CHAPTER-II

Perception as a source of valid knowledge

Perception is a direct source of knowledge of reality while other sources of knowledge lead us to reality, indirectly. In Perception we are face to face with reality whereas the other means provide only an indirect knowledge to us. As per literal meaning "Perception" is the Pratyaksa. The word ‘aksā’ in ‘Pratyaksa’ means the sense organ and ‘Prati’ means all the sense organ, therefore the word Pratyaksa means the function of each of the sense organs in respect of their appropriate objects. All the Philosophical Schools call it to be the basic and fundamental source of knowledge. Perception is called pratyaksa because it takes place through the relation to the senses (aksam aksamprati). The aksa or sense organs are five viz; eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin, these sense organs have an important role in the theory of Perception. The contact of the sense organs with the object is constituted as a nimitta karana or efficient cause of Perception. In it, we perceive something ‘here and now’, to perceive a thing means to grasp or understand a thing. In Layman's language, it is called the direct knowledge of the objective world. It proceeds directly from sense object. The process of Perception is as follows: first of all the self comes into contact with the mind, then the mind comes in contact with the senses and the senses in their turn come in contact with their objects, when the mind undergoes a modification through these contacts, then Perception follows. All schools of Indian thought have taken perception or pratyaksa as a source of valid knowledge. In fact; the first valid source of knowledge, recognized by all Indian philosophers in general is ‘Perception’.1 Perception is caused by sense-object contact and is not caused by any antecedent knowledge.

\textit{Indriya janyam jnanam pratyaksam; jnanakaranakam jnanam pratyaksam;}

\textit{Nyaya-siddhanta-Muktavali}

Perceptual knowledge is the apprehension of the unique particular object (svalaksana) and is given directly through the senses.2 Perception has been universally accepted as the primary
source of valid knowledge by all the orthodox schools of Indian thought i.e. Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samkhya, Yoga, Mimamsa and Vedanta.

_Aksaya aksayaa prativisayan vrttih^3_

It could be defined as an immediate knowledge of a present object by the use of sense organ contact. Different schools of Indian Philosophy have defined Perception in different ways.

**Nyaya-Vaisesika school defines Perception as;**

The Nyaya recognizes four distinct and independent means of knowledge of which Perception is the first and the most fundamental. In Nyaya, the position accorded to Perception is primary because perceptual knowledge is the final basis of all other kinds of knowledge. It is generally defined in the early Nyaya-Vaisesika as a definite and true cognition of objects produced by sense object contact. Ganesha defines Perception or pratyaksa, as direct apprehension. Gautama defines sense Perception as that knowledge which arises from the contact of a sense organ with its object in expressible words, unerring and well defined.

_'Indriyartha-Sannikarsa'_

His definition of Perception is as follow; Perception is such consciousness an arises from the contact of a sense organ with an object has not the name of an object as its object (i.e. is not verbalized experienced), is not an error (accords with its object) and is determinate. Perception cognition is defined as knowledge generated by contact of sense organ with object.

Another definition of Perception which anticipates the modern view is given by some old Naiyayikas as, “immediate knowledge, not due to any previous experience or reasoning.” Uddyotakara holds that literally the term ‘Pratyaksa.’ means what is related to the senses.4 Vaisesika says that Perception enables us to apprehend substance, qualities and action. Gautama definition sets forth four conditions necessary for a judgment to be a true perceptual judgment.1. A judgment is perceptual and true only if it is produced from contact between sense organ and an

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object. 2. It is *avyapadesa*; not verbal 3. It does not wander (*avyabhicari*); and 4. It is definite (*vyavasayatmakam*).

The prominent position of the definition given by Gautama was accepted by all the later Nyaya philosophers. Even the philosophers of other schools who professed to be opposed to Gautama accepted his definition of Perception. According to Annambhatta, “*Intriyartha sannikarsajanyam jnanam pratyaksam*”. Viswanath pancanana says that *Indriyajanayam janam pratyaksam*. The sense object contact is called *sannikarsa* or *prathasarthi*. It is the knowledge which occurs directly and immediately. According to the Naiyayikas, Perception is the knowledge, which is not mediated by other knowledge. Inference is produced through the knowledge of a sign or *Linga, Upamana* is produced through the knowledge of a *Sadrsyajnana* and Verbal testimony is produced through the knowledge of a word but Perception is not produced by the knowledge of any instrument of knowledge. In short *vyaptijnana, sadrsyanjnana, padajnana* are the uncommon causes of *aumitijnana, upamitijnana and sabdabode* respectively. Vatsyayana says that when a man seeks the knowledge of a certain thing, if he is told of it by a trustworthy person and has the verbal cognition of a thing. There is still a desire in his mind to ratify information by means of inference through particular indicative features, and even after he has been able to get at the inferential knowledge of the thing, he is still desirous of actually seeking the thing with his eyes, who has once perceived the thing directly, his desirous area is at rest and he does not seek for any other kind of knowledge. Gautama recognizes Perception as uncontradicted knowledge which arises out of the proximity of object and sense organ, it is distinct and is unrelated to any name. According to this view, Perception is that form of knowledge which results from the contact or nearness between the object and the sense organ and which is apparent and real knowledge. Perception is a kind of knowledge and is the attribute of the self. The self mind (*manas*) sense organs, objects and contacts between them are necessary for Perception. Thus, unless the self is in contact with the *manas* and *manas* with the sense organs, there can be no sense object contact and hence there can be no Perception.

Gautama’s definition is unique in the sense that all major classifications of Perception are implicit in it. Subsequent thinkers only make them explicit. From a part of Gautama’s definition
namely, ‘Indriyartha Sannikarsotpannam Jnanam’ follow six kinds of Ordinary Perceptions (laukika pratyaksa) i.e. five kinds of External Perception (bahya pratyaksa) and the only one internal Perception (manasa pratyaksa). The Modern school of Nyaya gives a new definition of Perception i.e. it is characterized by immediacy (saksatkaraivain) which is common to all Perceptions. It applies to all cases of Perception, human or divine. Visvanatha defines it as direct or immediate cognition which is not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition (Jnanakaranakam jnanam pratyaksam: Bhasaparicheheda by Visvanatha).

**Samkhya Yoga School defines Perception as;**

Samkhya defines, Perception as the direct cognition of an object through its contact with some sense. Kapila views “Perception as a cognition takes the form of an object being related to it.” Kesva Misra in his ‘Tarka Bhasa’ defines Perception as the source of valid immediate knowledge; and immediate knowledge is that which is brought about by sense object contact.’

Prasastapada defines Perception as the cognition that depends on sense organs. Yoga, which is an allied system of Samkhya Philosophy also recognizes, Perception as an independent source of knowledge. Perception as described by the Modern school is direct or immediate knowledge, not derived through the medium of some other knowledge, it excludes inference which is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge of universal relation, it excludes analogy which is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge of similarity, verbal testimony which is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge of words. Visvanatha also defined Perception as direct or immediate cognition which is not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition. Buddha or intellect becomes modified and transformed into the shape of the object through the activity of the senses and the mind. It is just as mirror reflects the light of a lamp and thereby manifests other things.

