PREFACE

War, which is violence when deliberate, organised, is an activity unique to homo sapiens. Only unique but also a typical activity of that resorts to violence not only for reasons of selection - an instinct which is common to all living - but rather uses this organised form of violence for his self-aggrandisement; and the ingenuity of his over the ages has turned this activity into a mutation in our contemporary society.

The new forms of war like the cold war, peace, combatants and civilians and have made sovereignty and national boundaries relatively war today continues to be fought even during the and often it is the 'balance of terror' which peace. Nations have developed the technologies and assiduously that today sitting 'overkill' capacity that can human and several times over, we find ourselves devoid of threats and enemies against whom we can use these war machines of ours.
No doubt limitation in warfare had always been impressed upon on the grounds of morality and by other limitations of resources and technology. However, with the advent of nuclear weapons on the one hand and of irreconcilable ideologies on the other, limitation in warfare has come to be a matter of necessity if the war has to sustain its traditional role of being an instrument of politics. And it is here that the strategy of limited war which seeks to preserve the eternal values of 'primacy of politics' and 'economy of force' even in the nuclear age has come to be of supreme importance.

The concept of limited war in the nuclear age does not include in its fold those wars which are fought exclusively amongst smaller powers and consequently are limited to a given locale, involve only a limited number of targets and weapons, and cause only a limited destruction - what nuclear strategists describe as 'local wars'. Instead limited wars are those conflicts in which the vital interests of the nuclear powers are directly or indirectly involved and in which therefore the threat of their expansion into a total war remains omnipresent and imminent. Accordingly, it is this 'massive and deliberate' hobbling of their infinite power by nuclear weapon powers that qualifies a certain conflict as limited war.
In the context of cold war era, when almost every conflict was bound to attract their attention, no one could have been more involved in the evolution of limited war strategies and in preserving the sanctity of this concept, than the then two super powers. However, being the first one to develop and use nuclear weapons and being the leader in fields of nuclear technology and strategy as also being a democratic society, the debates on limited war have been much more open and thorough in case of the United States. And now with the collapse of Soviet Union, it remains particularly the responsibility of the United States to ensure that the conflicts that involve dangers of exploding into general nuclear war must not expand and should be fought essentially within the parameters of limited war. Especially in the present context with the spate of revelations about the failure of nuclear non-proliferation regimes the significance of limited war theories and doctrines, particularly those of the United States, has sharply increased. And there is a great necessity today for scholars in countries like India - which have kept their nuclear option open - to learn and closely follow developments in the field of nuclear strategy and war fighting doctrines of the United States which has clearly emerged as the sole nuclear superpower of this post-cold war era.
The completion of this thesis, no doubt, like for any other scholar, is a matter of great satisfaction to me; it also provides me with an opportunity to express my impression that no such project can perhaps be completed without active support of one's well-wishers or in absence of favourable circumstances. It, of course, also brings an opportunity for me to express my gratitude to at least few of these. Much of the credit for my having located an appropriate subject, for having evolved the right framework for study and for having carried my research on the right track goes to Professor M. Zuberi, without whose patient guidance and scholarly companionship this unwieldly subject and the cumbersome profession of research could not have become so interesting for me. I remain equally indebted to Professor T.T. Poulose whose discussions on arms control and disarmament during our M.Phil. courses and the continued relationship ever since has been greatly responsible for crystalizing my understanding and moulding my interest towards the field of nuclear strategy. I am also grateful to Professor Eliot A. Cohen, Director, Strategic Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University for his suggestions, and for arranging my meetings with other scholars while I was in Washington. I would
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Much of my work was, of course, done in the libraries of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, the American Centre Library, the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, and the Institute of Defence Studies & Analysis and I feel deeply obliged to express my thanks for the cooperation that was extended to me by the staff of these libraries. Thanks are also due to Robert T. Tanner of Library of Congress, and to Janis A. Kreslings of the Council on Foreign Relations (New York) for their cooperation in enabling me to make optimum use of my limited stay in those two cities. Back home the circle of friends was, of course, greatly responsible for sustaining me in my research. And here names of Dr. Ronki Sahara, D. Shyam Babu, Sadr-ul-Haque, and Dr. Deepak Gos-
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