Upamana is also a major source of knowledge. The term *upamana* has been translated in various ways as comparison, analogy, identification, knowledge by similarity or knowledge by assimilation, etc. It is the knowledge derived from comparison and generally corresponds to analogy. In our day-to-day life, we obtain many bits of information just by comparing certain things and events. We also get knowledge by resemblance or similarity. Mukta Biswas defines in 'Samkhya Yoga Epistemology'; *upamana* is derived from the words 'upa' meaning 'sādṛṣya' or “similarity” and “mana” meaning “cognition” (*upa Mat lyut*). Hence, *Upamana* derivatively means the knowledge of the similarity between two things. When we see a particular object and recall another, the knowledge that we have of the similarity of the recalled object to the seen object is said to be due to the comparison. So *upamana* is comparison or analogy by which we gain knowledge of a thing from its similarity to another thing.

*Upamana* has an important role in everyday life, like the urban man understands the unknown animal *gavaya* through the *sādṛṣyajnana* or similarities of the cow. For example, a child who does not know about a thing can understand the unknown object when he gives an example about the thing i.e., the name and the particulars of the object and we can give many examples of this kind.

1. A person, who does not know the ginger, knows from another person that ginger is like the turmeric. After hearing the words of the familiar thing he comes to know about the unknown object as ginger.

2. A person, whose name is Ram, tells his friend that his son Sham will land at the railway station at six p.m. and he looks like himself. The friend reaches the railway station and sees a person like Ram, and then he remembers the words of his friend that his son is like him. Thus he is able to recognize Sham easily. Here the *sādṛṣyajnana* and the
authority statement of his friend helped the person to recognize Sham at the railway station.

3. A person, who does not know the animal sheep, but he perceives from another person that it is like a goat, and there is a slight difference between these two animals i.e., the sheep, has long hair along its body. Thus, he perceives the unknown animal as sheep through the similarity of a well known animal, goat. Thus we can understand many things through sadrsyajnana of well known object. From the above mentioned examples, we can understand that the upamana is widely used as means of knowledge in everyday life.

Upamana has been admitted mostly by the realist philosophers. Their theory of pramana (including upamana) mostly follows Bhatta Mimamsaks. In Indian Philosophical tradition, there are three major realist schools. They are Nyaya, Vaisesika and Mimamsa. Of these three schools, the First and the third accept upamana as a distinct pramana while the Vaisesika realist does not admit upamana as a distinct source of valid cognition. Advaita also accepts it as a source of knowledge. According to the Nyaya, third kind of valid cognition is upamiti and its means is called upamana. Gautama defines comparison as the knowledge of a thing through it’s similarly to another thing previously well known. Vacaspati Misra states that upamana is a distinct means of knowledge since it produces a distinct type of cognition. Comparison is the relation between the names and the objects denoted by them. Sabara has defined the results (pramiti), in the case of upamana, he choose to define the means is always clearly distinguished from the result.

Vatsyayana states that upamana is the knowledge of an unknown object by means of its resemblance to a known object. He supports Sutrapara in his assertion that effect of similarity does not depend upon its degree (e.g., project, great or partial), but upon its familiarity. He makes it clear that upamana does not proceed on mere resemblance, but on well known resemblance. Sabara regards comparison as the knowledge of similarity subsisting in an unperceived object (e.g. a cow) on the perception of a similar object. Parthasarathi Misra defines it as the knowledge of similarity subsisting in a remembered object (e.g. a cow) with an object (e.g. a wild cow) perceived. The cow which was perceived by a person in a town is similar to
this cow perceived in a forest at present. The Prabhakara also defines comparison as the knowledge of similarity subsisting in a remembered object, which arises from the perception of similarity. Its derivative meaning (upama+lyut) suggests that comparison is its proper substitute. This knowledge is gained by comparison. Example, suppose we do not know what "Saxophone", it means a musical instrument something like a u shaped trumpet." If on subsequently seeing a saxophone, we are able to give its name, it will be clear that we understand what 'saxophone' means. It is clear that upamana is just this way of knowing the denotation of words, or the relation between names and the objects denoted by them. In upamana we have such knowledge when we are told by some authoritative person that a word denotes a class of objects of a certain description, although we might not have seen them before.

