CHAPTER III

Portuguese Conquest and the Restructuring of the Port-City of Goa: 1510-1540

Portuguese conquest of Goa, which ushered in a new policy of land-based expansion of the Portuguese from the purely sea-based activities, brought new types of meanings for the process of urbanization in Goa. For the first time, the Portuguese had occupied a city in Asia with the use of force and coercion, which were further banked upon to restructure the existing port-city of Goa in a way entirely different from their other earlier possessions in Malabar, which they had obtained from local rulers as gifts and donations. In Malabar the tools of coercions and control were the military fleets—the Portuguese armadas—patrolling the western coast of India with artilleries; and, permits called cartazes. Cartazes were safety conducts for navigation issued by the Portuguese to native ships, with the exclusive view of showing that these vessels did not belong to the enemy camp. The underlying logic of the state-backed mercantile enterprise in Malabar had been to widen its profit margin in pepper trade by the twin strategies of engrossing abundant cargos at lower prices fixed arbitrarily by the Estado da India (which fell way beneath the market rates); and, monopolizing sale of spices in Europe through conditions determined by the Casa da India at Lisbon. In Malabar indigenous co-operation was

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3 The Casa da India or India House managed a variety of fiscal issues regarding the India trade such as contracting traders on behalf of king, organizing the Carreira da India (India fleets), supervising
essential to carry out the Indo-European trade of the Portuguese, which factor necessitated them to allow the co-existence of native towns in the vicinity of Portuguese settlements that they had developed as European towns in Malabar. Contemporaries hint at the beginning of a new trend with the territorial conquest of the port city of Goa. The attempts crafting of an exclusive Lusitanian city and the erasing of native elements newly evolving city, conceptually tallied with the Estado’s suzerainty over the Asian seas in general, and, the western coast of India in particular.

Within Konkan the Portuguese conquests in 1510 A.D consisted of the south Konkan port of Goa and the adjacent city of the Adil Shahi rulers apart from the rest of the island of Tiswadi, Chorão, Divar, Vamsim and Zuve. The port-city along with its satellite ports of Raibandar and Panjim and the rural hinterland that was encircled by the river systems of the Zuari and the Mandovi were identified as the Ilha de Goa (Island of Goa) in the Portuguese cartographical depictions. Often the Portuguese conquest of Goa was viewed as stemming from its geo-political importance. Its excellent harbor and strategic placement enables the Portuguese to use it as a military base for maintaining vigil over native ships, cruising the key economic ports of Malabar and Gujarat to check traffic in contraband commodities such as spices, textiles, arms, timber and even hostile foreigners. On the landward side the Western Ghats protected it from the land-based regional political powers and enabled ghat-route trade through the mountain passes. Thus the Estado’s immediate engagements in the conquered port-city was dictated by its objectives of asserting Lusitanian suzerainty over the maritime commercial traffic; and, to capitalize

the developmental activities of the colonies, arranging the loading and unloading of vessels, determining sale price of contraband commodities like pepper and other spices to the European traders at Lisbon etc. For details on function and composition of the Casa da India at Lisbon see Philomena Sequeira Anthony, The Goa-Bahia Intra-Colonial Relations 1675-1825. Tellicherry: IRISH, 2004, pp. 23, 24.

The Commentaries of The Great Afonso D Albuquerque, Part III, p. 14


See Map 1; also see Appendices 2.1; 2.2.
on the lucrative horse trade between Goa and Hormuz earning significant revenue by supplying Arabian steeds to the inland kingdoms of Vijayanagara and Bijapur. On re-analyzing contemporary letters of Dom Afonso de Albuquerque; correspondence between the various institutions of Goa and the Rei (Portuguese king); the Viceroy’s alvaras directing city evolution and traveler’s narratives linkages between the urbanization of the port city of Goa and the Estado’s larger objectives in Asian trade become evident.

Thus the chapter traces how territorial conquest was followed by a consciously cultivated European urban layout and institutions, to which the evolving socio-economic processes were made to get focused in the urban space during the period between 1510 and 1540 A.D. An attempt would be made to re-interpret city plans as it evolved in this first phase of Portuguese occupation (reconstructed through analysis of primary records) to study unanswered angles in the Portuguese conquest and restructuring of the port city. Furthermore investigations into why and how did the urban development occur under State benefices—even though the Estado faced fiscal bottlenecks in this period and decided upon Goa replacing Cochin as the Capital city at a much later date—would be undertaken. Correspondingly, it engages with the study of multiple processes linking the trajectory of urbanization in this phase with the Empire’s larger mercantilist orientations to control Asian trade particularly from the Eastern littoral regions of the Indian Ocean, such as the ports of Bengal, the Indonesian archipelago, China etc, which were not the military strongholds of the Estado da India unlike coastal western India.

**Historical Overview: Changing Orientations and Conquest of the Port City.**

By 1505, the objectives of profit maximization shaped the engagements of the Portuguese, as a mercantilist power, within the politico-economic fabric of the Malabar Coast by securing alliances with the local rulers and indulging in acts of coercion to ensure the accelerated flow of pepper supplies to the Portuguese factory at Cochin. Thus under the first Viceroy Dom Francesco de Almeida, the Estado da India’s strategies
involved controlling the Asian trade in pepper with the Red Sea ports through heavy naval patrolling of the western coast of India. This measure was prompted by the interests of the maritime mercantile power in blocking commercial linkages between the spice supplying ports of Malabar and the Red Sea ports. Furthermore, attempts at controlling the diversion of the pepper supply to alternate channels through the coastal networking of indigenous Muslim traders of Malabar such as the Marakkar and Mappila merchants with the Islamic traders from Egypt and Persia prompted constant naval vigilance by the Portuguese. However the flourishing "illicit" trade of the private Portuguese traders (of Malabar) in contraband commodities eschewed the Estado's attempts at monopolizing the accumulation and flow of spices. Similarly by 1509, conditions of outright confrontation peaked with the formation of alliances between the maritime mercantile kingdoms of the Mameluks of Egypt, the Christian Venetians, the Turks and the quasi-mercantile state of Calicut contesting Portuguese monopoly claims over pepper trade. Such tense conditions reveal the serious reaction of regional


10 Collaboration between the private Portuguese traders of Malabar and the indigenous Muslims in the 'illegal' maritime trade in contraband spices especially pepper with the merchants of Persia, Egypt and to Coromandel sea ports have been traced by Pius Malekandathil, Portuguese Cochin, pp. 127-133; 221-26

merchants and kingdoms to the threat posed by the mercantilist Lusitanians. This in turn prompted Almeida to use the dual tools of regular naval patrolling of the west coast; and, attempt at “sealing off the mouth of the Red Sea” so that “no more spices can pass through to the land of the (Mameluk) Sultan, and everyone in India would give up the fantasy of being able to trade with anyone save us……”

viz constructing fortresses in Socotra, Sofala, Angedive Islands and Quilon in Malabar. An important precondition to the successful implementation of such experiments was to possess substantial reserves of capital and human resources.

Herein was exposed the internal contradictions manifesting the first phase of the Portuguese engagements in the East. The funds allocated by Lisbon were either too late by the time they reached the political headquarters of the evolving Estado da India at Cochin; or, too little (insufficient) to purchase even the necessary cargos of pepper to be sent when the Carreira da India (fleets to India) arrived. Almeida’s governance continued the earlier emphasis on enriching the State coffers through tribute collection from the subjugated regional kingdoms and looting those indigenous mercantile ships that sailed without the Portuguese license. However this couldn’t secure the desired funds to finance the construction of garrisoned fortresses and constant naval patrolling of the western Indian littoral by the armadas. Furthermore, inherent contradictions within the Estado’s became more pronounced evident by the second decade of the sixteenth century with the Crown preferring the payment of salaries of its officials with various commercial privileges and perquisites such as right to collect returns from certain taxes, trade concessions and cargo spaces on the Carreira ships rather than cash.

\[\text{12} \text{ Raymundo Antonio de Bulhão Pato and H.Lopes de Mendonca (eds.), Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque seguidas de documentos que as elucidam, 7 Volumes, Lisboa, 1884 -1935. Tomo II, p 311.}]

\[\text{13} \text{ For details on how the corsair activities of the Portuguese and the division of the loot between the Crown, Viceroy, captains, crew members etc see Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Portuguese Empire in Asia , pp 60, 61, 62.}]

concessions fuelled the greed of the captains and officials who collaborated with private Portuguese traders and used native ships for trading contraband spices parallel to the official trade network. This further crippled the financial reserves of the Estado as it deprived them of important customs revenues and loss of spice cargos. Aggravated by the financial crunch was the serious crisis in manpower particularly soldiers and Portuguese civilians to serve in the lower administrative ranks and mercantile ships. With its headquarters at Cochin, the Estado depended upon the trickling supplies of soldiers and personnel from Portugal to carry on its military and mercantile enterprise in Asia.

In this respect, Albuquerque’s ascendance as the governor of the Estado by 1509 marked in some respect change despite the broader continuation of the earlier trajectory of mercantile expansion. Afonso de Albuquerque brought his predecessor’s ambitions to a logical culmination by establishing fortresses at Goa (1510), Malacca (1511), Calicut (1513) and Hormuz (1515). Soon a militarized chain of control through Portuguese factories and fortresses was established marking the fringes of the Indian Ocean littoral which were all largely answerable to the Viceroy. However explaining Albuquerque’s experiments as just an extension of the military orientations in a fidalgo dominated Estado marginalizes the mercantile and financial calculations of the governor. This indicates how Albuquerque’s conquests reflect the fledging attempts of the governor at enriching the State treasury through generating funds from within the Estado’s enterprise in Asia. Thus his command over the ports of Goa, Malacca and Hormuz can be seen as strategies to concentrate revenues and resources of the commercially thriving and

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15 For details on the evolution of the Portuguese state within mercantilist conceptual frame see Pius Malekandathil, “Maritime Malabar and a Mercantile State: Polity and State Formation in Malabar under the Portuguese, 1498-1663”, in K.S.Mathew(ed.), Maritime Malabar and the Europeans, Gurgaon, 2003, pp.197-215. For details on the dearth of material and human resources that the Portuguese experienced initially see Pius Malekandathil, Portuguese Cochin, pp. 160-6


economically rich port centers for use in his multiple projects of military and commercial expansion as well as securing the defenses of significant spice producing zones of Asia. Contemporary references to Albuquerque’s mercantile zeal which prompted him to re-negotiate with the Adil Shah and Vijayanagara rulers after the conquest of Goa for continuing the previous mercantile linkages of the port city with inland markets and production centers through peace and friendship with the neighboring non-Christian rulers\(^\text{18}\) corroborate our deductions on the changed strategies of the new Governor. The lack of adequate and quantifiable data for tabulating the total volume of mercantile goods exchanged at the port city of Goa, tax collections and its percentage-wise contribution to the State treasury of this period necessitates a re-analysis of Albuquerque’s experiments in the urban re-organization of the port-city and how became an instrument through which the \textit{Estado’s} mercantile tentacles were extended to regions east of the Coromandal coast for engrossing the sophisticated spices\(^\text{19}\) and textiles, from the supplying ports in the Indonesian archipelago and Bengal respectively.

\textbf{Formation of Lusitanian City in Goa: Restructuring and Repopulating the Urban Space.}

The \textit{Estado’s} changed strategy of land oriented expansion became evident in the conquest and fortification of Goa, Malacca and Hormuz. Administratively, till 1530 the municipality of Goa and the provincial officers of the \textit{Estado} such as a captain, factor, customs officials etc., managed the city of Goa and the State concerns respectively. While some urban structures and the main church were established on the ruins of the mosques and used the materials of the desecrated non-Christian religious edifices;\(^\text{20}\) the cityscape also witnessed continuities with the \textit{Estado’s} retaining certain Adil Shahi buildings—such

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{The Commentaries of The Great Afonso D Alboquerque, Part III.} pp 38, 39.  
\textsuperscript{19} Sophisticated spices comprised cloves, mace, nutmeg etc., supplied from Malacca and the Indonesian archipelago. Such spices especially cloves were available in only limited quantities to the \textit{Estado} for re-export to Europe.  
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{The Commentaries of The Great Afonso D Alboquerque,} part III, p 17.
as the politico-administrative edifices (the Palace of the Adil Shah Sultans, the fortress Palace etc) apart from the arsenal and the dockyard—though with slight alterations. Correspondence of the Estado officials and Portuguese traders with the Rei portray how under Albuquerque the conquered territories of Goa were to be governed by the Viceroy than being placed under puppet local governors such as the Hindu collaborator Timoja. As part of the new administrative and defense related rearrangements of Albuquerque, a number of measures were undertaken including drafting new policies and changes in the pre-existent demographic composition and settlement patterns within the port city of Goa. Despite the widespread protest of the Portuguese officials and mercantile elites to the unprofitable drain triggered by Albuquerque’s experiments, the governor’s calculations in consolidating the Estado’s hold over the geo-politically strategic harbor of Goa; and, harnessing the wealth accumulating potential of the commercial port-city aimed at filling State coffers. The fact that the twin politico-commercial advantages of the port of Goa had entered the knowledge circulation process of the Portuguese can be corroborated by Tome Pires’ narrative on the port’s centrality in controlling the maritime spice trade with Malabar and Banda in pepper and mace; and, the harbor offering a

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21 For details on the invitation and assistance of Timoja (the Hindu feudatory of Vijayanagara), his later day altercation with Albuquerque on being denied governorship of Goa and the administrative rearrangements effected by the Portuguese governor including pro-Hindu policies and direct control of the port city of Goa see V T Gune, Gazetteer of Goa Daman and Diu, pp.141-142.


