CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Alliances have long been the subject of theoretical and empirical analyses in international relations. A primary reason for this is the view that alliances create and counter much of the tension in world politics. The proposed study pertains to a trio of nations – Pakistan, North Korea and China – whose behaviour at rhetorical levels and on the actual chessboard of international relations has been thoroughly checkered and are full of exigencies and uncertainties. This study would make use of Stephen Walt’s balance-of-threat theory which posits that states balance the threat rather than power as the balance of power theory suggests. Walt’s theory was based on his analysis of West Asian international politics. In this work, I propose to test whether Walt’s theory also holds good for other regions of the world. Keeping Walt’s formulations in mind, this work examines the principal concerns of Pakistan and North Korea which led to their respective alignments with China. This is a period-specific study extending from 1980 to 2000. I have chosen to focus on this period because it covers the Cold War as well as post-Cold War era, which provides a good basis for comparison. The introduction provides an overview of the thesis.

It is difficult to define security in precise terms. Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (1977: 27) argue that survival is the primary goal of all states and in the worst situations, force is ultimately necessary to guarantee survival. In Wolfers view (1962: 150), security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked. The perceived threats of most nations are directly linked with the security perceptions confronting them. Size (territory, population, economy), culture, location of states have a direct impact on neighbouring nations. One of the methods which are usually employed by a nation for achieving her national interests is alliances and treaties. In fact, joining an alliance provides a state a primary mechanism for increasing its security. In this study threats and responses to threats are examined in South Asia and East Asia in the decade before and after the end of Cold War.
In diplomatic relations, the principle of balance of power (hereafter BoP) has operated from the earliest times, for example, in the leagues of the Greek city states, and the maze of wars and alliance of the Italian republics. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the balance of power was recognized as a definite formula of diplomacy. The years before World War I confirmed the balance of power as a principle of modern European policy. The Triple Entente (France, Great Britain and Russia) was countered by the Dual Alliance (Germany and Austria-Hungary). During the 19th century, nations sought to preserve peace by a policy of BoP. The goal was usually achieved by defensive combinations against any nation threatening to upset the equilibrium. BoP involved alliances, counter-alliances, burdensome armaments, shady territorial deals, rivalries and instability often resulting in war among the states (Ricker 1962; Friedman et al. 1970; Malhotra 2001: 510). The creation in 1918 of the League of Nations was an attempt to replace the BoP. In the 1930s, Britain and France tended to abandon the principle of the BoP in favour of the appeasement of the fascist dictatorships in Germany and Italy. Since 1945 there has been an emphasis on international arbitration and the UN as the means of settling disputes between nations. On the other hand, the theory of the nuclear deterrence has much in common with BoP politics, the Western bloc against the Communist bloc. With the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989-1990, the possession of nuclear weapons as a means of maintaining BoP between East and West became irrelevant. The end of the Cold War changed the dimensions of international relations dramatically.

However, the nature of international society has not fundamentally changed in the view of adherents to the Realist security paradigm. They do acknowledge that the end of the Cold War has brought relief from the hitherto dominant source of insecurity - namely superpower nuclear conflict, but other than that, nation state's quest for their individual security has not waned. Some of them see the present absence of major interstate confrontation or conflict as just a temporary phase in a long-standing cyclical pattern of peace and conflict in world affairs (Mearsheimer 1992; Waltz 1993). Some scholars characterize the post-Cold War world as an interwar period (Gray 1994; Weinberger 1996). Some others foresee an inevitable rivalry and confrontation between regional power blocs or civilizational groupings (Huntington 1993). Another group of realists advocates that the quest for economic advantage, if not supremacy, is now the primary
imperative of nations. Security for them is no longer measured by correlation of military forces but by success in gaining access to and control over markets, sources of capital, key technologies, and even labour supplies. The consequences of failure in terms of economic security do not lead to military invasion and subjugation but unemployment, technological backwardness, and ultimately, inexorable national decline (Huntington 1993; Moran 1990; Moran 1993). Yet, military threats constitute the main traditional security concerns. Military actions threaten all components of the state. It subjects the physical base to strain, damage and dismemberment. It can result in the distortion or destruction of institutions and it can repress, subvert or obliterate the idea of the state, particularly its organizing ideology and the institutions which express it. In the post-Cold War era, international politics can not be understood in terms of only BoP and other such set terms.

The security of a nation involves a wide spectrum of affairs – political, economic, social, cultural, ideological and military. The term national security implies safeguard from internal and external threats and the ability to counter these threats. This is to be served by each state. Political thinkers with a realist approach like Nicholo Machiavelli, Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger visualized the world as a conglomeration of different interacting sovereign states whose governments respond to the protection of national interest with due regard for the maintenance of power. According to the realist view, threats to the security of states emanate mainly from the external environment. The best way to counter this actual threat or perception of threat is to increase the capabilities of the state through the acquisition of weapons and the building of alliances. Much effort is spent into the intricacies of the causes and the process of unraveling the threat perceptions.

Belonging to this same tradition, Stephen Walt develops the balance of threat (hereafter BoT) theory which, unlike traditional BoP, claims that states do not balance against power, but against threats due to geographical proximity, power, capability and intentions of others. He focuses on issues such as, when states will form alliances; what determines their choice of allies; whether states tend to balance strong or threatening powers by allying against them; whether they are more likely to bandwagon by allying with the most powerful or threatening states, etc. He finds that balancing behaviour best
explains pattern of alliances in post-World War II West Asia, bandwagoning is rare, ideology can have a divisive impact, and foreign aid or penetration do not have independent effect. Walt's thesis is one of the most important treatises on alliances and alignments. The greater the degree of accuracy about existing and potential threats to the security of a country, the greater is the scope of an optimal response.

Threat perceptions and security assessment arising out of an adversary's intentions and capabilities take into account real as well as potential threats. This threat assessment is influenced by several variables, such as historical experience, geo-strategic environment, capabilities and intentions, domestic vulnerabilities, internal political dynamics of one's adversaries. Most importantly it depends upon perceptions. It is relative and needs perspective. Threats are not assessed in a vacuum but in the context of particular situation. Capabilities are essentially relative. The enemy country A's ability to harm country B is related to B's ability to defend itself. Intentions are dependent. A potential aggressor will depend rather heavily upon how it perceives the capabilities, the relationship between itself and the adversary, and also on the likely action it expects the defender to take in the event of crisis. The policy ensuing upon security assessment, in turn, leads to adequate defence preparedness. In fact, arms acquisition is an important means of ensuring both an offensive and defensive defence.

