Chapter-I

Introduction

Epistemology is considered as an essential part of philosophy. In the course of the development of the Indian systems, interest in epistemology gradually increased and it began to claim a large share in the philosophical discussions in almost every School of thought. The term ‘epistemology’ is derived from the Greek words ‘Episteme’ (knowledge or science) and ‘Logos’ (knowledge or information). William L. Rease defined Epistemology as the study of the theory of knowledge. Various philosophers have tried to define the term in their own way. Robert Audi called it as the study of (a) the defining features, (b) the substantive conditions, and (c) the limits of knowledge and justification. The study of the nature of knowledge is one of the core issues in epistemology. There is considerable agreement with regard to acceptability of knowledge as a value, but agreement about the nature of knowledge is not there. Philosophers disagree as to what the nature of knowledge is, and how it is acquired. All these issues belong to Epistemology such as what is knowledge, what is the origin of knowledge, what is the scope of knowledge, what are the various sources of knowledge and what is the validity of knowledge? J.F.Ferrier (Institute of Metaphysics, 1854) divided philosophy into ontology and epistemology. The word ‘Epistemology’ denotes the theory of valid knowledge, an important province of philosophical theory, and the doctrine on man’s ability to cognize reality, on the sources, forms and methods of cognition, the truth and the ways of attaining it. The English word ‘knowledge’ translates the Sanskrit word jnana. The concept of knowledge has been source of attraction for thinkers all over the world since long. Some thinkers hold knowledge to be an act, some others regard it as a relation, and according to some it is self subsistent and for some others it is a quality1.

In Indian epistemology, two words are used to mean knowledge. They are jnana and prama. Jnana means all kinds of knowledge, true or false. When reality reveals true knowledge it is called prama or valid knowledge.
Gautama, Vatsyayana, Uddyotakaras, Vacaspati Misra all refer *jnana* to knowledge through the terms, ‘*buddhi*’, ‘*uplabdhi*’, or ‘*jnana*’, irrespective of the validity or non-validity of a particular type of cognition. As lamp’s light shows physical things, the knowledge illuminates all objects aiming to it.

Knowledge is termed as understanding (*buddhi*), apprehension (*upalabdhi*), concepts judgments’, awareness and cognition or cognizance’s which are synonymous with each other. *Jnana* has quality of sunlight with a spectrum of colours. In the empirical state, *jnana* is obscured by *avidya* and contracted by *karman*. It reveals external objects and it is the source of all the mental states dealt with by psychology, normal, abnormal and metaphysical from the stage of instinct to that of supernormal consciousness. The first logician who dealt with the theory of knowledge in his work was *Bhasarvajna*, the author of the ' *Nyaya*. Next to him was Gangesa, the author of the *Tathavacintamani* and the reputed founder of the new School of logic.

All knowledge must reveal the self or the knower directly. Self is directly and immediately perceived in it, and knowledge may be regarded as perception from the point of view of self. Knowledge is a quality which is generated in the soul of man. It is an adventitious produce, produced in the *atman* by the contact of the *manas* with the senses that produce knowledge. Knowledge appears as the result of a relation between the soul and the body. Knowledge consists simply in the manifestation (*prakasa*) of objects. All things are made manifest or revealed to us when they become objects of knowledge. It is of two kinds, i.e., *prama* and the *aprama*. True knowledge is known as *prama* (*yathartha*), while the knowledge that is not true is known as *aprama* (*aythartha*). *Pramatva* or *pramanya* refers to the common property of any number of true judgments (*pramana*). Truth is correspondence of an apprehension with its object. Valid knowledge implies knowing self, an object of knowledge apprehensive of it, and its harmony with its real character, correspondence is the contact of truth. If the generating conditions are sound, knowledge is valid, if they are defective, knowledge is invalid. So, the knowledge which corresponds with the real nature of its object is valid and the knowledge which does not correspond with its real character is invalid. Indian philosophy presents a variety of opinions regarding the source of cognition or *pramanas*. 
The ancient Hindus classify the systems of Indian philosophy into two parts i.e., *astika* and *nastika*. The philosophical Schools of India, broadly speaking, may be grouped as orthodox and heterodox. *Astika* (orthodox) means one who believes in the authority (testimony) of the Vedas, and *nastika* (heterodox) means the opposite of this. All the six *Brahmanical* systems (Mimamsa, Vedanta, Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya and Vaisesika) accept the Vedic authority and are therefore called *astika*. This class includes six systems of Indian philosophy which are collectively known as *Sad Darsan*. It can be explained that *astika* means a theist or one who believes in God, while the word ‘*nastika’* means an atheist or one who does not believe in God, *nastika* (heterodox) School has three systems, namely, the Carvaka, Buddha and Jaina, and all these are non-vedic Schools. According to Manu, nasitka is a person who challenges the authority of the *Vedas* (*nastika Veda nindakah’: Manu Samhita II-11.* In Indian Philosophy, believer and non-believer words denote the testimony of the Vedas. *Astika* here does not mean one who believes in rebirth since even the *nastika* system of Jaina and Buddha also believe in rebirth. In this study, four valid sources of knowledge mostly accepted by orthodox School of Indian philosophy have been discussed.

In fact, the whole terminology employed by the Buddhist and latter Jaina writers on logic is that of the Nyaya and Vaisesika Schools and not much epistemology can be found in the Mimamsa and the *Vedanta Sutra* themselves, but the later exponents of the doctrines like Kumarila and Prabhakara of the Mimamsa Schools and Samkara and Ramayana of the Vedanta, have made distinct contributions to epistemological thought. Gangesa represents the culminating point in the development of the epistemology analysis in the Nyaya School.

The Indian term *jnana* (knowledge) primarily means spiritual awareness and may be employed in a variety of meanings in the Indian context. The Nyaya defines the scope of epistemology to include in it valid knowledge, sources of knowledge, tests and criteria of validity. In Indian philosophy, knowledge is one of the fundamental issues concerned with life and world knowledge regarding reality and the means of knowledge and the methods of explaining them. These convictions, in general, may be brought under the broad heading of *jnana* which denotes all kinds of knowledge, true or false. When a man comes across various
convictions regarding the same thing, he desires to verify their validity through various methods which are termed as pramanas.

According to Nyaya, knowledge is essential not only as adventitious property of the self. Nyaya defines that all knowledge is a revelation or manifestation of objects (arthaprakasha Buddha). Just as a Lamp manifests physical things placed before it, so knowledge reveals all objects which come before it. According to Nyaya-Vaisesika, knowledge is not only about objects but also about itself. It can’t turn back on itself and cognize its own existence, for less its own validity, hence no knowledge can be the test of it’s our truth. Nyaya’s fundamental definition of knowledge is phenomenological. Knowledge is cognition, apprehension, consciousness or manifestation of objects. In Nyaya philosophy, cognition (buddhi) is taken to mean the same thing as apprehension (upalabdhi), knowledge (jnana), and cognition (pratyaya).

