CHAPTER – V

PAKISTAN’S ACTIVITIES IN PUNJAB, KASHMIR AND XINJIANG: A CRITICAL GEOSTRATEGIC EVALUATION

❖ Pakistan: Frontline State and Citadel of Islam
❖ Pakistan’s Geopolitical Objectives: Kashmir, Punjab & Xinjiang
❖ Pakistan’s Geostrategy: Punjab, Kashmir & Xinjiang
❖ Militancy in Punjab: Role of Pakistan's ISI
❖ Pakistan’s Game Plan in Kashmir, Punjab and Xinjiang
❖ Cross-Border Terrorism in Kashmir, Punjab and Xinjiang: Cost-Effective Strategy
❖ Pakistan’s Proxy War: India’s Integrated Strategy
❖ Kashmir Problem: Possible Solutions
Pakistan's strategy of using its sponsored and trained terrorists to gain control over the Silk Road, a set of primary axes of transportation through the heart of Asia, is examined as an aspect of the Chinese-Pakistani relationship and unity of purpose. Pakistan reckons that if Pakistan is the dominant or hegemonic power over the western gateways to China, Islamabad will be in a position to exert influence over the entire trans-Asian axis. This influence will bring economic and political benefits to Pakistan far beyond what would be possible on the basis of objective factors, favoring increasing influence within the Islamic bloc. The confrontations on sovereign territories of India, Afghanistan, China and Tajikistan in the way of this strategy are described. The emergence of the Taliban in this movement is documented. Using the ISI's skills at running covert operations and irregular warfare-skills honed and proven during the 1980s in the war in Afghanistan-Islamabad has launched a major campaign to consolidate control over the Silk Road's traditional gateways to China. Pakistan is fully aware of the major strategic importance of the regional transportation system, Islamabad sees in its control over these key segments of the regional road system the key to its future and fortunes.

Beijing's present and near-future grand strategy considers the revival of the Silk road as a primary regional strategic entity. The on-land transportation system stretching along the traditional Silk Road is of crucial significance to the consolidation of the trans-Asian Axis -- Beijing's key to global power posture and strategic safety. The primary choke point of the Silk Road and its gateway into China is the Taklamakan Desert. West of the Taklamakan Desert are the strategic cities of Kashi (traditional name Kashgar) and Yarkand - both in Xinjiang in western PRC. Several axes of transportation - both the principal axes traversing through the Balkh and Pamir mountains (today's northern Afghanistan and Tajikistan respectively) as well as a feeder axis from the Indian Ocean through the lower Himalayas (today's Pakistan and Indian Kashmir) -- converge on Kashi and Yarkand, from where they proceed into the Chinese interior.

Essentially, whoever controls the access roads to Kashgar and Yarkand controls the gateways to China on the Silk Road.

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1 Bodansky, Yossef (1995) 'Pakistan's transAsian designs', (www.subcontinent.com/sapra-text-only/text.html)
There is only yet another overland gateway into China -- the brand new and fragile Karakoram Highway. Twisting through northern Pakistan along a narrow corridor and precarious mountain passes, the Highway enters into western China where it feeds into Kashi (Kashgar) and the traditional roads encircling the Taklamakan Desert. Work on the Karakoram Highway started in 1967. A passable road was completed only in 1978, and fully opened for traffic in 1986. The Karakoram Highway was a tremendous engineering feat of the PRC. Moreover, the mere existence of the Karakoram Highway is a strategic breakthrough for Beijing and Islamabad because it broke the isolation of both Pakistan and the PRC, ensuring a corridor between them that can withstand blockade even during most intense warfare.

Islamabad considers the Karakoram Highway as a symbol and manifestation of the unique Sino-Pakistani relationship and strategic unity of purpose. Islamabad expands this theme to include the emerging Silk Road. Pakistani officials stressed in December 1993 that the role of China in the construction of the Silk Route has made the bilateral relations as strong as the Karakoram Highway. Thus, fully aware of the crucial importance of the regional road system to the strategic survival of all powers -- both superpowers and aspirant powers - Islamabad sees in the road system through the region - particularly the western approaches to the Silk Road and thus the PRC - the key to its future and fortunes.

The Pakistani strategic calculation is that if Pakistan is the dominant or hegemonic power over the western gateways to China - a crucial component of both the Silk Road and the trans-Asian Axis (strategically, metaphorically) - Islamabad will be in a position to exert influence over the entire trans-Asian axis. Such a position, reinforcing Pakistan's already unique position as the linch-pin between the PRC and the Tehran-led Islamic Bloc, will enable Pakistan enjoy economic and political benefits in the process way beyond what it could have hoped to gain on the basis of the country's objective economic, scientific-technological, and population posture, and even the realistic future potential. Essentially, the Pakistani strategic logic behind the drive to control the western

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2 Khan, Tanvir Ahmed (1990), “Pakistan Regional Policy in Reference to India and Afghanistan”. *Pakistan Horizon*.

gateways to China is to transform Islamabad’s strategic position as the linchpin between the Islamic bloc and China into a tangible reality on the ground⁴.

Sophisticated as the Pakistani strategic grand design may be, it nevertheless confronts a very grim reality—the tracks of road Islamabad is determined to control, or at the very least secure hegemony over, happen to be on the sovereign territory of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and India. However, this reality does not seem to deter or restrain Islamabad. Therefore, in pursuit of these objectives, the ISI has recently launched a relentless drive to ensure that local Islamist irregular forces—most of them already Pakistan’s proteges for they are sponsored by the ISI—will control all key roads and axes in order to create a regional dependence on Islamabad to ensure safety of traffic—in other words, recognize Islamabad’s hegemony over the western gateways of China. Islamabad considers the Karakoram Highway as a symbol and manifestation of the unique Sino-Pakistani relationship and strategic unity of purpose. The accumulating Afghan experience of the ISI convinced Islamabad of the strategic importance of roads and provided precedents for using state-controlled irregular warfare—like the Afghan Mujahideen forces—as strategic instruments for state policy. In order to fulfill its strategic motives and aspirations, ISI would support major campaigns of its protege forces in order to ensure Islamabad’s control over strategic sites and assets⁵.

If Pakistan is the dominant or hegemonic power over the western gateways to China, Islamabad will be in a position to exert influence over the entire trans-Asian Axis. Pakistan’s strategy to gain control of Kashmir is examined, with explanations of the rationale and preparations for armed conflict— even nuclear war—to secure the so-called sacred objective. Pakistan has fed popular opinion and terrorism by characterizing the political struggle to seize Kashmir and to make further inroads into India as a Jihad to protect Islam, influenced by the political and strategic interests of Iran. Terrorist training is thus justified in Islamabad power circles, and non-cooperative leaders in both Pakistan

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and Kashmir are assassinated. Specific threat of nuclear war against India is repeatedly voiced to limit effective response to this strategy and resulting terrorism and subversion.

Kashmir is unique among all the crisis points along the Indo-Pakistani border in that a marked escalation of the fighting - both insurgency and regular - is virtually inevitable. For Islamabad, the liberation of Kashmir is a sacred mission, the only task unfulfilled since Muhammad Ali Jinnah's days. Moreover, a crisis in Kashmir constitutes an excellent outlet for the frustration at home, an instrument for the mobilization of the masses, as well as gaining the support of the Islamist parties and primarily their loyalists in the military and the ISI.

The ISI has a major interest to continue the crisis. Back in the 1970s, Pakistan started to train Sikhs and other Indian separatist movements as part of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's strategy for forward strategic depth. Pakistan adopted the sponsorship of terrorism and subversion as an instrument to substitute for the lack of strategic depth and early warning capabilities. The Pakistani sponsored terrorists and the Pakistani intelligence operatives in their ranks would be able to warn Pakistan of any impending Indian invasion, and then launch a guerrilla warfare against the Indian army even before it reached the border with Pakistan. Therefore, sponsoring separatist subversion has become a crucial component of Islamabad's national military strategy. During the 1980s, the ISI completed a vast training and support infrastructure for the Afghan resistance that was also used for the training and support of other regional groups. There was a corresponding ideological development in Indian Kashmir. Since 1984, virtually suddenly, the prevailing popular sentiments in Indian Kashmir was that "Islam is in Danger," and that sentiment, rather than nationalism, began mobilizing the youth.