Relation between two sovereign nations is a complex and complicated phenomenon. What is more, relations between two contiguous and neighbouring states are much more complex. In case these neighbouring states share a common geography and a history of conflicts, this relationship acquires a more complicated and volatile character. The foreign policy of any country is a mixture of a number of variables. It may include principles which shape policy, factors which influence the formulation of policy, the decision maker's perception of situations and most importantly, according to Margaret Sprout, their modes of thought, (Sprout and Sprout 1962: 124). The agencies involved in policy making, the planning, and other instruments utilized in the execution of policy are other vital factors. Historical legacies and tradition, geographical location, ideology, domestic compulsions, the socio-economic development of the country, the perception of ruling elites as well as regional and international political compulsions also play a role. Realists argue that a divided nation suffers even more acute security concerns
than other interstate rivals. Because of the imperative of national unification, the relative success of one side not only undermines the viability and legitimacy of the other, it also directly and immediately threatens the other's very survival (Buzan 1991: 74-75). In such a situation, security concerns predominate. These security conditions are applicable to Pakistan, North Korea (I use North Korea and Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK interchangeably) and People’s Republic of China (Similarly, I use PRC or China interchangeably), as Pakistani and North Korean relations with China are shaped by a wide variety of factors, including geographical proximity, historical and cultural inheritance, territorial wrangling, economic relations and even ideology.

Statement of theme

Pakistan and North Korea are two relatively weak states that have aligned with a strong neighbour, China. The variables in balance of threat theory in these two cases would explain that Pakistan and North Korea would have aligned against China and not with it. The present study tries to assess such factors that brought these countries closer to form an alliance.

China’s indulgence with Pakistan includes almost everything – conventional, nuclear and missile technologies, economic assistance, its views on Kashmir etc. Despite pressure from international community regarding nuclear and missile technology transfer, China did not change its main plank on supporting Pakistan. This close bond between Pakistan and China, though asymmetrical, had all the appearance of an alliance. What motivates these two countries with different systems to form such a close bond is a puzzle.

The important geo-strategic position of the Korean peninsula has made it a battleground for external powers like China, Japan, Russia and America. The Sino-DPRK alliance can be characterized as a case of extremely asymmetric dependency. The relation between North Korea and US has been marked by hostility. It is difficult to comprehend the persistence and intensity of confrontation between two unequal states like North Korea and US. The disparities between states covers a range of areas including size, population, level of development, military might, weapons of mass destruction, place and
role in the world politics, economy, trade etc. The study is an attempt to analyze how North Korea perceived threat from South Korea-US alliance and not from China.

**Purpose and propositions**

The objective of this research is to examine Walt’s formulations of the BoT theory which assumes that states actually balance “threat” not “power”. Applying Walt’s dictum to Asia, the states that I have chosen are Pakistan, North Korea and China. The central premise remains the assumption that Pakistan’s alignment with China was the result of Pakistan’s perceived threat from India and North Korea’s perceived threat from South Korea and the United States resulted in its alignment with China. China, a huge country, is in geographically proximate vicinity of Pakistan and North Korea, also more capable in terms of economy and defence strength, has aggregate power more than India and South Korea. Yet, Pakistan perceived threat from India and North Korea perceived threat from South Korea and the US (though China is closer than the US). This situation is to be examined in terms of Walt’s theory in this research. The focus is on the period between 1980 and 2000, separated by the decade during which several changes – perception as well as factual might have occurred in the overall pattern of international behaviour. Perceptions of threat and insecurity in Asia, for over fifty years were dominated by superpower rivalry. With the end of the Cold War that threat has almost vanished. But this does not mean that hostility has vanished. This study tests the following three hypotheses in the context of the Asian region:

1. That states ally to balance against threat rather than power alone.
2. That Pakistan allied with China because it perceived a threat from India.
3. That North Korea allied with China because it perceived a threat from South Korea and her ally United States.

It also aims to find out reasons as to why Pakistan and North Korea do not feel threatened by China, even though the latter is a big power both economically and as well as politically and is geographically closer. Though it is neither appropriate nor possible to compare the relations between the two different sets of countries because they have entirely different sets of structure, still it can be said that these cases are comparable as intensity of the major problems remains same in both the cases.
Any perceptions of security must be discussed in the context of the geo-political environment as Pakistan, North Korea and China are geo-politically very different from each other. For security considerations, they developed a working relationship despite differences in their political systems and ideologies. Pakistan and North Korea both sought alliances with China to enhance their military posture. The alliance formations with China enhanced the security of these countries through deterrence of regional threats.

This work is primarily focused on Walt's theory. Its aim is to use the foreign policies of Pakistan and North Korea as two case studies to analyze the BoT theory and examine the overall pattern of these alliances that has been affected by the end of the Cold War. These issues are examined by probing the extent to which Pakistan and North Korea pursued its China policy in the 1980s and to what extent it did so in the 1990s. In other words, this work seeks to explore what constitutes threat to the security of a country and how it handles that perceived threat.

Existing literature

There is a vast literature available on the subject matter of alliances and alignments. However, much of this literature is focused on one particular angle. It is primarily descriptive in nature. Here an attempt shall be made to briefly outline the debate on the subject in order to provide a background to the process described above. The foci shall be on those works that added important information on the problematic. I have divided my review of the literature on alliances broadly in two parts, the theory and the specific cases. It is not to argue that theoretical model building is totally absent in these studies. However, a great number of these studies are region specific.