It seems Knowledge means awareness of apprehension of objects. Gautama uses the terms ‘jnana’ and ‘upalabdhi’ as definite synonmys of ‘buddhi’, sufficient for understanding the nature of knowledge. Nyaya being realistic believes that knowledge reveals both the subject and the object which are quite distinct from itself.

The Samkhya- Karika by Isvarakrsna and the Samkhya-Pravacana –Sutra attributed to Kapila are two main works of Samkhya system. The Samkhya doctrine is about the means of knowledge (pramana) as contained in the Samkhya –Tattva-Kaumudi. There have been a number of commentators who have given their explanations and interpretations of Samkhya Karikas and other aphorism (Sutras) that constitute Samkhya epistemology. Gaudapada, Vijnana bhiksu and Vacaspati Misra are some of the learned commentators who have enriched the Samkhya epistemology. Similar to the relation between Nyaya and Vaisesika, Yoga and Samkhya are treated quite often as combined studies-Yoga for the disciplinary value, and its epistemological contents, based on the metaphysical assumptions provided by Samkhya.

According to Mimamsa, knowledge is an activity (mode) of the self and not a quality of the self as in the Nyaya. The soul is the enjoyer and the agent of karma. The soul is not atomic. It
is described as an act (kirya) or process (vyapara). It is supersensible and is known only indirectly through inference and not directly through introspection as Nyaya Vaisesika points. It may be either mediate or immediate. Bhatta defines, cognition is formless. Knowledge reveals objects but it does not assume any form. Knowledge is judgment. It arises in the form of such judgment as ‘this is a cup’, ‘this is a car’ etc., but not in the form of pictures. When I see a rose, I judge it to be a rose, and my seeing is true because the rose is actually there, not because I have a picture in my mind which faithfully copies the rose.

Advaita states that Knowledge requires neither means nor any proof, since it is self-illumined and self-proved. Knowledge i.e., self and Brahman occupy a prominent place in Advaita Philosophy, and epistemology has been given a subordinate place. Advaita Philosophy denies the reality of the truth of name and form as presented by the sense organs and so it can neither rely upon the knowledge given through sense, nor can it make any use of it to support its contentions, however helpful it may be, in common sense life. Hence, Samara recognizes all means of knowledge and all knowledge acquired through them is unreal from the transcendental standpoint. But none can deny their importance in the practical world before one gets the transcendental knowledge. Advaita defines knowledge as a blend of vritti as inspired by the saksin. The vritti element is contingent and the element of consciousness is eternal. It is divided into saksi-jnana and vritti-jnana. It may be either mediate or immediate. The ‘that’ of an object is known as mediate knowledge. In immediate knowledge, the ‘What’ is also revealed? Immediate knowledge takes place when certain conditions are fulfilled. The object must be directly knowable (yogya); the object must be existent at the time and should be established by a certain intimate relation between the subject and the object.

Cognition or ‘knowledge’ has been divided by Prabhakara in two broad classes of ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’ cognitions. Under ‘valid cognitions’, he involves all those cognitions that bear directly upon their objects and under invalid cognitions are those that bear upon their object only indirectly. 9
Valid means of knowledge is a problem, which has been with us, which was with us and which will continue to be with us. Which form of knowledge is valid and what is the basis for judging whether the knowledge that we have is right one, are some important questions, which have occupied the mind of thinkers in the west, particularly the Greek thinkers. In a way it exclusively deals with various conditions and proof of knowledge. It signifies the examination of phenomenon by direct evidence and syllogistic reasoning. Also, it represents the analytical type of philosophy and upholds knowledge gained through common sense. Valid means of knowledge raise the problem of what is to be accepted and what is not to be accepted as a means of knowledge. At times an opinion can pass for knowledge, at another occasion the senses are taken to be knowledge. Thus, it is an epistemological problem. It is also an attempt to revisit Indian logic to see its import and implications for modern education.

Keeping the above perspective in mind, it is worthwhile to probe deeper into the episteme and epistemological aspects of Indian philosophy. The valid means of knowledge is self – evident. The valid means of knowledge prove the existence of other objects and also its own existence. All philosophers attempted in their own ways to analyses valid knowledge (prama) and the means of attaining it. Prama means true knowledge. It implies an experience of the real nature of an object; and pramana implies an instrument getting such knowledge.

Yathar thanbhavah Prama, tatsadhanam ca pramanam

Different systems of Indian philosophy have forwarded divergent opinions with regard to the nature of prama. Nyaya is the science of correct knowledge (pramana sastra). Nyaya states that all knowledge implies the subject (pramatra), object of adequate knowledge (prameya) the resulting cognition (pramiti) and the means of knowledge (pramana). These are four important aspects of epistemology.

Subject (Pramatra): Knowledge involves a subject or knower, having certain attributes. It is the substantive ground of all cognitions. The pramata is self conceived as an intelligent agent. It is independent because it exists for itself and is an end to itself. It is that which knows and
strives, enjoys and suffers, remembers and expects, it is an agent, a striver, a desirous, and a refused. It is the subject of an adequate knowledge.

Object: Prameya is the object of adequate knowledge. Valid knowledge implies some prameya or object, to which the process of knowledge refers or to which it is directed. To know an object we need means of knowing it. Every knowable object has some characteristics and attributes. It is just a search light that reveals the object.

Pramiti: It is the resulting state of cognition and the piece of adequate knowledge.

Pramana; It is the means of valid knowledge. It is the distinctive cause or instrument of valid knowledge (prama- karanampramanam). Pramana means the instrument of valid presentative knowledge (yathartha-anubhava). The instrument (karana) is a form of cause (karna). It is not compulsory that any and every cause (karana) is an instrument. Only the most efficacious (sadhakatama) of the cause is called a karna. Akarna is that which the most efficacious (sadhakatama) is of the causes. Thus, though the knower (pramata) and the object known (prameya) too are considered as pramana because these are not instruments or the most efficacious ones of the causes of valid knowledge. Pramana is a mental function which leads to correct knowledge; to achieve this object; it should be free from doubt and error, and should relate to what is not already known. No valid knowledge is possible without the study of the pramana's. All Schools of Indian philosophy regards ignorance as the root cause of human suffering. So, true knowledge is necessary to overcome or minimize sufferings of the human beings. Vatsyayana commenting upon the first Sutra of Gautama says that the study of the pramana's is necessary, because through it alone we can properly know reality and thereby guide our actions so as to attain desirable ends and avoid sufferings. Although four aspects equally deserve same consideration, the pramana is told as the most important. The supreme importance of pramana amongst the four objects is due to its being the direct cause of real knowledge. The later Naiyayikas, however, use the term ‘Prama’, the term ‘Pramana’, ‘Pramiti’, ‘Premeya’ and ‘Pramanya’, however, as current in old Nyaya as in the latter, so valid knowledge is Prama.
Nyaya states that true or valid knowledge is a definite or certain and unerring preventative cognition of the object as it really is. Prama is true knowledge. It implies an experience of real nature of an object and pramana implies an instrument of getting such knowledge. Valid knowledge is called prama and validity is called pramatva. The latter Mimamsa writers adopt these terms but Kumarila and his commentators are not known to have used them. They have used the terms pramana and pramanya for valid knowledge and validity respectively and apramana to express the opposite notions. Prama is a definite and assured knowledge of an object which is present in a character.

