Chapter II
Semiotics
2.1. The Meaning and Scope of 'Semiotics'

2.1.1. The Meaning of 'Semiotics'

'Semiotics' as the name suggests, seems to be the study of signs as Peirce — an American pragmaticist of the late 19th century — has defined it: "a quasi-necessary or formal doctrine of signs — it is the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of semiosis". (quoted in Jain, 1994: 284). Thus, 'semiosis' may be the sign-process per se, which includes sign-using behaviour of all beings as a whole, i.e. the use of words, tones of voice, tempo, body-motions and 'gestures, and animal communication. The signs are usually natural — there may be a natural relation between the sign and its meaning, as in a human cry of pain or in bee-dances, in which a bee faces the source of honey in order to communicate its location to other bees. Signs can also be arbitrary as are most of the words in natural languages and tail-wagging among animals — the meaning of which varies for cats, dogs, and horses (cf. The new Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th edition, Vol. IX).

The history of the theory of signs (known as 'semiotics') can be traced back to the work of Stoic
According to Meier-Oeser (p. 13), the Stoic theory of sign, delineated in the late 4th and 3rd century BC., could be called, even if there are some important anticipations in Aristotle and the Megarian Logic, the first fully elaborate theory of sign in the Western tradition. And yet it is open to dispute whether it is at all a part or even more the starting point of that tradition which finally led to the modern concept of semiotics as a "general theory of signs, sign-processes and sign-systems in nature and culture". For it is true that the stoic theory of sign in its proper meaning or its technical sense (Semeion) was never designed for such a general purpose. And even more, such an objective would have been hardly conceivable for the stoics as well as for any other ancient philosophical school. Because that presupposes a concept of sign which is not — at least not as a technical term — to be found in Greek or Latin antiquity, namely a concept that would include both the natural sign of inference (the indexical sign) and the conventional linguistic sign (the symbol) as instances or 'species'.

It was Augustinus (as advocated by Meier-Oeser), who introduced the general notion of sign in
the late 4th century, which later became effective in the western tradition of semiotics and ultimately stimulated or made possible the development of semiotics as a comprehensive science of all kinds of sign in nature and culture. Augustinus has used two notions 'semaninon' (the linguistic sign) and 'semeion' (the inferential sign) related to semiotics and further explains them. Thus, 'semaninon' or the linguistic signs deal with the spoken sentence, e.g. "This man has a wounded heart"; the meaning or proposition expressed by the sentence; and that what happens, i.e. the heart of the man being wounded. 'What is said' or the meaning is incorporeal whereas the other two elements are corporeal. "This fact puts the 'lakton' in an exceptional position within the physicalistic or materialistic ontology advocated by Stoics attempting to describe everything—even things like God, soul, wisdom, truth or thought—as material bodies". (Meier-Oeser, 14).

On hearing the word 'sign' (or 'semeion'), we first think of traffic lights, footprints, gestures or linguistic expressions. But the Stoic sign is defined as "a proposition which forms the (pre-) antecedent in a valid conditional (that is a complex proposition of the form "if this, then that") which serves to reveal the consequent".
Now coming to the Peircean theory of signs, we find that the word 'semiotics' (originally 'semiotic') actually originated in Greek medicine for diagnosis by means of bodily symptoms and Peirce's definition of semiotics is based on his assumption of the term 'sign', He writes:

"A sign or representation is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representation". (Charles S. Peirce, in Hartshorne and Weiss, 1931-5, 227-228)

Peirce divided the different sorts of signs into three mutually intersecting trichotomies (Laver and Trudgill, 1979 : 2). The second trichotomy is most relevant here that consists of symbols, icons, and indices.