The strategic environment in which nations live contributes to their security perspective. A nation's security outlook is built up largely on how and from where it perceives threats to her security. In general, states seem to have been unable to coexist in harmony, since the actions of one state in pursuit of its own national security may create insecurity in others. The strategic environment includes: the presence of the adversarial powers in the neighbourhood, the different dimensions of the size of the country, political instability on the periphery, consistent effort by outside powers to have allies in the
region by manipulating them on various counts etc. (Kapur 1994: 17-18). Whatever may be the level of their development, the nature of their geographical location, the choice of their social system and the viability of their governmental structures, all states implicitly or explicitly, have always taken into account the military dimension while designing the broad security framework of their foreign policy. All conflicts can not be solved by a nation individually suing military means alone. In fact, arming for security is only one of the many options open for decision makers. The perception of threat is a vital element in the recipient’s calculation to acquire arms. Other means are also available to promote a nation’s security-related objectives like balance of power and by forming alliances. Security in an anarchic world of sovereign states is, in the final analysis, the responsibility of individual states. Kenneth Waltz calls it a ‘self-help’ system. In his view, “States are on their own to provide for their defense in a potentially hostile world. To bolster their security in response to threats, they can take actions both internally such as raising armies and strengthening their economies or externally engaging in diplomacy or forming alliances” (Waltz 1975: 36-37). In simple words, the concept of security was mainly understood in terms of threat from one state to another and therefore, states sought to secure themselves through realist tools such as armament, wars, BoP, alliances etc.

A number of works are done on the theory of alliances. A country’s inability to meet its security challenges by itself is at the root of alliance formation. A country that feels insecure against any other country and feels inadequately equipped to meet the threat, tries to secure itself by forging an alliance with the powers within the vicinity as well as outside the region. Glenn H. Snyder (1990) compared alliance formation as well as management in a multipolar and bipolar system. He dealt with the issues like how partners are chosen; what happens if an alliance is superimposed; what are the values of an alliance. He supported Stephen Walt’s views that regional states are concerned about the threats from local rivals. They may even align with external powers against local adversaries. Ole R. Holsti (2004) has highlighted that states often go for such coalitions, which guarantee them security in wake of an imminent danger. There are a lot of factors governing a nation’s choice of its allies but ultimately it is the common needs and goals, which play the determining role. The author proposes the need to forge such coalition
would always persist so long as systemic constraints are at work. Alliances would continue to be a major instrument of statecraft so long as states have common interests and goals. Most of these works describe different dimensions of an alliance without any reference to the specific region.

A number of works that attempt to present bilateral relationship between Pakistan and China from a theoretical point of view do so by focusing upon one aspect of the relationship or the other. One prominent work in this direction is by Anwar Hussain Syed (1974) who sees the pattern of Sino-Pakistani relations as being not so much that of a formal alliance, or even of a client-patron situation, but rather that of two states, of very different sizes, which have discovered that they share certain interests in common. On the basis of these interests certain understandings have been arrived at which have nothing like the force of a formal military pact along the lines of Warsaw Pact or Indo-Soviet Treaty signed in August 1971. According to Syed, both China and Pakistan drifted into this entente. Even when in early 1963 the entente gave rise to formal Sino-Pakistani treaty expression in the border agreement of March 1963, the wider nature of the relationship between the two powers remained informal. Though the author attempted to describe the basis and type of Sino-Pak alliance from theoretical point, the Chinese role is not discussed in detail. Azizul Haque (1985) throws light on Pakistan’s domestic politics, its relations with China and on the geopolitics of the South Asian region as a whole. Haque deals with the complex historical, ideological, geopolitical, religious, cultural and economic factors supporting the perception of Pakistani leaders. The need to consolidate the state and assert a national identity distinct from India forced Pakistani leaders to place undue emphasis on an Islamic ideology, while the fear of Indian hegemony and the elusive goal of parity with India pushed Pakistan to join Western security alliances. The pro-Western tilt has been at odds with domestic public opinion and has earned Pakistan the wrath of both the Soviet Union and China. Haque attributes these contradictions to neglect of geography and the role of ideology. The author attempts to draw the connections between Pakistan’s defense-centric and India-oriented foreign policy and its failure in national integration. He underestimates the domestic, regional, and international constraints under which Pakistani leaders formulated their foreign policies. This made him misread the balance between internal and external factors in the nation’s historical
development. Another work by Javeed Ahmed Seikh (1986) focuses on developing a theoretical model and explains Pakistan as an example of weak nation. Pakistan is used as an example of the nations where capabilities outdistance capabilities to interact with others. He deals with threats, wars, and defence related budgetary allocations on Pakistan. He has concluded that these three variables help in understanding the intensity of the insecurity Pakistan faces. Here the author is dealing with different issues but has not focused on why Sino-Pak relation endured for so long.

Arguing in a reverse fashion, Mira Sinha Bhattacharya (2001) states that China has always treated Pakistan as her close ally. Sino-Pak relations became more intimate after the events of 1971, especially the Indo-Soviet treaty and the Indo-Pak war. China in order to keep track of the developments in the volatile region of South Asia needed a trusted ally to clearly spell out her anti-India sentiments. Despite making friendly overtures to Pakistan, China was cautious enough not to overemphasize this relationship at the cost of worsening relations with India. While she continues to have Pakistan as a chosen ally, China is making sure that there is not much tilt in favour of Pakistan so as to antagonize others. This work has not discussed the relationship from theoretical point of view.

Writings on the Indo-Pak relations attempt to understand Pakistan’s sense of insecurity. Hafeez Malik (1993) studies Indo-Pak relations, their relations with the global powers, and their relations with regional states such as Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and China. Indo-Pak discord, as pointed out by Hafeez Malik, emerges from Pakistan’s security dilemma. Since Pakistan’s inception, it has felt threatened by ambiguous boundaries, the Kashmir issue etc. Statements by Nehru and Patel denouncing the country’s raison d’etre only exacerbated Pakistani fears. Following this argument, Hasan Askari Rizvi (1993) traces theoretical and contemporary aspects of global politics given various crucial changes and their impact on the developing world. This work is an attempt to share Indo-Pak relations, with a diplomatic history through the early 1980s when the Afghanistan crisis, nuclear proliferation, and Kashmir issue were in the forefront. Rizvi argues that, in the post-Afghanistan period, the situation has changed, given the diminished American strategic interest in Pakistan and the increasing American concern with Pakistan’s nuclear programme. He contests the notion that Pakistan’s friendship with China has successfully weathered various storms over the successive decades.
There are a number of books and articles written on the role of the US towards individual states. One of the noted works regarding the United States and Pakistan is by Shirin Taher-Kheli (1982). Taher-Kheli emphasizes on the 'influence relationship', who influenced whom, when and how in the US-Pakistan relations. She also discusses the differences in the threat perceptions of Pakistan and the US, and considers that an absence of common interests detracted them from common enterprise. However the major drawback of Taher-Kheli's work is that it does not emphasize on the impact of global developments on American interests in Pakistan. Another prominent work in this tradition, Victor Cha (1999) explores the dilemma, in both theoretical and policy terms, by using the notion of quasi alliance, in which the two states, Japan and South Korea remain unallied but share a third party, the US as a common ally. He seeks to extend realist analysis in order to arrive at an understanding not only of Japan-Korea relations but also of the dangerous Northeast Asia security situation. An important contribution of Cha's book which covers the period from 1965 to 1998 is to deal with two different notions of Japanese-South Korean tensions: the bitter memories of their past relations or a common threat, North Korea and need of a US deterrent as an explanation of both past and future policy in Northeast Asia. He finds that the less Korean and Japanese leaders are convinced of the US commitment, the more they are inclined to cooperate with one another. Insecurity promotes friendliness. As Cha explains, the quasi-alliance theory may have less applicability today than in the Cold War era. In new circumstances, diminished external threats, increased multilateral diplomacy, emphasis on the economic, technological, and financial components of security, and increasing pluralizing of domestic political life- international relations in Northeast Asia are far more complex than they were during the Cold War. The US has not abandoned its Cold War priority of maintaining a balance of power and emphasizing its bilateral alliances in Asia. There is indication of coordination of policy on North Korea's missile tests, the shared concern of South Korea and Japan about North Korea's intentions, defense policy initiatives by both Japan and South Korea.

