kamgar Kisan Paksha and other organisations came forward to extend support to the NC (G). The Goa Vimochan Sahayak Samiti that was formed to launch non-violent protest action comprised of the above-mentioned parties. An All-Party Parliamentary Body was created that comprised of Members of Parliament. This was created to facilitate them to take up the issue of Goa in the parliamentary proceedings. Although Congress did not officially participate in the 1955 satyagraha. Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee’s president, Keshvrao Jedhe, participated in the movement in his individual capacity. Likewise many congressmen participated in the struggle in their personal capacity.

One finds that the Indian National Congress since it was the ruling party could not take direct and active lead in Goa’s struggle. However, from time to time it expressed its moral backing to the struggle through various resolutions that it adopted in its annual sessions. As mentioned in the earlier chapter when it met
at Wardha it did resolve to support Goans in their fight against colonial regime. However the Government of India insisted that Goa’s struggle for freedom should be confined to Goan only and had disapproved joint efforts of Goan political parties and parties from the rest of India. The question arises here is that why the Government of India was not in favour of allowing the active participation of Indian political parties in Goa’s struggle? One of the reasons why it adopted this stand was because the Government of India feared that active participation of Indian political parties would create wrong impression at the international level that Indians were raising the issue of liberation of Goa. Portugal continuously stated that it was Indians who were instigating the Goans and Goans were quite happy with their the existing status of an “overseas province of Portugal”. Therefore, Nehru did not want Indians to indulge in any such activity that would favour Portugal’s false propaganda. However, NC (G) leaders as well as other political parties justified the active participation of Indians in the struggle as they argued that Goa was very much a part of India and therefore it was the duty of every Indian to get it liberated.

Peter Alvares, the president of the NC (G), while justifying the participation of these parties against the criticism that was levelled against their involvement in Goa’s struggle said “all these political parties feel it their duty to help Goans at this hour in their crisis”. He expressed his anguish against the policy adopted by the Congress party towards Goa issue and noted that such statements like “only Goans should participate” in the satyagraha had adverse effect on the struggle. Moreover, terming the participation of other political parties as the “opportunist participation” and such open allegations stating that “it is not yet time to intervene” had severe negative repercussion on the struggle and encouraged Portuguese regime to act more rigid with the non-violent satyagrahis. He further appealed to Congress Party that if it did not want to participate in the non-violent protest action at least it should at least maintain silence on the issue to avoid further damage to the cause. He said, “It is open upto
anybody to participate. If there is no participation, I hope that there will be at least silence."

Besides their participation in the satyagraha action, the NC (G) was successful in harnessing support for various deliberations of the NC (G) that were conducted in Bombay and other places. The Political Conference organised by NC (G) in 1947, 1950, 1959, and other rallies and meetings marked the support and guidance from these political parties.

**The National Campaign Committee:**

The efforts towards orchestrating the energies of various political organisations through the Goan Political Convention organised in October 1959 finally resulted in the formation of the National Campaign Committee for Goa. This body comprised of the members of the Central Council of the Goan Political Convention and of the National Council of the Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity. Its members also included members of the Indian Parliament.

Its objectives were as under:

1. To emphasise that Goa was a national issue and could be solved as a national problem with massive intervention and united effort of the Indian people.
2. It called for the intensification of the movement in Goa so that it will have
3. its repercussions on the struggles that were launched against Portuguese colonialists in Angola and other Portuguese possessions in Africa.
4. To facilitate the grand unison of all activists and to rally public opinion in anti-establishment forces engaged in the overthrow of Portuguese imperialism, it invited all leaders of the African movement to visit India and to have discussions with Nehru and other leaders from India.
5. Simultaneously it called upon all the Indians to participate Goa's struggle for freedom to annihilate the last residue from the map of India and thereby finish the incomplete task of Free and Independent India. 98

With these objectives in mind the Committee gave a call to the Indian people to organise the Goa Week from 12 to 18th June in 1961 to put forward the following demands:

1. "Effective Sanctions to bring about the immediate freedom of Goa, Daman and Diu and their integration with India as an AUTONOMOUS Reign of the Republic before the end of 1961.