The third pramana, which is admitted by Nyaya, is upamana and consists in associating a thing unknown before with its name by virtue of it. According to Nyaya, upamana is the means by which we gain the knowledge of previously unknown object on the basis of it’s similarly to another object previously well known.³

The Advantins explain upamana by this example; A person, who has perceived a cow in a town, goes to a forest, and perceives a wild cow, then has an apprehension, "this animal is similar to a cow" owing to the intercourse of his eyes with the animal, then he has an apprehension, "my cow is similar to this animal, this knowledge of similarity of a cow with a wild cow is acquired by comparison.

Mimamsa recognize that the instrument of knowledge is the result of the cognition of similarity. It is illustrated that a person who has not seen a forest animal called gavaya is informed by the forester that it resembles a cow. Then he goes to the forest and comes across gavaya, he sees the similarity of the cow to gavaya, he also discovers that a cow is similar to gavaya, it is the second similarity or the recollected similarity that is known as upamana. This differs from the Nyaya view which described upamana as the relation between a name and an object denoted by it. The upholders of upamana as an independent means of valid knowledge also differ in details. There are divergences of opinion regarding the nature of
resultant knowledge through *upamana*. The Purva Mimamsa and the Advaita Vedantins are on one side and the Naiyayikas on the other. According to Purva Mimamsakas, the resultant knowledge pertains to the similarity which the remembered object bears to the directly perceived one. But according to the Naiyayikas, it is the knowledge that a certain word denotes a certain class of objects. There is a difference of opinion among the Purva Mimamsakas, Vedantins and the Naiyayikas about the resultant knowledge or *upamitis*.

In *Tarka sanigarh* Annambhatta defines *upamiti*.

*Karanam Upamanam Samjnasmjani Sambandhajnanam Upamiti*, i.e., relations between a name and the object are denoted to it. There are some factors which are needed in the process of *upamana* i.e., the authoritative statement, the indirect knowledge of similarity, the recollection of the authoritative statement and resultant knowledge or *upamiti*. In broader sense it could be understood to mean either *upamiti* or *upamiti-karana* depending on the context. Standard grammar permits derivation of both these meanings. Form the grammatical point of view the word *upamana* is a complex expression. It is constituted by an *upasarga* (prefix), *dhatuprakrti* (a verbal root) and *pratyaya* (suffix). Therefore the structural analysis of the word *upamana* is *upa+ma+lyut*. The suffix may or may not add anything by way of meaning the word *upamana* to which it is added to form the word *upamana*. When any meaning it's added to add the meaning *karana* and then the word *upamana* means *upamiti-karana*.

*Upamanamca manantram anumanad eva tadarthasiddheh-NL, P.53,*

Knowledge by similarity is due to comparison. It has been recognized as the means of knowing denotative relation between a word and certain class of objects through the intermediary knowledge of similarity, dissimilarity or particular characteristics conveyed by authoritative or particular characteristics conveyed by authoritative statement.

Mimamsa accepts that it is the way by which we know similarly, which is distinct kind of object, example, If we see first an American bison and then an Indian Buffalo, we perceive the similarity.
between the two, when we see the Buffalo, we at once perceive that it is like the bison. The Nyaya thinkers take a little different view of *upamana*. According to them it is a process by which one identifies an object with particulars of name by recognizing a similarity in it, pointed out before with an already perceived animal is apprehended as a *gavaya* (wild cow) an account of a similarity of wild cow perceived in it, this similarity having been pointed to the perceiver by somebody before. Dr. Ganganath Jha has taken analogy as the English equivalent of the term ‘*upamana*’. Dr. S. N. Das Gupta also uses analogy as equivalent of *upamana*. Dr. Radhakrishnan and Dr. J. N. Sinha either adopt the term in its original form or use the word in comparison as its substitute.

According to Nyaya, the result is the cognition of the relation of a name with the named, e.g. in the given case, the cognition that the animal which is found to resemble cow is called ‘*gavaya*’. It is produced by the knowledge of similarity because a man recognizes a wild cow as a ‘*gavaya*’ he remembers the description that ‘a *gavaya* is an animal like a cow’. This knowledge is called *upamiti* and *upamana* is the instrument thereof. It is definite knowledge of the object sought to be definitely known through its similarity with an object already well known. Nyaya defines comparison as the knowledge of the relation between a word and another word or between a thing and another thing but between a word and thing another thing but between a word and thing. Comparison makes an object through its resemblance to a known object, e.g. as the cow so the *gavaya*. Comparison sub serves perception. It enables one to know an object designated by a particular name.

