CONCLUSION

In this concluding chapter, an attempt will be made to summarise and relate the generalisations which have emerged from the study of the growth of Hyderabad city and from the foregoing discussion on Third World Urbanisation.

In Third World countries, large sections of the population live below the poverty line, the level of economic and technological development is still low and there is an acute scarcity of resources. Given the dual necessity of capital intensive industrialisation for speedy economic take off and wide welfare measures, the State in Third World countries is compelled to play a vital role in shaping the future. The primate cities of Third World countries become a major focus point of these activities of the State, being the seat of administration, Centres of Industrialisation and the other related dimensions of the modernisation process.

Therefore, in the major cities of Third World countries the state becomes the initiator of urban growth. Policies on industrial location and housing and control over large tracts of government land give the state the power to control and guide urban growth. However, more often this access to enormous resources makes the state authority vulnerable to pressures of the political processes. In a democratically elected parlia-
mentary form of government the state apparatus is controlled by the ruling political elite who in Third World countries are deeply influenced by the pulls and pressures of interest group politics.

The mutual dependence between the political elite and the interest groups creates a system characterised by particularistic norms and patron-client relationships. This influences the decision making process of the state as a whole and gives rise more often to ad hoc measures and policies than to rationally planned proposals. The following newspaper report gives a vivid account of the predicament faced by governments in implementing rational plans of action.¹ It also bring out clearly how urban problems in under developed countries are often intractable because of the complexity of the underlying factors.

In order to overcome the problem of mosquito menace in the twin cities of Hyderabad-Secunderabad, the State government had passed a law in June 1986 banning wet cultivation within the limits of the municipal area. The law stated that wet cultivation of paddy or fodder grass or any other crop for which application of water is necessary and which may lead to breeding of mosquitoes was totally banned within the municipal limits. However, even after two years no action was taken inspite of repeated assurances from the Chief Minister because of the following reasons:

1) According to the municipal officials, the main impediment in the implementation of the rules are the city legislators who are indirectly
extending support to the cultivators and have a share in the sale proceeds. Thus, many of the legislators who had expressed concern at the continuation of wet cultivation had subsequently maintained a low profile and had offered no solutions: clear indication of political interests thwarting rational planning.

2) Banning of wet cultivation would mean depriving the cultivators of their only means of livelihood and therefore the government hesitated to take drastic action.

3) The authorities were afraid to enforce a ban because once wet cultivation was stopped, the land might be invaded by squatter settlements whose eviction would become extremely difficult. This had happened when wet cultivation on the river Musi bed near the Fever Hospital was banned.

4) Much of the wet cultivation is guinea grass which is used as fodder for cattle. The government is planning to evict all cattle sheds and private dairy farms from the city and establish them on the outskirts and stopping wet cultivation would have definitely helped the process. But the dairy farm owners constitute a powerful interest group because of their political muscle and such a step cannot be undertaken.

5) Finally, banning of wet cultivation would entail providing compensation to those who had been cultivating for more than five years. The amount of money to be paid as compensation worked out to be around 4 crores, a sum the Municipal Corporation which was in a poor financial position could ill afford.
It is this kind of progressive compromise on legislation and planning principle that Gunnar Myrdal has explained by the concept of 'soft state' and others have termed as 'particularistic state'.

The term 'soft state' is understood to comprise all the various types of social indiscipline which manifest themselves by deficiencies in legislation and in particular low observance and enforcement, a widespread disobedience by public officials on various levels to rules and directives handed down to them, and often their collusion with powerful persons and groups of persons whose conduct they should regulate. Within the concept of the soft state belong also corruption. These several patterns of behaviour are interrelated in the sense they permit or even provoke each other in circular causation having cumulative effect.

The theoretical discussion in the earlier chapter brought out certain lacunae in the existing explanations for Third World Urbanisation. As was shown, what was neglected in several theories was the vital and unique role played by the state which led to the distinguishing features of the typical Third World City that we see today. What essentially shapes this unique role played by the state is the primacy of interest group considerations and a legitimisation of a patron-client system in government. A corollary to this is the single party domination of the political system, a phenomenon often viewed as the 'rise of party charisma' in the context of the Third World countries. These two factors are elucidated below to bring out the consequences of such a kind of state functioning, particularly on the Third World City.

Interest group politics and urban political machine:

With enormous powers and resources vested with the government, the political elite enters into a system of patronage which operates at two levels. At one level are the quid-pro-quo connections between
the politicians and the business elite and at the other are the patron-client relations between the politicians and the voters, especially the poor.

