The Experience of Being

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Chapter Two

The Experience of Being
2.1. BEING IN ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY

For the Greeks, nature or physis\(^1\) in its primary sense meant being\(^2\), and in its secondary sense, a principle of coming-to-be. In its state of being, nature/physis constitutes some uniformity or *monas*. But considered in its coming-to-be, it is always found in some multiformity (*dyas*). For the Pythagoreans, uniformity and multiformity are two principle of all natural things. Thus constituting some unity and multiformity of everything in being and becoming, in the former, uniformity (*monas*) is the primary arche of nature. In the later, multiformity (*dyas*) is the *genesis* of things in their composition.

This twofold aspect of nature/physis as uniformity of being and multiformity of becoming, superimposes in the early Greek Philosophers a very difficult problem of establishing an ontological identity of natural things in regard to both their unity and diversity. If nature/physis is analyzed in its beingness as some uniformity of things, then the ontological identity of being consists of that which is the primary *arche* out of which everything can be made, preserving at the same time that diversity of all natural things. But if nature/physis is analysed in its becoming as some multiformity of things, then the ontological identity of being consists of how one could become
the other, retaining at the same time the specific unity of particular things. In a word, nature/\textit{physis} considered by the Greek philosophers as a polarity of uniformity and multiformity, requested that they find the underlying principle of coherence of all things as constituting some unity in multiformity.

The pre-Socratic discussion revealed nature/\textit{physis} in its original unity (\textit{monas}). But as always being posited (thesis) in some specific duality (\textit{dyas}), namely as a unicity in being and multiplicity of becoming. In other words, nature/\textit{physis} in its original unity in being disposes itself in a multiformity of becoming. This dual structure of nature/\textit{physis} led the Greek thinkers to some onto-cognitive ambiguity in establishing an underlying principle of the coherency of natural things in both their identity and diversity.

This onto-cognitive ambiguity of understanding the dual character of natural things in their identity and diversity depends on the interpretation of nature/\textit{physis} both in regard to its being and its coming-into-being. In general, when the stress is given to the ontological character of nature/\textit{physis}, then the natural things constitute some totality, and their dual structure will call for conjuction of all things, thus constituting some integrated unity of being, in spite of the manifest diversity of things in reality. But
when nature/physis is analysed from its coming-into-being, then the natural things appear in their singularity, and their dual character seems to consist only of the disjunction of all things. Thus constituting some diversified plurality, which is in a constant and successive processing of becoming. Consequently, its being remains always hidden.

The pre-Socratic ambiguity between identity and diversity of natural things, in their diathetical structure of nature/physis in its being and becoming, reached its acme in the respective doctrine of Parmenidean priority of being over becoming and Heraclitean priority of becoming over being. Though both Parmenides and Heraclitus proclaim the priority of unity over diversity of things, the latter explains oneness of things by a tension of opposites, and the former by likeness and similarity.

Parmenides, by giving priority to being over becoming, must stress the unity and continuity of being because only being can be known and understood as something which exists: "that which is possible to think is identical with that which can be". The paradigm of identity of thinking and being leads Parmenides to explain nature/physis only in terms of beings and to negate the reality of becoming. If only being can be known, and if being consists of unity, then being is ungenerated and imperishable,
whole, unique, immorable, and complete. If being is unique and complete, then there cannot be exist all in all or not at all. Furthermore, if being is one and not many, then there cannot be any genesis of natural things of coming-into-being, because otherwise this would mean that being becomes from non-being. But if it is impossible for natural things to come-into being, then there is no ontological difference among natural things, and everything that exists constitutes one single spherical unity.

If there is no ontological difference among natural things, then the mind can not grasp the diathetical character of nature/\textit{physis}, because Parmenides “regardes perception and thought as the same”\textsuperscript{5}. If they are the same then the human mind can know nature only in its unity of being, both without its\textit{ multiplication} into many and the possibility of its distribution throughout various and different things.

The reason for this consists in the Parmenidean teaching of being based on the similarity of the knower and the thing known. In view of this similarity between the knower and the thing known, natural things can be known by the human mind by what they have in common, i.e., being. But if being can only be known, and if becoming means only non-being, then natural things cannot
be known either as being in any, particular place or dispersed throughout various instances of being.

Parmenidean paradigm of identity meant that nature/\textit{physis} not only deprived of having any diathetical character and ontotheological foundation in reality, but that the pre-Socratic question of what-is of natural things received only epistemic meaning. In other words, if 'to be' means to be-thought; then nature/\textit{physis} can be known not as it is in reality, but as it is found in or by the human mind. Consequently, Parmenidean parallelism between ontological and epistemological meaning ended in an ambiguity of nature/\textit{physis} between its facticity and its activity\textsuperscript{6}.

In trying to overcome the pre-Socratic ambiguity of nature/\textit{physis} in its diathetical constitution, Heraclitus bases his quest for the natural things on a presupposition that there is an essential opposition between the knower and the thing known. This opposition of the knower and the known seems to follow from the Heraclitean teaching of \textit{logos} as both the actual unifying principle of being (all things are one) and the factual diversifying principle of becoming. For Heraclitus, then, the diathetical structure of natural things seems to contain some ontological inconsistency between its uniformity of being and its multiformity of becoming.
For Heraclitus, all natural things are dyadic in structure, because they are ontologically constituted out of different and various opposites. Although Heraclitus insists that nature/physis is in a perpetual flux of becoming and that all things come to pass through conflict. This paradoxical situation of nature/physis results in an epistemological relativism, and ends in an ontological duality of natural things as being simultaneously both in unity and plurality, namely, in being and becoming. For Heraclitus, logos is supposed to be both the principle of intelligibility of nature/physis and the underlying structural coherence of all things, nevertheless Heraclitean logos, however, is not uncovering becoming but covering up being. The Heraclitean paradigm of logos as a principle of covering and uncovering simultaneously being and becoming leads to a dichotomy between unity and plurality of natural things.