23 The initial measures towards this can be traced in Albuquerque’s permission to the Portuguese soldiers to marry and co-habit with native women, especially Muslim women and produce mixed-blood offsprings who would be Christian and Portuguese in aesthetic. See K.M Panikkar, Malabar and the Portuguese, 1500-1663, Bombay, 1929, p 84.

24 For details on opponents to Albuquerque’s experiments in Goa particularly using casados as unnecessary “loss of State property” and the list of the Portuguese officials and elites who opposed him see The Commentaries of The Great Afonso D Albuquerque, Part III, pp 42, 43.

sound base to launch military offensives on the neighboring economies. Furthermore assurances of the governor to the urban residents (mostly Hindus) to protect their rights and customs and imposing on the residents of Goa obligation to pay their inheritance shares, rent money, taxes and other charges to the Portuguese king (rather than their local lords and chieftains) reveal new strategies of the early colonial State to control and redirect the flow and concentration of resources from such conquered territories to the State treasury. This enables us to venture beyond the literal interpretation of the narratives which color Albuquerque’s acts—granting significant offices to the members of his family members within the conquered zones—resulting from the personal interest of enrichment by the governor.

Concurrently, the reactions and prejudices of the powerful trading-cum-official class of the middle nobility based in Malabar and interested at enriching themselves through illicit trade in spices with the Red Sea ports suggest alternate angles to the governor’s actions. Indirectly their dissent with Albuquerque’s experiments (especially his establishment of central command system) suggests the governor’s attempts at maximizing State’s mercantile profits and checking the drain of funds stemming from intensified official corruption. At the same time such a system would have enabled a close supervision over the redistribution of funds to finance politico-administrative and military projects of the State through the agency of such officials who were personally responsible to the

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28 Contemporary records further illustrate disobedience of the governor’s directions to secure Portuguese stronghold in Goa by dissenting officials and the latter resort to alternate maritime activities in the spice rich ports of Malacca. See *The Commentaries of The Great Afonso D’Alboquerque*, Part III, pp 48-51, 53, 54.
29 Attempts of the governor in concentrating and redirecting all maritime trade in horses and other lucrative goods towards Goa (after their defeat of the Adil Shahs in 1510) through grants of privileges, military and naval pressure etc. See *The Commentaries of The Great Afonso D’Alboquerque*, Part III, pp 39, 40.
governor. In this context the critique by these Portuguese elites branding Albuquerque’s engagements in Goa as a commercially and financially disastrous project can be investigated as the changed strategies (under the new governor) to maximize profits for the mercantilist State. Thus contemporaries\textsuperscript{30} refer to Albuquerque’s immediate concerns after the conquest of the Adil Shahi port-town as heralding a significant change in the previous spatial layout and demographic patterns. Integral to the attempts of the early colonial State at centralized control was the urban administrative and military rearrangement. Furthermore, a new class of urban citizens namely the Portuguese \textit{casados} who were ethnically Portuguese and religiously Christian were systematically cultivated through intermarriages with native women.

This rising class of Goan \textit{casados} (literally married men)\textsuperscript{31} comprised primarily of the mercenary Portuguese soldiers (\textit{soldados}), convicts, criminals and exiles (\textit{desperados/desegredados}) from Lisbon,\textsuperscript{32} artisans and commoners\textsuperscript{33} engaging in mixed marriages with the Hindu and Muslim women of Goa to form a permanent settler community of traders and skilled labourers. Thus by 1530s there were in Goa “many Portuguese men who live here are married in Portugal and marry here again.”\textsuperscript{34} Often majority of the \textit{Estado’s}

\textsuperscript{30} The Commentaries of The Great Afonso DAlboquerque., Part II, pp 101-102; Part III, p 17; Philip Baldeus, A True and Exact Description of The Most Celebrated East-India Coasts of Malabar and Coromandel and Also of the Isle of Ceylon. New Delhi, Asian Educational Services (AES), 2000, p. 606.

\textsuperscript{31} Casados are defined as Portuguese or part Portuguese men who were married and settled in Asia, See Philip Baldeus, A True and Exact Description of The Most Celebrated East-India Coasts, p 608; C.R. Boxer, Portuguese Sea-Borne Empire, 1415-1825. London 1969. pp 296-297.

\textsuperscript{32} The official elites classified the \textit{casados} as coming from the class of ruffian low borne soldiers, mariners and exiles. For details see Gaspar Correa, \textit{Lendas da India}, tom. II, p. 159.


\textsuperscript{34} Letter of Father Vincente de Laguna to the king dated 1530 in Silva Rego (ed), Documentação para a Historia das Missões, vol.II, p.195
population were militarily skilled officials (belonging to the upper and middling nobility of Portugal) and soldiers. However, the dwindling of the military might of the Estado with low supplies of men and resources from Portugal; the desertion of the military men to indigenous rulers to reap better profits; the ambitions of the fidalgos (upper class nobles-cum-officials) to return back to Portugal after reaping quick profits from India; and, the inability of the depleted State treasury to lure Portuguese manpower explain how and why Albuquerque initiated measures to consolidate a loyalist civil population who would provide the administrative and social base for the Portuguese empire in the East. Concurrently, the strategies of the colonial State under Albuquerque and subsequent governors such as Lopo Soares de Albergia (1515-1518), Nuno da Cunha (1529-1538) etc., were geared towards populating the port-city with Portuguese loyalists who would slowly and gradually involve themselves with the intra-Asian trade in spices and textiles, availing cargo for the Lisbon-bound vessels of the Portuguese crown. The early colonial interests of the State envisioned the use of such Portuguese intra-Asian traders and artisans as political tools to penetrate into the neighboring economies. Written sources record the intensified expenses of the crown and the declining returns from the gold mines of S. Jorge da Mina by the second and third decades of the sixteenth century. This suggests that the fiscal remittances from Lisbon to the Estado sharply deteriorated during the 1520s and 1530s rendering it inevitable for the redistributive early colonial State to

37 The Commentaries of The Great Afonso D Alboquerque, Part III, p 41.
38 Figures on the quantities of gold shipped from São Jorge da Mina from 1521 to 1530 suggest a spiraling decline in the Estado's income and the gold reserves of the royal treasury in a period of increased military and naval expenditure. This must have substantially affected the remittances to India from Lisbon. It was only by 1532 that the gold shipment rose substantially to 679 kgs. relative to the 428 kgs. of 1521 and 150 kgs. of 1530. For details see Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial, vol. I Lisboa, 1982., p 173.
buffer its fiscal and mercantile resources through the agency of the casado traders of Goa and the extraction and concentration of wealth from its various spheres of influence in Asia. Thus the strategy throughout the period between 1510 and 1540 comprised of the twin agenda to tighten the Estado’s grip over the maritime mercantile world of the Indian Ocean and cultivate a class of commercially oriented casados at Goa owing loyalty to the early colonial State and supplying cargo to the Lisbon-bound vessels. This can be inferred from the series of commercial and mercantile privileges encouraging (by empowering) the evolution of the Goan casados as substantial intra-Asian maritime traders, who with the help of the traditional mercantile networks of the indigenous merchants began to establish relative hold over the ports of Coromandel, Bengal, Malacca and Moluccas. Such developments ensured the flow and concentration of mercantile wealth into the hands of the Portuguese casado class; and, a steady supply of exportable commodities to the Estado’s warehouse at Goa for further transshipment to Lisbon.

Thus the conquest of Goa was followed by Albuquerque’s initial experiments in repopulating the port-city with Portuguese casados, as evidenced in his offering significant gifts of land, house, administrative posts and dowry of 18,000 reis to such men who married native women in Goa. Between 1510-1512 other privileges and honors (apart from the cash dowries and grants of land by the State) were also granted to encourage mixed marriages. Thus, erstwhile soldiers married and settled in Goa were exempted from military and naval services unless Goa was itself under attack from

40 The gifts of land, money, house and minor jobs in city administration in Alvara of the King to Afonso de Albuquerque in Silva Rego, Documentação para a Historia das Missões, I, p. 118; Also see K.M. Panikkar, Malabar and the Portuguese, p.84.
41 Both the movable and immovable properties that the native women inherited or were entitled to inherit from their fathers or husbands were granted to the casados who married them. See The Commentaries of The Great Afonso da Albuquerque, Vol III, pp 41-42.
mainland (Bijapuri) forces. Likewise fiscal advantages such as exemption from paying taxes to the royal treasury and allowing all citizens to navigate freely and bring foodstuff and other goods to the city without paying import taxes were also granted to these Goan casados. To encourage these casados as petty traders Albuquerque permitted them to set up shops and manufacturing units including shoe making, baking and tailoring. The Governor’s letter to the Rei in 1513 shows the active engagement of such casados in seastate selling wholesale cargos as he narrates,

“Your people travel securely all over India by land and sea.....they buy and sell all over the Malabar area.”

Albuquerque also used the resident casados to fill up lower ranks in the city administration such as the office of aldermen, market inspectors, justices of peace, police constables etc.47 His charter of privileges sent for royal confirmation in 151548 reveal the governor’s attempts at reserving municipal offices (barring the crown nominated higher administrative posts such as city captain, head constable and factory clerk) for these Portuguese married settlers. Similarly, the casados elected as office holders from within the city of Goa were further empowered through privileges such as protection against imprisonment during their term of office and proposing that no appeal could be raised against the judgment of the market inspectors beyond the municipal board.

44 The increase in the shops and petty business enterprises in Goa along with the increase in number of Portuguese permanent settlers in Goa is testified by Gaspar Correa, Lendas da India, tom. II, p.159.
45 Antonio da Silva Rego, Documentação para a Historia das Missões (1500-1542) Vol.I, doc.44, p.118; Also see Panikkar, Malabar and the Portuguese, p 84.
47 The Commentaries of The Great Afonso D Alboquerque, Part III, p 41.
48 Teotonio de Souza, Medieval Goa, p 133; Mathias Mundadan, History of Christianity, Vol I, p 441.
These powers and privileges conferred to the *casado* citizens of Goa elevated the social status of these migrants often of humble origins and low birth (*gente miuda*)⁴⁹ to share the same social platform as the high borne State officials⁵⁰ and equivalent to the *homens bons* (good gentlemen) and *cidadãos honrados* (honored citizens) of Iberia. Albuquerque’s vision to create a permanent community of citizens owing their loyalties to the mother country but residing and serving the *Estado* in India is corroborated by his letter to the king in November 1514 on the *casados*, their Portuguese aesthetics and expansion of the loyalist base “through breeding sons and daughters.”⁵¹ Furthermore his correspondences with the *Rei* unveil the calculations at substituting the indigenous merchants and skilled and unskilled residents of the port city with these Portuguese migrant. This prompted the Albuquerque to request the *Rei* permission to depopulate the port-city of its non-Christian population as an effective solution to tackle the problem of space when the Portuguese citizens proliferate in Goa.⁵² Concurrently it would have facilitated the extractive State to rally administrative, fiscal and military services from these Portuguese sea-traders, artisans, craftsmen and shopkeepers.⁵³ Thus these *moradores casados* with their social moorings in the Lusitanian city of Goa were to be the tools for providing material and physical assistance to the *Estado* in its expansionist and defensive ventures within Asia.

This reveals how Albuquerque’s strategy envisioned primarily the second generation of *casados* as the colonial community who with their attachment to the soil and socio-

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⁴⁹ Linschoten notes how these low born Portuguese settlers were honoured with titles such as “*hommes honorados*” apart from other ranks on account of their military assistance to the State. See John Linschoten, *The Voyage of John Huyghen Van Linschoten*, vol I, pp 188-189.

