CHAPTER III
PAKISTAN–CHINA: AN OPPORTUNISTIC ALLIANCE

This chapter seeks to test the validity of balance of threat theory as propounded by Stephen Walt that states react to imbalances of threat. It intends to explore threat perceptions of Pakistani leaders and the strategy they developed to cope with such security threats. It presents a synoptic view of Pakistan’s perception of threat from India, and promotion of alliance with China against this perceived threat. The chapter attempts to take an overview of Pakistan’s security dilemma against India and its responses in twin time frames: the Cold War period (1980 to 1989) and the post-Cold War period (1990 to 2000).

The obvious culmination of such perceived threats had been certain measures taken by Pakistan to match India in military capabilities through strategic alliances. Pakistan’s defence policy had been formulated on the perception of threat from India. The acquisition of arms, the upgradation of sophisticated arsenals, increase in fund allocation in defence have all been its tangible tactics to neutralise India’s military superiority. Pakistan also resorted to an active alliance with China in order to increase its competency. In addition to these efforts Pakistan also took recourse of aiming pan Islamic world declaring nuclear capabilities as an ‘Islamic bomb’, so that the wrath of the world would not be directed solely against Pakistan but the Islamic connection would come to its help. In other words, Pakistan, in order to safeguard its position vis-à-vis India, was seeking a patron who would support it against India and ensure its security against a perceived threat from India.

This chapter aims to cover the overall nature and changing dimension of Pakistan’s perception of threat from India and its alignment with China taking into account different factors as explained by Stephen Walt that affect the level of threat: aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions. The first part of this chapter analyses why India was perceived as a threat in Pakistan’s view with a historical retrospect dealing with the earlier period since Independence. The second part takes into account the response of Pakistan in terms of global and regional alliances. The third section deals with the actions taken by Pakistan with special reference to China. It
expounds how Pakistan's high threat perception has resulted in alignment with China. This section is periodized in three parts:

a. *Evolution to 1979* — It is against this background that Pakistan-China relations between 1980 and 2000 have been analysed.

b. *The 1980s* — This period discusses various conflicts between India and Pakistan as a result of which Pakistan perceived threat from India and consequently, Sino-Pak relationship thrived.

c. *The 1990s* — This period witnesses significant changes in the perceived threat from India and its impact on 'time-tested' and 'all weather friendship' of China and Pakistan.

The whole analysis runs within the structured paradigm of the following issues:

*Why Pakistan did not perceive threat from any country other than India?*

*Was India the only and exclusive reason that directly led to the alliance with China?*

*Is India the only determinant in the relationship between Pakistan and China or are there other factors?*

Finally, the chapter attempts to explore and extrapolate the future scenario and dynamics.

The quest for security vis-à-vis India has been the most important dimension of Pakistan's foreign policy from the very beginning. According to Azimussman Haider, the relations between India and Pakistan defy description by any usual diplomatic terminology (Haider 2001: 1). “Relation” indicates the presence of at least some sensible, civilized element. But what has existed between the two countries over almost six decades is the very antithesis of such a concept. It is not quite accurate to call it relation, except for the sake of convenience. It is almost an “antirelation”. Through the years, Pakistan’s quest for security has gone through various phases.

---

1 There are two approaches that nations follow while working out their security policies. One is to base security policies on the threat perception that a nation has and build a force structure as deterrence with defensive capability. Pakistan uniformly adopted this approach in relation to India, both in the conventional and nuclear spheres. The other method is to work out security policies based on national ambitions, the so-called “manifest destiny”, and national aspirations of dominance and hegemony in the region and beyond. This is the path India has followed, according to Pakistan, in building up its formidable conventional armed forces and aggressive nuclear potential. Maj. Gen. Jamshed Ayaj Khan (2005), “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Pakistan’s Perspective”, *Regional Studies*, 23(2): 4.
India as a dominant security concern: 1947-1980

Pakistan's foreign policy in most of the last three decades seems to have been dominated by its security concerns against India. In Pakistan's threat perception, India has constantly figured as the number one danger. It is perceived to have had problems coming to terms with Pakistan's existence. The two countries have gone to war on three separate occasions: 1948, 1965, and 1971. Pakistan considers India's superiority in terms of size, manpower, resources, weapons, economic patterns, industrialization, defence industry, and educational and technological development a threat. India's insistence on dominant leadership in South Asia also creates problems for Pakistan. The following table helps to make a proper assessment of Pakistan's security perceptions.

Table 3.1
Pakistani Perceptions

| 1. India and Pakistan – the products of basic, historical antagonisms. |
| 2. South Asia one of several security horizons. |
| 3. India a regional bully. |
| 4. Multilateralism, when required. |
| 5. External military ties check Indian hegemony. |
| 6. Issue by issue approach to disputes. |
| 7. Territorial adjustments needed. |
| 8. Independence and separation promote peace. |


The relationship between India and Pakistan in terms of trade or travel, is not as flourishing as one would imagine between two neighbours. Pakistan's foreign alignments or relations with other states are primarily driven by the singular agenda of acquiring military technology that could bolster Islamabad's military capacity in responding effectively to a potential Indian threat. Pakistan and India enjoy the status of big states in
South Asia, India being the biggest. Yet there is sharp divergence of perceptions between Pakistan and India. The Indian perception is based upon its self-image of big brother treating South Asia as its cultural domain, which can be turned into its political domain as well, through economic collaboration.

From the very beginning, Pakistan concluded that India had done everything possible to weaken Pakistan. India denied Pakistan its due share of financial assets, military hardware and even the water of canals over which Pakistan enjoyed historic rights (Chaudhri 1987: 31). Born militarily weak, Pakistan soon became the victim of an acute sense of insecurity because of its disputes with India, including that of Kashmir, and started developing closer relations with China. The rationale for partition needs to be elaborated here.

**Sources of Pakistani threat perception**

Pakistani threat perceptions go back to the period even before Independence in the form of the hostility that existed between Hindus and Muslims in the pre-partition era. Innumerable statements, some very threatening ones, were made in the initial years of independence. Some statements in this regard are noteworthy. Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, who had been asked to stay on to supervise the division of army goods, informed the British government that he had no hesitation whatsoever in affirming that the present Indian cabinet was implacably determined to do all in its power to prevent the establishment of the dominion of Pakistan (Jafar 1986: 67). In his memoirs, Pakistani diplomat Iqbal Akhund asserts that Nehru saw Pakistan as a feudal, obscurantist anachronism that was economically unviable (Akhund 1997: 16). He and other Congress leaders were convinced, and expressed aloud, that Pakistan would soon cave-in under the weight of its own folly and would return to the fold. They did not see the creation of Pakistan as an honourable settlement of the age-old Hindu-Muslim conflict, but as a

---

2 The All India Congress Committee in its resolution accepting partition stated: “Geography and mountains and the sea fashioned India as she is, and no human agency can change that shape or come in the way of her final destiny. Economic circumstances and the demands of international affairs make the unity of India still more necessary.” The Hindu Mahasabha was more frank and said: “India is one and indivisible and there will never be peace unless and until the separated areas are brought back into the Indian Union and made integral part thereof.” Quoted by Chaudhri Mohammed Ali (1967: 157), *The Emergence of Pakistan*, New York: Colombia University Press. Also see Sharif-al-Mujahid (1963: 633), *Foreign Policy of Pakistan - An Analysis*, Karachi: Allies Book Corp.
necessary evil, as a bitter pill to be swallowed, in order to attain India’s independence. Ensuring survival of the state was the challenge before the Pakistani policy-makers. Quaid-i-Azam M. A. Jinnah’s Presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11 August 1947 makes it clear:

“One can quite understand the feeling that exists between the two communities wherever one community is in majority and the other is in minority. A division had to take place. In my judgement there was no other solution and I am sure future history will record its verdict in favour of it. It will be proved by actual experience as we go on that it was the only solution to India’s constitutional problem. Any idea of a united India could have led us to terrific disaster” (as cited in Akhund 1997: 100).

Pakistanis argued that India has never quite come to terms with partition of the subcontinent and has been eager to undo Pakistan’s existence as an independent state (Banerjee 1998: 310). Lt.-Gen. A. I. Akram (1983: 1051), President of the Institute of Regional Studies in Islamabad, opines that this fear lingers in Pakistan’s mind about India not having accepted the existence of Pakistan. In his words: “We are the ones who have the inferiority complex and live under a fear which restricts us in dealing with India”.

Thus, the image of an aggressive India has worried Pakistani leaders from the beginning. They realized that the only way to stand up to India’s military might was through powerful external support. This perception of India’s intentions was reinforced by the war in Kashmir during 1947-48 and India’s military action in Junagarh and Hyderabad (Rizwi 1987). Several disputes concerning the process of partition have jeopardised the relations between these neighbours. These disputes include the influx of refugees, communal riots, the problem of minorities, the distribution of assets of the Indian government and the former Indian military, the canal water dispute, the evacuee property issue, the concentration of Indian troops on the Punjab border during 1950-51, and the unilateral suspension of trade by India in 1950. Pakistan believed that India did not want to solve these problems amicably in order to strangle the new state of Pakistan. The year 1951 marked an important turning point. During a period of political tension India moved troops toward the frontier in a manner that Pakistan interpreted as threatening.

What intensified Pakistan’s feeling of insecurity vis-à-vis its neighbour, India, were a number of security handicaps it had to face. Its immediate geo-strategic environment
also became a challenge to its territorial integrity, which in turn influenced its foreign policy. Pakistan is surrounded by three of the world's largest nations, i.e., the erstwhile Soviet Union, China and India. It saw itself as threatened by several relatively powerful neighbours, as it was surrounded by India to the east, China to the north, Afghanistan and Iran to the west, and separated from the USSR by a narrow Wakhan corridor of Afghan territory. There is no strategic depth, there are no natural barriers on its borders with India.

Having been born in such circumstances, Pakistan developed an acute sense of insecurity. Exchange of statements projects the level of threats and their intensity. Any hostile statement from across the border reminds the people and the policy makers of Pakistan their deepest fear of India wanting to undo the existence of Pakistan. Pakistan has been issuing statements, which project the deep-rooted psychological concern about its insecurity. It has also been issuing statements to counter threats and to warn the adversary. Constructing a force within South Asia to counterbalance India was not feasible because from the very beginning India was more powerful than a combination of all other states within the subsystem. The India-centricity of the security perception can be found in other areas as well. The rise in ethnic and sectarian disturbances in Pakistan is held as a development that can be attributed to the covert activities of India's intelligence agencies (Siddiqa 2004: 175). This further leads to confrontationist policy of Pakistan towards India - to be more precise, nuclear, missile and military collaboration between Pakistan and China.

The problems that existed in the initial years of their independence have not shown the signs of permanent solution. All these problems have been present in more or less the same measure. These as well as new problems that cropped up like 'Kashmir issue' will be analyzed. In the forthcoming sections, the individual issues regarding the two countries will be discussed in detail.

---

3 Extending from Afghanistan to China, the Wakhan corridor was created in the nineteenth century following an agreement between the British and Russian empires to avoid having a common border in South Asia. It thus marked out a 75 km Sino-Afghan border. In 1980, however the Soviet forces occupied the corridor creating so far as Pakistan was concerned a de facto Soviet-Pak border of around 300 km. Frederic Grare (2003: 1), Pakistan, in the Face of Afghan Conflict 1979-1985 at the Turn of the Cold War, New Delhi: India Research Press.
The Kashmir problem

A manifestation of the above mentioned state of mind has been the ongoing Kashmir dispute for the last six decades. Kashmir was the main cause of the sense of insecurity that gripped the Pakistani policy makers. The first Kashmir war of 1947-48 with India made it imperative for Pakistan to speed up the process of acquisition of weapons.

"Kashmir dispute" is a direct consequence of the "Divide-and-Rule" policy followed by the then British rulers. The state of Jammu and Kashmir was the largest in British India. It covered an area of 222,800 square kilometres, and in 1941 had a population of 4,021,616 of which Muslims accounted for 77 per cent and Hindus 20 per cent. The Indian Independence Act 1947, passed by the British parliament, only established the two sovereign dominions of India and Pakistan. The princely states were left free to accede to either of them. Kashmir became a part of India by accession as late as October 1947. "Pakistan-occupied Kashmir" appeared on the map after Pakistan's armed aggression against the state of Kashmir and occupation of its certain areas by Pakistan army regulars dressed as tribal people.

Tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir rose markedly. India's seizure of Goa by force on 19 December 1961 and the inability of the UN to prevent this had raised Pakistan's fears that India might have in mind the eventual forcible seizure of Pakistan-occupied portions of Kashmir. In this regard, President Ayub Khan's letter to President Kennedy dated 2 January 1962 stated that the forcible taking of Goa by India had demonstrated what they in Pakistan had never had any illusions about - that India would not hesitate to attack if it were in her interest to do so and if she had felt that the other side was too weak to resist (FRUS: 1961-1963, 1996: 170). Ayub Khan viewed his alliance with the US primarily as an insurance against the Indian threat.

The two countries fought two wars on the Kashmir question in a span of 18 years. The Shimla Agreement of 1972 recognised that Kashmir was an unsettled issue. It recommended the negotiated settlement under the principle of bilateralism. Other than Kashmir, the most intolerable for Pakistan was the quest for sharing the water of the Indus Basin.
**Indus water dispute**

Some successive events further deepened their perception of threat. A former Finance Minister of Pakistan, Syed Amjad Ali said that a state of nervousness prevailed throughout Pakistan, flowing from the defence built up of India and its purchase of a large number of planes and war equipments and ammunitions from outside sources (*FRUS: 1958-1960*, 1995: 90). This state of nervousness was aggravated by India’s renewed threat to divert the flow of certain Indus river basin-waters from Pakistan to India if Pakistan did not provide water from alternative sources by 1962. This threat was reinforced when India started construction of the massive Rajasthan canal. The feeling was growing in Pakistan that India’s substantial purchases of military equipment were really designed to enable India eventually to be in a position to “throttle” Pakistan with impunity. However, in the Pakistan’s then Finance Minister’s opinion, government of India would not need to resort to aggressive military action against Pakistan since it was already in occupation of a substantial part of Kashmir. Pakistan wanted to put on public record its disapproval of India’s threatened actions.

**Creation of Bangladesh**

The basic framework of Pakistan’s policy has not changed regardless of whosoever has been in power. It has always been their endeavour to acquire military parity or superiority over India. After Bangladesh was created in 1971 with the active support of India, the troops India used to deploy on the East Pakistan borders during 1947-71 could now be moved to the Pakistan-India border. Furthermore, most of Pakistan’s military forces were deployed on its eastern border. In a nutshell, Pakistan’s foreign policy was dictated by this very perception of threat from India.