The Heraclitean world without transparency of unity of natural things in being shows that nature/physis consists in a ceaseless process of becoming, where any solid and substantial reality is dissolved and nothing is left as explained by Martin Heidegger. But any temptation to follow the Heraclitean philosophy of becoming will ultimately lead to nihilism. The diathetical structure of natural things, the ancient Greek sages were
stressing either the priority of plurality over unity or giving the
primacy of unity over plurality the former resulted in Heraclitean
perpetual flux of becoming of things, and the later led to the
Parminidean ontological immobilism of being. In other words, the
pre-Socratic thinkers not only failed satisfactorily to explain the
underlying principle of coherency of all natural things, but also
brought about an ambiguity between the way of differentiation of
being and the mode of unification of becoming. So the question
of being remained a problem up to Heidegger.

In overcoming this dichotomy between unity and plurality
of being and becoming, Aristotle tries to resolve by his teaching
on *logos*. He understood as a rational problem which takes place
among natural things.

Apply this diathetical structure of reality to anthropologici-
cal evaluation of human being as *unitas multiplex*, human
existence can be analysed in two ways: as it is in itself or in
relation to its manifold modes of being. As considered in itself,
human existence constitutes a unique individual entity which
various elements which establish different levels of its nature. But
as considered in relation to its manifold modes of being, human
existence constitutes itself a person. This manifest various forms of his unique nature.

In order to understand human existence as unified multiplicity, one must indicate the very foundation of human existence through which man can be himself and realize all possibilities of both his individual and personal being.

The very formation at the essence of human existence as unifying multiplicity indicates that man in himself is an organically integrated, unique and indispensable in his own nature. Being, however, a diversified multiplicity of various entity, socially interconnected with others, and determined by the environment both human and natural. While searching for the very foundation of human existence as a unified multiplicity, one must keep in mind as unified multiplicity, one must keep in mind this dual characteristic of human existence as both individual and communal.

The dual character of human existence as unity and multiplicity requires, however, findings such as element through which man can be understood as unitas multiplex. The question is how can the duality of human existence as both unity and multiplicity be possible and real? In order to answer we find, a universal con-
crete which could be the most essential characteristic of human existence. Searching for the universal concrete of human existence, one has to find the most essential attribute of human existence, both in regard to its individuality and personality. Existence by itself does not predicate anything about a particular thing, but only reveals the very fact that by being present in reality, a thing has something of its own, i.e., some specific nature.

In fact there are many things, existence reveals their natures according to various modes of being through which things find themselves in a state of separation from each other. Being a principle of separation, existence reveals that the perfection of being is distributed among things disparately and shows that in the order of actualization of their beingness, things are transcending each other, both in ontological and phenomenological order. Transcendence from an existential points of view belongs most properly, to human existence, for in man. As Heidegger points out "transcendence constitutes selfhood". But in man the trabscedent character of human existence consists not only of separation, but of integration though which human existence is transcendental in nature and international in character. This twofold aspect of human existence of transcendentality and intentionality points to logos as the universal concrete of human behaviour through which

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constitutes himself as self-dispositional agent.

Early in Being and Time, Heidegger announces that the primary concept by means of which he aims to understand Dasein (human) is the concept to which he gives the name existence. Heidegger’s existentialism lies the claim that humans are given their content neither by historical transcultural essence, nor by nature. Rather, Dasein itself determines this content in its act of self-understanding.  

2.2. BEING AND THINKING  

Heidegger assings a seminal place to Parmenide’s assertion: “to gar auto noein estinte kai einai", i.e., “thinking and Being are the same”. For Heidegger, this provides the basic theme for whole of Western thinking. Heidegger points out that “the history of thinking is at the bottom a sequence of variations on this one theme”. Heidegger again points out that with respect to thinking: “The begining was storngest and mighest. What comes afterwards is not the development but the flattering that result from mere spreading out, it is inability to retain the begining”. The meaning that Heidegger assings to the expression gathering shows that Parmenides can not be interpreted in terms of Kant,
whereas the reverse in both possible and necessary. For Heidegger, mover over the inspiration to deal with the notion of thinking again through the dialogue with succeeding philosophers.

In Heidegger’s studies of Heraclitus and Parmenides, Anaximander and Plato, Descartes and Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, and many others, there is the repetition of the issue of “unconcealment....., so to speak, the element in which Being and thinking and their belonging together exist”14. He explored the ways of thinking that might be appropriate in the process of unconcealment and that might articulate the affiliation of Being and thinking.

Heidegger's *Being and Time* already contains significant reference to Parmenides and Heraclitus, and to their questioning of Being, perception of Being, truth, the world and the like. Heidegger’s examination of the earliest Greek thinking become decisive for him only when he developed the question as to what extend the truth of Being is forgotten in Platonic thinking, and when Nietzsche’s slogan about the death of God enable the Western to be seen in a new light. Heidegger is the first thinker who goes back to the thinking of Parmenides and Heraclitus in order to be able to recast the metaphysical difference between Being and appearance, Being and becoming, Being and thinking and
Being and ought. The distinction of Being and becoming stands set forth the Being of the assent in contradiction to becoming.

Parmenides' poem reveals coming-into-being and passing away. He further says we are looking-towards Being from within Being. On the contrary, Heraclitus says everything i.e., entity is in flux. Everything is becoming and here Being and appearance means the real in constradistinction to the unreal, the authentic over against the inauthentic. But from a Heideggerin point of view appearance belong to Being, the appearing. Being as appearing is the power of Being as unconcealment.

Sophocles and Holderlin are a few of the poets who put forward this idea through art and literature. Thinking and Being, for the Greeks were a struggle for a decision between the great powers of becoming and appearance. This led to mould the relation between thinking and Being into a definite form.

The distinction between Being and thinking is not only what is contrasted with each other but also different in content from becoming and appearance. Thinking means to reflect, to deliberate over a situation, a plan or an event. Thinking also serves as a name for the work of those who call themselves thinkers. Thinking refers to the future, present and past. Thinking brings something
before us, represent it to us. This representation starts always from ourselves. It is a free act. Thinking is reflective, we pursue in thinking the thing represented or thought. The representation may be meaningful or superficial, empty, serious or irresponsible. Thinking is one of our capacities along with others like desire, willing and feeling. The formula Being and thinking designates a differentiation. But it is sure that an inner union between thinking and Being cannot be inferred from what we have said so far about thinking. We arrived at this conclusion through logic. Logic is the science of thinking and it deals with doctrine or the rules of thinking and forms of thought. Moreover, it is one of the earliest philosophical discipline. Logic gives us the tools for an inquiry into the essence of thinking.

