Heidegger's Hermeneutical Phenomenology

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Chapter Four

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Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein starts from examining. Dasein in its everydayness. Here the goal is to transcend from everyday perspective to an ontological perspective. One of the basic constitution of Dasein is Being-in-the-world. Because, Dasein is always in the world. In the study of Heidegger, which involves two important methods one is phenomenology and the other is hermeneutics.

Husserl who sought to make philosophy a rigorous science was also that he who sought to make phenomenology a rigorous science. In fact, the first was to be accomplished through the second. Phenomenology as a method, founded by Husserl tries to form a presuppositionless, and rigorous science to lay the foundation for a radical start in Philosophy. It strongly advocates the suspension of all epistemological and ontological presuppositions. So that we can have a glimpse of the reality unaffected by theories and concepts. This sounds clearly in the motto back to the things-themselves (zu den sachen selbst)

In phenomenology consciousness is considered as the primary datum. It doesn’t study consciousness in all its empirical varieties, but the essential structure alone. The essential structure is same for all consciousness, it seemed possible for Husserl to
eliminate all personal variations in our experience. Whatever is presented to our consciousness immediately for the bestwal of meaning i.e. without any mediating inference, is called phenomena. In Husserl’s phenomenology, Heidegger found a tool which was not available to any philosophers before him. Husserl considered philosophy to be a science. He distinguished between exact science and rigorous science.

Fundamentally and primarily, hermeneutics deals with the task of interpretation and meaning of understanding. Hermeneutical phenomenology is a method that martin Heidegger accepts in his philosophical or ontological enterprise Heidegger attempts to inspect human being directly as it were. He turns hermeneutics from an analysis of text to an analysis of this being Dasein. This consequences of this shift in problematic are far reaching on ontontology of understanding replaces an epistemology of interpretation. Hermeneutics as a philosophical discipline is very much influenced by both phenomenology and existentialism. Husserl in his transcendental phenomenology holds that it is possible for us to arrive at such a pure datum, the noema which is ready to receive the meaning assigned to it by the transcendental ego. Heidegger asks a question is it possible for us to arrive at such a pure datum and his answer is no. Husserl’s contention
is that understanding is possible only interpretatively, only way of interpretation. Heidegger reclaimed that the words hermeneutics and hermeneutical to characterize the method of his project in *Being and Time*, a fundamental ontology. Its philosophical aim was to return to our own being as the openness from which being springs.

The term hermeneutics originally used to designate a classical discipline that formulated rules for correctly interpreting texts. Early forms of this discipline, can be found in biblical studies, philology and jurisprudence. The philosophical discussion of hermeneutics, which began in the nineteenth century, likewise initially engaged in the development of rules for proper interpretation. As the discussion developed, however, its attention shifted to the more basic question of the conditions of the very possibility of understanding. The distinctive characteristic that emerged in hermeneutic discussion of understanding was found a rejection of classical Cartesian and Kantian epistemology.

Hermeneutics has more or less taken the place of epistemology for these philosophers. To be sure, they usually refuse to identify hermeneutics with epistemology, but this is due to the empiricist and reductionist connotations which they sense in the

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latter term. There are essentially two problems which hermeneutic philosophers have with traditional epistemology. First, they disagree with the reduction of the entire cognitive process to a single model drawn basically from the natural sciences, i.e. empirical observation. Second, they reject the ahistorical conception of the knower as one who stands outside of what of that which is known and imposes meaning upon it.

Hermeneutic philosophers have tended to distinguish between the phenomenon of explanation which is appropriate to the natural sciences, and the phenomenon of understanding which is appropriate to the human sciences. If we say in an extreme form, they have made the empirical method (explanation) a derivative of the broader phenomenon of understanding. Hermeneutic philosophy has stressed the contextuality of knowing subject and the influence of one’s pre understandings on the knowing process.

The best way to characterize the difference between Kantian epistemology and hermeneutic philosophy is to note the difference in how they understand experience. For Kant, experience referred primarily to the reception of empirical impressions which must then be formed by the categories of understanding. By contrast, hermeneutic philosophers view experience historically as the accumulated knowledge of a tradition.
The difference regarding experience is the source of a different view of truth as well Richard Rorty puts it: the first tradition thinks of truth as a verticle relationship between representations and what is represented. The second tradition thinks of truth horizontally as the culminating reinterpretation of our predecessors' reinterpretation.⁶

In brief, hermeneutic philosophy is an approach to question of truth and knowledge that focuses on the recovery for the present to the experience of the past as expressed in various cultural forms. Moreover, it understands this focus as at least a supplement and, more commonly, an embrasive alternative to the ahistorical empirical focus of classical epistemology. By this method, Heidegger in his work, *Identity and Difference*, points out that pre-Socratic philosophers able to approach the problem of Being in a new way one of the most important and the oldest question of philosophy.

4.1. HEIDEGGER'S ONTOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS

Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology developing a theme which centered on life as the ultimate behind which one could not inquire. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger states that it is the fundamental shortcoming... of any serious and scientifically
mined philosophy of life... that here life itself as a kind of Being does not become ontologically a problem.⁷ That is to say, that life essentially is accessible into the science of the interpretation of that which is the hermeneutic of Dasein. The phenomenological analysis of Dasein as the Being of mankind, Heidegger not only deepens the epistemological analysis of Husserl. But he provides a critique of the assumption that they share with the whole of western philosophical tradition and which Heidegger identifies as metaphysics.

Heidegger's fundamental ontological conception provided a complete re-orientation and a more radical in conjunction with the categories-characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein. Heidegger's centre insights in Being and time is the ontologically difference between Sein (Being) and seiendes (entities), the realm of the ontological and that of the ontical. Heidegger's existential-ontological interpretation is concerned with the constitution of Being rather than its theoretical-critical generalization. He says neither the ontical depiction of entities within the world nor the ontological interpretation of their Being is such as to reach the phenomenon of the world. Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, i.e., existentiales. The meaning of Being can only be arrived at through
an interpretative effort. Therefore hermeneutics is a fundamental
correct of ontology and provides the basic for a transcendental
inquiry.

Since Dasein is characterized by its understanding of
Being, the meaning of Being can only be interpreted from within
the pre-current understanding. Hermeneutic theory can be a
derivative of the fundamental hermeneutic of Dasein in which we
try to explicate and clarify an already exiting pre-understanding that
is a structure of our Being-in-the-world. Heidegger’s development
of a hermeneutic philosophy has so far been considered in its
relation to the question after the meaning of Being and to Dasein
as understanding.

Heidegger formulates the relationship of Dasein, care and
temporality as that Dasein’s totality of Being as care means
ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as being alone (entity
encountered within-the-world) the primordial unit of the structure
of care lies in its temporality the essence of which is the
temporality ... i.e., the phenomena of the future, the character of
having been, and the present. Heidegger says temporality as the
condition for the possibility of original care and as the ultimate
horizon of the interpretation of being-in-the-world. This represents
the aim of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology.
Hermeneutics played a revolutionary change in the history of thought. Heidegger in his *Being and Time*, makes an interpretive understanding concerning the human existence i.e., Dasein. Heidegger did his account of understanding as a revolutionary break from the traditional philosophical emphase on problems about knowledge and on the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity. He was against the background of traditional hermeneutics as well as of Cartesian and Kantian philosophy.