2. That the United Nations immediately intervenes in Angola and stop the mass murder of the people of Angola.

3. That the Independent states of Asia and Africa close their ports and aerodromes to Portuguese ships and planes and sever diplomatic and economic relations with Portugal.

4. That all support be extended to the Indian Port and Dockworkers in their boycott action against ships carrying on trade with Portugal.

5. That a total boycott of all Portuguese goods be organised and a call upon the workers of Africa an Asia and the whole world to refuse to unload ships coming and going to Portugal." 99

Goa Week:

As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the National Campaign Committee for Goa organised Goa Week from the 12th June to 18th June in 1961. Political parties, such as Indian National Congress, Communist Party of India, Praja Socialist Party, Socialist Party and many others participated in the celebration of Goa Week and thereby reiterated their determination to eliminate
the last evidence of colonialism from India. Aruna Asaf Ali inaugurated the Goa Week in Bombay at a mammoth meeting. The resolution that was passed in the inaugural meeting of Goa Week stated that

“This meeting of the citizens of Bombay expect the Government of India to play its legitimate role in the liberation of Goa and take effective action to liquidate Portuguese colonialism in India.”

It further called all political parties and organisations of the people to take “all possible steps to carry the liberation movement forward”. A Goa Day was held on 15th June by the Bombay working class. Factory and mill gate meetings demanding effective action to free Goa were also organised. Simultaneously the dockworkers also gave a call of universal boycott of all ships trading with Portugal. A special prayer for the freedom of Goa and the other Portuguese colonies was organised by the Indian National Church. Mushaira of Urdu Poems on Goa and Angola was organised at Maratha Mandir.

A number of meetings were organised in Goans Clubs such as Varca Club, Divar Club, and the Goan Cooperative Housing Society. A mass rally was organised at Cross Maidan on 18th June 1961 that was addressed by the then Defence Minister, V.K. Menon who accepted that Goa’s struggle was a national struggle and asserted that “steps would be taken for its early liberation.” In addition to the organisation of these activities in Bombay, meetings were organised in Delhi, Ahmedabad, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, Belgaum and Sawantwadi.

In Delhi, a public meeting was organised at Durbar Hall on the 18th June that condemned Portuguese colonialism in Asia and Africa. Berta Menezes Bragança toured and addressed mass meetings at Eluru, Vijaywada and Guntur. The participants of the Goa Week evoked great response from people all over the world. The organisers were flooded with messages of solidarity that came from Tom J. Mboya, Secretary-General of the Kenya African Union, who in his
message stated that “the struggle against colonialism is indivisible and we in Africa look to those who have themselves been the victims of colonial oppression, or who are still under their rule, to assist us in our struggle.”\textsuperscript{101} The Vietnam Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee also sent a message that expressed the full support of the people of Vietnam to Goa’s freedom struggle.\textsuperscript{102}

**Coordination and Cooperation: NC (G) and the Nationalists of French India**

In order to counteract Portugal’s audacious behaviour of not heeding to the call of India to settle the Goa issue amicably, NC (G) decided to coordinate with the pro-merger elements of the French territories in India as it felt that the joint efforts of the nationalist forces in these territories would strengthen the efforts of the Indian Government to solve the issue soon. We have seen in the earlier paragraphs that the French Government initially responded favourably to the efforts of the Indian Government regarding the issue of French Indian territories. This had resulted in their joint declaration of holding referendum in this matter. However the nationalists who were fighting for the immediate union of French territories did not accept this proposal of referendum and demanded unquestionable integration of these territories within the Indian Union. French Government, on the other hand, insisted on holding a referendum. The nationalists from the French-occupied territories were against this policy as they were afraid that colonial authority by misusing their power and position would rig the opinion poll and the decision would go against the merger of these territories with India. Therefore, they opposed the French Government tooth and nail against conducting the referendum. Thus a stalemate had arisen regarding the French territories in India.\textsuperscript{103}