The vast network of training camps for Afghan Mujahideen was transformed by the ISI into center of Islamist terrorism throughout South Asia, as well as the melting pot of the worldwide Islamist jihad. This transformation concurred with an active ISI program "to initiate full-fledged subversion in Kashmir valley" that is still escalating. At first, the ISI's assistance to the Kashmiri Islamists was funnelled through Gulbaddin

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Hekmatiyr’s Hizb-i Islami, thus providing Islamabad with deniability. Pakistan adopted the sponsorship of terrorism and subversion as an instrument to substitute for the lack of strategic depth and early warning capabilities Islamabad increases its support for Islamist terrorism in Kashmir because there is a genuine whole hearted commitment to jihad among the Kashmiri terrorists and their international volunteers. Moreover, the ISI transformed its major paramilitary command into a major political force as a direct result of their increase of support for terrorism in India. Presently, there is a need for a mission use for the ISI’s numerous para-military and Afghan forces, as well as an institutional interest in preserving the political clout that comes with these operations. Islamabad finds a task for the ISI’s vast Pakistani and Afghan cadres previously involved in sponsoring the jihad in Afghanistan but who are now no longer needed, that would keep them away from domestic politics and power struggles. Indeed, the escalation of terrorism and subversion since the early 1990s is considered a part of the ISI’s implementation of a long-term program. Presently, Pakistani officials repeatedly vow to ”liberate” Kashmir, or enforce the recognition of ”Muslims’ rights” in the valley, even at a risk of a major crisis. This rising militancy of Pakistani officials is far from being empty rhetoric. Islamabad uses the escalation in Kashmir as a cover for the overall expansion of the terrorist training and support system for operations in central Asia and elsewhere in the world.

In order to escalate their Islamist jihad, the ISI established in the early 1990s the Markaz-Dawar, a center for worldwide Islamist activities. Mulavi Zaki, the center’s spiritual leader, told the trainees that their destiny was to fight and liberate “the land of Allah from infidels” wherever they might be. The commanders and instructors are AIM members, primarily Ikhwan from Algeria, Sudan and Egypt. Most of them had fought for more than a decade in Afghanistan. In early 1992, with world attention paid to their presence in Peshawar area, some of these ‘Afghans’ were transferred to Azad Kashmir where new camps were being built for them by the Pakistani army.

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10 Nayyar, K. K. (2003), Pakistan at the cross roads, New Delhi: Rupa and Company.
The Government of Afghanistan also increased its support for terrorist training and preparations. This growing direct involvement is important because the main operating bases for the ISI's operations in central Asia are in northern Afghanistan. In the aftermath of the fall of Kabul, many Arab 'Afghans' returned to Peshawar where they were organized by the Pakistani government to support various Islamist causes in concert with Iran and Sudan. The combinations of Pakistan’s poor relations with its neighbours and of weak internal institutions has created an environment in which terrorists groups can function and on occasion flourish.

Table: 5.1

**Killing using Sophisticated Weapons like AK-47 remains the most common and preferred method but terrorists adopt other methods as well, which are equally effective, like:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Slitting the throats</th>
<th>Hanging</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strangulating with thin wire, toggle, etc.</td>
<td>Impairing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burning the houses and their inmates</td>
<td>Lynching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blowing up of vehicles using IEDs</td>
<td>Torture before assassination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firing</td>
<td>Slicing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing</td>
<td>Dismemberment of the body</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Strategic Analyst, April 1999*

Islamic militancy and extremism has emerged as potentially the most threatening form of international terrorism since the closing years of 1980s. This form of terrorism has little to do with Islam as such. Islam provides a convenient religious cover for its perpetrators to achieve political objectives through the means of violence and coercion. A violent and terrorist movement, launched in the name of Islam, touches the sentiments of the followers of Islam, which makes it a more lethal and dangerous destabilising phenomenon for Muslim as well as non-Muslim countries. Pakistan emerges as the chief

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11 Khan, Tanvir Ahmed (1990), “Pakistan Regional Policy in Reference to India and Afghanistan”, *Pakistan Horizon*. 
patron and promoter of Islamic militancy and terrorism with the aim of utilising it to serve its policy interests.

Pakistan: Frontline State and Citadel of Islam

Pakistan declared that Islam was in danger in Kabul in 1980’s and gave a call for jihad to throw the infidel Soviet army out of Afghanistan. The US, Saudi Arabia, China and many Islamic countries poured in resources in men, material and money to organise resistance to the Soviet forces. Overnight Afghan refugees were converted into Mujahideen (holy warriors). Pakistan, obviously, assumed the role of the 'frontline state' and under its supervision and control, a chain of training camps were set up along the Pak-Afghan border to impart religious indoctrination and military training to Afghan Mujahideen and thousands of enthusiastic Muslim youth from other countries who had been rushing in to participate in the jihad. Organisations like the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam and Markaz al-Dawa al-Irshad were in the forefront of the whole venture. Militant Islam was raised to a very high pitch and it was strengthened manifold.\(^\text{12}\)

In this way, by the mid-1980s a sophisticated, well-equipped infrastructure to train militant Islamists was available for Pakistan to make use of. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan a highly motivated, militarily trained and war-hardened force of militant Islamists and a plethora of sophisticated weapons so generously gifted, principally by the U.S, were at Pakistan's disposal. There was no dearth of funds from domestic as well as foreign sources. Thus, Pakistan had at its disposal all the wherewithal for the pursuit of promoting and sustaining Muslim militancy and utilising it to facilitate Islamabad in becoming one of the leading lights of the Islamic world.

Pakistan’s Geopolitical Objectives: Kashmir, Punjab & Xinjiang

Three immediate objectives can be discerned in Pakistan's support and encouragement to Islamic militancy and terrorism as a means to attain primacy among

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Muslim countries. First, and the foremost, targeted India. It was planned that well-trained Islamic militants—Pakistani, Arab, Afghan and of Kashmiri origin—on their own, as well as in collaboration with locally drafted elements, would unleash a sustained campaign of sabotage, subversion, assassinations and other kinds of terrorist activities in as many parts of India as feasible and thus create chaos and strife in the country. By putting the government of India under pressure, its attention in Kashmir would be reduced. In Kashmir trained Islamic extremists would incite the religious sentiments and susceptibilities of Kashmiri Muslims and channelise their feelings thus aroused towards anti-Hindu, anti-India direction. Having thus created a favourable atmosphere, those Islamists and pro-Pakistan Muslim elements would then resort to a bloody campaign of terrorism as an 'Islamic war' that would ultimately lead to secession of Kashmir from India which would facilitate the fulfilment of their long-cherished dream of incorporating Kashmir into Pakistan. This would also suitably avenge the humiliation suffered by Pakistan at the hands of India during the liberation war of Bangladesh and its aftermath.\(^\text{13}\)

The second objective related to Afghanistan. The idea was to install in Kabul an Islamic government that would remain obliged to be, if not a puppet in the hands of Islamabad then at least, amenable to protecting and promoting Pakistan's interests. It could give Pakistan considerable tactical depth from the military point of view, as well as a comparatively easy and unhampered access to Central Asia. By exporting Islamic militancy and terror through a subservient Islamic dispensation in Kabul as well as independent of it, Pakistan would be able to exercise a commanding ideological and politico-economic influence over preponderantly Muslim areas of erstwhile Soviet Union and Xinjiang, the Muslim-majority region in north-west China.\(^\text{14}\)

Thirdly, the Islamic militant force would be useful in promoting the cause of Islam by violent and terrorist means in other parts of the world. After the Soviet withdrawal, a large number of well-trained Muslim mercenary zealots of middle eastern origin stationed in Pakistan could create a problem for the hosts, so in order to neutralised these insurgents Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), began to keep them gainfully

\(^\text{14}\)Mushaid, Hussain (1988), Pakistan and the changing regional scenario. Lahore: Progressive Publisher.