And yet, the question arise what does logic mean? The name logic is an abbreviation for *epistemelogile*, i.e., it is the science of the *logos*, and *logos* here means a statement. But how is that logic, supposed to be doctrine of thinking, turns out to be the science of statement. This is by no means self-evident. Logic and logical statement are not simply a way of defining thought.

In course of thought we are trying precisely penetrate the source from which the essence of thinking is determined, namely *atetheia* and *physis*, Being an unconcealment, the very thinking
that has been lost by logic. Logic still dominates our thinking and discourse and from an early day it has contributed in a large measure to determining the grammatical view of languages. Logic began in later Greek philosophy and placed in the curriculum of Platonic and Aristotelian schools. Logic, its formal structure and rules of thought arouse only after the separation of Being and thinking from *logos*. Logic is in need of an explanation regarding its claim to provide an authoritative interpretation of thinking. According to Hegel: “The logical the absolute from of truth and, what is more, it is also the pure truth it self”\(^\text{16}\). Hegel applied the logic to the discipline known as metaphysics.

According to the early Greek philosophers, thinking should have become a doctrine of *logos*\(^\text{17}\). For them, there is a relationship between Being, *physis* and *logos*. If we go back to two great Greek thinkers, Parmenides and Heraclitus we can find the relation between Being and *logos*. The German poet Holderlin, and Hegel were very much influenced by these thinkers. But in Nietzsche we find a current of opposition to Parmenides and Heraclitus. Christian theology also is responsible for the misinterpretation of Heraclitus' doctrine of *logos*. The *logos* in Christianity is Christ, the absolute personal God. The real
appearance at truth in the form of the God-man. remarks Heidegger, “sets the seal on the Greek’s philosophical insight concerning the role of the logos over all existence. This confirmation and seal establish the classicism of Greek philosophy”\textsuperscript{18}.

The concept of logos has many meanings in Plato and Aristotle. A simple interpretation is not to grasp adequately the basic meaning. Logos does not mean judgement. We understand judgement as “connecting two things”\textsuperscript{19} or “taking a position either by endorsing or rejecting. Rather, logos as speech really mens deloun, to make manifest what is being talked about”\textsuperscript{20}. On the other hand, Heidegger construed logos as truth in the sense of “correspondene” or “accordance” (Ubereinstimung)\textsuperscript{21}. This idea is by no meas the primary one for the concept aletheia means to take beings that are talked about out of their concealment to let them be seen as something unconcealed, to let them be seen in themselves.

According to Heraclitus, logos has characteristics, First and foremost it has permanence and endurance. Secondly, it has togetherness in essent\textsuperscript{22}. In accordance with this permanent togetherness Being is the dominant power. And this goes aganist the popular interpretation of Heraclitus who asserts that everthing flows. There
is an attempt to set forth the essential bond between *logos* and *physis* and on the basis of that unity. Secondly, we show the possibility of the separation between them on account of the inner unity. But there arises a question of Heraclitus on *logos* and Being are so intimately and essentially linked together, how can this unity and identity of *physis* and *logos* give rise to the opposition between Being and thought. The explanation for the opposition between Being and thinking is that Being is the object and thinking is of the subject, i.e., thinking is subjective. The relation of thinking to Being is that of the subject to the object. Probably, the Greek may have conceived this relation in an extremely primitive way because they might have lacked training in epistemology.

What is the essential law separates *physis* and *logos*? We here seek the help of Parmenides who stands on the same ground as Heraclitus. For Heraclitus, Being is unique and unifying, complete and fully standing-the-permanently manifested power which shines perpetually in the appearance of the one-and-many-sided. So the indispensable way to Being is three fold and it leads through unconcealment. What is understood as thinking is that its is an activity of the subject. The thinking of the subject determines what Being is Being is nothing other than object of thinking. That which
is thought. But thinking remains activity and thinking and Being are supposed to be the same according to Parmenides and thereby everything becomes subjective. Nothing is objective.

Thinking is an activity of the subject and the thinking of the subject determines what being is. Being is nothing but an object of thought. But thinking remains a subjective activity. According to Parmenides, thinking and Being are the same. But why does Parmenides say Being and thinking are one and the same? This is because of the meaning of *physis* to stand in the light to appear, to enter into unconcealment where Being prevails, it also means apprehension. Hence, the two belong together. Apprehension, the receptivity to bring-to-stand of the intrinsically permanent that manifests itself. Parmenides states that where there is Being, there is appearing and entering into unconcealment. Concerning man Parmenides' idea was that by an account of the essence of Being, being human is determined. In other words, Parmenides holds that man's being is determined by the essential belonging-together of Being and apprehension. He says that it is rather a process in which man first enters into history as a being, an essent.

Apprehension (*verne hunung*) is not a faculty of man but it is rather a happening that man is. The separation between Be-
ing and being-human comes to light in their togetherness. For the Western Philosophy, this is a crucial definition of being-human and at the same time an essential characterization of Being. Hence, there is no dichotomy of Being and thinking. Fundamentally, man is defined Western doctrines of psychology, ethics, theory of knowledge, anthropology, etc.

But nothing of that kind was explained by Parmenides. According Parmenides, manifestation of being-human first occurs and was stabilized due to apprehension. Being is defined from the standpoint of thinking and reason. It says “there is a reciprocal bond between apprehension and being”. However, the Greek treatment of thinking was diluted and misinterpreted by the modern concept and that tradition lasting upto the time of Nietzsche.