*Samkhya Sutra* states Perception as that with the thing perceived discernment which being in conjunction of an object portrays the form thereof.

*Yatsambandhasiddham tadakarollekhi vijnanam tat pratipksam.*
Gunaratna states that the sense organs come in contact with their respective objects and are accordingly modified into the form of the objects. When a thing like a pot comes within the range of vision, *buddhi*, or the intellect, is so modified as the form of the pot and the soul becomes aware of the existence of the pot. A popular definition of Perception as the “operation of cognitive organs, ear and the rest” is described to the followers of Vasaganya. (*Srotradivrttih pratyaksam – YD, 5.*

Perception is the mental apprehension of objects, and perceptual knowledge like any other form of knowledge which could be attained through modification of *buddhi* or intellect. The term *Pratyaksa* used in the *Samkhya Sutra* denotes only a small portion of immediate experience. The experience of inner phenomena remains outside the range of the definition of Pratyaksa. The definition given in the *Samkhya Sutra* either escaped notice or was knowingly spared due to its obscurity by almost all the eminent logicians. The definition as expounded by Vindhyavasvin however, has been refused by the Buddhist (Dinnaga), the Jains (Akalanka) and the Naiyayikas (Uddyotakara, Vacaspati and Jayanta) alike. In the Samkhya system, there are three main definitions of Perception 1. The one initiated in the *Samkhya Sutra*, Probably by Kapila himself, 2. The one propounded by Vindyasvamin or Varsaganya, 3. The one proposed by Isvarakrsana. The definition knowingly spared due to its obscurity by almost all the eminent logicians. So in the Samkhya system there are three main definitions of Perception. The first definition is given by Kapila, the founder of Samkhya, defines, “Perception as a cognition which takes the form of an object, being related to it”. The second definition is given by Vindyasvamin, “The sense organs come in contact with their respective objects and are accordingly modified into the form of the object”. The Third definition of Perception is given by Isvarakrsana. He adds that Perception is a determinate knowledge in respect of every individual object. Interpreting it Vacaspati states that perception is a modification of the mind which gives definite cognition of objects affected by the sense-object contact. In his opinion, intellect (*buddhi*), ego (*ahnkara*), mind (*manas*) and the sense (*indriyas*) constitute the apparatus through which external object is apprehended by the subject. When an object excites the senses, the *manas* arranges the sense impressions into a percept, the ego refers it to the self and the intellect forms the concept.
The *Samkhya Sutra* also defines Perception as the knowledge which portrays the form of object coming with it. Here, knowledge according to Vijnabhihsu stands for *buddhivrtti*, the *buddhi* goes to the object with the respective cognitive organ and gets the form of that object, and the essence of the definition is that Perception is *vrriti* of *citta* followed by its contact with the object and through the cognitive organ. Knowledge of all kinds, according to Isvarakarsna is the function or attribute of *buddhi* which is taken in the sense of both actual agent of knowing and means of knowledge. According to Jwala Prasad, the definition of *Samkhya Sutra* has two special features:

1. That the knowledge called *pratyaksa* is considered more as an act, which is the implication. 2. It is the form of the object (*tadakara*) which is cognized and not the object itself.

Cognition is regarded as a function of the *buddhi*, which is unconscious and cannot be its own object but can only be apprehended by the self. The *Samkhya Karika* of Isvarkarsna is the earliest classical source about the definition of Perception. In the *Samkhya Karika* the term *drsta* has been used instead of *pratyaksa*. The mention of Perception is only the statement of the term to be defined. It seems that the Philosophers of Samkhya yoga system have stated that Perception has been treated as superior to all other forms of valid knowledge and they assign the following reasons-1. Perception as a form of valid knowledge has been accepted by all logicians, and 2. Other valid forms of knowledge presuppose perception whereas perception presupposes none of them.

**Mimamsa School defines Perception as;**

Prabhakara defines Perception as direct apprehension, which relates to an object, the self and cognition. Jaimini explains “Perception as a cognition produced in the self by the sense object contact along with this, he adds that it apprehends only existing and does not apprehend supersensuous moral (*dharma*). Perception, according to *Pramana-candrika*, is the means to the apprehension (likelihood) of that which is comparatively proximate and is non-mediated. Gangesa and Visvanath define that knowledge is not brought about by the instrumentality of any
antecedent knowledge. This definition is applicable to human as well as divine Perception. *Pratyaksa* or Perception knowledge is stated in the fourth sutra in the Purva Mimamsa, to be cognition produced by the contact of the self with the mind, of the mind with the sensory organs with the object. This is same as what is accepted by the Naiyayikas. Jaimini defines Perception as the cognition that is produced when there is contact of man’s sense organs. Kumarila discusses the nature of direct Knowledge (*pratyaksa*) under M.S.1.1.4. The definition of direct knowledge is that knowledge obtained by a person, which is the result of the right functioning of the sense organs with reference to their objects. Kumarila calls it as direct knowledge by the proper contact of the sense organs with presented objects, which are free from defect. The initial contact of the sense organs with the object is “mere relevancy or the capacity to reveal the object, which we infer from its effect.” (Kumarila sloka varittika cited by Radhakrishanan). Perception relates only to objects that exist or are perceptible by the senses and thus, by implication, exclude “Super sensuous objects.” According to Prabhakara, an object that comes within the possibility of apprehension may be substances, classes or qualities. Jaimini regards perception as the knowledge produced in the self by the right intercourse of the sense organ with existing and acting upon the sense organs. Valid perception is produced when there is right intercourse of the sense organs with their objects. Perception is the immediate cognition in which the mental modification is identical with the object and is lit up by the self's light.

The Prabhakara School of Purva Mimamsa has presented a peculiar theory of Perception called the *triputipratyaksavada* (the theory of triple Perception) in his *Brhati*. It relates to an object, the self and the cognition. In every act of Perception of an object, the self, the cognition and the object are perceived. According to Prabhakara, objects apprehended may be substances, classes or qualities. Perception can be done through the qualities including color, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunctions, priority, and posterity. Cognitions are self created, but the self and the object are not self manifested. These are manifested by cognition, which is a state of self awareness. The Perception process takes place in the following temporal order: Contact of the object with the sense organs, the contact of the distinctive characteristics of the object and the sense organ the intervention of the mind (*manas*) and the
realization by the self. Prabhakara’s *triputipratyaksavada* has been again elaborated by Salikanatha Misra in his Rjuvimala and Prakarana pancika. In the Amrtakala prakarana of his Prakarana pancika, Salikanatha has stated that Perception is the direct knowledge which pertains to apprehend object (*meya*) the apprehending person (*mata*) and to the apprehension itself (*miti*). In each act of Perception the idea of each of these comes to be its constituent factor. This definition of Perception gives the theory of triple Perception.