⁵⁰ George Winius describes the administrative apparatus of the *Estado* in the initial few years as “a vehicle for defense” rather than one decided on grounds of meritocracy. As the State officials were appointed directly to the Crown they did not owe allegiance to the Viceroy. See, Winius, ‘Military and Diplomatic Processes’, p 334.


culturally Portuguese identity would not desert to the rivaling neighbors lured by better prospects. By 1520's a collectivity of citizens or a Portuguese civil society got shaped and incorporated into the urban space of Portuguese Goa—from both the descendants of the first generation of casados and new additions from Portugal—that were sustained by trade and keen on developing the private initiatives of its members. Confirmation to such a repopulating of the city with casados in addition to the floating population of Portuguese officials, fidalgos and soldiers on the one hand and Hindu, Muslims and other merchants on the other hand can be gained through contemporary demographic indexes. Figures derived from the number of intermarriages suggest that in the initial few years of Albuquerque’s governance more than 100 casado families resided in the port-city and by 1515 A.D the number swelled to 200 casados in the city. By 1524 the total number of Portuguese married men shot up to 450, in 1527 by 500 and in 1529 by 800. The growth of the casado population and the cropping up of clusters of Portuguese resident traders in ports of Bengal, Coromandel, Malacca, Moluccas etc has been linked to the lure of commercial profits following Governor Lopo Soares de Albergaria’s liberalization of commerce termed as his policy of ‘great freedom’ (grande soltura) in the eastern space of Indian Ocean by 1515. Tome Pires’ too hints at the increasing mercantile engagements and presence of the Goan traders in Bengal offering insights into the expanding world of the Goan casados. Thus despite the earlier disfavor of the crown by 1513 in granting fiscal dowries and administrative offices to men marrying indigenous

57 Mathias Mundadan, History of Christianity in India, Vol I, p 441.
58 Letter of Domingo Mariz written to the Crown dated 11-3-1529 in Gavetas 20-2-23 cited by Pius Malekandathil, ‘City in Space and Metaphor’, p.19
59 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Portuguese Empire in Asia, pp 71-72.
women;\(^{61}\) the commercial ambient of the evolving city of Goa continued to attracted successive groups of Portuguese migrants. The rising urban index of the 1520s and 1530s can be linked to both the 1518 Charter of privileges defining the immunities and privileges to the urban residents of Portuguese Goa; and, the intensified exodus of Portuguese from Lisbon to resettle in Goa owing to recurrent famines and pestilences in Portugal from 1521 to 1524, and, 1530-31. The 1518 Charter of privileges annulled earlier concessions such as freedom of the *casados* to trade in contraband spices,\(^{62}\) exemption from contributing to works of public utility and freedom from imprisonment and confiscation of property by State authorities;\(^{63}\) but defined the rights of the Portuguese citizens of Goa to urban representative government through an elected municipality having administrative immunities and resources derived from the confiscated land of the previous Muslim inhabitants. The termination of the crown monopoly over spice trade in Malacca and Moluccas by 1533 and 1537 also boosted the involvement of *casados* in the maritime mercantile trade in erstwhile contraband commodities such as cloves, nutmeg, mace and other sophisticated spices from the Indonesian archipelago to the *Estado*’s factory at Goa and can be linked to the threefold increase in the total Portuguese city dwellers of Goa by late 1530’s and early 1540’s. By 1543 sources estimate the Portuguese citizens of Goa at about 4,600 residents (with 1,600

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\(^{61}\) Albuquerque’s letter to king dated Goa, 3\(^{\text{rd}}\) December 1513 detailing on the governors discontinuation of encouraging such mixed marriages following royal orders and how the marriages that continued even after that were often in his absence. See Silva Rego, *Documentação para a História das Missões, vol.1* (1500-1542), p. 193.

\(^{62}\) The contraband commodities in which private trade by both State officials and Portuguese men apart from Indian traders was prohibited comprised of pepper, cloves, ginger, cinnamon, mace, nutmeg, lacre, silk and borax. For details see Alvara of king Dom Manuel dated 1520 translation in Pearson, ‘Corruption and Corsairs’, pp 26-27.

\(^{63}\) J H da Cunha Rivara (ed.), *Archivo Portuguez-Oriental, Fasc. II*, p.9
being citizens and the rest 3,000 soldados) relative to the 1,000 Portuguese in the city during 1529 A.D.

These demographic estimates and the steady peopling of the urban center with casados reveals the efforts of the early colonial State in the first phase of its conquest and domination of Goa to consciously cultivate a Portuguese mercantilist elite in the city to substitute and eventually reduce the dominance of Hindu and Islamic trading communities within the port-city. The State’s strategy in attracting the Portuguese migrants to Goa and transforming them as permanent residents to cater to the Estado’s multiple administrative and commercial needs both within the city and in Asia suggests the working of dual processes. Partly, juridical and commercial privileges were to raise the profitable intra-regional and intra-Asian commercial ventures of Goan casados. Partly, reshaping the urban space through establishing Lusitanian institutions, constructing new edifices and appropriating commercial and administrative spaces to recreate a distinctively Portuguese city sought to attract migrants to re-settle in Goa. For the Estado consolidating the settling down of trading migrants within the city space necessitated its being reshaped as an exclusively Lusitanian stronghold, where ethnic distinctiveness, besides conferring a sense of pride, was used as a logic for being united for assertions. This reflected the supremacy claims (military, commercial and cultural) of the early colonial power in the regional economic unit of the south Konkan ports. Concurrently, the private Portuguese settlers were made participants in the shaping and reshaping of the Imperial city that radiated in a semi-circular pattern around the commercial port of Goa through the tools of the camara municipal (municipality) and

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65 The figures are derived from contemporary documentation. For details see Malekandathil, ‘City in Space and Metaphor’, p.19; Also see Mathias Mundadan, History of Christianity, p 441.
66 Official correspondences and chroniclers corroborate Albuquerque’s innovations in 1512 whereby administrative posts within the city such as alderman, market inspectors, justices of peace, police constables etc, were entrusted to selected gentlemen (homens bons) possessing sufficient aptitude and elected from amongst the Goan casado. see Barros, Asia. Dos feitos que os Portuguezes fizeram
the Santa Casa de Misericordia (Holy House of Mercy). This becomes clearer through a critical and comparative analysis of the State funded institutions, humble edifices and defense arrangements in the town of the 1510s and 1520s with the urban evolution by mid and late 1530’s when fiscal contributions by both the public exchequer and private Portuguese residents were recorded. The development of various urban civil and religious institutions, structures, commercial and residential spaces during the initial years of the Lusitanian occupation of the port-city and the Estado’s transfer of the administrative capital to the Imperial city of Goa unveils the dynamics by which the socio-economic and political fortunes of the administrative cum trading class of casados were integrally linked to the continuity and dominance of the Estado in Asian waters through the port-city of Goa.

**Spatial Assertions and Construction Processes**

The analysis of urban planning reveals a European grid structure with the rua direita as the central dividing street, surrounded by concentric circles of commercial, administrative and residential spaces marking the sub-streets that converged into the straight street. Often the Lusitanian port city of Goa is seen as the direct outcome of the carving out of a completely new city (involving destruction of the pre-existing Muslim city of the Adil Shahs and grafting European urban structures) following the Portuguese intervention. Nevertheless the absolute transformation of the urban space in the 1530s can be linked to the Estado’s shift of its political headquarters from Cochin to Goa under Nuno da Cunha. Even then the fledging state’s attempts at re-structuring the urban space of Goa to suit the needs of being a power center were accelerated only after the conquest of Bardez and Salcete by 1543. Studying the evolving city layout during 1510-1540 suggests how the restructured urban space catered to the Portuguese mercantile orientation of dominating the maritime space of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Right from the very outset

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*no Descobrimento e conquista dos Mares do Oriente, Decada II, p 563; Antonio Baio (ed.), Cartas de Afonso de Albuquerque. p 133.*

67 *see illustration: City Plan 4.1.*
various structures and institutions implying power were erected in the city space, making it the administrative and military core centre of the Portuguese in Asia.

Sources refer to the appointment of Thomas Fernandes, a master builder, as the foreman of the construction works who with his retinue of twenty professional masons set about to build European styled public and private buildings and thus brought about a distinct change in the pre-existing urban landscape.\(^{68}\) While attention was given to renewing the earlier defense structures, meticulous efforts were taken to strengthen the pre-existing fort of the port-city,\(^{69}\) and maintain the city walls which were raised from time to time and retain the site of the Adil Shahi dockyard. Thus establishing the Ribeira Grande (royal shipyard) for producing and maintaining sea-going and coastal ships, refurbishing the customs house (Alfandega) for inspecting and issuing licenses (cartaz) and collecting revenues from private traders and the royal mint all portray the power claims of the Portuguese within the maritime mercantile space. Similarly the introduction of a new type of coinage and minting of new coins both big and small copper coins and bullion coins as currency\(^{70}\) at Goa under Albuquerque indicated new power claims in the resurgence of urbanization under Lusitanian occupation. Of the coins minted the popular currency remained the Xerafin, the Tanga and the Leal. Furthermore scholars visualize the Ribeira Grande as “the only area subject to any new urbanistic organization, as is clear from the tendency towards geometric layout of the surrounding roads.”\(^{71}\) Similarly the Alfandega, the Churches and Chapels marking the urban space, the residential buildings, the political

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\(^{69}\) Fonseca, *An Historical and Archaeological Sketch*, pp 142, 143.

\(^{70}\) Joseph Wicki, *Documenta Indica*, vol. XIV, pp.538-9; for the exchange rate and value of the portuguese currency introduced in Goa see Appendix 1.

\(^{71}\) Walter Rossa, *Indo-Portuguese Cities*. Lisbon, 1997, p 44; also see Penrose, *Goa—Rainha do Orient*, Lisboa, Comissao Ultramarina, 1960, p 55. Also see the grid pattern linking the Ribeira Grande with the heart of the city (comprising of the various administrative structures and the main religious institutions) through a complex of systematically arranged streets in City Plan 4.1 and 4.2.
edifices of the *Santa Casa de Misericordia* and *Camara* all were referred to being constructed in the European fashion.\(^{72}\)

The central structure in the pre-Portuguese port-city of Goa had been the Adil Shah's residential palace often known as the *Palacio de Sabao*. Portuguese conquest did not connote a destruction of this political emblem representing the might of the earlier sovereigns. Afonso de Albuquerque retained it as the official residence of the Viceroy and when Goa became the headquarters of the *Estado* the subsequent Viceroy's from Dom Nuno da Cunha (1529-1538) till Dom Afonso de Noronha (1550-1554) retained the *Palacio de Sabao* as the *Palacio de Vice-Reis*. Such developments by which the European Christian conquerors retained the palace of the indigenous Muslim ruler and appropriated it for proclaiming the Portuguese sovereignty in an alien land suggests multiple implications. Visually the takeover of the residence of the earlier power instead of its destruction and reconstruction in a Lusitanian aesthetic reveals the claims of the foreign conquering power over the indigenous traders of the urban center. Records hint at the early colonial State's emphasis on peaceful co-habitation and mutual co-operation with the indigenous Hindu merchants and artisans to ward off conflict conditions with the indigenous communities, retain the economic fabric and ensure mobilization of material and fiscal resources from the hinterland villages to the port-city. This is corroborated by the State's continuation of traditional offices (such as the *Tanadaria, Gaoncaria* and the *Catual*) and agrarian institutions (such as the *Communidade* system) in the hinterland villages. Similarly the State's policy of tolerance was evident both in the *alvara* of 1532 retaining regional customary practices such as holding swearing ceremonies of the natives in the temple at Bandora;\(^{73}\) and, in the multiple assurances of Albuquerque to the non-Christian residents of Goa such as protecting their rights and customs;\(^{74}\) remitting the earlier one-third land tax rate on agrarian produce; and promises to not increase any tax

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\(^{72}\) The European aesthetic evident in the structures of such institutions in Goa can be glimpsed in 19th century sketches of the ruins of the Misericordia, Arsenal etc attached as Appendix 6 in our study.


\(^{74}\) HAG: *Monçoes do Reinho, Foral dos usos e costumes dos gauncares e lavradores desta ilha de Goa e outros annexes ella*, No 76, fl. 48 ff.
on the *gaunkars* of Goa\textsuperscript{75} while retaining the earlier tolls, taxes, inheritance shares, customs dues and other charges were retained and redirected to the Portuguese king in his capacity as the new sovereign.\textsuperscript{76} Likewise, Albuquerque’s strategy of securing the loyalties and continuity of native Hindu traders and principal men such as the Hindu feudatories ("Nequisbaires" or Nayaks) who were disgruntled with the Adil Shahs viz restoring their houses and possessions\textsuperscript{77} suggests how the policy of socio-cultural and religious tolerance of the 1520s and 1530s was motivated by the economic and military needs of the early colonial State. The mercantile State’s banishment of all the Muslim traders residing in Goa, the fiscal crisis within the *Estado* and the reliance of the port-city on supplies of rice and other necessities from neighboring economies had eschewed any attempt by the early colonial power to terminate the pre-existing socio-economic relations between the political power and the indigenous Hindu mercantile communities resident in Goa. Previously the *Palacio de Sabaio* had been the prime location in the Adil Shahi city around which a web of relations unfolded encompassing the networks of diverse mercantile groups. In this context a destruction of the central edifice would have connoted a destruction of the space wherein the politico-commercial relations were defined and secure conditions for trade assured. Alternatively, the display of brute force proclaiming the ascent of the new political power would have jeopardized continuity of the mercantile fabric of Goa and fuelled migration of such commercially significant non-Muslim merchants to the rival neighboring kingdoms. The takeover of the Adil Shahi palace proclaimed the dawn of the foreign sea-power as political overlords yet assured the respectful continuity of the commercial liberties and security by the new sovereign to the indigenous merchants.

Thus urban re-structuring of the 1520s and 1530s reveal multiple dialogues between the European State and the indigenous trading and artisanal community inhabiting the city space; and, between the State and the new Portuguese urban elite. The conquest of the


\textsuperscript{76} Antonio da Silva Rego (ed.), *Documentação para a Historia das Missões*, Vol IV, p 304.