As the situation regarding Portuguese territories was equally hopeless nationalists from both the foreign enclaves decided to coordinate with each other. They rightly thought that this move would strengthen the anti-colonial elements in these territories and thus expedite the merger of these territories with India. In
order to fight against the common enemy, they decided to pull their resources together to assert the inalienable right of the people of these areas to reunite with their Indian motherland. In this regard a decision was taken to organise a joint front of freedom lovers belonging to Portuguese and French enclaves in order to derive maximum benefit from these two parallel movement whose objectives were identical. NC (G)’s basic policy stressed that struggles conducted in French as well as Portuguese territories for national independence voiced only one demand, that is, reintegration with India. Therefore it felt that if these efforts were well coordinated it would lead towards the desired goal. Accepting this fact NC (G) recognised the freedom movements of the people of French India as a part of the movement of the Indian people as a whole and its own counterpart in another area.

Indian National Congress Session of Nasik

The first step in this regard was taken when Indian National Congress met at its annual session at Nasik on 19th September 1950. At this session the various political groups from French India submitted their Memorandum to the President of the Congress. In this Memorandum, they expressed their desire that the Congress should go beyond just a bare moral support that it had shown in the past regarding the issue of foreign enclaves and should take up the issue of liquidation of foreign pockets seriously and get actively involved in fighting for the cause. They demanded that the Congress should take up the issue at two levels, one by not confining this issue of the foreign enclaves only to these territories but by making it an all-India issue and simultaneously pressurising their “own Government to pursue the goal without any reservation or hesitation.” The nationalist organisation from French India placed their humble request at Nasik urging the Congress Committees to take up the cause as early as possible as “the freedom of French India is indispensable to the freedom of their own land.”

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As NC (G) also shared a similar view and also wished that the Goa issue should be treated as an all-India issue with immediate Government intervention, the delegates of NC (G) like Madhav Bir, V. N. Lawande and others who were present at the annual session very strongly supported the demand of the French nationalists and simultaneously also briefed the Congress delegates regarding the conditions of people in Goa.

Memorandum to the Board of International Observers:

As mentioned earlier, France had proposed a referendum on the issue of merger of the territories of French India with the Indian Union. However, the nationalists from French India feared that the existing French Government in the Indian territories would fail to create requisite conditions for an impartial referendum. The chaotic situation in these enclaves would naturally affect the free and fair verdict of the people of these territories. Therefore at this juncture, they presented a memorandum to the Board of International Observers who was deputed to study the factual situation in these territories.

It was pointed out in the memorandum that if France insisted on a referendum then it was to be held: 1. under Joint auspices of France and India. 2. Neutral Observers invited jointly by the two Governments; 3. The whole procedure from the preparation of voter’s lists to the declaration of the results supervised by the Governments concerned; 4. All political cases from 8th June 1948 withdrawn: 5. All dismissed and suspended Government officials reinstated with compensation. 6. All political prisoners released. 7. Full compensation given to political sufferers; and 8. Full civil liberties restored.106

At the same time they forcefully demanded that unconditional merger of these territories was the fundamental right of the people and therefore at the Nasik session demanded that the Indian Government should vehemently oppose the proposal of holding a referendum in these territories and asked the INC members to “forcefully urge their own Government to pursue the matter.”107 The NC (G)
members, K.L. Sanjagiri, Madhav Bir, Frank Andrade, Janardan Sinkre, Lambert Mascarnehas and others extended their full support to the demands made by them to the International Board of Observers, when they met the foreign secretary of India, Rajkumar, with political groups from French India. 108

**Joint Conference of NC (G) and Political Organisations from French India:**

As mentioned earlier, these political organisations were trying to establish a joint front of nationalist groups from French and Portuguese India as they had realised that small and isolated attempts of forces of freedom had to be coordinated and synchronized in order to challenge the tendency of imperialism that the two powers, France as well as Portugal, was exhibiting more forcefully while dealing with the issue of Indian territories in their possession.

