CHAPTER – 2
CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION

As the thesis would examine the relationship between modernity and ethnicity, it is important to familiarise ourselves with the fundamental concepts we would be dealing with. We propose to discuss and elaborate on the concept of modernity/modernisation, its historical origin and evolution, the way social scientists from both the West and the Orient have been engaging themselves with the modernity and its consequences and the divergent debates on the very meaning of modernity/modernisation. Likewise we would discuss the concepts of ethnic group and ethnicity. A sociological enquiry into the trajectory of these concepts would help us locate the thesis in the ongoing debate and give a distinctive meaning to the central focus of our enquiry.

Modernity And Modernization: Their Historicity

We would use terms modernisation and modernity interchangeably. We would basically look at modernisation as modernity in action. This enables us to look at the massive social, economic, cultural and political changes which took place in the West in the Eighteenth Century and the Nineteenth century and at present in some of the developing countries as an expression of modernity.
As stated earlier, modernity privileged reason. By doing that it also privileged science, technology and education. The essential agenda of modernity was to pave the way for reason by doing away with constraints imposed by traditions, customs, beliefs and feelings. Reason was supposed to sweep away social and political beliefs and forms of organisation which are not based upon scientific proofs. As remarked by Allan Bloom "What distinguished the Enlightenment from earlier philosophy was its intention to extend to all men what had been the preserve of only a few: the life lived according to reason. It was not 'idealism' or 'optimism' or 'optimism' that motivated these philosophers but a new science, a 'method', and allied with them, a new political science" (1987:164)

This notion of modernity was revolutionary in the sense that it replaced the idea of the subject and the related idea of God. It emphasized the point that neither society, history nor individual lives were determined by the will of a Supreme Being to whom one had to submit or who could be influenced through magic. Such a conception of modernity was elaborated by the philosophers of the Enlightenment.

Japan -Jacques Rousseau, whose philosophic works reflect the Enlightenment agenda shares this conception of modernity. His whole work is motivated by a desire to struggle against the obstacles that obscure knowledge and communication. The same spirit pervades his critique of society and his educational programme. For him, the social order is neither
bourgeois nor sacred and must be based upon a free decision. That free
decision itself is, however, an expression of general will (Touraine 1995:17).

For Rousseau, the widely-used expression 'the general will' has a
clear rationalist meaning. He does not share the view that the general will
defends the interests of the majority or the Third Estate: it applies only to the
general problems of society and therefore to its very existence and such a
universalism is based upon reason. When a person leaves the natural order
under the influence of his desires and ambitions, he abandons that natural
existence and he enters the domain of evil where individuals are divided
and in conflict. It is then that social contract comes in. Social contract is
nothing but the embodiment of reason. He does not see divine revelation as
the organising principle behind society and replaces it with reason.

He conceives of the Republic as primarily the repository of the
universal ideal of liberty, equality and fraternity paving the way for both
liberalism and a potentially absolute from of power which is rational and
communication (Touraine 1995:12).

The education of the individual must be a discipline which frees him
form the narrow and irrational vision forced upon him by his family and his
own passions. It must expose him to rational knowledge and prepare him to
be part of a society which emphasizes reason. It must enable him to
organise his life on the basis of rational principles.
Kant's thought too reflects the agenda of the Enlightenment. His thought can be characterized as the celebration of reason and of modernity. He, for example, says that Good should be defined in terms of the unity of virtue and happiness and therefore of law and individual, system and actor (cited Tournaine 1990:22)

Such a unity is possible only by raising man above his inclinations and above any object or forms of behaviour that can be identified with the good, by elevating him towards the universal that exists within him, namely reason, which allows man to commune with the universe. This is the underlying principle of Kant's eminently modern ethics. The famous Kantian prescription: 'Dare to know: Have the courage to use your own understanding' (cited Cassires 1932:163) can easily be taken as an undiluted endorsement of reason. He segregates reason into the domain of science, ethical freedom and aesthetic judgement—a segregation apparently achieved without costs or charring effects. Neglect of these effects, however, led to dissent within modernist discourse.

Coming to the Hegel's notion of modernity, Habermas in his philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1985) points out that Hegel was the first philosopher to develop a clear and systematic conception of modernity. Although anticipated by Enlightenment thinkers from Descartes to Kant, it was only towards the end of the Eighteenth century that the problems of the self-understanding of modernity became so acute that Hegel could perceive
it as a philosophical problem and moreover as the basic problem of his philosophy. Hegel located the core of modernity in the principle of subjectivity. The basic motive of his philosophy was to provide a rational synthesis that would reconcile the dirempted aspects of modern reason and restore the integrity of ethical bond reconciling the conflicting elements of modern social life.

Apparently unfazed by the divisions and cleavages resulting from modernity, Hegel without abandoning the modern project sought to reconcile the dichotomies of 'nature and spirit, sensuality and reason, theoretical and practical reason, judgement and imagination, finitude and infinity, knowledge and faith (Habermas 1987:32).

While accepting the principle of subjectivity he recognises both its emancipatory potential and its ambivalence. In Habermas's words, the principle explained for him simultaneously the superiority of the modern world and its crisis character, in the sense that it represents both a world of progress and of alienated spirit. For this reason the first attempt to conceptualise the modern era was at the same time a critique of modernity (Herbermas 1987:13).

Having hopefully acquired a brief understanding of some of the celebrated philosopher's notion of modernity, we now turn to the incisive sociological analyses of modernity and modernization emanating from the
works of Comte, Marx, Durkhein and more recently that of Habermas and Anthony Giddens.

The idea of progress is inextricably intertwined with that of modernity in Comte's thought. He defines progress as "a gradual amelioration of some fundamental order, by a series of modifications gradually tending to the completion of one design" (Comte 1896:1-2). For him the advance of all knowledge through the theological, the metaphysical and the scientific or positive stage is an affirmation of progress and of modernity. He puts unbounded faith in science and its ability to emancipate the human mind from theological and metaphysical stages (Pathak 1998; 19). His belief in science makes him characterize sociology as a positive science of society. He looks for natural laws which would explain social phenomena.

He speaks of three kinds of progress. There is practical progress whose agency is activity, theoretical progress whose agency is intellect and moral progress whose agency is feeling. He conceives of social change (progress) as a product of forces internal in society and deriving from human nature and development of knowledge.

In the progression of any civilization, intellect (theoretical progress) and activity (practical progress) are considered to be a helping hand in the development of morals, in the evolution of feelings. He holds that both
material and moral progress are two essential types of progress and both are connected.

Emile Durkheim, in the influential work *The Division of Labour in Society* (1964, first published in 1893) deals with the formation of modernity and its institutions. He conceives of a transition from societies characterized be mechanical solidarity to societies characterized by organic solidarity. In the former people, differed least in terms of their values, beliefs and sentiments. Collective conscience was more predominant than individual consciousness. Social solidarity was born out of likeness, resemblance and it was mechanical because of the absolute domination of the collective conscience, which was based primarily on religious beliefs and sentiments. In the latter i.e. societies charatercised by organic solidarity (the modern societies), people are free to pursue their own beliefs. Collective conscience does not disappear but becomes enormously weak. There is a greater predominance of individual conscience.

The principle instrument to bring about this transformation is the division of labour which itself is a product of the interaction between material and moral density. Conflicts thrown up by the interaction between material and moral density are resolved through the division of labour.