**India’s nuclear explosion**

India exploded a nuclear device at Pokharan in May 1974. Bhutto characterized it as a “fateful development” and said that “a more grave and serious event... has not taken place in the history of Pakistan”. He said that his country would not succumb to “nuclear blackmail”. Immediately after the Pokharan test the Prime Minister of India had written to reassure Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto that ‘there was no political or foreign policy implications of the test and that India still adhered to its policy of using atomic energy solely for peaceful ends’. Bhutto’s reply was:
'It is a question not only of intentions but of capabilities. It is well established that the testing of a nuclear device is no different from the detonation of a nuclear weapon. Given this indisputable fact, how is it possible for our fears to be assuaged by mere assurances, which may in any case, can be ignored in subsequent years. Governments change, as do national attitudes. But the acquisition of a capability, which has direct and immediate military consequences, becomes a permanent factor to be reckoned with' (as cited in Palit and Namboodiri 1979: 16-17).

India’s explanation to the explosion that it was a peaceful nuclear explosion proved wrong according to the Pakistani assessment. They assessed that a decade after Pokharan not a single canal had been built in India with nuclear power, not a single mountain pass blasted, not a single dam site prepared. Pakistanis feared that the Indian could target such an explosion over a Pakistani city (Akram 1986).

Defence expenditure

Conflicts between the two states have shaped Pakistan’s security perceptions and policies. As a result, Pakistan has been over-investing on defence. The figures of the defence allocations have ranged between 30s to 70s percent of the budgets. 1947 to 1960 were the years when the larger part of the budgets had been allocated to defence (Sheikh 1987: 93). Pakistan’s defence expenditure has ranged from about 73 percent to 34 percent of total expenditure during 1947-85 (Rizvi 1987: 107). On an average it was 53.48 percent. The immensity of defence expenditure indicates that Pakistan was seriously concerned about security vis-à-vis India. During 1947 to 1960, border clashes were a constant threat. During 1960-70, the level of improvement was not much. The only increase was in 1965-66, which was the result of 1965 war (Sheikh 1987: 95). In 1970-80 the level of allocation remained fluctuating, the years 1971, 72, 73 witnessed increased allocations. The increase was based on 1970-71 crises. The allocations dropped between 40 to 50 percent during 1973 to 1980 (Sheikh 1987: 96).

Thus the security dilemma can be observed as the following: while India is the perceived cause of Pakistan’s insecurity and of Pakistan’s extra regional affiliations, it is these very affiliations that annoy India and trigger an arms race between the two. Coming full circle, this causes heightened insecurity to Pakistan. As some analyst has suggested,
India views Pakistan's military links with external powers as a disruption of its natural pre-eminence in the subcontinent; thus Pakistan's military ties with the US and China have resulted in heightened Indo-Pak tensions (Menon 1994: 48).

Military balance between Pakistan and India
Three major developments in the 60s and 70s made the Pakistani defense planners review their defense strategies. These were the supply of arms to India after the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict, the 1965 Indo-Pak war, and the 1971 war on Bangladesh issue. The 1970s witnessed the emergence of a nuclear India and the initiation of a nuclear programme in Pakistan.

The acquisition of arms by one country was immediately followed by a similar arms procurement programme by the other country. Pakistani leaders wanted to project their country's image in the international arena as an equal of India in military terms. To accomplish a power balance within the subcontinent, Pakistan joined forces with the major powers in military alliances. Pakistan's location made it strategically valuable for major powers like the United States and China, while the main aim of Pakistan was to reduce the gap between Pakistani and Indian military capabilities in order to diminish the danger of an Indian threat.

India's military build up in the 1960s accentuated Pakistan's security anxieties. The policy makers of Pakistan seemed convinced that India would use its military powers against Pakistan. India built up its military after the 1965 war. Its Cold War partner, the USSR, supplied it with military hardware, on the other hand, Pakistan's Cold War partner, the US, banned all American military supplies to it. A perception of imbalance in favour of India triggered sense of insecurity. The debacle of East Pakistan in 1971 lent itself to the belief that India was yet to reconcile to the existence of Pakistan.

Pakistan's nuclear programme was launched in earnest shortly after the loss of East Pakistan in the 1971 war with India, when Bhutto initiated a programme to develop nuclear weapons at Multan in January 1972. With the forcible break up of the country in 1971, cutting off of all military aid, and in 1974 facing a neighbour with proven nuclear weapon capability, Pakistan felt extremely insecure. Its suspicions of Indian intentions were further aroused by India's entry into the nuclear arena on 18 May 1974. It was already suffering the psychological impact of having lost its eastern wing and perceived
the Indian experiment as a grave threat to its security. The device test was perceived in Pakistan as evidence of India’s intimidating attitude and its intention to achieve regional supremacy. The main reason was that India’s first nuclear explosion was conducted in Rajasthan, not far from Pakistan’s border. The Pakistanis thought that India had gone nuclear to blackmail Pakistan (Chaudhary 1987: 75). To counterbalance the Indian explosion, which he perceived as a 'Hindu bomb', Bhutto vowed to make an ‘Islamic bomb’ (Shah 1997).

Stephen P. Cohen (1982: 99) explained Pakistan’s definition of Indian nuclear threat in the following manner: First, India possesses nuclear weapons. Second, she would use such weapons against Pakistan, not China. Third, as the prime target of Indian nuclear bomb is Pakistan, so the Indian bomb has a military and political rationale. The Pakistani sees this capacity as enabling Indian conventional forces to seize the rest of Kashmir from Pakistan. Fourth, a modest limited nuclear programme is essential to deter India’s nuclear forces. These four factors provide the basic rationale behind Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

President Z. A. Bhutto said after the Indian nuclear explosion that it was a fateful day and a threat to Pakistan’s security. He said his country would sign a no-war pact with India because of the latter’s nuclear explosion. He gave priority to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme as a parallel way of dealing with the problem of Indian predominance in South Asia. He worked with great zeal to build up Pakistan’s nuclear capability. Diplomatically also he kept an eye on further nuclear developments in India and approached international bodies like the United Nations to declare South Asia a nuclear free zone.

Table 3.2
Year Wise and Total Percentage of Pakistan’s Interactions from Dec. 1979 to Dec. 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Syed Farooq Hasnat, Pakistani policy makers tried to normalize relations with India. Most of the cooperative gestures from 1979 to 1985 were initiated by the President of Pakistan, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. Fifty percent of the conflict interaction with India (as shown in Table 3.3) indicates that they did not respond favourably to the President. India opposed Pakistan on all matters, which were of vital security concerns. For instance, opposition to military aid from the US, nuclear capability even for peaceful purposes, and involving Pakistan government in the Sikh affairs.

Apart from India, Afghanistan was an equally important factor in Sino-Pak relations ever since the establishment of friendly relations between the two countries, i.e., China and Pakistan. Afghanistan’s unfriendly relations with Pakistan and friendly relations with India and the Soviet Union impelled Pakistan to move closer to China.

**Other security concerns**

**Afghanistan**

Apart from India, until 1991, the former Soviet Union and, in a lesser way, Afghanistan, posed a potential threat to Pakistan. Pakistan felt an increased threat on both its eastern and north-western border. Threatened from both the east and the west, Pakistan tried to normalize its relations with its rival. In comparison to the Soviet Union, India was now perceived as less dangerous to Pakistan’s security. Consequently, in an effort to neutralise the threat from its eastern borders Pakistan offered a ‘no war pact’ to India in 1982 (Shah 1983: 55). The Indian response to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and India’s critical reaction to the Pak-American aid package once again generated feelings among Pakistanis that the Indian threat has not receded. Another development that strengthens such feelings was India’s luke-warm and even non-committal response to Pakistan’s offer of a ‘no war pact’. When the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is examined in the context of the history of Pak-Soviet relations, the Soviet role in Bangladesh crisis, and the improved ties between the Soviet Union and India, it seems that Pakistan’s security dilemma had become extremely acute.

The invasion of Afghanistan by a superpower changed the geopolitical scenario of the region. Pakistan was faced with two hostile fronts and this again brought Pakistan and the US together. This Pak-US partnership did not affect at all the growth of the special
relationship between Pakistan and China. As Afghanistan was China's neighbour, the Soviet armed invasion of that country posed a threat to China's security. Pakistan and China coordinated to deal with this situation. During this decade, the US, Pakistan and China developed a close collaborative relationship, whereas India maintained its traditional cordial relations with the Soviet Union. Agha Shahi (1988) wrote:

"A consensus has come to exist within the Govt. that the most likely contingency of direct aggression would be from the threat posed by India. An armed attack by India would be instigated, encouraged or supported by the Soviet Union should the Afghanistan situation remain unresolved. Despite the threat to Pakistan's security posed by the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, nearly 80 per cent of Pakistan's military forces were deployed in the east facing India. 1988 was the year in which Soviet troops began withdrawing from Afghanistan, an event, which had a great effect on the psyche of the people of Pakistan. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Pakistan's perception of India being the chief source of threat has been reinforced".

Barry Buzan (1991) defines the concept of 'security complex' as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another. He believes that any security complex between two or more states could be formulated in one geographical area. Buzan (1991) argues that, since the bulk of Pakistan's army is deployed against India instead of on its borders with China, Iran or Afghanistan, this makes it a member of the South-Asian security complex. The use of this concept highlights the interconnections between the respective dynamics of the Afghan-Pakistan and Indo-Pakistan relation. Pakistan's Afghan policy can be partially explained by the desire of the Pakistani decision makers to reduce the existing gap between the Pakistani and Indian military capabilities and hence to reduce the danger of the Indian threat (Grare 2003).

Kenneth Waltz (1979) writes, "States in the international system have one of the two ways of dealing with their perceived aggressors: they can balance against such aggressors, either with their own capabilities, which is called an internal balancing or by joining like-minded states against the aggressor, which is known as external balancing". The strategic choices made by Pakistan indicate an admixture of different balancing options. The major objectives of its international policies have been seeking a sustainable, consistent long-term patronage with a view to safeguard its position vis-à-vis
India in totality and to ensure its security against the contemporary threat from India, as well. The list of patrons it sought was long – the Commonwealth, Muslim states, the United States, etc. This can be manifested as the language and the contents of resolutions passed in such forums as the Commonwealth, Islamic countries associations, and in ASEAN, which have some pro-Pak, and anti India tinge. The existence of the Indian factor induced Pakistan to take the following course.

II

Pakistan’s response to challenges

The first phase (1947-1980)

In the early years after independence, Pakistan had banked its hopes on the UN to protect it against any Indian aggression. It also placed its hopes in the British Commonwealth and Britain, for assistance in resolving the Kashmir dispute and other problems with India. The United Kingdom helped Pakistan establish ordnance factories (Rizvi 1988: 41). Pakistan found the British unhelpful and leaning towards India. Another aspect of its strategy was maintenance of special relations with the Islamic world and the creation of a possibility of moral and financial support of the Islamic world to its India policy. To understand Pakistan’s position, it will be more appropriate to have a look at various steps taken by it.

Pan-Islamism

Pakistan explored Pan-Islamism to see if it could bring the support of the numerous Islamic states behind it with respect to India. Arising out of its preoccupation with security as well as ideology, an important dimension of Pakistan’s foreign policy has been the maintenance of special relationships with certain countries in the region like Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Iran, and Turkey.

Most of the Arab countries have tended to support Pakistan in its problems with India, particularly on the Kashmir issue, in the two wars with India, and during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In 1972, the Pakistan government turned towards the West Asia to strengthen itself on the vital issues it faced vis-à-vis India. Pakistan’s President Bhutto was to negotiate with his Indian counterpart at Simla. Before his departure for Simla, he undertook a tour of fourteen Muslim and African countries in January 1972,
followed by a second trip in May that year to consolidate his position against India and win diplomatic backing from the third world. The main purpose was to procure the Muslim world’s moral and material support in the negotiations with India for a peace treaty.

*Iran*: Pakistan tried to make up for its military vulnerability by strengthening relations with powerful Muslim states such as Iran, who could be depended upon in any future conflict with India. Good neighbourly relations between Pakistan and Iran owe their origin to the geographical location in an area of regional rivalry. Iran’s interest in Pakistan as an indispensable buffer state between itself and India- its regional rival was fully realised by Pakistan. The two states with overlapping interests increased their collaboration. Iran backed Pakistan’s entry into the UN and its stand on Kashmir (Mohammadally 2005). In the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, Iran aided Pakistan both diplomatically, and materially. An Iranian government statement labelled the Indian attack on Pakistan as ‘aggression’. During times of crisis when Pakistan had been threatened by India and Afghanistan, and Iran’s northern and western borders have been exposed to Russian and Iraqi threats, Islamabad and Tehran stood by each other. On 10 September 1965, Turkey and Iran in a joint statement called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of Indian forces from Pakistani territory and the despatch of a UN peace force to the frontiers. The communique concluded: ‘The Governments of Turkey and Iran reaffirmed the solidarity which links Turkey-Iran and Pakistan, and declared that they are ready to support Pakistan, a brother country and an ally’ (Ahmed 2005: 170). During the war of 1971 and seventies, Iran gave material and logistic support to Pakistan. Around 1994, the Iranian leadership explored the possibility of establishing an anti-US bloc in Asia consisting of Iran, India and China (Amin 2004). Neither India nor China was willing to join an anti-US grouping. From Pakistan’s point of view, such a proposal coming from Iran was disappointing. It showed a total disregard of Pakistan’s strategic interests and its threat perception from India.

*Saudi Arabia and Libya*: Pakistan has always been steadfast in its friendship with Saudi Arabia. Bhutto convinced the leaders of the Arab world, particularly Saudi Arabia and Libya, that it was possible to develop Islamic nuclear option. There is no direct evidence of either Saudi Arabia or Libya or any other Arab country having actively collaborated with Pakistan on the nuclear project.
Egypt: A Muslim country like Egypt’s show of preference for India over Pakistan hurt sensitivities of the Pakistani people. Nasser and Nehru became the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. Pakistanis resented Nasser’s remark that ‘Suez is as dear to Egypt as Kashmir is to India’ (Amin 2004). Bitter statements were exchanged between the two countries. During the 1965 war, Egypt seemed relatively more sympathetic to India.

Thus Pakistan’s rivalry with India has been a contributory factor, in establishing friendly relations with Islamic countries. Eager to increase Pakistan’s strength vis-à-vis powerful India, the leaders tried to exploit the situation to the full by emphasizing Pakistan’s West Asian and Islamic character. These countries were supportive of Pakistan in its disputes with India. This support was a diplomatic asset for Pakistan. However it also aroused uneasiness. The Islamic countries were not responding to Pakistan’s suggestion for an Islamic bloc. Pakistan finds little relief in its association with the Muslim nations. This left Pakistan with the option of turning to either of the two power blocs. Soviet leader Malenkov said in August 1953 that the USSR placed great value on good relations with both India and Pakistan. Thus the Pakistani policy makers found themselves in a dilemma. The Soviet Union did not veto any Security Council Resolution on Kashmir (Amin 2004). India-Pakistan relations kept on deteriorating.