Feibleman (1946-90) provides a useful condensed version of his writings. Thus, the symbol is "a sign, which refers to the object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general
ideas, which operates to cause the symbol to be interpreted as referring to that object" (2, 249); the ICON is "a sign, which refers to an object by virtue of characters of its own which it possesses whether the object exists or not". (2, 247); and the INDEX is "a sign, which refers to the object that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that object". (2, 248)

Obviously, there is no sharp distinctive borderline between the terms and this is why there are differences in interpretations by different scholars. Ogden and Richards (1923 : 23), for example, distinguish symbols as "those signs which man use to communicate with one another". The oft-quoted triangle of signification proposed by Ogden and Richards (1923 : 11) has created a lot of controversies among philosophers, linguists, and psychologists. The triadic relation has been shown thus:

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B (concept)

(symbol) A ................. C (significatum)
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Peirce's (1940: 104) contention is based on the conventional nature of the relation between sign and significatum, but Morris (1946: 23-7) views that "a symbol is a sign" which acts as substitute for some other sign with which it is synonymous", and that "all signs not symbols are signals". Cherry (1957: 7) uses the word 'sign' for "any physical event used in communication" and 'symbol' for "religious and cultural" purposes interpretable only in specified historical contexts (cf. Lyons, 1977: 95).

Saussure (1916) views the relation between a sign and its significatum arbitrary. This 'arbitrariness' is the basis for different signs for different objects in different languages on the one hand, and different interpretations of the same sign in the same language on the other. Thus, to saussure, 'meaning' was a relationship between two equally participating characteristics (the objects, ideas, etc. on the one hand, and the language used to refer to them on the other). (Crystal, 1985:161)

That, linguistic signs are 'arbitrary', is by no means easy to explain, since the arbitrariness calls for multidimensional approach to unfathom the
hidden truth in the linguistic sign itself and the mind of the user both depending on the context of situation or convention. Thus, 'arbitrary' and 'conventional' are seldom equivalent (cf. Lyons, 1977: 101).

Peirce's definition of 'symbol' that indicates an intermediary link between the signifies and the signified is the 'interpretant', which, however, is the 'link' of Ogden and Richards and the 'associative bond' of Saussure and is far from being non-controversial, since it is 'mental' and liable to change from one person to another and even in one mood of the individual to another. This is why a language is a heterogeneous system by virtue of being different and varied in nature.

Whereas the symbol is an arbitrary sign, the icon, as Peirce defines, is non arbitrary. Peirce distinguishes icons from symbols as under:

"An icon is a sign which would possess the character which renders it significant even though its object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a geometrical line ... A symbol is a sign which would have the character which renders it
a sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification". (1940 : 104)

Iconicity is based on resemblance between form and meaning and this is described as 'primary iconicity' (Lyons, 1977 : 103) and very likely it is 'medium-dependent' (Ibid.), e.g. the English word 'cuckoo' is iconic in the phonic medium. The second type of iconicity is that which is based on an extension of meaning from a basic to a transferred, idiomatic, suggested, or metaphorical sense. This is 'secondary iconicity'. Unlike 'symbolic', as Lyons suggests, 'iconic' has the advantage of not having a different non-technical sense outside semiotics (Ibid.).

The third main category of signs is the 'index', which Peirce defines as under:

"An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant" (1940 : 104). Here, Peirce takes the index to a non-arbitrary sign, e.g. the orientation of a weathercock would indicate the
wind-direction, the height of a column of mercury in a thermometer would be an index of high temperature, etc., as regards the human speech, the connection between an index (word) and its object (meaning) is likely to be arbitrary (cf. Laver & Trudgill, 1979: 3). Abercrombie (1967: 7) uses the term 'indices' to refer to "signs which reveal personal characteristics of the writer or speaker", which Bühler and other Prague school linguists have called 'expressive', falls within the province of stylistics — a branch of semiotics or linguistics (cf. Lyons, 1977: 107).

Lyons (1977: 108) has used another term in addition to the three mentioned above, viz. 'symptom' close to the sense used in medicine, and it was of the art of diagnosis, by interpreting symptoms as signs, that the word 'semiotic' was first used in Greek (cf. Morris, 1946: 285).