The control the government has over production, access to foreign exchanges, industrial licensing, assortment of taxes and access to institutional financing gives the government enough leverage to manipulate the business and the industrial class. This relation has been "systematically exploited by individual politicians, by parties at the state level and by the central high command to extract funds. A whole new class of intermediaries emerged to carry out the liaison between the money givers and the money takers, of whom the agent who arranged the kickbacks on foreign contracts were the last addition." These particularistic ties between the politician and the businessmen are mutually beneficial. The businessmen fund the election campaigns of the politician and they in turn flout rules and regulations to make concessions and grant contracts to the business elite. A recent legislation of the government of Andhra Pradesh which brings to light this nexus is its decision to increase the floor space index (FSI) of buildings in cities from the existing 1:1.5 to 1:2.5 ostensibly to ease the pressure on housing in cities. This decision was taken much against the advice of town planners who could foresee the problems of further congestion and overload on the already stretched infrastructural facilities like water, electricity and sewerage. On the other hand, the raise in F.S.I. was welcomed by the building industry. The South Indian builders forum hailed the decision as historic as it would revive construction activity in the State.
Opposition party leaders vehemently criticised the government and even submitted a memorandum to the President of India asking him to intervene as the increase in F.S.I. they alleged would help vested interests and regularise unauthorised constructions by the Chief Minister's family members and coterie. Aside from the kind of pressure groups described above, vote banks have also emerged from the influx of poor migrants from the rural areas into the cities. These urban poor are vertically mobilised either through patron-client network or through political machines.

Vertical mobilization occurs when the mobilized are induced to act in ways which influence the actions of the government, but are uninterested in, and sometimes unaware of the impact of their actions on the government. They are acting as instructed motivated largely by loyalty, affection or fear of a leader, or by a desire for benefits that the leader may make available to them if they act according to his directions. On the other hand, the mobilizer is consciously seeking to influence the government.

Vertical mobilisation may take the form of a patron-client relationships or the more organised form of urban political machine. In a patron-client relationship, the patron provides political protection and economic assistance, while his client offers loyalty, labour and political support. A politician who acts as an urban patron usually offers effective brokerage with higher authorities to his potential clients. But because resources are usually limited, and they are eager
to have an ever widening circle of clients, politicians focus on benefits that flow to groups rather than individuals, benefits like sewerage water connection, electricity, housing sites, etc.\textsuperscript{9}

In urban political machines, the patron-client relationships are organised into a centralised system with a well defined leadership and a disciplined heirarchy of workers. Where resources are lacking or personal factionalism runs deep one finds the 'personal machines' of powerful political leaders.

The patron-client relationships and urban political machines flourish in Third World cities because most of the migrants are poor, unemployed, uneducated and have limited skills, set up illegal squatter settlements and therefore need patrons to safeguard themselves. Although it is often suggested that the migrants bring with them residues of rural attitudes of dependence and paternalism, it may be stated that the tendency to seek patrons is a rational reaction to their existential insecurity and the absence of institutionalised protection.

The political patrons utilize the urban poor not only as vote banks but also during rallies, processions and public meetings. On the other hand the primary needs of the poor are mainly housing and employment and they need the support of the powerful political patrons for employment and to prevent eviction from their illegal squatter settlements. For example, according to official figures, there were 199 vacant spaces with an area of 19,48,561 sq.yards in the city
of Hyderabad of which 2,40,540 sq.yards was under encroachment, the actual figures being much higher. The political parties in fact compete with each other in order to expand their network of clientele with the ruling party usually having the upper hand. In fact, those in power have a wide array of resources available to attract the poor. They allocate low cost housing and sites and services plots, control the regularisation of squatter settlement granting them land titles, provide infrastructural facilities and undertake urban renewal projects.

The opposition parties on the other hand have no such resources under their control and can only hope to sponsor illegal squatting on unused lands and thereby undermine the government’s authority. This often leads to skirmishes between political parties. For example, in Hyderabad city, a clash occurred on November 3, 1988 between the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) workers and the Congress-I, Telugu Desam workers following a tie up over a piece of land in Qutubullapur town, a fast growing residential suburb. According to the police, there were about 500 to 600 unauthorised hutments protected by BJP on this piece of land and the TDP and Cong.I workers tried to establish their control over these hutments.  

The government as has been stated above uses its official power to regularise such settlements and off-set the power base of the opposition, parties. Recently the Chief Minister declared on the traditional New Year Day of Andhra Pradesh that the government had decided to regularise all illegal occupation of government lands
by the houseless poor in all municipal areas (112 municipalities and 3 municipal corporations) in the State and develop them into 'habitable residential colonies' with all the amenities. This, according to him, was being done to ease the hardships of the urban poor who were being exploited by brokers and influential people with money and muscle power. But within a few months he was lashing out at theillegal squatter settlements opposite Raj Bhavan called 'Makhta' area in local parlance by labelling them as "Bhoo Bakasuras" (land-hungry devils). These slum dwellers have to bear the Chief Minister's wrath mainly because these areas were under the complete domination of a powerful Cong.I leader.