It was under these circumstances that Pakistan decided to join the US sponsored military pacts. Relations with the Soviet Union turned sour only around 1954 when Pakistan decided to join the US sponsored military pacts.

External Balancing

The United States: Pak-US relations also form a very important element of Pakistan’s foreign policy by Pakistani policy planners to ensure the country’s security against the perceived threat. Faced with a hostile powerful India and an unfriendly Afghanistan on the borders, the planners sought to protect Pakistan through a policy of alliances with America. Politically, Pakistan expected the alliance with America to provide security against India. Its alignment with the US and its allies brought military aid. This certainly provided an assurance of a security against India’s hostility to some degree. Pakistan
remained associated with the US in bilateral and multilateral ties for about sixteen years. Pakistan’s motives in joining the alliances were explained by the then Foreign Minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra:

“Our main and only purpose was to safeguard the safety and security of Pakistan and we needed support from the like-minded and peace loving nations. We never made any secret of the fact that we apprehended a threat to our security from India” (as cited in Rajvi 2005: 190).

Pakistan abandoned the policy of non-alignment in favour of a pro-Western policy. It supported the Japanese peace treaty, opposed China’s intervention in Korea, its admission to the United Nations, etc. and joined the US-sponsored military alliances: SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organization, 1954) and Baghdad Pact (1955), later named CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). A major reason why Pakistan aligned with the West was to improve its overall position against India: to reduce the power inequality vis-à-vis India, to reduce the burden of heavy defence expenditure, to receive diplomatic support in case of a dispute with India, and to secure economic aid. Economic and military assistance flowed from the US to Pakistan, and Pakistani armed forces received training and modern equipment that somewhat redressed the quantitative imbalance with India. Between 1954 and 1957, the US had given Pakistan about $ 750 million in aid (Nyroop 1975: 383-85). Pakistan felt that it had found much needed external support. This self-confidence enabled Pakistan to deal politically with India. For example, the Nehru–Noon agreement on borders and the Indus Water agreement were made.

Pakistan’s confrontation with India had caused it to join the anti-communist alliances. As soon as it saw the Americans trying to balance India against Pakistan, it diversified its policy. For instance, in 1953, Pakistan was receiving $ 109.8 million as assistance from the US as against $ 45.1 million to India. But in 1954, when the balance tilted in favour of India, with India receiving $ 88.9 million as against $ 23.3 million to Pakistan, it sought to diversify its foreign policy by establishing relations with Communist China (Ahmed 2002: 207). Z. A. Bhutto had introduced confrontation with India as the ground norm of Pakistan’s policy with China as the regional ally instead of the global US.
However, there was a basic disagreement between Pakistan and the US. They were operating from two different perspectives. The US held that the pacts were meant to defend the member states against communist aggression only. On the other hand, Pakistan continued to insist that these pacts should also be applicable in the case of aggression against Pakistan by India. For the US the underlying considerations were global, for Pakistan regional consideration was important. The US wanted to contain the impact of Communism on Asian countries. Pakistan wanted to offset India's military superiority. For the United States, the alliance with Pakistan was to contain the Soviet Union and, later, to end its presence in Afghanistan. For Pakistan, the motive was the need to counter India. The Pakistan-US alliance served compatible but non-identical interests. Initially, US showed reservations to arrogate itself as Pakistan's ally against India. The US-Pakistan ties ultimately could not materialize to the extent Pakistan wished. In the eyes of the US, Pakistan was a small 'catch'. India, if it agreed to support and align with the US, would have been a much bigger 'catch'. Pakistan's position as America's "most allied ally" declined in the 1960s.

In the wake of India-China border war in 1962, substantial Western military assistance was rushed to strengthen India. This decision in disregard to the security concerns of Pakistan, which was the West's military ally in Asia, caused a rupture in the special relationship between Pakistan and the US General Ayub Khan's remark to the US was: "We are pegged to you; India is not pegged to any pact. She is a free wheeler and under no compulsion to reduce tension in our part of the world" (FRUS: 1958-60, 1995: 95). It created an informal alliance between Delhi and Washington on the one hand and Beijing and Rawalpindi on the other. The US military aid to Pakistan started to dry up and was completely stopped in 1965. But the US military aid did improve Pakistan's military capability. As Z. A. Bhutto (1969: 111) conceded: "While it is true that military assistance was not made available for use against India, nevertheless its possession did act as a deterrent against India".

During the 1965 Indo-Pak war, the US attitude of treating an ally and a non-aligned country on the same footing by suspending arms supplies to both India and Pakistan hurt Pakistan. From 1965 to 1970, Pakistan's relations with America were 'correct and cordial' but not 'intimate and friendly' (Hyder 2005: 10). In 1971, Pakistan suffered
greater disappointment. Its eastern province was invaded by India and the US remained a silent spectator. In April 1979 the Carter administration suspended all developmental aid to Pakistan on the allegation that it was manufacturing a nuclear device. For Pakistan, the American alliance had not provided security against India; thereby it had taken away the raison d'être of alignment (Hyder 2005).

The special relationship with the US did not protect Pakistan against external aggression. In fact an alliance between unequal partners of varying strength and threat perceptions often proves beneficial for a powerful partner. Washington never shared the Pakistan's ruling elite's threat perception about India. The policy of defense alliances failed to guarantee Pakistan's security and integrity against the powerful foe India. Because of these formal alliances with the US (CENTO and SEATO), Pakistan was unable to join the Non-aligned Movement where India became a leading player. With the Soviet-American détente and the Sino-American normalization in the seventies, military alliances lost their rationale. Pakistan formally abandoned the alignment policy. Pakistan left SEATO and also withdrew from the Commonwealth. It joined the Non-aligned movement (NAM) in 1979, after CENTO was dissolved. An added source of tension in Indo-Pakistani relations concerned the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

These policies are an indication of Pakistan's national security requirements. They were using formal or informal alliances as a balance against India. Their foreign relations have been fashioned to maximise the chances of survival. It chose the United States because the Americans had more to offer in the way of material support. Pakistan was also a Third World country so it looked for affinities with other Third World States. Here Pakistan selected China. It also associated itself with the states of the Muslim West Asia out of common religious experience for security needs. These parameters indicate that India dominated their security concerns and their policies have largely been determined by Indo-Pak dispute. The Indian factor was central to its security concerns.

Disappointed with the above-mentioned events and to overcome the challenges to Pakistan's security, the first task of Pakistan was to find an equalizer against India. Pakistan now looked towards China to bolster up its security.
III

China as a balancer

Pakistan's constant threat perceptions coupled with her desire to seek parity with India in all fields, particularly in defence, was the driving force in the formation of security problematics of Pakistan. Pakistan had felt the strong need to forge friendly relations with neighbouring China.

In order to establish parity with India Pakistan has been trying to attract extra regional powers in the region. The India-Pakistan conflict is the direct consequence of the imbalance of power between the two states and Pakistan's insecurity about this imbalance. The conflict between India and Pakistan is ever present and this is a consequence of the persistence of this imbalance and of Pakistan's attempt to correct it. The structure of the international system however, in South Asia has constrained the choices available to India and Pakistan in their relations with each other. Pakistan has responded with greater energy to bring changes in international alignments than India has. Pakistan's policy for the last five decades has been geared towards correcting this imbalance of power in South Asia.

A former Pakistani diplomat, Irtiza Hussain (1989: 11-14) writes that it was unfortunate both for the US and India that they "misread Chinese intentions as well as underrated China's strength". India's misreading "opened for the first time the door for a real dialogue between Pakistan and China". This was looked upon by Pakistan as a positive step for reducing the "imbalance" of power in the subcontinent and as Irtiza Hussain shares, "China's involvement means long-term counterweight to India".

A special kind of relationship between Pakistan and China had been forged proving that community of interests creates a far stronger bond between nations than scraps of paper called treaties. These two countries were ideologically apart, at one point of time belonged to two opposite military blocs. These countries had proceeded step by step towards establishing friendship on the basis of mutuality of interests, which overcame ideological differences. India, figured in an important way in the calculations.

Besides supplying arms and ammunitions, China helped Pakistan in building up infrastructure (Asian Recorder 1970: 9558). Among the suppliers of military weapons to Pakistan, China is the only country whose deliveries are made against very easy and
favourable terms. If French deliveries were for cash, the US had an extreme restrictive policy of arms transfers to South Asia. Similarly, the Soviet Union had provided a limited number of T-55 tanks to Pakistan, added to this, it demanded a settlement of the Kashmir issue as the price of further assistance. Only China emerged as the main supplier of arms and ammunition, defence system and a promoter of defence infrastructure in Pakistan without any explicit conditions being put forward to Islamabad. The Chinese terms were comparatively easier. S. M. Burke writes, “China’s policy toward Pakistan is an object lesson in how to attain long-term national goals by calm calculation, forbearance and diplomatic skill” (Burke 1973: 213).

John W. Garver states that the Sino-Pakistani friendship has a special character (Garver 2003: 188). According to him, “Chinese alliance with Pakistan is guided by three considerations: (i) Militarily, a strategic partnership between China and Pakistan presents India with a two front threat, in the event of a confrontation with either. (ii) A strong Pakistan, independent of and hostile to India, severely constrains India’s ability to concentrate its force against China in the event of a China-India war. (iii) China derives a third, far more amorphous but perhaps even more important, political advantage from the existence of India-Pakistan enmity. As long as these two countries remain at loggerheads, foreign audience automatically compares them with each other. China therefore, is left apart, in a separate category, either on a high moral plane or in the category of a greater power.”

Pakistan’s relations with China are conditioned by its geographical location. Their policies have always run parallel. China’s move with respect to India was based on a few calculations. Firstly, as the second largest country in Asia having a huge manpower and resources, India constituted an obstruction to China’s ambition for hegemony over the region. Secondly, India was emerging as a model of democracy and as an example of democratic development in Asia with Western economic assistance. Thirdly, under Jawaharlal Nehru’s leadership, India had adopted a model of mixed economy, avoiding the extreme right path of market economy. India also kept itself away from the path of command economy. This posed a serious challenge to China in ideological terms. Finally, there were territorial disputes between India and China. From China’s perspective, Pakistan has been a useful ally in its South Asian strategic calculations. Sino-Pak defence cooperation underlines this close relationship.
Development of Sino-Pak alliance: 1947-1980

Evolution of the relationship (1947-1962)

The Sino-Pakistan relations date back to 1950, the year People's Republic of China (PRC) was recognised by Pakistan. In the same year Pakistan supported PRC's claim to the UN seat. Pakistan as an independent state came into being on 14 August 1947. Pakistan was not enthusiastic in its support for the Kuomintang regime presided over by Chiang Kai-shek. The reason was that Chiang Kai-shek had not been sympathetic towards the demands of the Muslim League for a separate homeland (Rai 1981). Pakistan was the first Muslim state to give recognition to the People's Republic of China on 4 January 1950 after India recognized it in December 1949. Pakistan wanted to project itself as a true friend of China by supporting Beijing's claim to UN entry. Pakistan did not cherish the idea that in South Asia, India should be perceived as the only and sole champion of China's membership to the UN.

Pakistan surrounded by unfriendly countries, namely, India, Soviet Union, and Afghanistan, was keen to establish a good relationship with China. To gain confidence and win favours with China, Pakistan did not hesitate to part with a large chunk of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir territory to China, in spite of strong protests lodged by India on several occasions. Part of Jammu and Kashmir shares common border with China and Pakistan. Kashmir, under the control of India, and the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir form the western border of China. China shares borders with Russia, former Soviet Republics of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. The Karakoram Highway is of major importance to China, being its route through Pakistan to the Arabian Sea-Indian Ocean. In any crisis in which Pakistan is involved, it is the geopolitical interest of Pakistan that may induce China not to remain a silent spectator. Thus, the geographical location of both China and Pakistan impelled them towards an alliance for strategic and security considerations.

Pakistan's relations with China had remained warm in the 1950s even though Pakistan was a member of SEATO, a military pact aiming to contain China. The Chinese had understood that Pakistan's membership of this pact was meant to strengthen itself against India rather than against communism. Pakistan and China had the first opportunity of personal contacts in April 1955, at the Bandung Conference. The beginning of the
“Sino-Pakistan entente cordiale which, later on, was termed ‘collusion’ by India can be traced in this period” (Singh 1970: 105). The then Prime Minister, Feroz Khan Noon, made a remark before the National Assembly on 8 August 1958 that if Pakistanis were ‘to choose between Hindu domination and Communism, it is Communism they would choose’ (as cited in Azmi 2005: 229). Towards the end of the 1950s, several important changes in the international arena took place. India-China relations started deteriorating over the boundary dispute and Indo-Pak relations remained tense over the Kashmir issue. China started adopting anti-Indian attitudes. China had much to gain by improving its relations with Pakistan. Pakistan also followed the maxim that an enemy’s enemy is a potential friend. Both Pakistan and China were moving towards each other. In 1959, the Chinese ambassador in New Delhi made a veiled threat when he warned Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt that India might have to deal with two fronts - China in the north and Pakistan in the west (Rasgotra 1999).

Pakistan’s foreign policy entered its new phase with the Sino-Indian border clashes. It was a policy of dual alignment. While clinging to the benefits accruing from her alignment with the West, Pakistan strengthened her informal relationship with China. This paradoxical twist in diplomacy, tolerated to some extent by the West, reached its climax during the Indo-Pakistan conflict. The period from 1959 to 1962 was marked by deterioration in the relations between India and China, leading to an armed conflict. The 1962 “punitive war against India began with a Chinese perception of Indian territorial encroachments and resulted in a Chinese strike into Indian territory” (Chaudhri 1987). This war opened India’s eyes to the danger from the north. Now India perceived itself as under threat from two directions: Pakistan in the west and China in the north. The Chinese military move against India led the US, Britain and other countries to rush armaments to India. As Anglo-American efforts to build-up Indian defence began in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, Pakistan’s apprehensions towards US increased. As Sino-Indian relations worsened, Sino-Pakistan relations improved (Sherwani, Latif, Ahmed 1980). According to Bhutto (1964: 7), these arms with which India was now being fed would be turned against Pakistan for the settlement of its disputes with Pakistan. This was Pakistan’s genuine fear. It was also a natural fear. The emergence of
Sino-Pakistan entente was simultaneous with the collapse of Sino-Indian relations in 1962-64. In other words, the deterioration of China’s relations with India was the cause of its movement toward the second partner Pakistan.