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occupied in fresh operations in Kashmir and elsewhere, and thus minimised the chances of their indulging in activities prejudicial to the host country.

As during the Afghan resistance, so also after the Soviet withdrawal, fundamentalist militant organisations continued to work for the government plans to promote the 'cause of Islam'. Their activities provided a convenient cover for denial of official responsibility for ISI moves to promote Islamic militancy and terror. The Jamaat-e-Islami, for which any militant action, whether it involved the dispatching of zealots to fight against 'oppression' of Muslims in any part of the world, or the bombing of an 'enemy installation', was justified if it was for the larger 'Islamic cause'15.

Table: 5.2

**Sect- Wise Increase in the Number of Madrassas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Deobandi</th>
<th>Bareli</th>
<th>Ahl-1-Hadith</th>
<th>Shia</th>
<th>Jamat-I-Islami</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1779</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td>1585</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2801</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table: 5.3

**Increase in the Madrassas (1988-2000) (In%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deobandi</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bareli</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahl-I-Hadith</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Saleem Mansoor Khalid (ed.) Deeni Madaris Mein Taleem, IPS Islamabad 2002*

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Table: 5.4
Militancy among Madrassas Students in 2003 (N=142) (In %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What should be Pakistan’s Priorities?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Take Kashmir away from India by an open war?</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take Kashmir away from India by supporting jehadi groups to fight with the Indian army?</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support kashmiri cause through peaceful means only (i.e. no open war or sending jehadi groups across the line of control)</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: HIMAL, South Asian, vol.17, no.2, February 2004*

There have been three levels of terrorist training camps, imparting different kinds of military training to Islamists in Pakistan.

- The camps around Muzaffarabad in PoK trained inmates in hit-and-run tactics.
- In another kind of camps under the direct control of the ISI, training was given to create havoc in India.
- The third kinds of camps were more sensitive, meant to train terrorists for worldwide operations.

Pakistan has reportedly been utilising the huge amount of money earned by drug traffickers and their services in furtherance of its 'Islamic mission' in India. ISI levies a particular share from the income from drug trafficking which is spent on perpetrating terrorists activities in India. It has also trained two groups of traffickers of about 500 to perpetrate terrorist activities in India. Those groups are allowed unrestricted drug trafficking carrying with them explosives and arms. Most of the terrorist incidents like assassinations, bomb explosions, firing incidents, sabotage and subversion that have been prepetrated in Jamnu and Kashmir and other parts of the country since the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s are the outcome of Pakistan's 'Islamic mission' in India.16

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Under the patronage of the ISI, informs a Pakistan monthly, Pakistani religious organisations had established close contacts with clandestine Islamic movements in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Several of Pakistani Islamic fighters crossed over to these predominantly Muslim republics, which were still part of the erstwhile U.S.S.R., to promote the 'cause' of Islam against infidel Communists. The Soviet officials had protested strongly to Pakistan against the infiltration of Pakistani Islamists into those states. Probably due to Tajikistan's geographical proximity to, and contiguity with China's Xinjiang region, Pakistan's 'Islamic mission' in Tajikistan has been more extensive and prolonged one. A separate base was created to train Tajik militants in Pakistan17.

Apart from providing ideological and military training to Islamic militants from Xinjiang, Pakistan is reported to have been arranging for extension of various kind of assistance to Uighur Muslims of the northwestern Chinese province. A considerable number of Muslim dissidents from China are stationed in Pakistan. On the eve of Pakistan President Farooq Leghari's visit to China, Pakistan deported 12 of those dissidents in May 1997. Beijing has demanded from Islamabad deportation of another 130 Muslim dissidents18.

Pakistan's efforts in promoting and sponsoring Islamic militancy and terrorism in India, in general, and the state of Jammu and Kashmir, in particular, have, no doubt, created a lot of trouble for the government and people of India. It has not brought the Pakistan rulers anywhere nearer their cherished goal. In this respect Pakistani planners ought to have realised that, come what may, no government in New Delhi can allow anyone to impinge upon the territorial integrity of the country. Similarly, a strong country like China cannot permit the newly emerging Islamic fervour among Uighur Muslims to develop into Xinjiang's secession. Of course, in Afghanistan, Pakistan has succeeded in facilitating the Pak-organised, supported, equipped and guided Sunni fundamentalist force, the Taliban, to capture power in Kabul and control nearly two-thirds of the country. But the cost of the keeping the Taliban in power in Kabul would be very heavy for Pakistan in terms of men, money and material. Still in the long run, it is highly

18 Sharma, Rajeev (2001), The Pakistan trap, New Delhi: UBS publishers and Distributions.
unlikely that any Afghan dispensation in Kabul, be it even the Taliban, in view of fiercely independent nature of the Afghans, would be willing to play a second fiddle to protect and promote Pakistan's strategic interests and designs. The case of Central Asian Muslim-majority Republics, Egypt, Algeria and other countries has shown that they are prepared to face, by every means, the threat of Pakistan-inspired and encouraged Islamic militancy and terror. It is quite clear that Pakistan, by its policy of promoting and sponsoring Islamic militancy and terror can create difficulties and problems for the target countries. The products of Pakistan-Afghan militant training camps have made Pakistan an arena for their activities directed against their own as well as other countries. The Afghan war veterans and Afghan mujahideen have not spared even their host and benefactor from their militant fury. In other respects also Pakistan is now troubled by the activities of militants trained in Pakistani madrassas in the name of 'jihad'. Militants chased away by Indian security forces have now started indulging in undesirable activities. It is said that those militants have been instrumental in spreading violence in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and committing crimes against women like molestation and rape.

The outcome and fallout of Pakistan policy of nursing, promoting and sponsoring Islamic militancy and terror since the end of the 1980s is there for everyone to see. It is now for the Pakistan authorities to seriously think whether the results achieved by their policy of patronising, promoting and sponsoring Muslim militancy and terrorism are commensurate to the enormous efforts and resources, their own as well as those secured from other sources, put in for the pursuit of that policy.

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Pakistan's Sponsored Terrorism

Punjab:
- Compensate the loss of Bangladesh
- Create a buffer state
- Destabilize India
- Strategic space and base
- Domestic stability

Xinjiang:
- Ideological base
- Strategic base
- Leader of Islamic Nations
- Regional power
- Access to Trade routes & Energy resources

Jammu & Kashmir
- Maintain territorial integrity
- Leadership of Islamic countries
- Domestic stability
- Regional power
- Strategic space

Figure 5.1: Showing Pakistan's motives and intentions in Kashmir, Punjab & Xinjiang

It is a well documented fact that leaders of some of the most extremist Sikh terrorist groups are in Pakistan and are continuing to try and motivate Sikh youth from the UK, Canada as well as from Indian Punjab to take recourse to extremist activities. Wadhawa Singh of the Babbar Khalsa, Paramjit Singh Panjwar of the Khalistan Commando Force (Panjwar), Gajender Singh of the Dal Khalsa, Pritam Singh Sekhon of the Khalistan Liberation Force, Lakhbir Singh Rode of the International Sikh Youth Federation, are all presently in Pakistan and continue to try and engineer terrorist activity with Pakistani help in India. Wassan Singh Zaffarwal, one of the most wanted people in India for his terrorist activities in Punjab, remained in Pakistan for a long time and then surfaced in Switzerland, seeking asylum.\textsuperscript{22}