Prastapada in his Bhasya on the Vaisesika Sutra nowhere defines valid knowledge but he distinguishes between vidya (valid cognition) and avidya (non-valid cognition). Valid cognition includes perception, inference, arsa (the institutions of the seers) and memory. Non-valid cognition includes doubt, illusion, indefinite cognition and dream. Sridhara commenting on Bhasya defines vidya as a firm, un-contradicted and definite cognition. Sridhara defines, memory is vidya or true cognition, but it is not pramana or valid cognition because it reveals an object of past as already known. In this respect, he appears to be influenced by the Nyaya view.

Samkhya states that all valid knowledge has the factors, namely the subject (pramata), the object (prameya) and the ground or source of knowledge (pramana). The subject being a conscious principle is no other than the self as pure consciousness (suddha chetana). The modification (vritti) of the intellect, through which the self known as object is called pramana. The object presented to be the self through this modification is the prameya. Prama or Valid is the reflection of the self in the intellect as modified into the form of the object because without the self’s consciousness, the unconsciousness intellect cannot cognize anything. Valid knowledge as the mode of buddhi which apprehends an object is undoubted, real and not known before 12. The definition of prama in the Samkhya-Pravacana-Sutra, according to Vijnabhiksu, is thus the ascertainement of objects which are not already present in, or known to both (buddhi and purusa), or either of them. Samkhya defines that valid knowledge (prama) as the reflection of the self-Intelligent purusa (conscious self), in the mental mode (buddhivrtti) corresponding to the object and is therefore self-manifested. Purusa is immutable and imprudent. When the intellect
conceives the reflection of *purusa* and the form of object is revealed, then this revelation is called *prama* and the means which remain unrevealed is called *pramana*. Vacaspati Misra defines *prama* as the *cittavriti* (modification of *citta*) which apprehends an object that is undoubted real and unknown.

*Taccasandigdhaviparitanadhig atavisaya cittivrttih*

*Prama* may be explained by saying that *prama* or valid knowledge is a definite categorical assertion as distinguished from all indefinite, problematic and hypothetical knowledge. D.M. Datta accepts, “*prama*” is generally defined as a cognition having two-fold characteristics of truth and novelty and that as regards the first characteristic as truth, all Schools of Indian philosophy are unanimous. Jyantha recognizes, *prama* is that knowledge of object which is free from doubt and illusion. Vacaspati excludes recollection from valid knowledge and defines as the confirmed knowledge of an object, which is an agreement with its real character, independent of previous perception and different from recollection. Visvanath defines valid knowledge as the knowledge of the generic character of an object as abiding in it, or as the apprehension of a mode (*prakara*) corresponding to its object (*visesya*). A jar is the object of the knowledge of a jar, which is manifested in consciousness, is its cognized mode. When nacre is misperceived as silver, silver is the cognized mode that is manifested in consciousness which does not correspond with the nacre. The misapprehension of a nacre as silver is illusory because silver does not exist in nacre.

The Mimamsa, like most other Schools, admits two kinds of knowledge, immediate and mediate. Valid knowledge is one which yields some new information about something, is not contradicted by any other knowledge and is not generated by defective conditions (such as defective sense organ in the case of perceptual knowledge, fallacious premises in the case of inference, etc.) Prathasarptapada mentions three distinctive features of valid knowledge, viz, (1) its object is not remembered as having been previously known; (2) it conforms to the real nature of its object; and (3) there is a feeling of conviction regarding its conformity or agreement with
the real object. Thus, novelty, freedom from doubt and truth are the three essential marks of valid knowledge and if any one of these is absent in knowledge, it ceases to be valid.

Parthasarathi extracts from *Sutra* I.I of Purva Mimamsa the definition of valid knowledge as an apprehension of a previously unapprehended object, which is devoid of defects in its source and is not contradicted by subsequent experience. Later on he defines valid knowledge as a true cognition which relates to something previously unorganized. This definition is practically the same as the former expects that in the former case the discrepancy may creep in knowledge, viz, the defects of sense organs etc., is mentioned and the possibility of the falsification of a valid knowledge in future is precluded. Indian Philosophy defines valid cognition as that which, being free from discrepancies apprehends things which are not already apprehended. The self-evident character of knowledge is not compromised by this view. It merely restates the character of apprehension, which is valid of its own nature. Parthasarathi defines it as apprehension of an object which has not been already apprehended, which truly represents the object, which is not produced by defective causes and which is free from contradiction. Murari Misra, like the Nyaya School, makes a difference between cognition and after cognition, but unlike the latter, he maintains the validity of knowledge or cognition. He defines validity is determined not by “knowledge” but by “anuyavasaya”. In this way, when the sense organs and the object come into contact, there is knowledge that “this is a pot”. In order to test the accuracy of this knowledge or to determine it, there is the *anuyavasaya* that “I know this pot”.

Mimamsa states that the knowledge of something which is not contradicted and which is novel is prama. Mimamsa defines that the root “prama’ denotes real or actual experience. It constitutes the knowing of an unknown element. Thus, valid knowledge is that which gives knowledge of the meaning of an unknown element. In the Bhatta Mimamsa, Prama or true knowledge is defined as primary and original knowledge (*anaclhigata*). The method of knowledge must be conceived in what has not been previously known. So, memory cannot be prama or true knowledge. *Purva Mimamsa* accepts an act of knowledge has four constituents: (1) the knower, (2) the object of knowledge, (3) the instrument of knowledge, (4) the result of knowledge. The Prabhakaras accept *Tri-Putti-Vitti* cognition, i.e., each cognition has three
factors, the knower (self), the known (object), and the knowledge itself. The cognition “know this” has three presentations of (i) I, the knower (ii) this, the object and (iii) the cognition. The knowledge takes the following form- ‘I know the jar’; this knowledge takes the knower- i.e. soul, the object known, i.e., the jar and the knowledge.

Advaita Vedanta recognizes prama or valid knowledge as that knowledge which is insulated and unestablished by any other means. Vedanta Paribhasa defines it as; anadhirigata’- Badhita ratha- Visayaka – jnanatvam Pramatvam.