\textsuperscript{77} *The Commentaries of The Great Afonso Alboquerque*, Part III, p 22.
port city by the Christian mercantilist power was immediately followed by the establishment of the main church of St. Catherine on the site of the principal mosque and its being endowed with the revenue from the lands of the “Moorish mosques and Hindoo pagodas”. In this context, St. Catherine’s church constructed adjacent to the palace complex (constituting the core region in the urban grid structure) symbolized the dominance of the Christian conquerors in the previous Muslim city. The Estado’s subsequent transformation of the Palace (that stood juxtaposed between Se Cathedral and The convent and church of St Francis Assisi) as the headquarters of the Viceroy in 1530 and the construction of the European styled chapel and monastery of St. Francis by 1527 reveal the spatial claims of the Christian rulers. The initial edifice of the church of St Catherine was a simple structure reflecting indigenous architectural styles (with thatched roof and mud walls) hinting at the continued use of locally available materials and regional non-Christian artisans for urban constructions. However by 1532 the State funded enlargement and ornamentation of the church and its relocation to a site very close to the present day Cathedral Church indicate the complex developments marking the socio-political space of the port-city. The architectural transformation of the church of St Catherine using public and private funds by 1530s and its elevation as the Cathedral church under the papal bull of 1534 suggests the growth in the resources concentrated within the imperial city. It also reflected increased mercantile wealth following expanding maritime trade of the port and urban commercial activities. The rising volume of maritime trade during this period is corroborated by data registering the augmentation of customs duty on spices in Goa which rose to 1350 pardaos and food-grains amounting to 2500 pardaos in 1540s. By 1521 Portuguese traders used to take to the kingdom of

80 Details on the 20, 000 pardaos funded by the State to expand and re-decorate the church of St Catherine with big bells, good ornaments, gold furnishings, eight cornered baptismal font etc. in Carta de El Rei Dom João III A Cidade de Goa dated 26th March 1532 in Silva Rego, Documentação para a Historia das Missões . Vol II, Doc 78, p 209; Gaspar Correa, Lendas da India, tom.IV, 669.
81 Pius Malekandathil, “City in Space and Metaphor”,p.20
Vijayanagara an annual average of 1200 horses, which they used to buy at the price of 20,000 ducats in the city of Goa and sell at the rate of 1000 ducats for every 2 ¼ horses, fetching for them a total price of 533,333 ducats. Annual profit that the Portuguese traders used to bring to the city of Goa out of this strand of horse-trade with Vijayanagara was 512,333 ducats. Concurrently, the 1526 Charter regularizing rents (rendas) accruing from the hinterland villages that were granted to the Estado officials sustained the steady flow of agrarian surplus to the imperial city of Goa and accumulation of fiscal reserves in the public treasury.

Table 1: Annual Value of Private Trade in Goa, 1510-1540 (in Pardaos)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>1,670,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spices</td>
<td>22,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Grains</td>
<td>41,750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The boost in the public funding of urban institutions, edifices and State sponsored clergymen in the port-city has been linked to the flow of agrarian revenues amounting up to 50,000 prataps per year from Bardez and Salcete from 1532. However, fluctuating political trends rendering the Portuguese unable to consolidate these agrarian regions to the economic unit of Goa and its hinterland villages suggest that much of the wealth

82 Letter of Jorge Pock sent to Michael Behaim from Cochin on 1-1-1522: See for details Pius Malekandathil, The Germans, the Portuguese and India, Münster, 1999, p.66
84 This calculation is done on the basis of the amount that Adil Shah used to receive as customs duty from the city of Goa on the eve of Portuguese occupation. He used to get an amount of 1, 00,000 pardaos (which was 6% duty) as customs duty as per the information of Barros. Barros, Asia. Dos feitos que os Portuguezes fizeram no Descobrimento e conquista dos Mares do Oriente, Decada II-5-ii, p.24. For details on horse trade see Pius Malekandathil, The Germans, the Portuguese and India, p.66
85 Pius Malekandathil, “City in Space and Metaphor”,p.20
86 Ibid.
87 V T Gune, Gazetteer of Goa, Daman and Diu, p. 148
generated for funding the urban constructions in this period was derived from the mercantile engagements of the port. The relative wealth concentration in the city is evident in the artistic and architectural composition of these structures that were constructed using locally available materials (laterite, basalt and granite) and labour; and, its contrast with the highly ornamented edifices of the late 16th century. Nevertheless, the crafting of a new urban elite and redistribution of the State’s fiscal reserves to enlarge and modify pre-existent edifices such as the Adil Shahi residential palace and the humble structures of Albuquerque from late 1520s to 1540s went concomitant to the processes of spatial assertions, causing the enlargement of the Viceroy’s Palace, the establishment of Cathedral Church and the formulations of a European city in the urban space of Goa as symbols of power and grandeur, corresponding to the way which the Lusitanians as conquerors of the land wanted themselves to be represented.

A corroboration of this new mode of representation whereby the Viceroy re-defined his power relations with the officials and residents of the port-city on the one hand; and demonstrated the imperial grandeur at the early colonial State to the rivaling neighbors and maritime mercantile contenders on the other hand becomes clear through a critical analysis of the set of ceremonials and court etiquettes that evolved around the office of viceroy by the 1520’s and 1530’s. With the transfer of Portuguese headquarters from Cochin to Goa in 1530, stipulations were well articulated regarding the ceremonials to be observed while the viceroy/governor went through the streets of Goa. The court of Goa (cortes) had to accompany the elaborately dressed viceroy when he passed through the streets of Goa, with his servants and officers\(^{88}\) displaying the power of the Estado. Similarly, a critical analysis of the induction ceremony\(^{89}\); and, the stage for its performance being the imperial city of Goa (even when Cochin was the administrative


\(^{89}\) Detailed description of the ceremony by Pyrard de Laval in Gray(ed.), The Voyage of Francois Pyrard of Laval, vol.II, part I, pp 76-77.
capital of the *Estado* demonstrates how the early colonial strategies were geared towards spatially re-arranging the imperial city as symbolic of the political, military and economic power of the Portuguese power in Asia. By the 1560s the induction ceremony comprised of *visitas* (with fidalgos, officers and other dignitaries visiting the new Viceroy), the *entrega* (handing over of office by old Viceroy to new incumbent) and the *entrada* (formal entry of the Viceroy into the city). Thus by late 1530s the celebration of the *entrega* and *entrada* of the Count of Vidiguera Vasco da Gama (1524) and Nunes da Cunha (1529) with the formal handing over of power and responsibility by the previous Viceroy to the new incumbent and the ceremonial reception by the municipal and urban elite reveal new socio-political assertions of the early colonial State in the urban space of Goa. The theatrical *entrada* that began at the quayside with the ceremonial handing of the keys to the city by the municipality to the Viceroy; and, the formal procession into the city (till St Catherine’s church and ending at the residential Palace) demonstrates the urban spatial symbology proclaiming the new political suzerains of Goa.

Along the same line was the Portuguese occupation of the Fortress Palace located on the banks of river Mandovi. Contemporaries refer repeatedly to Albuquerque’s immediate

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92 Description of the arrival of Nuno da Cunha, his being greeted by the Captain of Goa, the ouvidor, city councilors, fidalgos and many citizens and the staging of the *entrega* with ceremonial handing over of city keys in Barros, *Asia de João Barros*, vol 4, p 173.

93 Documents reveal that Albuquerque enforced the Palace fortress with 400 soldiers; large number of ammunition; 80 mounted men (militarily trained cavalrymen) married and settled in Goa; and, an armada of 4 ships and 3 galleys under the chief captain Duarte de Mello to constantly maintain vigil at the coast and protect the city. See *The Commentaries*, Vol. III, p 43.
concerns with the strengthening of the fortress,\textsuperscript{94} which had been damaged in the Portuguese offensive on the Adil Shah city of Goa, both structurally by repairing its fortifications\textsuperscript{95} as well as equipping it with militarily skilled men and ammunitions. The control over the fortress and the Portuguese alterations to its structure proclaimed the port as a Portuguese stronghold and reinforced protection of the harbor. Scholars trace how pepper was the principal commodity imported from the ‘East’ and silver bullion was the principal export to the city Goa.\textsuperscript{96} As mentioned before the fortified harbor of Goa served as nodal point in international trade routes linking the Red Sea ports with the western seaboard of India and South-East Asian ports apart from acting as outlets to inland economies of Bijapur and Vijayanagara. In this context the pre-Portuguese military outpost of the Fortress Palace became the residence of the Portuguese Captain-major\textsuperscript{97} manning the fleet that guarded the middle province comprising in this period of the Island of Goa.

During the first phase of Portuguese occupation of Goa the Fortress Palace had dual roles to play, viz., militarily securing the harbor and as a factory for stocking the pepper and spice cargos from Malabar and Malacca—apart from the necessary provisions of corn and rice in the stone storehouses of the fortress constructed by Albuquerque\textsuperscript{98}—gained through the intra-Asian Portuguese private trade. This secured the cargos for the outgoing Carreira ships (to Lisbon) that were loaded at the port of Goa. In return the exports from Lisbon and Mozambique to Goa were in the form of bullion and European goods. Thus the fortress had dual roles as a military bastion and as the factory where exported and

\textsuperscript{94} The Commentaries of The Great Afonso D Alboquerque, Vol III, p 17, also see the letter of Afonso d’Albuquerque to the Adil Shah detailing on the Portuguese fortress at Goa in Ibid, pp 20-21. Albert Gray(ed.), The Voyage of Francois Pyrard of Laval to the East Indies, the Maldives, the Moluccas and Brazil, vol.II, Part I, p.32

\textsuperscript{95} The Commentaries of The Great Afonso D Alboquerque, Vol. II, p 101

\textsuperscript{96} Boxer, Portuguese Sea-Born Empire, pp. 51-52.

\textsuperscript{97} The fortress palace was the residence of the first captain of the city Rodrigo Rebello and subsequently the captains of the Carreira fleets. Gaspar Correa, Lendas da India, Vol II, pp 158, 176; Also see for details Fonseca, An Historical and Archaeological Sketch,pp. 194-195.

\textsuperscript{98} The Commentaries of The Great Afonso D Alboquerque, Vol II, p 101-102.
imported goods were accumulated for redistribution. It's power claims within the grid structure can be corroborated from references to the proximity of the residences of significant officers (the city captain, a factor, a writer, secretary, one or more judicial officers, chief Alcaide, the artillery-chief etc) and renters to the Fortress Palace. Spatially, the location of the fortress close to the customs house on the river banks and within the walled area of the city reveals its strategic placement as stemming from the need to protect the harbor and ensuring regularized working of the various state establishments such as the customs house, the arsenal especially the gun powder and ammunition manufacturing centre, the shipyard and the mint all of which occupied the east to west zone of the banks of the river Mandovi. The defense concerns of the fledging state were also visible in its conquering and consolidating the pre-Portuguese forts of Panjim, Banastarim and Rachol and establishing garrisons to guard the city against land based powers particularly Bijapur.

This draws the focus to the various State establishments such as the Ribeira Grande housing the royal shipyard, the mint (Casa da Moeda), the arsenal and the gunpowder manufacturing unit. Under Albuquerque the royal shipyard in Goa was developed on a gigantic scale with facilities of ship-repairing, ship-building, gun-casting and storage facilities for all the necessary armament and provisions for the fleets which cruised the eastern seas. The site selected was the same as the Adil Shah's dockyard. The early colonial mercantile power thus used the readily available timber for building militarized coastal and sea-faring ships such as gallions, manchus, fustas, fragatas and carrack. Contemporary sources remain silent on the labour availability in such State enterprises despite supply of raw materials such as timber from Ponda forests near the port-city of Goa. However the intensified process of shipbuilding and modifications in fast moving coastal vessels and sea-faring ships in the dockyards of Goa and Cochin by the late 1520s

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100 Boxer, Portuguese Sea-Borne Empire, p 57.

