Chapter - 4

SOURCES OF INDIAN EXPECTATIONS

Independent India inherited all the rights of their colonial masters without
the local preponderance of power that British had. Nehru was conscious of
India’s geo-strategic importance and in this regard he stated: “India because
of the force of circumstances, because of geography, because of history, be-
cause of so many other things inevitably has to play an important part in Asia.
Look at the map. If you had consider any question affecting the Middle East,
India inevitably comes into the picture. If you have to consider any question
concerning South East Asia you cannot do so without India so also with Far
East.” 1 Such a feeling was born out of conviction that India had played a great
role before she was colonised and after independence she would once again
play an important role in human affairs. Nehru further stated: “India has a very
strong individuality for thousands of years. We had a mind of our own, a soul
and spirit of our own”, and “to consider that we can tie ourselves with this or
that group regardless of what we are, seems to be a complete misunderstanding
of what India has been in the past or what she is or what she is going to be
in the future”. 2 It was this conviction that gave birth to India’s foreign policy
of non-alignment. The policy of non-alignment followed by India made her an
important country talking on equal terms to great countries in the international
arena. 3 Nehru being conscious of India’s position stated: “One of the main
things which in the years following independence have attracted the world’s
attention to India has been our broad based approach to international affairs.

1. J. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy (Delhi, 1971), p. 22
2. A. Chakravarthy, Nehru: His Democracy and India (Calcutta, 1961), p. 51
3. M. Brecher, India and World Politics Krishna Menon’s View of the World (London,
1965), p.165
particularly the policy of non-alignment”. It was in this background that Nehru developed his relationship with other countries. From the days of independence India’s relationship with all other countries except Pakistan had been cordial. Nehru was therefore, right in assuming that India had no substantive conflict of interests with any of the leading countries and ideological differences were not seen as an obstacle to good relations, given that there was a commitment to peaceful co-existence. India was thus justified in thinking that she would be the “Pivot of Asia” and the future of Asian countries especially India’s neighbours, both small and big would be determined by the future of India.

After Independence, the major threat perception of our policy makers was directed towards Pakistan. This perception was due to reasons for the creation of Pakistan as well as the communal aspect attached to it and to make matters worse the Kashmir issue remained undecided and to Pakistan the process of partition would remain incomplete without integration of Kashmir. To India the loss of Kashmir would go against its principle of a pluralistic and secular state. The communal factor that dominates between these two countries became a permanent source of security concern. Thus whenever the question of border came to the mind of policy makers it was the north-western border. The Pakistani attempt to forcibly take Kashmir in 1948, created a Pakistani fixation which one scholar has described as, “To guard the north west became a habit.” This feeling was justified by history also because traditionally it was through the north west that land invasions took place and Himalayas had prevented invasions from their side. Thus the north and north east due to Himalayas created a feeling of Maginot line. The north western part of India especially

4. J. Nehru, n. 1, p. 82
5. T. Mende, Conversations with Nehru (Delhi, 1956), p. 76
7. K.M. Panikkar, Geographical Factors in Indian History (Bombay, 1959), pp. 67 - 69
Kashmir became the most important aspect for defence of India.

Pakistan’s alliance with west by joining SEATO and CENTO in 1954 and 1955 enhanced the threat perception from the northwest. Pakistan on its part made it clear that it was joining these alliances mainly against India. 8 Pakistan’s joining of these alliances convinced India of Pakistan’s desire to destroy India. Pakistan also began to send overtures to China and at Bandung Pakistan got an opportunity to establish close ties with China. 9 The Chinese too did not allow this opportunity to go. They told Pakistan, at the peak of Sino-Indian relations in 1955, that there was no clash of interests between China and Pakistan. But this did not apply to India-China relations. 10 Pakistan too convinced the Chinese that joining SEATO and CENTO was not against China. 11 Chinese viewed this as an excellent opportunity to prevent India and Pakistan from coming close because an Indo-Pakistan alliance would be against China. Therefore China had a vested interest in keeping India and Pakistan separated permanently. To China friendship with Pakistan was a way to counter China’s encircling by Russia and India. 12 India on the other hand assumed that Pakistan and China would never come close, due to ideological and political differences between the two countries. 13 India thus failed to take note of real-politik which the Chinese were bound to follow because “Chou En-lai” as Nehru’s biographer says, “knew where power and interest lay”. 14 The Sino - Pakistan alliance was viewed to reinforce the belief that Pakistan would attempt to