Therefore, a decision was taken by these groups to hold a joint conference and give this thought a concrete shape. The issue of the *Goan Affairs* dated 25th February 1951 very elaborately placed before the people of Goa their desire to establish a coordination committee and announced the proposed Joint Conference. 109

Accordingly the joint conference was called by the NC (G) on 20th May 1951 at Bombay and was attended by French Indian National Congress, Pondicherry Town committee, The National Front of Liberation, Pondicherry Merger Committee, Mahe Socialist Party, Republican Party, *Bharat Yuvak Sangh* and *Mahe Mahadjan Sabha* with other various groups working for the liberation of Portuguese colonies. The conference aimed at putting up a united front of the people of Goa and French India against the colonial powers, Portugal and France. The conference proposed the formulation of a co-ordination committee of five persons from these settlements to formulate plans for ending colonialism in the country. They set up a committee that comprised of C.F. Dharatan, S. Perumal, and nationalists from French India, Kashinath Sanzgiri, Peter Alvares and Lambert Mascarnehas.
The conference very categorically reviewed the Indian Government's policy of negotiations and diplomatic relations and the response which the Indian Government received from both the foreign countries, Portugal as well as France. Therefore, they firmly voiced that "the issue could be solved immediately after the withdrawal of the British power from India "In a simple and straightforward manner, in the way which the French and the Portuguese imperialists seem to understand better."110

They stressed that the population of these areas had waited patiently for four years expecting that the Government of India would resolve this issue. However, recent developments regarding these territories did not show any further progress. They reiterated that it was the inalienable right of the people of these areas to liberate themselves from foreign yoke and reunite with the Indian Union. Since the solution for the merger of these territories was not insight, the conference resolved to demand that the Government of India must directly negotiate with France as well as Portugal for the outright transfer of these territories. At the same time they cautioned the people of these territories to "prepare themselves for a possible movement for the achievement of their freedom in case the attempts to solve the problem by negotiations" failed.111

Simultaneously, The Goan Affairs gave due coverage to the events in French India, supporting the actions of the pro-merger parties that had boycotted general elections held on 16th December 1951, as they did not expect free and fair elections in the existing conditions and had derided it as "election comedy."112

In this manner, NC (G) continued its task of highlighting the colonial onslaught on foreign enclaves and kept on urging that it was high time that the Government of India should take some concrete action with the help of political organisations from French India. However very soon events took a different turn, both in French India as well as in Goa. As mentioned in the earlier chapter in 1954 French Indian territories were liberated and later integrated with the Indian
Union. This was one of the reasons for which the hopes of Goans were raised and they decided to once again shift their actions from such co-ordinating efforts to the direct action of *satyagraha*.

**Networking with Afro-Asian Countries**

**Causes:**

**Abandonment of policy of *satyagraha*:**

As discussed in Chapter V, although the 1955 *satyagraha* had created a world wide impact and had provoked an all-India response regarding the Goa issue, the Government of India decided to ban the continuation of *satyagraha* as the technique to solve the Goa issue. They strictly warned the votaries of *satyagraha* to give up open non-violent action and threatened GVVS that if they continued with it the Government would take stern action against them. Thus this policy of the Indian Government against the continuation of *satyagraha* left no other option for the NC (G) and other political organisations, but to discontinue the conduction of *satyagraha* as it was very difficult for them to conduct it without the Indian Government support. So very soon NC (G) declared its decision to abandon the method of *satyagraha* and headed towards pursuance of other methods.

**Failure of Economic Blockade:**

The Government of India's decision to ban the entry of *satyagrahis* into Goan territory and to ask NC (G) to give up the method of *satyagraha* meant that now the Government was planning to take up the issue once again in its hands. As expected the Indian Government decided to try new ways of non-violent policy such as economic blockade to pressurise the Portuguese Government. As early as in 1950 NC (G) had suggested economic sanctions against Goa and demanded to stop all commercial transactions between India and the Portuguese state.\(^{113}\)
NC (G) had very strongly reiterated this demand during 1954-55 Satyagraha phase. They had stressed that the blockade should be introduced as a supporting measure along with the direct action that they had planned to launch. According to them, this ancillary action would contribute to the success of the struggle, as the Portuguese Government would come under tremendous pressure.\textsuperscript{114} As we have discussed in the second chapter, Goan economy was completely dependent on India.