Hans-George Gadamer in his Truth and Method (1960), was the first philosopher to develop Heidegger’s account of interpretation into a general hermeneutics. He defines hermeneutics as the philosophical enterprise for which the central question is, how is understanding possible? For Gadamer, the primary task of philosophical reflection on hermeneutics is not to develop a method of interpretation or understanding, but to clarify the (ontological) conditions in which understanding takes place⁹. Gadamer’s project is a hermeneutic philosophy of human understanding. Gadamer does not consider discussion of method subsidiary. He actually considers it and is usually guided by consideration of method tend of obscure and hinder the natural human capacity of understanding. His goals is to free that natural capacity by clarify its nature and conditions.
For Gadamer these conditions are the key to see that all acts of interpretation and understanding take place within a polarity of familiarity and strangeness. That is a tension between that which is pre-understood and that which is being presented for understanding. Gadamer’s conviction is that it is the tyranny of hidden preunderstandings that makes us deaf to the language that speak to us in tradition. He is not calling for presuppositionless interpretation. He sees enlightenment (Kantian) understanding of interpretation freeing oneself from all prejudices.

Gadamer recommends that interpreters seek to bring all preunderstanding above board from the beginning. So that they might be given full play and tested during the act of interpretation. Thereby, a distinction can be made between legitimate and illegitimate preunderstanding. One cannot escape starting with a preunderstanding, but that does not mean that one cannot test the preunderstanding during the act of interpretation or that the results of the act of interpretation are bound totally by the preunderstanding.

Heidegger describes interpretation as a thematic articulation of totality of meaningful relationships grasped by pre-structure of understanding.
The ready-to-hand is always understanding in terms of totality of involvements. This totality need not be grasped explicitly by a thematic interpretation. Even if has undergone such an interpretation, it proceeds into an understanding which does not stand out from the background. And this is the very mode in which it is the essential foundation for everyday circumspective interpretation. In very cause the interpretation is grounded in something we have in advance in a for-having... in something we see in advance-in a fore-sight... in something we group in advance in a fore-conception.\textsuperscript{11}

The most important consequence of the circularity of understanding for hermeneutics that there is no pure starting point for understanding because every act of understanding takes place within a finite historically conditioned horizon, within an already understood frame of reference. It is no longer a question of how we are to enter the hermeneutical circle, because human consciousness is always already in it. We understand only by constant reference to what we have already understood, namely, our past and anticipated experience. The experiencing and reflecting subject is never a \textit{tabula rasa} upon which the understanding of raw experience inscribes its objective character, rather, all experience and reflection are the result of a confrontation between
one’s pre-understanding or even prejudice and new or perhaps strange objects. The inevitable presence of pre-understanding or prejudice is not necessarily the distortion of the meaning of an object by an arbitrary subject, rather, it is the very condition for any understanding of all.

Heidegger, however, contends that presuppositions are the very condition for any reception of the object whatsoever. His notions of the ontological character of understanding and the primordial connection of subject and object in their pre-understanding and the primordial connection of subject and object in their pre-reflective relational whole provides the foundation for this contention. For him, all interpretation is a derivative form of a prior understanding, in which the prior relationship between subject and object is brought to explication. If we try to eliminate pre-judgements or preconceptions in order to meet the requirements of objectivist science, then we miss what Heidegger as well as Gadamer mean by understanding.

“But if we see this circle as a vicious on and look out for ways of avoiding it, even if we just sense it as an inevitable imperfection. Then the act of understanding has been misunderstood from the
ground up. The assimilation of understanding and interpretation to a definite ideal of knowledge is not the issue here. Such an ideal is itself only a subspecies of understanding what is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way. This circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any random kind of knowledge may move, it is the expression of the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself. It is not to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle or even of a circle which is merely tolerate. In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing".12

In short, all inquiry depends upon prior insight. Human being (Dasein) anywhere at anytime exists with some insight. The priority of insight places knowledge obtained through methodological inquiry at the level of a secondary mediation of experience13. A presupposition helps constitute the unspoken horizon which makes a supposition possible. A fundamental presupposition refers us to the structure of the most basic insight, the pre-reflective connection between the knower and that which is known. Presuppositions are inevitable; they are shared; they determine the
form of the questions we ask; and they provide the condition for the possibility of acquiring new understanding.

Heidegger's analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-world change our understanding of understanding from a derivative phenomenon to the key stone of human experience. Gadamer remarks "Heidegger's temporal analytic of Dasein has I think, shown convincingly that understanding is not just one of the various possible behaviours of the subject but the mode of being of Dasein itself.... And hence embraces whole of its experience of the world". The hermeneutic approach to philosophy is in contrast to the traditional approach running from Descartes through Kant to Husserl. The traditional approach held that the human being as a "subject" a knower disengaged from the world and from practical activity in the world.

Heidegger's hermeneutic turning is different from the earlier philosophy. It avoids the traditional model of the subject as the knower. Heidegger's methodology shows both the mentalistic vocabulary of the subject-object model is not the only possible starting point for philosophy and this vocabulary is derivative from the conterminous understanding. He conceives Dasein and world as forming a circle. He then extends the
traditional hermeneutical circle\textsuperscript{15} between a text and its reading down to the most primordial level of human existence.

Traditionally the method of hermeneutical circle is the reading of a text, where the parts cannot be interpreted without any understanding of the whole. And the whole cannot be grasped without understanding the parts. Heidegger's conception of hermeneutic circle is a feature of human existence in general. In \textit{Being and Time}, Heidegger says "understanding" in the sense of one possible kind of cognizing among others (as distinguished, for instance, from 'explaining') must, like explaining, be interpreted as an existential derivative of that primary understanding which is one of the constituents of the Being of the 'there' in general."\textsuperscript{16}

Heidegger is saying that \textit{Being and Time} is an interpretation. He had a deep conception of what is understanding and do have different conception of interpretation, a different account of how interpretation arises from understanding. Heidegger is describing that "primary understanding" which runs through various ways to existing in and interpreting the world. Heidegger argues that something is derived from something else. He is trying to show us that we need not to take "knowledge" as primary and see "understanding" and "interpretation" as derived, but we can reverse this derivation. He criticises and says that traditional philosophy
has come up against unsolvable and unbridgeable dichotomies, his reordering acquires greater plausibility to the degree that it avoids such difficulties.