101 On the availability of wood and native artisans skilled in building vessels in the port-city see Cortesão, Suma Oriental of Tome Pires. pp 57-58.
and 1530s which were better adapted to Asian realities and designed to combat Asian maritime traders conducting illicit trade in spices with the help of fast moving vessels with oars and equipped with light artillery rather than heavy cannons, engaging in traditional frontal collision caused by boarding the enemy vessels rather than sinking the latter by heavy bombardment etc., suggest multiple possibilities. Sources indicate the increasing use and manufacture of smaller and cheaper oared ships primarily the *fustas*, brigantines and *paraus* modeled on the traditional shipbuilding technology of indigenous coastal traders such as that of Mappilas of Kerala for better maneuverability in calm waters or adverse winds that the heavy sea-faring *naus* were unsuited for by 1529.102 Furthermore, documents such as the letter of the king granting privileges to the city councilors and municipal officers of Goa to "introduce" captains of the galleys, of *naus* and ships equipped to the Captain Major and the governor103 suggests that many such vessels especially the *fustas* and *catures*—constituting majority of the monsoon faring *armadas* of Goa—were owned in late 1530s by the *casados* and Portuguese private traders of Goa apart from the ones of early colonial State. Indirectly this reveals the division and specialization of labour at the Goa dockyard evident in the manufacturing of both the sea-faring high board ships and galleys104 as well as the smaller coastal vessels by mid 1520s and early 1530s using traditional knowledge of native artisans; military modifications in captured vessels by Portuguese master-craftsman; and, use of locally available materials. Similarly the working of the mint105 and the gun-casting also hints at

104 Under Lopo Vaz information is available on the governors ordering construction of large oared galleys, faster galleons and smaller caravels in Goa and Chaul as well as repair of 8 ships in Goa dockyard by 1527 A.D See Rodrigues, 'Adjusting to Asian Seas...' p 463. For references to the high-board *naus* of the *Carreira* manufactured at the Goa shipyard (though in fewer number than smaller coastal ships) such as the Cinco Chagas in 1559 see Boxer, *Portuguese Sea-Borne Empire*, p 210. Later day maps also indirectly hint at the intensified use of galley slaves to construct and man the expensive and larger galleys produced at the dockyard of Goa as deducted from the existence of the Street of Galley slaves within the city grid structure. For details see the following Chapter IV.
105 Albuquerque's regularization of the weight of silver, gold and copper coinage by re-minting the old 'moorish' coins stamping it with the dies of the Portuguese king and fixing the *cruzados* as the
intensification of labour organization. At a time when manpower from Lisbon was not forthcoming much of the labour force must have comprised of indigenous skilled and unskilled labour—both the erstwhile residents of the port-city and migrants from neighboring regions lured by better prospects to the restructured Lusitanian city—apart from the slaves. Thus by 1530s the production activities at the state industries in Goa hints at the enlarged demographic concentration within the port-city with the influx of Lusitanian and indigenous artisans and hinting at the territorial expansion of the urban space relative to its pre-Portuguese boundaries. Further corroboration to such intensified State engagements in retaining some of the earlier establishments but re-structuring them for asserting the military and political suzerainty of the Lusitanian power could be derived from the Cartas of Afonso de Albuquerque. Albuquerque’s letters to the king Dom Manuel106 and accounts of the reaction of the rulers of Gujarat,107 Calicut108 and Bijapur to the Portuguese on the conquest and consolidation of the port city of Goa attributes the renewed respect of these regional political potentates to the evolving power of the Portuguese.

On hindsight, the planning and evolution of Lusitanian urban space of the port-city of Goa during 1510-1540 was integrally linked to the mercantilist powers superiority claims for controlling the maritime commercial world. Alternatively, its development as the political headquarters of the Estado by the 1530s coupled with the establishment of the bishopric of Goa exercising jurisdiction of all lands east of the Cape of Good Hope in 1534 reveal the evolutionary processes whereby the State’s claims to dominance was

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106 Letter from the Great Afonso de Albuquerque to the King of Portugal concerning the maintenance of the Portuguese power in Goa and the prestige gained by the simple act of conquering and consolidating Portuguese territorial claims over Goa far outweighing the prestige gained by the mercantile and military fleets from Lisbon to India in The Commentaries of The Great Afonso D Albuquerque, Part Ill, pp 258-260.


demonstrated through the restructured and enlarged urban space apart from the port and harbour. The repressive integralist impulse of the 1540s soon replaced the previous emphasis on peaceful co-operation and co-existence. Thus by the late 1530's the wheels of re-orientation in the empire's strategies in Asia dictated changed trajectories whereby urban space reflected the mercantile powers colonial claims in its attempts at sovereignty over neighboring economies rather than suzerainty.

The Casados, Institutions and the Evolving Cityscape

The importance ascribed by the State to nurture the growth of a resident population of casados rooted in Goa can be reconstructed through a spatial study of the various civil edifices and institutions dotting the urban landscape of the Portuguese city of Goa from 1510 to 1540. Albuquerque's revoking his earlier prohibition on the Islamic horse traders visiting the Goan port by 1513 and his conquest of Hormuz by 1515 indicate the Estado's keen interest in reviving the role of the port city as the center of wealth accumulation owing to its lucrative horse trade. Eventually trade in Persian horses with the Vijayanagara kingdom, with its huge profit margins, became an important economic activity that pumped enormous wealth into the city. The street in the city of Goa, which became the focal point of horse trade and through which the transportation of such horses was done to the terrain of Vijayanagara came to be called rua de carreira dos cavalos (street for the transportation/ trade of horses). However in the first phase of urban restructuring, emphasis was given to boosting the commercial potential of the white settlers. The Estado's objectives of enlarging the casado population; and, securing the flow of resources through such white married settlers (who were culturally Portuguese but socially rooted in Goa) explain the new colonial conditions coloring the urban evolution

109 See illustration: 2.
110 Duarte Barbosa, The Book of Duarte Barbosa, vol.I, p.59; Luís de Figueiredo Falcão, Livro em que se contem toda da fazenda e real património dos reis de Portugal, India, e Ilhas adjacentes, e outras particularidades, escripta no anno de MDCVII, Lisboa, 1859,p.160
111 For more details see chapter IV.
of Portuguese Goa from 1510-1540. Unlike later periods that have been meticulously mapped by contemporary travelers, the reconstruction of the city plan during the initial periods of Portuguese occupation has to rely heavily on the recordings of chroniclers and corroborating it with the city sketch by St. Francis Xavier. An analysis of the evolving city layout suggests that reconstruction of the erstwhile capital city of Adil Shahs into a Lusitanian city was patterned on a European grid structure. In the evolving city space the market place for sale of non-lasting food commodities to the urban dwellers such as green vegetables supplied by the indigenous traders was conveniently placed behind the Misericordia. Another market called the bazarinho or small market was located close to the Convent of Saint Francis in the north-western part of the city while the fish market was situated adjacent to the quay of Saint Catherine.

In a period when the State struggled with structuring and consolidating the Lusitanian base in Goa, the appeasement of the mercantile interests of the casados was intended to curtail their migration to rival kingdoms. The neighbouring principalities like those of the Adil Shahis and Qutb Shahis tried to canvas Portuguese gunners, artillerists and military experts from Goa for updating their military equipments and strategies on par with the politically expanding Portuguese. That the resident Portuguese casados were intended to be effective substitutes to the non-Christian traders (who were suspected of shifting loyalties) is evident in the privileges granted to the mercantile casados under the Charter of 1518 annulling import taxes on foodstuffs and essential commodities traded by them and granting these Portuguese civilians freedom to sell any of their movable and immovable properties, including whatever they received as part of their dowries from the State, provided that the buyers were not Muslims or Hindus.

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112 The market squares and commercial streets have been marked in illustration: City Plan 4.2.
113 Albert Gray(ed.), The Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval to the East Indies, the Maldives, the Moluccas and Brazil, vol.II, Part 1, New Delhi, 2000, pp.43-4; Also see Medieval Goa, pp. 111, 127 footnote 15.
115 J H da Cunha Rivara (ed.), Archivo Portuez-Oriental, II, pp.5-8, 46-7
were also conferred to lure and incorporate migrant settlers from Portugal within the city structure the most important being the exclusive privilege of these Portuguese casados of Goa to vote and contest to municipal offices. Of the ten members who constituted the municipal senate (Senado de Camara) six were elected through a complicated system of balloting based on majority vote of the assembly of the citizens. The rest of the four members were representatives of the merchants and artisan guilds. Thus the Camara de Goa—modeled on the municipality of Lisbon—was one of the very few institutions which theoretically lay outside the fidalgo (nobility) stronghold and through which the trading Portuguese citizens of the port-city could create commercially and administratively conducive conditions in the alien land. The Senado de Camara had a number of administrative duties with a politico-economic significance including overall supervision of the municipality affairs, attending judicial cases brought to them by the market inspectors or private parties, defending the interests of the city corporation before the state government and before individual citizens, controlling the affairs of the artisans organized into crafts guilds and appointing subordinate officials and servants to look into numerous other concerns related to town activity. The use of the institution of the Camara de Goa to attract Portuguese trading dwellers to the city is further corroborated

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117 The Goa municipality refers to thirty categories of services which were to be supervised by such subordinate officers and servants appointed by the municipal council the important ones being foreman of public works to look after maintenance and building of public streets, city drainage etc; council secretary assisting the council as a clerk and standard bearer when the senate was preoccupied with festivals and public processions; judge of the market square; market inspectors etc. J H da Cunha Rivara (ed.), Archivo Portuguez-Oriental, II, pp. 48-50; 274-5.

118 For details on the role of the Camara de Goa in maintaining urban law and order, security, market regulations, jurisdictional functions, collection of taxes, repair and maintenance of the civic establishments within the city etc see C.R.Boxer, Portuguese Society in the Tropics: The Municipal Councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia and Luanda, 1510-1580, Madison, 1965

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by municipal records testifying least interference from the State government till 1530 when the administrative seat of the Estado was transferred from Cochin to Goa.\textsuperscript{119}

The privileges of the Goa municipality to least interference from the Estado’s officers and its direct access to the crown in Lisbon hint at the State’s strategies to intensify the peopling of the city of Goa by the mercantile casados granting attractive incentives and urban privileges. Curiously, despite the privileges, a number of checks and balances were imposed by the Estado on the Camara de Goa and the Portuguese citizens. Thus as soon as demographically the casados population increased to constitute more than 200 families within the city of Goa by 1517-1518,\textsuperscript{120} the crown eschewed some significant economic and politico-juridical privileges conferred by Albuquerque upon the civilian Portuguese people and the municipal senate (Senado de Camara).\textsuperscript{121} Similarly, the Estado curtailed the growing mercantilist ambitions of these Goan casados from becoming a challenge to the State’s economic interests by revoking the civilian’s right to trade sans duties in contraband spices; and, held the power to dismiss an incumbent officer under the municipality and confiscating his belongings in cases deserving punishment. Even the decision making powers of the municipality of Goa did not extend to covering military and diplomatic issues of the empire (being subordinate to the council of State) and was limited to mercantile and administrative governance of city of Goa itself.\textsuperscript{122} On hindsight, this suggests how the early colonial state in its initial phase of governance of the port-city visualized the Camara de Goa as a tool to control the socio-economic behavior of the urban dwellers and consolidate the diverse social spaces within the urban center into the political frame of the Estado. Our deductions find corroborative evidences in the spatial and symbolic meanings that came to be associated with the municipal building or the Town Hall within the cityscape.

\textsuperscript{119} Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial, vol.III, Lisboa, 1982, p.34
\textsuperscript{120} Mathias Mundadan, History of Christianity, Vol. I, p 441.
\textsuperscript{121} J H da Cunha Rivara (ed.), Archivo Portuguez-Oriental, II, p.9
\textsuperscript{122} Pearson, ‘The Crowd in Portuguese India.’, in Coastal Western India, pp 52-53
Of the very few urban structures constructed during the initial years of occupation, the Senate House or the Town Hall where the Senators (cidadãos) of the Goa municipality held their meetings was situated in the heart of the city. It was placed adjacent to the Palace of the Adil Shah which was converted into the Palace of the Viceroy's under Albuquerque and to the right side of the present day Cathedral church. The Estado's conscious efforts at empowering the municipality as the regulator of the city's socio-economic and administrative life can be re-read through the visual assertion of the municipal building placed in the heart of the city's grid structure, close to the rua direita (straight street), and sharing the compound space with the church of St Catherine and St. Francis church. For the Old Christian married settlers the municipal building overlooking the public space of the main market and the sacred space of the Christian empire, visually connoted the importance of the predominantly casado mercantile occupants of the rua direita and deriving divine legitimacy for these casados to reside and trade within the port-city. Rua direita or the main street extended from the northern gate of the city—where later on the Arch of the Viceroy's was constructed—located near the Quay of Viceroy's till the Church of Nossa Senhora da Serra (Our Lady of the Land) constructed by Afonso Albuquerque near the Baçaes gate that regulated the traffic between the city and the countryside. The planned reconstruction of the port city with the rua direita as the central axis in the grid structure and its accommodation of the commercial and residential quarters of the principal Portuguese and European jewelers, lapidaries, goldsmiths, money lenders and exchangers, wealthy merchants and craftsmen etc., within the street space hints at the early colonial State's emphasis on the new mercantile elites of the city who were ethnically Portuguese and religiously Christian. By critically analyzing the Estado's strategy of asserting the visual and legal prominence of Camara de Goa within the city space, dual claims of the colonial power can be reconfigured. On the one

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124 The sketch of the Porta de Nossa Senhora da Serra see Appendix 6. That the Rua direita extended till the church situated next to the Baçaes gate since the early Portuguese period itself can be verified from the fact that the church was ordered by Afonso de Albuquerque in 1515. See Fonseca, An Historical and Archaeological Sketch, pp.245-6; for the exact geographical extent of the Rua direita see Illustrations: Map no. 2 and City Plan 4.2.
hand the municipality by harnessing the casados as incumbents of lower administrative posts supervising the activities related to city administration effectively solved the deficiency of manpower within the Empire. Alternatively, by the late 1520's and 1530's the casados of Goa emerged as a sizeable community and progressively consolidated their mercantile supremacy within the local and regional trade networks to rise above the native merchants such as Krishna Sinai, Raluchatim and Loquchatim.\textsuperscript{125}