There is another term akin to 'sign', i.e. 'signal', which, however, differs, in its nature and interpretation, from all others discussed above. Apart from being used in its general sense of 'sign', 'signal' is time-bound according to Potter (1960: 46) whereas 'symbol' is timeless (Ibid).
The use of terminology relating to 'sign' and its types has been tabulated by Allerton (1979: 20), which focuses how idiosyncratic is the terminology of different scholars (actually the propagators):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall term</th>
<th>Every day term</th>
<th>Peirce</th>
<th>Ogden and Richards</th>
<th>de Saussure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Items standing for or indicating another item</td>
<td>? sign</td>
<td>sign</td>
<td>sign</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual term</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item taken as evidence or indication of another (casually connected) item</td>
<td>sign</td>
<td>index</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item used as arbitrary sign for individual item</td>
<td>symbol, sign</td>
<td>index</td>
<td>symbol</td>
<td>signe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(name, label)</td>
<td>sign</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item used as arbitrary sign for whole class</td>
<td>symbol, sign</td>
<td>symbol</td>
<td>symbol</td>
<td>signe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(word, name, label)</td>
<td>symbol</td>
<td>icon</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>symbole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item used (for specific purpose) as motivated sign for class</td>
<td>symbol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In short, a sign must have meaning. If there is no meaning then at best we are dealing not with a sign but with a pattern, and at worst with a mere mark or noise.
2.1.2. The Scope of Semiotics

The scope of semiotics, like its meaning and nature, is by no means easy to trace. However, Morris (1938 : 1946) recognises three main areas in the field of semiotics: syntactics (syntax), semantics, and pragmatics (cf. Lyons, 1977 : 114). The distinctions drawn by different scholars are far from precise. Nonetheless, by way of comparison one may be able to distinguish the three areas.

Morris (1938 : 6) has defined syntactics as the study of the formal relations of signs to one another; semantics as the study of the relations of signs to objects to which the signs are applicable, and pragmatics as the study of relations of signs to interpreters.

Carnap's distinction of the three areas of semiotics is close to that of Morris's (1942 : 9) thus: "If in an investigation explicit reference is made to the speaker or ... the user of the language, then we assign it to the field of pragmatics ...; If we abstract from the user of the language and analyse only the expressions and their designata, we are in the field of semantics. And if, finally, we abstract from the designata also and analyse only the relations between the expressions, we are in (logical) syntax."
It seems clear from Carnap's definition of pragmatics that he stresses the point of view of the producer or user rather than the receiver, whereas Morris takes it as the effects of signs on the interpreter (cf. Lyons, 1977: 115).

Smith (1966: 4-5) later defines these terms as follows. "... syntactics studies how signs are related to each other semantics studies how these signs are related to things. And pragmatics studies how they are related to people (i.e. the effects of signs on people)" (p. 519).

The areas that semiotics covers is not limited to what is generally taken from granted as is attested by the efforts made by different linguists, psychologists, and behaviouristic scientists from time to time. There is a growing awareness of the language aspects of art which prepared the ground for a fruitful use of the ideas of semiotics in the study of artistic culture. The semiotics of art and aesthetic activity is an important department of modern aesthetics. "In art, the system of meanings and senses of sounds take the form of the artistic image which in terms of semiotics is an artistic statement. This type of statement
carries artistic, universally human, non-utilitarian information. While being of the nature of a sign in its origin and being expressed by signs the artistic image is not itself a sign. The artistic text is a combination of images, a system of artistic statements that form an artistic message. # The sign is the minimal unit of an artistic text. The difference between the signs and the utterances is that in the process of communication the signs must be recognised and the utterance understood. The system of statements (utterances) constitutes an artistic text whose semantic context - the artistic conception - must be interpreted and evaluated.

An artistic text appears by transition from the level of signs to the level of object-semantic context. The attitude to the world and its values contained in the art work is realised in disappearing signs, in a sign system that dissolves itself. An artistic text refers us not to language but to the interpenetrating materiality and spirituality in the inner world of the work.