According to Heidegger, there are two types of truth, one is the ordinary philosophical sense of truth, where an assertion uncovers or discovers some fact about the world. He usually describes truth in this sense as being about things that do not have the character of Dasein. The contrasting term, 'disclosedness', suggests that the total context is opened through understanding. Heidegger says understanding does not consist only to making assertion about the world. But also of grouping the entire mode of being-in-the-world. Understanding grasps the world as such and without the discovery of particular features of the world. So understanding grasps not only the world but also Dasein's way of being-in-the-world. Hence understanding of the world is always a self-understanding. By self-understanding Heidegger means instead that disclosure involves both the world and Dasein at the same time, Dasein's understanding of its world is thus not distinct from its understanding of itself, but is at the same time an interpretation of itself. This self-interpretation thus does not discover facts about the properties of mental substance but discloses how Dasein has dealt with and is dealing with the issue of its own existence.
Heidegger suggests that the disclosure of possibilities could not be derived from the discovery of factual features. His philosophical interpretation is trying to show that both discovery and disclosure are necessary to human activity. Heidegger draws a distinction between 'facticity' and 'factuality'. Factuality has to do with nonhuman things, discrete facts about which could be entered in a list. According to Heidegger, Dasein finds itself thrown into a world. It finds itself as already projected or thrown into a situation which concrete possibilities. This possibilities are concrete and differ from, purely logical possibilities in that they come with concrete limitations. So he speaks of these limitations as Dasein’s facticity in contradistinction to the other kind of fact that he calls factuality.17

4.2. HEIDEGGER AND HERMANEUTICAL TURN

Heidegger’s turn may be comprehensively characterised as an overall attempt at appropriation and reappropriation, i.e. as an effort to come to terms with the significant tendencies of contemporary philosophy. His attempt is an over all re-examination and renewal in two ways: either the philosopher adhere to some existing tendency of the day or apriori disengages it from any one of them. We find that the philosophical position that
Heidegger preliminarily adhered to his own phenomenology. It was Husserl's phenomenology that provided him with the 'method' and devices for re-examining the very concept of philosophy which means that the rethinking of philosophy became inseparable from coming to grips with phenomenology.

It was phenomenology that provided him with the device and strategy of re-examining and reappropriating contemporary tendencies as well as the whole philosophical tradition, inclusive of phenomenology. Heidegger not just occasionally concerned with itself but he brings criticism. Heidegger sought radically an re-examination and reappropriate the original subject matter of philosophy. Heidegger says philosophers could either persist in their effort to pursue systematic or scientific philosophy or philosophers could choose to dramatically enunciate the irrationality of life there by vehemently attacking and indeed rejecting, systematic or scientific philosophy together with its claim to universal validity.

We may say that Heidegger ethusiastically adhered to the view of contemporary philosophy that the object primarily to be approached and investigated was life. He was reluctant to join in which the ardent criticism of scientific philosophy. Heidegger
offers an alternative to rational concepts and theoretical knowing, by way of such a 'destruction' is what he calls 'hermeneutical' 'concepts' overagainst pure or theoretical intuition 'hermeneutical intuition.'

The 'Hermeneutics' or 'hermeneutical' have their meaning as rival concepts to 'theory' or 'theoretical', understood in terms of 'theoretical neutral.' Generally speaking, it is due to Heidegger's search for proper methodological devices regarding an adequate conceptual expression of 'factual life' that his hermeneutic outlook emerges in the postwar.

The description of life or 'facticity' Heidegger comes to call as an overall hermeneutic character precisely in virtue of the insight that interpretation cannot be regarded as something. Heidegger finds that hermeneutics cannot remain an auxiliary discipline of human sciences as has been traditionally conceived within a pre-established realm of sciences (like Dilthey). Dilthey held hermeneutics to be the methodology of the understanding of recorded expression. Understanding is for Heidegger no longer a way of knowing proper to the human studies. It is in contradiction to explanation as the way of knowledge characteristics of the natural sciences, but is rather a way of being of the being called human.
Humans are understanding, so to speak all alonge, but the way they find themselves in the world involved in it. As an interpreting animal, the human being interprets being as well. Heidegger formulates his being-question specifically as a question of the meaning of being. So he links hermeneutics to ontology and he called ontology as hermeneutics of facticity. Heidegger’s modified outlook is that by adopting a hermencutic way of seeing, traditional empiricism can be shown to be in sufficiently empirical. There is a difference that Heidegger has in mind is something entirely difference from the concept of experience applied in empirical or positivist philosophy.

Heidegger’s dissatisfaction with contemporary descriptive strategies of life soon led him to the insight that the predominance of the theoretical comportment is not an occasional mistake committed by the philosophy of the day, but rather something that dates back to the origins of the distinction of rationalism and irrationalism or metaphysics and life-philosophy. Those insights provide Heidegger with a basic perspective to be applied in his historical connotations. They give him important clues for viewing the way of European philosophy up to the present. Task Heidegger assigns to phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity is therefore to deconstruct backwards the “dominating interpretedness in its hidden motives”.¹⁹
Heidegger's new concept of philosophy is in itself hermeneutical, i.e., situation centered, equally detached from relationalism and irrationalism, absolutism and relativism or historicism. This concept centers around questionable, essential to it is passionate dedication to the matter itself—which is Heidegger's way of taking over, appropriating, and immediately radicalizing Husserl's insistence on rigor. Heidegger's *Being and Time* announces itself as a work of fundamental ontology if whose aim "is to lay a foundation for the regional sciences by posing the question of the meaning of Being."\(^{20}\)

The fundamental thought in Heidegger is that the whole world is a text to him and is interpreting it with thoughtful meditation. Hence Heidegger writes that language, the house to Being and speaks us that ours is not to found either languages or being but only to let being be within language. The fact is that fundamental ontology that lie puts even in Heidegger's earlier thought and the most immediate evidence consists in Heidegger against the function, that is, he asserts equally in the ancient ontology of substance and the modern subject epistemology.

It is clear to Heidegger from the beginning that prevailing epistemological approach to the task was misbegotten. Heidegger's search was directed towards the transposition of the ground to ontol-
ogy. His interpretation on Kant as an ontologist rather than an epistemologist is seen in 1927 lecture-course published as *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Heidegger speaks against the foundational priority of epistemology as much as does the appeal for the reinstatement of ontology in the introduction to *Being and Time*.

In Heidegger's own words: "knowing is grounded beforehand in a being ready alongside the world, which is essentially constitutive for Dasein's being."²¹ Heideggerian construction lives in the recognition of the poignant reality that all expression is self-encoding, so that all interpretation requires decoding. His construction is an articulated response to the acknowledge difficulty of thinking directly the ultimate points of reference in this life, working inevitably within a medium not transparently fitted to this purpose language.

It is well known that not only Heideggerian phenomenology but also so-called existential phenomenology in general broke with Husserl over the issue of the transcendental ago. Among the ground breakers of this movements only Heidegger preserved in full flash the salient and founding feature. In the sense that the multidimensionality of founding-relations permits no univocal ground conceived as basis to which the unity within consciousness can be referred.
The traditional philosophical obsession with the truth or falsity of interpretive claims may be on the work track in trying to understand Heidegger’s account. In Being and Time, Heidegger is not primarily concerned with explicit, deliberate interpretation but with the interpretation of a practical sort that may not always involve articulated judgements or the thematizing. Contrary to present tendencies to think of the reading of texts as the paradigm case of interpretation, Heidegger’s paradigm case are everyday activities like opening a door. Heidegger’s philosophical interpretation is an interpretation not of a text, but of Dasein. Heideggers’ point is that even the most obvious ordinary objects taken by themselves do not have their characteristics inscribed in them.