With the increasing settlement of casados, the charitable and medical institutions including Hospital Real de Espírito Santo (royal hospital) and Santa Casa de Misericórdia (Holy House of Mercy) of Goa operating from the early days of Portuguese occupation turned out to be vital urban institutions because of the nature of services they rendered. The tropical weather conditions of Goa followed by recurring outbreak of tropical diseases increased the role of hospital in its urban space in an incomparable way during the early days of Portuguese occupation. Afonso de Albuquerque had established the dispensary-like institution in 1510 to take care of the injured soldiers in the battlefields and sick sailors and merchants returning from sea voyages; it eventually became the greatest place of refuge for the casados falling sick in Goa because of a variety of tropical diseases. The Misericórdia, which was founded in Portugal in 1498 to assist the old, the disabled, the sick and the weaker sections among the sailors, mariners and merchants involved in the overseas expansion\textsuperscript{126}, had its first house in Goa in 1513; however it became a powerful institution by 1525.\textsuperscript{127} Eventually the dispensary grew to the stature of a hospital by 1520s, known as the royal hospital, meant for the treatment of sick Portuguese soldiers, sailors and officials of the India garrison.\textsuperscript{128} Membership in the administrative bodies of these two institutions were considered to be a matter of social

\textsuperscript{125} Pius Malekandathil, ‘City in Space and Metaphor’, p.18
\textsuperscript{126} K.S.Mathew, Portuguese Trade with India in the Sixteenth Century, p.222
\textsuperscript{128} Pyrard de Laval attests to how only Old Christian and Portuguese were admitted to the royal hospital for treatment though some Portuguese Jewish converts also used its facilities. See Gray(ed.), The Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval to the East Indies, Vol II, Part 1, p 12; also see Boxer, Portuguese Society in the Tropics. The Municipal Councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia and Luanda, 1510-1800. pp 25-26.
prestige and honour, because they were the vital institutions in the city particularly for the *casado* traders, whose health and wealth happened to be in peril in course of their long-distance trade. However some had coveted their administrative positions as they found in the large flow of wealth to these institutions from the Portuguese crown granting ample opportunities to divert and manipulate their fund for carrying out their personal ventures, including trade. The early colonial State intervened at this juncture of diversion of its fund from the royal hospital to private ventures.  

129 Documents testify to the abuse of the Royal Hospital by the Portuguese residents of Goa. Such misuse of the charitable institution prompted the Viceroy Dom Vasco da Gama to moot the idea of transferring the administration of the royal hospital to the *Santa Casa de Misericordia* in 1524 though a yearly maintenance sum continued to be advanced from the public treasury.  

130 At the outset this decision addressed the problem of limiting the abuses by the citizens by bringing it under the direct supervision of the brothers of the *Misericordia* who were selected from the civilian Portuguese residents of the port-city. The excessive expenses incurred by the royal hospital in obtaining provisions—especially foodstuff for baking bread for the sick and drugs at the hospital pharmacy—stemming from the mismanagement of funds are indirectly revealed in the *Vedor da Fazenda* Afonso Mexia’s *regimentos* (instructions) and correspondences with State officials attempting at regulating the supply, quality and cost of such necessities that were funded by the State between 1524 and 1531.  

131 The repeated allusion to the mismanagement of funds is thus suggestive of the probable source from where some *casados* found initial working capital for their trading activities.

However by passing on the management of the royal hospital to the *Misericordia* the State had resorted to a clever strategy of making the administrative members of *Misericordia* responsible for raising the amount over and above what *Estado* had allocated from within the city. Thus through the agency of the *Misericordia* part of the


131 Silva Rego, *Documentação para a Historia das Missões*, Vol II India (1525-1543). Doc 8, pp 25-26; Doc 9, pp.27-29; Doc 14, pp 38,39
funds accumulated from the mercantile civilians of Goa as alms and bequests were redistributed to maintain the city’s hospital and charitable institutions till the sanctioned funds were made available from Lisbon through the next contingent of vessels. Till the arrival of funds from Portugal, the wealth of the casados was channelized through Misericordia to cater to medical care of the urban dwellers as an interim arrangement. Records to the enlargement of the church of St Catherine by 1532 using public and private donations;\(^{132}\) and, the gift of a baptismal font to the church in 1532 by George Gomez\(^{133}\)—most probably a mercantile Portuguese resident of Goa—also suggest the fiscal prosperity and redistribution of the wealth of such private Portuguese traders within the city.

Similarly, apart from the municipal building and the royal hospital, the other civil institutions which were integral to the grid layout evolving by the mid 1520s were the Misericordia (House of Mercy), the hospital for the poor or todos-os-santos and the school for teaching the children of the Goan casados. As we have already seen, scholars have traced the foundations of the Misericordia of Goa to Albuquerque in 1513-1514. Written records testify to the royal grant of esmolas (alms) to the Misericordia for taking care of the sick and poor amongst the new converts of the city in 1519, 1525 and 1527.\(^ {134}\) This reveals the sustained efforts of the State in the initial period of its conquest to fund urban institutions closely modeled on Iberian counterparts and allocate fiscal contributions for construction of institutions which would recreate a Lusitanian urban space to encourage further casado settlements and mobilization of Portuguese military men to the port city. The State limited the membership of the Misericordia to the lay

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\(^{133}\) Fonseca, *An Historical and Archaeological Sketch*, p. 205.

\(^{134}\) The State’s continuation of the traditional grant of 11 pardaos per day to the officials of the Santa Casa de Misericordia of Goa for the care of the poor recorded and reconfirmed on 13\(^{th}\) January 1525 and during September-October of 1527. Cf. Silva Rego, *Documentação para a Historia das Missões, Vol II India (1525-1543)*. Doc 17, p 47; Doc. 56, pp. 127-129.
brothers selected from both the Portuguese nobility and the low born but prominent mercantile and artisanal Portuguese residents of Goa. As we have seen earlier, its tasks were defined as taking care of the sick and needy within the city, as well as, engage in humanitarian tasks such as administering the gospel to those ignorant of it, to the dying and to those condemned to gallows serving capital punishment or otherwise. The strategic placement of the *Misericordia* de Goa at the extreme end of (and facing) the *rua direita* perhaps served as a constant visual reminder to the prosperous mercantile community (in their daily engagements in the market area) of the Christian values of charity and penance. As demonstrated above in the light of literary references to bequests and alms by wealthy European and casado residents of the city, as well as the *Misericordia*'s reliance on revenues and rents from some departments allocated to it by 1530s, the institution evolved as a tool of the colonial State to redistribute private Portuguese mercantile wealth and resources within the city. Correspondingly it was also a part of the mercantile State’s attempts at minimizing its expenses in taking care of the urban sick and poor—majority being the skilled and unskilled indigenous Christian converts and slaves (apart from the white settlers) that constituted the labour force for the various crafts and secondary sector production in the city, besides being the workers for the ship yard, gunpowder industry, construction of fortifications and other edifices etc. By mid 1520s funds from the *Misericordia* were increasingly channelized to cater to the needs of the various hospitals of the port-city.

The fact that this was the period when casado wealth was steadily increasing because of their thriving intra-Asian trade, enables us to draw significant co-relations between the efforts of the Estado ridden with fiscal challenges to curtail its expenses and the generating of funds internally within the city of Goa to finance the multiple needs of the city and the State. Scholars have deducted on the basis of the *Misericordia* of Lisbon that the charity of the house was meant mostly to the Christian community of the locality.  

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135 The Hospital of *Todos-os-Santos* (1547) was initially funded by the *Misericordia*. See Albert Gray(ed.), *The Voyage of François Pyrard of Laval to the East Indies, the Maldives, the Moluccas and Brazil*, vol.II, Part I, p 15.

136 V T Gune, *Gazetteer of Goa Daman and Diu*, p 161
However in the case of Goa it included the white population and the converted Christians residing within the city; but the chief beneficiaries were those in the city who suffered severe losses due to wars, commercial tragedies and severe crisis in health and wealth. Alternatively in the royal hospital which received financial contributions from the Misericordia during the 1530s, treatment was reserved for the soldados and the Portuguese white settlers recuperating from illness. Testimonies by contemporaries and documents on the shift of the royal hospital to the river side adjacent to St Catherine’s gate by 1514 A.D and enlargement of its edifice indirectly suggest that its maintenance owed both to the benefices granted by the State treasury and private bequests and gifts by the city elites. Thus concomitant to the burgeoning of the private Portuguese mercantile settlers of Goa and their increased participation in trade was the State’s move towards construction of a much more grand building for the hospital and followed by attempts to include private participation for rendering medical care to the city-dwellers. This also reveals how the State corresponding to intense capital accumulation within the city made moves to redistribute resources gained through customs duties and taxes from the port in the form of maintaining charitable urban enterprises such as the royal hospital.

The location of the hospital, its function and structure itself reveal the multiple implications and assertions of the early colonial State. The shifting of the royal hospital from its earlier provisional site to the prime space inside the city but close to the river and the enlargement of its structures suggest the attempts of the State to project the medical care institution in an impressive and attractive way within the Lusitanian city, making architecturally visible the elements of Portuguese royalty in the urban space. The institution was centric to the treatment of the soldados and officials of the Estado as many

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137 Miguel Vaz considered it the Jewel of the city in late 1530’s. Also see Albert Gray(ed.), The Voyage of Francois Pyrard of Laval to the East Indies, the Maldives, the Moluccas and Brazil, vol.I, New Delhi, 2000, p.451; Arthur Coke Burnell(ed.), The Voyage of John Huyghen Linschoten to the East Indies, New Delhi, 1997, pp.237-8

138 For reference to the grandness of the new edifice of the royal hospital—built by Francisco Pereira (doorkeeper of the convent of St Francis) near St Catherine’s gate—as the product of the services of the Portuguese citizens of Goa see Silva Rego, Documentação para a Historia das Missões Vol II., Doc. 13, pp 36, 37.
of them used to fall sick quite often or arrived with compromised health to Goa after the long and unhealthy voyages from Lisbon. Thus the edifice for the treatment of such royal officials was to be obviously projected as impressive structure, with marked difference in appearance. Royal hospital was not the only medical care institution in the city, though it stood as an urban institution with difference. For catering to the medical needs of common man and people with contagious diseases there were lower categories of hospitals in the city like the hospital for lepers, which was established by about 1530 and maintained by funds supplied by the Camara de Goa and the Misericordia. This Casa de São Lazaro (House/Hospital of St Lazarus)—placed outside the immediate vicinity of the city in the suburbs—was closely modeled on its counterpart in Lisbon and was granted similar powers, privileges and obligations by the royal letter of 26th March 1532. This hospital had to attend to not only lepers but also those who were inflicted with deadly and contagious diseases including sexual diseases, which necessitated seclusion from the rest of the urban-dwellers. Contemporary records narrate that it had a beautiful and well furnished edifice funded by the State and with its own parish church, chaplains and priests maintained on the State’s payroll. The hospital’s significance lay in its offering a solution to the Camara’s rising concern with the many lepers plaguing the streets of Goa which must have made degraded the civic appeal of the city grim by the looming threat of epidemics and thronging of beggars. In the process of consolidating a larger community of traders, artisans and militarily skilled migrants from Portugal as permanent settlers of the port-city of Goa the early colonial State used these two hospitals...

140 Letter from King to Camara, 26 March 1532 in J H da Cunha Rivara (ed.), Archivo Portuguez-Oriental. Voll, part 1, 12; Antonio Boccarro, “Livro das Plantas de Todas as Fortalezas, Cidades e Povacoas do Estado da India Oriental,” p 256
141 letter by King to Cidade de Goa, 26th March 1532 in Silva Rego, Documentação para a Historia das Missões, Vol II, Doc 78, p 208.
having both European and Indian medicines\textsuperscript{143} for getting them acclimatized to Goan tropical health and weather conditions.

The success of these institutions—the well maintained hospitals, humanitarian engagements of the \textit{Misericordia} and the representative character of the municipality—in recreating a Portuguese city on Indian soil for attracting further Portuguese settlers can be gauged through analyzing the growth rates of the Portuguese married dwellers in the port-city of Goa that reveal a doubling of the demographic index in every five years time. Thus statistics indicate that in 1515 there were 200 \textit{casado} families,\textsuperscript{144} which by 1524 increased to 450 \textit{casados},\textsuperscript{145} by 1529 to 800 \textit{casados},\textsuperscript{146} and by mid 1540’s the total \textit{casados} in the port city were 1600.\textsuperscript{147}

\textbf{Graph: 5.1}

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\textsuperscript{143} For details on the type of medicines used by Portuguese hospitals see in Silva Rego, \textit{Documentação para a Historia das Missões}, Vol I, Doc 63, pp.154-6.

\textsuperscript{144} Mathias Mundadan, \textit{History of Christianity}, Vol I, p 441


\textsuperscript{146} ANTT, As Gavetas 20-2-23 letter of Domingo Mariz written to the Crown dated 11-3-1529.