The structure of an artistic text is formed of artistic images and the latter are made up of signs. However, every transition to a higher level (from signs
to artistic statement, i.e. to image, from a system of images to artistic text) involves a qualitative leap, a resolution of the preceding level and the emergence and addition of a new quality of sense and new meanings of artistic thought.

The artistic text (a closed system) acquires the status of an art work (open system) in the process of social being, in the process of cultural communication. The art work, being a minimal unit, as element of artistic culture, is a sign of artistic culture, or rather, its meta-sign, i.e. a sign carrying a higher semantic context and broader object meaning than ordinary signs of which the image is built. Artistic culture as an entity is made up of meta-signs, i.e. art works.

The dialectics of the artistic process is extremely complex. It combines sign and non-sign elements: signs, through a qualitative leap, shape into an artistic statement, i.e. an artistic image (a non-sign entity); the images make up an artistic text (another leap), whose inclusion in social functioning makes it an art work, a meta-sign of artistic culture. A meta-sign (art work) has sense (artistic conception) and object meaning (value for mankind).
Semiotics interprets the language-communicative aspects of the artistic process. Style in terms of semiotics is the phenomenon of "a diversity of languages within a language", as recognition of basic equivalence of various styles, as the possibility, within certain limits, of translating the sense of a statement from one micro-language (style) into another. The translatability of style (similar to translation from one language into another with the preservation of the original sense) is readily observed in the performing arts where the same work can be performed in different style. Within the same language (macro-system) there exist stylistic varieties (micro-languages), and in that sense artistic culture presents us with stylistic diversity just like multilingualism. The semiotic approach to style in art detects and interprets an author's 'hand', the "pronunciation" of the signs of the artistic culture" (Bores, 1981: 287-288).

Semiotics may be widely used in detecting the social markers, physical markers, and psychological markers in the speech of an individual just like the height of a column of mercury in a thermometer would be an index or marker of heat or temperature (cf. Laver & Trudgill, 1979: 1-32).
This is an age of advertisements. Advertising a product means inviting people to purchase that product and semiotics would prove most useful in the search of how a product be audio-visually represented so as to impress people at its best.

To conclude, the sign being a functional aspect of an object or event, its study goes as far as one can expect, such as silence, pause, etc. in which we have no physical object or event that might function as sign.

2.2. The Role of Context in Semiotics

Language, being a social phenomenon cannot be thought of without context, i.e. the speaker, the hearer, the subject-matter, the language, the medium, the style, the place, the time, the purpose, the culture, etc. Thus, context is a complex whole of all the constituents taking part in the making of speech. There are as many contexts as there are situations or settings. For example, a person is now a teacher and now a friend, now a father and now a salesman, now a son and now a
brother, and so on. His roles change according to the place and time and so changes his speech. The same form of language cannot be appropriate to every context of situation. This is why we have varieties of style in the language use of an individual, known as the verbal repertoire.

"The more we study speech in natural settings, the more we find systematic variation within every speaker, reflecting who he is addressing, where he is, what the social event may be, the topic of discussion, and the social relations he communicates by speaking". (Eroin-Tripp, 1973 : 268)

Actually speaking, human society and culture is woven in language, i.e. the sex, the family relation, the social stratum, the administrative platform, and above all the intention of the speaker count most in the proper use of language. This dialectic proves that semiotics has to deal a great deal with context — who speaks what to whom, when, where, why, and how. There is no language without context or language cannot be used in isolation. Even if a man is left alone, he cannot be separated from the time
and the place. Furthermore, language does not and cannot stop whether or not we speak. (Monologue)

Language as well as its user has to do a lot with context. Scholars, ancient and modern, in India and abroad, have insisted much more on context to be the main basis for meaning. Firth views:

"Meaning ... is to be regarded as a complex of contextual relations, and phonetics, grammar, lexicology, and semantics each handles its own components of the complex in its appropriate context". (1957:19)

It reveals that the same linguistic signal used in different contexts depicts different meanings. It is also true that "the analysis of the meaning of an utterance consists in abstracting it from its actual context of utterance and splitting it up its meaning, or function into a series of component functions". (Lyons, 1977:609)