Taking this into account, the NC (G) had asked prevention of export and import facility. This would lead to substantial fall in their custom revenues and would also cause scarcity of consumer goods and this would in turn lead to a price hike. Since export facility to Goan goods was denied there would be a severe fall in the prices of the local product and this would create critical situation, as due to this economic crisis peasant community would fail to pay their dues to the Government. All these factors would contribute to a general resentment of the public against the Portuguese Government and consecutively heighten the activity to oust the colonial power.

NC (G) further asked the Government of India not to renew the railway agreement between India and the Portuguese territories in India. They had also suggested a sea blockade as well as financial blockade to restrict flow of Indian rupee in these territories. They had also demanded severe restrictions on the passage facilities to the people who travelled from Goa to the rest of India.\textsuperscript{115}

However, as we are aware, the Indian Government's decision to impose an economic blockade on Portuguese Goa did not coincide with the satyagraha struggle and was implemented after the Indian Government decided to ban the entry of the satyagrahis in Goa, and when the movement had subsided.

It was unfortunate that the policy of economic blockade of the Indian Government did not succeed. The reasons cited out for the failure of Indian Government's policy were that the policy of economic blockade to the Portuguese
Government was implemented after the 1954-55 satyagraha struggle and not during the movement. Therefore, it could not coincide with the satyagraha action and did not create the desired effect. Moreover, it was not employed all at once but came into being in a “piecemeal”, thus giving the Portuguese Government time to make alternative arrangements to deal with this by asking help from other countries. Portugal’s NATO ally and India’s traditional enemy, Pakistan, gave tremendous help to Portugal by opening its airways to them. Thus, food grains and other stuff that India refused to give came from foreign lands through Karachi. The strategy of economic barrier could not achieve its end, as Indian authorities could not put check to rampant smuggling activities in the border areas. Indian goods were smuggled into Goa due to inefficiency of the Indian Customs. Thus, due to above mention reasons economic blockade was unsuccessful and could not have desired effects.

Nehru’s refusal to take Army Action in Goa:

According to the NC (G) there were only two ways of solving the Goa issue, one was by an armed intervention of the Indian Government and the other was the continuation of the policy of satyagraha. Indian Government’s decision to give up the policy of satyagraha left open only other action that was the army intervention in Goa. But Nehru Government did not wish to go for it, as it would mean going against its own international policy. The Indian Government had all the time stressed on the utter belief that the Goa’s freedom would be achieved through non-violent means. The Goan activists who constantly suggested to the Indian Government that the only way to oust the Portuguese was by taking “police action” heavily criticised this attitude of the Indian Government. T. B. Cunha, in his speech delivered at the symposium of the Afro-Asian Study Group on 24th December 1957, had disapproved the “wrong stand” of the Government of India that “had put restrictions on her own right to directly intervene in the matter and to settle the case by herself or through her own means.”
As Portugal's arrogance regarding Goa continued the opinion of resorting to army action in Goa began to gain strength. But the Indian government refused to take recourse to such an action, as it was feared that this would arouse negative international reaction. NC (G) argued that since Goa was a part and parcel of India and Goa’s struggle was the continuation of a larger struggle that India had launched against imperialism, India had full right to intervene in Goa and oust the adamant dictatorial Portuguese rule. However this idea did not convince Nehru. Therefore, only way left with the Goan freedom-fighters was to make him realise that Goa’s struggle for freedom would open a new chapter in the history of nationalism in the Afro-Asian colonies of Portugal and serve as an inspirational source to the toiling millions of Africa and would give boost to all the anti-colonial movement in the world.