8. S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru - A Biography Vol. 3 (Delhi, 1984), p. 50
10. Ibid
11. S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru - A Biography Vol. 2 (Delhi, 1979), pp. 242 - 43
13. Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations (Press), Part - II, p. 136
14. S. Gopal, n. 8, p. 134
In May 1962 Nehru refers to the second tribal invasion to be organised by Pakistan which would lead to an all out war between India and Pakistan. The Pakistan phobia was so high that the policy makers without proof struck to this belief and even the opinion of the Indian Ambassador in Pakistan was rejected on the matter. Even as late as 1962 when tensions with China were running high Nehru described the Chinese threat only in terms of “tension” and petty conflicts.

Thus the Pakistani threat was overestimated as a continuing process of the partition and all the military resources and preparations were directed in this direction. This thinking was based on the probability that China under no circumstances would attack India, because an attack on India would be detrimental to the Chinese as well as to the whole world. This aspect why Nehru thought so about China will be discussed later.

Before the invasion of Tibet by People’s Republic of China, Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal and Tibet formed the buffer zones. The British by virtue of their superiority or power were able to retain these states as buffer zones. Independent India inherited these British rights in Tibet, Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal. Of all these states Nepal was the most important state because of its geographical location. Therefore through Nepal it would be very easy to infiltrate into India, hence defence of Nepal’s border with Tibet was very crucial from India’s point of view. In December 1950 Nehru said: “The Himalayas lie mostly on the northern border of Nepal. We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the principal barrier to India. Therefore much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or

16. Vertzberger, n. 12, p. 134
permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security." 18 Nehru was concerned about Nepal because he was confident that the day Chinese became strong, invasion of Tibet would become unavoidable and invasion through northern border, of Tibet with Nepal could be dangerous. Tibet's invasion was foreseen by Nehru and he wrote, "the result of all this is that we have the Chinese or the Tibetan communists right up on our Assam, Bhutan and Sikkim border" 19

During British days Nepal was independent but there was a British representative to prevent external powers from establishing their hold in this region and in 1923 Britain signed an agreement recognizing the sovereignty of Nepal. Generally when the British were ruling India Nepal was following an isolationist policy but by 1946 Nepal started shedding its isolationist policy and in 1948 it established diplomatic relations with USA. 20 In 1950 a friendship treaty was signed between India and Nepal which was based on the British policy towards Nepal and the treaty Britain had signed in 1923 with Nepal. According to this treaty which was signed between India and Nepal: "The two governments agree mutually to acknowledge and respect the complete sovereignty territorial integrity and independence of each other." 21 After the invasion of Tibet by China in 1950 October the Chinese described Tibet as the palm whose five fingers are Ladakh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and NEFA. 22 This made Nehru more cautious and he underlined and re-emphasised the significance of Indo-Nepal relationship by saying that "no other country can have as intimate a relationship with Nepal as our is". 23 Because India saw the Himalayas to the

19. S. Gopal, n. 11, p. 105
20. Vertzberger, n. 12, p. 140
21. S.D. Mum, The Foreign Policy of Nepal (Delhi, 1973), Appendix V. pp. 280 - 85
22. Vertzberger, n. 12, p. 115
23. Nehru, n. 18, p. 175
North of Nepal as India’s security boundary and therefore had a special interest in preserving the internal stability of Nepal. India played an important role in bringing about compromise in Nepal in 1951 between the King and the Nepalese Congress Party. Thus India was able to establish a special relation with Nepal. The Chinese too had recognized India’s special status in Nepal China in that period dealt with all issues concerning Nepal through India. Till 1959 there existed a stable relation between India and Nepal despite a few strains caused by Indian domination in Nepal.