Prama or right knowledge means in Vedanta the acquisition of such new knowledge as has not been contradicted by the experienced. Advaita provides that valid knowledge is knowledge which possesses non-contradictions (abadhita) and novelty (or sometimes just the former). Advaita admits that knowledge is valid, sarvajnanam yathartham. The word pramana denotes the rightness and utility of any knowledge since it discriminates valid knowledge from invalid knowledge. Thus, pramana is right knowledge and its rightness is known by its use in any time.

Prabhakara states; pramana is that which is invariably related to prama or to be pramana is never to be disconnected from a knower possessing right knowledge. Both Prabhakara and Kumarila regard knowledge itself as pramana or means of knowledge. In the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy, “prama is a term designating a true judgment: pramata is the universal property shared by all true judgments”.

According to Bhatta Mimamsa, valid knowledge is primary and original knowledge (anadhirigata). Kumarila regards cognition as a means of valid knowledge (pramana) because it is apprehension. Prabhakara defines valid knowledge as apprehension (anubhuti). All apprehension is direct and immediate and valid per se. Kumarila defines valid knowledge as apprehension of an object which is produced by causes free from defects and which is not contradicted by subsequent knowledge.

Kumarila defines valid knowledge as the following:
Valid knowledge is a form or assured of objects, which do not stand in need of confirmation by other cognitions. Umbeka says that the word ‘ ‘ excludes doubt from valid knowledge and (which is contradicted by other cognitions) which he reads in the place of excludes error or illusion. Sucarita Misra comments that valid knowledge is not contradicted by a subsequent knowledge in the form ‘this is not so’ and that it contains some new information about its subject. Valid knowledge, therefore, is a certainly true information and cognition of something.

Kumarila regards recollection as invalid, because it apprehends what was apprehended already by perception. Prabhakara also excludes recollection from valid knowledge which is in the nature of apprehension, and which is different from recollection. The Prabhakara definition of valid knowledge is the same as that of latter Nyaya except that he does not feel necessity of including the term “yathartha” in the definition ‘prama’ or valid knowledge as immediate experience (anubhuti). It is different from experience.

The Bhasya asserts that freedom from error is one of the essential conditions of direct knowledge that which is erroneous is not direct knowledge. The mutual contact of the sense organs, mind and the object is the cause of right apprehension.

According to Kumarila Bhatta, pramana is a definite and assured cognition of an object which does not require confirmation by other cognition. Pramana has been defined as the ‘karna’ instrument or ‘means’ of ‘prama’, ‘right cognition’ where the word pramana states the object to be defined and the phrase the instrument of right constitutes the definition. A subject arrives at the valid knowledge of objects by means of pramana's, for the existence and nature of objects are to be ascertained only by such cognitions as are based on pramana. Pramana has a real correspondence with objects, in the sense that, “the nature” and “attributes of objects” as revealed by pramana. It is that which gives us right knowledge. It has been said that there cannot
be any right understanding of the things except by means of *pramana*. *Pramana* is directly related to *pramitti*. *Pramitti* is the form of valid knowledge. The Advaita Vedanta defines *pramana* as the operative cause (*karana*) of *prama* or true knowledge. It defines *prama* in two ways. Knowledge that has both the characteristics of novelty and uncontradictedness this means that true knowledge is uncontradicted and original, i.e., it gives us new information. Secondly, *prama* is taken to mean simply uncontradicted knowledge of objects. So *prama* is made to exclude or include memory. Valid form of knowledge needs a *pramana* or an instrument. Thus, the root ‘ma’ with the prefix ‘pra’ (i.e. *pramana*) in the word *pramana* is to be taken only in the sense of preventative knowledge. Vaisesika defines valid knowledge as the unique operative cause of both true presentational knowledge and memory.

Nyaya recognizes the special cause of knowledge (*pramana*) as an important factor. Vatsyayana defines *pramana* as a source of means of valid knowledge (*Upalabdhi sadhanani pramanani: V.B.on N.S.I.I.3*). Vatsyayana commenting upon the first sutra of Gautama says that the study of the sources of knowledge (*pramana*) is necessary, because through them we can know the reality and thereby guide our actions to attain desirable ends and avoid sufferings. According to Vatsayana, *pramana* is that which causes cognition or in other words, which is the instrument of valid knowledge. Vacaspati Misra attempts to give Vatsayana’s definition of *pramana* a logical form by entrusting in it the word ‘artha’ and opting for the word ‘jnana’ occurring therein to stand for the valid knowledge of cognition. According to Jayanta, *pramana* is that collection of conscious as well as unconscious factors which result in producing such an apprehension by knowledge of objects that as different from illusion and doubt. The Bhatta view of *pramana* is that it gives us new knowledge, i.e., a true cognition of object of which we have no knowledge. Salinikanatha states that *pramana* is an experience which is different from memory. Different orthodox of Indian Philosophy accept different number of *pramanas*.

The whole doctrine of Nyaya philosophy is based upon the *Nyaya Sutra* of Gautama. Gautama recognized four means of valid knowledge, i.e., perception, inference, comparison and testimony. According to the *Vaisesika Sutra* there are strictly only two means of knowledge: direct knowledge (*pratyaksa*) and inference (*anumana*). The *Samkhya Karika* of Isvarakrsna
Pramana is defined as that by which an object is proved to exist; and it is of three kinds; sense cognition (drsta); inference (anumana) and reliable testimony (aptavacana). Drsta is definite knowledge obtained through the sense organs. Anumana is a cognition based upon the relation of the mark and it is of three kinds. Reliable testimony is the word communicated by trustworthy persons (apta srutih). Samkhya and Yoga are the two systems and two sides of the same coin and have common goal. The pramanas according to the Yoga-Sutra are direct knowledge (pratyaksa), inference (anumana) and scriptural testimony (agama). These are simply mentioned and not defined. The list is the same as that found in the Samkhya Karikas, with the difference that in the Samkhya Karikas we have ‘drsta’ for ‘pratyaksa’ and ‘aptavacane’ for ‘agama’. The Manu-Smriti reveals some Samkhya elements: for instance, the account of creation (chapter-1), the recognition (xii.105- Delhi ed. 1983) of pratyaksa, anumana and sastras the three sources of knowledge. Jaimini, Kumarila and Prabhakara are the leading commentators on the epistemological doctrines of the Mimamsa School. Jaimini admits three pramanas - perception, inference, and testimony. Prabhakaras adds two more-comparison and implication. Kumarila further adds non apprehension. In Mimamsa Sutra six means of knowledge recognized are perception, inference, upamana, verbal testimony, presumption, and non existence. Samkhara refers to only three sources of knowledge viz, perception, inference and scriptural testimony. Later Advaitins have added three more-comparison, implication and negation or non-cognition. Broadly speaking, the Advaita theory of knowledge is not very much different from that of Mimamsa. As we have already, seen in the Indian systems the factors constituting and connected with knowledge (jna or pramatr), are the object (jnaya or prameya), and the means of knowledge (pramana).