Indian Government had always championed the cause of de-colonialism in the African continent. It was felt that there was a need to make Nehru realise that Goa’s independence and integration with India would not only mean end of colonialism from the Indian soil but would also herald the beginning of a freedom struggle in Portuguese colonies of Asia and Africa.

Casablanca Conference:

A two-day conference of nationalist organisations of Portuguese colonies was organised in April 1961 by the King of Morroco at Casablanca in North Africa. This meet was attended by leading freedom fighters from the African national movements as well as by Indian leaders. Nationalist organisations from Angola, Mozambique, Guine, S. Tomé, Cabo Verde islands participated in the deliberations. P. D. Gaitonde represented the NC (G) in this meet and other members that attended the conference were George Vaz and Cajetan Lobo. A delegate from the Goa League João Cabral and Aquino Bragança, who was a professor at the Moroccan University at Casablanca, attended it.
The conference resolved against the continuation of colonialism on Asian as well as African soil and demanded that Portuguese must leave the shores of India as well as of its her other possessions in Asia and Africa. The president of the conference, Senhor Mario de Andrade, while greeting the organisers and the participants in Goa’s struggle said that the hour had come to “administer the final blow to our common enemy.” He further said that they had nothing fear to as all the people in the world who loved freedom and peace were supporting the cause. He wished “complete success in the final battle and early reunion” of Goa with its motherland. It emphasised the need to coordinate the efforts of nationalists in various colonial regions. In order to facilitate this, a permanent body was set up at Rabat in Casablanca with Mario Andrade as its chairperson, Marcilino dos Santos became its secretary and João Cabral took the charge of Administrative Secretary.

National Conference for Afro-Asian Solidarity:

The Bandung conference of Asian countries, held in New Delhi in April 1955 marked the beginning of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement. Delegates varying from politicians, statesmen, parliamentarians and significant personalities from the socio-cultural fields and others from 15 countries had participated in this conference. Indian delegation consisted of over 50 delegates from all political parties and to eminent personalities from different fields. Smt. Rameshwari Nehru led this delegation.

Later the President of Indonesia, Sukarno, convened a conference at Bandung. During its deliberations Nehru had voiced his displeasure against the continuation of colonialism in Africa and had emphasized the need for its speedy retreat. It was at this stage that the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement had come into existence with its headquarters at Cairo and Arun Asaf Ali headed its Indian wing. These political developments were definitely favourable to Goa’s struggle and as NC (G) rightly thought that at this stage if they stressed the global
importance of Goa’s liberation that would help the Indian government to take swift action in Goa. With this view in mind, NC (G) decided to established parleys with their African counterparts.

The Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity that aimed at uniting the people who had divergent views in internal matters but who principally agreed with the foreign policy of India and believed in the Afro-Asian Solidarity had organised two national-level conferences on this issue. The first conference was organised in October 1955 at Hyderabad. The second conference of the Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity was held in Calcutta from April 2-5 in 1959. The conference was called “to discuss and unanimously resolve to support the struggles of the people for freedom and preservation of national sovereignty and to further the cause of world peace and international cooperation.” 2500 delegates attended the conference. MP’s from political parties such as the Congress Party, Praja Socialist Party and Communist Party attended the conference along with representatives from different states of India. There were fraternal delegates from the Afro-Asian solidarity Committees of Ceylon, China, Japan, Iraq and U. S. A. Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, Pakistan, Japan, Mongolia, Ethiopia other courtiers sent their representatives to the conference.

The conference extended its absolute and wholehearted support to the struggle for freedom in Algeria, Cameroons, West Africa, Tanganyika, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Nyasaland, Rhodesia, Madagascar, Congo, Mozambique, Angola, West Iran and other states. The Indian Council also took up the question of Goa in special meetings as well as in conferences at international levels.