The early Heidegger does not emphasize textuality to the same degree, his account does underwrite the shift of philosophical attention from the epistemological model of perception to the hermeneutical model of reading. He features the notion of meaning centrally. He does so that will be congruent with this hermeneutic model and that will block some traditional problems, that arises from construction meaning as private, internal, or mental states. Heidegger’s claim to have reopened for philosophy
the great inaugural question of “the meaning of Being.”22 Meaning for Heidegger is something that one imposes on an object, it is neither a distinctive object of perception nor an intermediary between the subject and the object. Heidegger says it is understood is not the meaning but the entity.

There is a sense in which Heidegger eliminates the traditional philosophical notion of meaning from his vocabulary. He thinks that we grasp entities as entities in their webs of relation with other entities, not as aggregates of perceptual qualities. For Heidegger meaning, involves the holistic way in which something can become intelligible as something requires Dasein and only Dasein can be said to be meaningful.

Heidegger’s account of understanding and interpretations are influenced and lead to the hermeneutic turn later in the twentieth century. Two thinkers in the second half of the twentieth century and whose work would not have been possible without the section of Being and Time. Those philosophers are Hans George Gadamer (Truth and Method in 1976) and Jacques Derrida (of Grammatology in 1977). The hermeneutic theory developed by Gadamer and the constructive movement by Derrida take the Heideggerian account in different and apparently opposed direction.
Heidegger thinks that facing up to our own finitude can throw us back into our lives in a fuller way. Heidegger expresses that the clear-sightededly acknowledge that we are caught in the hermeneutic circle. It is also to realize that this circularity is an enabling condition which gives us access to our lives. As a result our aim should be "not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way."\textsuperscript{23}

Heidegger's discussion of 'authentic historicity' propose that we fully recognize the finitude and temporality of our possibilities of self-interpretation.

4.3. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TRANSCENDENCE

Heidegger elaborates the question of being as fundamental ontology, the science of Being. According to Heidegger, fundamental ontology as an enquiry into Being, was itself a possibility of human being which Heidegger called, Dasein, being-there or existence. Heidegger says Dasein is always operates with in a prevailing understanding of being. The investigation of Being taken up by Heidegger seeks the ground of Being, where Being could be ultimately founded. The fundamental ontology could be called fundamental only when the foundation (ground) of Being is shown in Being itself as far as it could be found in Being itself.
The search for the ground of Being was not at all new in philosophy. It has been the perennial current of all philosophies. As Heidegger sees it, very often the attempt has gone astray or at least was specially carried out that instead of seeking the ground of being in Being itself. But has been sought in something outside the Being-present. Heidegger tries to ground it in the very transcendence of Being.

In his search to find the ground of Being, Heidegger comes across the traditionally accepted principle of reason. It is quite natural that a philosopher well versed in the traditional inheritance of Western philosophy begins his investigation by commencing upon the already accepted principle of ground. Centuries before the problem of the ground remains a problem, open to further discussion. This discussion is leading us to the true region where Being could be ultimately grounded, which is nothing but the transcendence of Being.

Leibnitz who puts the problem of the ground took the form of the principle of sufficient reason. The principle of reason says about beings that every being has a reason (ground). But what the reason is, or where exactly is being grounded? About these questions the principle of reason does not give any answer. Hence, the sense of the ground which is the subject of our enquiry is not
yet made sufficiently clear in the so-called principle of the ground (reason). The principle of the ground touches only its periphery.

Although the principle of reason does not give us an adequate solution to the question of the essence of the ground. Heidegger thinks that it could be taken as an initial step of the problem of the essence of the ground. For this purpose Heidegger refers the principle of reason back to its historical setting and in doing so he shows us that the principle of ground (reason) is initially connected with the problem of truth.

Leibnitz formulates the principle of reason from the nature of true predication. It is the nature of every true prediction that the predicate should be contained in the subject that consequence should be in the antecedent, explicitly or implicitly. Leibnitz proposes this nature of true predication as the origin of the principle of reason. Leibnitz concludes that every true effect should have its pre-existence in its antecedents, namely have a cause. Heidegger has taken up this exposition of Leibnitz as the starting point of the problem of ground not because of the logic of the principle of ground but because in the statements of Leibnitz who found a union of truth with the problem of ground24. Heidegger takes this linking of truth with ground as a directive and goes further of the problem of ground, investigating the nature of truth.
Traditionally truth was considered as the adequation of the intellect with the thing. Heidegger thinks that this definition of truth is very vague and empty. This holds that good as a statement regarding truth. Heidegger again says Leibnitz has understand truth in this sense, as the truth of judgement. For a judgement to be true, the object judged should agree with the subject of judging. But Heidegger says that this does not reveal to us the essence of truth. The essence of truth should be explored further.

Heidegger conceives that the understanding of truth as agreement of subject-object originated in Plato and Plato thought Being as idea. In fact truth as agreement calls for a deep ground in light of which the agreement itself could be possible. Heidegger thinks agreement as agreement is possible only in the pre-supposition of something in relation to which subject and object are said to agree. As this meeting point of two terms of agreement, Heidegger proposes the original manifestation of Being (sein), which is essentially pre-predicative.

It is the very uncovering of Being (aletheia) of which the pre-platonic philosophers in their faithful awareness of the event of Being, spoke to us as truth. It is this original manifestation of the Being of beings which makes being revealable, which being, in their turn, taking a representative form in the mind of
The original manifestation of the Being of beings is called by Heidegger ontological truth in opposition to the secondary revelation beings (seiendes) which is termed as ontic truth.

According to Heidegger, truth is to be considered more fundamentally as ontic and ontological. Both belong together, as the former is founded in the latter. But the belonging togetherness of the ontic and ontological truth is possible only on the round of their relation to the difference between Being (Sein) and being (Seiendes). This difference between the Sein and Seiendes Heidegger calls the ontological difference. But any mention of the ontological difference reflects back to the existence of a Dasein only through Dasein is the ontological difference held open, because Dasein understanding the Being of being relates itself to being. Hence the difference between ontic and ontological truth which is based on the ontological difference of Being and being is more fundamentally based on the essence of Dasein, where the ascent (uberstieg) from being (Seiendes) to Being (Sein) occurs. This original happening occurring in the essence of Dasein, which furnishes a basis for ontological difference, is called by Heidegger transcendence. Transcendence, because it signifies an ascent from being to Being.
The study of the problem of ground leads us to the study of the essence of truth, and the study of the essence of truth of the ontological difference and the ontological difference to the problem of transcendence. The nearer we come to the essence of truth the closer we come to the ground of Being. Being and truth come to ground in one and the same thing, namely, the transcendence of Dasein.

We find that the ground of Being is ultimately sought in the transcendence of Dasein. Naturally the question arises: what is this transcendence in its essence? Transcendence signifies an ascent. Ascent in its very nature implies a relation. A relation from something to something. It is the very structure of existence and the fundamental event in the essence of Dasein. The character of Dasein is that it can transcend; that is, understanding the Being of beings, can relate itself to beings. It is not the individual being that, is attained in transcendence, but being as such and according to Heidegger, being as such, as well see, is founded in the world.

Because transcendence belongs to the fundamental structure of Dasein and because transcendence being-in-the-world, world it follows that the problem of being-in-the-world brings with it also the problem of the essence of Dasein. The being-in-the-world
belong to the basic grasp of Dasein, it is the necessary fundamental and \textit{apriori} grasp of Dasein.