Salinikanath’s *Prakarana-Panchika* defines Perception or *pratyaksa* as direct apprehension of the object through sense contact’ (*Sakshat-pratitih*). Parthasarthi Misra defines it as a non-relational apprehension of an object only with its generic and specific characters, which cannot distinguish them from one another. It apprehends an object with its various properties, viz., genus, substance, quality, action and name unrelated to each other just after the intercourse of some objects. There is no apprehension of a subject predicate relation in it.

According to Dasgupta, four necessary contacts have to be admitted in this connection;

1. The contact of the sense organs with the objects,
2. The contact of the sense organs with the qualities of the object,
3. The contact of *manas* with sense-organs,
4. The contact of *manas* with soul.

So Perception is described by the Davitin as the means to the apprehension of that which is comparatively proximate, is non-mediated, and present here and now.

**Advaita Vedanta defines Perception;**

"Perceptual knowledge is awareness of external objects"

*Brahmasutra-Bhasya* of Sankarcharya
Perception as a *Pramana*, is the unique cause of valid knowledge. In the real, sense organs constitute the *Karana* or the unique cause of perceptual cognition. We can attribute Perception activity to our organs. This source of knowledge is more concerned with empirical world as held by *Sankara*. The *Pratyaksa Prama* (true Perception) is defined as immediate and timeless knowledge (*Chaitnaya*). It provides us the direct consciousness of objects obtained generally through the exercise of the senses. We get this knowledge through the operation of *antahkaranvrtti*. In Perception the transparent *antahkaran* goes out through the sense organs pervades the object. This transformation of the internal organ in the form of the object is called *antahkaranvrtti*. The means to the valid knowledge of Perception (*Pratyaksa Prama*) is *Pratyaksa Pramana* (*Pratyaksa Prama karanam praytyksa Pramanam*).\(^{19}\) It has been generally explained by *Indriyartha Samnikarsha*, contact of the senses and their respective objects. It involves three stages, contact of the sense organ with its object and at the same time union of the sense with *manas*, mind and union of the sense with *manas*, mind and union of *manas*, mind with atman self. Identification of the subject and object consciousness by *chitta* adopting the form of the external object is Perception. According to Vedanta the subject and the object become identical, in Perception because both are the same consciousness.

Gautama’s definition of Perception is the starting point of the Nyaya’s epistemology as it is the first of four *Pramanas*. It is the basis on which the other *Pramanas* operate. The classical definition of Perception is given by Gautama in the fourth sutra of the first chapter of the first book of the *Nyaya Sutras*: its prominent position typifies the importance attached to it by all Naiyayikas.

Gautama’s definition of Perception in Nyaya Sutra:

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\text{Indriyarhasannikarotpannam jnanam avyapadesyamayabhicari}
\]

\[
\text{Vyayasayatmakam pratyaksam}
\]
Its English version is as follows:

Perception is the knowledge resulting from sense object contact (and which is) ‘not due to words’ (avyapadesya) ‘invariably related’ (to the object) (avyabhicarin), and is of a definite character (Vyavasayatmakam).  

It is clear that there are four points in this definition i.e. sense object contact (Indriyarthasannikarsa) Avyapadesya, Avyabchiarin, Vyavasayatmaka which need consideration and attention.

It seems that there are various characteristics of Perception in the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy i.e.

1. *Indriyarthasannikrasa* (sense object contact):

The specific feature of this characteristic is the sense object contact, which is accepted by many philosophical systems. According to Gautama it is the specific definition of Perception which is brought about by the sense of contact. He gives an important position to the sense object contact in Perception. It is only through the sense object contact that we can understand the knowledge of all things. It is the most important cause of the Perception. Vaisesika also accepted Perception as the knowledge which is conditioned by the senses. The similar view was expressed in Samkhya system that “Perception is the direct cognition of an object by a sense organ”. Perception is defined in Mimamsa system as the cognition which is produced by the efficient contact of the senses with their objects.  

Cognition is generated by the contact of the self with the mind, the contact of the mind with the sense organs and the intercourse of the sense organs with their proper objects. There are six kinds of Perception; five external organs and one internal organ. The word *artha* or object is used in the sutra in the sense of only perceptible object. There is no Perception without a contact between an object and the senses. Gautama uses the word *artha* to indicate that only the contact of the sense with the appropriate object results in its perceptual knowledge. The word, ‘sense’ in the definition means the six sense organs, i.e. (a) five external senses: eye, ear, nose, tongue, skin (b) one internal sense organ e.g. *manas* which he
accepts in sutra. In all these kinds of Perception, there must be the contact between the organs and the object. The word ‘object’ here signifies substance (draya), such as a table, a chair etc, it also signifies quality (guna), such a color (rupa), hard or soft, (sparsa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha) and sound (sabda). The object also includes pleasure (sukha) or pain. Sometimes we feel happy and sometimes we feel sad due to such Perception. The cognition substance like a table and of quality like color is an external Perception, but the cognition of pleasure or pain is an internal or mental Perception. These are means three kinds of objects. In the contact of the mind with the sense organs, they do not vary and are common to all Perceptions.

I. The physical substances or objects, e.g., a bed, a chair, a pot, a jar etc.
II. The specific objects or sensible qualities, e.g. color, any tangible quality (rough or smooth hard or soft or any such), savor, odor and sound.
III. The internal objects, e.g. pleasure, pain etc.

Vatsyayana defines that the apprehension of pleasure or pain by the soul are also the cases of Perception. He considers mind as a sense organ though unlike ‘Pratyaksa’ it signifies a particular species of knowledge. Gautama thinks that there is contact of a sense (say vision) with jati (say cowness) in a particular object (say a cow), which gives rise to the perceptual cognition of jati (cowness). He also accepts the Perception of something universal in a particular sensible quality (colorless in a color or soundness in a sound or any such thing). According to the older Naiyayikas, Perception is valid cognition of an object as distinguished from failing and volition, and as conditioned by the contact of the object with a particular sense organ.

Gautama is justified in claiming that Perception is the knowledge resulting from the sense object contact. It may also be true that Perception cannot be produced when a person who is asleep or whose mind is pre occupied with other things. The contact of the senses with the empty space or akasa does not result in any perceptible knowledge, because empty space is imperceptible. The contact of the internal sense (mind or manas) with the object, pleasure or pain, produces the perceptual cognition, and it is expressed in the form of a judgment. “This is
pleasure or pain”. From this definition it is clear that the old school of Nyaya defines Perception in terms of sense object contact. From all these definitions of Perception given by different philosophical systems, we learn that sense object contact is essential nature of Perception.