The third *pramana* as identified by Gautama is also *upamana* (comparison). In Nyaya Sutra, Gautama states that, the comparison or analogy is "The means of proving that which is to be proved from a well known similarity" e.g. the assertion ‘the cow so the *gavaya*’ i.e., the animal called *gavaya* is just like the cow.

In *upamana* we are to know the objects denoted by a word from their similarity, dissimilarity to certain well known things or from their peculiarities but more resemblance or difference without any universal relation cannot be the ground of a certain conclusion. We have such knowledge.
when we are told by some authoritative person that a word denotes a class of objects of a certain
description. We apply the words to some objects which fit in with that description, although we
might not have seen them before. Gautama says the function of upamana is to impart knowledge
of the relation of the name (with the corresponding object). When the proposition conveying the
comparison that gavaya is like the cow "is employed, a person perceiving through sense object
contact an object having similarity with the cow learns, the relation between the naming word
and the object denoted.

In his, Sutra 1.1.3 Gautama first introduced Upamana by name.9 According to the
Naiyayikas; upama is one of the four pramanas. In Sutra 1.1.6 Gautama has given the
definition of upamana as under:-

Prasiddha Sadharmyatsa Dhyasadhanam Upmanam.

(Comparison is the knowledge of a thing consequent to its likeness to another thing
which is familiar.) It means in English, Upamana (analogy or knowledge by analogy) is the
knowledge of the sadhya which results from prasiddha (known) similarity. 10 The definition
given in the Sutra 1.1.6 means that upamana is the knowledge (sadhana) of the relation, a name
has (samkhya sambanadha) with its object and this knowledge is occurred by known similarity
(prasiddha sudharmyat).

To understand the meaning of the Sutra, there are many comments and sub comments.
Comparison implies likeness between the things compared and the things to which one compares
it. For example one may see a thing which one is like a cat, only much bigger and with stripes, or
a chameleon, he recollects the comparison and at once recognizes the animal. In this case,
knowledge follows from a likeness to a thing which is previously known, through the mind
which mentally compares the pictures of what it has already a clear idea of, with the one which is
projected by the object, which is now presented to it.11 Nyaya Sutra definition is acceptable and
whether upamana is really an independent pramana has been considered in the sutra 2.1.44 –
2.1.48 of Nyaya Darsana or Gautama’s book of Nyaya-Sutra. In that connection Gautama has
stated of critical examination of revival views and finally stated that Upamana actually is an independent Pramana.\textsuperscript{12} Upamana is the identification of previously unknown object from its description given by a reliable person. Nyaya, Upamana is a way of knowing the denotation of words and solving the problem of identification.\textsuperscript{13} Vatsyayana explains Gautama’s definition of upamana which makes known what is to be made known, from similarly with an object that is already well known. Naiyayikas famous example of upamana is "as the cow so the gavaya" i.e.; the animal called gavaya is just like a cow. It could be explained by a person who is ignorant of the exact meaning of the word gavaya, goes to the forest and asks the forester what is gavaya. From the forester, he learns that the gavaya is similar to a cow. After hearing the words of the forester, he knows that there is a relationship between these two animals. On some future occasion when he happens to see gavaya, he recollects the instructive assertion of the forester and perceives the similarity with cow in gavaya. Here the sadrasyanjnana of the cow which helps the person to understand the unknown animal gavaya, is called upamiti. Here the resemblance of the meaning of words of the forester (the authoritative statement) is the vyapara or intercourse for making upamiti. The upamiti jnana is the result of upamana and it is not ascertained by other pramanas. We can say that upamana is the identification of a previously unknown object from its description given by a reliable person.

Vatsyayana is the first commentator who clarifies the idea of the utility of upamana, he gives another Nyaya example for upamana, a person is asked by the doctor to bring the medicinal herbs called mudgaparni (a kind of herb) and masparni (another kind of herb) and told that mudgaparni is like mudga and masparni is as masa. After the propositions, he goes to the forest to collect medicines and acquires the knowledge of the relation between the naming word and the object. Such analogies are of great practical value in everyday life and many things are known through upamana. So upamana is an efficient instrument of valid knowledge and it should be regarded as a separate pramana. Bhasyakara state the nature of resultant knowledge and upamati. His statement is that the purpose of upamana is the knowledge of the relation of the corresponding object. Udyotakara says that the authoritative statement has an important role to make upamiti and the knowledge of similarity is led by the authoritative statement. Udyotyakara
connects the authoritative statement and knowledge of similarity. He explains that the mere knowledge of similarity cannot lead to the knowledge of the relation of the name with a particular class of objects. One doesn’t know the name of an object when he sees a thing, but when he understands the recollecting of the remembrance of the sentence spoken by the trustworthy person. Here the recollection of the authoritative statement helped the person to understand the name of the thing in front. According to him merely the knowledge of similarity of an object is not sufficient to group the name and its denotation.