It may be asked now that how does Dasein, transcending as it is, build the world? To understand this we have to go back to the idea of world in Heidegger's philosophy. Because Dasein does not relate itself to this or that being, nor to the sum total of beings, the world to which Dasein relate itself is not the totality of the beings present. This view of the world seems to emphasize the Being-how of the world rather than the Being-what of the world. Heidegger shows us that this way of conceiving the world as the how in totality was already a feature of traditional philosophy.

In the early Greek thinking, they were thinkers, men caught in the radical astonishment of being\textsuperscript{27}. They never, mean this or that being nor the totality of beings. In the early Christian period Augustine conceived the world in this sense in so far as he understood world, in the sense of the lover of the world. In the middle ages St.Thomas also thought of the world in this manner, at least to the extent of his distinction between being present.

Kant brings out the concept of the world still more clearly. He thinks that the totality, generall conceived in the idea of the
world, relates itself to the finite things present. Finiteness is understood in a new sense and considered as the object of a finite knowledge. The finite being considered as the object of an absolute and Kant calls the thing-in-itself, The same finite being in reference to its possibility of being understood Kant calls the thing in appearance. The unity of appearances is formed by means of the synthetic *apriori* judgement. The unity of the appearances necessarily depends on an accidental, actual and passive becoming, is, always conditioned and incomplete.

The incompleteness is overcome by a conceived idea which is said to be transcendent. This idea has a completeness to which no empirical knowledge may reach, and with it the intellect can achieve a synthetic unity of the whole. This idea Kant calls the world-concept. Since Plato, says, Heidegger Western metaphysics has not asked the question or where it has intimated it as in Kant, it has failed to press it. The existential understanding of the world slightly-indicated or vaguely proposed in the philosophies of the past, should be further clarified and founded in the deeper layers of its reality. This is what Heidegger aims to do in developing the concept of the world of Dasein.

We see many objects in the world. One may think that it is the objects that constitute the world. But in reality, Heidegger
says, it is the world that explain the objects. The separate entities in the world are unintelligible. They are understood only by the help of an idea of the world already formed long before. It is because of this idea that we understood the objects in reference to one another. In fact, the one centre reference, the one point to which all other things could be referred, is the idea of the world.

Dasein in its average everyday existence is not conscious of this world. Every day existence is in activity and, thus does not understand the world as such with its preoccupations of the everyday existence, Dasein forms an environment at world which Heidegger calls the 'umwelt'.

The environmental world (umwelt) has a spatial signification. It is the concern (Sorge) of Dasein that forms the environmental world not the spatial nearness or distance. The reality of the environmental world does not consist therefore in an objective understanding of things but rather in a utilitarian view of things. So Heidegger thinks that perhaps the Greek expression *pragmata* may be better express the idea of things. The things are as useful, as implements.

We have seen that the question of ground is related to Dasein's transcendence. We also seen that the world-building
ascent of Dasein's as being-in-the-world is transcendence. Now we have to re-explore further what is the ultimate ground in Dasein, Heidegger says that it is freedom. Dasein builds the world as it gives meaning-to being and thus ascends to the Being of the beings setting the world in its own world-system. Dasein however, can direct its action only as its existence demands.

Now concern (Sorge) constitutes the very Being of Dasein, and present itself as 'concern for' in so far as Dasein strives to relate itself with other men, and 'concern with' in so far as Dasein tries to relate itself with infra-human beings. In any case concern is that which constitutes the Being of Dasein. We understand the meaningfulness of considering Dasein as concern when we pay our attention to another fundamental principle of Heidegger. Fundamentally viewed, Dasein is the sum-total of possibilities. It is because of the reason that the being of Dasein reveals itself as concern. Only in actualizing its own possibilities does Dasein find its own meaningfulness. But in order to actualize itself it has to come in contact with the beings in the world. But it can relate itself with these beings only in such a manner as to actualize its own possibilities. To this end it has to build its own world. Hence the Purpose of building the world is to actualize its own possibilities.
The conceptual frame work of producing and making leads back to Dasein's own concrete being-in-the-world. For Dasein lives its every day life within the horizon of a world of tools and instruments, of things which Dasein makes and uses, whether these things being "already there"\textsuperscript{28}, he uses. This world is founded only in understanding being in their inter-related system. In this understanding Dasein finds itself as one among beings, of course as the all-convering point of the world system that is being founded. According to Heidegger, the world, Being in their involvement with Dasein form the world. Only in this world Dasein finds itself meaningful.

It is this transcendental establishment of beings in their relation to one another and to Dasein itself, which necessarily includes the two other aspects of founding and footing, that we call ontological truth, the pre-predicative understanding of all Being of beings, which renders all other understanding of beings possible, namely, offers the possibility of ontical truth. The essence of Dasein is freedom. Dasein's transcendence being the determining factor in truth. The essence of truth is freedom and Being, being ultimately grounded in Dasein's transcendence, the ground of Being is also freedom. Everything is founded in freedom, in infinite freedom.
4.4. THE GROUND OF METAPHYSICS

The whole philosophy of Martin Heidegger is an attempt to lay the foundation of metaphysics. The investigation into Being was began to form the fundamental ontology. Since Dasein is the only privileged being capable of understanding its own Being. This attempt of forming a fundamental ontology was began with the analysis of Dasein. Heidegger does not claim to have brought it to completion.

Metaphysics may still be in the process of being founded. It seems that metaphysics founded in Dasein. In Heidegger's later writings he does not speak of fundamental ontology. Evidently the stress is given to the thought of Being and the fundamental ontology. Heidegger sometimes attempts to ground metaphysics in Being itself. But because the revelation of Being is restricted to the horizon of time and to the phenomenological circle of Dasein's experience. The ground of metaphysics which Heidegger arrives at remains intimately related to Dasein. Though the grounding process is not yet completely brought to its end, this attempt at grounding has its own positive contributions.

Strictly speaking, it is not in Dasein that Heidegger seems to ground metaphysics. It is rather in the existence of Dasein.
Dasein being existing to the openness of Being\(^{29}\), it is in the existing openness to Dasein to Being that metaphysics is ultimately grounded. We call it the existing ground of metaphysics in contrast to the subsisting ground in which the existing itself must further be grounded.

The existing ground speaks of the real beginning of metaphysics. Metaphysics begins where man encounters Being. The essence of Dasein considered as transcendence, which is the surrounding of Dasein from being to Being, presents \textit{Da-Sein} as the meeting point of \textit{Da} and \textit{Sein}, namely, man and Being.\(^{30}\) This transcendence is further explained as Being-in-the-world, because the Being of being is attained only in the interrelationship of implement-circles, which, in so far as it gives meaningfulness to the Being of being, constitutes the world for Heidegger. Because this global system of the implementally characterized being is finally understood in relation to the Dasein's ground, Being.