India had also established a special relation with Bhutan and Sikkim like the British. In 1949 and 1950 India signed agreements with Bhutan and Sikkim. According to these agreements India acknowledged the sovereignty of Bhutan and Bhutan declared that it will be guided by the advice of the Government of India on foreign policy matters. As per section 3 of the agreement with Sikkim the state of Sikkim shall be protected by India. India was anxious to keep Bhutan and Sikkim out of the influence of the Chinese because of their ethnic and cultural similarities with Tibetans and because these states had religious affinity towards Tibet and had close relations with Lhasa. The invasion of Tibet by China further made these states nervous in view of their vulnerability and these states would have expected India to protect them or act as shield against the possible Chinese takeover. Thus these states were to serve as a “trip-wire” against Chinese invasion. To what extent Nehru was successful in this regard is a different matter but Nehru was mainly concerned with a

24. S.D. Muni, n. 21, pp. 67 - 96
27. Vertzberger, n. 12, p. 118
28. Ibid
29. B.N. Mullick, My Years with Nehru : The Chinese Betrayal (Delhi, 1971), p. 225
policy which would prevent hostile forces from establishing a foothold in these states. Such a policy became imperative because the threat from Pakistan on the Western side was an obsession to India due to unavoidable reasons. Moreover good relation with these Himalayan states would serve as a check against the Chinese invasion.

Nehru was certain that the future of India would be determined by the developments in the world because he thought that India could never keep away from the world. To him the world was divided into two blocs and it was the non-aligned countries led by India that would play an important role of an "honest peace broker". The non-aligned group, according to Nehru was an island of sanity in a world which was on the verge of annihilation caused by sheer ineptitude. The two blocks viewed non-aligned nations very uncharitably in the beginning but slowly the attitude began to change. The change in the attitude of communist countries towards non-aligned countries and its leader India could have been due to the fruitful outcome of Korean crisis in which Nehru had legitimised Chinese interest and convinced Soviet Union to lift its boycott of the Security Council. The US too had reasons to be happy as she requested Nehru to use his proximity to China to dissuade her from attacking Formosa. The Korean crisis was followed by the solution on Indo-China at the Geneva conference in 1954 which saw the legitimization of the concept of Third World power. According to one scholar, this was due to the "coincidence of interest among major powers and the non-aligned nations .... that of saving the world from itself." By the end of 1950 Nehru was recog-

30. Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations (Parliament), Part - I, p. 315
31. Fortnightly letters of Nehru Vol. 3 (Delhi, 1961), p. 61
32. Prime Minister on Sino - Indian Relations n. 30, p. 182
33. Allan.S. Whiting, China crosses the Yalu (New York 1960), pp. 61 - 62
34. S.Gopal, n. 11, p. 109
35. Vetzberger, n. 12, p. 76
nized as a world figure, a stature which had no relation to his country's strength. 36 This achievement of Nehru was due to his "role of world's mental balance keeper." 37 The super powers acceptance of Indian's special role in various developments and Nehru's concern for peace was acknowledged by the west. Walter Lippman described Nehru as the "greatest figure in Asia." 38 Nehru was able to experience a kind of personal triumph when changes in relations between super powers were felt and the superpowers started cooperating to diffuse many local tensions. In 1956 the two super powers worked together in the UN to bring about stabilization in middle east following the Sinai campaign and in the Lebanon crisis the dispute was solved to the satisfaction of the contending parties. This was followed by the Congo crisis which was brought under control by the UN forces and the general agreement of 1960 March 15 reflected the attempt to achieve the impossible feat of disarmament and to Nehru, things were moving in the desired direction. Thus by his concern for promoting peace Nehru was recognized as "one of the few living men, who made an impression on the world" and the Harper Magazine described him as the man "since the end of the Churchill Stalin Roosevelt era is the most arresting figure on the world political stage." 39 Even New York Times and Chicago Daily Tribune and New York Post recognized Nehru as the world's most important politician. 40 Nehru's efforts in bringing about global peace were accepted by the leaders of USA and USSR. This uniqueness of India's position in international arena was proved when Khrushchev included India in the five power nations meeting on the Lebanese crisis. The American President also accepted Nehru's special place in international relations when he

36. S. Gopal n. 11, p. 109
37. Vertzberger, n. 12, p. 76
38. S. Gopal, n. 11, p. 56
39. Ibid
40. Ibid, p. 300
wrote to Nehru: "Universally you are recognized as one of the most powerful influences for peace and conciliation in the world. I believe that because you are a world leader for peace in your individual capacity as well as the representative of the largest of the neutral nations your influence is particularly valuable in stemming the global drift towards cynicism, mutual suspicion, materialistic opportunism and finally disaster." The acceptance of Nehru and India's unique position in the world was not only a justification of non-alignment but to Nehru it was also an underlining of India's geo-strategic and geopolitical place on the globe. In other words to Nehru India was able to give to the world a lot by virtue of her position.