The Indian Government called Portugal’s claim over Goa as a “preposterous proposition that no sane person can accept”. Further, it strongly objected to the plans of Portugal to link the Goa issue with NATO and use Goa as a military base and pointed out that this meant a grave threat to the security of the newly born Indian nation. At the same time the conference protested against the
brutal Policy that the Portuguese Government pursued in dealing with freedom fighters and demanded the immediate release of political prisoners.

It extended its full support towards the freedom struggle in Goa and called upon Afro-Asian Governments and people “to render all help to expedite the cause of Goa’s struggle for freedom.” Moreover, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council’s Secretariat gave a call to all national organisations to observe 25th November 1960 as “Freedom for Goa Day.”

Seminar on Portuguese Colonialism:

Against the above-mentioned background, the National Campaign Committee for Goa requested the president of the India Council of Africa, Aruna Asaf Ali, to organise a seminar of nationalist leaders from the Afro-Asian colonies of Portugal. By this time the freedom movement in the Portuguese colonies had become active once again. There was a revolt in Angola in 1959 and other colonies also were showing signs of resistance against the colonial rule of Portugal. Therefore, NC (G) felt that it was the appropriate time to coordinate with these struggles and voice an universal protest against Portuguese colonialism. Moreover, NC (G) also wanted to put pressure on Nehru to take a decision regarding Goa. “We came to a conclusion that Pandit Nehru was undecided about anything and the discretion that he said he would exercise was not forthcoming.” Therefore, in order to persuade the Government of India to take tangible steps against the existence of colonial regime over Goa, Daman and Diu, the seminar on Portuguese colonialism was organised.

The India Council of Africa organised a seminar in October 1961 in Delhi and its concluding session was organised in Bombay. Nehru inaugurated it and significant leaders like Kenneth Kaunda President of Zambia, Swai who was holding ministerial position in Tanzania, the Moroccan Foreign Minister, Abdel-el-Khatib and Wedgwood-Ben, the British Labour MP, and others, participated.
Peter Alvares, Sudhatai Joshi, Ram Hegde were among the Goan leaders who contributed to the seminar.

At its concluding session, Nehru made a very significant remark that indicated that the Government of India was toying with the idea of using "other methods" to get rid of the Portuguese colonial presence from the Indian soil. He said "India could no longer let the brutalities committed on freedom fighters and other citizens in Goa..." and if these things continued then the Government of India will have to think of some measures by which it will have to put a stop to this. Speakers who addressed this seminar considered Portuguese colonialism, which denied fundamental human rights to its people and colonies, as a definite threat to world peace and therefore it was urged that all efforts must be coordinated and directed towards its end.

Holding the dictatorial regime responsible for these barbarous and shameful deeds it was emphasised by them that such a system could no longer be tolerated. While criticising NATO powers for extending help to Portugal to continue its vicious rule on 15 million people who were held in bondage, the delegates urged that

"No effort should be spared to bring about the end of Portuguese colonialism, no means eschewed to hasten it. Moral, material and other support should be extended to all fighters for freedom in the Portuguese colonies."

Taking all these points into consideration the seminar was concluded on a very significant note that "the freedom of Goa would now be of the greatest importance in the liberation of other Portuguese colonies and is therefore, a matter of special urgency."

Thus, NC (G)’s efforts to coordinate with the Afro-Asian leaders seemed to be fruitful as it spelt out a significant shift in the policy of the Indian
Government regarding the Goa issue and the hopes of the Goans were raised that very soon India would decide to intervene in Goa. As rightly expected within two months the Indian Government launched its army action in December 1961 and put an end to Portuguese rule in Goa.
Notes and Reference


2 Ram Manohar Lohia Action in Goa, _Loc. cit._, pp. 48 -49.


4 Personal Communication with Berta Menezes Bragança

5 Oral History Interview Transcript of Berta Menezes Bragança, NMML, _Loc. cit._, pp. 111 -112.

6 Oral History Interview Transcript of Peter Alvares, NMML, _Loc. cit._, p. 45.


9 The Goan Political Parties as well as Indian Political Parties jointly organised a mass rally in Bombay, 4th June, 1956.