For, Durkheim, then societies evolve from lower to higher stages and move from and move from the simple and undifferentiated to the more complex. The Western Industrial society with its highly developed division
of labour is ultimately superior to the pre-industrial society. He is, of course, a critic of some aspects of industrial society. We will take up this point when we deal with his critique of modernity.

His famous methodological prescription "consider social facts as things" in his Rules of the Sociological Methods (1950) clearly reflects his disposition towards positivist philosophy. It is a modernist prescription per excellence. As we stated in the beginning, modernity is all about the celebration of reason and science. Durkheim by making such a prescription unmistakably conveyed that he is very much part of the philosophy of Enlightenment and the project of modernity.

Karl Marx (1818-1883) is a great analyst of modernity. According to the historicist thought of Marx, men make their own history only to destroy it, for history is the history of reason. It is a truism to state that the thought of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries was dominated by the encounter between reason and the subject, between utilitarianism and natural law; the historicism of the Nineteenth century absorbs the subjects into reason, freedom into a historical necessity, and society into the State (Tournaine 1995:79). As Berman (1982) says the Communist Manifesto can also be read as the Modern Manifesto. Terms like 'modern industry', 'modern worker', 'modern state power', 'modern productive forces' appear many times. It may be argued that the Communist Manifesto is the first major socio-political affirmation of modernity.
He concerns himself essentially with capitalism, which, according to him, was the "most highly developed and the most highly differentiated form". Capitalism, for him, was a highly modernising tool. In the preface to Das Capital, Marx was highly appreciative of the bourgeois society and said: "The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future" (1954:19). He is equally conscious of the fact that the process which leads to the power of capital leads also to the contradictions and antagonisms of the capitalist form of production thereby providing along with the elements for the formation of a new society, the forces for exploding the old one. He believes that the inherent growth of capitalism carries within it the seeds of its own destruction.

For the resolution of contradictions of class society, he looks to nature rather than social action. That is the concrete meaning of historical materialism and its classic expression can be found in the preface to the contribution to the critique of political economy (Marx 1859:20-21):

"In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and which correspond to definite forms of social consciousness. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material
productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or-this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms-with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. Then begins an era of social revolution”.

He aimed to provide a deeply scientific analysis of events leading to the overthrow of capitalism. He posed the science of historical materialism against ideology as distortion and falsification of the reality (Pathak 1998:19). There was a celebration of science in his writings.

One of the greatest analysts of modernity, is Max Weber. He says that the modern world is characterised by secularisation and rationalisation. The process of rationalisation meant that power was being increasingly transferred from the hands of traditional political authority to the formal organisations which embodied rationality i.e. bureaucracies. He, of course, conceived of modernity in terms of the rationality of means, as opposed to rational goal of values.

The growing disenchantment of the world is a product of modernity. According to him, modernity destroys the alliance between Heaven and Earth. It robs the world of its enchantment and does away with magic.

Modernity finds its fullest expression in capitalism. Capitalism consists of a very complex system of institutions highly rational in character and the product of development peculiar to western civilization. Capitalism had not appeared before in the history of the west and such a system never
appeared simultaneously in the East. He observes "in the last resort the factor which produced capitalism is the rational permanent enterprise, rational accountancy, rational technology and rational law, but not these alone. Necessary complementary factors were the rational spirit, the rationalisation of the conduct of life in general a rationalistic economic ethic" (Weber 1961: 260).

In his highly influential work the protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, he tried to show that the above mentioned features were encouraged by Calvinism, a specific form of Christianity. To be specific, he focussed on the Calvinist idea of predestination, which replaced 'otherworldly' asceticism with 'worldly' asceticism. He general intention was to demonstrate how the great religions either facilitated or hindered modern secularisation and rationalisation.

More recently Habermas in his extremely interesting book The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1985), comes to the defence of modernity against post-modernity. He shows his opposition to the depiction of modernity as a spent epoch, as having exhausted the promises and projects of its philosophical mentors in the Enlightenment. He defends the unrealized normative potential of modernity. This defense is based on Habermas theory of modernity and communicative rationality presented in his earlier two-volume work The Theory of Communicative Action . He argues for retaining a commitment to the project of modernity. He is deeply
aware of the distortions, aporias and pathologies of modernity, but believes that they can only be addressed and resolved in a fruitful way by protecting and expanding the sphere of communicative rationality. Modernity is then seen as an unfinished project.

Free and undistorted communication has an enormous potential in that it is reciprocal, dialogic and reflexive and its primary goal is understanding and emancipation (Pathak 1998:28). But the tragedy is that the instrumental rationality colonised almost every sphere of human existence. Liberation lies in fighting the colonisation and making the public sphere conducive to dialogue and communication. There is a compelling need rescue communication rationality.

Anthony Giddens (1990) provides a highly integrated image of modernity with four main dimensions: industrialism, capitalism, the industrialisation of war and the surveillance of every aspect of social life. He believes that the central tendency within the modern world is towards an increasing globalization which takes the form of the international division of labour and the formation of world economies. It also results, however, in an international military order and the strengthening of nation states with centralised systems of control. According to Giddens, modern society is usually thought of as a system which is capable of 'reflexivity', or in other worlds capable acting upon itself. That is why he speaks of 'reflexivity of modernity' which means no knowledge under conditions of
modernity is knowledge in the 'old' sense where to know is to be 'certain' (Giddens 1990: 40). This enables him to question post-modernity because what post-modernists are talking about, the critique of certainty - is inherent in modernity itself (Pathak 1998:29).

**Critique Or Discontents of Modernity**

Though Marx, Durkheim and Weber celebrated the triumph of modernity, they were also conscious of its discontents. They eulogised and critiqued modernity almost in the same breath. It will be interesting to see how a critique of modernity developed and the various directions it has taken. Marx regarded capitalism as a modernising tool, as we have already noted. At the same time he also wrote about alienation-the way capitalism and private property distort human relations, deprive man of his creativity, his joy in his work and cripple his relationship with nature with nature, women, community, and the larger world (Pathak 1998:21). He provided a scathing critique of capitalist institutions and their functions.

Durkhkhim too shared the optimism instilled by modernity as reflected in the transition from societies marked by mechanical solidarity to societies marked by organic solidarity and in the growth of division of labour. At the same time he dealt at length with anomie that is characteristic of industrial societies. Anomie is a state which arises due to weakening of the existing morel order and the growth of individualism. Modernity does not come without any costs.
Max Weber, perhaps, the most pessimistic of the three, spoke of the process of disenchantment which results from the growing rationalization and secularisation. He too did not believe that modernity would happen without paying a heavy price for that. The increasing disenchantment is the price that one has to pay for embracing modernity.

Perhaps the most systematic and powerful critique of modernity came form the critical theorists collectively known as the Frankfurt school. It was founded at Frankfurt in 1923. The Frankfurt school theorists became increasingly disillusioned with the growth of instrumental rationality (substantive rationality). Reason became an instrument of domination and came to be equated with technological superiority.

In his critique of Instrumental Reason, Horkheimer writes (1974: VII): “Reason for long period meant the activity of understanding and assimilation of the external ideas which were to function as goals for men. Today, on the contrary, it is not only the business but the essential role of reason to find means for the goals one adopts any given time.”

Herbert Marcuse, another celebrated theorist associated with the Frankfurt school, writes in his One-dimensional man that the “advanced industrial society -- obliterates the opposition between the private and public existence, between individual and social needs. Technology serves to institute new, more effective and pleasant forms of social control and social cohesion” (1964: 13).
What they say in essence is that modernity is dedicated to the pursuit of material interests which are destroying the life of the mind and acknowledge no higher principle of modernity. Further it is the growing bureaucratic and technological rationalisation which provides the context in which to situate the inhuman Nazi rule. The destruction of subjectivity is an inevitable outcome of the growth of instrumental rationality.