By 1953, after Stalin's death, the relationship with the Soviet Union was also improving. The new leadership in Kremlin, which had earlier considered non-alignment as an extension of western bloc now began to view the non-alignment bloc as as good as socialist bloc because by not joining the western alliances it was able to prevent the enhancement of the power of Western alliances. During Stalin's time India was suspect in the eyes of USSR; Gandhi and Nehru were considered as inheritors and successors of British imperialism. This did not force Nehru to drift away from Soviet Union; he still maintained his liking of the Soviet Union which had started in Brussels in 1927. The coming of Khrushchev to power in 1955 saw the development of a new Soviet relationship with the non-aligned world. In 1956, the 20th Congress of Communist Party of Soviet Union confirmed the new attitude towards peaceful-coexistence by the Soviet Union. This development meant according to Nehru,

41. S. Gopal, n. 8, p. 78
42. Vertzberger n. 12, p. 76
44. I. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (London 1983) p. 680
that the Soviet Union was moving towards liberalization and the adoption of a constructive role in world affairs and was attempting to mould a new world order similar to Nehru's ideas.  

The Soviet stand by 1955 was one of the supporting India on its most important factor in foreign policy-Kashmir. In 1957 the USSR for the first time vetoed the Security Council resolution on a referendum in Kashmir. India was thus able to use one super power without joining a particular bloc against Pakistan which was a member of western alliances. The post Stalin period in Indo-Soviet relations was viewed by Nehru as a time of mutual interests based on their common ideology of peaceful-coexistence. The Soviet Union was viewed as non-aggressive and to Nehru: "I don't think there is any country which is more anxious for peace than the Soviet Union." The Soviet support on Kashmir made India adopt a policy of explicit friendship towards her and the Soviet Union was also assured of not being encircled from the south by India so as to threaten the communist regime in Soviet Union. Nehru also saw the advantage from the domestic point, of view in cultivating Soviet Union because the Kremlin issued instructions that communist parties in democratic countries should participate in parliamentary elections and attain power through democratic process. India also saw the advantage of unconditional military and economic aid from the Soviet Union unlike aid from the west which was based on pre-conditions and was against self-reliance. The positive aspect of India's policy towards USSR was seen when in 1960 during Khruschev's visit he said: "If India ever needed help all it had to do was to shout as we are near, just over the mountains."  

45. Fortnightly letters of Nehru (1956) Vol. IV, p. 57  
46. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches March 1953 - August 1957, (Delhi, 1958), p. 303  
47. Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations n. 30, p. 215  
48. J. Bandhophayay, The Making of India's Foreign Policy (Delhi, 1979), pp. 95 - 96  
49. Vertzberger, n. 12, 86
By the year 1959 the US attitude towards India was also on the upswing though with some reservations. The US had played an important role in pressurising Britain to give independence to India and USA did try to include India in its group in the years immediately after India's independence. 50 When USA failed to achieve its goal it drifted towards Pakistan, because USA needed a South Asian country to check the spread of communism. In the initial years American policy makers like John Foster Dulles were not appreciative of India's non-alignment. Dulles viewed Nehru and his ilk as fence sitters trying to make capital out of the struggle between communism and democracy. To Dulles Nehru was a hypocrite preaching conciliation out of 'pactomania'. But Nehru's patience started paying off. Just as he admired Soviet Union for its socialism in the same way he admired the US principles of justice, freedom, equality and democracy which appeared in Indian institution. He himself was an ardent advocate of these principles too. Nehru's initial aloofness from USA was because he was convinced after his visit to that country in 1949 that the USA was determined to restrict the spread of communism and wanted to dominate the international system as the successor to Britain. 51 To Nehru America was not trying to understand the legitimate nationalistic feelings of Russia and China. 52 The US objection to People's Republic of China joining UN was also not appreciated by Nehru because he thought it was an attempt by the west to dominate the world forum denying the Asian country a chance in this world body. Despite these differences, his visit to USA in 1956 enabled him to build up trust with Eisenhower. America extended economic aid to India from 1957 to 1958 during food crisis. Eisenhower also assured Nehru on arms supply to