Gangesa defines comparison as the knowledge that a word denotes the generic character of an unfamiliar object, which coexists with its similarity or dissimilarity with a known object. The word ‘gavaya’ denotes the community of wild cow (gavaya), which is indicated by similarity with a cow. So there is a difference of opinion among the Naiyayikas about the karana or the cause of upamiti. According to Pracina Naiyayikas, the meditate activity or vayapara and sadrsyanjnana is karana. Annambhatta accepts the opinion of Navinanaïyayikas.

Two factors are involved in an argument by comparison. (i) The knowledge of the object to be known (ii) The perception of similarity. Mere resemblance, whether it be complete, considerable or partial is not enough to justify an argument by comparison. In the first case of complete resemblance or identity, there is no new knowledge. We do not say the cow is like a cow. In the second case of considerable resemblance, the inference need not be valid, for a buffalo is not a cow, though there are many points of resemblance between the two. If there is only partial resemblance, the case is worse.

The description in terms of dissimilarity is illustrated thus, a person of North India tells a person of South India that the animal is an animal which is ugly, lives on hard and sharp thorns and has a very long and crooked neck. The person from the south sees a camel. In this animal, he perceives all these characteristics which are totally dissimilar to those of other animals previously known to him. This knowledge of dissimilarity leads him to recollect what he previously heard and knew that it is was the animal denoted by the name as camel. Knowledge of similarity is the efficient instrument to assimilative cognition, e.g. a person is ignorant of the
exact meaning of the word ‘gavaya’. He has learnt from somebody that a ‘gavaya’ is similar to a cow; he goes to a forest, sees the animal called ‘gavaya’ which is similar to a cow, and recollects the information conveyed by the assimilative proposition and then the cognition arises. This is the animal denoted by the word gavaya. This knowledge is due to the Comparison which is the source of knowledge relation either between a name (samjnī) and a thing (samjna) or between word and its denotation.15

Vatsyayana states that it is the cognition of the relation of a name with the named. In the Nyaya theory of upamana we face some difficulties. The reason is that there is no single version of Nyaya theory of upamana. The views of Gautama, Gangesa, Bhasarvajna or Jayanta are somewhat different. It seems that the Nyaya theory of upamana has been formulated, understood and interpreted somewhat differently by different Naiyayikas over the ages. Gautama equates upamana with the well known similarity. Vatsayayana takes it as the statement of a reliable person conveying similarity, whereas Uddyotakara thinks it as knowledge of the well known similarity.

Gautama argues that upamana is neither perception nor an inference. The reason for its not being perceptational is that its contents include a reference to linguistic usage of that cannot be perceived. It is not inference, since inference gives us knowledge about things which can be verified through perception.

Napratyakse gavaye pramanartham upamanasya pasyamah- N.S, 2.1.47

It is the means of knowing. Nyaya states that it is produced by the knowledge of similarity because a man recognizes a wild cow as a ‘gavaya’ when he perceives its similarity to the cow and remembers the description that a gavaya is an animal like a cow. Nyaya accept that sadrsajnana is an important cause of upamiti and the authoritative statements are needed to complete this idea. So we can understand that opinions of Navinanaiyayikas are suitable to make upamiti. On the other hand, we accept the pracinanaiyayikas opinion i.e. vakhyartha sabdabodha as a karana, there is no upamiti originates.
The Naiyayika account of *upamana* differs from that of the Advaitin. A person who has not seen the *gavaya* is informed that the wild animal resembles a cow. He casually comes across a *gavaya*, and remembers what he has heard from his friend about the resemblance of the *gavaya* to the cow, and he comes to know that what the word ‘*gavaya*’ denotes. Thus according to the Naiyayikas, *upamiti* (knowledge resulting from *upamana*) consists of the knowledge of the relation between a name and the object denoted by it. Knowledge of similarity is instrument of such cognition.