Metaphysics seeks the meaning at Being. Being is to be attained in its truthfulness. Any consideration of Being invites us to view. Under this aspect Heidegger views Being, that is, Being only as it is manifested to us in the circles. The origin and the ultimate explanation of Being is never questioned. The consideration of the nature of being helps us to understand the real
nature of its Being. Because the nature of things necessarily presupposes Dasein's will to make use of them as it could be said that the nature of things are dependent on Dasein. This view defects this implementally-characterized Being of being. By this, we do not mean that Dasein functions as the efficient cause of the Being of being it encounters. Dasein is only searching after the meaningfulness of the Being of being.

The meaningfulness of Being is, however, deflected in the aspect of which it is implementally characterized. Here Dasein sees the world as such ultimately related and subordinated to Dasein which we call freedom. In this sense it could very well be said that freedom is the ground of Being, which would only mean that Dasein, in its decisive openness to the Being of being, brings out the meaningfulness of Being and finds Being in itself in so far as the meaning of Being is finally understood only in its basic relation to Dasein.

Man in virtue of his openness to Being is always going out of himself in search of Being. The consideration of implemental character of Being helps us to clarify the pre-established harmony between man and Being. In this pre-established harmony man finds himself as the central point of the interrelations, as the ultimate
in order to and thus finds a possibility of grounding Being in himself. But the Being understood here is the Being of being considered in the aspect of its implemental character. Being in the aspect of its pure ‘isness’ is neither questioned nor considered. So the grounding of Being in man’s openness to Being through it is true, considers Being only in a way limited realm of its causality. The whole grounding process is made possible because man is ready to accept the Being of being. It is with the original acceptance of the ‘isness’ of Being that man is concerned. The very consideration of the implementality of Being is made possible in the presupposition of the ‘isness’ of Being. It is accepting this ‘is’ that man is striving to go that of himself. The ground of Being in man is only an initial stage of man’s search after Being. The search will be completed when man can find the explanation of the ‘is’ of being to which he relates himself.

Dasein in so far as it is existing to the Being to the Being of being, is really the ground of metaphysics, because it renders metaphysics possible. Existing by the very fact that it is existing, Dasein is going out of itself to ground metaphysics. This going out marks the beginning of metaphysics. But, in so far as it goes out, it acknowledge its own incompleteness and incapability of grounding metaphysics absolutely. The existing ground, by
the very fact that it is existing, call for another ground, free of this existing character, which is the subsisting ground of metaphysics.

In an important essay, *What is Metaphysics?*, we can find confirmation for our interpretation: "The nothing is the, complete negation of the totality of beings. The totality of beings must be given in advance so as to be able to fall prey straightway to negation - in which the nothing itself could be manifest." But the definition of nothing as the negation of the totality of beings, Heidegger warns us is not the, nothing as such. For negation is always an act of the intellect an exercise of logic, the result of which is that the nothing is treated as something, as a being, that we obtain only a formal concept of the imagined nothing but never the nothing itself. The nothing that really nothing can be achieved only on the basis of the fundamental experience of the nothing.

In fact, the nothing is revealed, becomes present through Dasein direct, that is, Dasein's fundamental experience of anxiety (*Angst*). Heidegger says that anxiety reveals the nothing. More precisely, anxiety leaves us hanging because it induces the slipping away of beings as a whole. This implies that we ourselves - we mean who are in being in the midst of beings slip from ourselves. At bottom therefore it is not as though "you" or "I" feel
ill at ease; rather it is this way for same “one”. In the altogether unsetting experience of this hovering where there is nothing to hold onto, pure Da-Sein is all that is still there.32

The subject/object dichotomy takes hold at our thinking, the pure Da-Sein encounters the nothing in anxiety. “Indeed: the nothing itself - as such - was there.”33 Both Dasein and the nothing were there where Dasein confronts this thrownness into the world, his situated facticity of existence in a most immediate way as sheer being-in-the-world.

The nothing is not revealed as a beings, “just as little is it gives as an object.”34 Rather, Heidegger says, “in anxiety the nothing is encountered at one with beings as a whole,... the nothing marks itself known with beings and in beings expressly as a slipping away of the whole.”35

Heidegger through the following passage gives the argument of “what is metaphysics?”

In the clear light of the nothing of anxiety the original openness of beings as such arises: that they are beings and nothing.... The essence of the originally nihiliating nothing lies in this, that it brings Dasein for the first time before being as
such only on the ground of the original elation of,
the nothing can human existence approach and
penetrate beings.  

It would not be inaccurate to say that the nothing constitutes the condition of possibility of beings, that the nothing is constitutive of the pure essence in which only being can be and manifest as a being, as such and such. As the non-object of anxiety, beings as a whole, as not nothing, become present. But it would be a mistake to infer that the nothing is more primordial than beings. For the anxiety which reveals the nothing as such and brings forth beings to disclose the fundamental mood of Dasein that occurs to him when he finds himself most immersed in beings, so immersed that the overabundance of being outstrips this or that particular being. “Anxiety is indeed anxiety in the face of . . ., but not in the face of this or that thing.” The preponderance of beings defies determination and particularization on the part of Dasein. It announces itself as the “nothing” as nothing, paradoxically, that is fullest in its emptiness. The nothing is not nihil, it is rather the fullest expression of being’s presence as a whole, so full that the presence as this or that particular being slips into absence, into the ground that informs the figure of the nothing.

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Da in so far is existing to the Being of being, is really, the ground of metaphysics. Because it renders metaphysics possible. But it is only the existing ground. Existing, by the very fact that it is existing. Dasein is going out of itself to ground metaphysics. This going out marks the beginning of metaphysics. But, in so far as it goes out, it acknowledge its own incompleteness and incapability of grounding metaphysics absolutely. The existing ground, by the way fact that it is existing, calls for another ground, free of this existing character which is the subsisting ground of metaphysics.

We have already seen that metaphysics could proximately be grounded in the openness of man to Being. We have also seen that this existing ground calls for another and more fundamental ground where metaphysics could ultimately and absolutely be grounded. This ultimate ground, because it is the subsisting Being, as well shall see, we call the subsisting ground.

Some indications to the subsisting ground of metaphysics were already seen in the chapter where we treated Being in its relation to being, man and nothing. The consideration of any aspect of Being, when led forth the completion will logically lead us to this subsisting ground where Being and metaphysics are absolutely and ultimately grounded.
Heidegger does not arrive at this grounding of metaphysics, because he prefers to remain within the phenomenological circle of thinking-process. The absent to this subsisting ground demands a thinking beyond the limitations of phenomenology. Heidegger's quest to encompass all of thinking, willing, and feeling in a relationship to time could force phenomenological analysis into metaphysical realm or reduce it to a mythologizing of time. But phenomenology analyses things as they occur in our experience and narrates them. Because it stops here and never goes into inner nature of things reflectively.

Phenomenology can never attain the positive content of experience in itself. Without reflectively attaining the positive content of our experience of being in itself, we cannot found Being in its ultimate ground. The existing ground which 'phenomenology arrives at, though right, leaves the whole thing unexplained. So to explain it further we go outside the realm of phenomenology. Phenomenology has already attained its end. Now it should give way to reflective thinking of demonstrative character.

Phenomenology was of course a good beginning. It has brought to us our own experience of Being. But in analysing them phenomenologically we have had many oblique experiences, which
aroused our curiosity, and yet were not clear. Now we are trying to clarify those glimpses of the so-called supra experiences indicated together with the phenomenologically attained experience of Being. We found an element of mystery in thinking of Being something unsaid remaining behind all the said words of Being, which left an experience of holiness in the whole field of thinking. What is this holy? This we see in the Being of beings.