50. The Hindu 26th October, 1991
52. Ibid
Pakistan. 53 In December 1959, Eisenhower visited India which marked the turning point in Indo-US relations. In this visit Eisenhower promised Nehru large amount of US aid but Nehru did not accept it fearing pressure on Kashmir issue. 54 In his address to Parliament Eisenhower assured India that, “We who are free must support one another and USA will come to India's aid if the need arose” 55

This relationship got boosted further when Kennedy came to power because of his personal closeness to Nehru. Kennedy administration was loaded with pro-Indian officials. 56 Kennedy increased US aid to India excluding food aid. Between 1961-62 India received $400 million dollars and India was viewed as an alternative model to communist Asia. Thus by 1962 the economic diplomacy through non-alignment had started paying off. To India it was one of the rare moments in international relations because both US and Soviet Union competed for its favour. Nehru himself was very particular that India should have both status and influential position in international politics. 57 Nehru had stated that “nothing is more important in the opinion of this government than to make India strong economically and militarily, not strong in the big power sense because that is beyond our capacity”. 58 That is he had the ambition to make India “influential enough to affect international events.” 59 India’s stand-

54. B.N. Mullick, n. 29, pp. 285 - 86
55. New York Times 12th December, 1959
56. Vertzberger, n. 12, p. 94
58. J. Nehru, n. 1, p. 35
ing among the world nations convinced Nehru that India was influential enough to affect international event. Thus India's status created an opportunity to assert that "It is a great power, certainly not a great power of the first rank, but great power that relies not so much on economic and military might as on the prestige of an independent moral foreign policy." 60 This image of self gave India a feeling of "great power complex" which compelled Nehru to expect that others will respond to his policies in terms of this image. Such a thinking was born out of the existing reality. Nehru saw India "as father of Asian nationalism and himself as the midwife of the political rebirth of a score of countries in Asia and middle east." 61 Nehru believed that Indian foreign policy was a protest against power politics which had its foundation in the Indian tradition. In other words it drew it inspiration from the Upanishads which advocated Ahimsa. Such a policy enabled India to act as a "bridge of understanding between the rigid and bipolarized world and contribute peace," and Nehru became a "man with the mission to mediate" 62 "With the universal acceptance of his ideas .... he (Nehru) was constantly exhorting new nations. His representatives at the UN were inclined to treat new Afro-Asian members as children in need of a strong hand. Nehru's growing acceptance by great powers and his positive anticolonialist stand won him the respect of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa gratified that one of themselves could speak on terms of equality with the superpowers." 63 India's active participation in International relations during the height of cold war thrust India into prominence. In 1959 Nehru himself told the Parliament that: "It has been an amazing thing .... that India's voice has counted so much in the councils of the world in the last several years, since

62. L.W. Martin, n. 59, p. 98
63. M. Edwardes, Jawaharlal Nehru, Biography (New York, 1956), pp. 275 - 64.
independence." It was seen as a recognition by others of India's stand in international issues. The officials report of Government of India claimed in this regard: "The high position of prestige in the comity of nations that we have come to occupy is obviously the result of our disinterested approach to international problems and the special viewpoint of tolerance and peaceful co-existence, stemming from our cultural inheritance, which has characterized the stands that our leadership has always taken on international issues." It was this image about self which played an important role in raising India's expectations in its relation with China. This image gave Nehru the necessary confidence to pursue a policy of "friendliness" and "firmness" with China.