2. *Avyapadesyam*: Unnameable

The second character of Perception mentioned by Gautama, is that it is non expressible in word. Perception is knowledge of an object which is not characterized in any way. It is an apprehension of the object as ‘something’ but not as related to a class and called by a name. Nyaya described that all cognition need not necessarily be verbally expressed knowledge. It is beyond a simple apprehension that there is its, existence apart from any verbal association; hence it is a real state of Perception. Samkhya states that it an 'immature state'. Vatsayayana defines it as “non expressible” in words and pleads for its justified inclusion in the definition. According to him every cognition of an object produced by the sense object contact is (afterwards) denoted by such words as colour, taste etc. Jayanta concludes that the author of *Nyaya Sutra* includes both determinate and indeterminate Perception within sense Perception and by the term ‘avvapadesya’, he refers to indeterminate Perception. The other ancient Naiyayikas call it as indeterminate Perception that is nirvikalpaka.

3. *Avyabhicari*: Non-erroneous:

*Avyabhicari* means non-erroneous, cognition, mentions the logical condition of valid Perception i.e.; it should contradict the real nature of the object. Gautama explains (this) character on some other principles: Our interpretation is that Perception is avyabhicari in respect of specific objects or sensible qualities i.e. color, sound, taste, odor and other tangible quality. Nature has given us senses to perceive the specific objects or sensible qualities or proper objects (The modern term is sense data) and hence the senses must perceive them accurately. But since it is only the human device to perceive the physical objects, we may sometimes falter in perceiving them correctly.

Vatsayayana, Uddyotakara and Vacaspati Misra have discussed the meaning of an *avyapadesyam* in their commentataries. Vatsayayana and Uddyotakara hold that it means
unnamed. Vacaspati Misra says that it is impossible to have a sense cognition which is not connected with a name, and that the word ‘avyapadesyam’ means which is not the result of inferential mark. Vatsyayana says that it is nothing but apprehension, which is subject to error. In summer, when our eyes are in contact with, “the flickering rays of the sun intermingled with heat rays radiating from the surface of the earth”, we perceive water, which is not there. This Perception is not avyabhicarin. Again the Perception of a rope as a snake or the Perception of a shell as sliver proves that the Perception is not free from error. When an object is so near to our eyes, we have no doubt whatsoever as to its being real, and then it is perceptual knowledge. If a distinct object appears to be a real human being then it is perceptual knowledge. Vedantins, Prabhakaras and Neo-Naiyayikas characterize perception as immediate knowledge.

4. Vyavasayatmakam; determinate

Determinate Perception has been mentioned by Gautama as Vyavasayatmakami i.e. well defined. Gautama mentions determinate among the characteristics of pratyaksa. It is definite, that is to say, what is perceived directly is of a definite character. For example, if we hear a sound, it is bound to be of a definite pitch and of a definite quality, although we may not know nature of its source. Determinate Perception is the subsequent cognition of that object as qualified as possessing a character. Vatsyayana explains it as determinate or definite and maintains that the Sutrakara has incorporated this epithet in the sutra so that doubtful apprehension such as ‘Is it fire”? Or is this hill? Such exclusion is not possible if we simply define object contact. Vatsyayana further explains that doubtful apprehension is produced only by the contact of soul with mind and not by the contact of senses with the object and that there is no necessity for incorporating the term in the sutra. Gautama defines Perception by mentioning only its special cause (asadhararna- karana). It is the knowledge not due to the instrumentally of another knowledge and as such it is known as jnana-akaranakam jnanam First stage of Perception is determinate.
The second and fourth parts of the definition mention two kinds of Perception viz \textit{avyapadesyam, vyavasayatmakam}. The other ancient Naiyayikas call the first type of Perception as indeterminate Perception

Dinnaga's definition of Perception

According to Dinnaga, Perception is that which is free from determination (\textit{kalpanas}). They are

I. Name the person whom I see Sita,
II. Class- It is a girl I see:-
III. Quality – She is slim;
IV. Action – She is dancing;
V. Connection with other thing-she is carrying a stick.

So Perception is that which is not spoken of by a name or class or quality or action or connection, and that it is in keeping with the form of an object, which is definite and self able.’’

Different kinds of Perception: Many Philosophers have analyzed perception in various ways Perception and from different angles. It has two distinctions, ordinary (\textit{laukika}) and extra ordinary (\textit{alaukika}). In ordinary Perception, knowledge results from the contact of the sense organs with the object. Extra ordinary Perception provides immediate knowledge even without the senses. When the contact between the senses and the object is ordinary, we have ordinary Perception but in case of extra ordinary Perception, the contact between the object and the senses is not usual. Again, ordinary Perception has been divided into the following three classes:-

1. Indeterminate Perception

2. Determinate Perception and

3. Recognition
The Naiyayikas distinguish between kinds of perception as ordinary (*laukika*) and extraordinary (*alaukika*). According to Nyaya, ordinary Perception is of two types, namely *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka*. Both of these are equally valid and grounded in reality. It is an apprehension of the existence and qualities of an object without any explicit recognition or characterization. It is an apprehension of the existence and qualities of an object without any verbal judgment of a subject whose qualities are predicated. The indefinite object of *nirvikalpaka* Perception being associated with a certain class name is our past experience. It is here that we have a *savikalpaka* Perception of the object expressed in the proposition. 'This is a cow'. In *nirvikalpaka* the object is apprehended as an undifferentiated whole of the universal and the particulars. In *savikalpaka* these are analyzed unfold and recombined into the substantive adjective relation. Therefore, *savikalpaka* is valid and more expressive than *nirvikalpaka* Perception.

*Pratyabhijna* or recognition is regarded by the Nyaya Vaisesika as a kind of determinate (*savikalpaka*) Perception. It is the cognition of an object as what was cognized before, and therefore, qualified by past experience as when one says: This is the same jar that I saw'. Ordinary Perception is again divided into two types, external (*bahya*) or internal (*manas*). There are five external sense organs and one internal sense organ. Internal Perception is the actual contact between the object and the mind and produces knowledge of pleasure; pain, loud, hatred, morality, immorality etc (*manas*). External Perception has the distinctions connected with the five senses visual, tactual, auditory, gustatory and olfactory. It takes place when the five external organs of sense come into contact with their respective external objects. Mind is regarded as an internal sense in Nyaya and internal Perception is brought about by the mind’s contact with physical state. Extra ordinary Perception also has three distinctions- First Perception of classes (*samanyalaksana*) second: Complication (*jnanalaksana*) and third: intuitive (*yogaja*). These three kinds of extra ordinary Perceptions are the ways by which man's cognition transcends the present directly. Yogic Perception does not belong to the common. The First explains classes and universal propositions. The second explains how associations can be determinate factors in present Perceptions. The third *samanyalaksana* is the perception of a whole class of objects through the generic property (*samanya*) perceived in any individual member of that class. Thus,
when a man (we) perceive something as a jar we (he) judge it as belonging to the class of jars, it is the relation characterized by previous knowledge and is responsible for all cases of acquired Perception.\textsuperscript{27} For example we can say that the rose has fragrance. The knowledge of fragrance is not due to the contact with the object sense because the perceiver is at a distance. The knowledge arises out of the impressions of the past experience in an extra ordinary manner, called Jnanalaksana Perception. Intuitive ($yogaja$) Perception belongs to exclusively the $yogin$ who, by means of their superhuman powers, can perceive object imperceptible to others. The reality of $yogaja$ Perception is generally accepted in Indian Philosophy on the authority of the scriptures. The distinctions between ordinary and extraordinary Perception depend on the way in which the senses comes in contact with their objects. When there is the usual sense contact with objects present to sense, we have $laukika$ or ordinary Perception. On the other hand, in extraordinary Perception ($alaukika$) the object is such that it is not ordinarily present convey to the sense through an unusual medium. Distinction between $laukika$ and $alaukika$ is of vital importance in the matter of Perception.