The experience of philosophy propounded by philosophers starting from Plato, Aristotle until Nietzsche already announces another way of thinking. Heidegger, therefore, proceeds with the question of another beginning by recalling the beginning of the metaphysical tradition in the pre-Scratic philosophers. The First beginning is not left behind. The tradition is overcome only through its remembrance. That is why it is called “another beginning” The task of Heidegger is to rectify the misunderstanding of the ancient, medieval and modern thinkers. Heidegger is here not to
bring about the complete comprehension, but rather to pave the way for a transformation of the fundamental mood." Since the time of Plato and Aristotle, Western metaphysics transformed Being into a new mythology. He points out that Western metaphysics has never fully developed its primary question viz., the question of being. The remarkable thing in Heidegger is that the path of thinking certainly was moulded by past decision, slowly awakening change, and by sudden revolutions.

Heidegger takes up Aristotle's question of the manifold way in which Being can be expressed. He assimilates medieval thought and, indeed, with its entire burden of tension. Heidegger puts that. "I am indebted for vision and understanding of modern logical problem." Heidegger choses for himself transcendent philosophy and Phenomenology in order to be able to settle metaphysical questions. Heidegger's roots are in phenomenology and his research is to understand the factual life and its vicissitudes. But in doing so he does not trun back to psychologism agnist which he had struggled in his early works. According to Parmenides, the pure intutive perception enable us to discover Being. The "Primordial and genuine truth lies in pure intution. This has hence forth remined the basis of western philosophy." and of Heidegger as well.
The metaphysical doctrine of Being, i.e., ontology is grounded in fundamental ontology which raises the question about Being which functions as the ground for every possible meaning of Being. By ontological questioning Plato, Aristotle, and even Kant developed a productive logic which does not hang behind the sciences, but rather springs ahead as it was into a definite region of Being.

Metaphysics thinks of Being and it interrogates Being in its various aspects. It also thinks at Being in general in accordance with the fundamental character of Being. Thus, metaphysics is the theory of Being of beings. Ontology comes across as self-evident and its presence as the fundamental features of Being. Beings are grounded in Being which is constantly present. Thus, metaphysics seeks Being and in a specific way fulfills the demand for being to be constantly present. But in the course of time what happened in this, the self sufficient, divine being meets this requirements. Therefore, metaphysics not only is ontology, the foundation of beings (i.e, Being) but also of theology where the fundamental Being is the supreme being. It turns out, therefore to be ontotheology.

In short, we find Heidegger’s question about Being and the Being of beings. We have also examined the Platonic-Aristotelian
question of being and the concept of *logos, aletheia* and *physis*. We also see the Christian interpretation of *logos* giving it a personal connotation. Heidegger’s examination of the earliest Greek thinking became decisive when he developed the question as to what extent the truth of Being is forgotten in traditional thinking. We also find the thinking of Parmenides and Heraclitus, being reinterpreted in the context of the metaphysical difference between Being and appearance, Being and becoming, Being and thinking, and Being and ought. In short, we can say that the echo of the great Greek philosophy is being made audible once again by Heidegger.

**2.3. HERMENEUTICAL APPROACH OF HEIDEGGER**

Heidegger’s philosophy within the phenomenological tradition has remained too much a philosophy for Heideggerians. We find a fundamental level of Heidegger’s ontology in *Being and Time* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, his Dasein, analysis and interpretation, a critique which demands an expansion of his hermeneutical phenomenology. First a few remarks are in order concerning the general trust of existential phenomenology, constructing a general context for focusing on Heidegger.
Existential phenomenology, by deepening and extending intentionality, requires changed view of sense experience, understanding, imagination and schemata, in contrast with the epistemological emphasis of the moderners. In dealing with sense perception existential phenomenology attack the empiricist view of senses as a cause-effect relation and any reductionistic view of perception, it attacks the intellectualist theory of judgement. Merleau Pondy puts it "that from the amount behaviours is considered 'in its unity' and in its human meaning, one is no longer dealing with a material reality, nor, moreover, with a mental reality, but with a significative whole or a structure which properly belongs neither to the external world nor to internal life"29.

Existential phenomenology deepens and breadens the notion of intentionality. It requires this redefinition of understanding. Heidegger extends and deepens the notion of understanding to the level of Being-in-the-world, no longer considering it to be particular acts or function of connection in the Kantian context. Understanding, rather than an act, is a mode of being of Dasein, distinguished from the derived levels of understanding. Thus, for Heidegger, we must distinguish the understanding as one type of cognizing distinguished from explanation, from the understanding
which is their ground as "one of the constituents of the Being of there in general". The former is an existential derivative of the latter, just as intuition, including the phenomenological intuition of essences, and thinking are remote derivatives of understanding.

The primordial understanding constituted by the circularity of the forestructure and as structure involves the possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. The whole of Being and Time attempts to question of adequency of the fore-structure of Dasein taken as a whole. Further hermeneutic phenomenology in general must proceed by constantly deepening its fore-having (fore-structure), explicating the hermeneutical situation. Here, Heidegger tells us that this is the condition for primordial knowing that the presuppositions are explicitly worked out. The fore-structure of Dasein's understanding is worked out in terms of the things themselves. The fore-structure must be presented by the things themselves and not by anything else such as prejudices, fancies, and popular conception. Heidegger says: in a circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have understood that first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, foresight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular
conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of things themselves.

The whole of Being and Time take place in the context of primordial knowing. Since it is constantly concerned that its theme is secured by working out the fore-understanding, fore-sight, and fore-conception in terms of the thing-itself-Dasein as a whole.

Heidegger's notion of destruction will be dealt with in relation to his treatment of Kant in the context of the ontological tradition and time. Dasein, essentially constitutes by primordial time, has grown up in a traditional way of interpreting itself. The past, a constitutive aspect of Dasein, already goes ahead of Dasein, becoming an important part of any analysis which tries to be authentic and adequate, especially dealing with the question of being. Dasein can fall back upon its world, but it can fall prey to tradition too. Heidegger realizes the need therefore to destroy the tradition in terms of the content and history of ontology.

In Being and Time, Heidegger indicates both the negative and the positive aspects of this destruction. He says that we must on the contrary, take out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within its limits, these in turn are given factically in the way the question is formulated.
at the time, and in the way the possible field for investigation is thus bounded off. On its negative side, this destruction does not relate itself towards the past; its criticism is aimed at today and the prevalent way of treating the history of ontology. Its negative function remains unexpressed and indirect.