Following this, Samuel S. Kim (1998) on North Korea's foreign policy in recent years makes the readers aware of the dynamics of its foreign relations and domestic politics. It is devoted to analytical constructs, North Korea's ideology and negotiation.
strategy. It also features North Korea's foreign relations and looks into issue like security, foreign, economic and unification policies. It makes a balanced presentation of theoretical concerns and functional topics. While concerns over legitimacy, national identity, and the twin security dilemmas of entrapment and abandonment shape its domestic foundation of foreign policy making, interdependence and interpenetration of domestic, international, inter-Korean domains set its situational parameters, culture and ever-changing external factors are singled out as crucial predictors for North Korea's policy behaviour. The strength of the book is its analytical construct. Refuting the mainstream's preoccupation with realism and neo-realist, Kim offers an approach that sees North Korea in the cultural and political context. He emphasizes on legitimacy and identity. However, it does not deal with inter-Korean relations.

Yet another attempt at explaining DPRK-China alliance, Kim and Lee (2002) provide a perspective on China's role in Korean affairs. They discuss China's concept and practice of security and also deal with the power of the weak. There is a comparison between the needs and expectations of North Korea and China. A rising China and a declining North Korea gives a complex and confused expectation. However, no explanation of theory is given here.

The existing literature on alliance emphasizes a number of ways to form alliances to counter external threats. Although such literature has its own agenda, the focus is on theoretical perspective. The literature review also reveals that though the Pakistan-China alliance and Pyongyang-Beijing alliances have separately been a subject for the academic research, no previous work has compared these alliances. It is a matter of great interest not only from theoretical viewpoint to test the Walt's BoT theory in emergence of Pakistan-China and Pyongyang-Beijing alliance. It is also imperative to study the phenomenon of emergence and sustenance of alliances despite variations in the factors leading to the original alliance formation. The analytical study of the alliance of Pakistan-China and DPRK-China may provide few more dimensions and a new perspective to Walt's theory. These two cases represent good tests for BoT theory. Despite similarities between the two cases there are major differences as well. The actors are different, their ideologies diametrically opposite, they have different socio-economic environments and
the international scenario is also different. Threat perception or the fact that states form alliances in response to threats being a novel concept, the proposed work enhances the scope of the study.

Applying Walt to the case study of Pakistan and China

The Indian threat has loomed large on Pakistan since 1947 and influenced Pakistan’s behaviour in the regional and international context. In the words of Jean-Luc Racine (2002: 198), “A feeling of insecurity has been nurtured constantly since 1947, partly by India’s realpolitik, but perhaps mostly by Pakistan’s eagerness to take to task a much larger neighbour”. The primary objective of Pakistan’s foreign policy can be termed as search for security against India (Sayeed 1965: 229). The primary aim of the foreign policy of Pakistan is equality of status with India – to be even with India (Callard 1957: 11). Its insecurity vis-à-vis India occupies the central stage of regional security in South Asia. In terms of area, population, GDP and conventional forces, India has the advantage of magnitude. Pakistan perceives that the asymmetry is widening in terms of India. In Sino-Pak alliance, the principle reason to form an alliance with China is to balance against an external threat. This case study also supports the statement that states may choose to ally with the stronger of two powers, if the weaker side is more dangerous.

To overcome its challenges, the first task of Pakistan was to find an equalizer against India. As per the requirements of the objectives, Pakistan actively and to some extent successfully sought patronage from the Commonwealth, the Islamic world and the US. With regard to search for parity with India, Bhutto emphatically said that ‘Pakistan will always need a plus factor for coping with India’ (Bhutto 1968: 25). This need for a ‘plus factor’ first led Pakistan to enter into a close relationship with the US and became the ‘most allied ally’ of the US in Asia (Khan 1967: 130). The US-Pakistan strategic relationship was to be filled with tensions because Pakistan’s concern over Communist bloc threats was secondary to its preoccupation with India (Talbot 2000: 219) and later sought China’s friendship against India. Sino-Indian war of 1962 brought India closer to China’s enemies – the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and China closer to India’s enemy – Pakistan.

The Indo-Pak relations would have been a one-to-one relationship. However, China has emerged as the third important dimension of the picture. It became an important ally
of Pakistan during the Cold War, representing a bulwark against Soviet expansion in Afghanistan. Now that the Soviet threat is gone, the greatest strategic outlook of both countries is to offset Indian military power (Bymas and Cliff 1999: 15). As David Shambaugh states, China has practiced its view that alliances require declared adversaries as a rationale for their existence. In Pakistan, the band of leaders who favoured reorientation of Pakistani foreign policy on pro-China lines included President Ayub Khan and Foreign Minister Z. A. Bhutto. Most of the bureaucrats believed that the future of Pakistan as a separate and independent state could be reassured only by cultivating the friendship of Communist China (Sayeed 1965: 251-53). So far as the role of political parties is concerned, the Pakistan National Awami Party led by Maulana Bhashani supported a pro-Chinese foreign policy. A look at the National Assembly debates clarifies the stand of various political parties with regard to Sino-Pak relations.