Later on post-modernists continued the compelling critiques of modernity inaugurated by Nietzsche Michael Foucault (1970). Bauman (1988), Lytoard (1984) Derrida (1982) and others maintain a problematic relationship with modernity. Whatever internal differences they have, they critique modernity for its tendency to privilege reason over subject, holism over fragmentation, certainty over uncertainty, homogeneity over heterogeneity. Post-modernity is essentially about celebration of difference, heterogeneity and fragmentation. Michael Foucault, for example, expresses himself strongly against a totalising theory like Marxism. Because of its preoccupation with 'global' issues, argues Foucault, it tends to undermine the significance of local resistance and struggle (Pathak 1998:27). That is why he speaks of 'specific intellectuals' as opposed to 'universal intellectuals'. The former are intellectuals' as opposed to 'universal intellectuals'. The former are involved in the resistance and struggle at the local level.

Similarly Derrida's deconstruction is all about the affirmation of the multiple possibilities. It is an attempt to move to a world without any
absolute, objective, and permanent ideal (Pathak 1998:26). It is essentially an attempt to make us have a critical engagement with difference. Jean-François Lyotaro's celebrated statement about the end of grand narratives constitutes a direct attack on the hegemony of modernity.

What they find most problematic about modernity is its tendency to homogenise and destroy differences.

Coming to the more recent past, Tournaine in his Critique of Modernity (1995) traces the growth and destruction of the idea of modernity. It is indeed a fascinating account of how modernity developed and destroyed itself. The whole problem with the modernity is that it privileged reason at the cost of subject and reduced itself to rationalisation. It thus lost its liberating and creative power. Instead of initiating a dialogue between reason and subject, integrating rationalisation and subjectivation, it privileges the former over the latter. It is in fact defined in terms of a divorce between rationalisation and subjectivation.

What is required is, he says, is to redefine modernity in terms of both reason and subject. He tries to extricate modernity from a historical tradition which has reduced it to rationalisation and to introduce the theme of the personal subject and subjectivation. Modernity is the result of a dialogue between Reason and subject. Without Reason, the subject is trapped into an obsession with identity: without the subject, Reason
becomes an instrument of might (1995:6). In this century, we have seen both the dictatorship of Reason and totalitarian perversion of the Subject.

What is therefore required is the union between the reason and the subject and that the agent of their union is the social movement. The idea of a social movement which is so central to his work, is radically different to the idea of class struggle. The latter appeals to the logic of history whereas the former appeals to the freedom of the subject.

Empirical Understandings of Modernisation

Having hopefully acquired understanding of some philosophical conceptions of modernity and the possible critique, let us now turn to the empirical referents of modernisation. There are different empirical conceptualisations of modernisation. The existence of numerous conceptualisations of modernisation is reflective of the interest that this concept generated. Historically until the period after Second World War, very little interest was shown in the changes occurring in the societies. The study of social changes assumed great significance in the 50s and 60s when new nations came into existence and colonial empires gradually faded (Pandey 1985:167). Interest began to be shown to the nations on how they intended to fulfil the massive expectations of their peoples and with what institutional devices. Funds began to be allocated generously for conducting studies.
Modernisation became the main intellectual tool employed to understand the changes taking place. Although the term is used quite freely and frequently, its precise empirical meaning remains unclear. In fact it has also been argued that the term modernisation should be abandoned as it is nothing but a camouflage used to conceal the hegemonic designs of the West. It is based on the assumption that the institutions and cultures present in Europe and the West are 'modern' and those present in the so-called underdeveloped societies are 'traditional' and therefore the latter move in the direction of the former. The ideology of modernity is supposed to be based on a fundamental break with tradition. In this vision of the past, present and posterity a singular, imaginary and bloated West becomes history, modernity and destiny—for each society, every culture, all humanity. All action, every practice, each culture must fit variously within this horizon of the modern as primitive or oriental, lost or redeemable, which is to say, as inherently medieval or essentially exotic or nearly there. They have missed the bus of universal history, or they hang precariously from one of its symmetrical sides. They wait patiently for the next vehicle or they sit apart comfortably within this transportation of time (Mehta 1999: Role 1998: Horrobinian 2000).

Further the term modernization seems an anachronism in the context of World wars, the threat of nuclear holocaust, the perceptible destruction of the environment, the continued subjugation of the disadvantaged and the
dispossessed. When one keeps the above in mind, one is bound to feel a little uneasy to use the term modernisation.

Despite such criticisms, the fact of the matter is the term modernisation has come to stay. It will be our endeavour in the section to review the various formulations of the concept of modernisation.

Modernisation is generally conceived in terms of a transition form traditional societies to modern societies. It is the process whereby traditional or less developed societies begin to acquire characteristics common to the developed societies. Daniel Lerner in his the passing of Traditional Society (1958) lists such characteristics. They are 1. Literacy 2. Urbanism 3. Media participation 4. Empathy 5. Political participation. For him one of the crucial aspects modernisation is the development of 'mobile' personality, characterised by rationality and empathy which enables newly mobile persons to operate efficiently in a changing world. Empathy, according to him, is the capacity to see oneself in the other fellow's situation (Lerner 1958: 49-50).

His examination of the process of modernisation in the Middle East countries convinced him of the inevitability of the same on the global level. The process of modernisation was beautifully captured in the story of the grocer and the chief (1958) in the village of Balgat, Turkey. He found a big difference between 1950 and 1954. In 1950 the village was isolated as it had no decent road. The chief had a formidable position because he was the
guardian of tradition virtues and the grocer was considered a disreputable character as he expressed his individuality by wearing a necktie and dreamed of an American style shop. But in 1954, when he visited Balgat, it had a new road and a regular bus service. Many worked for wages in the nearly factories. The chiefs sons were neither soldiers nor farmers (which he would have preferred) but shopkeepers thus realising, in part, the dream of the grocer who, regrettably had died in the period between 1950 and 1954.

However, certain assumptions of his are problematical. Modernization, which is equated with westernisation is presumed at the outset to be beneficial. His characterization of tradition and modernity, as dichotomous entities rather than as existing on a continuum may not be acceptable to some.

Black sounds similar when he argues that modernisation refers to: "the dynamic from that the age old process of innovation has assumed as a result of the explosive proliferation of knowledge in recent centuries --- if a definition is necessary, modernisation may be defined as the process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man's knowledge, permitting control over his environment that accompanied the scientific revolution. This process of adaptation had its origins and initial influence in the societies of Western Europe but in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
centuries these changes have been extended to all other societies and have resulted in a worldwide transformation affecting all human relationships” (1966:7). This definition makes Black susceptible to the allegation of being Eurocentric and the assumption of a dichotomous relationship between tradition and modernity.

A more objective and neutral definition of modernization is sought to be given by Levy (1966). He suggests that modernisation be directly and simply defined as the growing ratio between inanimate and animate sources of power. In his own words, the modernisation refers to the “the use of inanimate source of power and the use of tools to multiply the effect of effort. A society will be considered more or less modernised to the extent that its members use inanimate sources of power and/or use tools to multiply the effects of their efforts” (1966:II).