The destruction of the history of ontology is essentially bound up with the way the question of Being is formulated, and it is possible only within such a formulation. In line with the positive tendencies of his destruction, we must in the first instance raise the question whether and to what extent the interpretation of Being and the phenomenon of time have been brought together thematically in the course of the history of ontology, and.... In pursuing this task of destruction with the problematic of temporality as our clue, we shall try to interpret the chapter on the schematism and the Kantian doctrine of time, taking that chapters as our point of depature....

The role of repetition in Heidegger's philosophy is likewise an essential aspect of his entire project, for it is central to the hermeneutical approach to the history of ontology and must be aligned with his attempt to destroy that history. The cornerstone of the temporal is the future and since he deals with the repetition of possibilities in terms of future, his search into the
history of ontology reveals possibilities especially in relation to future.

Historicality is simply a more concrete working out of temporality, and is interrelated with the resoluteness of Dasein. "The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes the repetition of a possibility of existence that has come down to us. Repeating is handing down explicitely that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has been there."34"

This repetition, strictly in terms of possibilities, does not attempt to make past actualities. The anticipatory resoluteness is the essential ground for the authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been there. Thus allowing, as Heidegger says, "the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero"35. Kant's role in the history of ontology decisive for that history and merits repeating as delving into the latent possibility to be handed down from the future. Since, "the laying of the foundation (of metaphysics) is base on time" 36 and since "the first and only person who has even let himself be drawn hither by the coercion of the phenomenon themselves in Kant"37. Heidegger approaches Kant as playing a decisive role in the tradition of ontology.

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Heidegger proceeds to give an ontological interpretation based on Kantian texts, especially from the edition of 1781 to the copernican revolution, showing that Kant does not wish to establish that all knowledge is ontic, nor does he wants to exclude what that presupposes-ontological knowledge. For “ontic knowledge can be adequate to the essent that is, if the constitutive of its Being is known.... The manifestation of the essent (ontic truth) depends upon the revelation of the constitution of the Being of the essent ontological truth”38.

Once the hermeneutical situation, the totality of presuppositions has been explicited in Being and Time, the way is open to investigate the ontological tradition. For, once the foreunderstanding has been explicitated, we have the stance from which to interpret the history of ontology in terms of possibilities latent in that tradition. Such an analysis is necessary to bring the question of Being to its depth: “The question of Being does not achieve its true concreteness untill we have carried through the process of destroying the ontological tradition”39. This effort of destruction of the ontological possibility of Dasein. In the context of the destruction and repetion of the ontological tradition that Being and Time is the prolegomenon to Kant and the problem of metaphysics. The fundamental theme of Heidegger
is focusing on the Being question. Heidegger says: "The laying of the foundation of metaphysics is based on time. The question as to Being, the fundamental question of a laying of the foundation of metaphysics, is the problem of Being and Time. The title contains the directive idea of the present interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason as laying of the foundation of metaphysics".  

Heidegger expresses the view that ontological, primordial knowledge is made up of transcendental determinations of time. Primordial time is the basis and origin of all else in human finite knowledge and existence. It is primordial time which allows the pure formation of transcendence to take place. Thus primordial time, as the innermost essence of the self. It makes possible transcendental imagination as essentially spontaneous. Only in this unity can pure sensibility as spontaneous and pure apperception as receptive spontaneity belong together and form the essential unity of pure sensible reason. This interpretation, in the context of Kant's language and problematics, indicates how Heidegger pulls Kant in the direction of the presupposed ontology from which he is operating. 

If a being is to be given to man, a finite being, man must be receptive or oriented to receive it beforehand. Heidegger's
account of the Kantian’s pure *a priori* schematization of concept for an image is really an attempt to show how almost speaks of the fundamental originary level of schematizing and an entity and the structure of Dasein in terms of its comprehension of Being. Heidegger is less interested in the *a priori* and pure dimensions of Kant’s account, than he is in interpreting the cognitive synthesis as an ontological synthesis presupposing the synthesizing temporalizing primordial time, which produces the horizon in the schemata. “The pure schemata as transcendental determinations of time from the horizon of transcendence”.

For Heidegger, the experience of an entity demands the entity must have this anticipatory structure as its mode of Being. According to Heidegger’s interpretive appropriation of Kant, the schema, formed as a mode sensibilization. The present discussion turn to consider epistemic dimensions latent in the Heideggerian effort toward a fundamental ontology and his interpretation of *Critique of Pure Reason* in the context of fundamental ontology. Heidegger concludes that the rule is represented in hour of, its regulation, that is, according to the manner which, in regarding the presentation, it inserts itself in, and imposes itself in, the aspect which presents the presentation. The act of representation of the hour of the regulation is the free “construction” of a
sensibilization. The latter, in the sense just described, is the source of the image.42

The shift of focus from the strictly ontological consideration to epistemological considerations, the perspective upon the schemata is no longer limited to the context of the Being of entities encountered in Being-in-the-world. The epistemic focus changes the attitude toward the schemata but retains the legacy of existential phenomenology regarding the nature and role of the schemata results from the deepening of intentionality, in one way or another. This epistemological consideration obtains at the ordinary level just as does any fundamental ontology. In short, critique of Heidegger's view of epistemology rounding out the above critique of his claim for the inclusiveness of ontology under the guide of primacy of being and ontology.

In Being and Time, Heidegger expresses charging with traditional epistemology, as well as traditional metaphysics, because both have failed to get the derived mode of Being of the present-at-hand in question of Being and of knowledge. This he takes back to their foundations in the existential analytic of Dasein. In Being and Time, Heidegger shows why an epistemological questions fails. He says our task is not to prove that the
external world is present at hand or to show how it is present-at-hand, but to point out why Dasein, as Being-in-the-world-has the tendency to bury the external world in nullity, epistemologically before going on to prove it. The reason for this lies in Dasein's falling and the way in which the primary understanding of Being has been derived to Being as presence-at-hand a diversion which is motivated by that falling itself.43

Again, Heidegger indicates an important aspect of his view of epistemology. He states that what is needed is the basic insight that while different epistemological directions which have been pursued have not gone so very far off epistemologically, their neglect of any existential analysis of Dasein has kept them from obtaining any basis for a well secured phenomenal problematic"44.