We are inquiring into the inner nature of which we experience in transcendence. The whither of transcendence was explained as to-the-world, because the Being of being was understandable only as Being-in-the-world. But it was precisely in this understanding of Being as Being-in-the-world that man felt mystery. The whither of transcendence was not yet fully solved. Though man understands Being as Being-in-the-world in the light of the whither of transcendence and in understanding it so he founds Being in himself. Man finds himself as the ground of Being, because the meaningfulness of Being in its world is understood only in the light of man. But man fails to identify himself as the final ground because he finds himself dependent on Being and transcending it. The intellectual tendency is clearly manifested here in its experience of the mystery of Being, in its thought of
the unsaid in the said. They are already manifested even in the phenomenology attained grounding of Being.

The opening of man to Being, which is transcendence to the Being of beings, is meant for the acceptance of Being by man. This acceptance is completed when man absolutely asserts Being in judgement. The assertion of Being is, however, possible only under the supposition of the implicit acceptance of the subsisting Being. It was because of this subsisting Being hidden behind the Being of being, that man found mystery in his understanding of Being, that he was called to think the unsaid of the said words of Being, that he felt holiness pervading everywhere.

The transcending subsisting Being is that creative agent who is responsible for man’s existence characterised by the transcending capacity of receiving Being by eliciting self extending, thinking, willing. Freedom is only the name for this capacity of man, or the name for its manifestation. Man with spontaneous impulse tries to disclose from within what he is. Participated as he is from the supremely transcending subsisting Being, he can not but reflect this supreme Being in all his actions, in thinking, in his willing, in taking his resolutions. In other words, in all his actions he transcends everything in this world and himself.
Thus we find meaningfulness in our thinking, we find richness in our thought, we find proportionate internal content in our experience of Being, but only when we arrive at this subsisting Being, where we could ground Being absolutely and ultimately. Metaphysics has therefore two grounds existing as well subsisting. The existing ground is the Dasein, which as the Da of Sein, is existing into the Being of being and renders metaphysics possible. The subsisting ground the subsisting Being, which as the subsisting Being makes possible and sustains the very existence of this existing ground itself. This subsisting ground, which is Being subsisting in itself, we call God.

We see that Heidegger does not lead philosophy to the ultimate grounding. Neither does he deny the possibility of arriving at his ground. That is, his philosophy is neither theistic nor atheistic. Heidegger leaves it undecided. According to Heidegger, arriving at this ultimate ground does not belong to the nature of essential thinking. The question is therefore the sense of thinking in Heidegger. How does Heidegger understand thinking? Heidegger says the most thought provoking thing about our thought provoking age is that we are still not thinking. He says it has been since the early Greeks. To discover what
thinking is we are instead lift back to the origins of Greek thinking before Aristotle.  

Essential thinking for Heidegger is poetising. In reflective thinking, according to him, the real nature of thinking dies out. He says poetical thinking is more authentic than abstract, demonstrative thinking. In “what is called thinking?”, Heidegger describes about the weakness of thinking in four statements.

1. Thinking does not bring knowledge as do the sciences.
2. Thinking does not produce usable practical wisdom.
3. Thinking solves no cosmic riddles.
4. Thinking does not endow us directly with the power to act.

Heidegger says that because of that poetical thinking only man has the experience of reality in its wholeness. Correspondingly, the transcendental imagination appears to be the important factor in the thinking process. Transcendental imagination is that faculty whereby man has maximum sensibility and minimum intelligibility. Poetical thinking needs truth in its sensibility. So Heidegger gives greater importance to intelligibility presented in sensibility. It is true that all our thinking process begins with our
senses and it is the intelligible content of the sensible data that man always understands. So the beginning of the thinking process is always understood. So the beginning of the thinking process is always connected with sensibility.

The scholastics call the state of thinking as \textit{cogitatio}. From this intelligibility man has to go to the intelligibility in itself. The way of this going is reasoning. Reasoning needs reflective and abstract thinking. So Heidegger dislikes reasoning. He really tries to arrive at intelligibility where reality is perceived. But he never arrives at it free of its sensibility, because reasoning is not duly attended. The lack of this attention to reasoning may be due to desire to surpass the subject object polarity of the traditional philosophy. The attempt to find out the unity of the subject-object relationship is really praiseworthy.

Though his method is phenomenology, his thinking to Being is phenomenologically attainable. This Being is not God. Heidegger clearly says that Being about which speaks is neither God nor the ground of world. According to Heidegger, Being is the Being that is phenomenologically attained and hence by Being as such he understands only Being manifested in beings.
The openness to Being and the revelation of Being in beings are worked out and clearly exposed in Heidegger's analysis of Being. Man is presented as openness life to receive the fulness of Being. Once the proper functioning of demonstrative thinking is attained, man could arrive at God from this openness to Being, as we have seen. It may be the natural facility of thinking of God, which God, has granted to man from the very beginning of human history, that facilitates his approach to God through reflective thinking. Man can arrive at the knowledge of a personal God by his reasoning. Actually, this knowledge may be pre-influenced by his traditional idea of God. So God is accessible by reason alone. This may be in some way, perhaps founded in an original revelation, influenced by the idea of God he already possesses. Metaphysics, is therefore ontotheological in character. It begins as ontology but ends as ontotheology. Ontology, when it turns to be ontotheology, passing through its existing ground arrives at its subsisting ground, which is the ultimate ground of metaphysics.

4.5. HEIDEGGER'S CRAFTSMANSHIP

Martin Heidegger in Being and Time, seems to offer the best access to the practical implications of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. To some readers of Heidegger's early works the
notion of authenticity implies an existentialist theory of action, with its emphasis upon choice and commitment. Heidegger's notion of authenticity offers a theory of engagement at all. The figure of the craftsman and the issue of authenticity are usually examined by Heidegger in isolation from each other, but where we look at how both issues, we notice that the two are often incompatible.

In Being and Time, Heidegger is discussing the nature of the world and the things within the world. Within these early sections of the book, the craftsman's use of a hammer has several significances one of which is to highlight the fact that Dasein is a being-in-the-world. Dasein can appreciate the contextual or worldly nature of a hammer only if it is intimately familiar with the way the hammer functions in relation to other tools. Heidegger has chosen the example of a Dasein that acts rather than one that contemplates an object in order to show that a tool is most truly itself. Heidegger's concept of world even though does not into restrict worldhood to any one type of world.

Heidegger defines worldhood in terms of the totality of references and involvements of useful or ready-to-hand things, he has in mind the pragmatic example of the craftsman's tools. In other
words, the concept of world in *Being and Time* is understood primarily in instrumental terms. For it is the references and involvements of tools which define the significance of the world, provided of course that tool is understood in the broader sense of equipment, as Heidegger uses the term. Heidegger has chosen to illustrate being-in-the-world with a craftsman rather than the examples of an artist or a moral actor, given the priority of his concept of world places on the use of things.\(^4^2\) He did not choose the example of an artist or a moral actor in *Being and Time*, because neither of these activities are concerned with the world exclusively in terms of objects of use.