Annambhatta says, “*Upamana* is the source of our knowledge about the relation between a word and its denotation”. If validity is due to an excellence, the Vedas are devoid of validity because these are not created by one person, nor can the validity of knowledge be determined by the knowledge of its harmony with the real nature of its object. The valid knowledge itself cognize the real nature of its object by its nature. Valid knowledge is a non perceptual source and is not reducible to perception nor can it be reduced to any of other non perceptual means such as inference.

The Naiyayikas hold that the statement of the authoritative person (forester) along with its perception of the similarity with a cow is the instrumental cause (*karana*). The recollection of the meaning of the sentences which is denoted by a word ‘*gavaya*’ resembles a ‘cow’ is the operation (*vyapara*). After that he has the knowledge that a *gavaya* is meant for the word ‘*gavaya*’. According to Nyaya, comparison (*upamana*) is the means by which we gain knowledge of a thing from its similarity to another with which we are familiar. For example, one has seen dog but not a wolf, and he has been told that there is a wolf similar in appearance to a dog. So when he sees an animal which looks like a dog but is not one he at once surmises that it must be a wolf.

Vacaspati Misra’s account of *upamana* is largely the same as that of Gautama and Vatsayayana. He however emphasizes that the essential value of knowledge by similarity consists in a definite identification of an object by a certain name. When we analyze the process of *upamana* we find that first of all we have an authority’s statement that a word
denotes object which have certain characteristics, i.e. ‘the gavaya is like a cow’. Then, when we observe any such object, we have the knowledge that it is in accordance with the given description and there is recollection of the given descriptive (authorities) statement. After the propositions conveying a comparison “the mudgaparni (a kind of herbs) is like the mudga’ and ‘The masparni (another kind of herbs) is like the mesa are employed, a person acquires the knowledge of the relation between the meaning of word and the objects denoted and he collects the herbs for preparing medicines. Thus, many other things are to be known as the objects of Upamana in everyday life. Vatsayayana uses the term ‘samkhya’ in place of sadharmya. Sutrakara defines upamana as a karuna (means of knowledge) and says nothing about upamiti (the result of upamana). Vatsayayana gives a clear cut upamiti as well. A man does not know what objects are denoted of the particular word comes to know that the word denotes some definite object and thus, it makes identification possible. It provides us knowledge through a given description of the objects to be known and a perception of their similarity etc. to the familiar things mentioned in the description. Suppose that a boy who has only heard the word zebra but never seen a zebra wants to know what is zebra. A person tells him that a zebra is like a donkey with strips on its body and says that the animal is a zebra. According to Nyaya, the boy is able to correctly identify the animal by perceiving the similarity between the descriptions of the animals. It goes without saying that for comparison to serve as a source of knowledge, one should already have knowledge of the denotations of terms constituting the description of the object. Thus in the above example, the boy would not have been able to identify the animal as a zebra, unless he already knew the denotations of “donkey”, “a body”, or “strips.

Samkhya, Yoga and Vasiesika don’t regard comparison as an independent source of knowledge.

Vatsayayana says;

Yatha gaurevam gavaya ityupamance prayukte Samjnasamjini Sambandham Pratipadyata iti.
In this passage the sentence ‘yatha gaurevam gavayah’ or, to translate, as the cow is so “is the gavaya i.e., bison is like a cow” has been said to be upamana. The basis of comparison is resemblance or similarity. Not however, as commonly understood, between a word and another word or between a thing and another thing, but between a word and the thing it denotes. Vatsayayana’s upamana doesn’t proceed on mere resemblance, but on well known resemblance.

The Advaitins differ from the Naiyayikas in their definition of upamiti. Upamiti is defined as the knowledge derived through the knowledge of similarity between two things. In other words, upamiti is not obtained through the knowledge of dissimilarity (vardharmya-jnana). According to the Advaitins, the reason “similarity existing in a wild cow with a cow” does not exist in the subject “my cow”, therefore the knowledge of similarity existing in my cow with a wild cow cannot be acquired from inference. It is acquired from comparison. It is neither perception nor inference but an independent means of valid knowledge which can be stated like that comparison is the means of the knowledge of similarity between present object and the one that is not present. For example, a person who has, perceived a cow in the town happens to go to a forest and perceives there a gavaya (wild cow) comes to the apprehension, this animal is similar to a cow. Here the knowledge of similarity is not acquired from perception as the gavaya (wild cow) has never before been perceived having any concomitance with cow. Comparison is attributed to knowledge arising out of similar cognition or perception of similar objects.