Chinese perceptions of India were based on several variables. As regards the model of development, India adhered to the principle of mixed economy. India’s model of development, a thrust on economic growth within a democratic and liberal institutional framework had quite an attraction for many countries of the third world. The repercussions of adherence to this model of development by India were two fold. On the one hand, it challenged the Chinese model of development based on ‘command economy’ and on the other hand India seemed to emerge as an area of convergence of interests between SU (Soviet Union) and US (United States). Moreover, India being the second largest country in Asia and possessing all potentials of a great power was capable of posing a threat to China’s dominant place in Southeast Asia and East Asia. Another area of difference between India and China was territorial disputes. Thus owing to all these reasons and India’s increasing involvement in international politics and the border disputes with India, China made an all out efforts to undermine India’s capabilities and potentialities in the regional as well as in the international field. In this crusade China found a natural ally in Pakistan against India, perceived by China and Pakistan as a common enemy to both. Once the graph of Sino-Indian relationship started going down,

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1 See the Resolution Passed by the Central Organizing Committee of the Pakistan Awami Party, Dacca Times, 6 March 1964.
correspondingly the graph of Sino-Pak entente started going up. After 1960s, when China decided that India at best is her adversary and at worst her enemy, she started building up Pakistan as a counterpart to India. Special warmth was achieved in Sino-Pak relations. Pakistan and China were connected through Karakoram Highway (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir). The Chinese support became an asset for Pakistan in its confrontation with India. The relationship became mutually rewarding.

In 1963, Pakistan and China signed a border agreement. During both the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars, China threatened to intervene. In 1965, during the Indo-Pak war, it stepped up the relationship to a quasi-alliance and after the war it provided material aid to Islamabad. In the 1965 war China issued a not-so-transparent ultimatum to India to ensure that India did not move some of its divisions facing China to the battlefront. Immediately following the war, when both India and Pakistan were embargoed by the West, China began its conventional arms transfer relationship that has been of substantial benefit to Pakistan (Thomas 1986: 26-29). As a part of this, China has since 1972 supplied some 1200 type-59 Tanks, 105mm, 122mm, 130mm towed artillery, patrol and missile craft, MIG-19 and MIG-21 type aircraft (SIPRI 1990: 289). Arms sales to Pakistan thus remained steady during the period. China supported Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir and Pakistan backed China’s efforts to join the United Nations. These trends accelerated after Indo-Pak war of 1965. Ties with China enhance Pakistan’s strategic and political reach. Karachi is a regular refueling point for Chinese aircraft flying to Europe, Africa and the West Asia, and Pakistan acts as a link between China and various Islamic countries, helping facilitate China’s relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Muslim nations. China was a major source of weapons, particularly of combat aircraft, missiles and tanks. In 1991, Pakistan procured M-11 missiles from China, with ranges of 290 km and the capability of carrying nuclear warheads. China played a major role in Pakistan’s nuclear programme. In the 1980s, China reportedly provided Pakistan with a proven nuclear weapon design and enough highly enriched uranium for two weapons (Milhollin 1997: 14). A high level of cooperation has continued in the 1990s. In 1994-95, a Chinese government owned subsidiary transferred 5000 ring magnets, which are used in centrifuges to enrich uranium, to unsafeguard facilities in Pakistan, a shipment worth $70,000 that violated China’s NPT obligations in the opinion of US administration.
officials and experts (Milhollin 1997: 14). China has also played an active role in Pakistan’s missile programme. For example, in November 1992 China transferred M-11 short-range ballistic missile components to Pakistan, and in August 1993 additional equipment related to these missiles. Intelligence reports of US leaked to the media indicate China sent missile parts to Pakistan in 1995 (Bymas and Cliff 1997: 15). The mutuality of interest and cordiality developed between Pakistan and China. It was an attempt to balance the main threat i.e., India. They also shared perceptions on the regional strategic environment. Pakistan, on its part, increasingly needs Beijing as a strategic ally.

Pakistan and India negotiated bilateral agreements from time to time, like the Indus Water Treaty (1960), the agreement to submit the Rann of Kutch dispute (1965) to international arbitration and the acceptance of the award of the tribunal (1968), the Simla Agreement (1972) etc. The year 1971 has been a turning point in Pakistan's history as it had further tilted the balance of power in South Asia in favour of India. The East Pakistan's crisis, followed by war with India in 1971 resulted in the breakup of the country. It suited neither Pakistan nor China. Pakistan felt threatened when India exploded a nuclear device on 18 May 1974. India continued to be Pakistan’s principal security concern. The nuclear test conducted by Pakistan in 1998 was a step taken in the context of the threat posed by India. In the words of Musharraf (2006: 284), 'Pakistan has always pursued a balance of power and forces with India. Deterrence demands it'. According to him, until 1974, the military balance involved conventional forces only. Once India became nuclear, Pakistan’s deterrence became untenable as this was only three years after the war of 1971, when India severed East Pakistan from them. He finds the period between 1974 and 1998 relatively peaceful along the border with India. Musharraf (2006: 285) says, "India’s intensions were offensive and aggressive, ours were defensive. The world and its powers relentlessly pressured us to desist, without similarly pressuring India". Pakistan’s search for security has the main target- augmentation of security against external threat primarily from India and counterbalancing India’s military superiority.

Thus, South Asian politics is heavily conditioned by the hostility of India and Pakistan. The distrust developed between Pakistan and India created a fear in Pakistan that India wanted to use its size, resources, technological advancement and military
superiority over it. Pakistan did not face a threat from China though it was a larger and stronger nation. In fact, it established closer relationship with China and sought to promote an alliance, citing its insecurity from India. The alliance has endured because both the sides, Pakistan and China perceive that the alliance is needed to deter potential sources of threat.

*Applying Walt to the case study of North Korea and China*

The Korean conflict is essentially a struggle between the two halves of a divided nation, one of which came under Communist rule in the aftermath of the Second World War, while the other had been influenced by the West. It is only with a proper understanding of North Korea's perceptions on the relationship with South Korea and the US, that one should examine these developments. When examining the foreign policy of the PRC on the Korean peninsula, one needs to first look at historical and then at strategic and geographical factors. China's geographical proximity to the Korean peninsula, its continuing influence on the North Korea, and ideological undercurrents bind North Korea and China. Of greater relevance to this study is how the North Koreans perceive the value of the US-ROK alliance.