Semiotically, the word is the verbal sign. "This concept of a symbolic relationship holding between a sign and its referent, where the relationship is conventional and arbitrary, lies at the heart
of the linguistic code". (Laver and Trudgill, 1979 : 2)
That is, "the constructive quality of the word is polysemy". (Borev, 1981 : 289)

Although each and every verbal sign is a coinage of context, it derives its function from the context of utterance. Abercrombie's (1967 : 7-9) discussion shows three classes of indices in speech that reveal personal characteristics of the speaker:

(a) Those that indicate membership of a group
   (e.g. a regional or social group);
(b) those that characterize the individual;
(c) those that reveal changing states of the speaker (i.e. changing affective states).

Thus, every linguistic sign is individualized, or broadly speaking, contextualized, first and then only it is meaningful.

Language and culture provide the speaker or hearer the most powerful basis for meaning and hence it is by no means easy to distinguish between the linguistic and the non extra-linguistic contexts, for the reason that no utterance can be thought of as consisted of mere words without context; i.e.
here, we recall Peirce’s basic concept of an idex referring to its object "by virtue of being really affected by that object". To be precise, every linguistic signal used in a proper context signifies more or less the social characteristics, such as regional affiliation, social status, educational status, occupation, and social role; physical characteristics, such as age, sex, physique, and state of health; and psychological characteristics of personality and affective state — categorically termed as social, physical, and psychological makers by Laver and Trudgill (1979).

The most important role of context in a work of art is a bit different from the day-to-day use of language. According to Borev, the language of art is the meta-sign of artistic culture. He explains this contention as follows:

"in art, the system of meanings and senses of sounds takes the form of the artistic image which in terms of semiotics is an artistic statement. This type of statement carries artistic, universally human, non-utilitarian information while being of the nature of a sign in its origin and being expressed by signs
the artistic image is not itself a sign... An artistic text appear by transition from the level of signs to the level of object-semantic level (meta-sign). The attitude to the world and its values contained in the art work is realised in disappearing signs, in a sign system that dissolves itself. An artistic text refers us not to language but to the interpenetrating materiality and spirituality in the inner world of the Gorh". (Borev 1981 : 287-8)

In everyday life, appropriate language may depend on different combinations of:

1. sender
2. receiver
3. message form
4. channel (e.g. speech verses writing)
5. code (e.g. dialect, language or jargon)
6. topic
7. setting or situation (e.g. Stubbs, 1983 : 46-47)

Stubbs proposes that "any analysis of language in use will ultimately stand or fall on its success in analysing what people actually say to each other in real social situations". (Stubbs, 1983 : 47)
Thus, the role of context in semiotics is concerned more with identification of who speaks what to whom when and where than any thing else. Context correlates the signal with the person, object, place, time, place already referred to in the utterance and minimizes ambiguity in communication.

2.3. **Deictic Elements**

'Deixis' is a Greek word meaning 'pointing' or 'indicating'. (cf. Lyons, 1977 : 636 ; Hendricks, 1976 : 67-68) It is a term generally used for reference of linguistic items to the extra-linguistic context in an utterance. That is, some linguistic elements require contextual information for their interpretation (Brown and Yule, 1983 : 27). The extra-linguistic bearing of information, such as 'have, now, I, you, this, that' etc., requires a solid base for interpretation, which scholars like Hymes, Lewis call 'ethnographic features'. Hymes checklist of ethnographic
features offers one characterization of context to which we can relate such deictic elements. A more elaborate checklist is provided by the philosopher Luis (1972), whose interests lie, not with these general features of the communicative event, but with those particular coordinates which constitute 'a package of relevant factors, an index' (1972 - 173).

The coordinates of the index are specified as follows:

(a) **Possible world coordinate** : this is to account for states of affairs which 'might be', 'could be', 'supposed to be' or 'are'

(b) **Time coordinate** : to account for tensed sentences and adverbials like 'today' or 'next week'

(c) **Place coordinate** : to account for sentences like 'here it is'

(d) **Speaker coordinate** : to account for sentences which include first person reference ('I, me, we, our', etc.)