India had convinced itself that it had a special relationship with China and attributed this relationship with China to their common past. The attitude of kinship towards China was not a sudden development in the years immediately after independence but long before it. In 1924 Rabindranath Tagore expressed this feeling towards China by stating: "The relationship between China and India was built not through the infliction of suffering but through the acceptance of sacrifice and our countries were united through the truth which enables us to feel those who are distant and different to be near and meaningful to us." Nehru too emphasized on relations with China in a similar view and in 1927 Nehru had designated Asia as the main area of Indian foreign policy and he said: "In developing our foreign policy we shall naturally first cultivate friendly relations with the countries of the east, which have so much in common with us". He further said in this regard that "the idea of closer contact with

64. Prime Minister on Sino - Indian Relations, n.30, pp. 246 - 47
Asian nations is becoming increasingly popular. The similarity of many ideas and cultures is partly accountable for this but the real reason is undoubtedly a common antagonism to European domination and exploitation. 68 Nehru in his report on Brussels Congress state that: "An interesting feature of the Brussels congress was the strong desire of the delegates from Asia that the beginning should be made of some Asiatic federation. This was not due to any special feeling against Europe or America but a drawing together of Asiatic elements and a common bond uniting them." 69 In the same report Nehru further stated that "whenever India achieves freedom she is sure to be drawn towards her neighbouring countries and to try to work in a large measure in concert with them." 70 While emphasizing this fact Nehru specifically pointed to friendship with China because of China's significance in Asia and the similarities in the struggle of India and the Chinese people and also due to security considerations in the long run. Nehru had visualized a good neighbourhood and in 1927 after his return from Moscow he wrote, "that between two neighbours as India and Russia there can be either amity or enmity. There is no question of indifference." 71 This was equally applicable to China also which was more close to India geographically.

Nehru was convinced of the historical affinities between the two countries and felt that the destinies of the two nations are closely interlinked. Even before India became free Nehru believed that the future of Asia would be decided by these two countries. In 1939 Nehru during his visit to China talked about imperishable links which bound the two countries and saw himself as one of the long line joining these two ancient centres in history and civilization who

68. Ibid, pp. 280 - 90
69. Ibid, pp. 289 - 90
70. Ibid, p. 270
71. K.P.S. Menon, Many Worlds (Bombay, 1971), p. 302
had found rebirth and vitality again. He was also grateful at the desire of Chinese people for a close and friendly relationship with people of India. In the same vein another great personality and thinker of India S. Radhakrishnan in 1941 said, “our civilizations possessing a common cultural spiritual background with an identity of ideal happy life and friendship” and on the political plain the historical relationship was described as a” "unique example of good neighbourly behaviour." In 1942 Nehru wrote to his sister, “The future which I dream of is inextricably interwoven with close friendship and something almost approaching union with China." Following India’s Independence and Communist victory in China Nehru worked to bring about closer bonds between India and her neighbours especially with China.

To realize the dream of the Asian solidarity Nehru championed the cause of China in the rest of the world, especially for her due place in the UN. The Chinese too reciprocated the Indian friendship by accepting Indian mediation during Korean crisis and Chinese friendship with India was seen as an acceptance of non-alignment and it enhanced India’s stature in the eyes of many newly independent countries. The rosy state of relationship that was developing between the two countries further compelled Nehru to think very optimistically that a creative solution to their problems could be found. India was thus building up relationship with China on the basis of emotional bonds and friendship with China became the “cornerstone” of India’s foreign policy and the future of Asia and to some extent of the world depended on this “friendship” Nehru therefore courageously extended the hand of friendship to a

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73. S. Radhakrishnan, *India and China* (Bombay, 1944), pp. 25 - 30
75. N. Lebow, n. 61, p. 216
76. S. Gopal n. 11, p. 106
globally isolated China despite domestic and external rebuke. This friendship between two important Asian countries reached its zenith by the signing of 1954 agreement on Tibet and the agreement was seen as a hallmark of India’s foreign policy. The agreement was described by Indian press thus: "The unobtrusiveness of the talks and their reward were in significant contrast to the importunateness of cold war diplomacy with its endless frustrations."  

The inclusion of Panchsheel in the 1954 agreement on Tibet signed between India and China had an important clause not to commit aggression against each other and it was an assurance to Nehru on Sino-Indian friendship. The pact of 1954 was not only a boost to the friendly ties between two countries but it generated so much of optimism about the relationship that Nehru rejected the suggestion of the Burmese leader UNu to form a pact against China consisting of India, Burma Ceylon and Pakistan.  

Nehru never accepted such a pact because it would affect India’s friendship with China and pact was no protection against China. In trying to establish friendship with China India had fallen out with other countries. 