The tension between North and South Korea is the result of the partition. The armistice of 1953, which has never been concluded in a formal peace agreement, led to insecurity. The military balance tilted in favour of the South poses threat to North Korea. The North also perceived threat from the US. The US is not a neighbour of the Korean peninsula, has attempted to influence North Korea to contain the latter's potential threat to the security of East Asia in general and South Korea in particular. The annual military exercises by the joint forces of the US and South Korea, termed *Team Spirit*, caused utmost alertness throughout the North. To balance these threats, North Korea opted for the support of PRC and became its ally. The Korean peninsula is a kind of bridge or strategic corridor between the Chinese mainland and Japan, and is adjacent to the critical industrial region of Manchuria.

Beijing maintains an alliance with North Korea according to the 1961 DPRK-Chinese Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. This treaty includes a military component pledging Beijing's aid to Pyongyang in case of foreign attack. With
these military alliance systems, both Koreas were closely tied to three major powers that included two superpowers. Therefore relations among the three powers have a direct impact on inter-Korean relations.

The Chinese intervention in the Korean War, the bipolar configuration of the world’s power structure, and China’s continuing rivalry with the Soviet Union for influence over North Korea kept Sino-ROK relations poor for nearly three decades after the cessation of hostilities on the peninsula. Towards the end of the 1970s, China’s adoption of a reform and open door policy at the time when indirect trade between China and South Korea began, brought major changes in China’s policy towards the peninsula. During the early to mid 1980s, China pursued a ‘two Korea policy’, which included cultural, academic and sporting contacts with South Korea. The other development was an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations in the mid to late 1980s, which undercut the erstwhile rationale behind the rivalry over North Korea. Developments, especially since 1991 in the international sphere have been pushing threat perceptions of North Korea. The passing of the Cold War enhanced the value of economic ties with South Korea and entailed the end of Sino-Russian competition over North Korea. China’s post-Cold War policy towards the Korean peninsula derives its foreign policy emphasis on economic priorities. For the sake of its own national interests, throughout the 1990s China supported the intra-Korean dialogue. Since the early 1990s, particularly after the death of Kim Il Sung, security and military ties between China and North Korea have been subject to the rigidity of their political relations.

Talking of Sino-North Korea relations – in the contemporaneous context where ideology is no more a prime determinant – it is important to underline the fact that there is a lot of unease and discomfort in the relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang. North Korea is still deep in orthodox ideology while China has exchanged her ideological dogma with pragmatic approach. Economic considerations and a market pragmatism are the guiding covenants to the Chinese ruling elites. On the contrary, North Korea is still deeply sunk in ideological militancy. On the surface, it is the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. In practice, it is the shadow of patriarchy and personality cult of Kim Il Sung. North Korea is one of the few regimes in the modern world which are practicizing a closed door policy. No wonder, then, China is quite often critical of this ‘inward looking’
mentality of North Korea. In one of the recent comments China called North Korea as a “strange country”, on another occasion she called it “an absolute feudal state” (Bazhanov and Moltz 2000: 176). Similarly, North Korea has made mocking comments on China’s market-oriented economic policies and termed them “revisionist and reformist”.

The changes in geopolitical realities since 1980s led to ideological isolation and economic backwardness of North Korea. The end of the Cold War has disturbed North Korea. Chinese and North Korean societies have gone so much in different directions that their interests are becoming incompatible, be it social, political or economic. However, Korea’s divided status, coupled with China’s power potential, continues to influence the perceptions that China will maintain its privileged position in the Korean peninsula.

Rationale
Examining alliance formation in particular case studies is especially valuable. The two cases namely, the Pakistan-China alignment and the North Korea-China alignment add new evidence from two different regions. These two cases were carefully chosen to capture the intricacies and finer details of implementation of Walt’s theory in South Asia and East Asia connected by a pivotal player, China. These regions also provides for a test of the hypotheses on balancing and bandwagoning. Comparative case study is more useful than a single case study. Since taking more cases leads to a dilution of depth of the case study, only two sets of cases are chosen.

Analyzing alliance formation in Asia particularly between Pakistan and China is of increasing interest for several reasons. Sino-Pak alignment with hardly any natural compatibility i.e., different social, cultural, economic and political institutions, different ideological imperatives and interests, might not be uncommon in international politics, yet the study of their relationship has attracted the attention of the scholars and analysts to a great extent. The Sino-Pak alliance has been matter of great interest in academics and strategic planners for several reasons largely because China being fastest growing economy, aspiring to be recognized as one of the poles in a unipolar world and Pakistan having influence in the stability and regional development of South Asia. The Pakistan-China relation has time to time been scrutinized because of their contribution in growing arms race and proliferation.
The Sino-Pak alliance has been identified to be examined for a variety of reasons. This relationship provides a strong case of an alliance despite the fact that no formal alliance was ever concluded between the two countries though Pakistan and China have signed number of agreements and pacts which they endorse. A special kind of relationship between Pakistan and China had been forged proving that a community of interests creates a far stronger bond between nations than scraps of paper called treaties. Beijing and Rawalpindi had "an unwritten military agreement" (as cited in Sharma 1968: 104). The test will help to arrive at a clearer understanding of why the Pakistan-China alliance persisted despite the absence of any formal alliance between the two. These countries have faced a number of internal and external challenges. The two countries have striking disparities in their institutions, one as a Communist regime and the other as an Islamic military regime during most of its time. Nonetheless, they have managed to maintain relatively successful relations. This unique relationship, which has come to be described as a 'great diplomatic enigma', 'a contemporary miracle of diplomacy' (Chaudhury 1976: 248), 'a classic case of the coincidence of objective' and 'the convergence of interests between the two countries' (Ayoob 1969: 1) grew for a number of reasons. The factors, motivations and objectives, which have shaped and governed their close relations, are to be traced in the present study.