Pakistan was welcomed as a friend by China not merely for positive reasons but for the presumed need and objective to isolate India (Damodaran 1998). It can be plausibly argued that common enmity towards India brought China and Pakistan closer during the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. During this period, Pakistan came to an agreement with China about certain strategic areas of India (areas which were considered to be in dispute among the three countries: India, China, and Pakistan). A week before the Sino-Indian war began, China and Pakistan began talks to settle their border dispute, which was completed a few months later (Vertzberger 1983). Pakistan also exerted pressure on the US to reduce the flow of arms to India. The Pakistani media, officials and ministers, all blamed India for the confrontation with China. Islamabad sided completely with Beijing. The sudden and dramatic advance of Chinese armed forces into Indian territory made the Sino-Pak alliance much stronger. China adopted an aggressive posture with a view to consolidating its military gains and initiated a strategy of containment of India by exercising the option of further strengthening the relationship with Pakistan (Bajpai 1983).

The years 1962 to 1965 saw a marked improvement in Sino-Pakistan relations, increasingly giving the impression of a military alliance, an alliance that Pakistan sought to cultivate. Though, the exact commitments China made to Pakistan remain unclear. Thus, China emerged around 1960s as one of Pakistan’s best friends. A mutuality of interests, particularly with respect to India, brought these two diverse countries together.

**Post-1962 period**

Pakistan was disappointed with the American help. Once again Pakistan had to rethink its security concerns. It achieved this by coming closer to China. Pakistan’s relations with China improved almost in direct proportion to the deterioration in Sino-Indian and US-Pakistan relations. As China’s relations with India soured in the late 1950s, followed by border clashes in 1959 and a war in 1962, the stage was set for Pakistan to forge a closer relationship with China. In President Ayub Khan’s (1967) words:
"We should endeavour to set up bilateral equations with each one of them, i.e., any potential friend, with the clear understanding that the nature and complexion of the equation would be such as to promote our mutual interests without adversely affecting the interests of the third parties. Each equation would have to be acceptable to the third parties. It would be like walking on a triangular tightrope".

Ayub Khan and Z. A. Bhutto saw that deteriorating relations between India and China created an opening for Pakistan. Beijing responded commensurately, and the foundation was laid for a political relationship (Harrison et al. 1999). Premier Chou En-lai said that China ‘would defend Pakistan throughout the world’. The Sino-Pak hostility to India was followed by the then Foreign Minister Z. A. Bhutto’s statement in the Pakistan National Assembly, Pakistani Parliament on 17 July 1963, that in case of an Indian attack, Pakistan now would not be alone because an attack on Pakistan by India would involve ‘the territorial integrity and security of the largest state in Asia’ (Burke and Ziring 1990: 293).

Since the early 1960s, China’s attitude towards Pakistan has been one of not mere friendship and understanding but of active cooperation in defence matters. Meaningful and beneficial cooperation between Pakistan and China started during the early 1960 to mid-1960s. For example, trade (January 1963), border demarcation (March 1963), air services (August 1963), and cultural agreements (March 1965) were signed. This period saw fruitful Sino-Pak cooperation in political, economic, commercial, technological, military and cultural fields.

China and Pakistan signed the Boundary Agreement on 2 March 1963 under which Pakistan ceded to China 2050 square miles of Kashmir territory under her occupation, without consulting the will of the people to whom it belonged and who were not represented by the government of Pakistan. So far as Pakistan is concerned there is nothing provisional in the agreement and the loss is permanent, because under Article VI of the Agreement, she is committed to maintain the provisions of the agreement in case she emerges as the sovereign authority ‘after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India’ (Pakistan Horizon 1963: 8). The boundary agreement, according to the joint communiqué issued two days later had “a significance bearing on the consolidation and development of friendly and good neighbourly relations between
China and Pakistan” (Peking Review 1963: 66-67). The joint communiqué signed during Zhou Enlai’s February 1964 visit to Pakistan said that the two sides “expressed the hope that the Kashmir dispute would be resolved in accord with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by the people of India and Pakistan” (The China Quarterly 1965: 172).

Since 1965, almost all Pakistani heads of state and government visited China. In due time China concluded negotiations regarding its borders with all countries last of all with the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachov. The Chinese border dispute with India remained, and remains, unresolved. By 1966 a major shift was observed in the foreign policy of Pakistan. Sino-Indian rift and China’s friendly attitude towards Pakistan made China a primary factor in Pakistan’s security perception. In 1967, the US press was talking of U.S.A.’s “bold new plan” for an arms limitation arrangement in the subcontinent. In Pakistan, there was not a little bit of doubt that whatever agreement might be reached, India was bound to cheat and there were also misgivings about US intentions. China was now Pakistan’s only dependable source of arms supply. Sino-Pak postures directed against India continued as they signed an agreement on 21 October 1967 on the opening of the Sinjiang-Gilgit link (Bhagat 1968: 2645) and also the inauguration of the Karakoram Highway - the ‘Friendship Highway’ - in February 1971, linking Pakistan with China’s overland.

Sino-Pak defence cooperation

Sino-Pakistani defence cooperation has been stimulated and sustained by the two countries over the last few decades, with common hostility to India. Especially for Islamabad, the search for security vis-à-vis New Delhi has been the single most important factor motivating it to strengthen its defence capabilities, a process in which China has played an important role. By 1965, Pakistan’s special relationship with the US had soured, India had developed an indigenous arms manufacturing capacity and the military balance was expected to swing in its favour, and finally Chinese support to Pakistan was assured. Since China was closely associated with the South Asian region, Sino-Pak collaboration thrived significantly.
The origins of Sino-Pakistan defence cooperation can be traced back to 1963, when General Ayub Khan was quoted by the *Washington Post* as saying that if India grew menacingly strong, Pakistan might feel compelled to enter into a military pact with China. Just two years after this statement, in 1965, the first Sino-Pakistani defence cooperation agreement was signed. This however, was made public only on 23 March 1966, on the occasion of Pakistan’s National Day Celebration; the fly-past was led by four Chinese MiG-19s flown by newly trained Pakistani pilots (Burke 1973: 361). The Sino-Pakistani joint ventures in defence production started with the setting up of a factory for the production of assault rifles at Ghazipur in East Pakistan. Later, China also provided technical and financial assistance for setting up another ordnance factory near Dhaka. However, all these factories were lost to the newly, independent state of Bangladesh. The disintegration of Pakistan, however, provided a great boost to Sino-Pakistani defence cooperation in terms of rebuilding the conventional weapons production sector.

Z. A. Bhutto visited China in 1971 and anticipated receiving military aid to compensate for the cut-off in American arms. And Chou En-lai’s statement that the Chinese were not ‘ammunition merchants’ but would extend military assistance to Pakistan on a gratis basis and would assist in securing the country against a future Indian threat was welcome news to Bhutto and Pakistan (Burke and Ziring 1990). With the Indo-Soviet Treaty in mind, Bhutto also raised the subject of a treaty with China. The Chinese preferred to base their relations on community of interests rather than on formalities (Burke and Ziring 1990: 407).

The 1971 Indo-Pak war strengthened and in fact deepened Sino-Pak military cooperation, which was further, cemented in the wake of Afghan crisis towards the end of 1970s. Z. A. Bhutto, apart from his much-publicised obsession with building a nuclear deterrent against India’s conventional superiority, was equally determined to strengthen Pakistan’s indigenous capabilities in conventional defence technologies. It was during his short tenure of five years, as Pakistan’s leader, that the foundations of Pakistan’s defence facilities in conventional weapons were laid with Chinese assistance. These involved the Heavy Mechanical Complex, Heavy Foundry and a whole tangle of defence-related industries, the most noticeable of which was Pakistan’s largest aeronautical complex at Kamra near Attock (Singh 2003: 179). In terms of establishing formal channels of Sino-
Pakistani defence cooperation, in May 1974 Bhutto signed a protocol on collaboration in defence production (FEER 1976: 33). The setting up of a joint Sino-Pakistani military committee in 1976 followed this.

A special mention also needs to be made of the Heavy mechanical Complex, which is the biggest undertaking of its type in Pakistan. It was set up at Taxila in 1979 with the help of Chinese expertise. One important feature of Pakistan’s weapons procurement from China is that while the other major suppliers like the US and the USSR resorted to arms embargoes during crises, Chinese assistance increased during Pakistan’s conflicts with India in 1965 and 1971 (Singh 1999: 10). In fact, going by Pakistan’s current arsenal, China in last thirty-five years has supplied Pakistan over 78 per cent of its MBT, 63 per cent of its combat aircraft and over 77 per cent of its petrol boat and missile craft.

China’s contribution in Pakistan’s defence production has been consistent. After the 1965 Sino-Pak war, it has extended military supplies, equipment and technology. It has helped in the development of various tanks, anti-tank artillery, aircraft weapon systems and small arms ammunition propellants. Some of the examples of Chinese collaboration are the establishment of the Heavy Industries, Taxila (HIT), the first industrial complex of its kind established by China in a non-Communist country; aeronautical complex at Kamra with facilities for repairing MiG-19/F-6; upgrading and expansion of the facilities at the Pakistan Ordnance Factories, Wah (POF); collaboration in shipbuilding: power plants at Guddu, Jamshoro and Ghazi Barotha; agreement in 1965 with the National Highway Authority to construct two sections of the Indus Highway; building a railway line between Peshawar and Lodhran, assisting in mineral and water exploration in the NWFP and Baluchistan; establishing Pakistan’s space programme in 1990 and the 790 km Karakoram Highway completed in 1978, built with Chinese financial and technical assistance (Jalalzai 2002). The Highway links Xinjiang with Tibet through the Aksai Chin. In case of an attack on Pakistan by sea, military aid from China can reach Pakistan through this route. These are commendable steps to make Pakistan self-sufficient in defence products.

Sino-Pak nuclear cooperation
It is very difficult to assign a definite date for the beginning of Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation. Pakistan started formulating plans for the development of nuclear energy in
mid-fifties. The main objective of Pakistan was to compete with India’s nuclear programme. Ayub Khan wanted to secure Pakistan’s borders and pointed out that the earlier years had proved conclusively that the threat from India to their security and existence was both real and constant. Indian efforts in the field of foreign policy were all directed towards one aim, the isolation of Pakistan and its disintegration. They had done all that they could to convince India that they wanted to live in peace with her, but India could not accept the existence of a strong and independent Muslim state next door. They therefore had to examine their situation and organize their relations with other countries, particularly with their neighbours in a manner consistence with the needs of their security (Khan 1967). Bhutto’s zeal for nuclear status started immediately after the commissioning of plutonium reprocessing plant by India towards the end of 1964. As minister for Fuel, Power, and Natural Resources and later as minister for Atomic Energy in President Ayub’s cabinet he sought funding for a plutonium reprocessing plant. Although it was turned down on financial grounds yet he had concluded that, since India was determined to possess nuclear capabilities, Pakistan would have to take similar steps (Bhutto 1969: 153).

Pakistan turned to China for nuclear assistance in the mid-1970s. Pakistan virtually got baffled by India’s nuclear explosion in May 1974. Very soon it discovered that it had to possess nuclear weapons to counter India at the nuclear and conventional levels. On the other hand to avoid the nuclear blackmailing of India, Pakistan consistently demanded since 1974 that the two countries should sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Naim 1991: 34). India opposed the treaty on two main grounds: the treaty was discriminatory. If non-nuclear weapon states were to surrender the option to develop nuclear weapons, then nuclear weapon states must begin to reduce and eliminate their own nuclear arsenals. From Pakistan’s point of view there was another problem: even if India signed the NPT, the treaty could not take away its option that it had already acquired. According to one Pakistani analyst, “Because by falling into the NPT trap Pakistan will be susceptible to even nuclear blackmail of its adversarial neighbours like India” (Naim 1991: 34).
As a reaction to the Indian nuclear test, China also supported Pakistan’s proposal of declaring South Asia as a nuclear free zone (Vertzberger 1985). Z. A. Bhutto in *The Myth of Independence* said that there could be no guarantee of territorial sovereignty for a country till it acquired nuclear weapons of its own. As far back as 1965, in his famous speech he (1970: 20) said, “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, and would not sleep till we acquire nuclear capabilities. We have no alternative”. Z. A. Bhutto’s three visits to China (last of these in May 1976) laid the foundation of Sino-Pak nuclear cooperation. Initially, China agreed to play a limited role in Pakistan’s nuclear development programme. Later, China’s help to Pakistan was mainly based on events following 1971 - India’s defiance of both the United States and China, Indo-Soviet treaty, break up of Pakistan, and 1974 nuclear explosion by India. These events convinced China so much that it arranged for a clandestine transfer of nuclear technology to Pakistan.

One of the first pointers to the existence of a secret nuclear deal between Pakistan and China is contained in the last testament, *If I am Assassinated*, of Z. A. Bhutto, where he said,

“In the light of the recent developments which have taken place, my single most important achievement which I believe will dominate the portrait or my public life is an agreement with China of June 1976, which I arrived at after an assiduous and tenacious endeavour spanning over eleven years of negotiations. In the present context, the agreement of mine, concluded in June 1976, will perhaps be my greatest achievement and contribution to the survival of our people and our nation. Now we have the brainpower, we have the nuclear power plant at Karachi. All we needed was the nuclear re-processing plant; we were on the threshold of full nuclear capability” (Bhutto 1979: 223).

This statement by Pakistan’s former President makes it very clear that Pakistan was trying to establish a nuclear relationship with China since 1965. A high-level military-scientific delegation headed by Prime Minister Bhutto was in Beijing during 26-30 May 1976. Further, two agreements resulted from this visit, one for scientific cooperation and the other for military cooperation. In the first week of June, a Chinese scientific team visited Islamabad. On 29 January 1977 Pakistan and China signed a protocol on scientific and technical cooperation for 1977 (Bhola 1993: 86). Chinese assistance for the development of nuclear energy was implicit in the protocol. In December 1980, Maj.
Edgar O’balance, writing in *National Defence* (Washington) claimed that in 1976 “Pakistan persuaded China to supply nuclear technology and apparatus”. The incident was also reported by an Iraqi news agency, that a “generous offer” of nuclear cooperation to help Pakistan build a reprocessing plant was made by China in view of the “special relationship” that existed between the two countries (Sreedhar 1987: xvi-xvii). According to this report, it was also meant to make Pakistan equal to India in the nuclear field.

The views expressed by Bhutto in *The Myth of Independence*, indicate the common objective of Pakistan and China: in Bhutto’s perception India was an adversary of Pakistan and had a dispute with China (Bhutto 1969: 134). China seemed to be of the opinion that India would become increasingly dependent on the US and gradually, under its influence, adopt a position hostile to China. For this reason, it was in China’s national interest to support Pakistan and it was in Pakistan’s national interest to develop friendly relations with China. Of all the countries that received military assistance from the US to combat communism, Pakistan alone had a fundamental common interest with one of the most powerful communist states. This was a unique situation.