**External or Internal Perceptions:**

Perception as a true cognition due to sense object contact is of different kinds. It is called external ($bahya$), when brought about by the external senses of sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell. It is internal ($antara manasa$) when due to the contact of the mind, the internal sense, with its proper objects The five external sense organs are primarily needed to receive knowledge of the external world, whereas mind is an instrument for memory etc.\textsuperscript{28}

From a part of Gautama's definition namely, 'Indriyartha Sainnikarsotpannam Jnanam' follows six kinds of ordinary Perception ($laukika pratyaksa$) i.e. five kinds of external Perception ($bahya pratyaksa$) and the only one internal Perception ($mansa pratyaksa$). External Perception involves the senses, which arise out of their respective elements and we have external perceptual knowledge regarding physical object. In internal Perception, the senses are not employed: rather, the mind directly perceives the internal feeling of pleasure, pain, jealousy or anger.
Kinds of Perception:-

1. **External**
   
   I. Visual
   
   II. Tactual
   
   III. Auditory
   
   IV. Olfactory
   
   V. Gustatory

2. **Internal Perception**

   I. Manasa (mind)

These senses are physical in character, because they are constituted by the physical elements. Pratyaksa, according to Vaisesika is external or internal. Internal Perception is due to conjunction of the self with the internal Perception. Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition are apprehended by internal Perception. External Perception is of five kinds as said by Nyaya and Mimamsa. The Vaisesika admits yogic perception by which the perceptual cognition of the soul (atmapratyaksa) arises.

**External Perception**

   I. **Visual Perception:** The contact of vision and a substance or physical object, (a dravya) e.g. a pot or a sensible quality (a guna), e.g. colour or (rupa) is the visual Perception.

   II. **Tactual Perception:** The cognition produced by the usual contact of sense of touch (tvak) and a substance or physical object, (a dravya) e.g. a table or a tangible quality e.g. hard or soft (a guna) is the tactual Perception.

   III. **Auditory Perception:** The cognition produced by the usual contact of sense of hearing (srota) and a sensible quality (a guna), e.g. sound (dhvani) is the Auditory Perception.
IV. **Olfactory Perception:** The cognition produced by the usual contact of sense of smell 
(*ghrana*) and a sensible quality (*guna*), e.g. odour (*gandha*) is the olfactory Perception.

The Olfactory sense is the organ of apprehending smell.

V. **Gustatory Perception:** The cognition produced by the usual contact of sense of taste 
(*rasana*) and a sensible quality (*guna*) e.g. savor (*rasa*), is the Gustatory Perception.

**Internal Perception:**

1. **Manasa Pratyaksa:** It is the cognition produced by the usual contact of internal sense 
   mind (*manas*) and an internal object say, pleasure (*sukha*) or pain (*dukha*) or any other internal 
   object is which is called the internal Perception. Thus the above six kinds of ordinary Perceptions 
   (*laukika pratyaksa*), i.e. five kinds of external Perceptions (*bahya pratyaksa*) and one internal 
   Perception (*manasa pratyaksa*) follow from the first part of the definition of Perception in sutra 
   of Gautama.

To the above list of the six senses, recognized by the Nyaya and the Mimamsa, the Samkhya 
   system adds five other senses. These are the five senses of action (*karmindriya*). They are called 
   speech, hands, feet, rectum and the sex-organs and perform respectively the functions of 
   speaking, pretension, Locomotion, evacuation and reproduction. The Vedanta accepts them but it 
   excludes the mind or *antahkarana* from the list of the senses. According to Advaita, the internal 
   organs function like light, their *vritti* moves outwards in the form of ray of light. What we 
   perceive depends on the nature of the mode. If the mode takes the form of the weight of the 
   object, one perceives weight, if of colour, one perceives colour. The two limiting conditions of 
   ultimate consciousness and the object do not produce a difference. The unification makes the 
   cognition of a thing perceptual in character.

About external perception (*bahya pratyaksa*) Niscaladas has explained in the fourth chapter of 
   his Vicarsagar the process of Perception as explained by Dharmaraja in his *Vedanta Paribhasa* 
   and also by the upholders of the theory of *abhasa-vada*. In the *Vedanta Paribhasa*, method of 
   external Perception is presented. In the act of Perception four factors are involved.
1. They are Pramatr chaitanya: the intelligence (pure consciousness) that is defined by the antahkarana.

2. Pramana chaitanya: The intelligence that it is defined by antahkarana vrtti, the modification of antahakarana (the internal organ, which comprises manas, ahmkara, citta and buddhi).

3. Visaya-chaitanya or Prameya-chaitanya: the intelligence that (it) is defined by the object (visaya) of perception.

4. Prama or Pramiti-chaitanya: the intelligence that (it) is defined by antahkarana- vritti which assumes the form of the object.

**Recognition:** Recognition means understanding the nature or character of things. In this sense, to recognize a thing means to know it. Recognition, in the wider sense, means the Perception of an object before we actually see it. The Perception of a parrot before us is a determinate Perception. So recognition in this sense cannot be accepted. When one see a man present before his sense and recognizes him as the same man, whom he had seen in the bazaar, it is case of recognition. Here recognition is the re-Perception of the same object. Recognition, even in this sense cannot be accepted. Nyaya accepts the narrower sense of recognition. i.e. recognition means that an object is perceived as well as recognized. But many Philosophers held the view that the third stage of Perception is recognition. Samkhya does not accept recognition as a separate form of Perception. The Mimamsa accepts the usual theory of recognition. Recognition is Perception where memory or re-collection of past experience of an object modifies the present Perception of an object. It gives us the knowledge of an object as existing in the present and as qualified by its relations to the past. The Naiyayikas conclude that recognition is a kind of qualified Perception, in which the present object is qualified by a distinct recollection of its past experience.