(e) **Audience coordinate** : to account for sentences including 'you, yours, yourself', etc.

(f) **Indicated object coordinate** : to account for sentences containing demonstrative phrases like 'this, those', etc.
(g) **Previous discourse coordinate**: to account for sentences including phrases like 'the latter, the aforementioned', etc.

(h) **Assignment coordinate**: an infinite series of Things (sets of things, sequences of things ...)

Thus we can conclude, as Lyons writes, "By deixis is meant the location and identification of persons, objects, events, processes and activities being talked about, or referred to, in relation to the spatiotemporal context created and sustained by the act of utterance and the participation in it, typically, of a single speaker and at least one addressee". (1977: 637) He further adds that, "the canonical situation of utterance is egocentric in the sense that the speaker, by virtue of being the speaker, casts himself in the role of ego and relates everything to his viewpoint". (Ibid. : 638)

Deixis proper refers to the orientational features of language, which are relative to the time and place of utterance. In written language, the reader and the writer are not in the same spatio-temporal situation. However, there are instances in which the speaker and the hearer are not always in the same
spatio-temporal situation, even then the conversation goes on successfully, e.g. a long distance telephone conversation, while it is true that the temporal and spatial displacement can obviously be much greater in written language, datelines in newspapers, copyright information in books, etc. can all serve to establish the deictic coordinates that hold for the writer, so that the reader can properly interpret any deictic elements present in the text (cf. Hendricks, 1976: 67-68).

2.4. Reference

In general, "Reference deals with the relationship between the linguistic elements — words, sentences, etc., and the non-linguistic world of experience" (Valmer, 1976: 30). But, specifically, Linguistic signals do not always refer to things as it were "It is the speaker, who refers by using some appropriate expression" (Lyons, 1977: 177). Thus,
reference is treated as an action on the part of the speaker (Brown & Yule, 1983: 28). This pragmatic view of reference is also supported by Strawson (1950) and Searle (1979).

Experience of the world varies from man to man and so does reference of a signal to the thing. Arbitrariness of meaning is based upon this varying nature of reference. This is why writers have to struggle a lot for appropriate reference by means of different expressions of the same message. "Referential meaning, then, seems to be a characteristic of sentences" (Palmer, 1976: 102) and, it is well proved, the sum of word-meanings does not and cannot be equivalent to the sentence meaning. Talking about the weather, politics, the education-system, unemployment, etc. are some of the examples of day-to-day life, which everybody knows how nonsensical it is to indulge oneself in matters like these!

2.5. Presupposition

Presupposition is one among many pragmatic issues of conversational communication in that two persons
cannot converse with each other unless they have some common assumptions, beliefs, conventions", etc. irrespective of whether or not the sentences are true. Givon (1979 : 50) defines it as the assumption the speaker makes about what the hearer is likely to accept without challenge. Stalnaker has put it as a common ground for both the speaker and the hearer:

"Presuppositions are what is taken by the speaker to be the common ground of the participants in the conversation". (Stalnaker, 1978 : 321)

Here, it should be noted, the source of presupposition is the speaker (Brown & Yule, 1983 : 29) only because the speaker is the initial part in a conversation and it is his ability to judge by intuition or experience what actually the common ground might be.

Venneman's (1975 : 314) approach throws light on the issue pragmatically in that each participant in a discourse has a presupposition pool and his pool is added to as the discourse proceeds. Each participant also behaves as if there exists only one presupposition pool shared by all participants in the discourse. Venneman emphasizes that this is true in 'a normal honest discourse' (Brown & Yule, 1983 : 80).
2.6. **Implicature**

'Implicature' is the term used by Grice (1975) to account for what is speaker can imply, suggest, or mean, as distinct from what the speaker literally says (Brown & Yule, 1983: 31). That is, "the notion of implicature rests upon a distinction between what is actually said and what is implied (but not entailed) in saying what is said".