**Evolution of Pakistan’s threat perception in the 1980s**

Most remarkable change in Indo-Pakistan relations took place in 1980s. India’s growing self-reliance, more accommodative foreign policy and the resolve to deal with proxy war (in terms of separatist movements in Punjab) of Pakistan, encouraged India to act more assertively to its national interest. It was a phase when both the countries acknowledged that there does exist an alternative approach to resolve the issues between India and Pakistan despite army deployment. This phase culminated into early 1990s when India started opening up its economy to the world with an objective to compete China and attain economic prosperity. This growing economic might would have also helped it to actively pursue the case of permanent UN Security Council seat. In the later part of 1980s and early 1990s, India shed its silence, started reaching out to the regional groups of states by charting out need-based policies to accommodate such regional groups for its economic enhancement.
Several crises have punctuated the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan after they became independent in 1947. They fought three wars in the first twenty-five years of their independence. However in the next twenty-five years, there has been no all out war despite the occurrence of some very serious crises. Four examples of crises in Indo-Pak relations that have occurred over the decades (1980-1990) are: the multiple crises in 1984-85 relating to India’s purported plans to attack Pakistan’s nuclear installations, the Siachen Glacier crisis, the Brasstacks crisis (1986-87), the Kashmir-related Spring crisis (1989-90).

During the first half of the eighties, Pakistan’s relations with India came under severe strain. The conventional arms race between India and Pakistan took a critical turn at the beginning of the 1980s. Pakistan had become involved in Afghan war. Both superpowers supplied arms to maintain military balance in the subcontinent. In 1980-82, the two neighbours, hitherto antagonistic towards each other in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, exacerbated their hostilities further. According to Pakistani perceptions, Indira Gandhi who ruled India from 1980 to 1984 stepped up her anti-Pak propaganda that Pakistan would commit aggression against India after being armed by the US, that Pakistan had invited Soviet intervention in Afghanistan by interfering in Afghan matter, by allowing the Mujahideen to carry out trans-border incursions and so on (Shahi 2003: 421).

In September 1981, Pakistan took major diplomatic initiative when President Zia-ul-Haq proposed Mrs. Gandhi a no-war pact (Chaudhri 1991: 123). In an interview to Rajendra Sareen (1984) at Islamabad on 14 April 1982, Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq made clear, that given India’s size, it possessed both offensive and defensive postures. Pakistan’s threat perception of India was decided by size of India’s air force, army etc. Pakistan also supported China’s policies towards Third World countries. Besides, the creation of Bangladesh made this threat perception more urgent, because there remained a fear of India repeating such a move.

An uprising of separatists in Pakistan’s Sind province in August 1983 sparked accusations by Islamabad that India was aiding and encouraging the rebels. Over the following year, the level of tension rose higher. New Delhi accused Islamabad of fomenting unrest by Sikh nationalists in India’s Punjab region and of making incursions into Kashmir, which led to a series of border clashes (Spector 1990). It started a proxy
war from 1984 onwards in Punjab and Kashmir. Limited fighting broke out at the Siachen Glacier in Kashmir. Zia-ul-Haq recognized that India was too dangerous and expensive an enemy (Harrison et al. 1999).

**Issues in Pakistani threat perceptions**

Unlike the minor crises, which occurred due to trivial misunderstanding between the two countries, four major crises occurred during the course of the history.

**The 1984-85 crises**

Few incidents occurred during these years underlining the crisis-proneness of Indo-Pak relations (Bajpai et al. 1997: 9-10). First, General Zia-ul-Haq informed the Wall Street Journal that India might emulate Israel’s attack upon Iraq’s Osirak reactors to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear programme. This allegation was denied by Indira Gandhi. Second, A New York Times report described information presented to the US Senate Intelligence Committee that Indira Gandhi had considered attacking Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. This was based on the inability of American satellites to locate two of India’s Jaguar squadrons that could have been used for mounting low-level attacks. Dean Hunton, the US ambassador to Pakistan, stated that the US would be “responsive” if India attacked Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Third, one year later, Zain Noorani, Pakistan’s Defence Minister warned that an Indian attack on Kahuta would amount to war.

A new point of tension that cropped up in Indo-Pak relations in the eighties was the Siachen dispute.

**Siachen Glacier**

The Siachen glacier dispute has been another bone of contention between India and Pakistan. Since 1984, the “snow-warriors” of India and Pakistan have been locked in supremacy for the control of Siachen glacier also described as the world’s highest battlefield. For over two decades India and Pakistan have fought at altitudes of over 22,000 feet in minus 60 degree celsius temperatures. The roots of the conflict lie in the fact that the 1949 Karachi agreement and the 1972 Simla agreement presumed that it was not feasible for human habitation to survive North of NJ9842. Prior to 1984 neither India nor Pakistan had any permanent presence in the area. Operation Meghdoot was launched
on 13 April 1984 when the Indian army and the Indian Air Force went into the Glacier. Pakistan quickly responded with troop deployments. The Indian army controls the heights. The Pakistanis cannot get up to the glacier, while the Indians cannot come down. In September 1985 both sides intensified air and ground battles. As President Zia told the Arab News of Jeddah in September 1985, Siachen was “not a very sensitive area... It is just a glacier. There is not a blade of grass there. But sensitive as people are, they won’t even give up glaciers nor will Pakistan do that” (as cited in Sreedhar and Kaniyalil 1993).

Pakistanis believe that Pakistan wanted friendly relations with India on the basis of equality. India had always adopted an antagonistic and uncompromising attitude towards Pakistan. It had, in fact, not hesitated even in interfering with internal affairs. In 1985 India’s Foreign Secretary was, on the one hand, talking about improvement in the chances of negotiations between the two countries; on the other hand, India had stationed an armoured division and five other divisions of its army at Suratgarh in Rajasthan near the Pakistani border from where Pakistan could be easily attacked. Pakistan had taken a serious note of this concentration of Indian troops and started taking steps necessary to meet the situation. Diplomatic circles had also noted that the Indian move coincided with the concentration of Soviet troops on Pakistan’s western border. Under such circumstances, it could easily be assessed how serious and sincere India was about its gesture of goodwill towards Pakistan and made efforts to normalize bilateral relations.

Severe fighting over Siachen continued in late 1987 and early 1988. A serious clash took place in October 1989. Attempts at tackling the Siachen issue were being made by the two countries by holding talks at different levels. Chinese Premier Li Peng visited Pakistan in November 1989. He was briefed by Pakistani officials about the India-Pakistan conflict over the Siachen Glacier. When asked if he agreed with the presentation, Li replied that it was not a question of whether he agreed or disagreed but whether Pakistan and China shared common perceptions, which they did (as cited in Garver 1996). The arrangements for resolving the Siachen Glacier issue, agreed to in 1989, were not implemented and the two countries have diverged on the ways and means to create a nuclear non-proliferation regime for South Asia.
The Brasstacks crisis: 1986-87

According to Pakistani policy makers, India’s Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi also reverted to aggressive attitude towards Pakistan. ‘Operation Brasstacks’ mounted by him in 1986-87 posed a serious threat of armed attack which was dispelled by counter deployment of the Pakistan armed forces.

The Brasstacks crisis between India and Pakistan took place between November 1986 and March 1987. *Dawn* called the Brasstacks crisis “spine-chilling”, “stunning”, with the two countries “on a collision course”. Ravi Rikhye (1988) argued that Brasstacks was initially intended to lead to a concerted attack on Pakistan via deception and misdirection. It began when India had launched the largest ever-military exercises involving nearly one-tenth of India’s army, called operation Brasstacks. In 1986, India launched a four-month long, multicorps exercise in the desert area of northern Rajasthan, a few hundred miles from the Pakistani border designed to pressure Islamabad to stop supporting Sikh separatists (Garver 1996). It could have precipitated a war between India and Pakistan since it led to face-to-face confrontation between their armed forces. The Brasstacks exercise involved 19 divisions of the Indian army, including its two strike corps. To the Pakistani government it was an ideal location from which to launch a cross border operation into the Pakistani state of Sindh that could cut Pakistan in half. It was concentrated on Pakistan’s sensitive border areas. Pakistani military analysts saw Brasstacks as a threatening exhibition of Indian conventional force. Pakistan responded with counter mobilization of its own army that were located close to India’s state of Punjab. It continued deploying its troops that were holding their winter exercises, in their exercise locations. Later, these troops were moved closer to Indo-Pak border. A massive airlift and ground movement of troops was then undertaken by India to occupy their defensive positions along the border. The crisis atmosphere was heightened when Pakistan’s nuclear scientist Abdul Qadir Khan revealed in a March 1987 interview that Pakistan had manufactured a nuclear bomb (Rajain 2005: 288).

Tension was still high when Premier Zhao Ziyang paid a visit to Pakistan in June 1987. Zhao pledged that “The Chinese government and people will firmly support the
Pakistani government and people in their just cause of safeguarding national independence, upholding stated sovereignty and promoting economic development” (as cited in Garver 1996). It shows that China sympathised with and supported Pakistan in its confrontation with India.

The crisis also drew the attention of the US and USSR. President Reagon of the United States is understood to have telephoned Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President Zia, instructing leaders to resolve it. As tensions increased, the hot line between the two states was activated. Officials from both sides tried to ease fears. The crisis also gave rise to a new phrase called “cricket diplomacy”. In February 1987, Pakistan’s President General Zia-ul-Haq travelled to India (to watch an Indo-Pak cricket match at Jaipur on February 4) and held talks with the Indian leadership to diffuse the crisis. These were followed by talk in Islamabad between 27 February and 2 March. Both sides agreed to a phased troop withdrawal to peacetime positions. This resulted in a number of new CBMs between India and Pakistan. For example, the Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and facilities was signed on 31 December 1988 in Islamabad.

**1990 Indo-Pak crisis**

The next Indo-Pak crisis came in late 1989-1990 over Kashmir. By this time however Sino-India rapprochement was under its way. In spring 1990, India reinforced its troops in Kashmir and Punjab by three and one division as part of its “precautionary movements”. From Pakistan’s perspective, these troop movements were alarming. Pakistan denied supporting the Kashmiri militants. It refused to repress demonstrations of sympathy within Pakistan for the Kashmiris. It responded with a counter build up of its own. In December 1989, Pakistan launched its largest ever-peace time military exercise- a three week long operation involving 200,000 troops simulating defence against an Indian invasion. Indian spokesman made statements about the danger of war and condemned Pakistani interferences in India’s internal affairs. Pakistani spokesman rejected Indian allegations and protests. On 5 February, Pakistanis demonstrated on the border, some crossed the border. India moved more troops into the region to prevent cross-border infiltration from Pakistan and to threaten hot pursuit or raids on training camps. When a
further border crossing occurred on 11 February, Indian troops opened fire. Pakistan also considered it alarming that India's armoured units conducting their annual training exercises in the Mahajan ranges in Rajasthan had not returned to their cantonments. Both air forces were placed on high alert. Under Zia, Pakistan had adopted a strategy of undermining Indian security through a war by proxy in Jammu and Kashmir. By 1990, the Kashmir insurgency was at its peak as perceived by Pakistan. India-Pakistan relations had deteriorated.

On 13 March 1990, Benazir Bhutto travelled to Pakistan controlled Kashmir and promised a "thousand year war" to support the militants. It was under these circumstances that Pakistan implicitly threatened to use nuclear weapons if India intervened militarily, across the Line of Control. The chronic conventional arms firing across the LOC in Kashmir increased manifold. During his visit to Pakistan in early May at the height of the crisis, Wan Li merely said "We appreciate Pakistan's attitude on opposing the use of military force, trying to stop the escalation of the situation, and resolving the issue through negotiations" (as cited in Garver 1996). It can be concluded that, measured against earlier periods, China's verbal support for Pakistan during 1990 was weak. It had weakened under the new conditions of Sino-Indian rapprochement. Yet Pakistani officials and specialists were not unhappy with the level of Chinese support during the 1990 crisis. They saw China as a reliable friend who could be counted on in times of emergency. They were confident that perceptions would lead China to support Pakistan against India. The US played a pro-active role in defusing this crisis. The American journalist Seymour Hersh (1993: 65) wrote that Pakistan "placed its nuclear weapons arsenal on alert during this crisis". The perceptions and misperceptions of protagonists mirror-imaged each other. Thus defensive and precautionary measures by one side were seen as offensive and warlike preparations by the other.

**Arms race between India and Pakistan**

By 1985, India had six research reactors and six power reactors. Some were under inspection by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), others not. Indians were far ahead of Pakistan. With the commissioning of Dhruva, a research reactor located at Trombay in 1985, Pakistan had reason to worry. It was supposed to be the largest in the
world and there were no international safeguards. It had gone critical in August. In October the Indian atomic energy people produced a fast breeder test reactor built at Kalpakkam, near Madras. Like Dhruv it was not under the safeguards of the IAEA. It brought India closer to nuclear weapons status. Pakistan also perceived that there was a marked increase in Indian propaganda against Pakistan. Almost all the speeches of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s included the point that Pakistan either had nuclear weapons or was about to acquire them (Akram 1986).

The US $ 3.2 billion military and economic aid package for Pakistan was followed by an Indo-Soviet package deal. The massive arms procurement programme led India to be a major Third World arms importer. The amount India spent for arms during the period 1978-1988 was US $ 21,488 million.

Table: 3.3
Military Expenditure of India and Pakistan on Percentage of Gross Domestic Product GDP, 1985-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIPRI Yearbook, World Armament and Disarmament, 1992

Whereas India spent on an average of 3.5% of its GDP on defence, the figure for Pakistan on an average was 6.8% (Table 3.4). The increasing defence expenditure is analysed in terms of security perceptions. During 1980-86 the level of defence allocations in Pakistan had been comparatively less than the earlier period. The following table represents military expenditure of Pakistan in comparison with India from 1985 to 2000.
### Table 3.4
**Military Expenditure of Pakistan and India**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pakistan (Rs.)</th>
<th>US$</th>
<th>Per cent Increase</th>
<th>India (Rs.)</th>
<th>US$</th>
<th>Per cent Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>35.11</td>
<td>(1.35)</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>83.65</td>
<td>(6.40)</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>38.85</td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>105.29</td>
<td>(8.00)</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>43.99</td>
<td>(1.49)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>124.96</td>
<td>(9.40)</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>48.89</td>
<td>(2.38)</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>133.00</td>
<td>(9.59)</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>52.90</td>
<td>(2.47)</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>145.00</td>
<td>(8.94)</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>61.93</td>
<td>(2.89)</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>157.5</td>
<td>(9.25)</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>70.95</td>
<td>(3.19)</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>168.5</td>
<td>(8.96)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>(3.6)</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>174.1</td>
<td>(6.7)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>(3.3)</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>215.0</td>
<td>(7.0)</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>108.0</td>
<td>(3.5)</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>235.0</td>
<td>(7.5)</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>115.0</td>
<td>(3.6)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>269.0</td>
<td>(8.3)</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>131.0</td>
<td>(3.8)</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>287.0</td>
<td>(8.4)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>135.0</td>
<td>(3.3)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>356.0</td>
<td>(9.9)</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>143.0</td>
<td>(3.2)</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>412.0</td>
<td>(9.9)</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>142.0</td>
<td>(2.7)</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>457.0</td>
<td>(10.7)</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>133.0</td>
<td>(2.5)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>585.0</td>
<td>(13.0)</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This perceived rivalry between India and Pakistan in the military field can be ascribed to the antagonism from past conflicts between them. Pakistan's missile development programme has been driven by its security concerns vis-à-vis militaristic India.