It is necessary to agree with Heidegger's insistence on existential analysis of Dasein for an adequate basis. The first part of the above statement reflects philosophically naive and archaic view of epistemology. For, epistemology, not limited and restricted to Heidegger's view of it, can enter the contemporary world view just as the ontology to which Heidegger subordinates his restricted and limited epistemology.

Epistemology does not necessarily remain within framework of the modem era. A viable theory of knowledge must
today seek the originary levels of existence, of experience and of Being, grounded of all aspects and levels knowing and understanding. Once we overcome the narrow and fixed epistemology criticized by Heidegger, we can go beyond it or beneath it to its epistemic existential foundation, in a way similar to the way in which Heidegger has done in his fundamental ontology. This requires the investigation of the fundamental level of Being-in-the-world from the point of view of its epistemic ramifications. Especially with regard to what Heidegger calls primordial knowledge as a possibility of Dasein contained in the circle of understanding, which constituted Dasein's being. There is an alternative to logical and epistemological analyses of meaning by opening them up to their full epistemic depth to reach the fullness and richness of existence, mode of being, or being-in-the-world.

2.4. DECONSTRUCTION OF METAPHYSICS

The meaning of Being by Heidegger's project is of fundamental ontology that unifies his manifold reflection on Being. Fundamental ontology involves a twofold task. On the one hand, as a structural existential analytic, and, on the other hand, as a structural analysis of the already existing ontologies. The existential analytic sets into operation analysis of Being insofar
as Being is there, of the *sein* that is *Da*, that offers itself whenever a concrete human being actualized its own Being temporally in-the-world. The analysis yields a set of existentials that lay bare the essential structure of Dasein's factical existence and its ontological constitution. The analysis of existing ontologies, in contrast, takes the form of a radical critique of the history of western metaphysics. Since for Heidegger's philosophy is always a construction such a critique necessarily becomes an historical destruction. Heidegger said that these three basic components of phenomenological method-reduction, construction, destruction-belong together in their content and receive grounding in their mutual pertinence. Construction in philosophy is necessarily destruction, that is to say a constructing of traditional concepts carried out in a historical recursion to the tradition.

Destruction should be understood as an appropriative destructive of a particular tendency of philosophical thinking. The objective of this consists in de-constructing sedimented layers of interpretation in order to explicate what remain concealed and unthought in the horizon of comprehension of the traditional determination of Being. The path way of Heidegger's destruction is truely geneological, that is, to the unthought (*das ungedachte*) the unsaid in the traditional metaphysical thinking and sayings.
Destruction must be tradition oriented and object specific. It is historically informed deconstruction aimed specifically at the ontologies prevailing from ancient Greece object-oriented and working within the tradition it attempts to undermine. Heidegger's destruction is at once a philosophical and historical cognition that works as a positive appropriation of the tradition from its forgotten and concealed sources. The history of philosophy, destruction strives for what Heidegger later calls the true overcoming (*uberwindung*) of that history by effecting an intense genuine analogue with the past.

Destruction is only to construct a true science of Being in terms of an original and originary moment of truth memorative in that it amounts to a receptive approximation toward the fresh self-presentation of Being. Under the diagnose of this step-back Heidegger means and says the set back thus moves out of metaphysics into the essential nature of metaphysics. That is Heidegger's aspiration for home-coming. The genuine home-coming Dasein is the roundabout journey in the remembrance of Being, a return at long last the whereabouts, of Being. Ontology orients the fields Being by articulating its *logos*. It is by virtue of this destruction or that those primordial experience of Being manifest in the profound simplicity of the fragments of
pre-Socratic thinkers can be identified and located, that the the first appearance of Being can be brought to view again.

The western metaphysics represents for Heidegger an eclips, a failure, something gone wrong. The reason for it lies in what Heidegger calls the oblivion of the distinction between Being and being namely the oblivion of the ontological difference. This oblivion is both productive and constructive in the true sense of the terms. With the ontico-ontological differentiation, Heidegger says the history of the western world comes to be borne out. It is the event of metaphysics.

The moment of the eclipse of Being is indeed the moment of beginning. Yet this is the beginning of darkness, a beginning whose development and continuation are determined by fateful indistinction. The time of darkness is the time when things are not clearly seen. It is the time of not being able to see, of invisibility. As a result of the indistinction of Being and beings, philosophical thinking is lost to itself, oblivious to its proper object and ignorant of the source which provokes thought to begin with.

The oblivion of the ontological difference is not the result of a contingent historical decision and part of the
philosophers. Heidegger remind us that by no means the consequence of a forgetfulness of thinking. Oblivion of Being belongs to the self-veiling essence of Being. It belongs so essentially to the destiny of Being that the down of this destiny rises as the unveiling of what is present in its presencing. Since Being together with its essence, its distinction from beings-keeps to itself.

The notion of the ontological difference contains a double edged indication concerning the unique relation between Being and beings in general and the self-eclipsing nature of Being in particular. On the one hand, it refers to Dasein’s straightforward oblivion of the difference between Being and beings, a forgetful indifference between that makes possible to the interpretations that reached in the western ontology. That is a groundless ontology that is ever since at a distance from its intended object, an ontology that treats Being as a being. On the other hand this notion brings essentially an intrinsically elusive nature of Being. It indicates as an instantaneous interply of presence and absence, this simultaneous self-veiling and self-unveiling, is the self-spectable of presencing.

The self-veiling of Being expresses the fact that Being as being does not leave its point of origin. In letting things be, in
unveiling itself for thinking. The double sense of ontological difference be clear that the ontological difference not only constitutes the condition of ontology but also it becomes its object. That is to say that, the difference is between the ontic and the ontological constitutes the difference between the heterogeneity. The project of ontology, an approximation toward the elucidation of Being. On the other hand, the difference evokes the ontological approach that difference becomes the-first and primary object for ontological reflection, that ontology starts by thinking difference. The ontological difference functions as a difference that anticipated transcendence of that difference.