India has suffered for the past nearly two decades from terrorism in Punjab, in Jammu and Kashmir and in other parts of India. Countless innocent lives have been lost to the terrorist's bombs and guns. India has consistently been highlighting the need for a unified international response to transnational and trans-border terrorism which is today affecting many number of countries and challenging established societies and governments. The links between terrorists groups operating in India and other countries are quite clear today and the role that Pakistan has played in allowing this scourge to spread has also been amply documented.\(^ {23}\) During 1990's, nuclear weapons have become a major instrument of Pakistan's assertive regional strategy with Islamabad's new strategy built on the perceived role of nuclear weapons in the crisis in Kashmir, where, Islamabad, along with Tehran, are sponsoring an escalation of Islamist terrorism. The overall Pakistani strategic confidence has already been expressed in statements coming out of Islamabad since the fall of 1993. The nuclear card is presented as the key to Pakistan's new regional strategy. Pakistan, in an effort to upgrade its nuclear arsenal, has embarked an energetic effort to modernize its nuclear technology. This has been reflected in the repeated efforts to illegally acquire advanced technology and machinery from the west. Furthermore, Islamabad considers the development of long-range ballistic missiles a top priority. These missiles will give Pakistan strategic capabilities that go well beyond the need to block an invading enemy or hit key strategic installations. Moreover, these developments are but a part of an overall massive military modernization and buildup, pursued with close cooperation from the People's Republic of China and Iran.\(^ {24}\)

While Pakistan in the past has proven itself to be valuable ally in an unstable part of the world, today their actions may be contributing to the instability of the Middle East and South Asia. Bhutto considered central Asia an extension of the non-Arab Muslim world and believed that Pakistan would bring that region into the hub in order to expand Islam's non-Arab component. In this view, the active support for the armed liberation struggle in Kashmir was defined by Mr. Bhutto as a way of demonstrating Pakistan's commitment to Islamic solidarity. In this connection, a close relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC), including Beijing's strategic guarantees and assistance


in the development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, was considered by Bhutto as the foundation of Islamabad's ability to avoid a clash with the U.S and a possible war with India. Mr. Bhutto's military nuclear effort was motivated as much by the determination to deliver the so-called 'Islamic Bomb' that would make Pakistan a leader in the Muslim world, as by the need to counter-balance India's military nuclear program. At first, Pakistan stuck with Zia's doctrine of relying on nuclear weapons as instruments of last resort. However, as time passed, Zia ul-Haq became increasingly prone to a pan-Islamic world view which he expressed by his willingness to facilitate the development of other Islamic, (primarily Iran's), nuclear weapons programs, though not at the expense of Pakistan's own strategic weapons program. Indeed, it was through its close cooperation with Iran that Pakistan also assisted other radical states, including Libya and North Korea. This was a turning point for Pakistan's national strategy. From this point on, nuclear weapons were no longer considered merely a trip-wire of last resort in the event of a major invasion of Pakistan. Instead, nuclear weapons now became a key to Islamabad's assertive strategy in Kashmir under a nuclear umbrella.

The annexation of entire Kashmir is part of Pakistan’s national security policy and grand strategy, the new rail line will connect Karachi and central Asia must pass through Indian held Kashmir to be engineeringly and economically effective. Pakistan’s challenge of proxy war and its unstinted efforts to niggle at India’s internal cohesion through what has been termed as ‘death by a thousand cuts’.

A relatively recent component of the geo-strategic reality in the region is the manner in which the lethal cocktail of religious extremism, small arms proliferation is financed by narcotics trafficking and cross border terrorism are plying havoc with pluralistic and liberal societies like India and China. There is clearly a transition from politically oriented terrorism to one that is more religiously or ideologically motivated. Pakistan’s establishment and the extremist religious terrorist organization as it support as, employ Sunni Wahabi militant Islam as an ideological camouflage to mount destabilizing jehadi terrorist actions in the neighborhood. Pakistan in order to fulfill its motives and objectives support terrorism in Kashmir, Punjab and in Xinjiang province. Pakistan has

not lost any opportunity in waging proxy wars and inciting instability in enemy or friendly states. Pakistan in order to achieve its geo-strategic interests, providing arms, funds, training, logistics and propaganda support to the extremists who are active in different parts of the region27.

Pakistan’s Geostrategy: Punjab, Kashmir & Xinjiang:

Punjab is located in the northwest Indian sub-continent. It is bounded on the north by the state of Jammu & Kashmir, on the east by the state of Himachal Pradesh, on the south by the states of Haryana and Rajasthan and on the west by Pakistan. Pakistan provided popular support, weapons, a sanctuary, and moral support to the extremist of Punjab. Pakistan aim was to destroy the confidence that the Sikhs have in the government by causing them to act outside the law; to bring about the moral alienation of the Sikhs masses from the government until it was complete and irreversible. The genesis of terrorism in Punjab is a combination of region, religion, economy and political motivation that gets juxtaposed28. The contours of terrorism was confined to three districts which borders Pakistan i.e. Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Ferozepur and partly Faridkot which borders Ferozepur. Religious fundamentalists and political ideologues for its own purpose and motives have duly exploited the economic frustration. Islamabad has been training Sikh and other Indian separatists movements as part of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s strategy of “forward strategic depth and also as a part of his effort to gain revenge for India’s support of an independent Bangladesh. Pakistan was quick to exploit the opportunity. From strategic point of view, Pakistan has encouraged the creation of a Sikh state of Khalistan in the Indian Punjab in order to make the Indian defence of Kashmir difficult. Islamabad was determined to exploit the growing tension in Kashmir to destabilize India and therefore began to provide began to provide better training and military assistance for Sikh militant29.

The first strategy Pakistan adopted was to alienate Sikh community from the mainstream of India's socio-economic and political life. Pakistan supplied arms and ammunitions for the cause of Bhidranwale, the Sikhs provided fund and moral support. It along with many militant organizations created public opinions through distorted facts and figures against India, which was propagated by Pakistan agents. The government of Pakistan openly supported the idea of Khalistan and provided infrastructure facilities to the intellectuals working under Bhindranwale. Pakistan came forward to train the school dropouts and the unemployed youths in Lahore and Karachi where they were trained under command of Pakistan Generals and later were sent back to Punjab for subversion. Pakistan provided moral support and various telecommunication facilities to the people of Punjab in order to bolster its own objectives and goals.30

The challenges as perceived by Pakistan are to maintain territorial integrity and India's efforts to undo politics of religion. Another threat is ideological threat. Co-existence of Hindus and Muslims erodes logic for the creation of Pakistan. The secular

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culture of India poses challenge to Pakistan as a nation i.e. Indian secularism is considered threat to theocratic Pakistan conquest of Kashmir could help Pakistan in many ways to overcome its weakness as a nation. It would enable Pakistan to regain its lost confidence of Muslim population in this region. Pakistan aim is to achieve leadership of Islamic countries. Conquest of Jammu & Kashmir would strengthen Pakistan’s urge for setting up an autocratic state in the garb of Islam. The Kashmir problem is used as a shield to impose military rule and to settle domestic political problems especially in Sindh and Baluchistan. Even Pakistan had geo-strategic considerations for integrating Kashmir in to their country, its rivers originated in Kashmir, most West Pakistan cities were exposed to a potential military from a hostile Kashmir. Control of Kashmir serves the regime as an important access point to the markets of Central Asia. Pakistan began expanding its operation and promotes separatism primarily in Kashmir, as a strategic long-term programme. Kashmir region or province is not just an area of strategic and economic importance but also the object of the ideological passions for the various states of the region.