It seems to be reasonable that Indian Philosophy presents a variety of opinions regarding the sources of cognition or pramanas. But the present research undertakes to study perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony as the sources of pramanas. No valid knowledge is possible without the study of pramana. There are different meanings and different definitions of the word pramana. But it can be said we can say that pramanas are directly related to prama or
pramiti which is interpreted as a valid form of knowledge. Nyaya classifies that valid knowledge is of two kinds.

Anubhava (presentation)

It is included into yathartha or real and ayathartha or unreal. Of the two, the former is sound or valid (prama) as it exactly corresponds to the object real by or it cognizes an attribute as belonging to an object which it really has. It is a form of valid knowledge which is the presentational knowledge of objects. It is original in character. Valid knowledge is obtained through perception, inference, comparison and testimony.

Smrti (memory representative or remembrance) is produced by the revival of an impression of an object, previously known and hence the instrument of remembrance cannot be accepted as an independent pramana. It is a form of invalid knowledge. It is reproduction of previous knowledge of objects.

Invalid knowledge (aprama) is obtained arising from memory, doubt, error, and hypothetical.

Memory is not accepted as a source of valid knowledge, by Naiyayikas because it represented as much by our past experience of it. Memory is not presentational. It is different from the object present and there is no correspondence between memory and its object. Memory is not prama or valid knowledge as it does not refer to presented objects. It may be of two kinds namely, true and false. True memory is in accordance with the real nature of the objects remembered, whereas false memory does not fully correspond with the real character of the remembered objects. Prabhakara’s view against the validity of memory is that it stands in need of previous knowledge. According to Sivaditya, smrti or memory is that kind of knowledge which is brought about by impressions left behind by a former knowledge in the soul. Annambhatta states that it is a knowledge which is born of a mental impression alone. Memory is always the present recollection of some impression (sanskara) left on the soul by an experience. Our experiences modify the soul in some way and these substance modifications are preserved in the
soul. These modifications of the soul substance are called impressions and they are the direct cause of recollection. It is not presentational knowledge for it is recollected after the event and experience.  

Doubt is an unpleasant state of mind in which the mind swings between two or more alternatives without being able to reconcile them. It is an indefinite cognition (anavadhanatmaka pratyaksa) which characterizes an object in mutually conflicting ways, something is seen, but there does not arise a fixed notion about it whether it is one thing or another. Doubt is uncertainty in cognitions. It is not valid knowledge, because it lacks belief or firmness which is an essential mark of validity. Doubt is not definite knowledge, for it admits of alternative possibilities and the mind shifts between the two alternatives. For example, when we perceive a tall thing, we cannot decide whether it is a man or a pole. In a doubtful cognition, two or more interpretations of an observed datum are offered, but the mind does not arrive at any fixed decision. According to Gautama, samsaya (doubt) is a conflicting judgment on the precise character of an object. Pratasatapada finds that there is only one kind of doubt and that is always due to perception of properties common to many objects. Samkhya excludes doubt from valid knowledge since they hold it as an uncertain knowledge. Doubt is marked by the lack of assurance or belief. Kumarila mentions two causes of doubt, viz. the existence of an uncommon quality and the existence of two apparently contradictory qualities. Umbeka accepts these three causes of doubt, while Sucarit Misra and Prathasarthi reject uncommon property as one of the causes of doubt.

Error (illusion):

It represents an object in a form which does not belong to it. It reveals an object differently from what it actually is. It is a mere misrepresentation of what is cognized when a man steps on a rope in the dark and thinks that it is a snake. In a dream, an object which is really absent is perceived as present, so that it cannot but be false. Error does not describe the object contained in it. From this it emerges that valid knowledge is presentational, unerring and objectively valid. Error as a misapprehension is of two kinds: (1) thinking that a thing exists
when, in fact, it does not; and (2) thinking that a thing has a certain property when in fact it does not have it. We have five theories of illusions or errors, three of which came from the idealists and two from their opponents—a division which is not as neat as it seems, however the five theories are: (1) Sat-khyati (accepted by the Jains), (2) Ramanuja Atma-khyati (accepted by the Buddhists), (3) Viparita-khyati or anyatha khyati (accepted by Vaisesika) Nyaya and Yoga School, (4) Akhyita (accepted by the Mimamsa Schools, particularly by Prabhakara and his followers), (5) Anirvachaniya-khyati (associated with the Advaita Vedantis).

Samkhya, Prabhakara and Ramanuja all believe that error is non-apprehension. Error is only partial truth. Error means imperfect and incomplete truth, an illusion of nacre as silver or of a rope as a snake, the eye is actually in contact with a piece of nacre or a rope, but the appearance is of a piece of silver or a snake. The Bhatta theory of illusion is known as viparita khyativada. It describes that an illusion manifests a real object in the form of a different object which too is real.

**Sat khyati;** (Ramanuja’s theory of error):

The view of error in earlier Samkhya and in Ramanuja mechanically called Sat-khyati is similar to the view of Prabhakara’s akhyati. Sat khyati takes a fully pragmatic view of knowledge as only a means to successful activity, while the Prabhakara is content with the non-apprehension of the distinction between perceived shell and actual silver. In this theory, error is regarded as misapprehension and is held as due to a wrong synthesis of two cognitions which are separately real (sat), through the synthesis of two cognitions.

**Anirvachaniya-khyati:** (illusion):

The theory of error advocated by the Advaintins is called anirvachaniyakhyati. As per this theory, illusion is an experience of a relatively real object, which is neither absolute being (sat) nor absolute being (asat) nor both. Same example when rope is mistaken for snake, the rope limiting consciousness is the ground on which snake and its cognition are illusorily imposed by beginning less ignorance than what actually happens.
Anyatha khyati: illusion: Nyaya

According to Nyaya Vaisesika School, an illusion is the misrepresentation of one thing as another. The word ‘Anyatha’ means otherwise and the word “khyati” means cognition. Therefore, the compound word means cognition of a thing other than what it is. The theory is called anyatha khyati which means ‘apprehension as other than what it is’. The word ‘any that’ means ‘else wise’ and ‘elsewhere’ and both these meanings are brought out in error. The presented object is perceived ‘else wise’ and the represented object exists ‘elsewhere’. Error, according to the Nyaya School, is due to wrong synthesis of the presented objects. Error creeps in when we wrongly relate two or more objects presented to our cognition. Kumarila’s viparita-khyati is much similar to anyatha-khyati of the Nyaya -Vaisesika, though there are certain differences. Like Kumarila this School holds that illusion is due to a wrong synthesis of the presented and the represented object. In it the presented object is confused with the represented one. For Instance, when rope is wrongly confused as a snake, the illusion that arises takes the form ‘this is a snake’. There is first contact of the eye with something present before it. The Nyaya Vaisesesika also believes like Kumarila that error is due to a wrong synthesis of the presented and the represented objects. The represented object is confused with the presented one.