**Nirvikalpaka** (indeterminate) and **Savikalpaka** (determinate)

**According to Nyaya Vaisesika School**
According to Nyaya school, ordinary Perceptions is of two kinds, namely *Nirvikalpaka* and *Savikalpaka*.*\(^{29}\) Former is called indeterminate and later is called determinate). Former is bare awareness of an object; latter is cognition of an object that is qualified. The former gives isolated sense data while the latter compounds these elements and subject-predicate knowledge arises.*\(^{29}\) Indeterminate and determinate Perceptions are the two stages of the same process of Perception. One is less advanced, the other is more advanced. Indeterminate Perception is a real but not a perceived fact. It is a conscious, but not a self conscious state. In self consciousness cognition is cognized by another which follows the first and apprehends it as an object to itself. Indeterminate Perception is the primary cognition of an object existing as real without any characterization as something. Determinate Perception is the Perception of an object as qualified by certain attributes.

Nyaya-Vaisesika admits that all cognitions need not necessarily be verbal expressed knowledge. Our first experience of an object is a simple apprehension of its existence apart from any verbal association. Determinate Perception is relational apprehension. There are subject-predicate relations in it. It involves assimilation, discrimination and association. The indefinite object of *nirvikalpaka* Perception being associated with a certain class-name in our past experience reviews the world-image answering to that name. Nyaya Philosophers recognize that indeterminate knowledge should precede determinate knowledge. These two types of Perceptions are only inferred because no relation can be established between the object and the quality without differentiating or distinguishing the two. Gautama does not clearly mention this twofold division of Perception as "cognition which arises through sense-organ coming into relation with object and which is non-verbal, unerring and determinate.

*Indriyrrhasamikarsotpannamjnananam Avyapadesyam, Avyabicari Vyavasayamakam: N.S.I. 1.4.*

According to Vatsyayana and several others two words *Avyapaedesya* and *Vyavasayatmakam* are referred as to the two kinds of Perception, Viz. indeterminate and determinate. The Nyaya School gives normal (*laukika*) types of Perception.*\(^{30}\) These are *Samyoga, Samyukta-samavaya, Samyukta-samavatya, Samavaya; inherence, Samveta- samavasya,Visesana-Viseya-Bhava.*
Gangesa, the founder of modern Nyaya defines indeterminate Perception as the non-relational apprehension of an object free from all associations of a name, genus and the like. Jayanta Bhatta holds that indeterminate Perception apprehends generality, substantiality, quality and action. While Vatsayayana says that determinate Perception apprehends all the characters together with a name. According to Vatsayayana, the perceptual knowledge immediately resulting from sense-object contact is of the nature of mere acquaintance (alochana) with the object, which is called indeterminate Perception. Immediately after arises the determinate Perception of the object.\(^{31}\)

Determinate (savikalpaka) knowledge is the knowledge of an object as qualified by qualifier (Visesana visista jnana). According to ancient Nyaya, the only difference between the indeterminate and determinate Perception is that while the former is not associated with a name, the latter is associated with it. Indeterminate Perception resembles the Perception of children and dump persons.\(^{32}\) It is necessary to admit an indeterminate Perception immediately preceding the determinate one. Both these forms of Perception are the results of the same sense-object contact. However, to produce the first form of Perception, the sense object contact does not depend on any previous knowledge.

Gangesa says that indeterminate Perception is that of an object and its generic nature is unrelated to each other. When the relation between the object and the class to which it belongs is also apprehended, we have determinate Perception. Indeterminate Perception, according to Annam Bhatta, is the Perception of an object without its qualification, while determinate Perception comprehends the relation of the qualified and the qualification such as name and class.\(^{33}\)

According to Nyaya-Vasesika Perception of an object is isolated and altogether uncharacterized. It is a preliminary cognition which is only logically deduced from a fundamental postulate of the system. All complex things are explained as the putting together of simples constituting them. However, such simples, cannot be directly cognized.\(^{34}\)

We can therefore say that nirvikalpaka is the first level stated and savikalpaka is the second level of an ordinary Perception. The first level develops into the second in the case of all normal individuals who know the use of any language. 'This is a cow', the first step is the contact of
sense with the object, which immediately leads to a nirvikalpaka Perception or simple apprehension of 'the cow' as something indefinite. In the nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) stage, a formless and nameless percept is presented. In the later savikalpaka or determinate stage, a concept is applied to the earlier Perception and a detailed knowledge of the object as having a form, a name, and as belonging to a class" is attained.\(^{35}\) Indeterminate Perception cannot have practical utility so there is no doubt as to whether it is a Bird or an Insect or anything else. Determinate Perception gives knowledge of the fact that "he is a boy "he is black", he is still etc. It is the developed form of Perception and it is on the basis of it that the practices of the world continue to function. Indeterminate Perception is the Perception of an object without its class name, class character etc. For instance; the Perception of a cow just as an object without its class name, class character etc. is the indeterminate Perception of a cow. The Perception of a snake as a snake along with its class name, class character, is the determinate Perception of a snake. The complex process of perceptual knowledge as described in Nyaya is close to what Kant calls the "Conceptualization of Percepts". Indeterminate Perception is also called simple apprehension.

Indeterminate Perception reveals the things with their characteristics and universals. If at the time of having the Perception of a thing of which the name is not known to me, anybody utters its name then, the hearing of that should be regarded as a separate auditory name Perception. Only that product is said to constitute nirvikalpaka Perception which results from the perceiving process of the contact of the sense with the object. Indeterminate Perception is a simple apprehension, in which the 'this' is experience is brought under the general idea of something (Vastsayanya). It is judgment without words. Indeterminate Perception is the bare awareness (alocana) of an object just as there, without an explicit recognition of its character.\(^{36}\) At nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) level we have simple isolated sense data at the (savikalpaka) determinate level, these elements are compounded and our knowledge becomes expressible in the subject predicate mode. Nirvikalpaka is not a judgment of the object in terms of the subject predicate relation. Indeterminate knowledge of an object is not characterized in any way. It is an apprehension of the object as 'something' but not as related to a class and called by a name.
According to Samkhya:

The term **Pratyaksa** used in *Samkhya Sutra* denotes only a small portion of immediate experience. The experience of inner phenomena remains outside the range of the definition of Pratyaksa. Samkhya explanation of determinate perception is different from of the Nyaya School, Samkhya States that the former is a vague awareness which latter becomes clear and distinct through analysis, synthesis, and interpretation.

Through indeterminate Perception we express our perceptual experience in the form of a judgment- "This is something" example: at this stage our eyes come in contact with the object, say a cow for the first time. This is why we do not perceive the features of the cow. Consequently our Perception of the cow is indeterminate or indefinite. In determinate Perception, leads to the second stage of Perception, this is called determinate Perception. There is just the presentation of the perceivable, which is followed by a much more complex, more determinate state, involving the simultaneous representation and recognition of the former as "Such and Such". In determinate Perception we express our perceptual experience in the form of a judgment- "This (object) is such and such object".