Xinjiang and Xinjiang Muslims have received arms support, moral support from radical Islamic groups from Pakistan. These provinces distinctly poses a security threat to the Chinese state and it is furthur accentuated by the growth of radical Islamic militancy with its wide terrorist networks. Pan-Islamic militancy has sustained in these regions with the active support of Pakistani government. There has been a diffusion of violence and terrorist acts all across the entire region and beyond. The threats from terrorism have transcended the territorial boundaries of South and Central Asian states. Despite differing ideologies and objectives goals, groups of various hues have established linkages with each other, forming alliances. Such alliances help in seeking training, weapons, procurement, sharing intelligence and in some cases drug trafficking which is a mean of raising much needed resources for the terrorist groups. Pakistan intelligence agency, the ISI had developed an elaborate infrastructure for recruitment, training and support from the profits of drug trade for the terrorist that it infiltrates in to Punjab, Kashmir and Xinjiang region. To achieve its objectives Pakistan sponsored terrorism resort to suicide

bombings, the psychological warfare. Cyberterrorism and attempts at mass disruption of key sectors of essential economic infrastructure. Terrorism and organized crime will erode social cohesion, political stability and undermine economic development if it is not tackled immediately at regional level. Pakistan sponsored terrorism posed a threat not only to India’s security but also to that of the entire region including China’s western provinces.

Militancy in Punjab: Role of Pakistan's ISI

Terrorism was the sole weapon of Pakistan in Punjab. Khalistan is of strategic importance to Pakistan. Pakistan’s foreign policy analysts always perceive threat from India. They believe that security of the Indian sub-continent is divisible and can be shared by both India and Pakistan: Pakistan in the northwest and India in the northeast: Creation of Khalistan at the north-west border would achieve this objective and can eliminate this threat perception. Pakistan believes that non-existence of a barrier at the Indo-Pakistan border is a dangerous situation for security of Pakistan. Khalistan as a buffer state would provide barrier that would ensure territorial integrity of Pakistan, simultaneously, carving out Khalistan would cut the Jammu&Kashmir from Indian roadways and railways that is crucial for India. This situation will help Pakistan to capture Jammu&Kashmir in the same way as Bangladesh was created. Creation of Khalistan would bring domestic stability in Pakistan and exalt its status at a regional power at par with India.

The nature of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in Punjab is different from other regions but geo-strategic realities and aims are the same. The most dominant factor is religion i.e. religion sentiments are exploited by Pakistan in Jammu&Kashmir. Pakistan taken steps which are not counter productive of its territorial integrity. Therefore they have adopted a path of calculated risk in abetting terrorism in Punjab. The objective of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in Punjab is cessation of the state from India and to

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promote secession and create a separate Sikh state\textsuperscript{36}. Pakistan tries to achieve the same by sponsoring terrorism with the help of local population of Punjab. The infrastructure provided to Jammu&Kashmir militants were also made available to the Sikh militants, it helped Pakistan in two ways:

- **Firstly**, the government created dissension and law and order problem for India.
- **Secondly**, raised funds for its ordinance factory by selling arms to the militants.

Sikh militants were encouraged to buy arms and ammunitions where as Jammu&Kashmir militants were aided and funded.

Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is employing new strategies to revive militancy in Punjab and putting pressure on the remaining militants to "undertake some sensational terrorist actions", according to official sources here. "Pakistan-based Punjab militant groups, particularly Khalistan Commando Force (Panjwar) (KCF-P), Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) and International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), are under pressure from ISI to undertake some sensational terrorist actions in India. KCF-P chief Paramjit Singh Panjwar is believed to have sent two consignments of explosives to Punjab, they said, adding two of his confidants-Paramjit Singh and Kulwinder Singh-have sneaked into the state from Germany via Nepal with a specific purpose of targeting VIPs\textsuperscript{37}. At least 29 leaders of various Punjab militant organisations are presently believed to be in Pakistan getting active support of ISI. The sources, citing the recent incidents of militant strikes in Punjab and neighbouring states, said that the ISI has embarked upon a new strategy to revive the atmosphere of terror in the state. "The reason for this seems to be the lack of support of the people to its machinations," said an official of the Punjab government here. As part of the new strategy, stress is being laid on coordination among militant groups of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir and various fundamentalist organisations\textsuperscript{38}.

Intelligence agencies have also discovered recent emergence of narco-terrorism with growing nexus between people involved in smuggling of drugs and Punjab militants. Besides, militants released from jails are being "re-used" for terrorist activities in Punjab.

\textsuperscript{36} Mudgal, Vipul (1999), "Roots of Violence in Indian Punjab", \textit{AAKROSH, vol.2, no.3: pp.36-56.}
\textsuperscript{37} "Pakistan lend support to Sikh militants in Indian Punjab", (www.fas.org/irp/congress/1993)
\textsuperscript{38} Bangalore Deccan Herald (Internet Version) in English 28, Jul 99
and elsewhere in the country. In addition to these, ISI has intensified its efforts to propagate the cause of "Khalistan" and Sikh Jathas visiting Pakistan have been subjected to "high pitched anti-India and pro-Khalistan" propaganda.

The comparative lack of international interest in the separatist movements in India's North-East and Punjab and the co-operation received by India from the Western countries in dealing with terrorism in Punjab in the form of exchange of intelligence etc. could be attributed to the fact that they recognised these areas as an integral part of India and were disinclined to support the demands of the insurgent and terrorist groups for secession from India. Their still lingering mental reservations in respect of Jammu & Kashmir are due to the fact that they do not still recognise Jammu & Kashmir as an area, whose legal status has been settled once and for all. Before 1995, the West was not even prepared to concede that there was terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir. Only after the kidnapping of some American and West European tourists in 1995 by the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) under the name of Al Faran was there a willingness to recognise that there was terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir.

Pakistan has been supporting all these terrorist movements—whether in the North East or Punjab or Jammu & Kashmir—but with nuances. In the case of Jammu & Kashmir, it talks openly of its right to extend political, moral and diplomatic support to the terrorists, whom it projects as freedom fighters, because it considers the territory as rightfully belonging to it. However, it denies giving military support to the terrorists anywhere—neither in Jammu & Kashmir, nor in Punjab nor in the North East. In the case of Punjab and the Northeast, it does not talk of any right to extend political, moral or diplomatic support to the separatists since it recognises the areas affected by separatist movements as integral parts of India. There is no involvement of any Pakistan-based mercenary groups in any of these separatist movements in the North East or Punjab, which have remained purely indigenous.

It is a well documented fact that leaders of some of the most extremist Sikh terrorist groups are in Pakistan and are continuing to try and motivate Sikh youth from

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39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
the UK, Canada as well as from Indian Punjab to take recourse to extremist activities. Yousef Bodansky of the United States House Republican Research Committee Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare had published a report. The New Islamist international, which gave details of how Pakistan had been training Sikh and Kashmiri. Now it is trying to revive the Khalistani movement in Punjab. It has recruited the Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist organization, Jamaat-e-Islami for this task. A convention of the separatist Sikhs from all over the world was called in Lahore and they were assure by the Jamaat-e-Islami leadership that they were not alone in their struggle and that all the Muslims of the world were with them. The Sikh separatists were attending the "Sangh Sabha" convention called by the terrorist organizations like Dal Khalsa and Babbar Khalsa in connection with the 15th anniversary of Operation Bluestar.

Pakistan’s Game plan in Kashmir, Punjab and Xinjiang:

Pakistan is involved or sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir, Punjab and Xinjiang in order to bolster its own geo-strategic motives. The Xinjiang region is experiencing an Islamic revival as a rallying point for cultural identity makes the region even more attractive for Pakistan. Pakistan wants to increase its political and economic role in these regions for two reasons. It views these regions as territorial enticement to realize its quest for “strategic depth” it wants to encompass Muslim population of Xinjiang and Kashmir in to a stream of Islamisation.