Viparita-khyati: (Illusion)

According to Kumarila Bhatta, in illusion there is the knowledge of activity in the absence of activity. This leads to the perception of activity in the absence of activity and unreal as real. It is a positive misapprehension and not a mere non-apprehension. It does not consist in omission, but in commission. It manifests a real object in the form of a different object which too is real. Kumarila also maintains that knowledge always points to an object beyond itself. It is due to a positive wrong synthesis of the two imperfect cognitions. It arises due to some vicious subjective and objective conditions or defect in the case of knowledge.

In illusion, some wrong judgment makes one behave in a way which is the reverse of valid knowledge. It reveals an object differently from what it actually is. This theory established
the view that the illusion is not due to any positive wrong knowledge, but due to a mere negative factor of non-apprehension due to certain weaknesses of mind. While seeing snake in a rope, when it is said that it is a snake, both subject and predicate are true in this statement. The cause of illusion here is not non-existence of either but the conjunction of two distinct things as subject and predicate. Illusion is not there in the objects but it is in their relationships. This illusion leads to contradictory behavior such as running to escape, while seeking snake in rope.

So it is clear that it arises due to some vicious subjective and objective conditions or defects in the cause of knowledge. In illusion, some wrong judgment makes one behave in a way which is the reverse of valid knowledge. It reveals an object differently from what it actually is.

Indian theories of knowledge are divided broadly in two classes-one, maintain the self validity (svatah-pramanya) of knowledge; and the other contending that it means to be validated by an extraneous means (paratah pramanaya). According to svatah-pramanya, whenever knowledge arises; the presumption is that it is right and verification becomes necessary only when there are some circumstances throwing doubt upon it. This knowledge is taken to be self-assured. According to paratah pramanaya, knowledge by itself guarantees nothing in this respect; and its truth or falsity is to be ascertained through some appropriate test. The Mimamsaka upholds former view that knowledge is self valid (svatah pramanya), that knowledge reveals and manifests objects and therefore is a proof of its own truth. Naiyayikas maintains that knowledge reveals both the subject and the object in a specific knowledge-situation. Knowledge is the subjective awareness or apprehension (upalabdhi) of the object existence. Such subjective awareness is incapable of certifying the objective truth which one actually perceives but it may not be really so. The Mimamsakas and Naiyayika differ in their opinions about the validity of knowledge. The Nyaya theory of knowledge is known as paratah-pramana, while the Mimamsa theory of knowledge is known as Svatah-pramanya.\(^{20}\)

The doctrine of self validity of knowledge (svatah pramanya) forms the cornerstone on which the whole structure of the Mimamsa Philosophy is based.\(^{21}\) They advocate the theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge and do not admit error or invalidity in the logical sense.
Nyaya states in *paratah pramanyavada* that knowledge is just the manifestation of objects. As such it is neutral to both truth and falsehood. Validity and invalidity of knowledge are made out through extrinsic considerations and are ascertained by extrinsic circumstances. *svatah pramanya* recognizes that cognitions by themselves are valid and contrary nature of their objects or by the recognition of discrepancies in their causes. Mimamsa accepts that all apprehension is intrinsically valid. All knowledge is valid by itself. It is not validated by any other knowledge. Its validity arises from those very causes from which knowledge itself arises. Validity of knowledge arises from the essential nature of the causes of knowledge. It is not due to any extraneous conditions. Vedanta maintains the theory of self validity of knowledge (*Svatah Pramanvada*) ²²

Theory of self validity or intrinsic-validity is acceptable to Mimamsakas and Advaita Vedantins. The Mimamsa and the Vedanta Schools maintain that the truth of knowledge is due to conditions that are intrinsic to knowledge and the knowledge of truth is also due to conditions of knowledge itself. This implies that knowledge is made true and known to be true by its own conditions. But both these Schools maintain that falsehood is extrinsic to knowledge. Nyaya defines that validity of knowledge is extrinsic and depends upon extraneous conditions. Validity is neither produced by the general conditions of knowledge nor by the mere absence of defects, but by some proficiency in its cause. Invalidity is neither produced by the general conditions of knowledge nor by the mere absence of proficiency, but by some deficiency in its cause. ²³

Advaita Vedanta states that knowledge is self-manifest (*savtah prakasa*). It requires no other knowledge to know it. When an object is known, its knowledge also becomes manifest to the knower at the same time. It is the very nature of knowledge to reveal its object and also itself. It means that knowledge is self-revealed and its manifestation is not due to any other knowledge. The Mimamsa philosophy asserts that all knowledge expecting the action of remembering (*smrti*) or memory is valid in itself; for it certifies its own truth, and neither depends on any other knowledge for its validity. All knowledge is valid *per se* and there is no question of error, since it maintains that all experiences are valid (*anubhuti prama*). Validity is full of truth. Kumarila states that knowledge is valid in itself, and is not validated by any other
knowledge. Intrinsic validity of knowledge consists in its being generated by the complement of caused conditions of the knowledge itself, and not by extraneous conditions besides them. *Praratah pramanya* can also be stated when there is knowledge of the pot resulting from the contact between the pot and the sense organ, this knowledge is marred by doubt. This is named ‘vyavasaya’ by the Nyaya philosopher. We have knowledge of validity of *vyavasaya* or previous, rather it is extrinsically valid. This view of the Nyaya philosopher has been refused by the Mimamsa and corresponds to the nature of the object. The test of true knowledge is that it should lead to successful practical activity. If this test is not satisfied, it is false. Hence the only test for right knowledge is that it must correspond to the nature of the object of our knowledge and serves our practical ends.

Nyaya maintains that the validity or invalidity of perceptual knowledge can only be ascertained by the correspondence of perception. It arises from other circumstances than those which give rise to knowledge. Thus, the Nyaya system holds that the validity or invalidity of knowledge depends on the presence of corresponding object of the judgment, for instance the judgment ‘mangoes are sweet’ the validity of this judgment can be illustrated after practically tasting the mangoes.

The Nyaya theory advocates that validity of knowledge can best be understood by a comparison with the Mimamsa who are of the view that knowledge is self-valid (*svatah pramanya*). Knowledge is the subjective awareness or apprehension (*upalabdhi*) of the object existence, but such subjective awareness is incapable of certifying the objective truth which when one actually perceives may not be really so.

So, the Nyaya philosopher advocates the theory of extrinsic validity (*paratah pramanyavada*). Truth and falsity are extrinsic characteristics of knowledge. They are apprehended by a subsequent knowledge. Validity and invalidity of knowledge arise (*utpattah paratah pramanyam*) after knowledge has arisen, and they are known (*jnaptah paratah pramanyam*) and they have also arisen. According to this theory, (*paratah pramanya*) knowledge in order to be valid must correspond to reality. The Samkhya regards the validity of knowledge
and the invalidity of knowledge both as intrinsic. Samkhya philosophers advocate the theory of svatah pramanyavada and say that both validity and invalidity are intrinsically made out. Knowledge is both made to be true or false by conditions of knowledge itself. They cannot be made true or false and known to be true or false by any extraneous condition. Hence, knowledge is self-evident as it is made valid or invalid by its own conditions. Validity and invalidity both are intrinsically made out and ascertained. It is by virtue of the reflection or proximity of the same chit (self-luminous consciousness) that the existence of a cognition vritti and its validity or invalidity is illuminated.