At the state of determinate Perception, there is analysis (*nikalpaka*) as well as synthesis (*savikalpaka*) of an object. This is why we perceive an object as definite or determinate. Samkhya refer to (nirvikaplaka) indeterminate Perception as the immediate pure and simple cognition of an object. According to Vacaspati, the activity of *manas* is necessary for Perception; Vijnanabhiksu denies it and holds that *buddhi* directly comes in touch with the object through the senses. Vacaspati assigns to *manas* the function of arranging the sense data and ordering them into determinate Perception. In indeterminate Perception our sense comes in contact with the object for the first time. This is why we do not perceive the features of the object. Consequently our Perception of the object is indeterminate or indefinite.
According to Mimamsa:

Both Kumarila and Prabhakara admit two stages in Perception, namely, indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka). Determinate Perception is direct and immediate knowledge of an object and its properties as related to each other, which is produced by the sense-object-intercourse aided by subconscious impressions.\textsuperscript{38} We express our perceptual experience in the form of a judgment. "This object is such and such object; for instance at this stage of Perception we analyze and synthesize the object say a dog that comes in contact with our eyes. This is why we perceive an object as definite or determinate i.e. as a 'dog'. And we express our Perception in the form of a judgment. "This object is a dog."

Kumarila recognizes the validity of determinate and indeterminate Perception both. It apprehends an object and its generic and specific properties in a subject predicate relation. It is based on the indeterminate Perception where the genus, the name and the qualifying properties are implicitly apprehended.\textsuperscript{39} Prabhakara defines determinate Perception as valid, because it apprehends the subject predicate relation between its object and its properties, substance, quality and genus, which is not apprehended by indeterminate Perception. Prabhakara states determinate Perception as the apprehension of the generic characters and the specific characters of an object as generic and specific respectively. Determinate Perception is an immediate apprehension produced by the sense-object intercourse aided by subconscious impressions.\textsuperscript{40} Prathasarathi Misra states that determinate Perception is apprehension of an object with its various forms such as genus, substance, quality, action and name. It apprehends its object and its properties in a subject-predicate relation like Kumarila. According to Bhatta the nature of the object perceived is determined on the basis of previous experience. In it there is knowledge of name, shape, quality, class, etc., of the object. Kumarila says that the cognition that appears first is a mere alocana, or simple Perception called non-determinate.\textsuperscript{41} The nirvikalpaka (determinate) Perception of a thing is its Perception at the first moment of the associates of the senses and their objects. This Perception apprehends the individual, which is the substance of its generic and specific characters though there is no apprehension of the object as having specific or generic features.\textsuperscript{42} Perception is the apprehension of the relation between the qualified object and its
qualities. If there were not indeterminate Perception there would not be determinate Perception. Prabhakara also regards indeterminate Perception as valid, since it is sensuous apprehension of an object unrelated to other objects and devoid of recollection. Kumarila says "Only because we do not remember the other things in relation to which, or in contrast to which the percept has to show its character as genus or differentia". Thus, indeterminate Perception is due to the object itself; it indicates a stage when we do not yet discriminate between the "qualified and the qualifications and the generic and the specific features", something which relates to the stage of determinate (savikalpaka) Perception. Prabhakara believes that indeterminate Perception presents both the class characters and the specific features but the object is not then appreciated as actually belonging to a class possessing the specific features, since its real nature cannot be cognized until it is compared with other object of the sense class. Bhatta view is similar to the conception of Nyaya, it is postulated that indeterminate Perception precedes determinate Perception. Perceptual knowledge comes when there is actual contact between the object and the sense organs, preceding which conjunction there is only an awareness of the object in which knowledge is limited to knowledge that 'it is'. As to what it is there is as yet no knowledge. For this reason it is called indeterminate of nirvikalpaka jnana. Indeterminate Perception is the bare awareness of the object, it is non-relational.

**According to Advaita**

Advaita states savikalpaka seems to consist in our seeing an object, and then declaring that it is this or that; simply accepting a thing such as it is without any previous idea of it, such as when we awake from sleep, see a tiger, and at once run away. Advatins accept that determinate Perception does not give a knowledge of reality. They recognize that indeterminate Perception is the only valid Perception. Indeterminate Perception presents the absolute Brahman alone as its cognition. Example of this includes: 'Thou art that (tat tvam asi) or 'This is that Devadatta' (So 'yam devadattah). Both Advaita and Samkhya state that at the nirvikalpaka level the relation between the object and the qualities does not present themselves. At this stage the mind has not yet come into play. It is a level of mere sensation. Subsequently, when the mind interprets the sensations through a vritti, a distinction is introduced between the object and its attributes.
Thought splits up the original unity, or identity of what is presented into object and quality. It is thus that we perceive object and quality in relation to each other at the savikalpaka level. Ramanuja admits the distinctions (savikalpaka) Perception that only those specific characteristics which were apprehended in indeterminate Perception are recognized and remembered. There is savikalpaka Perception when the object (or individual) is apprehended a second or third time and we recognize its generic character as common to the whole class. Ramanuja and Visistadvaita state that determinate Perception has its own object with difference, because it relates to the one which is distinguished by generic difference and so on. Non-determinate Perception has its object only which is marked with difference because it is on the basis of non-determinate Perception and the object is distinguished by generic character and so on nirvikalpaka Perception is not Perception of a mere unqualified, "that". According to Visistadvaita, all knowledge is of a qualified object. Thus indeterminate Perception is Perception for the first time, while savikalpaka Perception signifies Perception of the same object on the second and subsequent occasions. Ramanuja's view that the external object is for consciousness or reveals objects, avoids the impasse caused by extreme realism and idealism has the merit of simplicity. Visistadvaita states that perceptual experience is called nirvikalpaka when an object is experienced for the first time. According to it all experience involves judgment and it is merely a case of primary presentation or subsequent apprehension. Dvaita accepts only savikalpaka Perception. Knowledge being both unqualified and objectless is held to be impossible. Perception is defined as knowledge generated by sense-object contact with both the sense organs and the object, free from defects. We can say that in extra ordinary Perception (alaukika) the objects are not actually present to sense. In it there is a special kind of sense object contact (alaukika sannikarsa). There are frequent references to extra ordinary Perception and intuitive knowledge in all the Nyaya texts, but the most elaborate exposition of the three fold classification is found in Tattavachintamari of Gangesa. Both Vaisesika and Nyaya recognize three types of extra ordinary (alaukika) perception; Samanyalaksana perception, Jnanalaksana perception and Yogic perception.