According to Mimamsakas, upamana is a separate (svatantra) pramana. One of the things by them is that the knowledge by analogy (upamiti=upamana) is a distinctive or irreducible kind of knowledge. It is different from pratyaksa (perception), anumiti (inference), sabda (knowledge by verbal testimony) and the like. According to them, knowledge of similarity about an absent object is obtained by the means known as comparison. For example: town man who has seen a cow previously in a town or other place, goes to a forest and finds gavaya and perceives its similarity to the cow which is not present there. He may then obtain by comparison the further knowledge that the cow in a town or elsewhere is like the gayal. Mimamsa, like the Nyaya, accepts comparison as an independent source of knowledge but
interprets it in an entirely different manner. Sabara's definition of Upamana as “Knowledge of an unperceived object being similar to some known object is not incompatible with the suggestion that he takes Upamana as analogical argument”. Upamana is regarded as a source (means) of knowledge of similarity existing in an unperceived object on the perception of a similar object. Cognition of similarity between a cow remembered and a wild cow (gavaya) perceived is a stock example of knowledge gained by upamana (comparison). This knowledge is neither perceptual nor inferential according to the Mimamsakas.

The Nyaya holds that on learning from an authority that a gavaya is like the cow, a person goes to a forest, perceives some animal like the cow and thinks he has by upamana or comparison the knowledge that such an animal is a gavaya. Against the Nyaya view, it is pointed out by Mimamsakas that the knowledge of the particular animal perceived is like the cow is derived from perception and the knowledge that such an animal looking like the cow is a gavaya, is obtained through recollection of what was previously learnt from some authority. The knowledge of this particular animal is a mere inference from the last knowledge. Hence what the Nyaya considers to be derived from a new source, namely, comparison, is not really so.

Mimamsakas gives an example; a person notices the similarity of the wild Ox (gavaya) or with the cow and discovers that the cow is also similar to the gavaya. The cow at this time is not within the preview of his perception. This cognition is similarity of the recollected object to the one seen is due to comparison. Kumarila Bhatta mentions the practical utility of upamana as follows: it helps us to get the knowledge of sacrificial details in case of a rite. The sacrificial details viz., the properties and appurtenances not given in the “Saurya scarifies” are known as the same as mentioned in case of agenya through upamana since both of these have the common deity.

“Similarly, when the vrihi kept for sacrifices are spoilt or stolen, nivara can be used as a substitute of vrihi with a view that the fruit will be the same. This is because the nivara is similar to the virhi.
According to Mimamsakas comparison may be brought under two heads, namely, comparison of similarity and comparison of dissimilarity. The example of comparison of similarity is already explained. The comparison of dissimilarity is as follows “the camel is dissimilar to the horse.”

Example of (upamana) dissimilarity to other objects, when a man does not know a horse, is told by other person that a horse, unlike a cow, has no clove hoofs and after perceiving such an animal, he comes to know that this is what is called a horse, then we have a case of upamana in which the man as of knowing the denotation of an unfamiliar name is the perception of dissimilarity. The Mimamasakas and Nyaya views on the nature of upamana however are fundamentally different. The Prabhakara states that the knowledge of similarity subsisting in a remembered object arises from the perception of similarity. Famous example of upamana:-

A person, who had a cow in a town, in the past, perceives a wild cow in a forest, perceives its similarity with the cow, and then knows the similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived wild cow. The knowledge of similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived wild cow is comparison. Prabhakara’s view of comparison is identical with that of Kumarila. Both regard similarity as an object of comparison. But Prabhakara unlike Kumarila, regards similarity as an independent category. The Bhattas are in agreement with Prabhakara on this point. When we see a certain object and remember another object, the cognition that we have of the remembered object as being similar to the seen object is analytical; for instance, the similar to this gavaya that I see now is analogical. Kumarila’s interpretation, the result of upamana is the cognition of a remembered thing, qualified by its similarity to a perceived thing. A man who has never seen a gavaya, but has seen a cow, goes to the forest and sees a gavaya there for the first time. Then he observes that the gavaya is similar to a cow. ‘The gavaya is similar to a cow is a judgment of perception, because it arises in the observer’s mind that the remembered cow is similar to the gavaya. This cognition is the result of upamana. But unlike the Prabhakara, the Bhatta doesn’t regard ‘Similarity’ as distinct category; as according to them, it is only a quality consisting in the fact of more than one object having the same set of qualities. Analogical
cognition is distinct from perception, as it is the cognition of something not in contact with the
senses; for instance, the monkey is not actually seen at the time that we have the cognition of its
similarity to the Ourang-Outang. Nor is it mere remembrance as at the time that the monkey was
seen, the Ourang Outang has not been seen and hence at that time the similarity could not have
been seen and what has not been seen cannot be remembered. Nor lastly, can it be regarded as
inference; as none of the factors essential for inference is there.