He is quite skeptical about the spatial spread of modernisation. He believes that some countries like England, France and West Germany represent high levels of modernisation and no country in Asia would be near them except, perhaps, Japan. Similarly no African country save South Africa and isolated portions of Algeria could qualify as being on the relatively modernised side of the time. His theory, too, however, assumes a dichotomy between and modernity and speaks of an evolution.

A more comprehensive definition of modernisation has been given in Weiner's collection (1966) which includes contributions from twenty four of
the leading proponents of modernisation theory in the 1960s. According to him, economists see modernisation primarily in terms of man's application of technologies to the control of nature's resources in order to bring about a marked increase in the growth of output per head of population.

Sociologists and social anthropologists have been primarily concerned with the process of differentiation that characterizes modern societies. They have explored the way in which new structures arise to assume new functions. They give attention to the differentiation occurring within social structures as new occupations emerge. They, of course, also study some of the disruptive features of the modernization process—rising tensions, mental illnesses, divorce, racial, religious and class conflicts (1966:3).

Talcott Parsons (1964), a highly influential figure located within the framework of structural-functionalism, says if societies are to move from the primitive to the modern, several 'evolutionary' universals have to be present—by this he means "any organisational development sufficiently important to further evolution that, rather than emerging only once, it is likely to be 'hit upon' by various systems operating under different conditions" (1964: 339). Elsewhere he defines an evolutionary universal as "any complex of structures and processes which increases the long-term adaptive capacity of living systems" (1964:340-I).
Market, money and bureaucracy are some of the evolitional universals that he refers to. The presence of evolutionary universals such as the above would distinguish a traditional society from a modern society. But what would ensure the presence of these universals? It is here that his path-breaking conceptualisation of pattern-variables (a general system of values) comes in (1951:58-67). He argues that modernisation entails a movement from collective-orientation to self-orientation, from ascription to achievement, from particularism to universalism and from functional-diffuseness to functional-specificity. He implies that the former are characteristic of traditional societies and the latter of the modern society. For example, he regards the Australian aboriginal society as primitive and at the other end of the evolutionary scale, Western Europe, the U.S.A. and the then Soviet Union are considered modern. However, he does not mean to say that a modern society is characterized only by the presence of the pattern-variables of achievement, universalism, self-orientation and functional-specifically. But they are certainly more dominant.

However, one would notice that he ignored Weber's warnings against confusing ideal types and reality. His characterisation of his own society America, as the 'most modern' speaks of ethnocentrism. Further his evolutionary scheme is not sufficiently backed by historical research (Harrison 1989:39). Moreover he basically sees colonialism as having a positive influence in the development of modernity and completely ignores
the contribution made by the colonial peoples to the development of the First World.

Hoselitz uses Person's pattern variables to describe the process of development and locates societies along dichotomous lines (1960). He proceeds on the assumption of the validity of a tradition-modern dichotomy. Collectivity, particularism, diffuseness and ascription are said to characterise tradition while self-orientation, universality, specificity and achievement are characteristic of modernity.

Very recently, Stephenson attempts to advance a culturally specific meaning of modernity. He locates modernity in relation to tradition. In his own words, “the set of doctrines, values or beliefs which makes up the 'traditional' states is traditionalism, while the comparable state at the other end of the continuum—that set of 'modern' beliefs and values—is modernism” (1968:266). Modernisation is “a personal and cultural expression of one type of social change, namely, movement of person along a dimension from what is defined by the cultural norms as a traditional to what is considered modern by the same culture” (1968:266).

What is appreciative about this understanding of modernity is that it can not be accused of being Eurocentric as the very definition of modernity depends upon tradition. It thus retains enormous respect for tradition.
In the above studies the assumption of a dichotomy between tradition and modernity can be noticed. There are some studies which have advanced a series of stages of development besides assumption of the dichotomy. Foremost among them is the modernisation theory advanced by Rostow (1960). He suggests that all societies can be placed in one of five categories or stages of economic growth; a point which he derives from his study of Western economic development. In the first stage, in which a traditional society is located, production is limited because of the inaccessibility of science and technology, values are generally fatalistic and political power is non-centralised.

At the Second stage, 'the pre-condition for take-off', new ideas favouring economic progress arise and with them, education, entrepreneurship and institutions capable of mobilising capital. Despite the development of some modern manufacturing, traditional social structures and production techniques remain. He made a debatable point, however, that the pre-conditions for take-off were endogenous in Britain whereas elsewhere they were likely to have been the result of "external intrusion by more advanced societies" (960:6).

His third stage is the 'the take-off where traditional barriers to economic growth are overcome, perhaps through the absorption of new technology alone (as in Britain and its Dominions) or with the additional
emergence of new political groups, prepared to accord a high priority to the modernisation of the economy.

At the fourth stage, 'the drive to maturity' sizeable national income is invested in the economy. Technology becomes more complex and there is a more away from heavy industry. What is produced is now less a matter of economic necessity and more a question of choice.

Then he speaks of the final stage of high consumption, where the leading economic sectors specialise in manufacturing durable consumer goods and services. Basic needs are satisfied and there is focus on social welfare and security.

After presenting the above stages of modernisation, he makes the highly controversial point that the European powers did move societies along the appropriate path and “often included modernisation of a sort of as one object of colonial policy” (1960: 112), a statement which appears to justify colonialism.

One of the biggest critics of the above stages of growth has been put forward by Frank (1969:39). His main point is that such an ideal-typical approach, “in all its variations, ignores the historical and structural reality of the under-developed countries” (1969:47). Far from modernizing the Third world, colonialism, in fact, perpetuates underdevelopment. It is only by perpetuating underdevelopment that colonialism sustain itself.
Smelsor (1969) looks at modernisation in terms of the four major processes. First, there is a move from simple to complex technology. Secondly, a change from subsistence farming to cash crops. Thirdly, a move from animal and human power to industrialisation. Finally, an increasing urban-based population. He goes on to suggest that these four processes of change have a similar affect on modernising societies. First, structural differentiation occurs i.e. one social role or organisation differentiates into two or more roles or organisations. Secondly, new integrative mechanisms arise to maintain societal cohesiveness. However, despite the presence of these integrative mechanisms, some amount of tension is inevitable given the clash between tradition and forces of modernisation.

One escapable conclusion from his theory of modernisation is that all modernising societies follow the example set by their more advanced counterparts which have already undergone the above-mentioned processes.

His theory is subject to one basic criticism which is that he sought to mechanistically apply the conclusions derived from the study of development in the West to the Third world.

One common conclusion that emerges out of the above understandings of modernization is that tradition and modernity are viewed not only as dichotomous entities but also as incompatible.

However, some have refuted that i.e. they do not agree that traditions and modernity are mutually incompatible. For example, Srinivas (1962)
argues quite convincingly that Hinduism is able to absorb rather than obstruct the processes of modernisation. Similarly Singer (1966) has been able to show that the Asian societies, far from being static, are able to adjust their religious institutions to the demands of modernisation.

One of the strongest objections to the standard polarization of tradition and modernity and indeed, to the neo-evolutionist perspectives in modernity and indeed, to the neo-evolutionist perspectives in modernization theory, comes from Bendix (1967).

First, he argues that the disjunctive characterisation of "tradition" and "universalism" exaggerates and simplifies evidence (1967:314). Such labelling serves to confuse the abstract nature of ideal types with empirical reality and runs the risk of projecting Western experience on to the Third World as a mono-casual, uniform and inevitable process. In short, it is an example of 'misplaced evolutionism'.

Secondly, it is not the case that tradition and modernity are exclusive characteristics of self-regulating systems: rather, elements of tradition will be found in modern societies and allegedly modern characteristics will be operating in traditional societies.