The focus on China is growing increasingly intense. Its relation with Pakistan is a matter of great concern for India. Though a number of works have been done on Sino-Pak relations, no comprehensive work has been done which focus exclusively on the threat as a factor for Sino-Pak alliance. Regionally, China's deep involvement with Pakistan's nuclear programme contributed to the arms race in South Asia. Globally, it also spread instability outside South Asia. Thus it has raised the tension level across the subcontinent. With Chinese assistance, Pakistan has accumulated nuclear capable missiles. China's continuous support to Pakistan's nuclear programme witnessed slight change at least on paper with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union as well as the signing of CTBT and NPT by China. Neither China nor Pakistan denies continuous support to Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes. However, these developments could not give satisfactory explanation of the Sino-Pak relationship.
India by being a great power to its neighbours always had a strong impact upon their identity. That is why India is of great concern to Pakistan. And it has always been Pakistan's intention to bring China into South Asian affairs to counterbalance India. So far as China is concerned, India resembles China in its emergence as a major state. China visualizes India as its competitor. Both China and Pakistan follow the principle 'the enemy's enemy is my friend'. Despite the dramatic changes in the international and regional environments, the Sino-Pak relations continue to enjoy cordiality and basic continuity. This relationship often described as 'time-tested' and 'all weather friendship'. It has seen many twists and turns over a period of time. But it always revolved around the Indian factor. The relationship, which is based on politico-strategic considerations, has wide ramifications both regionally and internationally.

The relevance of this study is not limited to a single case. The North Korea policy research is also apt to be read as an interesting case to study in itself. There are many reasons why North Korea's behaviour is selected as the subject for a case study. The Korean problem is a matter of global interest because of the strategic location of the divided nation. The brief history of two states on the peninsula makes clear that the region has been an area of anomalous relationship. Its important geo-strategic position has made the peninsula a battleground for external powers. This is where the interests of China, Japan, Russia and US have intersected. The North Korean policy is appropriate for a case study as the Korean peninsula has been a victim of great power rivalries. North Korea figures very highly on the agenda of major actors in Northeast Asia and it is regarded as one of the major destabilizing factors in the entire Asia-Pacific region. This case study of China-North Korea alliance is a powerful example of alliances of a relatively long duration. Sino-North Korean alliance was informal from 1950 until the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and mutual Assistance. To assess how the power or influence of Chinese foreign policy has evolved, a case that involves the possibility of both bilateral and multilateral interaction must be selected. The coordination of the North Korea policy presents exactly this kind of context. This study places Korean issues into the larger context of Sino-US competition and examines the DPRK's emerging security challenges of balancing its commitment to the alliance with the US and Chinese operation.
No aspect of the dilemmas on the peninsula can be understood without recourse to the US. The US as a global player retains interest and troops in Northeast Asia. It is crucial to China. The West tends to project a very one-sided image of North Korea — one that sees it a source of danger and instability. Very few policy makers, security analysts and journalists ever make the effort to imagine how threats are perceived from the North Korean perspective, or consider how these perceptions are part of security dilemma. For the sake of understanding the dimensions of the crisis, how it must have appeared from the vantage point of North Korea's decision makers. It is said that foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy and that sometimes they are inseparable. This seems true of the Korean policy.

These three countries namely, China, Pakistan and North Korea are undergoing changes of different sorts and have very little in common. However within all the diverse problems, there is a logical consistent pattern. There is a different scale of economic development. Their socio-political arrangements are different. None of the three can duplicate the experience of another. In spite of these differences, a close examination shows some sequence. The alliances rest on a firm foundation of common objectives and the values shared by them.

In many of the regional balances, the great powers play important roles by providing arms and military, financial backing, support or lead military operations and, in some cases, direct military intervention. Much of current international relations are dominated by regional tensions and military balances. The detailed examination of the regional cases is an essential part of the study of international relations. Although every region has its own importance, these two cases may exemplify some of the major trends that are also seen in other areas. And they are worthy of study in themselves.

The cases presented here are selected for a number of reasons. They provide a basis for comparison, as the focus is on more than one geographic area i.e., South Asia and East Asia. In both cases the role of external powers are examined. The cases also identify the major causes of conflict. Comparing the cases allows us to analyze and compare the basis for alliances and alignments. It is a comparative study to gain an in-depth understanding of the security policies of particular states. A comparison can also be made between states by examining how each state responds to similar strategic imperatives. These include the perceptions of threat to national security and strategies to respond to these threats. A systematic analysis of history broadens the scope.
Research methodology

The research is based on the case study method as the cases are selected on the basis of similar general characteristics. The hypotheses of two similar processes of alliance formation, Pakistani and North Korean alignments with China in the balance of threat system have been explored in this research by using comparative observations. It examines whether threat or capability, independent variable is more important in determining alliances that is its dependent variable.

The study is based on qualitative and quantitative method. It is based on deductive reasoning as BoT theory is applied in two cases. It evaluates the events and policies and hence follows analytical method. The organization of this study is essentially chronological. The description of perceived threats has been discerned from the statements, interviews and assertions made on various occasions by the Pakistani and North Korean leaders, policy makers, academicians, journalists etc., in addition to other sources of information. This is also based on an analysis of the official records and related materials such as press statements. The role of two superpowers, the erstwhile Soviet Union and the United States and Japan has also been analyzed wherever and whenever it held pertinence on the above issue.

The scope of the present study required a careful and extensive work to collect materials and information. The present study in addition to the primary sources, like the official documents and the National Assembly debates, speeches had to rely on the books in English language published from Pakistan, China, North Korea, US, South Korea, India and other journals, periodicals and newspapers. On the basis of these sources, an attempt has been made to make an analytical assessment of the emerging developments and situations. The study has become historical and descriptive wherever a historical context was required to explain the mutual relationship between the two countries.
Structure of the Study

The present study consists of six chapters including this introductory chapter.

The second chapter is an extensive discussion of theory of alliances and techniques of alliance building. It discusses existing theories of alliances, their strength and weaknesses. Finally, it delves into the BoT theory as propounded by Stephen Walt. It is here that a brief scenario about threat, capabilities, goals and the alternative actions available to decision makers are discussed. By highlighting his theory it also discusses interpretations by other scholars to provide different perspectives to his theory. This chapter lays the groundwork for testing the models developed in the next chapters.