It does not mean complete unity of identity, but similarity in most respects. Hence, it
cannot be said to be generally such that humanity remains the same in all the individual cases.
Comparison cannot be accepted as subsidiary to perception, inference or testimony. It has been
recognized as an independent source of valid knowledge.

Between the Prabhakara and Bhatta schools of Mimamsa there is a minor difference, viz;
sadrsya or similarity, which the object of upamana, is an independent category, nor reducible to
substance, quality action, universal etc., according to Prabhakara, but according to Kumarila, it
nothing but an assembling of common features. The Advaita view is identical one with the
Bhatta view. According to Prabhakara, Kumarila and Vedanta, the result is the cognition that a
cow resembles a gavaya.

According to the Naiyayikas, resulting knowledge through upamana refers to denotative
relation wise. According to the Mimamsakas, it refers to the similarity which the remembered
object bears to the directly perceived one. On the other hand, the Naiyayikas lay more stress on
authoritative statement, while the Mimamsakas do not consider it essential at all.

Sabara thinks that upamana in Indian philosophy is what is named in western logic an
analogy. For example, by an analogy, one can believe that others also feel the existence of their
own selves. He further defines that Upamana is knowledge of an unperceived object and is
similar to some known object.

Upamanam api sadrsyam asannikrsterthe buddhim upadayati(Mb-P.12)
According to Sabara, *Upamana* is resemblance which brings about the cognition of an object which has not been in contact with the sense. Though in the case of perception, inference, verbal testimony, *arthapatti* and *anupalabhi*, Sabara might have been conscious of the difference between *upamana* and *upamiti*, but we observe that in his definition of the pramanas, the subject is sometime the means and sometimes the result. On seeing a rat, one perceives that it is like a mouse perceived in the past, and then he gets the knowledge that the remembered mouse is like mouse in the perceived rat. The knowledge namely that mouse perceived in the past, is like this rat is obtained from comparison or from the knowledge of a similarity of the rat to the mouse.

He defines comparison as the knowledge of similarity, subsisting in an unperceived object (e.g., a cow) on the perception of a similar object. The Prabhakara states that knowledge of similarity subsisting in a remembered object arises from the perception of similarity.

Mimamsa further states that Nyaya comparison is realized on perception. Example is ordinary cow similar to wild cow. Hence, it is regarded that the animal which is presently perceived is a wild cow. In this way, contrary to the view of Nyaya, Mimamsa believes that in comparison, upon perceiving an object which has been perceived before, it is inference that the object remembered is similar to the object being presently perceived. Similarity cannot be called a quality or *guna*, because a quality cannot be possessed by another quality. It does not mean complete unity or identify, but similarity in most respects. It cannot be treated as a universal (*Samanya*, class or *jati*), because universal means something which is exactly identical in many individuals (e.g. cowness in cows). Comparison cannot be accepted as subsidiary to perception, inference or testimony. Similarity does not mean any completely identical character. Nyaya comparison is the knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by the word. On the other hand, the Mimamsakas points out that the knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by that word is derived by verbal authority. (e.g. by the word of the person who tells that a wild cow is similar to a cow and not by a comparison. It is known through the recollection of what was learnt from the verbal authority of the person and the knowledge of wild cow itself is due to perception and not comparison. According to Nyaya, it is first known
from the utterance of a reliable individual that the wild cow is like an ordinary cow or is similar to the latter and then an individual comes across a wild cow in the forest and upon perceiving it, realizes that it is like a cow, he knows that it is a wild cow.

Any comparison, according to Mimamsa, apprehends the similarity of the remembered cow to the perceived wild cow. Any person who has seen a cow and happens to see a wild cow himself remembers the cow as similar to the wild cow he perceives. This knowledge is similar in comparison. It is distinguished from inference because the *Vyapti* or the invariable concomitance is not needed here.