Pakistan’s ambition of becoming a leader of the Islamic world for attaining these goals, Pakistan is using the Islamic card and it is focusing on the security, strategic and winning friends in a region which had been totally shut away from its influence in the past. Pakistan is supporting religious fundamentalists, political extremists, international terrorism and armed subversion and all these have become an important component of its regional strategy. The long aim is to arouse the religious and nationalists passion of majority of Muslims in these regions. Spill over of terrorism from these regions has longer geo-political ramifications. The spread of religious extremism from these regions for instance can destabilize entire resource rich central and South Asian region. Even,

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consolidation of radicalism in these regions will harden extremist pressure on India. Pakistan's policy makers greatest concern is to thwart India's hegemonic designs or plans to gain a prominent status in the region's geopolitics. The first tactics of Pakistan is alienation of the province or state from the mainstream of the country concerned by dividing the people on religious lines and highlighting people grievances in the media. The second factor used by Pakistan is subversion of the state machinery through violence, murder, arson, kidnapping, robbery and highjacking. The factor employed by Pakistan is related to infiltration of terrorist from POK to other parts of the region. An important tactic is to established link between various terrorist groups active in the region. Pakistan's objective of acquiring a strategic base in the regions of Punjab, Kashmir and Xinjiang. China although a friend of Pakistan but still vary due to its efforts to play an Islamic card i.e. fear of repercussions in its own region. This is the reason China opposes Islamabad's efforts to sponsor Muslim secessionist move in Kashmir. All these regions are very close and adjacent to Pakistan's border. Beijing remains geared to the objective of precluding an upsurge of Islamic or nationalist agitation among its Muslims population mainly in Xinjiang province. In 1990's these provinces bordering Central Asia became a center of Islamic uprising which required 200,000 Chinese troops to quell it.

Religious fundamentalism is propagated by Pakistan with a view that an Islamist ideology could facilitate the emergence of closer links between the insurgents, their supporters and Islamabad. Pakistan support to secessionist forces in different regions has become an integral part of Pakistani policy. Pakistan had used terrorism against India for forcing a solution of Kashmir issue and in Punjab to avenge the loss of Bangladesh in 1971 and in Xinjiang for Islamist cause and ideological base. The dissatisfied and alienated elements in Punjab, Kashmir and Xinjiang province found Pakistan ready to give them every possible assistance. Since Pakistan have some serious ideological differences and major border conflicts including the issue of Kashmir with India. It is bent upon particularly after the emergence of Bangladesh not only to disturb and destabilize but to disintegrate India at all costs and destabilize the entire region. Pakistan Islamist cause and fundamentalism have triggered awakening among the Muslims of

Xinjiang and about their Islamic and pan-Turkic identity. The arms for the uprising in these regions came from the Afghan Mujahidden through Pakistan.

Islamabad has realised the significance of newly emerged independent Central Asian Republics dominated by Muslims. It can acquire a strategic depth in the region by portraying itself as a leading Islamic nation. It can also influence their leadership in helping Islamic nation. It can also influence their leadership in helping it to counter India and in supporting its Kashmir cause vis-à-vis New Delhi. The Pakistan leadership has also realised that by building up its trade and economic ties with these countries as also by offering easy access to warm water ports, it stood to gain a lot in terms of using their nascent markets for its products as well as for getting access to their raw material resources.

Pakistan has sought to achieve these goals by playing the Islamic card. It has been working towards the establishment of Islamic regimes in the region. In pursuit of these aims, ISI was assigned a major role. In order to achieve them, ISI has been adopting a multi-pronged strategy. This includes spreading of Islamic card in all these countries. The Sikh extremist activities in Nepal are quite different from those in other countries, particularly in Europe and UK, USA and Canada. Nepal has become an important contact point and an escape route for Sikh extremists in the Punjab due to the intensified security measures along the Indo-Pakistan border. Sikh extremists from Europe as well as those based in Pakistan have been using Nepal for holding meetings and for crossing over in to India.

Majority of the Sikhs living in Birganj, who are migrants from Jammu and Kashmir and Ludhiana district of Punjab have been helping Sikh militants by providing boarding and lodging facilities. The Sikhs in Birganj are mainly engaged in truck and bus transport business. ISI has been increasingly using Nepal for holding discussions with Sikh extremists and for guiding their operations in the eastern parts of India, particularly in U.P. The ISI officials posted in Kathmandu are:

- Regular contact with local Sikhs (Pritam Singh, Joga Singh),
- Arranging interaction with Muslim agents of ISI.

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47 Ibid.
### Table: 5.5

Militancy among Madrassas Teachers (N=27) (In %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Open war</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehadi groups</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful means</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: HIMAL, South Asian, vol.17, no.2, February 2004*
Involved in arranging arms for Sikh extremists through Nepal
Arranging release of Sikh extremists in India for carrying out terrorist activities.

Earlier in late December 1996, Satpal Singh and Amarjeet Singh of KZF had been in contact with Tariq Hussain, first secretary (Commerce), Embassy of Pakistan, Kathmandu, for getting assistance for Sikh militants48.

Cross-Border Terrorism in Kashmir, Punjab and Xinjiang: Cost-Effective Strategy:

Pakistan resorted to the strategy of terrorism because it appeared to be a more cost-effective option. It is a low-cost option that has greater chances of success. It also does not involve the risk of conventional war as it is fought on the victim’s territory. It appears that due to these advantages the option of a proxy war through terrorism has increasingly replaced the option of conventional war in South Asia. It enables Pakistan to keep the conflict at low costs, less intense and at a low level to avoid the possibility of full-fledged conventional war. Proxy war is a low cost and no-cost option but best suited to promote Pakistan’s geopolitical, diplomatic and military interests, not only to wrest Kashmir but also to gain forward strategic depth. Pakistan’s main objective is to keep India involved in protracted proxy war to degrade India’s conventional superiority through a process of strategic fatigue49.

Pakistan’s supported terrorism in Kashmir has become more intensified in the post–cold war scenario. Pakistan has been supplying arms to terrorists in Kashmir and continues to do so even after the cold war. Pakistan having won the covert war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, feels emboldened that if it could win against a superpower, terrorism can be a successful strategy against a lesser powerful country like India. Pakistan is in a position to supply a large number of militants and insurgents in Kashmir because it is still in possession of weapons supplied by U.S to oust Soviet influence in Afghanistan. During the cold war period, the U.S had supplied arms ammunitions and equipments worth million of dollars to Pakistan. About tens of thousands of tones of small arms were supplied to Pakistan by U.S, China, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, Turkey

48 ibid.
and U.K. It is estimated that at least 4,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles had been supplied to the ISI and about 900-stinger shoulder-fired surface to air missiles to the Afghan Mujahidden. It has been reported that ISI still has access to 3 million packed and greased kalashnikov assault rifles. India has been affected most by these developments because Pakistan and Afghanistan became the centre of gravity for terrorism. Pakistan is not using terrorism as a last resort but as a short cut to attain strategic and political objectives. Terrorism in Kashmir though initially supported by some disgruntled youth can be defined as trans-border or international terrorism because it is sustained only with external financial support, cross border training camps and sanctuaries. Thus, terrorism is not just not a vehicle of intra-state violence but it is transnational phenomena, using mercenaries, organized crime cartels, sophisticated weaponry and modern means of communications to operate from, through and in to various countries. Transnational terrorism has exacerbated due to one nation’s terrorists groups not recognizing the boundaries. These terrorists try to acquire the legitimacy of religion or ethnic identity. Pakistan tried to project its terrorism as the Kashmiris fight for the right of self-determination and uses religious ideological doctrines like jihad to promote terrorism in Kashmir. Thus, Pakistan sponsored terrorism in Kashmir is politically motivated and built around religious fundamentalism. Pakistan has been using Islam as a tool of its domestic and foreign policy since its creation. It justifies its claim on Kashmir on the basis of two-nation theory and has been using religious ideology as the basis of terrorism in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{50}


Table: 5.6
Comparison of Terrorists Violence in Jammu and Kashmir

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Incidents of Violence</th>
<th>Security Force Personnel killed</th>
<th>Muslims Civilians killed</th>
<th>Hindu or Sikh Civilians killed</th>
<th>Terrorist killed</th>
<th>Others killed</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>07</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>220</td>
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<td>06</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>08</td>
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<td>05</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>05</td>
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<td>08</td>
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<td>April</td>
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<td>06</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1309</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>1596</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Terrorism in South Asia: A Politico-Strategic Analysis by Krishan Gopal in edited book by Sengupta and Singh, “Terrorism in South Asia”.