The third chapter examines the Sino-Pak alliance to assess Walt’s theory. The chapter takes into account the historical background of the Sino-Pakistan relations. It seeks to trace out the history of their relationship ever since 1949 and goes up to 1979 to discuss it in the phase of 1980s and 1990s. It attempts to put together and analyze the various factors which were responsible for developing cordial relations between China and Pakistan. As its consequence, it revolves around the India factor in Pakistan’s perception. Both China and Pakistan seem to have recognized from the early fifties that there was an ‘area of coincidence’ in their aims and objectives in so far as they related to India, and the ‘coincidence of these objectives’ and convergence of interests of China and Pakistan led the two countries to realize that there was a firm basis for cooperation on the Indian front (Ayub 1967-68: 279). The linkage between Pakistan’s policy towards Beijing and the ups and downs of the Sino-Pak relationship is analyzed. The formative phase of Sino-Pakistan entente is 1960-1965. Maximum developments in their relations took place during 1966-1971 and brought the two countries very close to each other. Besides the impact of changed regional and international situations on their relations, the present study makes an attempt to study the Sino-Pak relations in the light of India’s nuclear test (May 1974), the Afghan crisis etc. The military and nuclear collaboration between China and Pakistan has come to assume an additional significance in their mutual relations. One part of the chapter is devoted to this dimension. Consequently this period came to be regarded as an era of a closer collaboration between the two countries. In the 1970s Pakistan emerged as one of the major recipients of Chinese military help. The Sino-Pak
military cooperation was further cemented during Afghan crisis i.e., the end of 1970s.
During 1979-1982, China was the seventh largest arms exporting country to Pakistan. At
the beginning it was the arms deal. In late 1970s and early 1980s, there were commercial
deals also. China emerged as the only country which dealt with these transfers and deals
on very easy terms. The Western media has given a wide coverage to Chinese missile and
nuclear technology transfer to Pakistan. China also faced threats of sanctions from the
U.S. many times. Despite these pressures China did not change its principal stand on
supporting Pakistan. In 1977, the Chinese President Ziang Zemin stated that China would
not compromise on its commitments to Pakistan regarding transfer of nuclear technology.
Following the nuclear weapons tests in May 1998, Chinese attitude indicated that Sino-
Pak strategic cooperation remained in place. From a hostile political environment, the
major sources of threat can be summed up as: Pakistan’s fear of Indian hegemony in the
region and its trying to strengthen the position by developing relations with third
countries primarily China. The Indo-Pak confrontation on the Kashmir issue is the most
revealing in this respect. Pakistan’s entire foreign policy is India (Kashmir) centric.
Kashmir is the be all and end all of her foreign policy.

The fourth chapter deals with the alliance between North Korea and China. It is focused
on North Korean threat perception from South Korea and the United States. The
argument proceeds in different stages. The chapter thoroughly devotes considerable space
in discussing the Korean question, the war developments and the armistice. One part
surveys the period which shows that since the division of Korea, different great powers
have played a significant role in determining fate of Korea. The Cold War years and
patterns of arms race on the Korean peninsula have been described. Another section
examines the North Korean alignment with China. The July 1961 Friendship treaty, the
automatic intervention clause (has its own mark in the evaluation of the present work),
the description of Beijing-Pongyang relations as close as ‘lips and teeth’ is discussed. It
focuses on Beijing’s role in the 1980s in the region that has gone through a major shift in
its policy orientation and as a result has started to act as the host of ‘Six-Party Talks’.
North Korea as a closed society, which is difficult to understand, follows a policy, which
is understandable i.e., its security and system maintenance.
Two similar instances of international interaction should be compared. The fifth chapter examines the efficacy of the two cases. In light of the previous discussions on alliances and alignments between Pakistan and China and North Korea and China, a comparative study of the two alliances will be attempted in this chapter. The objects of comparison are similar. Both the states have involved China and aligned with it. In both cases international concerns about the development of nuclear weapons increased. This addresses a series of common questions. Comparing, the parallels and the contrasts between Pakistan-China and North Korea-China do throw some light on how the foreign policy of a country has advanced and how it has to go further.

The sixth chapter sums up with concluding remarks. It states the main argument of the research as a whole. It provides lessons that can be derived from the research and briefly look toward how future work might resolve some of the unsettled questions.

Limitations

As I have stated in the beginning of introduction that this research will critically analyze and evaluate the Sino-Pak and Sino-North Korean alliance on the scales set out by Walt. Walt has given a sort of a theory or a model to analyze alliances. It would be more accurate to argue that Walt’s theory is basically based on the well known theory of ‘balance of power’ which is as old as international politics. Walt’s concept of ‘balance of threat’ and ‘balancing and bandwagoning’ is an extension and in fact an extrapolation of the theory of ‘balance of power’. This statement of mine needs two important riders and qualifications. First, Walt’s theory is not and can not be scientifically accurate model. There is a world of difference between physics and international politics. Walt’s theory at best is a kind of approximation. Hence it is a question of adding pluses and minuses to Walt’s theory. Secondly, and more importantly International Relations have such specific and sui genus character that defy all classifications and parallels.

Difficulties and limitations remain in this proposed work, of which the most important is the absence or reliability of the data on the North Korean development, at the same time a pro-Pakistan bias of some of the Pakistani scholars is understandably evident in their studies. One persistent theme in most Pakistani literature on relations with India is the assumption that the India has not and will not accept partition. North Korea remains
so secretive to outsiders that it is difficult to comprehend. There are constraints of data related to North Korea. Very little is known about its domestic politics and foreign policy. It is very difficult to get any reliable information about its functioning. Most of the sources which are available in this regard are either South Korean or American. Careful analysis of the data and information is required to get an unbiased conclusion about North Korea. The greatest body of literature on Korea is publications about the Korean War. More materials are desperately needed in English about Korea. Primary source materials also need to be translated for researchers who do not know Korean language to utilize in their work. Figures published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies are used throughout this thesis because they are the best available materials. Statistics, which relate to a society as tightly closed as is North Korea must always be viewed with recognition that some degree of estimation is involved.

**Summing up**

In this chapter, an attempt has been made to present the context, rationale of the study and the research questions. It presents an outline of the structure of the thesis. It very briefly states and analyses the alliances between Pakistan and China as well as between North Korea and China. The effort is to learn, critically analyze, understand and test the rationale of Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory in Asia in the time frame 1980 to 2000; one spectrum of the end signifies the Cold War period and the other end underlines the end of the Cold War in the proceeding chapters. The focus throughout has been upon Pakistan and North Korea and their perceptions of India, South Korea and the US and not other's perception of them.