Such knowledge cannot be classed perception, for the object (the mouse, or the cow) known to be similar is not –perception then. It does not come under memory, because though the object was perceived in the past, its similarity to the present object was not then known; and therefore this similarity cannot be said to be simply remembered. From their arguments it is clear that there are two similarities. From the knowledge of one similarity, one acquires knowledge of the other similarity. The other similarity being imperceptible must be known to another as distinct source of true knowledge. It is also not an inference. From knowledge like ‘this *gavaya* is like the cow at home’ we cannot infer ‘the cow at home is like this *gavaya*’, unless we have another promise like “all things are similar to other things which are similar to them” (and such a universal premise containing, an invariable concomitance between the two terms is not really used in the above case where one arrives at the knowledge of the absent cow’s similarity to the present *gavaya*, from the perception of the *gavaya* being similar to the cow. Again such knowledge does not obviously arise from verbal testimony or authority. Hence it is given an independent place. In the Nyaya system, the means is always clearly distinguished from the result.

Vardaraja, has given a wider definition of *upamana* in his work ‘*Tarkikaraksa*’. According to him *upamana* is the cognition, through the perception of an object denoted by a name occurring in the statement of an authoritative person by a person who does not know the meaning of the name. *Upamana*, in this way is the identification of a previously unknown object
from its description given by a reliable person. *Upamana* should not be restricted to the perception of similarity alone as there are other means also, (for instance, dissimilarity according to Uddyotakara and Dharmamarata) according to the Varadaraja through which the denotation of a name could be cognized. *Upamana’s* has characteristic for example, when a man who does not know a camel is told that a camel is the animal which has a long neck and dropping lips and feeds on thorns and later on perceives such an animal and recognizes it as a camel, this is a case of *upamana* where we know an unknown object from its peculiar characteristics. Uddyotakara introduces the element of ‘Vaidharamya’ as a basis of *upamana* in addition to ‘Sadharmya.’ He justifies his thesis; by pointing out that the term ‘sadharmya’ is the aphorism. Varadaraja adds one more type of *upamana*, i.e. *Dharamamatropamana* in the list of the forms of *Upamana* given by Uddyotakara. So there are main three characteristics of *Upamana*; i.e,

1. *Sadharmaya- Upamana*: - In *Saharmaya- Upamana* (when) the description of an unknown object given in terms of its similarity to a well known object by some authoritative person. A class concept to certain facts on the basis of some observed similarity between them and other known facts are applies here. The concept is given to us and the facts to which it applied are selected by us. In the example of *Sadharmapramana*, we are to know (person) that a certain animal must be a ‘gavaya’ because it is similar to the cow. If the similarity between the two is perfect, then they become identical with each other. Hence, on the ground of such perfection, similarity it is as much true to say that the animal is a cow as to say that is gavaya. If on the other hand, the similarity is considerable then the word ‘gavaya’ may be taken to denote buffaloes so far as they are considerably similar to the cow.

2. *Vaidharmaya-Upamana*: - In this form *Vaidharmaya-Upamana* the objects denoted by a word are described in terms of their contrast or dissimilarity to some well known objects of experience. This negative description enables a man to recognize certain objects as denoted by a word or as belonging to a certain class in so far as he finds that they fit in the given description.
3. Dharmamatra-Upamana: - In this form Dharmamatra-Upamana the object denoted by a name is described in terms of its particular attributes to any combination of attributes which is particular to it. This description enables us to discriminate between the things denoted by the name from all other things and consequently apply the name to just that class of things. Thus, we can say that upamana is the identification a previously unknown object from its description given by a reliable person.

If we make the analysis of the process of Upamana, we get the following steps. The authoritative statement of the forester that a wild cow denotes a class of object of a certain description (atidesavakya), e.g. the gavaya and perceives, the villager comes across a gavaya and perceives its similarly with the cow (sandsyadhi), there is a recollection of what he previously heard from the forester (vakyar thasmarti). Lastly, he knows that the animal before them is gavaya, i.e. is denoted by the word gavaya (upamiti). One thing common to all cases of upamana is the knowledge of the denotative relations, between a word and a certain class of objects. Thus upamana is a process of reasoning by which we know that a word denotes a certain class of objects on the basis of some authoritative statement.
References

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