He rejects the inevitability and unilinearity of modernisation process. In his words "the point is that countries which come late to the process of development process social structures which must be understood in their own terms rather than merely as 'transitional stages' to the type of
industrialized societies exemplified by the English, or, better still, the American cases” (1964:213).

He gives a lot of importance to the internal social and political structures, class alignment and values, intellectual sand the State, albeit subject to external influences and constraints. It may not be out of place to mention that he made an exhaustive study of Japan (1966) which brought out the role of Samauri in transforming the Japanese society in the late Nineteenth Century.

Similarly Barrington Moore in his detailed study of the Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1967) expressed himself strongly against a unilinear theory of modernisation and spoke of three routes from pre-industrial to modern society; 'bourgeoisie' revolution, as in England and the United States, Fascist revolution 'from above', as in Japan and Germany and Communist revolution 'from below' as seen in Russia and China.

He recognises the importance of factors such as political leadership, entrepreneurial activities and technological changes in accelerating the process of modernisation. Although he conceives of the inevitable process of spreading of Western technology, his point that there are different routes to modernity is abundantly clear. According to him, modern societies need be neither capitalist nor democratic. We can have “non-democratic and even antidemocratic modernisation” (1967: 159).
Arguing in a similar fashion Therbon speaks of four major entries into modernity (1995: 131). First, the European gate of revolution or reform, that is, of endogenous change which fascinated scholars like Max Weber. However, resistance to modernity was also generated within Europe. The second pass was located in the New Worlds of the Americas, a product of trans-continental migration and genocide. Thirdly, modernity could appear as a sudden external treat, as in Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt in 1798. Fourthly, modernity by conquest, subjection and appropriation, also called the gate of the colonial zone. One can cite India as an example. He says that the four gates may be used as ideal types and individual societies may confront different combinations.

Most recently, king in an essay on The Themes and Spaces of Modernity (1995) depreciated the tendency to look at modernity only in terms of what is present in the West. The space which is western is usually taken for granted.

To begin with he makes a distinction between the 'humanities' conceptualisation of modernity and those of the social sciences. He suggests that 'modern' and especially 'modernism' 'modernity' and 'modernist' are terms and concepts especially used in the humanities to refer to particular movements and tendencies in the arts, literature and architecture largely between 1890 and 1940 which took place principally in Europe and the U.S.A. and very little reference to the world system as a whole (1995: 109).
Modernity in the social sciences is generally used to refer to economic, technological, social and cultural changes either within Europe or the 'West' as whole (1995:110). The notion of 'the modern' was firmly and powerfully fixed in the West and then conveyed to other parts of the world through the uneven relationships of colonialism and global capitalism.

Making his own position clear, he argues the real emergence of today's modernity should be located in colonial and not in metropolitan space. He adopts two criteria for deciding what is modern.

First, he takes 1995 (rather than 1945 or 1895) as the 'now' of modernity. This is a modernity judged not by some elitist Eurocentric conception of 'modern' but by the present-day reality, characterised as it is by conditions of grossly uneven development, of the total internalisation of production and world interdependence in which, in theory at least, there are not Others (Giddens 1990).

His second criterion is the existence in a significant number of cities round the world, of ethnicities, races and peoples from virtually all parts of the planet. If one looks for the first 'modern multicultural city', the answer is certainly not in the European or North American 'core' cities of London or Los Angeles but probably in 'peripheral' areas of Rio, Calcutta or Momara (King 1955: 114).

He uses the terms 'core' and 'periphery' in a problematic way because, as he says, from a social and cultural (rather than economic and
political) perspective, the core would become the periphery and periphery the core.

The are some such as Berger and Luckmaan (1967) who deal not only with modernity per se but also with its effects on everyday life and the individual consciousness. They view modernisation as "the institutional concomitants of technologically induced economic growth. This means that there is no such thing as a 'modern society' plain and simple. There are only societies more or less advanced in a continuum of modernisation. It consists of the growth and diffusion of a set of institutions rooted in the transformation of the economy by means of technology" (Berger et al 1974: 15).

It is clear from the above that technology assumes primary importance in introducing social changes (modernisation). In this technologically induced process of social change, those connected with the economy or with the apparatus of the modern State, such as bureaucracy are accorded special importance. They are the 'primary carriers' of modernisation.

What they are more concerned with, however, is the effect to technologically induced modernization on individual consciousness. The imposition of a Weberian kind of cold rationality by technology and bureaucracy has the inevitable long-term consequence of leading to anomie and traditional religious and traditional authorities can no longer provide
the desired security. In their own words: “The final consequence -- is that modern man has suffered from the deepening condition of homelessness” (Berger et al 1974: 77).

In a situation like this where there is growing anomie, certain factors may have a cushioning effect. For example, nationalism is one such factor, socialism is another. About socialism they say “if modernisation can be described as a spreading condition of homelessness, then socialism can be understood as the promise of a new home: (Berger et al 1974: 124).

However, their theory is not too above criticisms. For example, like Durkheim and Weber, Berger and his colleagues too regard modernisation as a process which is, by and large, identical to Western development making them vulnerable to the accusation of being ethnocentric. It is also suggested that Berger and his co-authors fail to relate their major units of analysis to one another, to a social order and to history and that implicit in their approaches is the primary of the individual and individual consciousness, with a corresponding reluctance to focus on social groups and social conflicts (Stanton 1975: 37).

Now turning our attention to those understandings of modernization which emphasise the personality dimension, we can take up two. McClelland (1976) emphasised that the need for achievement, otherwise known as n. ach., is an essential attribute of modernisation. It can be found in individuals from different cultures and that this need is associated with
other indices of development including economic growth. Children need to be infused with this need if they have to have entrepreneurial spirit. Even adults can be made to develop this need. In fact, the claim is that short training courses for Indian businessmen have made them more adventurous, innovative, enterprising and generally more efficient. However he does not entirely ignore social factors and accepts the need for achievement is not the only ingredient in modernisation.

One basic fallacy with his understanding is that though he recognises the importance of social factors, he does not seem to give as much importance to the present economic, social and political structures as they deserve.

Similarly Alex and Inkeles as, already noted in the Introductory chapter, made a path-breaking cross-cultural study (1979) in six developing countries (Indian, Pakistan, Nigeria, Israel, Argentina and Chile) spread over Asia, Africa and South America. He identified a set of attitudes indicating modernity. Since it has already dealt with in the Introductory chapter, we do not dwell upon it now.

**Ethnic Group and Ethnicity**

Unlike modernisation (modernity) whose philosophical and intellectual roots go back very far in history, as we have seen, ethnicity is quite a recent term. It was first used by David Riessman in 1953 (Glazer and Moynihan 1976:1). It became a crucial concept in the social sciences
only in the 1960s as a result of certain important political trends. The consolidation of the process of decolonisation in Africa and Asia resulted in the birth of new "nation-states". And colonial and anti-racist arguments privileged ethnicities which were used by sociologists and others, as Spoonley has suggested, to "acknowledge the positive feelings of belonging to a cultural group" (Spoonley (1998) (1993). In certain situations and contexts ethnicity formed the basis of articulation of one's identity.

However, in more recent years ethnicity became a crucial concept to analyse some of the 'negative' trends. The notion of 'ethnic cleansing' in the former Yugoslavia brought the very idea of ethnicity into political disrepute. However much a sense of shared ethnicity created positive feelings of belonging to an in-group, it seemed to imply total hostility and genocide towards neighbouring out-groups.