11 _Prime Minister on Goa_, New Delhi : External Publicity Division, Minister of External affairs, Government of India, 1962, pp. 2 – 3.


13 For further details refer to A. K. Neogi, _De-colonisation of French India_, Pondicherry: Institute of Pondichery, 1997
14 Personal Communication with Madhav Bir and others.

15 Ibid.

16 NC (G) Memorandum to the Members of Parliament 1950, pp. 1 - 2

17 Ibid.

18 Personal Communication with Nagesh Karmali.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 NC (G)'s Memorandum 18th September, 1950, to delegates of 56th Annual session of Indian National Congress, p. 2. see Appendix VIII.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., p. 3.

24 Ibid.


29 *The Hindu* (Madras, 9th June, 1948, p. 4.

337
30 Indiagram, Loc. cit.


33 Ibid., p. 30.

34 P. D. Gaitonde, Loc. cit., p. 46.


36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.


39 Note of Legation of India, Lisbon to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Portugal, 14th January, 1953, Salazar’s Archives, AOS/CO/UL – 21, Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, pp. 67 – 70. see Appendix XV.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.


43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.


52 Note of Legation of India, *Loc. cit.*


56 Dr. Pratima Kamat, “Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and the Liberation of Goa.” Paper presented at the National Seminar on Jawaharlal Nehru and India’s Foreign Policy, University of Calicut, 1989, p. 9


60 Letter of NC (G) to Salazar, 25th August, 1949, pp. 1 – 2.
61 Goan Affairs, 15th December, 1951, p. 8.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 NC (G)'s letter to Salazar, Loc. cit.

65 Ibid.

66 NC (G)'s letter to UNO, Ressurge Goa, 15th May, 1952, pp 3-4.

67 Ibid.

68 NC (G) letter to the Member of Parliament, Loc. cit.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.


73 Ibid.


75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 Letter of K. L. Sanzgiri, 7th December, 1951, p. 1. see Appendix VI

Ibid.


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Circular no: 1, Goan Political Convention.

Ibid.

Letter of S. S. Kavlekar to Jayantilal Mehta.

Ibid.

Circular no: 1, Goan Political Convention.


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Letter of Peter Alvares, 19th July 1955, p. 3.

Ibid.

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Ibid.

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Memorandum submitted by Mahadjan Sabha Mahe, to the board of International observers, 6th April, 1951, p. 5.

Ibid.
110 Ibid.

111 Memorandum submitted to 56th Annual Session of NC (G), Loc. cit.

112 Goan Affairs, 25th February 1951, p. 3.

113 Ibid.

114 Goan Affairs, 28th May 1951, p. 4.

115 Goan Affairs, 24th January 1951, p. 3.

116 Goan Affairs, 28th May 1951, p. 3.

117 Goan Affairs, 1st December 1951, p. 2.

118 Personal Communication with Joaquim Dias.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid.


123 Personal Communication with August Alvares.

124 Oral History Interview Transcript of Peter Alvares, p. 97.

125 Personal Communication with V. N. Lawande.

126 Ibid.
The map depicts the state of Goa, India, with various districts and towns marked.

Districts and towns include:
- Bardez
- Vasco Da Gama
- Tiswadi
- Salcete
- Sanguem
- Canacona
- Ponda
- Satari
- Dodamarg
- Patradevi
- Bicholim
- Biamliit
- F=1 A

The text at the top seems to reference a location "IF-I" and "naji Tiswadi R ISalcete Vasco Da Gama Ponda Sanguem A N S E f D damarg 401 40 411140 Bardez Biel l r Satan".
NC (G) Poster Depicting Terekhol Day
Message of Mahatma Gandhi
Yashwantrao Chavan Inaugurating Goan Political Convention

Goan's demanding Military Action on Goa
Peter Alvares and others at Seminar on Portuguese Colonialism

NC (G) meeting organised in 1955
NC (G) Office Premises – Girgaon, Bombay
AGD Office premises, Dabol – Girgaon, Bombay