Nyaya School establishes that, when knowledge is said to be valid on account of practical efficiency, it is presumed that validity of knowledge depends upon its correspondence with the real world and its knowledge depends upon its practicability. In this way, this School believes in correspondence theory of truth. The truth of our statements depends upon their relations to facts and the relation is held to be one of agreement or correspondence, which we infer from the working of our ideas.

Samkhya holds that the validity of knowledge consists in certainty, and correspondence to the object and novelty as a mark of the validity of knowledge. The Mimamsaka criticizes the Samkhya view by pointing out that the same knowledge cannot be both intrinsically valid and invalid. But what is maintained is only this that valid knowledge reveals its invalidity without depending on external conditions, it would be difficult to distinguish between valid and invalid knowledge. Three Schools of Mimamsa, namely, the schools of Bhatta, Prabhakara and Murari Misra, advocate the intrinsic validity of knowledge. According to Mimamsa, validity of knowledge is not produced by any extraneous cause other than absence of defect. This is not accepted by the Naiyayikas. According to them, validity is produced by excellence which is other than absence of defect.

Kumarila Bhatta advocates the theory of knowledge known as jnanatavada. He contends that knowledge is to be inferred through its effect. Prabhakara’s theory of knowledge is known as “Triputiprakasavada”. He does not make difference between vyavayavasaya and cognition and
after cognition like the Nyaya School and regards knowledge as svaprakasa or self- luminous. Murari Misra, who represents a third School of Mimamsa accepts the self validity by its retrospective cognition (anvyyavasaya). Mimamsakas recognize that every experience is valid. Validity is property of knowledge, though we may not test the truth of our knowledge by finding out whether it agrees with other knowledge or is in conflict with it. The Mimamsakas conclude that truth is inherent in all cognition but falsehood is externally conditioned.

The main cause why the Mimamsa philosophers accept the theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge is that they believe in the Vedas, they believe the Vedas to be external, impersonal and intrinsically valid. Hence, it is only logical for them to look upon knowledge as having intrinsic validity. Validity of the Vedas or by the Vedas in itself implies intrinsic validity.

On the other hand, correspondence theory of Nyaya is that which invariably relates knowledge to an object. Nyaya philosopher recognizes that when we perceive something as blue, it is the direct result of visual contact and the latter cannot certify the resulting knowledge as true for the simple reason that it is not in touch with the knowledge it has conditioned.

Purva Mimamsa holds different view about the problem of validity. Unlike the Nyaya, this School believes that every cognition as soon as it arises, is known to be valid and validity go together. This is true even in cases where cognition turns out to be erroneous when a person has the illusion of a snake; his reaction is to fly away from the scene. This shows that the person took for granted the validity of his cognition. Thus, cognition may be either valid or invalid in itself but is always known to be valid.

Nyaya defines that the validity of knowledge cannot be determined by the knowledge of any special excellence in its cause, or the knowledge of its harmony with the real nature of its objects or determined by the knowledge itself. Example of self-evidence (svatah-pramanya); if a man suffering from jaundice thinks that the shell is yellow, when he recognizes the disorder in the eye, he attributes the yellowness to the eye and admits that the shell is white. So long as we do not cognize discrepancies, there is no reasonable ground for doubt. Cognitions are externally
invalidated either by the discovery through other means, or by the discovery of the defects in the instruments of cognition.

The controversy between the Mimamsaka and the Naiyayikas regarding the validity of knowledge has become classic. The Naiyayikas contend that knowledge arises simply as knowledge, that it is neutral and that the question of its validity or invalidity arises afterwards and depends on external test. The Mimamsakas point out that the so called ‘neutral’ knowledge is impossibility. We always experience either valid or invalid knowledge. There is no third alternative: we never experience neutral knowledge.

“Mimamsakas theory asserts that all knowledge which is related to the issue from the action of remembering or memory (smrti) is valid in itself, for the simple reason that it endures its own truth. Nyaya view is based on a theory of correspondence invariably relating knowledge to an object. For the Nyaya philosopher, when we perceive something as black, it is the direct result of visual contact and the latter cannot certify the resulting knowledge as true for the simple reason that it is not in touch with the knowledge it has conditioned.

Moreover, the Nyaya philosopher argues that knowledge is something mental and hence cannot authenticate the objective truth of its representation.

“Intrinsic validity belongs to all sources of right knowledge”, says Kumarila, “for a power by itself non-existent cannot be brought into being by another”. Nyaya extrinsic theory states that truth and falsehood are specific characters that are added to knowledge which is indifferent to both, but may have either according to special circumstances.

Yatharthatarasadhanaodharmobodharupataim.²⁴

Prabhakara admits that in cognition, the knower, the known object and knowledge itself, along with its validity are presented. All cognitions are valid; their invalidity is due to their disagreement with the real nature of their objects. Whenever a man works according to his knowledge, he does not so with the conviction that his knowledge is valid and not in passive or
uncertain temper of mind. This is what Mimamsa means when he says that the validity of knowledge appears immediately with its rise, though its validity may be derived from later experience or some other data. Knowledge is self-evident and self-enlightening. The intrinsic validity of knowledge is proved by its self-enlightening. Hence, it does not need support from any other source to establish its validity (anubhutti) and implies that all apprehension is direct and immediate.

Kumarila defines valid knowledge as apprehension of an object which is produced by causes that are free from any defect and which is not contradicted by subsequent knowledge. Therefore, all knowledge is presumably valid and our normal life runs smooth on account of this belief. A need for explanation is felt only when knowledge fails to be valid. And its invalidity is inferred either from some defect in the instrument of knowledge or from a subsequent contradicting knowledge. If knowledge is valid on its own account, it cannot be made valid on account of any external condition. The truth of knowledge is known by itself at the time of its birth and no other knowledge is required. But invalidity or falsity is extrinsic to knowledge.

Kumarila believes that even a cognition of shell as silver is valid as cognition. The cognizer at the time has the cognition that it is rejected by subsequent experience is another matter. Even in the cognition of shell as yellow, there is a real yellowness belonging to the bile of the eye which is perceived. The validity of knowledge consists in its apprehension of an object. The falsity is known through a second cognition, when its falsehood is detected by another means. The knowledge of validity also is generated by the same agreement of causal conditions which make the knowledge known. But the invalidity of knowledge arises from defects in the causal conditions of the knowledge, and is known by the knowledge of them and the knowledge of a contradicted knowledge.