One more recent trend also gave impetus to the concept of ethnicity. The coming of immigrants into Northern Europe from post-colonial societies and from dependent economies. Their presence in the European Union is seen by many as constituting a political problem, a cultural issue and an identity problemmatique. In North America while many European immigrants had been assimilated over a period of more than a century, there now appeared two problems: that of assimilating new immigrants coming directly or indirectly from Asia, Africa and Latin America and that of integrating black or African American residents descended in part from a
slave population and coming out of a semi-colonial plantation economies. (Guibernau and Rex 1997:1). The increased pace of migration has imparted new significance to the study of ethnic group and ethnicity.

The enhanced pace of modernisation itself, as argued by some, is said to be another factor responsible for the growth salience of ethnicity. The very process of modernisation with its attendant process of homegenisation is said to create a socio-psychological vacuum which is sought to be filled in by ethnic attachment which provide a sense of roots to the groups.

But what is an ethnic group? What is ethnicity?

If one looks to the classical sociologists Marx, Durkheim and Weber, one may not get much illumination except from the last-mentioned sociologist. Marx did not given much theoretical space to the concept of ethnic group, as he was more concerned with class and class consciousness. For him ethnic group was a superstructural category whose significance would decline with the increased significance of class. Ethnicity represents a false consciousness. But like other forms, false consciousness will disappear as class consciousness develops inexorably following intensification of class contradictions.

Durkhein too did not define ethnic groups and ethnicity, in precise terms anywhere, though he expected the significance of ethnicity to decline in the face of modernisation (Fenton 1999:100). He was more concerned
with the contrast between traditional and modern societies. He understood the latter in terms of the concept of 'organic solidarity'.

It was Max Weber who did find space for the concept of ethnic group. He attempted to conceptualise it in contrast to the notion of class, status and party. He called ethnic groups "those human groups the entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or of both or because of memories of colonization or migration" (Weber (1922) 1968:389). Some of the implications of the definition are clear. First, it is not the objective characteristics which are important, but the subjective perception of these characteristics, both by those who share them and by those who react to them. Secondly, he had a strong sense of the role of history in shaping ethnic groups, which he perceived as having memories of a common past, attachment to a clearly demarcated territory and certain tradition or ways of life. Thirdly, he did not believe that shared ethnicity by itself would lead to groups formation. It only facilitates group formation, particularly in the political sphere. It is the political community, however, when it is organised which appeals to a shared ethnicity and brings it into action. Yet once ethnic groups have been constituted politically in this way, the belief in common ethnicity 'tends to persist even after the disintegration of the political community, unless drastic differences in the customs, physical type or

Clearly, he saw political action as central to the dynamics of ethnicity.

Coming to the more recent past, Barth is supposed to have pronounced the last word about ethnic groups. It has originated the expression 'B.B. and A.B.' (before and after Barth), in which the A.B. seems to be final. Fredric Barth in his edited collection Ethnic Groups and Boundaries made a huge impact through his introduction.

He tries to show that ethnic groups are socially constructed and that the contents of the group—in terms of both 'culture' and personal has not priori existence or stability. In his analysis it is not the objective characteristics such as language which are by themselves important in defining the group because such characteristics may disappear over a period of time but the idea of the group which is important. He is more concerned with the social organisation of cultural differences. He begins his analysis of the group by outlining the main features that were considered characteristic of ethnic groups in earlier anthropological literature “biologically self-perpetuating, bounded, sharing fundamental cultural values, forming a field of communication and interaction, conscious of a category of identity which is recognized by others” (Barth 1969a:10-11).

But he tries to shift the focus from discussions of the content (dress, food etc.) of ethnic identity towards a consideration of the boundaries that mark the limits of such contents. He makes to salient points with regard to
such boundaries. First, that boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel and information across them. Secondly, that such groups can not exist in isolation but only in contrast to other such groups. That is the boundary does not bound 'something's' off from nothingness, but rather it distinguishes between two 'something's' (Banks 1996:13).

The reason why he does not privilege the content in the definition of an ethnic group is that the inventory of the attributes is not finite in length and social actors will choose or enumerate features which legitimate their location and status in any given situation.

One basic problem, however, remains with this understanding of ethnic group i.e. how boundaries come to be identified in the first place. Without sharing the objective characteristic and a subjective perception of it, how a group comes to define its boundaries in the first place is a question that remains unaddressed.

The Soviet ethnographers led by Bromely made significant contribution to the study of ethnos (ethnic group) and ethnic group. The 1969 was significant because it was the year when Barth published Ethnic Group and Boundaries and also Bromely delivered a paper in Leningrad entitled 'Ethnos and Endogamy'. Five years later he published a paper in English that outlined the main content of ethnos theory (Bromlye 1974).

First a word about ethnos and ethnics the terms which he used. The word 'ethnos' is of Greek origin. When used in Ethnography/Ethnology, it
means people as the English, Japanese, Assames, Mizos etc. Then communities with very large or very small population and again both archaic and modern people alike may be called ethnos or in the standard English ethnic group. The terms ethnos may be used in a broad as well as in a narrow sense. In identifying the Mizo ethnos, for instance, we take out from the entire mankind a distinct group of people all of whom are known as Mizoro as all of them share certain features in common which in their entirety are not present in any other group. An ethnos in such a restricted sense may be called 'ethnicos'.

Coming back to Bromely, he defines the ethnos as being 'a historically formed community of people characterised by common, relatively stable cultural features, certain distinctive psychological traits and the consciousness of their unit as distinguished from other similar communities' (1974:66).

Thus one can notice that Bromely is not merely content, like Barth, to enumerate the features of an ethnos. He also harps on the demarcation of boundary, which constitutes an ethnic group: 'the notion itself (ethnos)----largely stems from the contraposition of one community to another' (1974:58). That is to say, it is in ethnic interaction that ethnic identity or ethnicity is consolidated. He then goes on to point out that this interaction must be long-lasting and not temporary. He gives the example of sports
teams in different strips as interacting, self-defined groups, but the duration of their team identity is strictly limited (1974:58).

In the course of his discussion on the ethnos he makes one vital point. It is that the prevailing economic and political conditions do affect the character of the ethnos. But they would it rather than break it or distort it completely. His new term, ethno social origin describes the interaction of the ethnos with the historical stage (or economic environment) (1974; 69-71).

Because of these conditions, the salient characteristics of an ethnos may change, a position similar to that of Barth. The boundary of the ethnos is always in place, but the content or distinctive characteristics change.

Cohen (1974) who has focussed more on the instrumental aspects of ethnicity looks at an ethnic group in this way. An ethnic group can be operationally described as a collectivity of people who (a) share some patterns of normative behaviour (b) form part of a larger population interacting with people from other collectivities within the framework of a larger system. The first characteristic accounts for ethnicity having an affective aspect and the second its being instrumental and goal-oriented. It is because of the combination of the affective and instrumental aspects that the ethnic groups are not permanent but continuously being formed and recreated. Ethnicity has been used as a powerful instrument to achieve socio-economic and political objectives all over the world. The history of the
North-East of India, for example, is the history of how ethnicity has been used to demand adequate share in political and economic resources.

According to Glazer and Monynihan (1975), social scientists tend to broaden the use of the term “ethnic group” to refer to not only to subgroups and minorities but to all the groups of a society characterised by a distinct sense of difference owing to culture and descent. They add that the significance of ethnicity as a social reality is not the particular characteristics on which it is built but in that it serves as a basis for mobilisation. They observe: “There is some legitimacy to finding that forms of identification based on social realities as different as religion, language and national origin all have something in common such that a new term is coined to refer to all of them, 'ethnicity'. What they have in common is that they have all become effective foci for group mobilisation for concrete political ends challenging the primary for such mobilisation of class on the one had and nation on the other” (p.6).

Ethnicity may also be recognised as an enclosing social device which marks out a recongnisable social collectivity based on certain shared perceptions of distinctive commonness. De Vos and Ross (1980) define it is follows: “Ethnicity is defined on four levels of analysis 1. In respect to a social structural level 2. As a pattern of social interaction 3. As subjective experience of ethnicity 4. As expressed in relatively fixed patterns of behaviour and expressive emotional styles."
It is that second aspect of ethnicity (as a pattern of social interaction) which makes it crucial in modern urban society. While an ethnic group is a self-perceived group of people who hold in common a set of traditions not shared with others with whom they are in contact, it is the fact that they do not share it with others which is pertinent (Leila 1989:7).

Anthony Smith who has preferred to use the notion of 'ethnie' (ethnic group) lists six characteristics of an ethnie. These are a collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity and a sense of Solidarity (1986:24). The main difficulty, however, with this characteristic as noted by Oommen (1997: 35) is that the sixth characteristic is a product of the first five features, which conjointly produce a sense of solidarity. To invoke the product as a defining feature does not accord well with the rest of the features.

Paul Brass (1991) who has done appreciable work on ethnicity and nationalism especially in the context of India takes a more comprehensive view of ethnic group. According to him there are three ways of defining ethnic groups-in terms of objective attributes, subjective feelings and in relation to behaviour (1991: 18).

Objectively an ethnic group is supposed to consist of features, such as language, territory, religion, colour, diet, dress or any of them. However, as he says if one sticks to objective attributes of ethnic group, it would be
difficult to determine the boundaries of ethnic groups in this way. For example, it is quite possible that two or more ethnic groups share one thing or the other, say, dress as common.

As he says, there is a problem with the subjective definition of ethnic group which is that it does not answer the basic question of how a group of people arrives at subjective self-consciousness in the first place.

Behavioral definitions have something to do with the ways one ethnic group interacts with other ethnic groups. The problem with this definition is that it lacks the universality required.

Finally he arrives at his own elaborative definition of an ethnic group “any group of people dissimilar from other peoples in terms of objective cultural criteria and containing within its membership either in principle or in practice division of labour and for reproduction, form an ethnic category” (1991:19).

Ethnicity refers to the consciousness of ethnic identity. De Vos, in fact, defines it as “subjective, symbolic or emblematic use by a group of people -- of any aspect of culture in order to differentiate themselves from other groups” (1975:16).

As Brass says, ethnicity is to ethnic category what class consciousness is to class.

One could also make an analytical distinction between generic and emergent conceptions of ethnicity (Sharma 1995:4). Generic conception of
ethnicity relates to the identity construct based on a set of objective cultural makers in terms of which the members of a collectivity differentiate themselves from others and are similarly differentiated by others. The emergent conception of ethnicity relates to the transformation of consciousness of cultural differentiation into the consciousness of political differentiation. The accent in the emergent conception of ethnicity is on the transformation of cultural capital into political capital. Phadnis (1989) puts it succinctly when she views ethnicity as “a summation of impulses and motivation for power and recognition of a group based upon its sense of cultural distinction” (1989:1-6).

There has been a strong tendency to view ethnicity, as a social process rather than as a fixed category, as the way people, collectively and individually, draw boundaries and identities around themselves in their social lives. At the level of individual action ethnicity is a signal of identification. At the social system level ethnicity refers to “systematic and enduring social reproduction of basic classification differences between categories of people who see themselves as culturally discrete” (Erikson 1993:1-26).

Similarly, though Fenton (1999) looks at an ethnic group as a group of people sharing ancestry, culture and language and they have a consciousness of the fact that they are different from others, he says that for ethnicity to spring to life it is necessary that these real or perceived
differences of ancestry, culture and language are mobilised in social transactions (Fenton 1999:6). He also makes the vital point that these elements ancestry, culture and language are socially constructed and culturally elaborated and are therefore constantly subject to change, redefinition and contestation. For example, people may choose to remember some aspects of their past and forget others and may choose to venerate some ancestors and discard others. Similar is the case with culture and language.

The construction of ethnicity depends upon the economic and political contexts (using of the differences of ancestry, cultural and language). In the economic context, it may be used to defend economic privileges and conversely it may also be used to resist the monopolisation of economic resources by the dominant ethnic group. The ethnicised economic structures prevalent in Malaysia, Fiji and South Africa and the Slavery and Post-slavery systems of societies such as the U.S.A. and Brazil are a classic example of how ethnicity is used to justify disadvantaged economic position. The Africans are predominantly located in the low jobs and this is justified on the ground of their being suited to that (Fenton 1999:24).

Ethnicity, Race and Nation

At this juncture, it may be pertinent to mention that there has been a tendency to conflate race and ethnic group and in fact subsume the former
under the letter. Similar is the case with ethnicity and nation. It is therefore necessary that we make a few clarificatory points about this.

Early instances of conflation of race and ethnicity and the subsumption of the former under the latter can be found in the writings of Montagu (1964), Glazer and Moynihan (1975) and Gordon (1978). Later on Horowitz took it up and treated them as interchangeable entities. He prefers an inclusive concept of ethnicity which encompasses differences based on colour, appearance, language, religion: it covers 'tribes', 'race', 'nationalities' and 'castes' (p. 53). He defends at length the justification for including colour and race in the definition of ethnicity.

Similarly Bulmer writes: “An ethnic group is a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared past and cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements which define the group's identity, such as kinship, religion, language, shared territory, nationality or physical appearance” (1986:54). These are the features which can also be taken as those of race.

Such a tendency to conflate race with ethnicity has been criticised on the ground that this ignores specific differences that obtain between race and ethnicity. From our point of view, a racial group is defined in terms of biological and physical characteristics whereas an ethnic group should be viewed in terms of socio-cultural characteristics. Further conflation of race under ethnicity camouflages the oppression that is specific to race.
It is important to recognise the notion of everyday racism. The subsumption of racism under ethnicism denies empirically and conceptually the existence of everyday racism.

Van den Berghe, one of the first to plea for a separation between race and ethnicity, argues: “precisely because a racial phonotypical definition of group membership is far more stigmatising than an ethnic definition and typically gives rise to far more rigid social hierarchies, it is important to keep the analytical distinction clear” (1978:XV). Further to abandon a stigmatising level like race in favour of ethnicity will not do away with racism. It may, in effect, camouflage, it to the advantage of the privileged group.

Similarly Rex argues that race relations are fundamentally relations of inequality and that therefore any attempt to subsume them wholly within the field of ethnicity is inappropriate. This is because he assumes from his sociological perspective that theories of ethnicity are only about group differences: rather than 'discrimination and oppression' (1986:19) As recently as 2001, the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain’s which was assigned the job of suggesting steps to deal with the discrimination and disadvantages to which ethnic minorities are subject to in Britain has decried the tendency to conflate race with ethnicity. As Bhiku Parekh (the Chairman of the Commission) wrote: “Racialisation of ethnicity has several disadvantages. It conceptually and politically ghettoises blacks
and Asians, implies that while people are free from ethnicity and concentrate only on colour based racism" (2001:3538-3542). Therefore it sought to define an ethnic group in non-racial terms and took it to refer to a group of a people who share common historical experiences, a cluster of cultural beliefs and practices, a broad collective consciousness of belonging together and see themselves and are seen by others as more or less distinct.