The table showing fatality index clearly indicates two aspects: that there has been no de-escalation in the levels of terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir and more
crucially, that the ground-level situation is not conductive to any form of peace in the immediate future.

The main objective of Pakistan's sponsored terrorism in Kashmir is to use violence to affect the psychology of India so that it gets exhausted and surrenders. Pakistan sponsored terrorism is a well-planned strategy. The main aim of Pakistan's proxy against India is to ensure that the Indian army and central paramilitary forces remain engaged in counter insurgency and internal security operations in Kashmir. In religious terrorism, though the target is the state, the victims are civilians. Jihad has killed more than 100,000 people in Kabul and more than 10,000 in Kashmir. The objective is to bleed India by thousands cuts to destabilize and dismember it.\(^{31}\)

Pakistan's continues its strategy of trans border terrorism as it neither leads to conventional war nor an escalation of the situation and yet keeps India constantly engaged in internal squabbles that impact its socio-economic and political conditions. Clearly, trans border terrorism is an effective strategy that gives an added advantage to the sponsoring country by giving it an option of denying its role if international reaction becomes too hot for it to bear. Pakistan is using the plea of supporting Kashmir's cause for self-determination and trying to malign India's image by projecting the Indian army's actions as violation of human rights in Kashmir. By resorting to terrorism under the garb of Kashmiris, movement of self-determination, Pakistan has sought to internationalize the issue to get it resolved in its own favour.

Pakistan's strategy of terrorism had flourished under its nuclear umbrella. It still projects Kashmir as an international flashpoint to draw international attention to its cause in Kashmir. As Pakistan's capacity to counter India militarily and diplomatically declined due to the emergence of a unipolar world and due to U.S policies on nuclear issues, Pakistan turns towards China. It intensified militancy in Kashmir while trying to strengthen its nuclear capability with the help of China. Pakistan's clandestine nuclear programme forced India to forward its nuclear programmes. Even Pakistan's intrusion in Kargil was the army handiwork as it felt that India would not respond to such act militarily and it would be able to draw international attention to Kashmir and get it resolved in its own

favour. Kargil was a desperate attempt on the part of Pakistan to capture Kashmir. The Kargil war has blown apart all Pakistan’s pretensions of its non-involvement in the proxy war of Kashmir. Pakistan’s strategy is to use Afghan irregulars to destabilize India in the name of jihad. Pakistan can also make use of its regular forces under the garb of irregulars. Thus Pakistan will be using both regular and irregular forces to achieve its missions in Kashmir. The growing power of ISI, the huge funding available to army, large number of Afghan irregulars controlled by Pakistan army, all help Pakistan to continue its proxy war against India. Pakistan, thus decided to use moral and physical means other than military operations to destroy the will of the enemy, damage his political capacity and expose him to the world as an oppressor. Kargil has proved that a nuclear environment is conducive for terrorism and proxy war. Pakistan still considers Kashmir as a part of the unfinished agenda of partition to be completed by force. It considers Kashmir as a core issue. It demands that the UN resolution calling for plebiscite in Kashmir be observed, thus clearly rejecting the Simla agreement. Pakistan feels that covert war can continue and aggression across the LOC carried out and that India would be deterred by Pakistan’s nuclear capability.

**Pakistan’s Proxy War: India’s Integrated Strategy**

India is at the cross roads where it has deterred Pakistan's conventional war but needs to evolve an integrated strategy to deal with Pakistan’s proxy war. In order to prevent the possibility of conventional war, India is trying to enhance its conventional war fighting capability as well. Pakistan enjoys the advantage in this regard because it deters India’s conventional war by its possibility of nuclear strike. There is fear of arms race in the region because Pakistan tries to acquire parity with India by matching its capability in numbers. The continuation of terrorism and possible escalation of arms race would have a destabilizing effect on the deterrence stability between India and Pakistan.


Since Pakistan and Afghanistan have been the epicenter of terrorism, it was hoped that terrorism might get eliminated in Kashmir. It was hoped that the U.S fight against terrorism would fracture and gradually eliminate terrorism in the region. However, U.S policy to use Pakistan as frontline state to fight terrorism in Afghanistan belied India’s hope. Instead, Pakistan feels benefited by the U.S presence as it acts as a bulwark against India’s pressure. Pakistan also feels benefited economically, politically, militarily, diplomatically and strategically. It considers the U.S presence as a defector umbrella over Pakistan. Musharraf by offering his full cooperation to the U.S has emerged as a forceful leader and a close ally of the U.S and continues to put Kashmir on the agenda to pacify the fundamentalist’s forces at home and to get international support abroad. Even, U.S has not been able to put much pressure on Musharraf to stop cross-border terrorism in Kashmir.\(^{55}\)

The secular public education system needs to be rebuilt in Pakistan to reduce people’s reliance on madrassas that inculcate Pakistani youth with Islamic fervour. The free and fair press and impartial judiciary also need to be established. It would weaken fundamentalist’s forces in Pakistan. Since Kashmir is the main bone contention between India and Pakistan.\(^{56}\) India can take unilateral, bilateral and multilateral actions. India has taken unilateral action:

To initiate confidence building measures towards Kashmir by good governance and development process.

- Deal with cross border terrorism firmly by boosting its defence capabilities.
- Initiate dialogue with Pakistan to evolve a solution mutually acceptable to both India and Pakistan.
- India’s policy of diplomacy and vigilance on the one hand and effort to generate confidence in Kashmir in those who feel alienated can help India to restore peace in Kashmir.

Besides taking political initiatives for good governance, India has to continue to pursue the policy of vigilance and strength to contain Pakistan’s expansionist designs.

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India has to take certain measures to contain Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism. India has to first manage its soft borders that help in smuggling of arms, narcotics and mercenaries. Border can be electronically fenced in order to prevent any kind of objectionable infiltration in India57.

India needs to change its old structure and procedures of border patrolling. It needs to introduce modernized surveillance and communication systems so that India can detect the problem before it is too late. There has to coordinated command, control and communication and intelligence systems in order to avoid any delay in action. Indian forces should be provided lightweight weapons, proper clothing suitable to the alpine climatic conditions. People should be informed about the security issues in order to mobilize their support to defence preparations and government policies. Media should be used to generate consensus at the national, regional and global levels to cope up with terrorism. Since the problem cannot be resolved only by military means, India has to initiate non-military and confidence-building measures towards Pakistan absence of dialogue can make fundamentalists forces more powerful in Pakistani politics58.

Pakistan continues to harp on the Kashmir issue due to internal compulsions. The increasing weightage of religious parties in Pakistan’s elections is also alarming for the region as a whole. India feels that dialogue can resume only if Pakistan stops cross-border terrorism. India’s initiative to open dialogue has led to the resumption of the Lahore bus service but terrorism in Kashmir and elsewhere continues to be the stumbling bloc in reducing the gap between two neighbouring countries. In this regard, the international community can play a significant role by pressurizing Pakistan to stop terrorism in Kashmir and thereby creates an environment conducive for dialogue and cooperation between India and Pakistan59.

58 Ibid.
Kashmir Problem: Possible solutions

An independent Kashmir: Kashmir is one of the options in the Kashmir valley. While it is good sign for India that Kashmiri are less and less identifying with Pakistan, it will be a strategic setback to India if Kashmiri insists on separation. Pakistan and India are not in a favour of independent Kashmir, whereas Hurriyat conference wants an independent state. An independent Kashmir can prove to be a playground for the big powers of the region and the U.S.