In order for the ontological inquiry to take its first step, Dasein must in some sense exist both in and outside the ontological clearing; Dasein must be both authentic and inauthentic. Defined by its pre-ontological comprehension of Being, Dasein embodies, so to speak the between with open passages toward both Being and beings. This betweeness of Dasein is precisely the transcendence of existence with grounds Dasein's compartment toward the world, and, as Being and Time took great pains to show, is ultimately rooted in the temporality of Dasein. The transcendence of Dasein thus constitutes the difference between
Being and beings which, according to Dasein’s own truth, takes the form of a temporal unfolding.

Heidegger means the factical existence of Dasein as a temporal being-in-the-world (that is Dasein’s existence takes time and is in time) manifests the ontological difference; that the existence of Dasein is the temporal embodiment of the ontological difference. Dasein being-there is the same as the performance of this distinction. In fact, Dasein is what it is precisely by performing this distinction. To the extent that Dasein is there, the sheer fact that it exists. Dasein exists across two realms, the ontic and the ontological and its transcendent nature anticipate the transcendence of ontological indistinction by first realizing its ontic ambiguity. In Dasein’s existence, in the existential performance of the ontological difference i.e., we found only the oblivion to that difference but also the possibility of overcoming that oblivion as Dasein’s pre-ontological cognizance of the deference develops into an explicity understood difference.

The ontological difference and the meaning of Being make up that one thought that Heidegger-along with those great thinker poets like Holderlin-continuously thinks. This destructive thinking back to a Being. It is a hermeneutic, found on a notion of truth as self-presence which seeks to claims to preceede all forms of
discursive and rationalist representation. Heideggerian destruction realizes a violence of interpretation, violent hermeneutic that ferries us across to the flows the logos of western rationality at the end to arrive at early Greek thinking. Heidegger says that to think Being of beings means to think Being without regard to metaphysics. Yet disregard for metaphysics still prevails even in the intention to overcome metaphysics. Therefore, our task is to cease all overcoming, and leave metaphysics to itself.49

This determination to “ceaser all overcoming, and leave metaphysics to itself” reveals Heidegger’s understanding the difficulty that even though the past is past, its ghost may will be still with us. The very idea to think through tradition to replace a disoriented metaphysics with a fundamental ontology is itself tradition-guided. But this self-awareness does not stop Heidegger. The presistent inquiry toward a true understanding of Being has led him to “trace Being its own from appropriation”50.

Heidegger at the end of the essay “on Time and Being”, concludes: “Appropriation neither is, nor is Appropriation there .... what remains to be said? Only this: Appropriation appropriates51.
2.5 BEING AND BEING HUMAN

Heidegger states that it is the first and foremost a happening of Being itself, because it offers itself in the centre of human existence in such a way that it demands the priority over thinking. Not beings, but Being is most worthy. The ontological difference, which essentially characterizes man’s being, must be thought in function. It is the necessary condition for the possibility of the turn-to being (Kehre). As the ontological difference occurs primarily in thought, as understood by Heidegger, the Kehre is also a return of Being into thought. Only this turn of Being into thought overcomes metaphysics as the mode of thinking in which came about the forgetfulness of Being.

The kehre of the being occurrence is also verbalized in Heidegger’s particular thought. It implies that his thought by the Kehre intends to be a victory over metaphysics Heidegger’s thought is defined by a shift in thinking. This shift leads to a critical evaluation of Heidegger’s thought against the background of the authentic thinking of Being. Being and Time is an analysis provided of the being of man. It is an inquiry into the basic features of being-human. Temporality is pointed out as characteristic of the being of man. The question about Being must
like wise be thought in and along a times perspective. He elobrates the basic question at the beginning of *Being and Time* namely the question about the meaning of Being. But after the *Kehre*, Heidegger thinks Being in a time perspective. Heidegger states that understands the happening of being human in together with others.

*Kehre* is a dialectical event not only in thought of Heidegger but of Being itself in and through beings. According Heidegger, thinking is a responding to Being. His thought intends to be a thinking to Being. The starting point of thinking of Being is the being of man who is attuned to Being as such. Man ‘know’ Being as the horizon of his existence as being-in-the-world. The fact is that man knows about. It is very clearly shown by language. Being human understanding Being. But Being as such can dawn the horizon of being-human. It is (happens, appears) the necessary ground for man’s existence. This Being ground is the over against of the being that is such a way that it utters itself first out of nothingness.

Being is the antithesis of beings, primary human being. Not in the sense that man posit Being as such as again himself (this would be some kind of ontological idealism, a transcendental subjectivity). But in the sense that man finds himself over against
being as merely transcendent or other words, in his understanding of Being, he reached. Being as the non-being that grounds him. In this relationship man is the shepherd of Being. Being itself make of man the keeper and guardian. Here being enacts itself also in man and sends him forth into his undermined nature.

It is an undeniable stand in Heidegger’s thinking that thinking is equated with concealedness and with the happening of unconcealness. Being as unconcealedness lets every being be in its own unconcealness, lets being be present. Thus being as unconcealness is the formal happening, that must be said as condition and ground to all that which happening. Every being lets it be seen that it is and is thus an unlocking of the happening of Being as un-concealedness. Whereas, according to Heidegger, in western philosophy, starting with Greek philosophy, namely, with Plato, Being was identified with and narrowed down to what-ness. Heidegger himself identifies it with and narrows it down to thatness

Speaking and thinking about language and the word, Heideggers claims that the nature of language evokes and admits being as beings. In language Being exerts a thrust, because the utterance of language refers to which is to be named by some it is. As (utterance) language is a happening of Being, this Being
which is imported by language and word, is as logos and sage
(utterance) called un-concealedness. The being that is imported and
unlocked by language and word is empty being, it formally causes
the thing to be. Although as formal ground of the Being of
beings this Being has an essential and necessary relationship to
beings.