China too confirmed its sincerity towards Indian friendship when Chou En-lai wrote to Nehru on 28th December, 1954: "As I have said before the Chinese people are very glad to have such a friendly neighbour as India in the common cause of defending peace. I have firm conviction that the deep friendship between our two peoples and their common desire to work for peace have provided the prospect of broad development for the friendly co-operation between China and India." 

Nehru was thus, able to make a deep impression on the Chinese and felt fully justified in overzealously stressing the aspect of Sino-Indian friendship.

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77. *Times of India* 1st May, 1954
78. S. Gopal, n. 11, p. 65
79. Ibid, p. 108
80. Ibid, p. 234
Nehru was now certain that China recognized and respected the pro-Chinese bias of India's policy and "counted on this reservoir or goodwill" to solve all the differences between India and China. In other words Nehru was sure that profession of amity in themselves would be a solution to the problems between the two countries as and when they arise. Nehru had thus developed a very strong attitude of affinity towards China and right throughout it was this attitude which dominated Nehru's thought on relations with China. It was this mindset of friendship which raised high expectations in the mind of Nehru and from it he found it very difficult to come out. Moreover Nehru believed that China's acceptance among the world nations was due to his personal efforts for which China would always be obliged to India.  

Hence it was quite natural on the part of Nehru to expect that the Chinese would respond to Indian requirements accordingly. Moreover success in international relations not only made Nehru very confident but also made him feel that the position of India was progressing on the expected lines. Such a feeling encouraged him to disregard the Chinese attitude on the border issue. The Indian position was made clear to China but there was no opposition or reaction to India's statement thereby assuring India that the Chinese had more or less accepted the McMahon line. In 1953 Nehru wrote: "No major challenge to these frontiers is likely in the near future."  
The policy of friendship with China itself was to protect the frontiers of the country. Naturally friendship with China was central to Nehru's thinking.  

It was under such circumstances that the crisis in Sino-Indian relations set in. In 1956 Nehru did show some concern regarding the depiction of bound-

82. S. Gopal, n. 11 p. 179  
83. J. Nehru n. 1, p. 79  
84. N. Maxwell, India's China War (Bombay, 1972), p. 72
aries in the Chinese maps and in 1957, the Indian Ambassador in Peking and the Consul- General in Shanghai reported that a coolness was growing on the part of China towards India. 83 Nehru did not take this seriously because in the same summer he had declared in Europe that relations between India and China would continue to be friendly and any lack of agreement would not be a barrier to friendship. 86 Nehru regarded these minor disputes on the frontier were of no great significance to either country. 87 Once again Nehru was being reasonable in the matter and was placing due emphasis on a relationship based on friendship between China and India. In November 1958 Nehru wrote to the Chief Ministers that there was no tension in India's relationship with China or Soviet Union. 88

By 1959, the Sino-Indian crisis, following the developments in Tibet, came out of its shell but Nehru never took it seriously in the beginning because he viewed India's China policy in a fixed manner and left the matter concerning crisis as it was. To Nehru the Sino-Indian border was not to be seen as a case for military action or conflict because India had viewed this border more or less like the U.S.-Canada frontier and only checkposts had to be maintained to guard the routes. 89 If at all there was a dispute, to Nehru, it would be confined to protest notes and status quo on the border would continue indefinitely. 90 Nehru described the border crisis between the two countries as something which comes and goes off, "as if, one was turning a tap on." 91 Thus Nehru's

85. S. Gopal, n. 8, p. 38
86. Ibid. p. 39
87. Ibid
88. Ibid. p. 88
90. Prime Minister on Sino-India Relations n. 30, p. 355
91. Ibid, Vol. II, p. 76
expectation was very firm that the Sino-Indian relations can never go wrong. As days passed on the crisis became more and more grave and the Chinese made it clear that they will not accept the border as dictated by India and the border with India was not formally delimited. Chinese response to the border dispute was seen as Chinese negation of what India had done for the Chinese all these years. 92

