Chapter Three:

**THE CONCEPT OF ANUSAYA AS REFLECTED IN THE ABHIDHAMMA TEXTS**

Each text in the *Abhidhamma* has a specific way to deal with the *dhammas*. For example, in the *Dhammasaṅganī* each of the factor on the *anusayas* is defined with a series of almost synonymous words. The *Vibhaṅga* only enumerated the seven anusayas. The *Puggalapaññatti* categorizes beings using these factors as criteria. The *Kathāvatthu* deals with the nature of *anusaya*, as to whether they are wholesome, unwholesome or neutral. Especially in the *Yamaka*, a whole chapter is devoted for *anusaya* and is called *Anusaya Yamaka*. The *Paṭṭhāna* mentions which relational conditions regulate the *anusayas*.

3.1. Definitions of *Anusaya* in the *Abhidhamma* texts

The *Vibhaṅga* as well as the *Visuddhimagga* gave a definition of *anusaya* as follows: “The inherent tendencies (*anusaya*) are the seven, namely, the inherent tendency to greed for sense desires, the inherent tendency to resentment, the inherent tendency to conceit (pride), the inherent tendency to false view, the inherent tendency to uncertainty, the inherent tendency to greed for becoming, and the inherent tendency to ignorance.” For it is owing to their inveteracy that they are called inherent tendencies (*anusaya*) since they inhere (*anusenti*) as cause for the arising of greed for sense desires, etc., again and again.”¹

To further explain the meaning of *anusaya*, the *Aṭṭhasālinī* said, “Continually lies latent in the sense of being firmly fixed—this is ‘bias’.

¹ PP., p.714
Besets and subjugates the mind—this is ‘bursting forth’.

(Thāmagataṭṭhena anusetīti anusayo. Cittaṃ pariyuṭṭhāti, abhibhavatīti pariyuṭṭhānam)”

Most of the Buddhist terms are defined in the Dhammasaṅganī, but as Caroline A. F. Rhys Davids remarked in her Introductory Essay to the translation entitled “A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics”, the Buddhists had not elaborated the intellectual vehicle of genus and species, as the Greeks did, hence they had not the convenience of a logic of definition. “They substitute for definition proper what J. S. Mill might have called predication of equipollent terms — in other words, the method of the dictionary. In this way precision of meaning is not to be expected, since nearly all so-called synonyms do but mutually overlap in meaning without coinciding; and hence the only way to ensure no part of the connotation being left out is to lump together a number of approximate equivalents, and gather that the term in question is defined by such properties as the aggregate possesses in common.”

Therefore, in this part, when giving the definition of the anusayas, the quotations are taken from the texts to make the readers familiar with the Buddhist psychological terms, as well as the style of the Abhidhamma texts. The definition of each dhamma will be followed by the explanation quoted from the commentary of the Dhammasaṅganī, namely the Atthasālinī, translated into English by Pe Maung Tin. The Pāli equivalents will be given whenever necessary. Each of the dhhammas in the anusayas will be defined as follows:

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2 Exp., p.339
3 BMPE, p.xxix
3.1.1. Kāmarāga: sensual desire or lust

“That sensual desire, sensual passion, sensual delight, sensual craving, sensual fondness, sensual fever, sensual languor, sensual rapacity, which is excited by the pleasures of the senses — this is called the Fetter of sensuality.4

In the above list, all the dhammas enumerated has the same characteristics as kāmarāga, that is, attachment to sensual pleasure. Though the Anusaya group is not discussed in the Āṭṭhasālinī, all the seven dhammas of this group coincide with those of the Samyojana group, hence the definitions are exactly the same. However, as the definitions taken from the texts mentioned samyojana, they are quoted hereby as such.

“By it associated states lust, or itself lusts, or the mere act of lusting, such is “greed” (or lust).5

A unique feature of the Abhidhamma commentaries is that it defines each paramattha dhamma in three ways:

1. Kattu sādhana: emphasizing the quality or ability of the doer.
   For example: Lust means “itself lusts” (sayaṁ lubbhati).
2. Karana sādhana: emphasizing the quality or ability of the instrument.
   For example: Lust means “by it associated states lust” (lubbhanti tena),

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4 Yo kāmesu kāmacchando kāmarāgo kāmanandī kāmataṅhā kāmasineho kāmaparijāho kāmamuccchā kāmajjhosaṅnam – idam viuccati kāmarāgasamyojanaṁ. Ibid., para.1114, p.298
5 Lubbhanti tena, sayam vā lubbhati, lubbhanamattameva vā tanti lobho. Exp., p.332
3. **Bhāva sādhana**: just emphasizing the occurrence, not other qualities. For example: Lust means “the mere act of lusting” (*lubbhanamattameva vā tanti lobho*).

Out of these three methods of definition, only the third is real, the others are just metaphorical, because all phenomena just appear dependent on conditions; they have no quality of doer or instrument. However, these two methods are used to reject the concept of soul to emphasize the fact that there is no agent behind the phenomenon; only the *dhamma* exists. Apart from lust, there is no agent or soul that lusts. Besides, lust never arises alone; it always arises with its associated *dhammas*. Through lust the other associated *dhammas* lust. It is lust that helps other *dhammas* to lust, not any soul works behind as an operator. Thus, by these three ways of defining the *dhammas*, there is no place for soul.

To explain more, the Commentary continues:

“Of them, greed has the characteristic of grasping the object like sticky lime; the function of clinging like a piece of flesh thrown into a hot pan; the manifestation of not letting go like a taint of lampblack; the proximate cause of viewing the fetter-like states as enjoyment. Growing into a river of craving, it takes away beings to purgatory as a river of swift current carries any object fallen into it to the great ocean. Thus it should be regarded.”

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6 Tesu lobho ārammanaggahanalakkhano makkatālepo viya, abhisaṅgaraso tattakapāle khittamamsapesi viya, apariccāgapaccupaññāhāno telañjanarāgo viya, samyojaniyadhhammesu assādadassananapadatthāhāno. So tānkhānadībhāvena vaddhamāno, sīghasotā nadi viya mahāsamuddam, apāyameva gahetvā gacchatīti dāṭhabbo. Ibid.
Here it should be noted that a particularity of Theravāda Abhidhamma, is that all these dhammas are discussed based on the analysis of their sabhāva. To elucidate the nature of any ultimate reality, the Pāli commentators propose four defining devices by means of which it can be delimited. These four devices are:

1. Its characteristic (lakkhaṇa), i.e. the salient quality of the phenomenon. It is the specific (sabhāva) or generic (samañña) attributes of such and such dhammas.

2. Its function (rasa), its performance of a concrete task (kicca-rasa) or achievement of a goal (sampatti-rasa). The function actually means the taste of the object, how one actually experiences it.

3. Its manifestation (paccupaṭṭhāna), the way it presents itself within experience, mode of manifestation (upatthanakara-paccupaṭṭhāna) or mode of effect (phala-paccupaṭṭhāna). It means how these Dhammas actually appear, how they establish themselves in our perception.

4. Its proximate cause (padaṭṭhāna), the principal condition upon which it depends. Dhammas are everything that exists in the world, and everything only exists in interdependent origination, therefore there is always a cause for each dhamma.7

All the other dhammas are also described in the same manner, that is, by the three method of definitions and the four defining devices.

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7 Exp., p.84
3.1.2. Paṭigha: Hate, aversion

Typically, first of all the question is raised: “What is hate?” And then comes the answer with a series of synonyms of “hate”:

“When annoyance springs up at the thought: he has done me harm, is doing, will do me harm; he has done harm, is doing harm, will do harm to someone dear and precious to me; he has conferred a benefit, is conferring, will confer a benefit on someone I dislike and object to; or when annoyance springs up groundlessly - all such vexation of spirit, resentment, repugnance, hostility; ill-temper, irritation, indignation; hate, antipathy, abhorrence; mental disorder, detestation; anger, fuming, irascibility; hate, hating, hatred; disorder, getting upset, derangement; opposition, hostility; churlishness, abruptness, disgust of heart - this is what is called hate.”

Again in the Commentary, “hate” is further defined in a clearer manner:

“Hate may be defined as “by it associated states offend (the object)”, or “itself is offensive,” or as “mere offending”. It has flying into anger or churlishness as characteristic, like a smitten snake; spreading of itself, or writhing as when poison takes effect as function; or, burning that on which it depends as function, like a jungle-fire; offending or injuring as manifestation, like a foe who has got his chance; having the grounds of vexation as proximate cause, like urine mixed with poison. By it the mind reaches the putrid state - this is “malignity”, or, it ruins the practice of the

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8 BMPE., para. 1060, p.282
Vinaya, the attainment of beauty, of benefit of bliss, etc. - this is ill-will. In meaning it is just doso.\textsuperscript{9}

Patigha connotes an instinctively reactive behavior. This behavior is based on a dualistic state of affairs. Sensual lust and aversion are the opposite sides of the same coin: what we instinctively like defines what we would dislike. Sensual lust here is a pulling fact, while aversion is a pushing factor.

3.1.3. Māna: conceit

“Conceit at the thought “I am the better man”; conceit at the thought “I am as good (as they)”; conceit at the thought “I am lowly”- all such sort of conceit, overweening, conceitedness, loftiness, haughtiness, flaunting a flag, assumption, desire of the heart for self-advertisement- this is called conceit.”\textsuperscript{10}

Herein conceit is fancying (deeming, vain imagining). It has haughtiness as characteristic, self-praise as function, desire to advertise self like a banner as manifestation, greed dissociated from opinionativeness as proximate cause and should be regarded as a form of lunacy.\textsuperscript{11}

The Vibhaṅga gives two passages on the three conceits or discriminations. The first defines them in terms of the nine conceits while the second is simply a summary list. The Vibhaṅga defines the three conceits as follows:

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\textsuperscript{9} Tattha dussanti tena, sayam vā dussati, dussanamattameva vā tanti doso so candikkalakkhāno pahatāsiviso viya, visappararaso visanipāto viya, attamo nissayadahanaraso vā dāvaggi viya, dussanapaccupaṭṭhāño laddhokāso viya sapatto, āghāṭavathupadaṭṭhāno visasamsatṭhapūtimuttam viya daṭṭhabbo. Exp., p.342

\textsuperscript{10} BEPE, para. 1116, p.299

\textsuperscript{11} Tattha maññatīti ‘māno’. So unnatilakkhāno, sampaggaharaso, ketukamyatāpaccupaṭṭhāno, diṭṭhippayuttalobhapaṭṭhāno, ummādo viya daṭṭhabbo. Exp., p.340
“Therein what is the conceit, “I am superior” (seyyo 'ham asmī’ ti)?

Here, a certain person, by birth, or by clan, or by good family, or by personality [looks and elegance], or by wealth, or by ability to recite mantras and texts, or by sphere of work [professionalism], or by skill in the arts [the fine arts and humanities], or by scientific status, by learning [academic qualification], by wit [intelligence], or on any other ground, works up conceit. Such conceit, thoughts of conceit, state of being conceited, haughtiness, “flag-raising,” arrogance [assumption], the desire for self-glorification [a mind desiring a banner]. This is called the superiority conceit.” Similarly with the conceit, “I am equal” (sadiso 'ham asmī’ ti) and the conceit, “I am inferior” (hīno 'ham asmī’ ti).

The *Vibhaṅga* then lists the nine conceits as follows:

In one who is superior, there is the conceit, thus:

1. “I am superior.”
2. “I am equal.”
3. “I am inferior.”

In one who is equal, there is the conceit, thus:

4. “I am superior.”
5. “I am equal.”
6. “I am inferior.”

In one who is inferior, there is the conceit, thus:

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12 *Tattha katamo seyyo 'ham asmī’ ti māno: idh’ekacco jātiyā vā gottena vā kolaputtiyena vā vannapokkharatāya vā dhanena vā ajjenena vā kamm'āyatanena vā sipp'āyatanena vā vijjāhānena vā sutena vā paññabhānena vā aṭṭhatānena vatthunā māna jappeti, yo evarūpo māno maññanā maññitatta unnāti unnāmo, dhajo sampaggāho ketukamyatā cittassa ayam vouccati seyyo 'ham asmī’ ti māno. Vbh., p.866*
7. “I am superior.”
8. “I am equal.”
9. “I am inferior.”

In the Dhammasaṅgaṇī Commentary it is said, “In the superior, the superiority conceit is alone a true conceit, the others are false. In the equal, the equality conceit is alone true. In the inferior, the inferiority conceit is alone true.”

“True conceit” (yāthāvamāna) here refers to the person’s state of mind, that of conceit, that is reflective of his true status in society. For example, a powerful person, knowing his status, shares power with another, and feels proud about it.

Understandably, if one is powerful but feel inferior about it, desiring more power, then it is not true conceit, but simply a desire for more power: this is greed, not conceit. Or, if one were equal to others, say, in power, but feels that one is more powerful than everyone else, it is not true conceit, but probably a delusion of grandeur. Or, if one were powerless and were to pride in that powerlessness, it would not be real conceit, but, in reality, dislikes those in power, which would be hate.

However, for one who is wealthy, the pride that he is better off than others would clearly be superiority conceit. If this same person were to feel proud of the fact that another (say, his brother) is richer than he is, it is inferiority conceit. Even if this same person merely thinks that he as rich another (but in reality is not so), it is still equality conceit. The same pattern works for the other two kinds of persons.
Besides the key term *māna* (conceit), a number of other related terms which are found in the *Suttas*, are also briefly examined in the *Vibhaṅga* and its Commentary.¹³

1. *Atimāna* (haughtiness), arises on account of one’s birth, etc, regardless of one’s real status. Hence, the verb *atimaññati* means “he is haughty,” that is, he excessively prides in his birth, etc, thinking, “There is none equal to me.”

2. *Mānātimāna* (pride upon pride) arises, for example, in this way: “Formerly he was my equal. Now I am foremost, and he is inferior.” This pride, as such, grew dependent on previous pride of equality, like heaping a new burden upon an old one.

3. *Omāna* (self-effacement) is described in the same manner as *hīnamāna* (pride of lowliness). However, for the sake of those who are teachable, says the Commentary, this pride is stated as self-effacement. Furthermore, this should be understood here as “self-effacement” when it occurs as being proud of one’s lowliness, thinking (reflexively) thus, “You have birth (*jāti*), but it is like that of a crow’s; you have clan (*gotta*), but it is like a *Caṇḍāla* clan; you have a voice, but it is like that of a crow’s.”

4. *Adhimāna* (over-estimation or arrogance) refers to the perception that one has attained that which is not attained (*appatte pattasaññitā*), especially in regards to misperceiving that one has understood the four noble truths when the reality is that this is not so. Or, thinking that one has done the work of attaining the path to awakening when in reality one has not.

¹³ *Vbh.*, p355; *VbhA*. 488
Or, that one has fully realized the four noble truths when the reality is that one has not. Or, that one has directly attained to the path of arhathood when the reality is that one has not. This is also called adhigatamāna (the pride of achievement).

5. Asmimāna (self-conceit) can arise by way of the thought, “I am in the form” (rūpe asmī’ ti māno), or “I exist as form” (that is, the abiding soul exists in the form of a body), so that there is the pride, thus: “I am form” (aham rūpaṁ). The Vibhaṅga notes that this is synonymous with chanda (zeal), that is, the zeal (or will) that accompanies the pride.

6. Micchāmāna (false pride) refers to conceit (or over-confidence) related to an evil sphere of work (pāpaka kammāyatana) (that is, those that harm life); an evil sphere of arts (sippāyatana) (that is, skill and industry in making the tools and means of harming life); sorcery (vijjā/FL109/FL109hāna) that harms others; wrong learning (suta), that is, those connected with violence, lust and so on; evil talk (paṭibhāna), that is, those regarding gossips and sense-pleasure; wrong practices (sīla), such as goat-asceticism and ox-asceticism; wrong vows (vata), such as goat-vows and ox-vows; and wrong view (diṭṭhi), that is, any based on any of the 62 wrong views.

3.1.4. Diṭṭhi: wrong view or speculative opinion

The Dhammasaṅganī give this definition to wrong view:

““To hold that the world is eternal, or that it is not eternal, infinite or finite; that the living soul is the body, or that the living soul is a different thing from the body; or that he has won truth exists after death, or does
not exist after death, or both exists and does not exist after death, or
neither exists nor does not exist after death – this kind of opinion, this
jungle of opinion, the fetter of opinion, puppet-show of opinion, scuffling
of opinion, the grip and tenacity of it, the inclination towards it, the being
affected by it, this by-path, wrong road, wrongness, this “fording-place”,
this shiftiness of grasp – this is called speculative opinion.”

The *Vibhaṅga* gives a more detailed description with many ways of
classifications of wrong views. It reads:

“Therein what is becoming view? “The soul, also the world, will be
again” thus that is which is similar, wrong view, resorting to wrong view,
jungle of wrong view wilderness of wrong view, distortion of wrong
view, vacillation of wrong view, fetter of wrong view This is called
becoming view.

Therein what is non-becoming view? “The soul, also the world,
will not be again”, thus, that is which is similar, wrong view, resorting to
wrong view, jungle of wrong view, wilderness of wrong view, distortion
of wrong view, vacillation of wrong view, fetter of wrong view. This is
called becoming view.

Therein what is eternalistic view? “The soul, also the world, are
eternal thus, that is which is similar, wrong view, resorting to wrong
view, jungle of wrong view, wilderness of wrong view, distortion of
wrong view, vacillation of wrong view, fetter of wrong view. This is
called eternalistic view.

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14 BMPE, para. 1099. Pp. 293-94
Therein what is annihilationistic view? “The soul, also the world, will cease”, thus, that is which is similar, wrong view, resorting to wrong view, jungle of wrong view, wilderness of wrong view, distortion of wrong view, vacillation of wrong view, fetter of wrong view. This is called annihilationistic view.

Therein what is finite view? “The soul, also the world, are finite thus, that is which is similar, wrong view, resorting to wrong view, jungle of wrong view, wilderness of wrong view, distortion of wrong view, vacillation of wrong view, fetter of wrong view. This is called finite view.

Therein what is infinite view? “The soul, also the world, are infinite thus, that is which is similar, wrong view, resorting to wrong view, jungle of wrong view, wilderness of wrong view, distortion of wrong view, vacillation of wrong view, fetter of wrong view. This is called finite view.

Therein what is ultimate beginning view? “Concerning the ultimate beginning of beings, that which arises is wrong view, resorting to wrong view, jungle of wrong view, wilderness of wrong view, distortion of wrong view, vacillation of wrong view, fetter of wrong view. This is called ultimate beginning view.”

Therein what is ultimate end view? Concerning the ultimate end of beings, that which arises is wrong view, resorting to wrong view, jungle of wrong view, wilderness of wrong view, distortion of wrong view, vacillation of wrong view, fetter of wrong view. This is called ultimate end view.
Therein what is faulty view? “There is no alms-giving; there is no sacrifice; there is no offending; there is no fruit or resultant of actions done rightly and done wrongly; there is no this world there is no next world; there is no mother, there is no father, there are no beings born spontaneously there are not in the world recluses and Brahmins who have reached the highest point who are well practiced, who themselves having fully known, having realized this world and the next world make it known to others, that which is similar, wrong view resorting to wrong view jungle of wrong view, wilderness of wrong view distortion of wrong view, vacillation of wrong view, fetter of wrong view this is called faulty view. Also all false view is faulty view.”

Therein what is gratification view? Herein a certain one. recluse or Brahmin, says thus views thus “There is no fault in sense pleasures, he plunges into sense pleasures This is called gratification view.

Therein what is soul view? Herein the unlearned worldling who does not recognize the Noble Ones, is not versed in the teaching of the Noble Ones, is not disciplined in the teaching of the Noble Ones, does not recognize good man, is not versed in the teaching of the good men, is not disciplined in the teaching of the good men; regards material qualities as soul, or soul as having material qualities; or material qualities as being in soul; or soul as being in feeling; perception; mental concomitants; regards consciousness as soul; or soul as having consciousness; or consciousness as being in soul: or soul as being in consciousness, that which is similar, wrong view, resorting to wrong view, jungle of wrong view, wilderness of wrong view, distortion of wrong view, vacillation of wrong view, fetter of wrong view, this is called soul view.
Therein what is false view? “There is no alms-giving; there is no sacrifice; there is no offering; there is no fruit or resultants of actions done rightly and done wrongly; there is no this world; there is no next world; there is no mother; there is no father, there are no beings born spontaneously; there are not in the world recluses and Brahmins who have reached the highest point, who are well practiced, who themselves having fully known, having realized this world and the next world make it known to others, that which is similar, wrong view, resorting to wrong view, jungle of wrong view, wilderness of wrong view, distortion of wrong view, vacillation of wrong view, fetter of wrong view This is called false view, eternalistic view, gratification view, individuality view, soul view, annihilationistic view, false view.”

In the exposition of wrong views, in the sense of not viewing justly, such views are called *diṭṭhigata* (gone to views), from being included in the sixty-two heretical views. Just “opinion” as being something difficult to get beyond is meant by “view as jungle”, like a jungle of grass, of forest, of mountain. Just “opinion” as being something dangerous and fearsome is meant by “view as wilderness”, like a wilderness infested by thieves and wild beasts, of sand, waterless, without food. As something crushing or boring through the right view and being contrary to it is meant by “opinion as a disorder.” For wrong views when they arise pierce right views, and go counter to them. The changing and wavering of views from the holding at one time the Eternalistic, and at another time the Annihilationistic standpoint is meant by “opinion as a scuffling.” A man of opinions is not able to stand by one view, follows at one time the Eternalistic and at another time the Annihilationistic view.

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15 Vbh., pp.467-478
Opinion as holding captive is meant by “fetter” in the term “opinion as a fetter.” It seizes the object firmly as crocodiles seize a man—thus it is called “grip”; and “fixity”, because it establishes itself. For a false view or opinion from the strength of its procedure establishes itself and seizes. By way of permanence, etc., it convinces—hence the term “conviction” (or “tendency”). Passing over the intrinsic nature of things, it considers them perversely, as permanent, etc.—this is “perversion”. It is a vile path, because it brings disadvantage; or, it is the way to vile places of suffering—hence the term “by-path.” From being not the right path, it is a “wrong path”. For just as one who is gone astray, although he holds that this is the path to such a village, does not arrive at the village, so a man of false opinions, although he holds that this is the path to a happy destiny, cannot get there; hence from being not the right path it is a wrong path. From its false nature it is wrongness. (Just as people may appear to be crossing at the ferry), fools frequently cross over at an opinion or view from their merely wandering to and fro at it—thus it is a “ford”. It is a ford, an abode of disadvantages—thus it is a “fording-place” (titthāyatana), or in the sense of the birth-place, dwelling-place (āyatana) of heretics (tittha) it is titthāyatana. That state or intrinsic nature which is an inverted grasp is vipariyesagaha; or it is grasp (gaha) on account of the object being inverted; thus it is vipariyesagaha. Perverted grasp is the meaning.”\(^{16}\)

In the Vibhaṅga, another set of four types of wrong views is also found:

“Therein what are four wrong views? Wrong view arises firmly as truth thus, pleasure and pain are produced by the self; wrong view arises

\(^{16}\) Exp., pp. 336-37
firmly as truth pleasure and pain are produced by another cause; wrong view arises firmly as truth thus, pleasure and pain are produced by the self and are produced by another cause; wrong view arises firmly as truth thus, “Pleasure and pain are not produced by the self are not produced by another cause but arises without cause”. These are four wrong views.”

The Commentary gave quite a detailed description to wrong view, plus explaining the terms related to wrong views that were mentioned in the Suttas:

“Wrong view” is untrue view; or, from being held amiss, a false view is a wrong view. A view loathed by the wise as bringing disadvantage is also a wrong view. Further, by it associated states see wrongly, or itself sees wrongly; or it is the mere act of wrong seeing - thus it is wrong view. It has unwise conviction as characteristic; perversion as function; wrong conviction as manifestation; the desire not to see the Ariyans as proximate cause. It should be regarded as the highest fault.

Despite their wide variety, we can classify wrong-views into three main groups. The first includes all the religions current at the time; the second comprises materialist theories which arose in direct opposition to religion; and the third consists of all forms of skepticism which arose as a reaction against both.

“Among the many religions of the day, some were a linear development of Vedic thought while others seem to have emerged either

\[17\] Vibh., p.487
\[18\] Apica micchā passanti tāya, sayaṃ vā micchā passati, micchādassanamattameva vā esāti micchādīṭhi. Sā ayoniso abhinivesalakshanā, parāmāsarasā, micchābhīnivesapaccupatṭhānā, ariyānaṃ adassanakāmaṭṭhipadatṭhānā; paramaṃ vajjanti datṭhabbā. Exp., p.331
in isolation from or in opposition to it. In the former, the trend was more
towards theism, monism and orthodoxy; in the latter, it was more towards
non-theism, pluralism and heterodoxy. Between the two groups there
were a variety of religious teachings which were based on
epistemological grounds such as scriptural authority (piṭaka-sampadā),
revelation (anussava), the omniscience of the teacher (sabbaññuta),
knowledge gained through extrasensory perception and arguments based
on pure reasoning (takka-vima/FL67sa). Although they represented a wide
spectrum of religious views and practices, they all appear to have
subscribed to a belief in a soul or self-entity. This common belief, though
it had many variations, is represented in the early Buddhist discourses as
a general statement: aññam jīvam aññam sariram (the jīva or soul is one
thing and the sarira or body is another). This distinction seems to
emphasize the fact that while the soul is something permanent, the body
is something perishable. This distinction is also one between the physical
body and the metaphysical self.” 19

Almost all religions believe that this self-entity is something
immutable, it survives death and that it is in this self-entity (soul) that
man’s true essence is to be found. This religious view of the human
personality is the theory of the metaphysical self. It was this belief in a
permanent spiritual substance within man that came to be represented in
the Pāli suttas as sassatavāda. Accordingly, from the Buddhist point of
view, all the religions of the day which advocate an eternal self-subsisting
spiritual entity were but different kinds of sassatavāda.

19 Y. Karunadasa, The Buddhist Critique of Sassatavāda and Ucchedavāda: The Key to a Proper
Understanding of the Origin and the Doctrines of Early Buddhism. The Middle Way, U.K., vol 74
& 75, 1999-2000
The materialist tradition which emerged in direct opposition to religion also seems to have had more than one school of thought. These took their stand on the epistemological ground that sense-perception was the only valid means of knowledge. Hence they questioned the validity of theological and metaphysical theories which do not come within the ambit of sense-experience. This explains why they rejected the religious version of attavāda, the belief in a metaphysical self, and gave it a new interpretation. This new interpretation is expressed in the Pāli suttas by the words taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sariram (the self is the same as the body). This is quite in contrast to the religious view which emphasizes their duality rather than their identity. “The line of argument which seems to have led to this conclusion may be stated as follows: there is no observable self-entity apart from the body, and since only the observable exists, this self-entity must be identical with the physical body. Therefore, for materialism the soul is a product of the four primary elements of matter (ayaṃ atta rūpi catummahabhutiko). This materialist view of the human personality is the theory of the physical self. Because materialism identifies the self with the physical body, it necessarily follows that at death, with the break-up of the body, the self too is annihilated (ucchindati, vinassati), without any prospect of post-mortal existence. In view of this inevitable conclusion to which the materialist view of life leads, it came to be represented in the Buddhist texts as ucchedavāda (annihilationism).”

Some modern scholars believe that materialism (ucchedavāda) rejects attavāda or the belief in a soul or self-entity. This may be true, but from the Buddhist point of view it is not valid. According to the Buddhist

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20 Y. Karunadasa, op.cit.
understanding of *attavāda*, any kind of thing, whether it is material, mental or spiritual, could become an *atman* if it becomes an object of self-identification. This process of self-identification is said to manifest itself in three ways: this is mine (*etam mama*); this I am (*esoham asmi*); and this is my self (*eso me atta*). As materialism takes the body to be the self, to be an object of self-identification, it is also a variety of *attavāda*. One objection that may be raised here is that what materialists identify as the self is not a metaphysical entity but the perishable physical body. In the context of Buddhist teachings, however, what matters is not the permanence or impermanence of the object of self-identification but the very fact of self-identification. Thus Buddhists view both *sassatavāda* and *ucchedavāda* as two varieties of *attavāda*.

For those who believe in *sassatavāda*; between the soul and the body, it is the soul that is in bondage. Hence if anything is to be saved, it must be the soul. What prevents its upward journey is the gravitational pull of the body, that is gratification in sensuality. Thus deliverance of the soul, its perpetuation in a state of eternal bliss, requires the mortification of the flesh. This is what came to be represented in the Buddhist texts as *attakilamathanuyoga* (self-mortification). It is very likely that it was this belief that led to a variety of ascetic practices during the time of the Buddha. A case in point was Jainism, which advocated rigid austerities to liberate the soul.

For *ucchedavāda* (materialism), on the other hand, man ‘is a pure product of the earth’ awaiting annihilation at death. His aim in this temporary life thus cannot be the rejection of sense-pleasures in the pursuit of a higher spiritual ideal. If anything, it should be just the opposite. This is what came to be described in the Buddhist texts as
kāmasukhallikanuyoga (sensual gratification). Hence self mortification and sensual gratification represent the practical aspects of the two theories of sassistavāda and ucchedavāda.\(^{21}\)

This polarization of intellectual thought into sassistavāda and ucchedavāda, with a number of sects and sub-sects within each tradition, that paved the way for the emergence of skepticism. In the Indian context, however, skepticism does not necessarily mean complete dissociation from any ideal of salvation. For there is evidence to suggest that some adopted skepticism on the grounds that knowledge was not only impossible but also a danger to moral development and salvation.

3.1.5. Vicikicchā: doubt or perplexity

“To doubt, to be perplexed about, (1) the Master, to doubt, to be perplexed about, (2) the Doctrine, to doubt, to be perplexed about, (3) the Order, about (4) the Discipline, about (5) the past, the future, about both the past and the future, (6) as to whether there be an assignable cause of states causally determined – it is this kind of doubt, this working of doubt, this dubiety, puzzlement, perplexity; distraction, standing at crossroads; collapse, uncertainty of grasp; evasion, hesitation; incapacity of grasping thoroughly, stiffness of mind, mental scarifying – that is called perplexity.”\(^{22}\)

Mrs. Rhys Davids explains why she renders vicikicchā as perplexity, and not doubt: Cikit is the desiderative or frequentative of cit, to think; vi, the prefix, indicating either intensive or distracted thinking. Thus, the etymology of the Indian word lays stress on the dynamic rather

\(^{21}\) Y. Karunadasa, op.cit.
\(^{22}\) BMPE., para.1004, p.260
than the static, on the stress of intellection rather than the suspense of inconclusiveness. When the term recurs, Buddhaghosa refers it to kiccho - to “the fatigue incurred through inability to come to a decision” - a position nearer, psychologically, to “perplexity” than to “doubt”\textsuperscript{23}

Another definition is found in the Vibhaṅga: “Therein what is doubt? That which is puzzlement, being puzzled, state of being puzzled, perplexity, doubt, oscillation, dual path, fluctuation, uncertainty of grip, evasion, hesitation, not plunging in, rigidity of consciousness, mental scarifying. This is called doubt.”\textsuperscript{24}

Doubts in the meaning of words and sentences, or doubts as to which route to follow on a journey, etc., do not constitute vicikicchā. Even Arahants sometimes have doubts on the meaning of Vinaya rules, whether such an act is in accordance with the Vinaya or not. In this case it is not vicikicchā. It simply is conjecturing or discursive thinking, vitakka. Only skepticism on the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Saṅgha amounts to vicikicchā.

Here doubt means exclusion from the cure of knowledge. Or, one investigating the intrinsic nature by means of it suffers pain and fatigue (kicchati) – thus it is doubt. “It has shifting about as characteristic, mental wavering as function, indecision or uncertainty in grasp as manifestation, unsystematic thought as proximate cause, and it should be regarded as a danger to attainment.”\textsuperscript{25}

A simile of doubt is narrated in the Commentary as follows:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} BMPE., p.5, n.1
\item \textsuperscript{24} Vbh., p.220
\item \textsuperscript{25} Tattha vigatā cikicchāti vicikicchā. Sabhāvam vā vicinanto etāya kicchati kilamati ticikicchā. Sā samsayalakkhaṇaḥ, kampanarasā, anichchayapaccupaṭṭhāṇā anekamsagāhapaccupaṭṭhāṇā vā, ayonisomanasikārapadaṭṭhānā. Patipattiantarāyakaratī daṭṭhabbā. Exp., pp. 344-45
\end{itemize}
A man traveling through a desert, aware that travelers may be plundered or killed by robbers, will, at the mere sound of a twig or a bird, become anxious and fearful, thinking: The robbers have come!” He will go a few steps, and then out of fear, he will stop, and continue in such a manner all the way, or he may even turn back. Stopping more frequently than walking, only with toil and difficulty will he reach a place of safety, or he may not even reach it.

It is similar with one in whom doubt has arisen in regard to one of the eight objects of doubt. Doubting whether the Master is an Enlightened One or not, he cannot accept it in confidence, as a matter of trust. Unable to do so, he does not attain to the paths and fruits of sanctity. Thus, as the traveler in the desert is uncertain whether robbers are there or not, he produces in his mind, again and again, a state of wavering and vacillation, a lack of decision, a state of anxiety; and thus he creates in himself an obstacle for reaching the safe ground of sanctity (ariya-bhūmi). In that way, skeptical doubt is like traveling in a desert.

In the exposition of perplexity or doubt, a previous doubt is said to induce a subsequent doubt. Consciousness imbued with doubt is “dubious” from the arising of doubt, and of such the state is “dubiety”.

3.1.6. Bhavarāga: passion for renewed existence

“The desire, the passion for coming into being, delight in coming into being, craving, fondness for coming into being, the fever, the yearning, the hungering to come into being, which is felt concerning rebirths — this is called the Intoxicant of renewed existence.”

26 BMPE., para.1098, p.293
Passion for renewed existence arises conjointly with the eternalistic view, which assumes that pleasures are indestructible since living substance knows no death continuing through-out eternity. The physical part of the body may become decayed or destroyed, but the spiritual part of it lives as it migrates from one body to the other and gives rise to a new entity. The universe may get destroyed, but the spirit or living substance lives on. It is permanent, and it is eternal.

Outside the teaching of Buddhism this view is the most popular. Those who hold this view presume that when a man dies, he is raised to heaven where he lives eternally, or alternately, he is consigned to hell, also eternally, according to the will of God. Others would like to believe that one’s spirit migrates from one body to another and renews itself according to the working of one’s kamma.

“Another belief is that life is predetermined and fixed, and it goes on eternally according to that predetermination. Briefly stated, a belief in eternity of the substance of life is eternalism. Under such a notion, life is like a bird that hops from tree to tree as the old tree falls into decay. When the physical body dies, the living matter moves unto another new body. Under the influence of craving for sensual pleasures supported by the idea of eternity, an individual is gratified with the thought that self abides by him permanently. He feels that what now exists is himself, confident that what he is now enjoying can also be enjoyed in his future lives. Hence his attachment to all what he sees, hears, tastes, smells, touches and thinks grows stronger throughout existence. He not only delights in sense-objects which he experiences in the present life, but also in those which he hopes to experience hereafter. He wants to enjoy life now and desires to continue enjoying it in his next existence. Having led
a happy life as a human being, he goes even further than that, and hopes for happiness as a divinity.”

3.1.7. Avijjā: ignorance or dullness

In the *Dhammasaṅsanī*, ignorance or dullness is defined as not knowing the four noble truths. “Lack of knowledge about Ill, lack of knowledge about the uprising of Ill, lack of knowledge about the cessation of Ill, lack of knowledge about the way leading to the cessation of Ill; lack of knowledge about the former things, about the latter things and about both taken together; lack of knowledge about the assignable causation of causally determined states-even all that kind of lack of knowledge which is lack of insight, of understanding, of wakefulness, of enlightenment, of penetration, of comprehension, of sounding, of comparing, of contemplation, of perspicacity; impurity, childishness, unintelligence, the dullness that is stupidity, obtuseness, ignorance, a flood of ignorance, the yoke of ignorance, the dependence of ignorance, the being possessed by ignorance, the barrier of ignorance, the dullness that is the root of evil-this is called dullness.”

It should be made clear that “not knowing” is not always avijjā. For instance, not knowing a subject which one has not studied, not knowing places where one has not been to, not remembering names which one has not been acquainted with, is not avijjā. Such kind of not knowing is merely lack of knowledge; it is not real avijjā at all; hence it is not an unwholesome mental factor; it is merely the absence of recognition, or perception, saññā, that has not perceived it before. Even *Arahants* have such a kind of not-knowing, let alone ordinary common worldling.

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28 BMPE., para. 1061, p.283
In the commentary, it is said, ‘Delusion’ has the characteristic of blindness or opposition to knowledge; the essence of non-penetration, or the function of covering the intrinsic nature of the object; the manifestation of being opposed to right conduct or causing blindness; the proximate cause of unwise attention; and should be regarded as the root of all immoralities.”\(^{29}\)

### 3.2. The significance of “lying latent” (anuseti)

Through the description in the previous parts, it is clear that \textit{anusaya} is so called as it lies latent (\textit{anuseti}) in beings’ mind. What is the sense of lying latent, with whom (\textit{puggala}) an \textit{anusayo} lie or does not lie latent, in which plane (\textit{okāsa}) an \textit{anusayo} lies or does not lie latent, who cognizes an \textit{anusayo} and why, who has eliminated an \textit{anusayo} and in what respect.

#### 3.2.1. What is the sense of lying latent?

In the \textit{Anusaya-yamaka-āṭṭhakatha}, the commentator raised a series of questions regarding the meaning of lying latent.

- In which sense is it called \textit{anusaya}? (\textit{Anusayāti kenaṭṭhena anusayā)?})
- In the sense of lying latent. (\textit{Anusayanaṭṭhena}.)
- What is the sense of lying latent? (\textit{Ko esa anusayanaṭṭho nāmāti}?)

\(^{29}\) \textit{Moho cittassa andhabhāvalakkhano aṇṇānalakkhano va, asampativedharaso ārammanasabhāvacchādananaraso va, asammāpattipattipaccupāṭṭhano andhakārāpacchupāṭṭhano va, ayonisomanasikārapadaṭṭhano. Sabbākusalānām mahānti dFFEFThabbbo. Exp., p.332}
It is the sense of not being eradicated. They lie latent in the thought-process within someone in the sense of not being eradicated, therefore they are called **anusaya**. Lying latent means they arise when they receive proper conditions. (Appahīnaṭṭho. Ete hi appahīnaṭṭhena tassa tassa santāne anusentī nāma, tasmā anusayāti vuccanti. Anusentīti anurūpaṃ kāraṇaṃ labhitvā uppajjantīti attho.)

If someone objects that all defilements that cannot yet be eradicated are latent tendencies, the answer is that the latent tendencies are not merely defilements that cannot yet be eradicated, but that they are defilements which are very powerful; they are able to lie dormant in each citta without arising and performing functions. Therefore, the latent tendencies have the nature of **akusala dhamma**, but they are different from all other defilements since they are subtle defilements of great strength. They are able to lie dormant in each citta and they can only be completely eradicated by the path-consciousness.

The text of the commentary to the *Visuddhimagga* explains further that the latent tendencies are of a nature that is powerful (thāmagato). They are as hard to remove as is dirt in the eye that one tries to remove with a lubricant oil as medicine.

When speaking in general, it is said that the defilements that are past, future and present are called latent tendencies. This means that when they are not yet eradicated in the past, future and present, they are still lying dormant in the citta and they are ready to be a condition for the arising of medium defilement. Thus, they have the nature of latent defilements.
tendency with regard to the past, the future and the present. This does not mean that they are dependent on time, thus, that they arise and fall away.

3.2.2. Where does anusaya lie latent?

This part will be based on the Anusaya-Yamaka of the Abhidhamma. “The Yamaka follows a unique different method of treatment. It is divided into seven chapters (vāra), each consisting a positive and a negative section namely:

1. The Biases (anusaya – vāra)
2. Possessed of Biases (sānusaya – vāra)
3. Abandoning the Biases (pajahana – vāra)
4. Penetration (pariññā – vāra)
5. Biases abandoned (pahīna – vāra)
6. Arising of biases (uppaṭjana – vāra)
7. The Biases in the various spheres of existence (dhātu – vāra)"31

In the first section of the Yamaka (Uppattiḥṭhāna Vāra), each anusaya is mentioned as to where they can lie latent. The questions are very important, as we should know the place where they lie so that we can observe them from the time they begin to arise. Thus, the questions and the answers run as follows:

- Where does latent state of attachment to sensual pleasures lay latent? (Kattha kāmarāgānusayo anuseti?)
- In the two feelings of sensual element, latent state of attachment to sensual pleasures lies latent. (Kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsu ettha kāmarāgānusayo anuseti.)

31 Nyanatiloka Mahathera, Guide through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, Kandy: BPS, 1983. P.104
About this answer, the commentary to the Yamaka gives further explanation:

Kāmarāgānusayo lies as latent in unwholesome feelings through two conditions: as being born together (sahajāta) and as objects (ārammana). kāmarāgānusayo arises being born together with unwholesome pleasant feeling and with neutral feeling. It means that kāmarāgānusayo arises making those feelings as objects. Kāmarāgānusayo arises making the remaining feelings, i.e., sense-sphere wholesome feeling, resultant feeling, and kriya feelings as objects (these feelings are only objects of kāmarāgānusayo but not born together with kāmarāgānusayo). When kāmarāgānusaya lie latent in the two feelings of the sense-sphere it also lies latent in the saññā, sañkhāra and viññāṇa which are associated with those feelings. It’s impossible for kāmarāgānusaya not to be born together with saññā etc. which are associated with feeling, when it lies latent in feeling, or to arise without making saññā etc. which are associated with feeling as an object. Although kāmarāgānusaya lies latent in saññā etc., here it is said “kāmarāgānusaya lies latent in two feelings” because only these two are important among the remaining associated dhammas. Neutral and pleasant feelings are delightful, therefore kāmarāgānusaya arises in them.

Kāmarāgānusaya does not lie latent in unpleasant feeling and in form-sphere etc., therefore apart from 9 lokuttara dhammas, the dhammas in the form-sphere and the formless sphere together with their planes, and the unpleasant feeling with their associated dhammas, kāmarāgānusaya lies latent in all the form, sound, smell, taste and tangible object.

32 Yamakāatthakhatha
• Where does latent state of hatred lie latent? (*Kattha paṭighānusayo anuseti?*)

• In unpleasant feeling, latent state of hatred lies latent. (*Dukkhaṁya vedanāya ettha paṭighānusayo anuseti.*)

*Paṭighānusaya* lies latent in the three feelings i.e. the unpleasant feeling associated with body-consciousness and the two unhappy feelings. *Paṭighānusaya* lies latent in the unhappy feelings through the two conditions – being born together and being object. It lies latent in the remaining unpleasant feeling through the object conditions. Lying latent in those feelings it also lies latent in the aggregates of perceptions etc. which are associated with those feelings. Being born together with feeling it is also born together with the perceptions etc. which are associated with feeling. Making feeling as object, it also makes perceptions etc. which are associated with feeling as object. Even so, for only unpleasant feeling, because of being displeasing and undelightful, which makes *paṭighānusaya* arise, are important among the associated *dhammas*, therefore, it is said “*Paṭighānusaya* lies latent in unpleasant feeling.”

A question may be asked: Lying latent through object condition, does *paṭighānusaya* lie latent not only in unpleasant feeling and its associated *dhammas* but also in undesirable object etc.? It is said in the *Vibhaṅga* (Vbh., p. 816): “In the world there are unlovely form (nature), and undelightful form (nature), *paṭighānusaya* lies latent in those forms within living beings.” In the reverse order of the *Anusaya* Chapter of this book (*Yamaka*) it is said: *Paṭighānusaya* does not lie latent in two feelings of sense sphere, it’s not that *kāmarāgānusaya* does not lie latent there. *Paṭighānusaya* does not lie latent in form sphere, formless sphere and supramundane *dhammas*, and *kāmarāgānusaya* does not lie either.” Here the commentator wants to say that apart from two feelings of sense
sphere and their associated *dhammas*, the *dhammas* in the form sphere and formless sphere together with their planes, and the 9 supramundane *dhammas*, *paṭighānusaya* lies latent in all the remaining forms etc. Why is it not said here? Because it is not clear to know. Referring the way it is said above only unpleasant feeling is clear to know, the other *dhammas* are not clear to know; therefore it is not said that *paṭighānusaya* lies latent in those forms etc. This meaning should be got, thus it should be understood that *paṭighānusaya* also lies latent on those *dhammas*.\(^{33}\)

Are the other two feelings and desirable objects not the object of *paṭighānusaya*? It’s not so. Within the person who lost jhāna, unhappy feeling arises as being worried about it, taking that feeling and its associated *dhammas* as an object. That is only unhappy feeling, and not *paṭighānusaya*. *Paṭighānusaya* as a *kilesa* in a strong position, arising as hatred towards the undesirable object; therefore here *paṭigha* together with unhappy feeling without performing the function of *paṭigha* thus it is not *paṭighānusaya*, and it is not necessary to mention. Just as the hatred that arises together with the volition of killing can not be the mental *kamma* and is not necessary to mention… The place of lying latent of *paṭighānusaya* should be understood in that way.

- Where does latent state of pride lie latent? (*Kattha mānānusayo anuseti?*)
- In the two feelings of sensual element, in the fine-material element and immaterial element, latent state of pride lies latent. (*Kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsu rūpadhātuyā arūpadhātuyā ettha mānānusayo anuseti.*)

\(^{33}\) Yamakāatthakhatha
The place of lying latent of \textit{mānānusaya} is threefold, i.e., two feelings of sense sphere, form sphere and formless sphere. It also lies latent in those unwholesome feelings through the condition of being born together like \textit{kāmarāgānusaya}. It lies latent in the form sphere and formless sphere, in the neutral and pleasant feelings of the sense sphere and in all the \textit{dhammas} associated therewith through the condition of being object. In the reverse order of the \textit{Anusayavāra}, it is said, “\textit{Kāmarāgānusaya} does not lie latent in unpleasant feeling and in supramundane \textit{dhammas}, neither does \textit{mānānusaya}.” Therefore apart from unpleasant feeling and nine kinds of supramundane \textit{dhamma}, \textit{mānānusaya} lies latent in all the remaining mental and material phenomena. This should be understood as the place of lying latent of \textit{mānānusaya}.

- Where does latent state of wrong-views lie latent? (\textit{Kattha diṭṭhānusayo anuseti}?)
  - In the states of all that include body, latent state of wrong-views lies latent.
  
  \textit{(Sabbasakkāyapariyāpанныsu dharmasu ettha diṭṭhānusayo anuseti.)}

- Where does latent state of doubts lie latent? (\textit{Kattha vicikicchānusayo anuseti}?)
  - In the states of all that include body, latent state of doubts lies latent.
  
  \textit{(Sabbasakkāyapariyāpанныsu dharmasu ettha vicikicchānusayo anuseti.)}

\textsuperscript{34} Yamakāatthakhatha
Diṭṭhānusaya and vicikicchānusaya lie latent in all the dhammas of the three spheres. Therefore it is said: “Diṭṭhānusaya lies latent in all the dhammas which are included in the five aggregates, so does vicikicchānusaya.” “Sabbasakkāyapariyāpannesu” means “in all the dhammas which are included in the five aggregates in the sense of being dependent on the circle of death and rebirth.” Diṭṭhānusaya and vicikicchānusaya lie latent in five kinds of consciousness (4 lobha-mūlacittas associated with wrong view + 1 moha-mūlacitta associated with doubt) as being born together with them. In another way, they lie latent in the five kinds of consciousness and other dhammas of the three spheres through the object condition by taking them as object at the time of arising. This should be understood as the place of lying latent of diṭṭhānusaya and vicikicchānusaya.35

- Where does latent state of attachment to existence lie latent? (Kattha bhavarāgānusayo anuseti?)
- In the fine-material element and immaterial element, latent state of attachment to existence lies latent. (Rūpadhātuyā arūpadhātuyā ettha bhavarāgānusayo anuseti.)

Although bhavarāgānusaya arises in the four kinds of lobhamūlacittas dissociated from wrong view through the condition of being born together, it is said to lie latent in the two feelings of the sense sphere. Though bhavarāgānusaya arises with the two feelings of the supramundane, it obtains only the dhammas of the form sphere and the formless sphere. It does not take even one dhamma which is included in the supramundane as its object, therefore it is said bhavarāgānusaya lies

35 Yamakāatthakhatha
latent in the form sphere and the formless sphere through the object condition. On the other hand, \( rāga \) is twofold, namely \( kāmarāga \) and \( bhavarāga \). Among them \( kāmarāga \) lies latent in the two feelings of the supramundane. If \( bhavarāga \) is said as \( kāmarāga \) it seems to be mixed with \( kāmarāga \), therefore the Buddha preached dividing \( rāgakilesa \) into two kinds in order to show the difference between \( bhavarāga \) and \( kāmarāga \). It should be understood as the place of lying latent of \( bhavarāgānusaya \).\(^{36}\)

- Where does latent state of ignorance lie latent? (\( Kattha \) \( avijjānusayo \) \( anuseti \)?)
- In the states of all that include body, latent state of ignorance lies latent. (\( Sabbasakkāyapariyāpannesu \) \( dhammesu \) \( ettha \) \( avijjānusayo \) \( anuseti \).)

\( Avijjānusaya \) lies latent in all the dhammas in the three spheres. Therefore, it is said \( avijjānusaya \) lies latent in all the \( dhammas \) which are included in the five aggregates. It lies latent in the twelve \( akusalacittas \) through the conditions of being born together. Concerning the object, it never arises without taking any \( dhammas \) of the three spheres as its object. This should be understood as the place of lying latent of \( avijjānusaya \).\(^{37}\)

“Here the following facts should be remembered that the \( Sotāpannas \) and the \( Sakadāgāmins \) have still five biases (i.e. 1,2,3,6,7; the \( Anāgāmins \) three (i.e. 3,6,7) and the \( Arhats \) none.\(^{38}\) The questions begin thus:

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\(^{36}\) Yamakāatthakhatha

\(^{37}\) Ibid.

\(^{38}\) Guide, p.105
(1 with 2)

a. “Does to (every) one to whom the bias of sensuous craving adheres, also the bias of anger adhere? – Yes.

b. And does (every) one to whom the bias of anger adhere, also the bias of sensuous craving adhere? – Yes.

(1 with 3)

a. “Does to (every) one to whom the bias of sensuous craving adheres, also the bias of conceit adhere? – Yes.

b. But, does (every) one to whom the bias of conceit adheres, also the bias of sensuous craving adhere? – (No; e.g.) to the Anāgāmin, conceit doss adhere, but not sensuous craving; to three Individuals (Worldling, Sotāpannā, Sakadāgāmin) both do adhere, sensuous craving, as well as conceit.

(1 with 4)

a. “Does to (every) one to whom the bias of sensuous craving adheres, also the bias of erroneous opinion adhere? – (No; e.g.), to two Individuals (Sotāpannā, Sakadāgāmin) sensuous craving does adhere, but not erroneous opinion.; to the Worldling, however, both do adhere, sensuous craving, as well as erroneous opinion.

b. (This converse question is answered in the affirmative.)

Then follow pairs of questions regarding: 1 with 5, 1 with 6, 1 with 7; thereafter, 2 with 3, 2 with 4 and 5, 2 with 6 and 7, then 3 with 4 and 5, 3 with 6 and 7; then 4 with 5, 4 with 6 and 7; 5 with 6 and 7, 6 with 7’; then, 1 and 2 with 3; 1 and 2 with 4 and 5, 1 and 2 with 6 and 7; 1-3 with 4 and 5, 1-3 with 6 and 7; 1-4 with 5, 1-4 with 6 and 7, 1-5 with 6 and 7; 1-6 with 7. Example:
(1-5) with 6 and 7): To whomsoever sensuous craving, anger, conceit, erroneous opinion, and skepticism adhere, do their also craving for existence, and ignorance, adhere?\textsuperscript{39}

In *Anusaya-vāra*, to the questions “Does *paṭighānusaya* arise in whom where *kāmarāgānusaya* arises?” the answer “Yes” is given; this seems to be wrongly answered. Why? Because *kāmarāga* and *paṭigha* can not arise at the same moment. It’s true that *kāmarāga* arises in the eight kinds of *cittas* associated with *lobha*, *paṭigha* arises in the two kinds of *cittas* associated with *domanassa*, there is no arising of the two at the same moment. Therefore, a negative answer should be given to this question. Instead of giving a negative answer, the answer “Yes” was given without taking the present verb according to momentary present, therefore it should be grasped in another way. How? As being not eradicated. In the question “Does *paṭighānusaya* arise in whom where *kāmarāgānusaya* arises?” it is said to refer to the state of being not eradicated. In whom *kāmarāgānusaya* is not eradicated, in that person *paṭighānusaya* is not eradicated either, that is the meaning which should be noticed. If one of those two *anusayas* is not eradicated, the other anusaya is neither eradicated; therefore the answer is “Yes”.

Therein how the meaning should be known? Just as the artists after having started painting and not yet finished the work, if they are asked, “what are you doing these days?”, whenever they are met by friends and friendly people, even at the moment of not doing their work, said that, “we do painting, we do sculpture.” At that moment although they are not working, having not completed the work, but referring to the moment of the work being done and the moment that the work should be done, they

\textsuperscript{39} Nyanatiloka Mahathera, ibid.
are said to be doing. Even so, in that process *anusayas* are not eradicated, or in the process its arising is not rejected if there is condition of arising. There even at the moment of not arising, referring to the arising of the past and the future *paṭīghānusaya* is said to arise in the person in whom *kāmarāgānusaya* arises. This method is also for the other answers.40

In the *Visuddhimagga*, it is said: “Now, there are various meanings of “arisen,” that is to say, (i) arisen as “actually occurring,” (ii) arisen as “been and gone,” (iii) arisen “by opportunity,” and (iv) arisen “by having soil to grow in.” Herein, (i) all that is reckoned to possess [the three moments of] arising, ageing, [that is, presence] and dissolution, is called arisen as actually occurring. (ii) Profitable and unprofitable [*kamma*-result] experienced as the stimulus of an object and ceased-reckoned as “experienced and gone” *anubhūtāpagata*—, and also anything formed, when it has reached the three instants beginning with arising and has ceased-reckoned as `been and gone’ (*hutvāpagata*)—, are called arisen as been and gone (*bhūtāpagata*). (iii) *Kamma* described in the way beginning, “Deeds that he did in the past” (M III 164), even when actually past, is called arisen by opportunity made because it reaches presence by inhibiting other [ripening] *kamma* and making that the opportunity for its own result. And *kamma*-result that has its opportunity made in this way, even when as yet unarisen, is called “arisen by opportunity made,” too, because it is sure to arise when an opportunity for it has been made in this way. (iv) While unprofitable [*kamma*] is still unabolished in any given soil (plane) it is called arisen by having soil [to grow in].41

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40 Anusaya-yamaka-āṭṭhakathā, trans. by the researcher
41 Vsm., p. 716.
Here the difference between the soil and what has soil should be understood. For “soil” (plane) means the five aggregates in the three planes of becoming, which are the object of insight. “What has soil” is an expression for defilements capable of arising with respect to those aggregates. Those defilements have that soil (plane).

“And that is not meant objectively. For defilements occupied with an object arise with respect to any aggregates including past or future ones as well as present, and also with respect to the subjectively fully-understood aggregates in someone else whose cankers are destroyed, and so on. And if that were what is called “arisen by having soil to grow in” no one could abandon the root of becoming because it would be unabandonable. But “arisen by having soil to grow in” should be understood subjectively with respect to the basis for them in oneself. For the defilements that are the root of the round are inherent in one’s own aggregates not fully understood by insight from the instant those aggregates arise. And that is what should be understood as “arisen by having the soil to grow in,” in the sense of its being unabandoned.”

Summary:

- **Lobha cetasika** which attaches to 11 kāma planes is known as latent state of attachment to sensual pleasures, and it is:
  (a) as of person: lies latent at *Puthujjana, Sotāpanna* and *Sakadāgāmi*, and not at *Anāgāmi* and *Arahant*.
  (b) as of eradication: happens at *Sotāpatti Maggāṭṭhāna* and *Sakadāgāmi Maggāṭṭhāna*, and does not happen at *Anāgāmi Maggāṭṭhāna* and *Arahatta Maggāṭṭhāna*.

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42 Vsm., p. 716.
(c) as of plane: happens at the time when sensing  kāma dhātu (or) 11 kāma planes.

(d) as of feeling: arises at 19 kāma sukha vedanā and 32 kāma upekkhā vedanā.

(e) as of lying latent: Even if (this latent state of attachment to sensual pleasures) is not at the rising-moment, or standing-moment, or ceasing-moment in present; as long as it is not eradicated by Magga, then it is called (anuseti - lies latent) whether it was, or it is, or it will be.

❖ **Dosa cetasika** is known as latent state of hatred, and it is

(a) as of person: lies latent at Puthujjana, Sotāpanna and Sakadāgāmi, and not at Anāgāmi and Arahant.

(b) as of feeling: arises at 2 domanassa vedanā and (as only when sensing) 1 dukkha vedanā

(c) as of lying latent: Even if (this latent state of attachment to sensual pleasures) is not at the rising-moment, or standing-moment, or ceasing-moment in present; as long as it is not eradicated by Magga, then it is called (anuseti - lies latent) whether it was, or it is, or it will be.

❖ **Māna cetasika** which associates with 4 diṭṭhigata vippayutta (of lobha-hetu) is latent state of pride, and it is:

(a) as of person: lies latent at Puthujjana, Sotāpanna, Sakadāgāmi and Anāgāmi, and not at Arahant.

(b) as of eradication: happens at Sotāpatti Maggaṭṭhāna, Sakadāgāmi Maggaṭṭhāna and Anāgāmi Maggaṭṭhāna, and does not happen at Arahatta Maggaṭṭhāna.
(c) as of plane: happens at the time when sensing 11 kāma planes (or) kāma dhātu, 16 rūpa (fine-material) dhātu and 4 arūpa (immaterial) dhātu.

(d) as of feeling: arises at 19 kāma sukha vedanā and 32 kāma upekkhā vedanā.

(e) as of lying latent: Even if (this latent state of attachment to sensual pleasures) is not at the rising-moment, or standing-moment, or ceasing-moment in present; as long as it is not eradicated by Magga, then it is called (anuseti - lies latent) whether it was, or it is, or it will be.

\textit{Diṭṭhi} cetasika which associates with 4 diṭṭhigata sampayutta (of lobha-hetu) is latent state of wrong-views, and it is:

(a) as of person: lies latent at Puthujjana, and not at Sotāpanna, Sakadāgāmi, Anāgāmi and Arahant.

(b) as of planes: happens at the time when sensing (all) three Dhātu.

(c) as of feeling: arises at sukha vedanā, dukkha vedanā and upekkhā vedanā

(d) as of lying latent: Even if (this latent state of attachment to sensual pleasures) is not at the rising-moment, or standing-moment, or ceasing-moment in present; as long as it is not eradicated by Magga, then it is called (anuseti - lies latent) whether it was, or it is, or it will be.

\textit{Vicikiccā} cetasika which associates with 4 diṭṭhigata sampayutta (of lobha-hetu) is latent state of doubts, and it is:

(a) as of person: lies latent at Puthujjana, and not at Sotāpanna, Sakadāgāmi, Anāgāmi and Arahant.
(b) as of planes: happens at the time when sensing (all) three Dhātu.

(c) as of feeling: arises at sukha vedanā, dukkha vedanā and upekkhā vedanā

(d) as of lying latent: Even if (this latent state of attachment to sensual pleasures) is not at the rising-moment, or standing-moment, or ceasing-moment in present; as long as it is not eradicated by Magga, then it is called (anuseti - lies latent) whether it was, or it is, or it will be.

Lobha cetasika which associates with 4 diṭṭhigata vippayutta (of lobha-hetu) that attaches to rūpa planes and arūpa planes is the latent state of attachment to existence, and it is:

(a) as of person: lies latent at Puthujjana, Sotāpanna, Sakadāgāmi and Anāgāmi.

(b) as of eradication: happens at Sotāpatti Maggaṭṭhāna, Sakadāgāmi Maggaṭṭhāna and Anāgāmi Maggaṭṭhāna, and not at Arahatta Maggaṭṭhāna.

(c) as of plane: happens at the time when sensing rūpa planes and arūpa planes.

(d) as of lying latent: Even if (this latent state of attachment to sensual pleasures) is not at the rising-moment, or standing-moment, or ceasing-moment in present; as long as it is not eradicated by Magga, then it is called (anuseti - lies latent) whether it was, or it is, or it will be.

Mohá cetasika which associates with (all) 12 akusala is latent state of ignorance, and it is:

(a) as of person: lies latent at Puthujjana, Sotāpanna, Sakadāgāmi and Anāgāmi, and not at Arahant.
(b) as of planes: happens at the time when sensing (all) three Dhātu.

(c) as of feeling: arises at sukha vedanā, dukkha vedanā and upakkhā vedanā (of 12 akusala).

(d) as of lies latent: Even if (this latent state of attachment to sensual pleasures) is not at the rising-moment, or standing-moment, or ceasing-moment in present; as long as it is not eradicated by Magga, then it is called (anuseti - lies latent) whether it was, or it is, or it will be.

3.3. The nature of Anusayas

In the Kathāvatthu of the Abhidhamma, all the theories that: anusayas are neutral, anusayas are without a cause, anusaya are dissociated from mind” are rejected.

3.3.1. Anusayas are immoral (akusala)

The Mahāsaṅghikas and the Sammitiyas held that the latent bias in its seven forms is:

1. unmoral,
2. without moral or immoral motive,
3. independent of mind.

They alleged that it is not right to say that the average man, while moral, or immoral consciousness is going on, has latent bias, since the motive or condition of such consciousness cannot cause latent bias to manifest itself, nor is such consciousness conjoined with any form of bias.
The Theravādin refuted by saying that if latent bias is unmoral then it will be identified with any of the morally indeterminate ultimate (abyākata) - with resultant (vipāka) or with inoperative indeterminate (kiriya), with matter or body (rūpa), with Nibbāna, or with the organs (cakkhāyatanaṁ) and objects of sense (phoṭṭhabāyatanaṁ).

Again, take each form of bias, unless that each form is something different in kind or degree from the corresponding kind of ‘fetter,’ (saṁyojana) or ‘outburst,’ (pariyuṭṭhānaṁ) or ‘flood,’ (ogha) or ‘yoke,’(yoga) or ‘hindrance,’(nīvaraṇa) which are indisputably immoral states, you cannot call the corresponding form of bias unmoral, whether it be sensual desires, or enmity, or conceit, or mere opinion, or doubt, or lust of life, or nescience. If latent bias is unmoral then lust etc. must be unmoral. An average man, while thinking moral or unmoral thoughts, has not got rid of the root-condition (hetu) of lust or greed. Since latent bias cannot be identified with any ultimate which is admittedly independent of the root-conditions (hetu), it must be indisputably motivated by the root-conditions of lust, or enmity, or dullness.

The Mahāsaṅgikas argued, “You affirm that latent biases are not unconditioned by these root-conditions, and maintain that an average person, while thinking moral or unmoral thoughts, is possessed by forms of latent bias. But you deny that these forms are conditioned by any of the root-conditions accompanying those thoughts. Surely then latent bias is unconditioned.

The Theravādins refuted, “If such an average person is still possessed of lust, even while thinking moral or unmoral thoughts. But you deny that that lust is conditioned by the hetu accompanying those
thoughts. According to you, therefore, lust is unconditioned—which is absurd.”

The *Mahāsaṅgikas* opined, “You affirm that an average person is still possessed of latent bias, even while thinking moral or unmoral thoughts. But you deny that the latent bias is conjoined with such thoughts. Surely then latent bias is independent of mind.”

The *Theravādins* answered, “If, as you admit, such a person is still possessed of lust while thinking moral or immoral thoughts, your denial that lust is conjoined with those thoughts does not necessarily lead to the false conclusion that lust is independent of mind.”

In other words, on the view of the *Andhakas*, the *anusaya* of desire (latent desire) is distinguished from the manifested desire, the desire as flood (*kāmarāgapariyuttāna*), bond (*kāmarāgasamyojana*), outburst (*kāmogha*), fetter (*kāmayoga*), or obstacle (*kāmacchandanivaraṇa*), all of which are the manifestations of desire in different degrees. The latent desire has no objects, while the rest has. The reason for this is not that *anusaya* belongs to the material form, the sense organs, or the sense objects, all of which are part of the material realm and certainly possess no objects. Nor is it because *anusaya* belongs to *nibbāna*, the unconditioned state that goes beyond material and mental factors, and beyond the division between subject and object. Instead, *anusaya* is associated with conditioning force (*saṅkhāra*).

About the nature of *anusaya*, the commentary to the *Yamaka* confirms,

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43 KV., p.253
“In this case it should be decided that *anusaya* is the unwholesome *dhamma* which is produced by conditions and associated with mind. *Kāmarāgāanusaya* is *kāmarāga* as well as *anusaya*.”

One may argue that a *paramatthā dhamma* must arise and pass away, but *anusaya* does not arise, how can it be called a *paramatthā dhamma*? Here it’s not reasonable to say that the mode of being not eradicated arises. It should be understood that the mode of being not eradicated is *anusaya*, and *anusaya* is the stronger *kilesa* in the sense of being not eradicated. Therefore, *anusaya* is associated with mind, having an object, having a cause in the sense of having a condition; it is definitely unwholesome, either past, future or present, therefore it is reasonable to say that it arises. The latent tendencies have the nature of *akusala dhamma*, but they are different from all other defilements since they are subtle defilements of great strength. They are able to lie dormant in each *citta* and they can only be completely eradicated by the path-consciousness.

3.3.2. **Anusayas are with mental objects**

Another controverted point is of “latent bias as with or without mental object.”

Some, for instance, the *Andhakas* and certain of the *Uttarpathakas*, hold that what are called the (seven) latent biases, being something distinct from mind, unconditioned, indeterminate, are thereby without concomitant mental object. The Theravādin’s questions are to show what sort of phenomenon it is that ‘has no mental object.’

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44 *Yamakāatthakhatha*
The Theravādin argued, “Then the forms of latent bias must be either material quality, or Nibbāna, or one of the five organs or five objects of sense, which you deny. But let us take the first form, the bias of sense-desire. If this is without mental object, must you not also affirm the same of all manifestations and notions of sense-desire—to wit, sense-desire as lust, as an outburst of lustful desire, as a Fetter, as a Flood, as a Bond, as an Obstacle? Would you not rather affirm just the opposite of these, that they are concomitant with mental object?

Or again, in what aggregate is latent bias included? The aggregate of mental coefficients (saïkhāra), you say. But these are concomitant with object not less than the other mental aggregates: this you of course admit. How then can you maintain your proposition? If you affirm that (a) the bias of sense-lust has the aggregate of mental coefficients involved with it, and yet is without mental object, you must say no less of (b) sense-lust in general. But you refuse (making of sense-lust as bias a thing apart).

Thus you get: (a) aggregate of mental coefficients with mental object; (b) aggregate of mental coefficients without mental object.

Then is that aggregate partly with, partly without, mental object? Then must you affirm the same of all the mental aggregates . . . which you may not.

Or, passing over the next five latent biases—resentment, conceit, mere opinion, doubt, lust of rebirth—as disposed of by this same argument, take similarly the seventh—nescience—if this as latent bias is without object, it must be no less without mental object when figured as
Flood, Bond, Outburst, Fetter, Obstacle—which you deny [keeping the latent bias a thing apart].

The argument about the aggregates applies no less to this form of bias.

The Andhakas said, “But is it not right to say that, when an average man of the world is thinking of something that is morally good or indeterminate, he may be described as ‘having latent bias’? And are not [at that moment] those forms of bias [latent in him] without mental object?

The Theravādins: “But you could equally well say of him at such a moment that he had lust in his heart, and you deny that lust is without mental object.”

To summarize, first, if the latent desire belongs to saṅkhāra, then saṅkhāra should also be without objects. On the other hand, however, the manifested desire itself also belongs to saṅkhāra, and this desire certainly possesses objects, then saṅkhāra should have objects. The Andhakas are forced into a self-contradiction by admitting saṅkhāra to be with and without objects at the same time. Their solution to this contradiction is to admit “a portion of saṅkhāra being with objects and the other portion without objects.”

The third point concerning anusaya discussed in the Kathāvatthu is “That the kāma-sphere means only the fivefold pleasures of sense.”

There are these fivefold pleasures of sense, bhikkhus: which are the fire? Objects desirable,. . . adapted to sense-desires (kāmā), and seductive

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45 KV., pp. 234-36
are cognizable by sight, hearing, etc. five kinds of [objects associated with] sense-pleasure. Nevertheless, bhikkhus, these are not sense-desires; they are called in the Ariyan discipline [objects of] sense-pleasures [kāmaguṇā]. For kāma is a man’s lustful intention.”

“The manifold of objects in the world,
This in itself is not ‘desires of sense.’
Lustful intention is man’s sense - desires.
That ‘manifold of objects doth endure;
The will thereto the wise exterminate?”

Hence it is wrong to say that just the five kinds of sense-objects constitute sense-desires.”

In this discussion, when the Andhakas were asked whether this division between the portion associated with the mind and that disassociated with the mind is applicable to other aggregates such as feeling (vedanā), conception (saññā), and consciousness (viññāna), they denied. This means that only the aggregate of saṅkhāra enjoys the status of being both associated and dissociated with the mind.

Finally, the Andhakas argued for the latent defilements being without objects along the line of moral psychology. When the ordinary person, i.e., those who have not liberated from defilements, is willing something morally good (kusala) or neutral (abyākata), he is still understood to be embedded with anusaya, for otherwise he will be liberated. In this state, his good or neutral thoughts have their corresponding objects, but the latent defilements at that moment cannot

46 KV., p. 216
have any objects. If it does, the morally bad thought would emerge and that would eradicate any morally good or neutral thought.

This argument in terms of moral psychology makes more sense if we understand *anusaya* as an unconscious or subconscious state. An unconscious or subconscious state can be understood to be dissociated with the conscious mind, so it is not a regular type of mental activity. As a result, it does not take the normal mental objects as objects, and can be considered to have no objects. Another way to make sense this point is to resort to the Lacanian concept of pure desire that is beyond any recognizable object. For him, desire is not a relation to an object but a relation to a lack. In any case, the thesis that latent defilements have no objects constitutes the first step toward the formation of the concept of the cognition of nonexistent objects.\footnote{Zhihua Yao, Some Mahāsāṃghika Arguments for the Cognition of Nonexistent Objects, accessed at http://philpapers.org/archive/YAOSMA.1.pdf}

The fourth controverted point is “Of the pleasures of sense.” This discourse is intended to teach those who, like the *Pubbaseliyas*, contract the meaning of *kāmadhātu* (element or datum of desire) to that of *kāmaguṇā* (pleasurable sensations), ignoring the difference in the meaning of the two terms. It is true that in the *Sutta*, “There are these five kinds of pleasurable sensations, *bhikkhus*” — the whole world of *kāmadhātu* is implied. Nevertheless, generally *kāmadhātu* may stand for *vatthukāmā*, objects of sense - desire; *kilesakāmā*, corrupt, worldly desires; and *kāmabhava*, or the eleven lowest planes of existence (from purgatory to the six lowest heavens). In the first term *kāma* means ‘to be desired’; in the second, it means both ‘to be desired’ and ‘to desire.’ However, in the last term *kāma* means ‘to be desired’ or ‘desiring,’ or
place where objects of sense happen.’ Dhātu, as always, means self-existing ultimate, without entity, non-substantial.

The Theravādins asked, “You admit, do you not, that desire, intention, zest, and joy, and the passion or lust that is involved in each, are all bound up with the fivefold pleasures of sense? How then can you maintain that the kāma-life is only those pleasures? Do you mean that human organs of sense are not coextensive with kāma-life, the five organs of external sense and the coordinating sense, or mind? No, you say (meaning only the pleasures of sense in your proposition); but think again as to mind. . . Yes, you now say, mind is not kāma life. But was it not said by the Exalted One:

“Fivefold the world’s sense – pleasures be,
And mind as sixth, our lore doth rede,
Whoso therein doth purge desire,
Is thus from ill and sorrow freed”?

Hence it cannot be said that the kāma-life does not include the mind.

Again, can you say that the pleasures of sense amount to a sphere of life, a destiny, a realm of beings, to renewed life, to a matrix, a station for consciousness, an acquiring of individuality? Is there karma leading to them? Are there beings to be reborn in them? Do beings get born, grow old, die, decease, get reborn ‘in’ sense-pleasures? Are there the five aggregates in them? Are they a five-mode existence? Are Buddhas Supreme, Silent Buddhas, Chief Pairs of disciples reborn in them? All these things you can predicate of the ‘kāma-element’, but not one of them of the pleasures of sense.
P. But was it not said by the Exalted One: Bhikkhus, there are these fivefold kāma-pleasures—which are they? Objects desirable, sweet, agreeable, dear, connected with kāma and seductive, are cognizable by sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch—these are the five kinds of kāma pleasures.

Hence surely the kāma-element is only those five.”

The fifth points of controversy is “Of Lust for the Unpleasant.”

The Uttarāpathakas, based on the Sutta-passage, “Whatsoever feeling he feels, pleasant, painful, or neutral, lie delights in and commends that feeling” emphasizing the ‘delights in’ hold that one can delight in painful feeling as enjoyment of passionlessness.

The Theravādins argued, “Do you go so far as to maintain that of the beings who delight in the painful, some wish for it, long for it, seek, search, hunt for it, and persist in cleaving to it? Is not rather the opposite your genuine belief? You assent. Then how do you maintain your proposition? Can anyone have at once a latent bias of lust for painful feeling and a latent bias of aversion from pleasant feeling? Will not these two forms of bias be [really] directed inversely, the former craving pleasure, the latter hating pain?

[3] U.—But if I am wrong, was it not said by the Exalted One: 6 He, thus, expert in complacency and antipathy, delights in and commends whatsoever feeling he feels, pleasant, painful, or neutral, and persists in cleaving to. Hence surely there is such a thing as lusting for the unpleasant?

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48 KV., pp. 214-15
In summary, the discussions in the Kathāvatthu aimed to show that anusayas are paramattha dhammas. They are cetasikas, they “arise” in the meaning that they have not been eradicated yet and can arise whenever there are proper conditions. They are unwholesome and has mental objects.

3.4. The accumulation of anusaya

If whatever we have seen, heard, felt, perceived, thought, experienced and done were not registered in some way, in the subconscious or unconscious, we would not even be able to remember what we were thinking at the preceding moment. We would not know anything of the existence of other beings and things; we would not know our parents, teachers, friends, and so on; we would not even be able to think at all, as thinking is conditioned by the remembrance of former experiences; and our mind would be emptier than the actual mind of an infant just born, or even of the embryo in the mother’s womb.

“In the philosophy of mind underlying the Abhidhamma, the mental process falls into two general categories. One is passive consciousness, the other active consciousness. Passive consciousness consists of a succession of momentary mental states of a uniform nature, called the life-continuum (bhavaṅga). This type of consciousness runs through and beneath the whole existence of an individual from birth to death, interrupted only by the occasions of active consciousness. The life-continuum is a result of kamma generated in the past existence, and determines the basic disposition of the individual in the present. It is most prominent in deep sleep, even though it occurs undetected countless times
each day during waking hours in the brief intervals between active consciousness.”

Thus this subconscious life-stream, or bhavanga-sota, can be called the precipitate of all our former actions and experiences, which must have been going on since time immemorial and must continue for still immeasurable periods of time to come. Therefore what constitutes the true and innermost nature of man, or any other being, is this subconscious life-stream, of which we do not know whence it came and whither it will go. All life is a flowing, a continual process of becoming, change and transformation. Previously accumulated cetasikas (anusaya) provide the necessary driving force which causes new forms of energy to arise as the mind continues to function.

“The Abhidhamma theory of bhavanga-citta has its parallel in the Yogācāra conception of alaya-vijñāna or ‘store consciousness’. Like bhavaṅga, alaya too has two aspects. It is originally pure (prakṛtiparīsuddha) and is at the same time defiled by adventitious elements (agantukaklasopaklista). The major difference between the Abhidhammika and Yogācāra theories is that the former maintains its realist standpoint by asserting that the originally pure consciousness is defiled as a result of its impact with the real external object, while the latter upholds its idealist point of view by maintaining that defilements are due to the subject-object discrimination which is an activity of the mind itself.”


Anusayas are accumulated at every moment, but there cannot be an additional citta that stores these anusayas, and there cannot be anything lasting. That would be eternalism. One citta falls away, but it is succeeded by the following one. If there would be no connection between past and present there would be annihilation belief. Accumulations change, they are not static, because a new accumulation, good or bad is added. Accumulations lie dormant and can condition the arising of kusala or akusala at the present.

Anusaya cultivates the ignorant mind to give rise to thoughts, feelings, emotions, and memories. This is an on-going phenomenon continually arising within less time than it takes to snap one’s fingers; so this process repeats itself endlessly. The ignorant mind is unable to be aware of this very subtle and spontaneously natural process. The Paṭṭhāna, the seventh book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, explain the conditional relations of the kamma we do with the anusaya we accumulate.

Thus, akusala javana vīthi-citta, kusala javana vīthi-citta and kiriya javana vīthi-citta can be repetition-condition (āsevana-paccaya) for the arising of the succeeding citta. Through this condition there is a repetition of cittas of the same jāti (nature) which arise and perform the function of javana, and thus, kusala citta and akusala citta can acquire strength, they can become kamma-condition for the arising of vipāka (effect) in the future. Each time greed, hatred, or delusion arises; it becomes anusaya. An accumulation of greed is called rāgānusaya, habit of greed. When it arises each time, it accumulates. Whichever defilement arises once, it becomes an accumulation. If we have hatred once, it
accumulates, and is called \textit{patigh\=anusaya}. If we have delusion again and again, it is called \textit{avijj\=anusaya}, habit of ignorance.

Moreover, there can be natural strong dependence-condition (\textit{upanissaya-paccaya}), for the arising again in the future of \textit{akusala javana v\=ithi-citta}. The frequent arising in a continuing series of different kinds of \textit{akusala javana-cittas} conditions an ever increasing accumulation of \textit{akusala} as it is stated in the \textit{Pa\=ṭṭhāna}:

\begin{quote}
“Lust, hate, delusion, conceit, wrong view, wrong view, wish is related to lust, hate, delusion, conceit, wrong view, wrong view, wish by strong-dependence condition.”\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

Good and bad qualities accumulated in the past become our nature, they condition the different \textit{cittas} in the present life by way of natural decisive support-condition. We read in the \textit{Maha-Sutasoma Jataka} that the Buddha said that not only in his present life he had tamed the robber \textit{Aṅgulimāla} who had slain many people but later on attained arahatship, but also in a former life when the Buddha was King \textit{Sutasoma} and \textit{Aṅgulimāla} was the King of \textit{Baranasi}. Once the King’s cook could not obtain meat and gave him, without telling him, human flesh. We read:

\begin{quote}
“... No sooner was a bit of the meat placed on the tip of the King’s tongue than it sent a thrill through the seven thousand nerves of taste and continued to create a disturbance throughout his whole body. Why was this? From his having previously resorted to this food....” \textsuperscript{52}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{51} CR., p.161
\textsuperscript{52} Jataka Stories V, no. 537
His longing for human flesh became exceedingly strong, it determined his whole life. He was unable to give up his craving, so he abandoned his kingdom and kept on murdering for the sake of human flesh. He had accumulated greed for human flesh because in his preceding life he had been a man-eating Yakkha. His previous accumulations were the natural decisive support-condition for the arising of greed for human flesh and for his killing of human beings. He could not refrain from taking human flesh. Thus we see that deeds performed in the past are a natural decisive support-condition for deeds at the present. Akusala kamma is dangerous since it not only produces unpleasant vipāka, but also by performing akusala kamma the tendency is accumulated to perform akusala kamma again. We like all sense objects, but liking for specific objects can be strongly accumulated.  

Accumulated unwholesome inclinations are a natural decisive support-condition (pakatupanissaya-paccaya) for the arising of akusala citta at the present time. The commentary to the Paṭṭhāna explains the term ‘pakata’ in pakatupanissaya. as ‘done properly’, ‘done thoroughly’. Kusala and akusala which were “done thoroughly”, often performed, can become firmly accumulated, they can become habitual. In this way they are a cogent reason, a powerful inducement for the arising of kusala and akusala later on, which are the dhammas conditioned by them, the paccayupanna dhammas.  

Accumulated dosa can lead to the killing of living beings. Also accumulated lobha can lead to killing, for example, when one kills because one wishes to have someone’s property. At the moment of killing

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there is dosa-mūla-citta, but lobha can motivate the deed, it can be natural decisive support-condition (pakatupanissaya-paccaya). When one commits one kind of akusala it can easily lead to the committing of other types of akusala. We read in the Paṭṭhāna:

“Killing is related to killing... stealing... unlawful intercourse with the other sex... lying... slander... rude speech... foolish babble... avarice... ill-will... wrong views by strong dependence-condition.”

It is then explained that stealing and the other kinds of evil are related to all kinds of akusala by way of decisive support-condition. We may think that it is not very harmful to indulge in idle, useless speech. However, this kind of speech can be a natural decisive support-condition for lying, stealing, killing or other kinds of akusala kamma.

Among the innumerable deeds done in the past that particular kamma has been a powerful inducement, a natural decisive support-condition for the patisandhi-citta. Kamma has by its own nature the power to cause the arising of the appropriate result, even after countless lives, it is natural decisive support-condition for that result. It does not have to depend on decisive support-condition of object or on proximate decisive support-condition to produce its result. As we have seen, kusala kamma and akusala kamma performed in the past are also a natural decisive support-condition for kusala kamma and akusala kamma at the present time. Even so, by the performing of good or evil deeds now we accumulate the tendency to doing similar deeds later on, thus, such actions are natural decisive support-condition for future deeds.

55 CR. p.161
There are various different terms which are sometimes translated as ‘accumulations’. Here are some that come to mind, some of which you’ve been discussing already:

1. *Carita*: character, behaviour, nature.
2. *Āyūhana*: specifically refers wholesome and unwholesome *kamma* or *kamma* formations (*Saṅkhāra*) as basis for rebirth. *Kamma* conditions rebirth consciousness (*paṭisandhicitta*) only because all possible *kamma* has been ‘accumulated’.
3. *Āsayānusaya*: refers to good and bad tendencies.
4. *Saṅkhāra khandha*: refers to all mental formations except *vedanā* and *saññā*, which are ‘formed’ or ‘accumulated’. It shows the different aspects and how these are all conditioned.
5. *Ācaya*: another word for accumulations
6. *Pakatuupanissaya paccaya*: natural decisive support condition. This is the widest condition which mainly determines how and why attachment or aversion or wisdom or any other states or *cittas* can arise now.
7. *Adhimutti*: shows the difference between the quality of accumulations or dispositions. Some have good ones and others have less.
8. *Pāramī*: perfections refer to just the special good qualities which are accumulated with the mental cultivation.
9. *Vasana*: good and bad habits or mannerisms. Only the Buddha can eradicate the bad aspects or mannerisms completely. We can see the *vasana* in different people’s gestures or walks or sitting postures. The present *vasana* ‘accumulate’ and will condition the *vasana* in future lives too.
3.5. Anusaya and Carita (temperament)

There is a famous saying that is familiar to everyone, “Sow a thought and you reap an action; sow an action and you reap a habit; sow a habit and you reap a character; sow a character and you reap a destiny.” This explains the relation between *anusaya* and *carita*. The *Aññatara Bhikkhu Sutta* records the Buddha as giving this teaching to the monk:

*Bhikkhu*, one is reckoned by whatever lies latent in one.
One is not reckoned by what does not lie latent in one.

*(Ya kho, bhikkhu, anuseti, tena saṅkham gacchati ;
Ya nānuseti, na tena saṅkham gacchati’ ti.)*\(^{56}\)

The *Sutta* commentary explains that if we have a latent tendency towards form by way of sensual lust, etc, then we are described in terms of that latent tendency as being lustful, hated or deluded. But when that latent tendency is absent, one is not reckoned so.\(^{57}\)

Bhikkhu Bodhi adds an interesting note in this connection: “Additionally, we might suppose that, one is reckoned not only by way of the defilements, but even more prominently by way of the aggregate with which one principally identifies. One who inclines to form is reckoned as a “physical” person, who inclines to feeling a “hedonist,” one who inclines to perception an “aesthete” (or fact-gatherer), one who inclines to volition a “man of action,” one who inclines to consciousness a thinker, etc.”\(^{58}\)

\(^{56}\) S. III. 30

\(^{57}\) SA. 3:265

\(^{58}\) CDB., p.1053, n.47
The more *anusaya* is accumulated, the more it flows out. Therefore, when the feeling of greed, anger, or delusion passes by, it immediately jumps out because of many accumulations in the trait. And these psychological and behavioral traits in a person define his own temperament which is called *carita* in Pāli.

*Carita* signifies the intrinsic nature of a person which is revealed when one is in a normal state without being preoccupied with anything. The temperaments of people differ owing to the diversity of their actions or *kamma*. Habitual actions tend to form particular temperaments. *Rāga* or lust is predominant in some, and *dosa* or anger, hatred, ill-will, in others. Most people belong to these two categories. There are a few others who lack intelligence and are more or less ignorant (*mohacarita*). Akin to the ignorant are those whose minds oscillate - unable to focus their attention deliberately on one thing (*vitakkacarita*). By nature some are exceptionally devout (*saddhacarita*), while others are exceptionally intelligent (*buddhicarita*). Combining these six with one another, we get sixty-three types. With the inclusion of speculative temperament (*diṭṭhicarita*) there are sixty-four types.⁵⁹

*Carita* distinguished one person from another, people differ in outlook, attitude, habit and tendency. Because, in the previous existences if his deeds were mostly influenced by greed, then *kamma* and *vipāka* cause him to be rāga dominant (*rāgacarita*). If *dosa* was significant in his deeds in the past lives his tendency in the present existence would be one of *dosacarita*. If ignorance accompanied his *kamma* in the past lives, now the result will be a *moha* dominant person. If a person loved wisdom in

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the past and did meritorious deeds pertaining to paññā, he will now be reborn as a buddhicarita person.\footnote{Narada Mahathera, \textit{The Buddha and His Teaching}, Buddha Dharma Education Association Inc., pp.412-413}

“A significant aspect of these ‘character traits’ is that they cut across the dispositions of people over a number of births and thus go beyond the limits of childhood experience. This, too, is a concept that has not been absorbed by contemporary psychology in the west”\footnote{Padmasiri de Silva, \textit{An Introduction to Buddhist Psychology}. Great Britain: Lowe and Brydone, 1979. p. 86}. The \textit{Visuddhimagga} explains the source of these temperaments as their previous habits:

“Apparently one of greedy temperament has formerly had plenty of desirable tasks and gratifying work to do, or has reappeared here after dying in a heaven. And one of hating temperament has formerly had plenty of stabbing and torturing and brutal work to do or has reappeared here after dying in one of the hells or the nāga (serpent) existences. And one of deluded temperament has formerly drunk a lot of intoxicants and neglected learning and questioning, or has reappeared here after dying in the animal existence. It is in this way that they have their source in previous habit, they say.”\footnote{PP., pp. 97-98}

Venerable \textit{Buddhaghosa} continued to mention the importance of the relinking conciousness or \textit{paṭisandhicitta}:

“For when in one man, at the moment of his accumulating [rebirth-producing] \textit{kamma}, greed is strong and non-greed is weak, non-hate and non-delusion are strong and hate and delusion are weak, then his weak non-greed is unable to prevail over his greed, but his non-hate and non-
delusion being strong are able to prevail over his hate and delusion. That is why, on being reborn through rebirth-linking given by that kamma, he has greed, is good-natured and unangry, and possesses understanding with knowledge like a lightning flash.

“When, at the moment of another’s accumulating kamma, greed and hate are strong and non-greed and non-hate weak, and non-delusion is strong and delusion weak, then in the way already stated he has both greed and hate but possesses understanding with knowledge.

“When, at the moment of his accumulating kamma, greed, non-hate and delusion are strong and the others are weak, then in the way already stated he both has greed and is dull but is good-tempered and unangry.”  

However, not only paṭīsandhīcitta is important in forming a person’s carita, what he is doing at present while accumulating kamma in this life also affect his temperament as it is said further in the Visuddhimagga:

“When, at the moment of another’s accumulating kamma, greed and hate are strong and non-greed and non-hate weak, and non-delusion is strong and delusion weak, then in the way already stated he has both greed and hate but possesses understanding with knowledge.

“When, at the moment of his accumulating kamma, greed, non-hate and delusion are strong and the others are weak, then in the way already stated he both has greed and is dull but is good-tempered and unangry.”

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63 PP., pp. 97-98  
64 Ibid., p.99
To the question “How is it to be known that “This person is of greedy temperament?” and so on, the Visuddhimagga explained as follows:

“By the posture, by the action,
By eating, seeing, and so on,
By the kind of states occurring,
May temperament be recognized.”

The evil impact of mental defilements is not limited personal scale, rather they generate the climate which feeds the acquisitive personality (rāgacarita) and the aggressive personality (dosacarita) in others, too. If we are dominated by the craving to collect, hoard and possess things, we excite the same tendencies in others and unknowingly exalt this personality type as the most infectious social symbol, leading to passion, avarice, wickedness, quarrelling and strife.

In this chapter, based on the explanations of the Abhidhamma, each anusaya is defined clearly, their own nature as being a paramattha dhamma is justified, how they are accumulated, by which kinds of causal relations, and the connection between anusaya and carita are also presented. Together with what has been discussed in the Chapter II, hopefully the whole image of anusaya as reflected in the Sutta and Abhidhamma of Early Buddhism is quite clear.

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PP., p. 99