Concomitantly the *Estado* pursued the gradual shaping of the married settlers of the city of Goa as the loyalist supporters of the Empire by embarking upon a systematic process of knowledge production. Thus corresponding to the periods when steady growth of the *casados* were registered in Goa attempts were made by the early colonial *Estado* to start a school by 1514 where children of the Goan *casados* were engrained with notions of Christian exclusivity and Portuguese consciousness. That the children of the indigenous converts did not gain subsidies to be enrolled in the curriculum of such schools in this period\textsuperscript{148} indicates that the early colonial agenda exclusively focused on creating a band of loyalists from the *casado* children with Portuguese lineage. Thus the study of the school systems initiated and aided by the *Estado* during the early period suggests that the attempts of the *Estado* were to consolidate its hold over the Portuguese trading settlers and their mixed blood offspring by cultivating them in Christian religious values, European aesthetics and Lusitanian ethos and mentality rather than prioritizing the general Christianization of the Goan masses as was embarked in later stages.

The focus of the *Estado* thus differed significantly from later phases when there were attempts to enlarge the support structure by forcible conversions of the indigenous population of Goa to Christianity. For moulding the young minds, Portuguese teachers were commissioned by the *Estado*\textsuperscript{149} and each teacher received a subsidy of 10 *cruzados per mensem* per boy. While initially the pay of the teacher was financed by the *Estado* from the ‘purse for children’ established by Albuquerque, under subsequent Viceroyalties this was stopped\textsuperscript{150} and financing education was once again to be funded by the civilians through the institution of the municipality. However, colonial knowledge production was not only restricted to the schools. The shaping up of a loyalist civilian base in the city for the evolving empire was executed through the office of the *juiz de orfaes* (judge of the orphans) wherein the officer and the clerk would baptize and train the orphans\textsuperscript{151} and maintain the orphanages on State funds. Alternatively provisions were also made to

\textsuperscript{148} Silva Rego, *Documentação para a Historia das Missões*, Vol I, pp.22ff, 246

\textsuperscript{149} Silva Rego, *Documentação para a Historia das Missões*, Vol I, p.419

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid, p.353

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid, vol.1, pp.186-8
impert Christian training to the converted wives and slaves of the white settlers through the medium of the clergy and the church. For all practical purposes this education system was meant to get them familiarized in Lusitanian customs and practices and get them integrated into the Lusitanian base of the evolving empire.

Christianity, the Mercantile State and Urban Space

The centrality of the Estado’s mercantilist objective during the occupation and urban reorganization of Goa in 1510-1540 can be envisioned through a critical analysis of the European power’s emphasis on constructing religious edifices and in its Christian assertions within the port city. In marked contrast to the State’s claims of being a Christian power and the glorification of the city as Rome of the East by literary sources of late 16th and 17th centuries, a critical re-reading of the evolving urban layout reveals limited construction of religious edifices during this phase and a lack of ornamental flamboyance that characterized later day churches. This section thus analyses how and why under the European ‘Christian’ power of the early 16th century priority was given to the civil and political edifices with only a few religious edifices being constructed within the city space. Also the section proposes to study the structural and sculptural architecture of such religious edifices and traces significant linkages between the Portuguese intervention in Goa during the period under study and the larger trajectories of the empire in its engagements within Asian trade.

As stated before the primary initiative of the Estado in urban remodeling was to cultivate a loyalist population of white settlers. The construction of the church of St Catherine symbolized defeat of the erstwhile Islamic potentates and politico-ideological dominance of the European Christian State. Its relocation to share the space marking the administrative nucleus of the port city (comprising the Palace of the Viceroy’s and the Town Hall) by 1533 and elevation as the Cathedral Church of the Portuguese State of

India\textsuperscript{153} suggests changes within the supremacy claims of the State with the transfer of the imperial headquarters to Goa. We have traced before how the strategies of the mercantile State had initially relied on mutual co-operation and peaceful co-existence with the non-Christian trading and craftsmen resident within the city. However, at the same time our analysis of the contemporary data reveals that by late 1520s and early 1530s the class of Portuguese casados, castiços and mestiços had evolved numerically and professionally as significant sea-traders within the city space.

Despite the continuity of the mercantile activities of the Hindu traders of Goa, the Portuguese private traders shared with them the mercantile space of the Indian Ocean world and were no longer dwarfed by the indigenous mercantile activities. Furthermore, by 1532 the temporary acquisition of the territories of Bardez, Salcete and Ponda and the intensified contestations in subsequent periods between the Viceroy Nuno da Cunha in his territorial claims with the Adil Shahi rulers over these agrarian zones\textsuperscript{154} and securing its mercantile interests of controlling spice trade on coastal western India (Gujarat and Konkan coast) through constructing fortresses in Bassein (1534) and Diu (1536)\textsuperscript{155} had their impacts on the city. Partly the temporary acquisitions assured an increased flow of revenue and resources to the imperial city. Partly, Goa as the imperial city was to psychologically assert the mercantile prosperity, wealth and politico-cultural superiority of the maritime European power in its political claims and contestations with the rivaling mercantile Sultanate's of Bijapur, Gujarat, and the Ottoman Empire as well as the indigenous Muslim traders and hostile rulers of Calicut and Cannanore. In the changing

\textsuperscript{153} The papal bull proclaiming the Church of St Catherine as the Cathedral Church on 3rd November 1534 and Goa as the bishopric with jurisdiction over all lands east of the Cape of Good hope in V T Gune, \textit{Gazetteer of Goa, Daman and Diu}, p 153; Mundadan, \textit{History of Christianity}, vol I, p 459; Fonseca, \textit{An Historical and Archaeological Sketch}, p 199.

\textsuperscript{154} V T Gune, \textit{Gazetteer of Goa, Daman and Diu}, pp 148-149.

power relations of the Indian Ocean world—with the intensification of the Islamic mercantile linkages between the spice producing and supplying ports of Malabar with the Ottoman ports of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea; and, the increasing politico-mercantile role of the Gujarat and Konkan ports as entrepôts in this new mercantile nexus which ran parallel to the Portuguese controlled trade—the resources rallied through the port-city of Goa provided the internally generated funds for the *Estado* to meet its various military and economic urgencies in Asian waters.

The major religious institutions and edifices set up by the Portuguese within the earlier boundaries of the port-city consisted of the chapel of the Misericordia; the chapel of Our Lady of the Land (*Nossa Senhora da Serra*) in 1515 to the west of the Misericordia; a small chapel within the fortress; the chapel of the royal Hospital initially built on the site coterminous to the Archbishops palace; and, the chapel of St Catherine. A remarkable similarity between these churches within the space enclosed by city walls was the low budget on which it was constructed by the State. These initial structures under constructed by Albuquerque were visually unimpressive and lacked ornamentation indicating the hurried construction of such edifices mobilizing indigenous artisans and locally available material such as bricks, laterite and granite stones, adobe and palm leaves for the thatched roofs. However a contextual analysis of these buildings placed against their functional role within the city space enables us to understand the larger processes at work. Contemporaries list the chapels and the main church constructed by Albuquerque to be small and built of mud walls with thatched roofing.\(^{156}\) This perhaps stemmed from the mercantilist State’s attempts at reducing expenditure in a period when much of its limited resources had to be diverted to military engagements in the Indian Ocean and strengthening the administrative and defense arrangements within Goa through military bastions and fortresses.\(^{157}\) Alternately the sources record Albuquerque’s vision to use such chapels and churches to spread Christian learning amongst the converted indigenous

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\(^{157}\) The richly constructed and maintained four fortresses in Goa testified by Cortesão, *Suma Oriental of Tome Pires*, p 58
communities primarily the native women married to the casados; their baptized mixed blood offspring; and, the converted slaves of the Christian households. It is this information which enables us to link the modest and hurried nature of the constructions and the need of the State to use such churches to nurture the community of casados and their mixed race offspring (mestiços) which would be bound to the empire politically, economically and culturally. Thus apart from their role in proclaiming power claims of the Portuguese in the conquered territory, such edifices were integral to early colonial knowledge production binding the loyalty of the Christian casados community to the city space of Goa at the micro level; and, to the politico-economic interests and growth of the Estado in Asian trade at the macro level.

Picture 2: Chapel of St Catherine
Furthermore the lack of ostentation in the construction of such churches during the initial years (of Albuquerque and Lopo Soares de Albergaria) can be understood as the empire’s strategy of continuing and intensifying the commerce of Goa based on mutual co-operation with the resident Hindu traders. This policy reflected the port city’s dependence upon the inland and regional Hindu traders to maintain its supplies of food and other essential commodities in a period when Bardez and Salcete were still unconquered and the casados community had not grown to substantially control regional trade. An analysis of the royal grant of concessions to all the residents of the Goan islands in 1518 irrespective of their religious alliance corroborates that the State’s primary interest was to sustain and develop trade and commerce by encouraging co-operation and collaboration between the different mercantile and producer communities resident in Goa to bring prosperity to the city.158 Such a spirit of co-operation and co-existence is indirectly evident in the alvara of Viceroy Dom Nuno da Cunha allowing the continuity of the Hindu customary practice of pledging on betel leaves, cow and buffalo dung and salt by the non-Christian residents of Goa outside the Portuguese occupied territory.159 Indirectly the very fact that the various governors of the Estado from 1510-1540 did not forcibly annul such a practice or enforce the Christian customary practices and rituals on the Hindu residents of Goa during this span of thirty years suggests the continuity of the spirit of religious tolerance despite the proclamation of Goa as the imperial headquarters of the European Christian State and as a Bishopric by 1534. Furthermore it also hints at how the wealthy Hindu traders and craftsmen of Goa still constituted an important section of inland and sea-traders dealing in essential commodities such as grain and foodstuff as well as luxuries such as precious stones and textiles despite the growing role of the casados as intra-Asian traders. Similar instances of tolerance can be traced in the crown’s disregard of the repeated requests of Friar Antonio de Louro in 1518 to dissuade the Hindu residents from reviving their religious practices by legally barring the entry of

158 Silva Rego, Documentação para a Historia das Missões, vol.1, p.356
159 For details on the alvara of the Viceroy see Silva Rego, Documentação para a Historia das Missões, Vol IV, pp. 208-210; For a contrary reading of the alvara see P.P.Shirodhkar, ‘Socio-Cultural Life in Goa during the 16th century’ in Charles Borges and Helmut Feldmann (eds.), Goa and Portugal: Their Cultural Links, p 29.
Hindu Yogis in Goa; and, the appeal of the Bishop of Dumenas, the Dominican Father Duarte Nunes in 1522 to ban all Hindus from residing in the Ilhas and destroying their sacred images and temples. In this context, it can be deduced that the massacre of Muslims, violent demolition of the mosques and construction of churches within Goa were un-accompanied by an ostentatious display in church ornamentation as it was feared that claims to religious exclusivity and cultural superiority by the empire could backfire the State interests by prompting the migrations of Hindu traders to the secure commercial environment of neighboring Hindu kingdoms.

Apart from a few churches within the urban commercial center, Albuquerque also established churches on the boundary and the immediate vicinity of the Adil Shahi city. Thus Our Lady of the Mount (Nossa Senhora do Monte) was established to the east of the city; Our Lady of Light (Nossa Senhora da Luz) to the south and Our Lady of the Rosary (Nossa Senhora do Rosario) and St Anthony (Sao Antonio) to the west of the city, but outside city walls. The significance of the churches that were placed outside the city walls stemmed from their strategic location on hills overlooking the city and the river Mandovi, as these locations ensured better supervision of all vessels plying in the river. A study of the architectural layout and placement of the Nossa Senhora do Rosario enables us to reconstruct its significance at a time when the city faced threats from the contesting neighboring kingdoms of Bijapur. Its garrison like construction with steep and thick walls overlooking the Mandovi makes it appear more as a military bastion than Lisbon’s highly ornamented and elegant churches. Moreover its placement on top of a hill which sloped gradually towards the south (where lay the city) and sharply to the west (to the banks of the Mandovi) rendered it an excellent place to overlook the riverine traffic before it entered the port-city of Goa and rendered it impregnable in case of an offensive attack. The geographical advantage of its location on the Holy Hill led the State to use the church

160 Silva Rego, Documentação para a Historia das Missões, vol.1, p.354
161 Silva Rego, Documentação para a Historia das Missões, Vol I, pp. 452-453
162 The sites are marked in illustrations: no. 2 and City Plan 4.2.
as the lodging place for troops in their defense of the city against military offensives of rival sea-borne powers.