If Heidegger’s conception of world in *Being and Time*, learns strongly toward the activity of using things, this is understandable that he seeks to overcome a philosophical tradition which views man as a subject insolation from things and which views these things as mere things. By focusing on the example of the craftsman, Heidegger can show a thing is not a mere thing standing in opposition to a subject but is first and for the most part something tangible that we put to use. The emphasis Heidegger puts on the use of it is in short, a very effective way of disputing the Cartesian distinction between subject and object.
We exclusively concentrate on Heidegger's structural analysis of human existence to the neglect of its ontological orientation. Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of human existence is oriented towards a science of Being or ontology. At the every outset of his treatise, *Being and Time* Heidegger states that the main purpose of his enquiry is to raise a new question of the meaning of Being, and to reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question.43

The purpose of enquiry according to Heidegger, sees purely intellectual, insofar as his enquiry merely aims at the understanding of Being. But on closer examination it can be shown that Heidegger's purpose is no less practical than intellectual. For, throughout his philosophy, Heidegger makes a distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence, and one of the definitions of authentic existence is that it consist in the cultivation of the awareness of Being as distinguished from the nothingness which seems to pervade the world of objects, and the consequent realization of freedom from erring and misery in life.

Heidegger's method is phenomenological in as much as he seeks to analyse the structure of human existence as disclosed in the concrete lived experience of the individual, but this analysis
is only preliminary to the individual preliminary to the understanding of Being in his philosophy. Since he reaches out to his conception of Being through the emotive concepts of dread and nothingness as disclosed in the structured analysis of human existence. Heidegger justifies his approach to Being through an analysis of human existence by pointing out that human existence unlike the other entities in the world is a unique kind of being. For, it provides us with a mode of being which we can understand from within in a manner in which we can understand no other entity, and hence serves as the best medium through which the meaning of Being can be grasped. Thus it may be broadly said that Heidegger's method is phenomenological.

Heidegger lays stress on the fallenness of human existence and plead for the necessity of freedom from there of, this freedom consists in an act of self-transcendence towards Being and both regard this transcendence as an experiential act. Heidegger works out in detail the psychological process of transcendence through the analysis of structural moods such as care, dread, nothingness and Being. Heidegger points out that we always discover man as being-in-the-world but his 'inness' is not mere spatial inness he is in the world not as thing are spatially in the world but as concernfully dealing with the world. Man can thus
be defined as concern, and his concern is always with the world and with himself as being in it.

Heidegger also points out that the empirical self is not locked up in a body but always stands out, so as to disclosed close the world within it. The self in this sense is being there (Dasein) in the world and its thereness implies its openness of being in which the world comes to be disclosed. The relation between the self and the world is thus structural since the world is what is disclosed in the self and the self is the disclosedness of the world.44

It follows that there can be no self without the world and no world without the self.45 The structural unity between them is what is expressed in the phrase being-in-the-world, and this structural unity is apriori in the sense that it is primordially and constantly a whole as disclosed in the phenomenological analysis of concrete experience and not placed together by means of conceptual analysis.46 Heidegger works out in great detail the theme of human existence as temporality and lays stress on the structural mode of human existence as and of itself towards death. Man is never a static being but is constantly ‘drifting’ and he is drifting towards death. Death is not an accident which cuts short human life at a point in time, but is the structural pontentiality of
human existence. Man is cast into death since his birth and is capable of anticipating it as the most personal, unshareable, inevitable termination of his present life. Death turns a man’s existence into the mode no longer being-in-the-world and disrelates him from all that is in the world. The anticipatory conception of this disrelationship to the world introduces into life, according to Heidegger, a sense of nothingness or worthlessness of human worldly persuits and possessions even while they still exist as options and actualities. Heidegger thus emphasises the need for a revelation or devaluation of all that is on the part of man from the standpoint of one’s own temporality and death.

The mood which discloses the nothingness or worthlessness of all that is called dread in Heideggerian’s philosophy. Dread is not mere fear which has an external cause and can be overcome with the removable of that cause, but is a primordial mood which pertains to man’s being-in-the-world as such discloses the void which is present all through it, what matters in dread is not the presence or absence of things or possessions but their utter lack of value, it is the oppressive feeling in which the whole world seem to slide away from one’s own being, leaving behind a sense of void.
Dread usually announces itself not as that which we face but as that from which we free. Man’s constant flight from the dread of his own being-in-the-world results in his fallenness or inauthentic existence whereas facing it marks the beginning of his authentic existence. Heidegger insists that man should not be misled by the apparent permanence of worldly possessions or succumb to their temptations, but should be aware of their basic transitoriness and act or live in the world with that awareness. This is authentic existence, in the sense that it expresses man’s freedom from the deceptiveness of the world, and an act performed at this level, of existence can only be disinterested or unselfish, since selfishness or attachment always springs from mistaking the transistory for the enduring.

For Heidegger, human existence begins in birth and ends in death. Man’s existence in this sense is finite and there is nothing for him beyond death. His phenomenological analysis of human existence excludes from its scope the postulates of soul and rebirth, and he finds no need for them either in explaining the structure of man’s empirical existence or in emphasizing the need for his authentic existence.

Heidegger believes in the oneness of Being as distinguished from the distinct entities disclosed in our concernful dealing with
Being, he affirms is not a bare general concept which we intellectually derive from our distinct perceptions of the particular entities, nor is it a mere totality of such entities, but it is the indeterminate immediate reality of which we are certain, and which is the ground of all that is and determines all that is to be what it is.

According to Heidegger, the basic error which consists in the concealment of Being it structurally constitutive of man’s being-in-the-world and basically underlies his knowledge of the world. Heidegger points out that it is not necessary that man should rest contented with his state of ontological error or misery, but he can rise above it or become free from it. This implies Heidegger’s conception of authentic existence or transcendence which man can achieve in his own life. This transcendence he believes will not come as a result of his intellectual activity, but as a matter of his subjective encounter with Being.

For Heidegger, there is no contradiction in affirming that nothingness is the medium through which Being can be encountered. Nothingness and Being are thus integral to each other, and in order to emphasis the integral relation between them. Heidegger goes to the extent saying that Being and nothingness are one. This identity should not, however, Heidegger takes to man the denial of
Being but the nihilation of nothingness in Being which, according to Heidegger occurs when man reaches out to Being through nothingness.
NOTES AND REFERENCES


5. Ibid., P.518

6. Ibid., P.518


8. Ibid., P.100


10. Ibid., P.522

12. Ibid., P.215

13. Ibid., P.222


15. Hermeneutics circle means it is a methological device in interpretation which considers a whole is in relation to its parts, and vice versa.


17. Ibid., P.179


19. Ibid., P.16


26. Here transcendence means beyond what is given to our experience.


32. *Ibid.*, P. 103

33. *Ibid.*, P.103

34. *Ibid.*, P.105

35. *Ibid.*, P.104

37. *Ibid.*, P.102


40. *Ibid.*, P.159


45. *Ibid.*, P.92, The world is not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein essentially is not, it is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself.

46. *Ibid.*, P.65

47. *Ibid.*, P.231

48. The world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety