Dwelling, Building and Thinking

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Chapter Three

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3.1. HEIDEGGER ON THINKING

Thinking in the sense of thinking of Being or meditative or essential thinking is the kind of thinking that Heidegger is advocating. He hopes that meditative thinking may “grant us the possibility... of a new ground and foundation upon which we may stand and endure in the world of technology without being imperiled by it”1. This kind of thinking, Heidegger tells us, dwells in what lies close to us and meditates on what is the closest. The task of Heidegger’s thought places before us is that of learning how to think. In the world of thinking, Heidegger has such an enduring presence first and foremost as a teacher, then as the practitioner of the art of thinking.

From the point of Heidegger the oldest and the most important question of philosophy is the question of Being. According to Heidegger, this problem was first raised by Anaximander. He adds that Being is the closest to us than our inner most essence. The noticeable thing according to Heidegger, is that the pre-Socratic philosophers alone dealt with this problem of Being in its authentic and unblemished form. Modern thinkers considered Being, following Aristotle as an empty concept. Some fundamental error in metaphysics caused this misfortune. Man is one who
can think and, hence, he is called a rational animal. Man can think in the sense that he possesses the capacity to think. To be capable of thinking, we need to learn how to think. We learn to think by giving our mind to what there is to think about. Everything is capable of provoking thought and that enable use to think. What this most thought-provoking? From the Heideggerian point of view the most thought-provoking thing in our thought provoking time is that we are still not thinking. Today, every where there is an interest in philosophy. Almost every claim to know that philosophy is all about is, in fact, is a claim to know philosophers who are thinkers par excellence. They are called thinkers precisely because thinking properly takes place in philosophy.

In our era man thinks the profoundest thought. Buy thinking so, we do remain related to what must have been thought in the past. What has been said so far is that science dose not think the way thinkers think. This is shocking. The gulf between thinking and the science becomes very wide and it remains unbridgable. Hence, it is important that we should learn how to think and we learn it only if we unlearn at the same time. The matter before us is that we can learn thinking only if we radically unlearn what thinking has been traditionally. To do this we must come to know it.
Heidegger asserts that there is a difference between *logo* and *mythos*. *Mythos* means “to utter the word”. For the Greeks to utter is to lay bare and make it appear. *Mythos* is what has its essence in its utterance, what is apparent in the unconcealedness. On the contrary, the early Greek thinkers (for instance Parmenides) are precisely the one to use *mythos* and *logos* the same sense. *Mythos* and *logos* become separated and opposed to each other only at the point where neither *mythos* nor *logos* can keep to their original nature. But Heidegger in his characteristic manner remarks that nothing holy is ever destroyed by logic, but can be destroyed only by God’s withdrawal.

The thinking back to what is to be thought is the source and ground of *posey* (poetry). This is why *posey* is the water that flows at times towards the source, and at times towards thinking as thinking back, i.e., a recollection. As long as we take the view that logic gives us information only about what thinking is, we shall never be able to think how much all poetry rests upon thinking back, i.e., recollection. Everyone admits that arts and sciences are totally different from each other. If a distinction is made between thinking and science and then the two are contrasted, then the fear may arises as to thinking might open hostilities against the science. When we speak of sciences, we
shall not be speaking against it but speaking of its essential na-
ture. The existing fact is that today's sciences belong to "the realm
of the essence of technology" and not simply "in technology''.
Along still surrounds the essence of modern science, that fog is
not produced by individual investigators and scholars in science,
i.e., it is not produced by man. It arises from the region of what
is most thought-provoking that none of us is still thinking. This
is most thought-provoking that none of us is still thinking. That
is why we are here attempting to learn how to think. The writing
of poetry is no more exempt from thinking.

The art of good teaching is more difficult than learning. A
good teacher has a large store of information. Today, nobody wants
to become a teacher because of his attitude towards teaching. And,
presumably, this disinclination is linked to that most thought-pro-
voking matter which makes us to think. We are trying to learn how
think. At any rate, it is an art or a craft, handicraft. Thinking
itself is man's simplest, and yet for that reason the hardest
handiwork, if it is accomplished in its proper way. We must learn,
how to think because our being able to think is still no guarantee
that we are capable of thinking properly.

The gift of what must properly be thought about, is what
we call the most thought-provoking. Our answer to the question
is "the most thought-provoking" might turn us away from the most thought-provoking thing. In fact, it has long since turned many men away. Socrates did nothing else other than placing himself at the disposal of this art. That is why he is called purest thinker of the West. All the great western thinkers after Socrates, with all their greatness were unlike him in this art. Thinking has entered into literature and literature decided the western science which, by way of the doctrine of the Middle Ages, become the scientia of modern time.

We do not know what is thinking and what calls for thinking and, therefore, can't think about what poetry is? We, modern men, don't have the slightest notion of how thoughtfully the Greek experienced their lofty poetry. Its statement rests on its truth. Beauty is a gift of the essence of truth (aletheia). We are compelled to let the poet's world stand in its truth in beauty. This does not exclude on the contrary, includes that we think the poetic world.

Holderlin’s poetic statement with which Heidegger is concerned in his endeavour to think Being is said to be the "most thought-provoking." What is stated poetically, and what is stated in thought are never identical. But there are, occasions when they become similar. And, the gulf separating poetry and thinking is
clear and decisive on such occasions. This can occur when poesy (poetry) is lofty and thinking is profound. Holderlin understood the matter well. The question "what is called thinking?" can never be answered by proposing an Aristotelian definition or by suggesting a universal concept of thinking. The truth is that we may not think about what thinking is. However, the Greek thinkers, and there after Kant and Hegel understood the fruitfulness of such a reflection. In the west thinking has flourished as logic, Logic refers to a special kind of thinking. The knowledge logic concerning logic has been made scientifically fruitful only recently, in a special science that calls itself logistics. It is the most specialized of all specialized sciences.

The essence of modern technology is worthy of thought. It is higher than the traditional views on science which sees science merely as a phenomenon of human civilization. The essence of technology pervades our lives in a way which we have barely noticed so far. But so long as the essence of technology does not closely concern us, in our thought, we shall never be able to know what the machine is. None of us know yet what handicap must modern man in the technological era carry even if he is not a worker at the machine. Neither Hegel nor Marx could know it nor could they ask why their thinking had to move in the shadow of
the essential nature of technology. This is the one track thinking that causes human laziness. This one track thinking, which is becoming more wide spread in various shapes, is one of those unsuspected and forms in which the essence of technology assumes dominion.

The one track thinking is something more than mere one sided thinking. It has a greater reach and a loftier origin. The word thinking means having a view. For instance, I think it will rain tonight. Occasionally we say the one who speaks that way is thinking, he merely expresses his views on something. Heidegger warns us that we must be very careful not to regard this "viewing" as a significance mode of thinking. It leads precisely the sphere of scientific exploration. Historical science may thought fully explore a period of history for instance, in every possible respect and yet never explore what history is about. It cannot in fact do so scientifically, By way of history, a man will never find out what history is. Similarly, a mathematician cannot show way of mathematics, i.e., by means of his science, what ultimately a mathematical formula is all about. In the like manner man remains inaccessible to spheres such as history, art, language, nature, etc. It must be said that the science qua science has no access to thinking, for, science does not think.
In a passage from the *Letter on Humanism*, where Heidegger, while commenting on the nature of thinking, says that “the thinking that inquired into the truth of Being and so defines man’s essential abode from Being forward Being is neither ethics nor ontology neither theoretical nor practical” but “come to pass before the distinction”.

The sciences, i.e., fields of knowledge, have infinitely more knowledge than thinking. There is another side in every science which that science as such can never reach. That is the essential nature and origin of them. The sciences remain necessarily one sided. This one sidedness arises on account of a defect of our minds, for sometimes the minds hold the view that everything is identical. To-day every newspaper, every magazine, and every radio or television programme offers various items in an identical manner to all sorts of viewers. They also consider the subjects of science and that of thinking in an identical manner.

However, it would be an error for us to believe that such a phenomenon is merely to criticize our present age. Certainly, we should escape from the imperceptible power of the uniformly one-sided view. It is only on the plane of the one-sided uniform view that one track thinking takes its start. And this is what we mean when we say that we are still not thinking. Many thinkers give us
food for thought. That does not mean that we are thinking nor does it mean we have come to what is the most thought-provoking.

It is supposed that the forming of thoughts and ideas are one and the same. Traditionally it was believed that thinking is a kind of representation of ideas. But at the same time it remains obscure as to how this traditional understanding of thinking arouse. When someone says, to think the matter is such and such, it clearly follows that to think is to form ideas. Basically, they are still inaccessible to us. Let us be honest with ourselves regarding the essential nature of thinking, the essential possibilities of thinking and the essential origin of thinking. They are all strange to us and they, in fact, give us food for our thought. Our manner of thinking still feeds on the traditional nature of thinking the forming of representational ideas. But that is not the nature of thinking and it is not the reality of thought. The real nature of thought will reveal itself to us if we remain open and docile to it.

The representative of traditional thinking who is the closest to us in time and when the most stimulating is Nietzsche. He sees clearly that the history of western man is coming to an end. Nietzsche saw the necessity of change in the realm of essential thinking. He was the first thinker to recognize it clearly
and the only one to think metaphysically. Within the purview of thinking, Nietzsche calls man the last man. He adds that the last man is no longer willing look beyond himself and to undertake the task of essential thinking, in a way that is essentially right. Man is in so far as incapable of it. He has not yet come into his own self. That is why Nietzsche says: "Man is the as yet undetermined animal." Western thought holds that man is a rational animal. Through reason, man raised himself above animals. But in Nietzsche man is still the undetermined animal. The rational animal in him has not yet been fully brought out. Nietzsche, says man is not willing to subject to himself. Nietzsche gives an ideal, the superman, which is often misunderstood. But does not refer this title to the existing man. Nietzsche's words refer to the density of man and that density will take the foundations of man's thinking.

According to the Greek doctrine, man is "that rising present which can make appear what is present." From the western conceptual viewpoint man is a peculiar combination of animality and rationality. But to Nietzsche, the proper essential unity of the two has not been achieved. Therefore, as of now, the two domains of being, animality and rationality are separate and they do clash. This rapture prevents man from possessing the
genuine type of man and forces him to cast off his “humanity”. Nietzsche’s thinking gives the expression of something that already exists, but it is still concealed from our current views.

3.2 THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THINKING

The question “what is called thinking?” is still remote and seems almost strange to us. From the point of the common man, Heidegger’s query is ambiguous since for him thinking is only an expression found in our day to day use of language. The vagueness of the question what is called thinking? lies precisely in the ambiguity of the expression “to call”. Moreover, this question has a unique meaning compared to any other question. We, in any given situation, are capable of thinking. But we are not actually involved in thinking because we are too occupied with other matters and, hence, disinclined to think. The people committed exclusively to think are very few. According to Heidegger, poetry and thought are the media for expressing the thought of Being in language. Thought and poetry never merely use language to express themselves, rather thought and poetry are themselves essential for language. If we utter the word “thinking”, it calls for an examination of the history of the word thinking. The words thought and thinking are expressions used in the history of language although thinking is an activity common to all of us.
We have placed thinking close to poetry and at a distance from science. The essential closeness of poetry and thinking do not ignore their difference. On the contrary, it is the difference, an abysmal kind. Due to this difference, we moderners have trouble in understanding the meaning of thinking. Thinking and poetry have long since been a part of literature. The history of language is accessible only by historical investigation and philosophical insights.

For the one who tries to understand the mind of Heidegger's philological explorations are of utmost significance. Philosophy opens up the pre-scientific mode of thinking, i.e., essential thinking, and shows the historical development of the notion of thinking. When we examine the etymology of the word thinking reveals its close relation to the old English word thanc. This word is rich in meaning and conveys more than what we generally understand from the word thinking as a mental activity. Heidegger's words: the thanc means man's inmost mind, heart, the heart's core, that -innermost essence of man which reaches outward most fully and to the outermost limit, and decisively that, rightly considered, the idea of an inner and outer world does not arise."
Here one finds the suggestive meaning of the word *thanc* which are closely related to thinking. First, we notice that thinking and memory have a close affinity with each other and it is summation of all that we care for as human beings. Secondly, find that thinking and thanks are closely related to each other in their meaning. Our unique capacity to think is here viewed as a gift of Being and, therefore, it enables us to ask the most thought provoking question.

Heidegger’s understanding of memory is quite different from the general conception of it as the ability to retain or hold back the ideas which has got a reference to the past. The present day meaning of the term memory as the power to recall was something alien to it originally. Thinking, in Heidegger’s opinion, is the all gathering thinking that recalls. Here the essential nature of thinking is conceived as gatheredness. Memory is not exclusively related to the past, the present, and the future too have a place in it. In other words, it is the present having a reference to not yet and the no longer; they are encapsulated in the present. What is past and what is yet to come appear in oneness with the present. Since this basic meaning remains distorted. We are compelled to emphasize this particular meaning of thinking and this is conveyed through recalling memory or remembrance.
Moreover, the word memory suggests a steadfast and constant concentration on Being. Consequently, memory is not just the quality essential to recall, but it is fundamentally the gathering of everything that the heart holds in Being. Memory, therefore, cannot be taken as an after the fact collection of that which exists, but it covers the tiding that overtake all our doings.\textsuperscript{13} In short, thinking is that gatheredness which recalls our essential relation to Being or makes possible to ask the most thought-provoking question.

Thinking and thanking are also closely related in meaning. As we have seen, the authenticity of \textit{Dasein} rests in its constant attempt to remain in poximity to Being. Essential thought which Heidegger often speaks about is nothing more or anything less than this listening to the voice of Being. For, essential thinking is related to Being in two different ways. First, it is owned by Being and secondly, it attends or makes a response to the call of Being. Heidegger emphasizes the claim of Being to ourselves, and we ourselves are the text and texture of the question.\textsuperscript{14} When we understand that our relation to Being is essential, there is a feeling of thankfulness or devotedness for this gift. This is the reason why Heidegger says: to think is to thank. Thanking is a gift of Being which is the highest and most rewarding for it.
mines our essential nature, by revealing our relation to Being. According to Heidegger, one must be thankful for this unique endowment and one can express his greatfulness by giving to the most thought-provoking question.

But thinking is one of the major activities of man. The question what is called thinking is an attempt to reach out to the source of this activity. Indeed, the question is prior even to thinking. The question is directed toward what would be called supposition of thinking. We understand what thinking is in an ordinary, vague or implicit sense. However, the implicitness thinking betrays us because of the fact that what we understand by thinking is presented and handed down to us by logic.

Thinking expressed in terms of logical propositions affirm something of something. For instance, consider the statement: the moon is risen. In this proposition the predicate does not merely express in speech something but also presents or affirms somethings as something, viz. the moon is risen. Such a presentation and affirmation are ruled by a conjunction of what is stated with that is made. The conjunction constitute a sentence. Every proposition is a sentence. But every sentence need not be a proposition. "what is called thinking ?" is not a proposition, it is a sentence.
There is another way of looking at our query: "what is called thinking?" When we ask the question "what is called thinking?" in the first sense, the word thinking directs us to the essential sphere of memory, devotion, and thanks. In the second sense of the question, the meaning of thinking emerges differently. However, according to Heidegger, philosophically the word is related to thought, memory, and thanks. The decisive question still remains what is it which the western civilization and especially the European thinking (today) received in its essential character from the Greek thinking. The way of thinking cannot be traced from somewhere to somewhere, nor does it exists as such in any place. No thinker ever has entered into another thinker's solitude. Yet it is only from its solitude that thinking that comes after or that went before reveal itself. It was Parmenides who remarked that one should state and think that Being is. This statement of Parmenides has two aspects. The first concerns the content of the statement and the second is the manner in which we carry it over from the Greek to our own language.

1. The content of saying: The content of the assertion easily escapes and slips away from us into oblivion. The expression "Being is" hardly confirms to our accustomed ways of thinking. We often hear the sentence and find nothing worthy of
thought in it and we take the view that subject and predicate of it are equally clear. We have the ‘is’ even before it is spoken. In the course of two and a half thousand years, starting from the early Greek philosophers, thinking itself has slowly become accustomed to the idea which the sentence echos. Hence, a theory could be formulated stating that nothing further could beside about it than what the above expression tells us. Kant in his work, Critique of Pure Reason says that “being” and “existence” are among the “almost un analysable concepts”. He further remarks that what the expressions “being” and “existence” tells us can be grasped only in a concept. Today we talk of “being” and “existence” in a routine manner. We only notice the monotony of the sentence “being is” and yet the day may come when some will find the sentence astonishing.

2. The translation of the saying: The translated form of above question “what calls on us to think?” is of a special kind because the expression in translation does more than conveying knowledge of an earlier view of philosophy. But the translation is nothing special and nothing worthy of distinction. The expression of the early thinking fits in splendidly with the common picture. Among the early thinkers we see Parmenide’s fragments speaking, stating, and thinking of the Being of beings. It speaks of the
highest and the deepest, the most remote and yet the nearest, the most veiled and yet the clearest sense of Being.

Parmenides fragments concerning Being and thought which he nowhere elucidates, conceals a still deeper and wider sense than the expression of Being does in Holderlin's poetry. The later Greek thinkers like Plato and Aristotle state that thinking proceeds as though the meaning of thinking were the most obvious thing in the world. However, that is not the case in Parmenides' approach. Greek thinking seems to have reached its completion in Plato and Aristotle. But we are inquiring back into the past asking for the nature and the mode where determination will be ruled by logic. Parmenides says: "Needful the saying and so thinking too, that Being is."\textsuperscript{16} Being is what is to be stated and thought. Here the character of the sentence "Being is" has been stressed. To the modern man the thoughtfulness will of course, seem entirely to be out of place. Yet, the modern man will, perhaps forgive us for reminding him that the expression thinking is a remarkable word of western logic and without logic there would have been no age of Enlightenment and no dialectical materialism and without it the world will look different.

The concept of thinking established by logic is only a preparation to disclose what is concealed. The age of
Enlightenment obscures the essence of thinking. The medieval and modern philosophy explain the Greek essence of thought in terms of the concept called *ratio*. Kant's main work, *Critique of Pure Reason*, deals mainly with logic and dialectic. In general, it blocks our access to essential thinking of the early Greeks. But it does not say that philosophy after the Greek is false. We can say that most philosophers despite all logic and all dialectic do not aim at the discussion of the question "what is called thinking?" And philosophy strays farthest from this hidden question when it is led to believe that thinking must begin with doubting and the characteristic of thinking is not an apprehending but rather conceptualizing. In the unfolding of its essence, thinking knows nothing of grasping a concept. All the thinking of the Greek thinkers, including that of Aristotle, holds Heidegger, was non-conceptual.

Greek thinking remains fundamentally different from the modern ways of thinking of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, who think in opposition to the system, but for that very reason remain captives of the system. The interpretation of Greek thinking by modern thinkers, whose thinking is guided by modern conceptual thinking, is, therefore, inappropriate. One important thing regarding our modern way of thinking is that it is representational and hence, blocks its access to the beginning of Greek thinking.
When we say “Being” it means “Being of beings”. Again when we say “beings” it means “being in respect of Being”. We are speaking always within a duality. The duality is always an *apriori* datum to Plato, Kant, and Nietzsche. The duality has developed before hand in the relation of beings to Being. This relation can be interpreted and explained in various ways.

According to Heidegger, to discover what thinking is we need to go back to the origin of Greek thinking. Heidegger has long before reflected on the mysterious nature of language, its relation to thinking and Being.

Heidegger is mainly concerned with the way language is related to thinking and its response to the call of thought. Heidegger was encouraged by his study of Holderlin’s poetry to think of Being as divine without, however, being God. In fact, he is singular among the modern philosophers in attaching special importance to poetry. This may be taken partly as a reaction of Heidegger against abstract concepts. In a needy time the poet is rich, for he holds his ground in nothing. He creates to manifest what is hidden, and in this endeavour Heidegger has combined the role of both the seer and the philosopher. Heidegger says poetry is the founding name of Being. He speaks of poetry, rather than God, as a mediator. Poetry is the record of the dialogue of the
poet with Being. Thus, thinking and poetry are the two modes that lead us to Being.

The proximity between thinking and poetry reveals a secret kinship between the poet and the thinker. It is the same which is called Being by the thinkers and “Holy” by the poets. They, thus, reveal Being in their own ways. Both the poet and the philosopher are peculiarly responsive to Being. Genuine thinking, according to Heidegger, is a dialogue between the thinker and Being just as a genuine poetry is a dialogue between the poet and the Holy. Heidegger’s question is about Being and not about the existence of man. However, he holds that this question of Being can be examined and answered only within the framework the analysis of the Being of man. In his works, Being and Time, Letter on Humanism, etc., he tried to remove the Cartesian dichotomy between the human and the world by pointing out what could be loosely called participatory view of knowledge which has a direct and immediate bearing on thinking and Being.

Perhaps, the main of benefit of this study is this: we may with a joyous return to Being, i.e., home coming, from which we have been in exile, may gain entry again to the domain of Being which Heidegger claims exclusive to his philosophy. This has been the general aim of Heidegger’s philosophization, viz. to attain entry
into the domain of Being. And here, in terms of the treatment of thinking, Heidegger demonstrates how that aim can be achieved.

Now, we come to consider Being in its relation to man. The projection of the world by man in the understanding of Being and the experience of nothing in man as invitation to the authentic signification of Being have already shown as the ultimate relation existing between man and Being. The essence of man is existence understood as possibility. The actualization of this possibility depends on the understanding of the truthfulness of Being.

The Being plays the important role in constituting the essence of man. Man is man only when he understand Being. Only in so far as man bestows some thought upon Being and endeavours to understand it, Being comes out of its hiddenness and manifest itself. Being and man are so intimately related that one is inconceivable apart from the other.

In the strict sense Heidegger does not consider man as such. In our way to Being we find Dasein as the ‘Da’ of ‘Sein’. It happens that ‘Da’ of ‘Sein’ is in reality identical with man. Man is therefore the Da-Sein. Man is man because he is a “being there” and “is-there”. It is because he is ‘Da-Sein’ that he became the ontico-ontologically preferable object of our investigation. The characteristic of Dasein is that understanding Being, can relate
itself to the *Sein* of being. Hence Dasein, detecting the Being of being (*sein des seienden*) manifests itself as the *Da of Sein*. The *Da* in Dasein is therefore the openness of man to Being. It is the place where Being reveals itself. Since revelation of Being is truth, *Dasein* is the seat of truth where Being manifests itself. The *Da* is the illumination of Being.

The Heideggerian understanding of man as Dasein. The *Da* constitutes the fundamental modes of ‘Being-in’ of man. The *Da* essentializes itself in two basically different modes of existence: authentic and inauthentic. The existential constitution of *Da*, presenting itself as beholding, understanding and speech, forms the authentic existence of man. The everyday being of *Da*, presenting itself as prattle, curiosity and ambiguity forms the inauthentic existence of man.

Heidegger states that “Dasein, man’s Being, is defined as that living thing whose Being is essentially determined by the potentiality for discourse”18 The understanding of man as *Dasein* gives us a hint of the nature of his existence. Heidegger in his later writings expresses it as Ek-sistence. Ek-Sistence in contrast to existence, signifies the proper nature of human existence because the Ek denotes the Extra, the world, to which *Dasein* existentially tends. In this tending out of itself Dasein finds
Being illumined. The Ek-Sistence of man is thus the standing in the illumined of Being. The illumination is truth. It is the standing out into the truth of Being. Beyond this Ek-Sisting man has no essence. The essence of man is his existence. But this existence is not understood in the traditional sense of 'existentia' as actuality or reality opposed to possibility. The sentence man 'ek-sist' does not answer the question whether man in reality exists.

Though Heidegger asks the question what is the essence of man, he never considers a substance as a 'necessary substract' for this changing *ek-sistence* of man. The existence of man is itself his substance. We have to think that in the whole question of Being Heidegger seems to treat the Being-how (*Wie-Sein*) of Being. Correspondingly the question about the essence of man is also question about the Being-how of man. The sentence the substance of man is his existence would then mean only the man in which man in his own essence essentializes himself to Being. The ecstatically temporalized Ek-Sistence in which man holds himself opened to Being is his essence.

Man is the very oppenness to Being. Openness indicates his existence is not complete or closed in itself. To exist in a fuller sense to realize his possibilities, he has to go out of himself. This
going out takes place in transcendence which is the must of Dasein. So Heidegger could say that man in his essence is ways ahead of himself is beyond himself and his Being is 'Being ahead-of-himself'. To the essence of man belongs what is not himself the Being-in-the-world.

In the *Letter on Humanism*, Heidegger states: Being is not a being, because it is that which enables beings to be present to man and men to each other. It is nearest to man, because it makes him to be what he is and enables him to enter into compartment with other beings. Yet it is farthest removed from him because it is not a being with which he, structured as he is to deal directly with only beings\(^9\)

To be opened to Being is the fundamental character of his Ek-Sistence. Being on the other hand offers itself to the openness of man. Only in this openness of man, in this ‘Da’ of Da Sein could Being essentialize itself as Being. There is an inseparable inter-relation between Being and man. Heidegger thinks that the traditional understanding of Being and man was insufficient. We always say too little of Being itself when in saying Being we leave out the presence to the essence of man and thereby fail to recognize that this essence itself helps us to determine the Being. We also always say too little of man if, in saying Being
(not being human), we set man apart and then only being that which has thus been set apart into relationship as the 'Being'.

The relationship between Being and man may be compared to a sununoning-hearing relationship. Any presence (Being) to the essence of man and in so far as presence (Being) to the essence of man is a call, it summons the essence of man. In order to exist, man must carefully attend to the silent summonings of Being and attending their call preserve them in truth. As the preserver of the truth of Being, man is the shepherd of Being. Being needs this shepherd because only in the hearing of this shepherd is Being brought to its truthfulness and authentically constituted. That is man only in the summoning of Being. Being is Being only in the hearing of man.

3.3. THINKING AND THE ESSENCE OF BEING

The essence of man is related to Being. Apart from Being man is unthinkable. This intimate relation between man and Being points out us also the relation between man and nothing. Being cause in the innermost essence of Being nothing as Being is. So any relation of man to Being should also have a counter-appearance of a relation between man and nothing. Being manifests itself only through nothing. Hence man who knows Being should
necessarily encounter nothing. The historical manifestation of Being to man, veiling and unveiling as it is, is a play of Being giving itself to man under the forms of Being and nothing. The oblivion of Being, which according to Heidegger is the characteristic note of the western philosophical tradition, has created such a misunderstanding or of nothing. The nothing result in nihilism.

The oblivion of Being, which began with the time of Plato, has already paved the way for misunderstanding. Plato is not less nihilistic than Nietzsche. Heidegger corrected Nietzsche’s back to cannonical metaphysics.\(^{20}\) is a time nihilism is in its phase of completion. It is the normal state everyone.

This misunderstanding of nothing should be surpassed. The attempt of many to evade nihilism is not praiseworthy. That is no way to surpass nihilism. On the contrary, the attempt to flee from will only help to preserve nihilism for ever. The basic reason of nihilism is the misunderstanding of the nothing of Being revealed to man. This misunderstanding is fundamentally grounded in the oblivion of the truth of Being. Hence the only way to surpass nihilism is to enter into it and try to expose the real nature of nothing which is nihilistically understood.

Our thinking should approach more fundamentally to the innermost essence of Being which could manifest itself as
nothing at last for a period of time. Heidegger says nihilism is not so negative as it is normally thought to be. But only a directive for a new dawn of metaphysics. Truth, Heidegger says, relates fundamentally to nothingness. This nothingness, however, is not nihil (nothing).

The new beginning marks a new direction of Being. Only with the aid of this new direction of Being we could surpass nihilism. The new direction of Being is only a new way of conceiving the genuine nature of Being in its relation to nothing and man. The essence of man is the central point in the new direction of Being. The intimate relation existing between Being and man allows us to conceive Being as a 'turning towards'. The question is more fundamental. The question touches the problem whether Being is something for itself or whether at times it turns also to the essence of man. Presumably this turning itself is what we call Being.

In this turning away Being withdraws itself the essence of man and conceals itself. The Being is absent, but the absence does not signify a nullity. Absence is only a mode of presence. The Being is present there, but the presence is concealed under its veil. This concealed presence of Being we call absence. Absence is thus the veiled revelation of Being. The absence of Being is the
withdrawal of Being from man in so far as it is veiled. But at the same time it is manifestation of the nothing of Being to man because nothing is the veil of Being. It is simply the other of Being through which Being manifests itself to man. Thus absence is a mode of presence, a mode of the hidden presence, a mode of the presence of the nothing in Being. Only genuine thinking could grasp the concealed presence of Being in absence.

The every concealment of Being may remain concealed and thus the average intellect may be tempted to assume the idea that absence is non-existence and nothing is absolute nullity. This understanding which is founded in the oblivion of Being gives way to the dawn of nihilism where Being is nihilistically understood. But the truth is not so. Nihilism, so-called is in fact only a transitory state where Being withdraws itself from man manifesting itself in concealment.

Heidegger believes in the oneness of Being as distinguished from the distinct entities disclosed in our concernful dealings with the world. Being, he affirms, is not a bare general concept which we intellectually derive from our distinct perceptions; but it is indeterminate immediate, and which is the ground of all that is and determines all that is to be what it is.22
Man has to apply thinking to the concealment of Being and liberate Being from its concealment. This would bring about event of Being. The event of Being is that man by his thinking reveals Being from its concealment. It is the very unveiling of Being where the truth of Being shines forth. Man should be consciousness of his intimate relation to nothing in the very way in which he should be conscious of his relation to Being, because Being, as the turning away, manifests itself to him, as nothing, the no-being. Man who openness to Being, the *Da* of *Sein* is the openness and the *Da* only in so far as he is the place keeper of nothing.

### 3.4. THINKING, BEING AND LANGUAGE

Heidegger's concern with language arises from a prior concern with thinking, and thinking gives rise to the absolutely prior question about Being. We usually regard language as our communication. It objectifies our knowledge. It is a universal, public form for expression. Language guarantees that objective expression can survive from one generation to the next and thus gives rise to tradition. It encapsulates the world view of a people non-thematically in its structure, grammar, syntax, origin. It is also historical. For Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, Dasein has language
and shows itself as the entity which talks and language discloses the contents of consciousness.\(^23\) We start to regard it as a means to communication, as a tool for handling ourselves in the business of the world. In so far as its being is regarded as purposive, as a tool, language also conceals the very thing if ought to reveal about itself.

The later Heidegger recalls us to that which lays behind language, and this is accomplished by analysing two ways wherein man allows Being, namely, thinking and poetry.\(^24\) His path to Being is through thinking.

Heidegger in *On the way to Language*, finds the idea of discourse. Throughout he is unfolding the connection between thinking and poetry, and he repeatedly warns against the inadequacy of calculative thinking, He begins with a poem in or raise the question about the nature poetic insight: how is one express that for which one has no word? “Nothing is where world is lacking....”\(^25\) Heidegger argued that he reached in what is metaphysics? On the nature of nothing, where nothing does not mean negation.

Heidegger is summoning us to an experience of language which has to be a thinking experience. This thinking is not calculative or purposive but foundational, a thinking not meant to produce knowledge but to cut furrows in the soil of Being. In this
sense poetry and thinking are neighbors in the same soil. Authentic thinking is another side of Dasein's openness; just like the openness which grounds discourse, authentic thinking involves a listening. We discover that in asking about the being of language itself, starting with a poet's word, we are engaged in thinking inquiries about the language of being, the domain of nothing. Such thinking brings us into a region of openness where thinking and poetry are neighbors.

The word, *logos*, is unique in the history of thinking. It applies simultaneously to Being and to saying. It may be that the essential nature, the being of language, simply refuses to let itself expressed in words and things. On the other hand, the word allows a thing to be a thing, sustains it in the region of being. Heidegger's point is that, when we speak about language, are not speak of something distant, but of a reality close to home. This point suppose his understanding of Dasein. Dasein already finds itself in this open region characterised by the nearness that touches whatever is. It is the region where all things are in their nothing like character. The answer to the question about language from us because Dasein is already Being-in-the-world and participate in the disclosedness of Being that simultaneously reveals and conceals.
The consideration of the relation between Being and man leads to consider those aspects where man and Being come into closest union. We seen that all explanation regarding the inter-relation between Being and man were based on thinking. A special consideration of this thinking itself in its relation with Being will reveal to us many other hidden truths of Being not yet sufficiently considered. The terms thinking and Being are equally important, because are understood in a pre-established relationship. Thinking, in order to be authentic and essential, must bring Being to its truthfulness. Being in order to manifest itself as authentic Being needs the thinking of man. Thinking is the thinking of man.