Samanyalaksana (Relations by generally or Class Nature); The Perception which involves the cognition of a common quality or attribute is different from ordinary Perception and called the
Perception of classes. It is the relation characterized by class nature of generality (samanya) by which when we perceive particular of the class we perceive also in general the other particulars, substance attributes and also in class essence. When we perceive an object, we see its abstract particulars. It is assumed to explain the knowledge of the past, present and future individuals belonging to a class. Naiyayikas define that it is the Perception of the whole of a class as related to an attribute, which is simultaneous with the Perception of the class essence as so related to distinguish it from ordinary sense Perception. When we perceive a pot we perceive the unpotness. The knowledge of the universal here is the medium of sense object contact by which we have a Perception of all pots when one is perceived. Nyaya scholars gave special importance to samanyalaksana Perception. Nyaya Philosophers state that knowledge of man arises from the Perception of his common quality of 'manhood' which he shares with all men. It is on the basis of this perceptual experience that one says that man is mortal because mortality is an attribute of manhood. The voluntary effort to attain pleasure cannot be explained without it. We strive for future pleasure because we know through the universal pleasure (pleasurableness) that the future pleasure will be like the present one. So it is the relation characterized by class nature or generality (samanya) by which when we perceive of a particular of that class, we perceive also, in general the other particular. John Crime explains it in 'A concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy' as a relation which is characterized by generality or class nature by which, when one perceives a particular of a class, one also perceives, in general, the other particular, e.g. to see a cow is to see "cowness" which is present in all cows. Nyaya states that without it we cannot explain the knowledge of universal proportion (vyapti) which is presupposed in inference. The relation between all cases of smoke and cases of fire cannot be established through normal sense contact. The coexistence of smoke and fire is seen in a hearth but it relates only to a particular smoke and particular fire. A doubt arises as to whether the coexistence between smoke and fire is in variable. Such a doubt relates to all smokes and fire as it presupposes the visual Perception of all smokes past, present and future without samanyalaksana we cannot explain negative judgments of Perception, Example; when we say 'this is not a cow' we presuppose the knowledge of the class of cows, i.e. cowness as perceived in the present cow.
Jnanalaksana: (Super normal sense contact):

The second kind of extraordinary Perception is called *jnanalaksana* which refers to the 'jnana' (cognition) that acts as the contact in this Perception; 'laksana' means nature of Svarupa. The contact in which *jnana* (knowledge) becomes an essence is called *jnanalaksana sannikarsa*. It is in the form of memory of the recollected cognition of previously known object and serves as the qualifier (*prakasa*) of the object present to our sense organ. The recollection cognition (*smrti*) or previous cognition of the object concerned is the cause of *jnanalaksana pratyaksa*. It is the relation characterized by previous knowledge. It is also responsible for all cases of acquired Perception. The sight of Sandalwood is an occasion for the Perception of fragrant sandal, even though there is no physical contact between the sandalwood and one's sense of smell; this is due to one's past association with, it that one percept gives rise to another. As when one perceives a piece of sandalwood at a distance, one at once knows that it is fragrant. Here the fragrance could be perceived neither by the eye, nor by the nose as the sandal piece was at distance. It is therefore apprehended by a kind of extraordinary Perception. The Naiyayikas recognize that the seeing of 'fragrance' which is ordinarily perceived by sense cannot be explained without the help of *jnanalaksana*. We look at a blooming rose from distance and say 'we see a fragrant rose'. But how can fragrant be seen. It can only be smelt. Fragrance can be perceived by olfactory organ and cannot be explained without the help of *jnanalaksana*. Fragrance perceived by the organ of smell and not by the sense organ of vision. Here the visual Perception of the rose revives in memory the idea of fragrance by association which was perceived in the past through the nose. *Jnanalaksana* Perception is through association. It is the relation characterized by previous knowledge which is responsible for all cases of acquired Perception.

In *jnanalaksana* an object is not directly present to a sense organ, but it is indirectly present to the senses by the past cognition (of it). The Naiyaikas also explain illusion, e.g. of a snake in a rope, as a case of *jnanalaksana* Perception. For instance, when we say, ”Ice looks cold, we are using even if unconsciously both our sense of ‘sight’ and senses of ‘touch’. We can say that ice looks cold because ice is perceived in the present, but there is also recollection of the past experience of its feeling cold. Perception is the result of an association of present Perception.
"what is presented" and what is represented through memory. So experiences like "fire looks hot" and "cotton looks soft" are classed under \textit{jnanalaksana} Perception. Such Perception may be called Perception by associations, complications or transference.\textsuperscript{47}

\textbf{Yogaja or Intuitive Perception}

The third kind of extraordinary Perception is called \textit{yogaja}. It is the positive faculty cultivated by Yoga. This is the intuitive Perception of all objects and is peculiar to \textit{yogin} who possess supernatural power. A \textit{yogin} believes that at any one moment, things are present either in their manifested form or in their unmanifested form. This experience can be had only by those who have achieved supernatural power after meditation and Yogic practices. This power makes it possible for them to have perceptual knowledge of all objects, past and future, complex and minute, near and far, which are ordinary imperceptible to others. It is the intuitive and immediate sense-relation with all objects due to some supernatural powers possessed by the \textit{yogins}. It is of two kinds: "\textit{yaka}" and \textit{yunjana"}. \textit{Yukta}: In the case of those who have attained spiritual perfection, such intuitive knowledge of all objects is spontaneous and constant. \textit{Yunjana}: in the case of those who are on the way of perfection is the contact with all past, future, minute, and remote objects requires the help of connection as an auxiliary conditions.\textsuperscript{48} The possibility of this kind of intuitive Perception is accepted by almost all the systems of Indian (scholars) philosophy. It may be compared with \textit{kevalaynana} of the Jains, Bodhi of the Buddhist, the Kaivalya of Samkhya and Saksatkara of the Vedantins.\textsuperscript{49} Only the Mimamsakas do not support the theory of Yogic intuition by which the Yogic (seers) are believed to have apprehended objects of the past and future as well imperceptible and distant. Mimamsakas accept that, it is the Vedas alone which can give us knowledge of past, future and distant objects. Samkhya texts mention a third kind of Perception also, called Yogic Perception. Such a Perception is possible on the part of a Yogic alone, who has acquired a certain specific but indefinable power through meditation that allows him to perceive objects in all times and all space. Thus, sense organs which are an inseparable part of ordinary Perception are unnecessary and irrelevant for the purpose of \textit{yogic} Perception, which includes a lot more than the merely sense-perceived. Naiyayikas maintain that this type of knowledge belongs to \textit{yogins} who by means of their super
human power can perceive objects which are imperceptible to others. Later Naiyayikas like Visvanatha, divided it into two kinds, the perfect and the imperfect. One who is perfect in Yogic mediation can know all things, both infinite and infinitesimal, at all times. One who is not perfect has to make a special effort for concentrating one's mind for knowing particular objects at particular times. In either case, it is only mind that is active and even sense objects can be known by mind, without use of senses and without coming into contact with objects. The reality of yogata Perception is generally accepted in Indian Philosophy on the authority of the scriptures, but there is absurd or strange contact of an intuitive knowledge of things.
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