Kumarila lies down that validity is not imparted by knowledge but by ‘known ability’. In this view, in spite of knowledge being self-enlightened, there is no immediate awareness of it. A valid knowledge is essentially useful and hence it must reveal something new.
Nyaya asserts that, validity or invalidity of knowledge is known by its workability. When we perceive an object as water, approach it, drink it and satisfy our thirst, we know that our knowledge is valid. But when we perceive an object as water, peruse it, but never get water, and cannot satisfy our thirst, we know that our knowledge is invalid. Thus successful action establishes the validity of the knowledge.

Parabhakara points out that when we receive the knowledge of an object through any source, then the question with which we are conjoined is whether that knowledge in itself is valid or whether there is need of any other proof of its validity. Nyaya philosophers support the theory of extrinsic validity (paratah pramanyavada), while in the Mimamsa theory of intrinsic validity (svatahpramanyavada). Two main principles are invalid in the theory of intrinsic validity (svatahpramanyavada).

1. The validity of knowledge is present in the material that creates the object.
2. The awareness of validity of knowledge arises simultaneously with knowledge itself.

The analysis of knowledge in Indian philosophy provides that (1) direct knowledge (pratyaksa) including sense-cognition and other direct means of knowledge, (2) inference (anumana), (3) knowledge by similarity (upamana), (4) verbal testimony (sabda), including scriptural testimony (sastra or agama), (5) presumption (arthapatti), and (6) Non existence (abhava) are the sources of knowledge. Kumarila and Prabhasara of the Mimamsa Schools, and Samkara and Ramanuja of the Vedanta have made distinct contributions to epistemological thought. First four means of knowledge are mostly accepted by all the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy.

In Indian philosophy, almost all the schools have recognized perception as a source of knowledge. As per scheme of the study, the concept of perception has been discussed analytically in Chapter-II. Perception means knowledge obtained through sense object contact. Perception (pratyakasa) has been universally accepted as the primary source of valid knowledge. It is a direct source of knowledge. Perceptive knowledge is indubitable presentive, and
immediate. Perception has been analyzed in various ways. From one angle its pace has two
distinctions, ordinary (laukika) and extraordinary (alaukika). Extraordinary perception provides
immediate knowledge even without the senses. Ordinary perception also admits of two
distinctions; external (bahya) and internal (manas). Internal and external; admit of three
distinctions: determinate, indeterminate, and recognition. Extraordinary perception also has three
distinctions, Perception of classes (samanayalakasana), complications (jnanalaksana) and
intuitive (yogaya).

Chapter -III we discuss inference as a source of knowledge. Inference: the second kind of
knowledge that comes after perception and is relational. It is also called anumana. It is accepted
by all the orthodox School of Indian philosophy. Anumana is the knowledge of the object after
the observation of the previously known mark.26 Dr. D.M Datta has observed, in Indian systems
vyapti is regarded as the logical ground of inference.” By inference we arrive at a conclusion
through the medium of mark, for example, we infer about fire by seeing smoke at a distinct hill.
Inference is understood as a logical process of arriving at a conclusion with the help of certain
steps; pratjina (or an assertion) hetu (or the reason), udharana, upanya and nigamana (or the
conclusion). Mimamsa accepts it as a valid source of knowledge. According to Sabara, when a
certain fixed relation has been known to subsist between two things, so that if we perceive any
one of these things we have an idea of the other things. This later cognition is called inference.

Comparison as a source of knowledge explored in Chapter-IV. Nyaya, Mimamsa and
Advaita accept it as a source of valid knowledge. Nyaya School considers that it is the source of
our knowledge of the relation between a world and its denotation. However, Mimamsa School
takes it as an independent and valid source of knowledge. Knowledge arises from comparison
when on perceiving a present object to be like an object perceived in the past, we come to know
that the remembered object is like the perceived one.

Chapter-V seeks to discuss ‘testimony as a source of knowledge. Sabda (testimony) has
also been recognized as a source of valid knowledge by all the orthodox Schools of Indian
philosophy but in different manners and they differ with one another with regard to its nature
from and a number of other aspects. Words are the vehicles of thought. *Sabda prama* is knowledge derived from the authority of words. Verbal testimony is a valid means of knowledge. To the Mimamasakas and the Advaitins who regard truth as revealed by scripture, *Sabda pramana* is vitally important.

*Anupalabdhi* (non-cognition) non-apprehension

It is also considered as a means of knowledge. The Bhatta School of Mimamamsa and Advaita admit *anupalabdhi* (non-cognition) as a valid (aperion) which opposes the limit. Kumarila Bhatta and others consider non-apprehension as the sixth independent source of knowledge. It consists in the preventative knowledge of negative facts. In other words, negative facts are cognized by a special instrument (*karana*) called non-apprehension. The non-existence of knowledge, in general, says the Advaitin, is known by the witness. The word *anupalabdhi* means the ‘absence of apprehension’, i.e., the absence of knowledge derived through any of the five foregoing *pramanas*. Kumarila argues that the nonexistence of a thing (e.g. there is no jug in this room) cannot be perceived as non-existence. This is the specific *pramana* by which negation not nothing, is known, e.g. the absence of a jar or of atoms somewhere. Non-existence cannot be perceived, for there is no object for sense contact, Vaisesika, says that negation is real, but is not cognized by a distinct source.

*Arthapati* (Presumption)

It is another form of knowledge. Kumarila and Mimamsa Schools admit *arthapati* as a source of knowledge. V.A. Ramaswami says: *Arthapati* (presumption) presents an object presumed to exist without another object seen or heard cannot be spoken of as existent. It can be explained by an example that when we know that a person Rajinder is alive and perceive that he is not in the house, we cannot reconcile these two facts, viz. his remaining alive and his not being in the house and this method of cognizing the existence of Rajinder outside the house are called *arthapati* (presumption or implication). Sabara Swamin defines presumption (*arthapati*) as the
surmise about an object on the ground that something which has been seen or heard cannot be possible otherwise.

K.Damodaran says, “Postulation or arthapati meant the supposition of an unperceived fact in order to explain some contradictory phenomena.” Example: if we observe a man growing but, say that he is fasting, we come to the conclusion that he must be eating at night.

This exploration of various pramanas is of great help of underscore the importance being given to Sabda pramana in Indian philosophical thought. In Indian tradition sayings of the Risis or the Wisemen and the sentences of the Vedas are considered be the authentic statements. Upanishads give us the knowledge of the Atman, Brahman, Individual soul and the external world. The modern source of human knowledge like the books on history, news, etc., is also known to be trustworthy.
References

16. Vatsyayana *Bhasya on Nyaya Sutra*, 1.1.3


19. Ibid., p.29.


24. T.M.P. Mahadevan, *Outline of Indian Philosophy*, Bhartiya Kala Parkashan, Delhi (India), 1968, p.3.