Heidegger’s thought between Being and beings-a relation of
beings to Being, that, is a necessary significance of, being for
Being itself, is practically absent. Heidegger says that there exists a relation of man of Being, which consists in the fact that
his nature belongs to Being by giving it a hearing. The autonomy
of Being with respect to beings is expressed by Heidegger when
he emphasizes concealedness of Being. The anxious desire to give
priority to that which the deepest foregetfulness of being
characteristic of metaphysics, which confused being. Beings,
misleads Heidegger and causes him to fall into empty and abstract
Being.

As a disciple of Husserl, Heidegger intends to philosophize
by starting merely from the things themselves, but infact he does
it in such a way that they are ultimately escape him. Whatever is
empirical is called ontic and referred to the nonphilosophical
sciences. Heidegger is convined that rationalism we see his
antirationalistic and antisubjective frame at least in its idealistic
type, saw through Being, because ultimately the thinking
subjectivity posits Being as constitutes the nature of Being. Hegel
and Neitzsche are clear examples. This looking through Being is
a well determined form of dominating and mastering Being, and
he reached a certain peak in today’s technology.

The reaction against subjectivism and rationalism lead
Heidegger to an objectivism and an irrationalism, which we mean
that for him Being is a dark in itself lack all content. Greek
conception of being that calls be appearance, presence, collecting,
logos, and so on may lead to a thinking for which being thus
understood is everything. Being must be thought in the extreme
discord of the togetherness of everything and nothing. Accordingly,
this togetherness is the essential concord of being itself. Beings
must be thought together with Being, and vice-versa. Every being,
whether man, thing or word, is an unlocking and rendering present
of Being as ground. Because this Being has neither name nor con-
tent and is only itself, the Being to each being is likewise empty.
Thus beings are formally equal to each other.

2.6 ECLIPSE OF BEING

Heidegger has tried to name Being in accordance with the
starting point of his thought. Being can be aimed at only by starting from the Being of beings, especially from the being of man. The most conspicuous and important term for Being is \textit{welt} (world). The world is formally Being as unconcealedness, present in beings, even as the earth is called the formal dimension of the concealedness of Being. The world has here an historical significance, that is Being discloses itself in the history. This world as the unconcealedness of Being possesses also well-determined content which must be called historical. Heidegger speaks of the world that is set down and set open by the Greek, he certainly also means the culture, thought, religion, daily activity history, and so on, of the Greek people during a certain period.

In Heidegger’s thought confrontation with poets, especially with Holderlin, world assumes an even more dynamic meaning. World is the happening, the enacting of the four religions of being: gods and materials, heaven and earth. Heidegger in the conception of Being has drawn the consequence of his deepest thought intention, namely, to bring Being and time together in thought by starting from the temporalized being of man.

The thinking of Being which corresponds to this connections is first and foremost a commemorating of Being, one
gets the impression that which must be commemorated is especially the dawning of Being in and through thing yet metaphysics, the destruction of western philosopher seems to be guided by the idea that the end is already preset at the start. Here start means the authentic origin (primodial leap) it belongs properly to the leap of Being, that to the opening up, to the unlocking of Being, that it should already contain its end, although in a hidden way.

Heidegger claims that Being happens in thinking. Being dares man to listen to the happening of Being and on the other hand, man claims Being as history for himself. The dominating and independent function of the occurance Being is the fact that the subjective individuality of human being becomes ever more subordinated. This development stands under the influence of Heiddegger's utter rejection of rationalism, idealism, subjectivism, and Being so on a forms of human domination over Being. The passionate rejection of man's subjectivity has influenced Heidegger the conception of Being. After the kehre, this realization human subjectivity gains ground.

Heidegger does not sufficiently view the individual man person as a unique arrangement of Being. He overlook the insight that individuality makes Being into history. Plato, Plotinus, Descartes, Churchill, and so on are moment of Being, by which
Being becomes history, is presence, while at the same time, an account of the limitation of individuality.

Heidegger by pointing out to the significance of the artist, as concrete subject for the being of the work of art. Heidegger states emphatically that, in this connection, individuality has no significance. What matter is that the work of art be there as made, and present itself as being. According to its nature, the work of art is an unlocking of Being as unconcealedness, not a proclaiming of the creative artist. With regard to Being the artist is only an obedient servant. It is quite clear that in this way Heidegger takes a stand against Nietzsche.

It is something similar in Heidegger's considerations about technology. According him, technology is not a human activity, the essence of technology is Being itself that unveils itself while at the same time hiding itself. In technology beings rules but under the spell of rational subjectivity. As forgetfullness of Being, technology is a danger. Heidegger points out that what we experience in the frame as the constellation of Being and man through the modern world of technology is a prelude to what is called the event of appropriation. This event, however, does not necessarily persist in its prelude. For the event of appropriation the possibility arises that it may overcome the more dominance
of the frame to turn into a more original appropriating of the world of technology from its dominance back to servitude in the realm by which man reaches more truly into the event to appropriation.

This brings us to the conclusion that thinking of Being like that of Heidegger may mean a flight from historical reality. The responsibility of man as critical consciousness, as the possibility of affirming-and denying, for the history Being of which man belongs as first called is too much over looked in such a thing. It is the possibility possessed by the individual and the community of Being, i.e., of telling Being happen in this determined way namely, in one's own history, culture, community, and on.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. In Greek Philosophy *Physis* which refers to the ultimate reality as opposed to their appearances, to refer to the real, essential nature of reality.

2. For the Greeks, the meaning of *Physis* as being. They also mean nature or whatever exists outside of humankind.


7. It means that unity and multiplicity of man.


15. *Aletheia* is a Greek word which means truth, i.e., unconcealment. The essence of Being is *physis*. The essence places itself in and stands in unconcealment, *aletheia*.


17. *Logos* is a Greek word, it means which has the features of permanence and endurance. It means togetherness of the essents.


23. Ibid., P.136

24. Ibid., P.145


27. Ibid., P.14

28. Ibid., P.30


31. Ibid., P.195

32. Ibid., P.195

33. Ibid., P.44-45

34. Ibid., P.437

35. Ibid., P.437

36. Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the problem of Metaphysics*, James


41. *Ibid.*, P.204

42. *Ibid.*, P.101


44. *Ibid.*, P.250

45. *Ibid.*, P.64


51. *Ibid.*, P.24