The urban political machines are also intensely interested in generating a flow of welfare projects that will provide opportunities for patronage on which the machine depends and here the ruling party has an added advantage. To give an example, in the city of Hyderabad bad blood has been created between the Majlis Party which controls the local government and the Telugu Desam the ruling party in the state, over handing over control of the drainage system from the Municipal Corporation to a specially constituted Hyderabad Metro Water Works and Sewerage Board which is under State Government control. The root cause of the problem is the recently sanctioned 233 crores World Bank funded scheme under which 83 crores are to be spent to upgrade the sewerage system of the city. Both the political parties were vieing for this scheme because this massive project could be exploited to dispense patronages and woo the urban voters. Similarly
the British Overseas Development Administration funded slum improvement scheme under which about 660 slums of Hyderabad-Secunderabad are to be upgraded at the cost of 50 crores is riddled with political controversies. Each political party wants slums which are under its patronage to be taken up under this scheme and often areas which are not slums get identified as slum areas because of political pressures, some recent examples being Laxminagar and Bodabanda areas in the outskirts of the city. Then, the party in power and in control of the release of funds is often accused of being partial towards its own vote bank areas. In Hyderabad, the opposition party members of the city civic body often accuse the Majlis party of utilising more than 70% of the ODA funds for development of old city slums, which are their stronghold and neglecting other areas of the city.

This kind of particularistic ties of patron-client relations or political machines are found in most underdeveloped countries and can be attributed to the twin factors of migration into the cities of the poor and unskilled in search of jobs and protection and modern democratic elections which has made these migrants politically significant.

It may be added that such political machines were very prominent in the United States in the early stages of the urbanisation process and disappeared only in the late 1920s after much of the urban population had climbed out of object poverty and institutional help and social welfare programmes were available as well as administrative reforms.
which had greatly reduced free access to public funds.

**Rise of "Party Charisma"**

Another factor which has contributed to the lack of Universalism in the State apparatus of Third World countries, is the rise of 'Party Charisma' in the political process.

Most of the Third World countries were once under colonial rule and have had charismatic leaders leading the struggle for independence. These charismatic leaders were seen as the embodiment of the aspirations and sentiments of the people. They symbolised the people's thirst for freedom from colonial rule. After independence, the onus of channelizing the rising aspirations of the people, their quest for socio-economic prosperity fell on those leaders. But at the same time the people themselves wanted to participate in the post-independence political apparatus, spurred by the socialist rhetoric of the leaders. Therefore the party which was democratically elected into power was inevitably of these charismatic leaders who came to represent the national aspirations. It is this emergence of a charismatic political elite which is termed as the rise of Party Charisma."

However as was experienced by several Third World nations charismatic authority also slows down the development process. The charismatic leader of the party may promote an 'ego-focussed' conception of progress which may hamper economic development by resorting
to short term measures which are politically advantageous but are not viable for the economy in the long run.

The 'ego-focussed' conception of development of the charismatic leader often leads to misplaced or wasteful expenditures like monuments, creation of plazas, commemorating events like the 'historic revolution' rather than the utilization of the scarce resources for economic development of the country. To give an example from the Hyderabad context, the regional party Telugu Desam led by its charismatic leader NTR coasted to victory in the Assembly election of the State of Andhra Pradesh defeating the national party Congress-I by playing on the regional and linguistic sentiments of the people of the State who according to him were being neglected by the rulers at the centre (symbolised by Congress-I). But contrary to his pledge to regenerate the economy, he often indulged in wasteful expenditure. Recently the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority's plan for widening of the Tank Bund road (which connects the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad) to lessen the traffic bottleneck was suddenly changed. Instead more than thirty statues of men who had shaped the 'destiny of the state' were installed on the widened portion of the road at the cost of more than six crores. For charismatic Chief Minister, such cultural symbols were of more importance than the need to solve the more basic economic problems.

Similarly, nearly rupees ten crores are being spent on the sculpture and installation of a monolithic Buddha statute (purported
to be the biggest in the world) in the middle of the Hussain Sagar lake because it would set the tone for the Budha Poornima project which is being undertaken by HUDA with the aim of developing a commercial, recreational and residential centre there. Whether such commercialisation of the area around the lake would directly benefit the local community is a moot question.

Therefore, it is clear how such capricious decisions of charismatic leaders lead to unplanned and ad hoc state expenditure at the expense of more demanding economic programmes.

Thus, we have considered the free flow of pulls and pressures of interest group politics in government and the ego-focussed conception of development of the charismatic leadership as the two important factors which impinge upon and change the structure of the city.

As has been strongly held by the soft state theorists, Third World countries continue to exhibit the feudal and particularistic values of historic times, which are largely responsible for the distortions in policies for urban management.

Further, Third World countries have not evolved the institutional checks and balances which temper biases in decision making. Sadly, their cities are also lacking in robust people's organisations which could constantly play the role of watch dog over the arbitrary motions of government.