We take this opportunity by stating our position clearly on this: We wish to keep them analytically distinct due to specificities associated with them.

**Ethnie and Nation**

Before we discuss the differences between ethnie and nation, we need to get an idea of what nation means. There has been considerable body of scholarly literature on nation and nationalism. We, however, propose to go into only some of the understandings of nation for our limited purpose of making a distinction between ethnie and nation.

In its original classical Latin sense the world nation meant a tribal-ethnic group, a people born in the same place and territory; the political dimension was not a necessary. The emergence of the nation as a community of citizens, that is, a political entity-was the creation of the French Revolution.

One can usefully start with Stalin's definition of nation. He (1935) defines a nation as a "historically evolved stable community of people,
formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture”. It must be emphasised that none of the above characteristics is by itself sufficient to define a nation. On the other hand, it is sufficient for a single one of these characteristics to be absent and the nation ceases to exist. It is only when all these characteristics are present that we have a nation.

Patterson defines a nation as a “people, a folk held together by some of or all of such more or less immutable characteristics as common descent, territory, history, language, religion, way of life, or other attributes that members of a group have from birth onwards” (1975: 181) as well as “community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own: Hence a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own” (Weber in Gerth and Mills 1948: 176). The conflation between nation and state is unmistakable.

After a critical analysis of a wide variety of authorities, Smith lists seven characteristics of a nation (1971:318). There are size, economic integration territorial mobility, a distinctive culture, external relationships, equal membership rights and group loyalty. A nation, according to Smith, is a “large vertically integrated and territorially mobile group featuring a common citizenship rights and collective sentiments together with one (or more) common characteristics, which differentiate its members from those
of a similar group with whom they stand in relation of alliance or conflict” (p. 175).

Two of the most influential ideas on nation and nationalism are those of Benedict Anderson (1983) and Ernest Gellner (1983) (Banks 1996:126). For Anderson nations are 'imagined communities' in that “members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their community” (1983:15).

Gellner believes that the nation and the ideology of nationalism are essentially a product of industrial society. Factors contributing to the formation of nationalism are power, education and culture.

It was Connor who, however, emphasised the need of conceptualising nation in essentially psychological terms. He maintains that “nation--- refers to a human grouping whose members share an intuitive sense of kindredness or sameness, predicated upon a myth of common descent” (1984:XIV). He castigates those who focus on objective factors: “Failure on the part of the scholars to appreciate the psychological well-springs of the nation most certainly contributes to the tendency to undervalue the potency of nationalism (1994:204).

More recently, Oommen has pointed two critical minimum criteria necessary for the constitution of a nation. They are homeland and language. A group has to lay a moral claim over a territory as its homeland, ancestral
or adopted, and there must be a common medium of communication. “It is the combination, the fusion of territory and language, that makes the nation; a nation is a community in communication in its homeland” (Oommen: 1997:19). He expresses his sense of discomfiture over the notion of nation-state as he believes such a possibility is quite remote. Even in Western Europe which is supposed to be the cradle of nation-state one needs to conceive of multiplicity of nations in a state. The tendency to conflate nation and state needs to be resisted as it ignores the empirical reality.

From the above, it would appear that ethnie and nation are sometimes difficult to be distinguished. For example, common ancestry, history, language religion and a consciousness of the distinction would be true for both ethnie and nation. How does one distinguish them?

Some attempts have been made to distinguish them. For example, Smith (1981) argues that when an ethnic group becomes highly self-conscious in its historical identity and uses this to realise its political objectives, it becomes a nation. Thus nations often grow out of and are constructed from ethnic materials.

Connor contends that when an ethnic group becomes self-differentiating, that is, when a significant percentage of its members become aware or believe that “one's own group is unique in a most vital sense', it acquires 'nationhood’” (1994:40-3).
The point made by Moynihan also gives us a good idea of the difference between ethnic groups and nations. He holds that "... it is helpful to distinguish between ethnic groups and nations, between ethnicity and nationality."

It is a distinction of a degree. The nation is the "highest form of an ethnic group, denoting a subjective state of mind as regards ancestry, but also almost always an objective claim to different forms of territorial autonomy ranging from a region assembly to full-blown independence" (1993:4-5). The important point in the above definition is that he makes it clear that the distinction is one of degree, not one of kind.

Before Connor and Moynihan, Paul Brass (1991) attempted to make a clear distinction between an ethnic group and a nation. Perhaps his work on India gave him a good insight into the differences between the two. In his view an ethnic group can operate both as an interest group and as a group which demands that corporate rights be conceded to the group as a whole (1991:19-20). By corporate demands he means those demands which may include a major say for the group in the political system as a whole or control over a piece of territory within the country or they demand a country of their own with full sovereignty. According to him, mere political invocation of its corporate demands is a sufficient condition for the transformation of an ethnic group into a nation.
Erikson also carefully notes the differences between the two. The major one concerns the relation to the State: “A nationalist holds that political boundaries should be coterminous with cultural boundaries whereas many ethnic groups do not demand command over a state” (1993:6).

Oommen (1997) has attempted to make a clear distinction between a nation and an ethnic group. The most important difference between the two is that an ethnic group does not have a claim over homeland whereas a nation has a claim over a territory as its homeland, ancestral or adopted. Whenever an ethnic group succeeds in laying a claim over a territory, it becomes a nation. Whenever a nation is dispersed over different territories, these various units become ethnies in their new places. Therefore he refers to the possibility of transformation of ethnies into nations and vice versa.

Though there are many other scholarly attempts to distinguish between the two, we have dealt with only some of them as they would suffice in terms of gaining clarity about the differences between an ethnic group and a nation.

Community

A brief clarificatory comment about the word community needs to be made here. We are aware of the importance it enjoys in the writings of Aristotle (who perhaps used it in a technical sense for the first time), Tonnies, Durkheim, Max Weber and others. We, however, do not propose to use it in a deeply technical sense in our work.
One can speak in terms of political community, scientific community, religious community, linguistic community etc. It is in the last-mentioned sense that we use the word community. By this is meant is a group of people who share, among other things, the language. It is in this sense that we refer to Telugus as a community.

At this juncture it will be appropriate to reassert the central focus of our research. The very fact that we intend to examine the complex relationship between modernity and ethnicity means that these concepts need to be perpetually redefined and reinterpreted. For example, the process of modernisation need not necessarily be similar in all societies. It might take different twists and turns depending on cultural specificities of historically known societies. Therefore, a conventional dichotomy of Reason vs. culture modernity vs., tradition and may prove to be simplistic. As argued in the Introduction the fact that we have chosen Alex Inkeles's understanding of modernity for our study does not mean that it is free from problems. It is possible for a society to choose, say the select instrumentality of modernity like technology, industrial development, urbanity but at the same time, it may retain certain traditional/communitarian ideals. Likewise ethnic identities might exist as a possible identity that seeks to distinguish one in an otherwise modern, complex, and an anonymous society. In other words, ethnicity may itself we seen as a legitimate child of modernity rather than its negation. It is in this context that the empirical work that we
will undertake would acquire special relevance because it will be an occasion to engage more meaningfully and critically with the issues relating to modernisation, ethnicity and identity formation. The next chapter which would deal with the existing research which has already been done in this field would further help us to enter into the central focus of our enquiry.