*The missile factor:* The perceived potential of ballistic missiles led India and Pakistan to start missile programme. The Indian missile programme dates back to the early sixties. This actually initiated the missile race in the subcontinent. Pakistan's missile development programme was in its infancy, with insignificant material and manpower resources dedicated to it. In the absence of a limitation agreement, Pakistan would be
obliged by its threat perception to develop an appropriate counter to Indian missiles. India tested its first SSM (Surface to Surface Missile), called Prithvi in February 1988. The second achievement in missile technology is the test of Agni in May 1989. Pakistan resumed the missile programme at about the same time India did. But it took a year to follow India. Pakistan first tested its missile in February 1989 (Nuruzzaman 1993).

India's missile capability has the potential to undermine Pakistan's security. With the advent of long-range missiles (Agni, Trishul, Aakash, Nag, etc.) Pakistan had to take remedial measures to counter this threat. Prithvi has posed a significant threat to Pakistan's security as it can bypass forward deployments and hit deep inside Pakistan's territory (Pakistan's structural facilities like strategic command centres, bridges, power stations) - gas facilities, oilfields, etc. In the words of Musa Khan Jalalzai (2005),

"The realization of the emerging Indian missile threat has deteriorated our security environment. Pakistan is faced with a real threat of heavy magnitude from these weapons. Our principal adversary "India" has embarked on an ambitious missile-building programme".

Indian missile programme had become part of Pakistan's threat perception. The first test firing of the liquid-fuelled 'Ghauri', with a range of 1500 km, contributed towards enhancing Pakistan's deterrence and providing it with a capability to match India's 'Agni' missile. This was followed by the firing of an improved version of 'Ghauri' and the first test firing of the solid fuelled 'Shaheen-I' missile in April 1999, in response to India's testing of its advanced version of 'Agni' missile, designated as the Agni-II, with a range of 2500 km. Pakistan's missile programme is aimed at achieving a credible, reliable deterrence capability and endeavours to meet its bare minimum requirements consistent with its threat perception.

Pakistani responses

External balancing: China

According to Robert Ross,

"China continues its support for Pakistan by supplying nuclear and missile technology as China views a credible Pakistani deterrent as the most effective way to guarantee the security of its sole ally in Southern Asia against Indian power... In this respect, China's relationship with Pakistan is similar to America's relationship with Israel" (as cited in Paul n.d.).
During 1972-1985 both China and Pakistan demonstrated their desire to reaffirm and strengthen their mutual ties. They tried to preserve their friendly relations. China has been one of the most dependable sources of arms supply to Pakistan. Pakistan is receiving 50 T-59 tanks every year against an order of 1000 tanks placed in 1975. Pakistan also received sixty-five F-6 aircrafts by 1980. It received 20 CSA-1 (SAM batteries) in 1980. 2 Romeo class submarines were received in 1980. It further received 2 Hoka class FAC (guns) in 1980. It received sixty Q-5 Fantan A fighters ground attack (FGA) aircrafts during the period 1982 to 1984. It also received 16 Hai Ying missiles in 1984. It again received 4 Huangfan class FAC in 1984. The military assistance continued in form of unspecified number of artillery guns and ammunition. In addition China’s military assistance ranges over the technical upgrading of defence production factories and installations, which help Pakistan overhaul tanks, guns, and aircrafts. In 1985, Pakistan Ordnance Factory at Wah started production of 12.7 mm anti-aircraft guns with assistance provided by China (Abbasi 1986).

Reports of Chinese assistance to Pakistan for development of atomic weapons had begun to appear from early 1979. The London-based Lebanese magazine Uruba-val Arabi reported that China had “responded positively” to a Pakistani request to conduct a nuclear test on China’s soil. Another report published in New Scientist (London) in 1981, citing American and Israeli intelligence sources, said that China might provide a site for Pakistan’s first bomb, which was expected to explode later that year. It also stated that negotiations had already taken place between China and Pakistan to ready the site by the end of summer. In 1983, U.S. intelligence agencies reported, “China had transferred a complete nuclear weapon design to Pakistan, along with enough weapons-grade uranium for two nuclear weapons. It also reported that China was helping Pakistan operate its Kahuta Uranium-enrichment plant” (nti n.d.).

For the sake of better relation with New Delhi, China adopted more neutral position on Kashmir. In June 1980 Deng Xiaoping stated that the Kashmir issue was a bilateral dispute between India and Pakistan should be solved peacefully. This was balanced in December 1980 when Pakistan Foreign Minister Agha Shahi visited Beijing and Foreign Minister Huang Hua stated that China “appreciated Pakistan’s efforts to seek a just settlement of the Kashmir issue in the spirit of the Simla agreement and in accordance
with the relevant UN resolutions” (Ahmad 1981). After 1980, Chinese officials no longer mentioned the Kashmiri people’s right to self-determination. While China’s post-1980 position on Kashmir was more neutral than before, there remained a pro-Pakistan slant.

When Mrs. Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980 she reassembled the team that had carried out the PNE in 1974 that led to further speeding up of the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme (Rajain 2005: 287). In 1982, a Washington Post news report, quoting intelligence sources, mentioned Indian plans to launch a pre-emptive strike on Pakistani nuclear installations including Kahuta (Rajain 2005: 287). A threat like this compelled Pakistan to accelerate its nuclear programme. More information on Sino-Pak nuclear collaboration came in June 1984, when Senator Cranston told the US Senate that Pakistan had already acquired the nuclear capability. According to him, “Pakistan can make at least a dozen bombs” (Pande 1991: 75).

In 1986, China concluded a comprehensive nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan. This agreement was signed on 15 September 1986 on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This agreement includes the design, construction, and operation of nuclear reactors. This agreement sought to place all material and equipment being transferred from China to Pakistan under IAEA safeguards. This was done after the US postponed the ratification of the Sino-US nuclear cooperation agreement in 1985. Later in the year, Chinese scientists began assisting Pakistan with the enrichment of weapons-grade uranium. China also reportedly transferred tritium gas to Pakistan that could be used to achieve fusion in hydrogen bombs and boost the yield of atomic bombs (Pande 1991). In 1991, U.S. officials alleged “China provided Pakistan with enough weapons-grade uranium for two nuclear powers, and that Pakistan now has a “workable bomb” weighing 180 kg (Binkley 1994: 93). In the same year, German officials also said that China sold Pakistan enough tritium in 1986 for ten nuclear weapons. Pakistan has been testing nuclear weapons parts of Chinese design with the aid of Chinese scientists at a clandestine nuclear project in Kahuta” (cns n.d.).

In July, in a Pakistani defence journal, retired General Khalid Mahmud Arif, who had served as vice chief of the army staff under Zia and was responsible for managing the construction of the Kahuta plant, declared that since India was relentlessly pursuing her nuclear military effort, Pakistan needed to review her nuclear policy (as cited in Spector
and Smith 1990: 107). In August 1989, pressures appeared to mount on Bhutto to manufacture nuclear arms in response to India's growing conventional and nuclear capabilities. In 1989 Pakistan and China signed a ten-year memorandum of understanding for military cooperation in the fields of purchase, joint research and development, joint production, transfer of technology, as well as export to third countries through mutual agreement (Faruqui 2003). In December 1991, a commercial contract between Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and China National Nuclear Cooperation was signed for the construction of a 300 MW reactor at Chashma (Nuri 1999: 6). Chinese President Jiang Zemin, on a visit to Pakistan in December 1996, assured critics that Chinese cooperation with Pakistan in nuclear power generation was under supervision of IAEA (Jalalzai 2002).

There was no diminution of Sino-Pak military as a result of Sino-Indian rapprochement in 1987-1990. The number of high-level military exchanges between China and Pakistan based on indexes of the Foreign Broadcast Information Services indicates that there were five in 1985, three each in 1986 and 1987, six in 1988, eight in 1989, and three in 1990. But during the Kashmir crisis of 1990, China was avoiding antagonising India. In none of the Chinese statements was there a mention of the UN or its resolutions, but only of bilateral negotiations leading to a peaceful settlement of the issue. The Chinese Defence Minister Qin Qiwei arrived in Pakistan on 19 February with a military delegation. Qin lauded Sino-Pak friendship as solid and having withstood the test of time. He praised Pakistan for its support of the Afghanistan people's struggle against foreign aggression and for having played an active role in maintaining peace and stability in South Asia. The deterrent support offered by Qin was:

"The Chinese government will never change its policy of supporting the Pakistani government, people, and armed forces in safeguarding their state sovereignty and territorial integrity, no matter how the international situation changes" (as cited in Garver 1996).

This was China's strong statement of deterrent support for Pakistan during the 1989-1990 Kashmir crisis. Most Chinese statements during this crisis called for peace. Of course, the visit by Qin Qiwei's military delegation to Pakistan in the context of Indo-Pak confrontation was an important manifestation of Chinese support. Pakistan was dissatisfied with Beijing's new formulations. Pakistan's displeasure was conveyed to
China. China responded positively to Pakistan’s request with statements mentioning the UN. In this manner Pakistan tried to balance its entente cordial with Pakistan against its new rapprochement with India.

Thus, Pakistan’s geostrategic location in the Cold War period had given it an opportunity to join Western-sponsored military pacts and get Chinese support and this had in turn provided them with the weapons and with political, economic, and moral support that they needed to face India.

*Pakistan’s threat perception in the 1990s*

The old order of power politics had been replaced by a new chapter. It is important to consider the strategic perspective of the new realities of power politics focussing attention on the implications of security problems for Pakistan with respect to India. During the 1990s, hostility between India and Pakistan deepened. The search for security continued to haunt Pakistan in the post-Cold War period. The major crises in the decade (1990-2000) were the nuclear issue (1998), Kargil conflict (1999) and the extended Indo-Pak border confrontation (2001-02).

Pakistan’s relations with the US saw dramatic changes in the post-Cold War period. Pakistan no longer enjoyed the kind of support it had during the Afghan war period. Since 1989, Pakistan has not been getting any American aid, after the Bush administration refused to certify that Pakistan’s nuclear programme was only for peaceful purposes. The US suspended economic assistance and stopped military sales to Pakistan by invoking the Pressler Amendment on 1 October 1990. It summoned back all frigates and warships it had leased to the Pakistan navy. Pakistan lacked hard cash to obtain new equipment from other sources. The maintenance of the US supplied military equipments proved expensive. Pakistanis believed that Pakistan has been a faithful ally of the US. Instead of being rewarded in the post-Cold War world for this commitment, Pakistan has been abandoned in favour of India. Thus US-Pak relations which were strong in the 1980s when Washington transferred billion of dollars in economic and military aid to Islamabad were strained in 1990. In 1992-93, the US threatened to declare Pakistan a state that harboured terrorism. This was the lowest point in Pak-US relations.
The year 1991 marked a departure point in traditional thought with regard to security. In the geo-political and strategic context, the end of Cold War called for readjustment and reassessment by South Asian nations. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, India lost a strategic ally. India adopted a liberalized economic policy at its core, while Pakistan fell behind in the economic race. Trade ties under WTO (World Trade Organization) regime became the focus under which military and diplomatic policies were put in place, while Pakistan’s thinking continued to be Kashmir-centric and India-centric because it continued to pretend that it was threatened by India. Indo-Russian relations had changed. So had Sino-Indian relations. Pakistan’s strategic ally against India, China had to readjust to the changing pattern of global politics. But Pakistan continued to depend on Cold War period allies for defending its security. With the end of the global conflict, its principal concern had been to counterbalance and contain what it regarded as regional threats with active diplomacy. Its foreign policy during and after the Cold War was underlined by a search for security.

The recent claims by the Indian leadership regarding the possibility of stopping water to Pakistan have heightened the fear regarding India’s intent or capability of making life difficult for Pakistan. There is an un-demarcated maritime boundary issue. The absence of a sea boundary is linked to the border dispute of the 60-mile long estuary of Sir Creek in the marshes of the Runn of Kutch. This area lies on the border between the Indian state of Gujarat and the Pakistani province of Sindh. Negotiations were conducted to resolve the issue, especially in the 1990s. In 1994, New Delhi offered to delineate the boundary seawards, an offer that was rejected because of other political disputes such as that over Siachen Glacier (Siddiqa 2004: 177). It was feared that the acceptance of an Indian plan would have led inadvertently to the acceptance of a boundary without really solving dispute (Siddiqa 2004: 178).

India-Pakistan foreign secretary talks were halted between 1994 and 1997. In this period Pakistan did not test or deploy new nuclear delivery systems. It had been blocked from receiving F-16s and Chinese missiles after early 1990s, and while it then sought North Korean missiles, details of its transactions with North Korea were unknown until its April 1998 Ghauri test (Mistry 2003: 122). And it remained under US pressure to freeze its nuclear programme.
In an observation made by a survey conducted by the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies in 1996, indicated that by majority of respondent, India is rated as the only threat to Pakistan, to the extent that conventional and nuclear warfare development was justified by them perceiving India as a threat and Kashmir was considered as linked to nuclear warfare and development (Ahmed and Cortright 1996).

In January 1998 at Dhaka, India presented a non-paper to Pakistan outlining simultaneous discussion on all issues including Jammu and Kashmir. The proposal was rejected by Pakistan just before the Colombo SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) summits (Musa Khan Jalalzai 2003). When BJP (Bhartiya Janata Party) came to power in India in 1998, Pakistan was considered the number one enemy of India and China second (Jalalzai 2003). In 1998, India and Pakistan carried out nuclear explosions. Even after the nuclear testing, Kashmir continues to be central to the threat perception of Pakistan and thereby to its defence policy. The Kashmir conflict explains the genesis of the perceived threat to Pakistan’s security and the evolution of her strategic doctrine to provide security against this threat (Tahir 1998).