Picture 3: Bastion like Architecture of *Nossa Senhora do Rosario*
Similarly a physical analysis of the site of Velho Goa (Portuguese city of Old Goa) suggests that the Nossa Senhora do Monte was situated atop a hill and the elevation must have been strategic to have a panoramic view of the entire city including the rua direita, the church of St Catherine, the Fortress on the banks of the Mandovi, the customs house (Alfandega) as well as the Viceroy’s Quay and the Wharf. This made it an excellent place for watching over the city and the river. Albuquerque’s awareness regarding the storing of Adil Shah’s artillery at this site—rendering it difficult for disruptive powers (invaders or feuding forces within the city) to subjugate the hilltop without being detected first—must have motivated him to construct the Nossa Senhora do Monte soon after the conquest of the city.
Picture 5: Hilltop Location of *Nossa Senhora do Monte*

Picture 6: Panoramic View of City and River from *Nossa Senhora do Monte*
The looming of such hilltop churches over the city acted as visual symbols asserting the dominance of Christian rulers over the trading urban gentry and visitors. The establishment of the church of *Nossa Senhora da Luz* has been traced to the late 1530s though its elevation as a parish church was only by 1543. The church like the others mentioned above was established on the city boundaries and was strategically located at the city gate which led to the suburbs. Thus a re-reading suggests that visually the church must have asserted the might of the Christian power to the conquered alien lands lying beyond the city and to the migrants from the suburbs entering the urban commercial center to render skilled and manual labour as seen in the indigenous artisans, craftsmen etc., working in the shipyard and mint or as merchants. Furthermore, the establishment of *Nossa Senhora da Luz* hints at the experiments of the State by the late 1530s to expand the city boundaries for accommodating the increased Christian population of the city—with the expansion of the earlier *casado* community and the swelling of the immigrant Portuguese and native settler—by establishing churches in the immediate outskirts of the erstwhile city walls.

Records reveal the construction of further religious structures under subsequent governors and viceroys such as the church of St Francis of Assisi (1521),\(^{163}\) the Franciscan monastery (1527)\(^{164}\) and the chapel attached to the royal hospital when it was shifted to the site near St Catherine Gate.\(^{165}\) Documents further highlight the opulence of the St. Francis church constructed and maintained by funds advanced by the factor, which were used for procuring skilled labour of Portuguese craftsmen and other building materials such as wood\(^{166}\) from neighboring forests (most probably Ponda), stones from an ancient

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\(^{163}\) Construction of the magnificent church of St Francis of Assisi and the completion of the convent under Diogo Lopes de Sequeira (1518-1522 A.D) is testified by *Philip Baldeus, A True and Exact Description*, p 606.


\(^{165}\) Schurhammer, *Francis Xavier, His life, His Times, Vol II*, pp. 36ff.

\(^{166}\) Silva Rego, *Documentação para a Historia das Missões*, Vol II. Doc 42, p 100.
dilapidated temple of Divar that was demolished during the 15th century and tiles from the hinterland production zones for construction and maintenance of the convent's roof. This enables us to re-trace slight shifts within the larger processes marking the empire's orientations in Goa and Asia. By the late 1520s the swelling of the casado population in the city of Goa coincided with the attempts of early colonial State to visually assert the Lusitanian power in the city through edifices which differed from the earlier humble constructions. While much of the edifices of the church and the convent of St Francis of Assisi was enlarged and rebuilt during successive years; the original gate of the main church has been retained. Analysis of this doorway suggests the use of "black" stone which reveals that the church and convent initially used the locally available black granite from the mines in the hinterland regions. In addition to documentary testimonies to the use of wood from neighboring forests, the materials used in constructing the convent suggests the beginning of a new process whereby the State was able to concentrate material resources within the urban commercial center by mobilizing wood and granite stones from hinterland economies. Such a mobilization also provides insights into the interests of the early colonial power in concentrating raw materials supplied by the territories of Bardez, Salcete and Ponda following the military aggressions and as part of diplomatic treaties of with the Adil Shahs and Vijayanagara rulers in 1520 and 1532 when temporarily the Portuguese gained control over these neighboring economies. Furthermore, the exquisite Manueline carving and the architecture of the doorway suggests the increasing use of Portuguese master craftsmen in supervising the construction of edifices now reflecting a European aesthetic unlike the indigenous sculptural and architectural patterns—evident in the mud walls and thatched roof of

169 This has been confirmed by the A.S.I. See pictures of the Church of St. Francis of Assisi and its Manueline doorway in Appendix 6.
170 This is an observation made on the basis of my fieldtrip to Velho Goa and survey of the building of the church of St Francis of Assisi.
171 For details V T Gune, Gazetteer of Goa, Daman and Diu, pp 148-149.
172 Fonseca, An Historical and Archaeological Sketch, p 223; Patrick J. Lobo, Magnificent Monuments of Old Goa, p 50.
earlier structures such as St Catherine’s church constructed by native artisans under Afonso de Albuquerque and Lopo Soares d’ Albargaria. This is further corroborated by documentary references to the maintenance and repair activities at the church of St.Francis Assisi being entrusted by the factor of Goa, Leonardo Vaz , to the Portuguese mason-cum-resident of the city of Goa, Bastiam Piriz in 1527. 173

These evidences hint at the State’s efforts at redistributing funds towards maintaining Lusitanian institutions and urban edifices that by the 1530s and 40s increasingly reflected architectural and sculptural aesthetic. While on the one hand this suggests changing strategies of the early colonial State to attract increased population of Portuguese casados within the city-space by late 1520s; on the other hand such edifices clearly demonstrates the increase in the concentration of Portuguese skilled and unskilled community residing in the port-city relative to the erstwhile urban settlers comprising predominantly of indigenous traders and artisans. Sources further testify to how the space granted for the construction of the church and convent of St Francis and fiscal assistance—just like the 1530s enlargement of the church of St Catherine—were undertaken by the public treasury at Goa.174 Thus the germination of the process whereby the wealth of the city was displayed in ornamental churches—which reached its zenith by the end of 16th century—could perhaps be linked to the concentration and redirection of mercantile wealth and human resources as early as the late 1520s and early 1530s with the casado settlements within port-city Goa and through the agency of the early colonial mercantilist State. Such a redistribution of the city’s wealth into constructing ornamental religious edifices after 1520s could be envisioned as the State strategy at preparing the imperial city to be the representative of the early colonial might of the Portuguese in its political engagements with the mainland powers of Bijapur and Vijayanagara. The Portuguese aesthetics used in architecturally and decoratively re-structuring the first generation of churches in the city further reflected the attempts at evolving the city as a visually impressive space. It was

into this evolving glittering city that the Portuguese migrants from Lisbon got accommodated from 1530s on.

Thus the initial years of 1510-1520 reflect the State’s strategy to prioritize continuity of the commercial efflorescence of the city of Goa by retaining the Hindu merchants and not engaging in frenzied religious proselytization. However by 1530s—with the expansion of the Portuguese *casado* community of Goa—the State’s strategies saw slight shifts towards consolidating a Christian base for the empire using the Franciscans\textsuperscript{175} and some Dominican clergy\textsuperscript{176} who engaged in teaching Christian faith and cultivating values of loyalty to the *Padroado* amongst the new converts and the *casados*. Such teachings reveal the processes whereby the state soon assumed the role of being the protector and promoter of Christianity in the East. During the span of thirty years from 1510 till 1540 there was relatively no stimulus from the State to indulge aggressively in Christianization and expand the pastoral field of missionaries; nor did the State venture for forcible conversions or changes in socio-cultural practices of non-Christians. The mercantile leanings of the diocesan clergy during this period become evident in St. Francis Xavier’s criticism of their lacking proper theological training and engaging primarily in trade rather than pastoral care. Furthermore the fact that it was only in 1534 that Goa was declared a diocese and that even then it did not have a resident bishop till 1538 reinstates our argument that the period from 1510 till 1540 was marked by continuity in the Mercantile State’s strategy of peaceful coexistence and mutual co-operation within the various mercantile communities residing in the city space of Goa, though slight reconsiderations towards the Christian knowledge formation amongst the *casados* and other converts were noticeable.

However it says only one part of the story; the early colonial State used religion and its church institutions to make its powerful presence visible in the countryside encircling the

\textsuperscript{175} On the Franciscans of Goa, their life and activity see Silva Rego, *Documentação para a Historia das Missões*, vol I, pp 246-272

\textsuperscript{176} Apart from the Franciscans contemporaries reveal that only one or two Dominican friars occasionally or continuously lived and worked in Goa prior to 1540s. See Silva Rego, *Documentação para a Historia das Missões*, Vol I, pp 272-278.
city of Goa. The use of religion in establishing the State's claims upon the predominantly Hindu population in conquered zones which faced threats of invasions from the neighboring kingdoms perhaps explain the establishment of churches in the countryside. Thus post-Albuquerque's period saw the establishment of the churches of Our Lady of Help (Nossa Senhora de Ajuda) in Ribander an important satellite port to the port-city of Goa; Our Lady of Conception in Panjim at the entry point of the sea-side; Our Lady of the Cape (Nossa Senhora de Cabo) at the tip of the island; Our Lady of Guadalupe (in the village of Batim), St Lawrence (São Lourenço) to further south in Agaçaim, St James, St John the Baptist (São João Baptista) in Carambolim, St Blaise (São Bras) in Banastarim177 were established in strategic areas.178 Thus such churches in geo-politically strategic ports such as Ribander and Panajim; gateways such as Banastarim and Carambolim; and, outposts such as Agaçaim overlooking the riverine crossing to Salcete and the main land were significant to monitor traffic to the port-city as well as maintain vigil to guard against peasant unrests and offensive attacks by inland kingdoms of Bijapur and Vijayanagara.

The foregoing discussions suggest that urbanization in Portuguese Goa during the period between 1510 and 1540 was dictated by twin processes. Much of the city development aimed at militarily and administratively securing Goa as the bastion of the empire in the Indian Ocean for the purpose of controlling the maritime traffic between the littoral ports on the western coast of India. With the shifting of Portuguese headquarters from Cochin to Goa in 1530 and with the establishment of a bishopric in 1534, the city became the seats of both temporal and spiritual powers, whose weight began to get increasingly manifested in the city through various edifices that were constructed after 1520s. The edifices after 1520 were considerably ornamented and decorated when compared with the simple structures of the first decade of Portuguese occupation. The casados, who were envisaged as to become a loyalist social base for the empire, brought immense wealth to the city through the medium of their trade, particularly trade in horses and the evolving

178 Places marked in illustration: Map 3.
urban institutions were so designed as to incorporate their wealth, partnership and expertise for running various urban portfolios including the delivery of healthcare and social care to the city-dwellers. With the increasing flow of migrants from Portugal from 1530s, the number of *casados* residing in the city swelled, augmenting the need for several urban functions for the municipal council to perform, which was established as early as 1518. Because of the sea-related professions, the *casado* traders very often used to succumb to sicknesses of various kinds, particularly because of their frequent exposures to different zones of tropical weather during their long-distance travels, which made institutions that delivered medical care like the hospitals and *Misericordia* to evolve as central urban institutions of the city of Goa. The injuries that many city dwellers used to get in the wars waged for the State with rival powers also increased the need for the hospitals to come at the centre of the urban life of Goa. Obviously the hospitals signified a great amount of urban stratification, in which the royal hospital was kept open mainly for the nobility and royal officers, while the hospital of the people was open for the ordinary settlers of the city, while those with contagious diseases were to remain in the hospital of St.Lazar located in the periphery of the city, implying also the social peripheralization. The multicultural and accommodative phase of the city is indicated for the period up to mid 1530s by the co-existence of different merchant groups and economic classes, for keeping whom in good humour different regulations and legislations were made by the State. However, while retaining the cosmopolitan nature for the city during the initial period, the mercantile State also tried to identify the loftiest parts of the cityscape and the country side to erect churches impressively protruding to the skies for the purpose of indicating Portuguese sovereignty and control over the region.
Illustration III a.: Map of Tiswadi listing Major Fortification, Passes & Religious Institutions

Legend

- Passes & Check Posts
- Eastern Fortification
- Fortresses
- Churches & Seminaries
- Bastion

Map showing various locations and symbols indicating passes, fortifications, churches, and seminaries in the region of Tiswadi.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Passes and Checkposts</th>
<th>Fortresses</th>
<th>Churches and Seminaries</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1. Fortress of Mormugao</td>
<td>1. Church of Nossa Senhora do Cabo</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Passo de Gondolim</td>
<td>2. Fortress of Nossa Senhora do Cabo</td>
<td>2. São Miguel</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Passo de Agraçaím</td>
<td>5. Castle of Farol (Bardes)</td>
<td>5. Nossa Senhora das Mercês</td>
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<td>7. Panjim</td>
<td>7. Fortified College and Church of Reis Magos</td>
<td>7. Nossa Senhora da Aguda</td>
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<td>43.</td>
<td>43. Nossa Senhora do Goadalupe</td>
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Illustration III b: Eastern Fortification, Military Out Post and Strategic Check Posts Guarding the Cidade de Goa

Legend
- Passes & Check Posts
- Eastern Fortification
- Fortresses
- Churches & Seminaries
- Bastion
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<td>2. São Miguel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Passo de Agaçaim</td>
<td>5. Castle of Farol (Barnea)</td>
<td>5. Nossa Senhora das Mercês</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Passo de Narve</td>
<td>6. Fortified College and Church of Reis Magos</td>
<td>6. São Barbora</td>
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<td>8. Raibandar</td>
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<td>8. São Pedro</td>
</tr>
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</table>

29. Nossa Senhora do Goadalupe
30. São Anna
31. Nossa Senhora de Nazareth
32. Santa Maria Magdalena
33. Nossa Senhora da Luz
34. Nossa Senhora do Monte
35. Nossa Senhora da Serra
36. São Amaro
37. São Alexio
38. São Paulo
39. A Sc
40. São Andre
41. Nossa Senhora do Rosario
42. São Roque
43. São Simão.