Thinking allows Being to shine forth as it is. Because the Being of being could shine forth only in the illumination of the inter-relationship between Being and man. In allowing the Being of being to shine for the thinking brings the relation between man and Being to clear perception, and thus to perfection. Being, giving itself to the thinking of man, brings its message to man. Man, by virtue of his thinking, understands the message and answers it. The language is supposed to be the house of Being. Thinking builds this house and, building the house of language, preserve Being in it.
Heidegger used (hermeneutical) phenomenology as a method, with its imperative to the things themselves and therefore with its own infinite tender care in handling these with its interpretation of the phenomena. The philosophy he used yields, contrary to Husserl's interpretation, as states or modes of being and not-being and nothingless opened the philosophical eye as no other method had done. He made the fundamental distinction between Being and beings. The fact that man's essence is his existence. So that man is precisely that being whose being is itself very problem. Here the radical difference between categories and existential modes of being. The fact that we are always in-the-world. So we are always concerned with this or that thing, including above all and behined all one very being and not being.

The hiddenness or concealedness or covered-up-ness of discourse as grounded in existential self-articulation. The fact that Dasein has always made some sort of decision. We are always ahead ourselves in our plans and projects. Heidegger interprets Dasein's characteristics primarily as ability, that is, characteristics that are not states, but rather capacities.26 Dasein exists either authentically or unauthentically and that we exist authentically only when we concern ourselves with our ownmost possibilities.
Our everyday mode of existence in which all distinctions are averaged up or leveled down and in which we take no firm stand. The existential specialty of man, in the sense of being contained in space, space itself is contained in man and man himself is spatial. The fact that there is a primordial existential knowing in which all perception, scientific knowledge, determination of nature etc. are grounded. So we are always living with others. In fact we are always there always outside ourselves and always outside others. Being there as mood and being there as understanding. So that we are always in some mood or other. We are usually undecided and therefore ambiguous. So that if we said, we have already made some decision, the decision we have made here is to be undecided and vague.

Hence our essence is care (sorge), we are really full of cares all the time. The being of death in our life being conscience as the call from unauthenticated to authenticity for being, a call which our own careful existence makes upon us: a sudden pulling ourselves together into decisiveness and being. How time-past, present, future is grounded in our essence as care, and as mood and understanding? He says a temporal character adhered to every existential structure of Dasein. For instance, being some-how mixed up with the past, understanding with the future gossip and
‘das’ man with the present. He took and gives a critique of the traditional notion of time, especially gives a critique of thee traditional notion of time, especially with Aristotle and Hegel. Heidegger refuses to admit any theory or doctrine without an authentic certification as to how it is integrally grounded in human existence. Man is the measure of all things not accidently, not capriciously, not individualistically, but essentially and in a structurally existential.

3.5. RORTY’S CRITICISM

Later Heidegger or Heidegger II, tried to go beyond Dasein and to come to grasp with Being in general. This is called the turning (Kehre) from the fundamental existential analytic of Dasein in Being and Time. Both at the beginning and at the every end of his work emphasis that the existential analytic was only preparatory for this task of going beyond in as much as “philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and take its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein”.

Heidegger considers Being and Time as only enkindle the problem of ontology. We find that Kehre is far from being, a departure from or reversal of Being and Time. But the fundamental distinction between Being and beings is retained throughout.
Indeed phenomenology would appear to be only one way of thinking and thinking now becomes the way to Being. Though his philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, we find that thinking-meditative puts us in touch with Being. Concerning the disclosure of Being Heidegger criticizes the tremendous historical phenomenon of Nietzsche as completing chapter modern metaphysics. The possibility of the opening up of a use in philosophy based on Heidegger himself seen with his phasis on man, existenz, Being and meditative thinking.

The radical disturbance which modern ruthless technology creates and promotes in Being. The grounding of this whole disturbance in something that happened to the human soul way back in the beginning of the modern era. An event which found its philosophical expression in the misfortune that was Descartes whereby reality is reduced to objects and our attitude to it is dominated by calculative thinking. This give a view to self-assertion, control, prediction, use and exploitation rather than by love and adoration with a view to dwelling respectfully and hopefully.

In *What is called Thinking?*, Heidegger suggests an original relationship between thanking and thinking. He relates the old English ‘thanc, to think, to thanc, to thank’. In giving heart, he says the heart gives thought to what it has and what it is. We
give thanks for something by giving thanks to him who we have to think for it. The things for which we have thanks are not things we have, from ourselves. They are given to us. We receive many gifts, of many kinds. But the highest and really most lasting gifting given to us is always our essential nature.

Heidegger thinks that our essential nature is to think, rather than, in conformity with Leibniz, Schelling Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Commentators are telling that Heidegger does not tell us that into whom we thank or are we thankful to Being for articulating itself through us? or is clearly in the end a mode of thinking ourselves. Richard Rorty suggests a series of criticism against Heidegger. In Rorty’s view, Heidegger cannot really differentiate between Being and being in the way he wants. Heidegger cannot give no sense to the word Being other than the old metaphysical one. That is, Being and the ontological difference are metaphysical and it is like of the Platonic distinction of the real and the apparent world.

In fact Rorty feels that Heidegger can make no real distinction. Rorty also claims that it is impossible to distinguish ontic from ontological becoming. That is the various epochs of Being which Heidegger distinguishes. Heidegger’s account of ontological epochates is a species of idealistic reflection upon the
history of man's activity upon things. Rorty says: All we are told about Being, thought, and the ontological difference is by negation. Heidegger thinks that the historical picture which has been sketched offers a glimpse of something else. Yet nothing further can be said about this something else, and so the negative way to Being, through the destruction of ontology, leaves us facing beings-without-Being, with no hint about what thought might be of.30

Rorty in the first quote from Heidegger in the paper, from Letter on Humanism says that the distinction between Being and the truth of Being is swallowed, by the distinction between Being and being. The failure to note the distinction between Being and the truth of Being is perhaps not surprising, given that Heidegger himself is often unclear in regard to it.