Plebiscite: The Hurriyat conference has been talking in favour of a plebiscite. The facts that Pakistan has given away a part of POK to China and that Pakistan is conspicuously silent about a plebiscite in POK are hindrances in the way of a plebiscite.

Trifurcation of the state in to Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh: India, Pakistan and the Hurriyat conference have ruled out such an option. It is also feared that trifurcation will lead to the communal division of the state which will not fit in to the secular credentials of the Indian nation. It might also justify the two-nation theory that gave birth to the Pakistani state.

Greater autonomy: This in some way ends the alienation of the Kashmiri. India has recently announced recently that the centre would resolve more powers to Jammu & Kashmir provided the state government identified areas that needed greater autonomy. Indian government and the Kashmir organizations are in favour autonomy the government of Pakistan is not.

Conversion of LoC to international border: The conversion of LoC to the international border was mooted in 1972 Shimla agreement. But what went in to paper in Shimla was only the question of LoC and not it’s conversion in to an international border. Later on both sides hardened their positions on the issue of international border with Indian parliament passing a resolution claiming the entire territory of Jammu & Kashmir including the POK and this idea of converting LoC in to international border was repudiated by New Delhi.

Measures to be taken to contain the Kashmir problem: One is to built a better Jammu & Kashmir would be to rebuild Kashmir’s economy and to provide employment and career-building opportunities to the Kashmir youth. India must also commit itself to give adequate autonomy to Kashmir ensuring that the profits of autonomy reach the grass
The Indian government must take necessary initiatives to ensure that election in Jammu & Kashmir are conducted in a free and fair manner. This will strengthen the faith of Kashmiri people in Indian democracy. It is also necessary to get confidence of the Kashmiri people by patiently listening to their problems and government making efforts to solve them\(^60\).

The unabated militant activity in the state of Jammu & Kashmir and other parts of the country continued to be a serious security concern. More than 60,000 civilians and 9,000 security men have died in terrorist attacks so far, according to the statistics released by the government. Terrorism for India is no longer an abstraction or something associated with Kashmir alone. It is the most defining and destabilizing force in the lives of the nations today. US led international crackdown on terrorism has presented us with a unique opportunity to take this fight to finish. Guerilla insurgencies can grind on for decades, however, fiercely opposed by traditional fighting forces. The most pressing need before the country at this juncture is to defeat the forces of terrorism, unprecedented challenges call for extraordinary solutions\(^61\).

The two-nation theory created Pakistan and it still survives on this theory. Pakistan finds it difficult to accept the reality that India continues to be a democratic, plural, multi-religious society and that India today has more Muslims citizens than Pakistan. The government of Pakistan has taken upon itself the responsibility of not only protecting its own citizens but also the Indian Muslims. The power structure in theocratic Pakistan, dominated by the army, the feudal landlords, the bureaucracy and the religious leaders has been able to retain its hold over the levers of power by playing the anti-India and Islamic card. Pakistan plays the Islamic card in its foreign policy also. It misses no opportunity to club India as an anti-Islamic country where Muslims are not safe. The continuing tensions between India and Pakistan have a direct bearing on the internal situation in India\(^62\).

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The presence of hostile neighbours enables the internal conflicts to get external support, which includes money, arms and sanctuaries. The vested interests exploit these conditions to pursue their own agenda. The hostile external forces, taking advantage of this situation through subversive propaganda, further accentuate these conflicts. They give material and ideological support to aggravate this sense of grievance to such an extent that small minorities are willing to become tools in their hands to subvert the stability and security of the country.

The rise of fundamental forces is posing the most serious threat to India’s security. The intelligence agencies in our neighborhood and the organizations like Al-Qaeda and Jaish-e-Mohammad are encouraging the so-called ‘Jehadis’ to enter India from outside. After first targeting the border states they have now spread deep inside the country. These bands of fanatics are not only indulging in subversive activities, but are spreading the virus of fundamentalism among the Indian Muslims. The break up of the Indian Union continues to be the main goal of Pakistani’s domestic and foreign policy. Easy availability of deadly weapons in India has created new dangers for India’s security.

With the ‘golden crescent’, and the ‘golden triangle’ in India’s neighborhood, drug trafficking poses yet another threat to its security. Drug syndicates are generating huge funds, a part of which is being used to give financial support to some of these subversive groups. The intelligence agencies like the ISI are recruiting a number of ‘carriers’ in drug trafficking as their agents. These agencies provide legal immunity for their criminal activities in their own country in addition to giving them financial and logistical support.

Pakistan has started a proxy war since 1989. Waging of a proxy war fits in to the Pakistani designs of bleeding India. Unfortunately, the weaknesses of the state and of the administrative systems have provided Pakistan with opportunities to fish in troubled waters. Its rulers have been exploiting regional and religious differences. Anti-national forces thrived in this environment and Pakistan had missed no opportunity to support and encouraged them. Over the years it has succeeded in building a pro-Pakistan base in the state. The fundamental forces have managed to penetrate in to the secular polity. One of

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Pakistan’s main aims is to divide the polity on communal lines. The attitude of the Pakistani military government is unlikely to change in the near future\(^\text{64}\).

Kashmir has become symbolic issue in the domestic politics of both India and Pakistan, and in neither country have political leaders shown much disposition to embrace imaginative approaches to the problem lest they be accused of betraying fundamental interests\(^\text{65}\). While Kashmir dispute led to wars between India and Pakistan in 1948 and 1965 and a major clash at Kargil in 1999, its violence has largely played out in the form of terrorist strikes in Kashmir by Muslim militants backed by Pakistan, and repressive tactics by Indian security forces. A number of the more prominent groups including Hizb-al-Mujahidden, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba, have had close relations with circles in Pakistan and another group, the radical Harkat-ul-Ansar was close to the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda. When the US struck Al-Qaeda training camps in eastern Afghanistan with Tomahawk cruise missiles in Aug.1998, following the bombing of its Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, a large number of Kashmiris were killed\(^\text{66}\).

The three key elements were identified for an effective campaign against terrorism:

- **The first element** was pressure on Pakistan. As a main sponsor of the Taliban, Pakistan had a great deal for which to answer and it was clear from 11\(^\text{th}\) September onwards that the nearly saintly patience that Washington had displayed towards Islamabad’s regional stratagems had been exhausted.

- **The second key** element was a military operation against the Taliban regime and the Al-Qaeda forces it had aided.

- **The third element** of an effective war against terrorism, namely coalition building and maintenance, has also been poorly handled by the U.S.

The main danger posed by terrorism in India is that it may induce the Indian leadership to strike military against its perceived sponsor, with potentially catastrophic

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consequences. Confidence building measures can help alleviate the risks that terrorism poses and there is an urgent need for major powers to offer Pakistan a mixture of both positive and negative sanctions to disconnect itself from some of the extremist groups that have found haven on its soil. The main danger in Pakistan is that extremist groups could contribute to major societal upheavals from which radicals might emerge with command over nuclear weapons. The main danger in Afghanistan is that it could again lapse into the state of disruption that in the 1990’s permitted Al-Qaeda to find an operating base. There is no excuse for allowing any such thing to result from inaction on the part of the wider world\textsuperscript{67}.

New Delhi’s growing interest in Central Asia goes beyond offsetting Pakistan’s influence in the region. It is also seen as a diplomatic offensive to discredit the Pakistani position on Kashmir within the Muslim world. India could cultivate the opinion of the Muslim world on Kashmir by encouraged Muslim Central Asian states to present New Delhi’s case in the organisation of Islamic Conference. Among other things, India could argue that it has a greater Islamic interest at heart, given the fact that India has the world’s second largest Muslim population after Indonesia. The 11\textsuperscript{th} September attacks on the US and the subsequent US military operation in Afghanistan had a critical impact on the geo-strategic impact of the region. On the revised regional map, Pakistan has lost its sway over Afghanistan and the former Soviet Central Asian republics are being wooed by the South Asian rivals.