CHAPTER - III

SARTRE’S CONTRIBUTION TO PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Introduction

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) was one of the most influential French Philosophers of twentieth century. He is known for his existential phenomenology. He is a major thinker of existentialism. For Sartre, ‘existence precedes essence’. This slogan sums the existentialism. In other words, that we are is prior to what we are. He is identified with the atheistic existentialism and humanism. He was a political activist and an epitome of what he himself called an ‘engaged’ or ‘committed thinker’. He has opposed the complacency, sham and hypocrisy of contemporary western society. Apart from his contribution to philosophy, he is also popular through his literary writings. Sartre’s emphasis is on human existence rather looking for the essence of human being. He is critical about theories of human nature and objective knowledge derived out of human nature. Sartre believes that man is nothing else but what he makes of himself. This is treated as the first principle of existentialism.\(^1\) He argues that man is responsible for what he is and to make the full responsibility of his existence rest on him. And when we say that a man is responsible for himself, it means he is responsible for his own individuality but also responsible for all others. Sartre developed an ontological account of what it is to be human with the phenomenological methods. The main features of this ontology are the groundlessness and radical freedom which characterize the human condition. For him, man is a subject not an object. He believes that meaning of life is constantly being created but not discovered. For Sartre, there are no readymade and objective norms to guide our lives and to give them meaning. There are only our personal commitments. For him, values are given neither in God’s commandments nor (as in Mill) in the empirical nor (as in Kant) in the a priori nature of man. Sartre wants to make a totally new start. Man has no nature or if you prefer man’s nature is his freedom that is his open-

---

endedness.\textsuperscript{2} For Sartre, there are no norms of conduct other than our truthfulness and consistency. He maintains that values and norms are created by our own choices.

While studying at the French Institute in Berlin he encountered phenomenology in 1933 and wrote *The Transcendence of the Ego*. His phenomenological investigation into the imagination was published in 1936 and his *Theory of Emotions* two years later. Sartre wrote his existentialist magnum opus *Being and Nothingness* during the Second World War and published in 1943. His *Existentialism and Humanism* was published in 1946. Sartre also had an abundant literary output with such novels as *Nausea*, *The Age of Reason* and plays like *Intimacy (The wall)*, *The Flies* and *No Exist*. In 1960, after three years working on it, Sartre published the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. In the Fifties and Sixties, Sartre was involved in promoting Marxist ideas. In 1964, he turned down the Nobel Prize for literature as his opposition to capitalism. His *The Family Idiot* was published in 1971. In 1977, he claimed no longer to be a Marxist, but his political activity continued until his death in 1980.

Sartre’s *The Family Idiot* is a logical outgrowth of his search for a method to understand human beings. According to him, it is not only enough to philosophize about human beings for understanding human beings rather one must find a method of studying human existence. Therefore Sartre’s psychological analysis directly follows from his existential approach and his attempt to find an appropriate method for studying people. Sartre’s existential phenomenology highlights the significance of existential predicaments of human beings. Freedom being the centre to his philosophy, he tries to understand human predicaments from the perspective of human being is freedom. He further touches the psychological aspects of human existence through his elucidation of emotion in general and anguish, shame, despair and forlornness in particular. He further tries to redeem imagination from the impoverishment in the hands of psychologists and philosophers. He emphasizes that the human behaviour is conscious and willful act. Human behaviour is volunteer action of an individual. It is the replica of the individual’s own decisions and choices. He came a conclusion that stimulus response pattern of

understanding human behaviour as done in many of the modern psychology is not appropriate.\(^3\)

Though Sartre’s writings are primarily philosophical in nature, but had significant implications for psychology. In fact, he approached the problems of psychology from his philosophical perspective. His phenomenological psychology has reoriented the modern psychology. Sartre finds that human science is not given due importance, even psychology is considered to be nothing more than mere study of human behaviour. But to have a comprehensive understanding of behaviour, it is necessary to analyse the interaction between agent and world, subject and situation, and on the one side of the subject further distinction has to be made between merely bodily reactions, behaviour properly speaking and the states of consciousness that accompany them. Sartre points out in tune with Husserl that the traditional psychology dealt with the psychic state as though it simply existed as such, without signifying anything but the virtue of phenomenology is to realize that all human phenomena are significant.\(^4\)