The Chinese attitude on the border dispute soon turned into disillusionment for India. Nehru was then forced to set out on a course despite adverse factors arising during the crisis because Nehru never wanted to give up that course for fear that the original stand he had taken could be called into question. Such an attitude from Nehru is not totally unexpected because he was very dogmatic and stubborn and his ideas on foreign policy were fixed. 93 In such a situation to change the stand that he had adopted on China would negate all that he had done all these years and would damage his image which was the last thing he would do. Nehru “loved to be admired and adored and nothing would induce him to risk his resplendent image to be tarnished.” 94 In the case of China this factor carries more weight with Nehru personally than India’s friendship with China. 95 This was so because: “Every country’s foreign policy, first of all, is concerned with its own security and with protecting its own progress. Security can be obtained in many ways ... It is equally true that security is protected by policies. A deliberate policy of friendship with other countries goes further in gaining security than almost anything else”. 96 Thus having developed a mindset for overzealous friendship with China Nehru found it

92. Mankekar, n. 81, p. 162
93. Vertzberger, n. 12, p. 228
94. V.B. Kulkarni, The Indian Triumvirate (Bombay, 1969) p. 548
95. N. Maxwell, n. 84, p. 121
96. J. Nehru, n. 1, p. 79
impossible to retreat or cancel the decision already taken on the border issue. As intraelite competition prevented Nehru from having absolute dominance over his party so he was compelled to pursue a policy keeping in mind the domestic interests.

Nehru was the hero of Indian masses and the “greatest statesman” of that era to whom people of Asia and Africa looked up for inspiration and guidance. Hence to Nehru “natural friendship” is not possible if a nation is looked down upon by the other because Nehru said, “we are great countries of the world who live in freedom without dictation ... We value friendship of the great countries of the world but we can sit with them as brothers only.” Therefore Nehru could never reconcile himself to the fact that he will have to compromise with China on the border dispute to nurture the “historic friendship “In other words, he could never think that a friend could become a foe. To escape from such a pathetic position, Nehru was compelled to resort to a tough stand because Indian parliament had generated lot of interest in this regard as it concerned the security of India. The failure of Nehru’s expectation made him vulnerable to the disgruntled personalities of Congress party and to the opposition which got an opportunity to harass Nehru when they could never pin him down on domestic issues. Nehru was fully aware of his vulnerability therefore had to challenge the adversary to protect himself politically.

Resume

Thus it is very clear that expectations do play an important role in policy making and these expectations are not due to misperceptions but due to certain historical reasons and sometimes by the existing reality in which a nation is placed. Indian expectations were to a great extent due to India’s strategic position geographically and the policy of non-alignment adopted by India had

97. Ibid. p. 271
placed her as an important country in the international arena and probably India was the only country which was talking to other great countries including super powers on equal terms. She was able to develop excellent relations with most of the countries regionally and globally. Thereby feeling that she will be the "Pivot of Asia". The only threat perception that India had in the 1950s was that of Pakistan and this was more due to the circumstances that led to the creation of Pakistan in 1947 at the time of Indian independence. Regionally India was able to develop excellent relations with Burma, Bhutan and Nepal.

Following the Korean crisis and the positive role that India played in this crisis made her acceptable to both the super powers and Indian Prime-Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was regarded as the "Worlds mental balance keeper," Thus by the middle of 1950s India under the leadership of Nehru was accepted and acknowledged by USA, USSR and China as an important nation in the World.

The role that India played during the height of cold war in the international arena had thrust India into prominence. The prominence of India among world nations gave India the necessary confidence in handling her relations with China. Nehru had developed a special affinity towards China even before India became free from the British rule. This affinity towards China had started as early as in 1927 as is evident from his writings on the Brussels conference held in 1927. The Chinese too had reciprocated these sentiments and the 1954 agreement or treaty on Tibet between India and China was an example of the affinity each country had towards the other. The open declaration of amity was seen by Nehru as a solution to the problems between India and China as and when it arises. This was the basis of India's expectation with regard to China and the desire of overzealous friendship with China thus created an emotional intensity and it led to viewing of the China policy in a fixed manner.

It was the desire for overzealous friendship with China which made Nehru declare publicly that India and China will not have any problems regarding the
border and if at all anything comes up it can be solved amicably. The Chinese did accept India's friendship, but when it affected their strategic interests they discarded all sentiments of friendship with India and made it clear that they will not accept what India dictates. The Chinese attitude made Nehru politically vulnerable in his own country and therefore to protect himself he was forced to take a rigid attitude on the boundary problem so as to rationalise his commitment to the Indian public.