The nuclear factor in the threat perception of Pakistan

Nuclear issues have played an important role in shaping the relations between India and Pakistan. Nuclear developments in both the countries are tied to their perceived national security and national pride. India justifies its policy on the premise of its antagonism with China mainly, and to a lesser extent with Pakistan. Pakistan bases its nuclear option solely on its threat perception vis-à-vis India through nuclear deterrence. Pakistan lacks strategic depth against a nuclear attack by India and is also vulnerable to India’s medium range missiles.

India’s five nuclear explosions at Pokharan in Rajasthan on 11 and 13 May 1998 changed the balance of power in South Asia. India issued warnings to Pakistan that now when India was a nuclear power, it could settle things “according to its will”. The Indian

---

4 The Indian Prime Minister in his letter to President Clinton had written, ‘I have been deeply concerned at the deteriorating security environment, faced by India for some years past. We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust that country has materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear weapons state. At the hands of this bitter neighbour we have suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years’ (Vajpayee 1998a).
Prime Minister said that his country was now a nuclear weapon state, and would not hesitate to use the bomb if attacked. The Indian Home Minister, Lal Krishna Advani warned Pakistan that the Indian decision to test five nuclear bombs showed that India would take a tough stance over the issue of Pak-held Kashmir. He said that Islamabad should realize the change in the geo-strategic situation in the region and the world and roll back its anti-India policy, especially with regard to Kashmir. India’s bold and decisive step to become a nuclear weapons state had brought about a qualitatively new stage in Indo-Pak relations. It signified India’s resolve to deal firmly and strongly with Pakistan’s hostile design and activities in Kashmir (Mahmood 1999).

These statements caused a great concern in Pakistan and the then Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif assured his nation that Pakistan would take all appropriate steps to safeguard its security in the wake of Indian nuclear explosions and would not accept any outside pressure in this regard (Mahmood 1999). He said in his speech that after India conducted its tests, Pakistan faced the threat of force. He uttered that India had tested to alter the strategic balance and threatened their security and sovereignty. They had waited for seventeen days for the world to respond. They had known that no country could provide them security assurances against nuclear India. Thus circumstances had forced them to test (Jalalzai 2005).

Soon after Pakistan had tested the nuclear devices, Prime Minister Vajpayee offered to sign a no-first-use accord with Pakistan. Pakistan did not respond positively to this offer. This is understandable because India enjoys significant conventional superiority over Pakistan. Accepting this offer means if Pakistan is legally bound not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, it will not be able to defend itself against conventional attack by India.

*Kargil: a turning point between the two allies:* The 10th SAARC summit was held in Colombo in July 1998. The Indian and Pakistani leaders came face to face for the first time after becoming nuclear powers. During 1999, a number of incidents and events took place. A Pakistani cricket team arrived in India. The bus service between Delhi and Lahore became operational. Indian and Pakistani leaders signed the Lahore Declaration on 21 February 1999 and the process of dialogue began.
But suddenly Kargil crisis in May 1999 became a turning point between the two allies, Pakistan and China. The crisis developed as Pakistan unilaterally occupied strategically important mountaintops in Kashmir. Islamic militants, along with Pakistan’s regular forces, intruded across the Line of Control and occupied the Indian Army’s defensive positions in the mountainous Kargil – Drass sector. At the height of the crisis, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary had warned, “We will not hesitate to use any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity” (The Times of India 2 June 1999). During the crisis, the then Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz came to Delhi for talks, but just before that he flew to Beijing, where he was apparently told to respect the line of control and seek a bilateral solution. The international community once again tried to diffuse the crisis. Lack of support from China, American pressure and other military situations forced Pakistan to withdraw.

According to Shaheen Akhtar (1999) it was India who first effectively linked Kashmir to the nuclear tests by threatening Pakistan to overrun Azad Kashmir and boasting that its newly acquired capability would determine negotiations over Kashmir. While spelling out the country’s foreign policy at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs on 23 June 2000, Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf said that there was certainly a threat to Pakistan from India. He further said that to counter India’s desire to emerge as the regional power, Pakistan had to mobilise international forums like the UN and the OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries). He said that national security was the primary concern of each Pakistani. In his words, “It is the threat perception that gives rise to our security concerns and our responses to that threat” (Musharraf 2000: 49-50). The Kashmir issue thus continues as a symbol of Indo-Pakistan enmity.

To understand Pakistan’s sense of insecurity, it is important to have an overview of the nature of the arms race and of Indian superiority in it for the year 1999-2000.
Table 3.5
Arms Race between India and Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total strength</td>
<td>520,000</td>
<td>980,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional commands</td>
<td>Now 2 (2006)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armoured divisions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry/Mountain divisions</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>2,050</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>1,806</td>
<td>4,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSM</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack helicopters</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total strength</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport aircraft</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total strength</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal surface vessels</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Air Force (combat aircraft)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the post-Afghanistan period, the Afghanistan based relationship between Pakistan and the US could not be sustained. In 1990s, Pakistan’s ally, the US, had turned its back on Pakistan. This happened in the aftermath of nuclear explosions in 1998, Kargil and the 1999 military coup in Pakistan. The US aid to Pakistan was stopped because Pakistan refused to sign the NPT unilaterally and to open its nuclear installations.
for international inspection. Despite having made advance payments of for the purchase of F-16 fighters, Pakistan neither received the remaining batch of aircraft nor had its money returned. In 1992, the US was on the verge of including Pakistan in its list of states sponsoring international terrorism. Pak-US relationship ran into difficulties because they did not share each other’s views on regional issues.

It is argued that during the Cold War, Pakistan perceived regional threats especially from India. With the end of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union, the regional threats in general and Indian threat in particular continue to exist. The difference is that Pakistan is no longer a part of the Western alliances.

**Pakistani responses**

*External balancing: China*

In the post-Cold War scenario, China is also facing challenges. In cultivating its relationship with Pakistan in the early 1960s, China had two major objectives. First, both countries had problems with India and with the Soviet Union. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, threat to Chinese security diminished. Second, until the 1970s China had used Pakistan as a link to the other countries, particularly to the US. In the 1990s, the geo-political situation had changed. This also applies to the significance of Pakistan in Sino-US relations. The US has been attempting to keep China away from Pakistan. Yet Pakistan and China have maintained cordial interactions in the post-Cold War period. Consultation on the bilateral, regional and international issues, exchange visits of senior officials was maintained. China extended technological and economic cooperation for Pakistani industrial development and defence production.

Over the years, Pakistan-China friendship has become an example of ‘time-tested’ and ‘all-weather friendship’. The effect of Sino-Indian rapprochement on Sino-Pakistan relations did not change the scenario. In fact, the improvement of Indian-Chinese relations has made relations between China and Pakistan more complex. Beijing has tried to balance its entente cordial with Pakistan against its new rapprochement with India. This was manifested in the Kashmir crisis of 1990, when China ceased referring to the UN after Qian Qichen’s discussions in New Delhi, in China’s lack of enthusiasm in Pakistan’s efforts to internationalise the Kashmir issue, and in softness of Chinese
deterrent support for Pakistan during this crisis. However, the substance of China’s support for Pakistan continued. China’s continuing support for Pakistan’s development efforts and the continuing military relations between Beijing and Islamabad indicate that China is not prepared to sacrifice its entente with Pakistan.

Although Beijing continued transferring dual use industrial technology relevant for missile components and manufacturing, it halted sales of complete missiles to Pakistan after US sanctions in 1991 and 1993 and its non-proliferation assurances to the US in 1994. China had become Pakistan’s most reliable supplier of military hardware, providing equipment and supplier to every branch of the Pakistani military. The most significant military development occurred in 1992 when China supplied Pakistan with 34 M-11, 300-KM ballistic missiles, a solid-fuel variant of the Soviet Scud-B missile. In return, China secured midair refuelling technology and stinger missiles from Pakistan (Faruqui 2003: 83). A supplementary agreement to the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1989, providing Chinese credits for Pakistani arms purchases was signed in 1993 (Faruqui 2003: 83). In September 1995, Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali, then Foreign Minister of Pakistan was told by Chinese Premier Li Peng that relations between China and Pakistan had entered a new phase of sustained development. The new phase of Sino-Pak relations was based on efficient cooperation in various fields (Rahman 1999). China’s total aid to Pakistan till 1996 has been around $1.5 billion (Jalalzai 2002). In addition to the cooperation in the production of K-8 trainer aircraft, China agreed in 1995 to work towards joint development and manufacturing of a fighter aircraft, Super-7, and warships. In the mid 1990s, Beijing partially moderated its technology transfers to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes.

China agreed to provide two nuclear power reactors in 1989 and 1996. On 31 December 1991, Jiang Xinxiang, General Manager of the China National Nuclear Corporation and Ishfaq Ahmad, Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission signed a contract under which China was to export a 300 mega watt nuclear power plant to Pakistan (Jalalzai 2002). Chinese Premier Li Peng was present at the singing ceremony in Beijing. Five years after the conclusion of this agreement, on 5 February 1996, the Washington Times was the first to disclose intelligence reports that the China National Nuclear Corporation, a state-owned corporation, transferred to the A. Q. Khan Research
Laboratory in Kahuta, Pakistan, 5000 ring magnets, which can be used in gas centrifuges to enrich uranium. According to the report, intelligence experts believed that the magnets provided to Pakistan are to be used in special suspension bearings at the top of rotating cylinders in the centrifuges (*The Washington Times* 2 Feb 1996). The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), in June 1997, submitted a mandatory report to Congress stating that during July-December 1996, "China was the most significant supplier of WMD-related goods and technology to foreign countries" (CRS 1997: 850). China supplied a nuclear power reactor for the Chashma power station, as committed in 1989-90, and offered in 1996 to extend similar cooperation for another nuclear power station. Gordon Oehler, former head of the CIA's Non-proliferation Centre, testified on 11 June 1998, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that in November 1992, "the Chinese delivered 34 M-11s to Pakistan" (CRS 1998: 168).

China moderated its stance on Indo-Pak disputes especially Kashmir. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, China supported the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir, as set out in the UN resolutions. Later it avoided the use of the term self-determination. In the post-Cold War period, China began to emphasize the need of bilateral dialogue for the resolution of Indo-Pak problems including Kashmir. The strongest plea for a bilateral dialogue for the resolution of the disputes was made by Chinese President Jiang Zemin during his visit to India and Pakistan in November-December 1996. He addressed the Pakistani Senate and made a very important policy statement. He urged Pakistan to emulate Beijing by settling minor issues with India before moving on to settle major issues such as the dispute over Kashmir (Faruqui 2003: 89). In 1997, China warned Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban, or risk losing its economic, military, and political support. Wang Jianping, a Chinese expert on Islam noted that China had some problems with Pakistan over its deep involvement with the Taliban regime and the export of fundamentalist Islamic political ideas (Faruqui 2003: 88).

*The Sino-Pakistan nuclear nexus*: The issue of nuclear weapons has considerably influenced the threat perceptions and threat assessments of Pakistan. T. V. Paul writes, "China's involvement in nuclear proliferation in South Asia has been long standing. It is both a cause of and a contributor to proliferation in the region. As a military ally of
Pakistan and an adversary of India, China has helped Islamabad to build its nuclear and missile capabilities. China has used this assistance to Pakistan as a way to balance India militarily and politically”.

After the Indian explosions, Pakistan’s relations with China further strengthened as the two countries faced India’s growing nuclear ambitions. According to Tehmina Mahmood (1999), both Pakistan and China realized the extent to which India could go in the fulfilment of its ambitions. On 20 May on his arrival from Beijing, Pakistan’s foreign secretary briefed the newsmen about the trip. He said that “there is complete identity of views between Pakistan and China on the gravity of the situation which has resulted from India’s reckless actions and China agreed that Indian nuclear explosions were a threat to Pakistan’s security. He further said that Chinese leadership reaffirmed that the all­weather friendship between the two countries was above any political expediencies’ (as cited in Rahman 1999).

Pakistan’s security was threatened by nuclear India. In its response, Pakistan, with Chinese help, exploded six nuclear devices on 28 and 30 May 1998 in Ras Koh range in Chagai Hills in Baluchistan to restore the balance of power in South Asia. These nuclear explosions were the direct result of India’s nuclear explosions. The extent of Sino-Pakistani collaboration became clear following Pakistan’s nuclear tests, as China’s reaction to Pakistan’s tests was muted in comparison to its reaction to India’s tests. Reacting to the Indian tests, foreign ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao stated that, “the Chinese government expresses grave concern over India’s nuclear tests .... India’s nuclear tests under such circumstances run counter to the international trend and are not in the interest of South Asia’s peace and Stability” (ceip n.d.). Whereas, while responding to Pakistani test the same spokesman stated, “The present situation in South Asia was caused solely by India, while Pakistan’s nuclear tests were conducted as reactions to India’s intimidation” (ceip n.d.). While it was preparing for the tests, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmed, made an unannounced visit to Beijing. Moreover, after Pakistan’s nuclear tests on 28 May and 30 May 1998 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1998), while giving his first official statement lauded his country’s ‘time tested’ relations with Beijing, and said that, “Our friendship has been further strengthened... We are proud of our great neighbour”.

110
G. Parthasarthy (2001) writes, “All Pakistan’s military rulers have invariably professed their commitment to improving relations with India, especially to gullible visitors from India. But their true sentiments about their neighbour are more accurately reflected in the views they voice to their own countrymen and to their Western and Chinese interlocutors. China also, despite its protestations of innocence, has consistently provided Pakistan with wide-ranging assistance to enable Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons and a wide variety of missiles, ranging from short range M-11s to medium range M-9s and intermediate range M-18s”. The long-standing friendship continues to be strong even today. Speaking at the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad on 15 November 2000, he proclaimed to an audience that “Pakistan’s security interests lie in maintaining a regional balance. And in this it would desire an active Chinese role. This role will remain vital especially in the changing geo-strategic realities” (Parthasarthy 2001).

Above statements, reports, agreements, data, are indicators strong enough to show that China has helped Pakistan build its nuclear and military weapons. Both the sides however, deny any such relationship and claim that, their cooperation in the nuclear field is for peaceful purposes only. In 1996, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Shen Guofang, in response to a report that the CIA had evidence that China transferred ring magnets to Pakistan, stated, “China, a responsible state has never transferred equipment and technology for producing nuclear weapons to any other country, nor will China do so in the future” (cns n.d.). On similar lines, on 4 April 1998, in an interview with Janes Defense Weekly, Dr. A. Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon denied that China aided Pakistan in developing its nuclear weapons. He said,

“I can tell you with full authority and very honestly that we have had no access to any Chinese data. If we produce a hamburger, the West will say that it has been copied by McDonald’s” (Karniol 1998: 21-22).

The Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, blamed India for the current tension in South Asia, in the first direct reaction to the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan on 3 June 1998. He accused India of targeting both China and Pakistan, and pointed out that the nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan was strictly peaceful, in the area of technology of nuclear reactors. He pointed out that 11 installations concerned were under the control
of the International Atomic Energy Agency. On the same day, the official *China Daily* criticised India for its ambition to become a world power, and warned that the “long running Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir is like a sleeping volcano beneath the nuclear threat” (Jalalzai 2002). These Chinese statements indicated that Sino-Pakistani strategic cooperation remained in place.

Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs Li Chanhe in a statement at the First Committee of the 53rd UN General Assembly on 14 October 1998, observed that “settlement of the Kashmir issue is one of the key elements that will help bring peace and security in South Asia and the international community should move to help facilitate a peaceful and just resolution of the issue” (Mahmud 1998-99: 8). China proposed a five-nation conference on Kashmir involving the US, Russia, China, India and Pakistan. India rejected the offer terming it an attempt at third-party mediation. China also offered to mediate between the two countries to resolve the dispute.

At the same time, Sino-Indian relations have improved. The foreign ministers of the two countries have exchanged visits and initiated a security dialogue. Trade between India and China (stands at over two billion dollars) exceeded Pakistan’s trade with China (1.3 billion dollars). Nevertheless, Chinese military cooperation with Pakistan continues at a rapid pace. Chinese Defence Minister General Chi Haothian visited Islamabad in February 1999, and his visit was reciprocated by General Pervez Musharrafs visit to Beijing in May 1999, in his capacity as Chief of the army staff (Faruqui 2003: 93). Musharraf spoke of the growing state-to-state and military-to-military contacts between the two countries.

Commenting on China’s support to Pakistan, the *Frontier Post* on 20 January 2000 observed that there was no doubt that a strong Pakistan-China relationship would keep the Indians at bay. Veteran Pakistani diplomat Agha Shahi visited Beijing in July 2000. On the issue of Indian-Pakistan confrontation, the Chinese counterparts advised Pakistan to settle the dispute through dialogue and discussion (Faruqui 2003: 93). They assured Pakistan that Chinese policy toward India was not aimed against Pakistan.

Analysing Sino-Pak ties in the 1990s, John Garver (2003) noted that although China transferred conventional weapons to Pakistan, “Chinese diplomatic and deterrent support for Pakistan weakened as a result of Beijing’s rapprochement with New Delhi”. China reassured Pakistan that developing ties with India would not beat the cost of its friendship
with Pakistan. In response Pakistan’s then Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Akram Zaki said, “We think that China would exercise a restraining influence on India’s ambitions in the region. We welcome the development”. On 22 July 2000, the Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan said in an interview:

“China and Pakistan enjoy normal relations between sovereign countries, including relations of military trade, which conform to international law and norms. These relations are just like the relations enjoyed with some other countries.”

Pakistan’s strategy has to be considered in its totality. The nuclear threat is only one element. If between two adversary countries one is inferior in conventional weapons it can overcome that inferiority with nuclear weapons. This concept was put into practice by Pakistan against India by going nuclear. The nuclear programme of Pakistan gives it another type of “equalizer” in its relationship with India. It has increased Pakistan’s capability of passive deterrence against India. Pakistan’s argument is that it cannot commit itself to non-use or no-first-use of nuclear weapons because they are its insurance against Indian superiority in conventional weapons and forces (Chopra 1999).

China transferred M-11s to Pakistan and insisted that it was within MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) guidelines. It led to tension between the US and China. Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed,

“Our ties with China constitute a cornerstone of our foreign policy and a fundamental element of our quest for regional peace and stability. The vast spectrum of bilateral cooperation between our two countries ranges from political, economic and cultural spheres to the fields of defence and security. The relations with Chine have served as a check on the hegemonistic tendencies of some other countries in the region” (As cited in Rajain 2005: 160).

This outlines the Sino-Pak relations, which are based on mutuality of interest and cooperation in the fields of defence and security. The Chinese and the North Koreans continued to provide assistance to Pakistan’s ballistic missile programme during the first half of 1999. It has procured a small number of short-range tactical missiles from China (Sattar 1994-95). Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, while referring to the new dimensions of his perception of the threat to Pakistan, had pointed out that it required the country to stay alert and be fully prepared to meet all eventualities. He said the induction of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and the threat of nuclear weapons had added new dimensions to threat perceptions. He added, “We have to meet these challenges and meet them effectively”.

113
Table 3.6
Sino-Pak Nuclear and Missile Cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct transfers of 34 complete M-11s (1992).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuing Chinese assistance, including a blue print and a construction equipment missile factory in Rawalpindi for manufacture of medium-range ballistic missiles (1996-97).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatf-1/1A, possibly developed with some Chinese assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatf-2, possibly developed with some Chinese assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammonium percolate, a chemical used in rocket fuel: alleged Chinese shipment of 10 tonnes to Pakistan (1996).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anza surface-to-air missile; Pakistani version of that in PRC, supplied by China.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms material, special metals and electronics used in the production of Chinese-design anti-tank missiles and alleged Chinese shipment to Pakistan (1998).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It has been speculated that the Shaheen-1 IRBM, which Pakistan tested in April 1999 is actually modelled on Chinese M-9 missiles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Pakistan’s relationship with China has been steadier. The military and economic support of China enabled Pakistan to strengthen itself against threats to its security. Its support in the nuclear and missile areas had been critical. It was a shared strategic perception or security against external challenge that led to the special friendship between Pakistan and China. Pakistan has linked its nuclear option to India’s and developed a direct link with China on nuclear and missile issues. Military spending in Pakistan reflected the insecurity scenario. India propagated that its armament policy was for maintaining balance of power vis-à-vis Pakistan. Pakistan viewed it as a hegemonic
attempt by India to dominate the South Asian region, which posed danger to Pakistan because its perception was that India had a central position in its foreign policy which affected Pakistan's security. Pakistan claimed its nuclear weapons were because of the Indian threat, which it would use as a tactical weapon for Pakistan's survival. China had played an important role in advancing Pakistan's strategic capability in the wider context of its strategic rivalry with India. The common concern of both Pakistan and China was to contain India.

Pakistan's security perceptions have been undergoing changes over the years. Each time it has direct bearing on its thinking on the Kashmir dispute. In the first decade after its independence, Pakistan's main fear was that India was not reconciled to Pakistan's separate existence. It was conspiring to bring about Pakistan's disintegration. By the formula that Muslim majority areas would constitute Pakistan, Kashmir should have become part of Pakistan. It became determined to make Kashmir issue the central point in all negotiations with India. In the second phase, starting in the late 1950s, with the help of US military assistance, Pakistan felt that it was able to defend itself and also force India to give up Kashmir. Kashmir became a matter of national prestige. In the third phase, perception in Pakistan was that their forces were close to winning the 1965 war. This mood also raised the feelings of Pakistani public on Kashmir issue. This psyche led Pakistan into a new war with India during Bangladesh crisis. However, in the decades of 1970s, the fervour of Kashmir dispute was dampened. In the 1980s, with the acquisition of nuclear capability, there was once again hardening of its position on Kashmir. In the 1990s, Pakistan again decided to put Kashmir on top of the agenda in all negotiations with India. With the end of the Cold War, the threat from Pakistan's regional environment lives on in the form of a perceived Indian dominance.

The special nature of the Sino-Pak relations continued during the decade following the end of the Cold War.

**The Recent Years**

Over the past fifty-eight years, the India factor has gained such prominence in the national psyche of Pakistan that it is considered politically risky to make any changes in the foreign and defence policies that would have any semblance of a compromise with India. The ouster of Navaz Sharif's government in October 1999 bears witness to this fact.
In July 2001, the Agra summit between Prime Minister Vajpayee of India and President General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan took place where Pakistan insisted on maintaining the centrality of the Kashmir issue while India's prime concern was terrorism. On 13 December 2001, the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament shocked India and it suspected Pakistan’s hand in it. The Vajpayee government’s position on Kashmir during the Agra summit and its propaganda against Pakistan in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the US is held as examples of India’s animosity towards Pakistan. Islamabad wants both China along with the US, in the role of a power balancer in South Asia. This may be one of the reasons why Beijing was involved in the development of the second port at Gwadar. Chinese presence in this region would compel India to beef up naval capability. Although Pakistan itself may find it difficult to counter this enhanced naval strength of India, but it hopes that Chinese presence would help it in balancing the power equations in the region (Siddiqa 2004: 188). Another reason for developing a second port is to counter the potential threat of a naval blockade by India.

However, the Cold War era Sino-Pak strategic ties had changed in the new global order. For Beijing, India was now more of a negotiating partner than a common enemy of both China and Pakistan. Pakistan’s ambition, goals and threat assessment had been exaggerated out of proportion. Beijing acknowledged that Pakistan had faced very little actual threat from India. In its assessment, India had metamorphosed into a status quo power and its threat had been in response to Pakistani activities. The 11th SAARC summit was held in Islamabad in January 2004. On the sidelines of the summit Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf met on 6 January 2004. In a joint statement, the two leaders emphasized that constructive dialogue would promote progress towards the common objective of peace, security and economic development of the two countries (Jalalzai 2005). The Chinese government not only appreciated the restraint shown by New Delhi but also changed its stance on the Kashmir issue. China now calls it a “bilateral problem in Indo-Pak relations” and asked India and Pakistan to resolve it through peaceful negotiation. Indian External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh, in his first interview to the Hindustan Times on 28 May 2004, said that he wanted a ‘multi-speed dialogue’ with Pakistan to follow on the lines of New Delhi’s relationship with Beijing. He said: “Pakistan is close to China and so is India. So why don’t we follow the same example? We are saying don’t forget Kashmir but keep it aside for faster progress on other issues” (Jalalzai 2005).
Even after more than fifty-eight years of Indian and Pakistani Independence, the ghost of the past still dictates the mindset of the leadership of these three countries, namely, Pakistan, China and India. In other words, it may be said that it suits the leaderships to keep public attention away from domestic problems by inciting fear of external aggression. The media also play an important role in projecting the images of personalities and perceptions in the relationship between these three countries. The images of hostility as perceived by the Pakistanis and Indians are the result of mutual suspicion. Pakistan’s foreign policy has always been based on a perception of its weakness vis-à-vis India. This has created an obsession in Pakistan about India’s military strength. In its quest for parity with India, Pakistan leadership (both military and civilian) sought an understanding with China hoping that Beijing’s adverse relations with India would persist in the same way as its own. It is said, ‘common enmity leads to friendship’. There is a general belief in Pakistan that in case of war with India, China will throw its weight behind Pakistan. It is quite clear that neither social nor economic reasons have prompted Pakistan and China to come closer. Instead, this is just political intimacy developed partly spontaneously, and partly consciously, taking the Indian factor into account. This single reason has encouraged massive transfers of defence equipment, economic aid and nuclear and missile technology from China to Pakistan. The Pakistan-China relationship has been classified as a model of friendly relations between two neighbours irrespective of ideological incompatibilities. Their mutual friendship has survived many ups and downs in the last five decades. It has become an example of “time tested” and “all weather” friendship.

It is therefore need of the hour that the two countries namely, Pakistan and India should evolve a shared perception in the quest for common security and regional peace. Advocating a change in the basic concept of national security, eminent Pakistani economist, the late Dr Mahbubul Haq had said that the essence of real security lay in safeguarding the people, not just safeguarding the borders. According to Dr Ayesha Siddiqa (2005), the fact is that there is much that we do not know about each other and that often leads to misperception and a poor calculation of each other’s reactions. India and Pakistan are like distant cousins that never saw each other after their birth. India has to decide on having good relations with Pakistan for its own reasons, not because it is
granting a favour to Islamabad. Building peace can only work in a win-win situation. A perception that peace could, or should, benefit one party more than the other would not lead India and Pakistan too far.

IV

Summing up

Viewed in terms of cause and effect analogy, this whole scenario presents India as a cause of threat to Pakistan, its effect being the forging of an intimate Sino-Pak alliance. Pakistan’s threat perception is based on its geographical characteristics, on the capabilities and intentions of a neighbour and its inability to maintain a conventional military balance with India due to resource constraints.

During the Cold War, the Sino-Pak balance of threat was forged to counter the perception of Indian hegemony in the region. In lieu of the hypothesis of this chapter that Pakistan’s China policy is determined by its power relationship with India, Pakistan’s foreign policy can be understood in the context of Indo-Pak relations. China’s friendship with Pakistan can also be understood in this context. Cooperation with Pakistan did effectively balance the Indian threat and prevented India from focusing on China. China embarked on an enduring strategic relationship with Pakistan. It used the elements of its own national power: political, economic, military, nuclear cooperation to influence Pakistan. The underlying feature of Pakistan’s foreign policy has been commitment to its security especially its perceived threat from India. This case study supports the balance of threat theory. It illustrates that India by possessing the power coupled with its geographic proximity, offensive powers and aggressive intentions posed a threat to Pakistan.

The Sino-Pak intimacy is informal in the sense that it is not sanctioned or governed by any formal treaty of friendship or alliance. China’s choice of Pakistan as a friend and ally could be seen as part of a policy which began at Bandung in 1955 and matured through 1962 - the year of Sino-Indian tensions, which was to reach its peak in 1965. Pakistan is likely to remain China’s ally in most scenarios. At the same time, Chinese trade with India continues to grow. But possibilities of this rapprochement between China and India is limited, hence it serves Pakistan’s interests.
It can be said that Pakistan’s foreign policy in the past fifty-eight years seems to have been dominated by an extreme sense of threat perceived from its neighbour India. Almost everything else has been subordinated to the Indian factor. That is why, Pakistan had no option but to take note of the Indian armed power, missile capability, and nuclear weapon power. It seems likely that in all possibilities Pakistan might not be able to equal India’s burgeoning economy and hence its achievements in defence sector, due to various factors viz a nascent economy and unstable polity. Even today the stereo type perception is that the two countries do not and can not agree on anything, that they are constantly fighting and arguing.

The conclusion, therefore, is that since Pakistan’s policies towards India are based on perceived Indian hostility and aggression to the very existence of Pakistan, the threat from India is at the core in defining its relationship with India. For a Pakistani, an Indian threat is real. Therefore, the core issue for India is to assure Pakistan that India poses no threat to its security. Otherwise, the perception of such a threat is likely to become real in what becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Pakistan on its part needs some pragmatic thinking. A more significant outcome of the threat perception has been the urge for de-escalation of tension. Need of the hour is a shift in the foreign policy and not in alliances. Therefore, both India and Pakistan should use all imagination to work for common security and move towards a secured future. Good international relations depend upon mutual trust. New perceptions are needed to generate confidence. Since the Sino-Pak alliance against India is no longer pragmatic, in the context of a twenty-first century international order, due emphasis must be placed on South Asian regional cooperation in different fields for the common goal of development.