(Lyons, 1977: 592)

According to Grice, there are, in principle, two types of implicature — conventional and conversational. The former is determined by the conventional meaning of the words used (Grice, 1975: 44) whereas the latter is the result of a general principle of conversation plus a number of maxims which speakers would normally obey (cf. Lyons, 1975: 593; Brown & Yule, 1983: 31).

Grice has laid down some conditions, called maxims, from which are derived implicatures as under (cf. Lyons, 1977: 593):

(a) **Quantity**:

(i) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purpose of the exchange);

(ii) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

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(b) **Quality**: Try to make your contribution one that is true:

(i) Do not say what you believe to be false;

(ii) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

(c) **Relation**: Be relevant.

(d) **Manner**: Be perspicuous:

(i) Avoid obscurity of expression;

(ii) Avoid ambiguity;

(iii) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity);

(iv) Be orderly.

The maxims mentioned above are supported by the "co-operative principle" as propagated by Grice (1975: 45) thus:

"Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged".

It appears, the speaker and the listener use their common knowledge in conversation. By the term 'co-operative principle' is meant "a tacit understanding of just how much the speaker should actually say, how much
leave unsaid, and how meanings are to be 'implicated' beyond what is actually said. By this set of conversation what the speaker says should be relevant, sufficient in quantity and adequate in presentation for the purpose of giving the required information, and yet only as detailed as is necessary" (Allerton, 1979 : 266).

Stubbs (1983), however, presents another aspect of implicature, which provides ambiguity to be denial or falsehood. "A characteristic of implicatures is that they can be cancelled. They may be denied without logical contradiction. (They are a relatively safe way to tell lies, since they cannot be denied !). They are therefore essentially 'ambiguous" (Stubbs, 1983 : 209-210).

2.7. **Inference**

One of the pragmatic concepts in discourse analysis is inference which plays a vital role in the
exchange of information in conversation. Actually speaking, the hearer does not and cannot have direct access to what the speaker actually intends in producing an utterance, rather "he often has to rely on a process of inference to arrive at an interpretation for utterances or for the connections between utterances" (Brown & Yule, 1983: 33). Thus, inference depends on the hearer's capability.

"Once one goes beyond the strictly factual considerations of 'who', 'what', and 'when' questions, the need for inference becomes very obvious. If 'how' and 'why' questions are asked, we immediately have to make what Warren et al (1979) describe as 'elaborative' and 'evaluative' inferences" (Brown & Yule, Ibid. 268).

As concerns the elaborative inference, we are used to deciding how an action or event took place, whereas in evaluative inference our endeavour is towards justifying whether or not an event took place.

"A large part of our comprehension of what we read and hear (and see, no doubt) is, after all, a product of our making sense of the motivations, goals, plans and reasons of participants in described
or witnessed events. Evaluative inferences must clearly be based on more than the reader's (or hearer's) interpretation of the literal description of events in the text (or conversation) ...

Such inferences will readily be made by a reader (or a hearer) to try to account for behaviour which is described, but not explained, in a text (or conversation). They represent the open-ended aspect of 'filling gaps' ..." (Brown & Yule, 1983: 268).

2.8. Coherence

Coherence or cohesion in discourse is the quality of sticking together of different signals in an utterance by way of hyponymy, collocability, comparison, repetition, substitution, consistent tense, etc. (cf. Brown & Yule, 1983: 194). This is the basic need for texture in language use and whose function is to relate utterances to the context in which they are
produced (cf. Halliday, 1970; Halliday & Hasan, 1976). "These text-forming, or contextualizing, resources may be lexical, grammatical or phonological. For example, such word-forms as 'however' or 'moreover' never occur in what we take to be the system-sentences of English: their function is exclusively that of relating the text-sentences in which they occur to the preceding co-text. Such word-forms as 'but' and 'and', on the other hand, have both a contextualizing and a non-contextualizing function" (Lyons, 1977: 632).