Rorty says Heidegger used Being in two different, indeed opposed, senses. Firstly, Being is the Being of beings, what each being is thought to need so that it is, rather nothing. That is Being refers to that which each being involves simply and solely in so far as it is at all. The science which studies Being in this sense is metaphysics, the science of Being qua Being. Equally metaphysics as the science of Being qua Being, in ground of beings and itself. Thus metaphysics comes to see Being in this
first sense as both what is most general, that which every being possesses in that it is, and as that which supplies the ground for all such beings. "Metaphysics thinks of the Being of beings both in the ground giving unity of what is most general, what is indifferently valid everywhere, and also in the unity of the all that accounts for the general, that is, of the All Highest."\textsuperscript{31}

Such views of Being are pure act, as absolute concept, or even Heidegger's own view of the Greek notion of Being as the presence of the presencing, all speak to this first sense of Being. In the second sense, Being is sometimes used, unfortunately as a shorthand express standing for the sense of Being or the unconcealment (truth) of Being in \textit{Being and Time}, this Being as the sense of Being, time is the concern of Heidegger's thought.

Rorty's criticism of Heidegger is aimed at the content of the history of Being arises out of the history of philosophy. But the history of Being can be subsumed under the history of philosophy, Thus Rorty's Heidegger is necessarily committed to the view that metaphysics was always about Being. And that his own thought is tied to this tradition... the only thing which links him with the tradition is his claim that the tradition, though persistently sidetracked onto beings, was really concerned with Being all the time - and, indeed, constituted the history of Being.\textsuperscript{32}
But if Heidegger's thought is really different from the tradition as Heidegger claims, then he is committed to the odd view that his thought is essentially a continuation of the same thinking as metaphysics, although at the same time he utterly rejects everything in that tradition. The criticism thus has three steps. First, Being without being is a vacuous notion. Second this vacuity is overcome through a consideration of the history of philosophy. This in turn commits Heidegger to the obsurred position that his thought is both entirely different from the tradition and also a continuation of the tradition which is about the very same thing as that tradition. Heidegger needs the tradition in order to indentify the matter of his thinking, but then turns around and denies that tradition.

Rorty's initial claim is that Being without being is a vacuous notion. And also Heidegger's thought, the truth of Being may also prove to be vacuous. Rorty says Heidegger is unable to determine the truth of Being without recourse to his version of the history of philosophy. As Heidegger rejects that tradition as, at least, inadequate, he would once again be in the position of identifying the matter of his thinking through ontology, while denying that ontology has nothing positive to say about that matter.
Heidegger’s truth of Being is in no sense the same as is thought in Kant’s thing-in-itself that is the truth of Being is not a real world or being as they are independent of experience. Moreover, the truth of Being can not successfully be made into an object of experience. Rorty is asking if the truth of Being can never be an object of experience, how can it be indicated or pointed to? So it cannot be ostensively determined. And also, it can’t be distinguished as this, as opposed to that and it can’t be in terms of some being.

Kant suggests a transcendental procedure for the determination of the truth of Being. But Heidegger uses transcendental sounding language in his later writings. But is considering the truth of Being as merely the necessary condition for the possibility of experience, as this would be every subjectivistic. Heidegger often uses quasi- transcendental arguments in order to identify the place and role of the truth of Being.

It is clear that Heidegger thinks there can be no direct access to the truth of Being, no uncovering of the truth of Being such as occurs in regard to beings. We find that Heidegger substitutes a quasi-transcendental approach. The tradition for this transcendental access is not experience, however, but rather Being. Rorty says if the truth of Being can only be identified in
and through Being, then Being itself must be available to us. But Being as presencing is not. Concerning Being as presencing, Heidegger explicitly addresses on *Time and Being*. Rorty’s contention is that Heidegger can only determine Being from out of the tradition of ontology. But what gives us the right to characterize Being as presencing? This question comes too late. For this character of Being has long since been decided without on contribution.... Thus we are bound to the characterization of Being as presencing. It derives its binding force from the beginning of the unconcealment of Being as something that can be said.... Ever since the beginning of western thinking with the breaks, all saying of Being and is held in remembrance of the determination of Being as presencing which is binding for thinking.33

For Heidegger, the tradition of ontology is not wrong in regard to its continuous thinking of Being as presencing. But it is inadequate and incomplete and it fails to think the clearing, or truth of Being in which there can be both present beings presencing itself, Being.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


3. By unconcealedness, Heidegger means disclosedness, *aletheia* or truth, which in final analysis means Being.

4. *Posey* means poetry. Heidegger in his philosophical thinking was very much influenced by the German poet, novelist, and dramatist, Holderlin


6. *Scientia* means science, Heidegger was of the opinion that science does not think the way thinkers think.


10. *Ibid.*, P.68

11. *Ibid.*, P.144
12. Ibid., P.139
13. Ibid., P.145
14. Ibid., P.116
15. Ibid., P.179
16. Ibid., P.197

17. The world ratio means reason. Heidegger holds that philosophers from Plato and Aristotle onward up to Nietzsche misunderstood Being. Heidegger, therefore, not only wants to destroy the history of ontology but also wants to build up something new on the basic of his fundamental ontology.


30. *Ibid.*, P.139