Sartre’s phenomenological psychology holds that human being as a unified whole expresses one’s choice in every aspect of one’s behavioural act. The analysis of one’s behavioural acts should reveal what is one’s original choice. This chapter deals about Sartre’s contribution to phenomenological psychology and its importance in the field of psychology. Sartre maintains a position that every act of human behaviour is a conscious act. It is a voluntary action of an individual and a reflection of the individual’s own decisions and choices. Therefore he argues that the stimulus response pattern of understanding human behaviour as done by many thinkers of the modern psychology is not appropriate.

Sartre’s phenomenological understanding of human behaviour explained by the concepts of emotion and imagination. He elaborates further by explaining the human existence in a situation against freedom and responsibility of the individual. In this connection, Sartre explains anguish, despair and shame and Bad Faith and argues for


authentic human existence. Further he explains that freedom makes a person to authentic. Freedom is a unique quest which lies in working out the demands of one’s inner self and impressing one’s genuine or authentic self. Freedom means facing conflicting choices, making decisions and accepting them. Sartre maintains that to be authentic is to embrace our existence as an open-ended field of multiple possibilities of self-identity from which we choose.

**Sartre’s Understanding of Human Existence**

Sartre’s understanding of human existence is based on his existential philosophy. According to existentialists, man first exists and then seeks to acquire an ‘essence’ for himself. This is what Sartre means “existence precedes essence”. Sartre came up with a novel conception of human and new outlook by making human existence as the real frame of reference. His existential phenomenology is a study of the basic structures of human experience. The human individual will not be anything unless and until one will be what one makes of one self. He also shared the same idea as Heidegger that traditional metaphysics was impoverished by leaving out the full range of our experiences of the ‘world’ around us. So he wanted to focus more on human situations, the concerns of human living, emotions, values, etc. He holds that every truth and every action implies a human setting and a human subjectivity.⁵ According to Sartre, human being is the foundation of all thought and action. He holds that human first of all exists, encounters oneself, surges up in the world and consequently defines the self. The emphasis of the existentialists on personal existence and subjectivity has led to new dimensions of human’s freedom and responsibility.

According to the existentialist thinkers determinism, whether genetic, social or environmental, does not offer adequate explanation of human’s inner potentialities and capabilities. Existentialists hold that each human being is unique and reveal one’s inner potentialities and creative skills only because of one’s freedom. First of all, human exists in the world and with the utmost freedom, he or she creates himself or herself through each and every actions. A person is the maker of himself or herself. Human being is the

project which possesses subjective life and apart from this projection of self, nothing exists. And therefore each one has to complete the project in and through one’s freedom. Hence there comes responsibility for whatever one does and, in this way, the whole responsibility of one’s action falls on one’s own shoulders. As Sartre states in *Being and Nothingness*, “man is being condemned to be free carries the weight of the whole world on his shoulders; he is responsible for the world and for himself as a way of being.”

In Sartre’s understanding of human experience, consciousness of individual plays a vital role. Sartre holds that consciousness cannot exist merely by itself. Consciousness always involves some object. In other words, consciousness is always the consciousness of something. To be conscious of something is to be aware of being conscious of something. In this sense, the human consciousness can never become its own object. The object of consciousness is what it is; wholly there, totally given, without any separation from itself. Each human experience has the dual aspect: on the one side there is consciousness and on the other side an object. Without the object no experience can be materialized. At the same time, the nature of consciousness is different from the object. The consciousness is unstable. It is always fleeting. It has no permanency. It is fluid, non-self-identical and dynamic in character. Consciousness is not itself a something. It is not complete and self-contained the way that being-in-itself is, we are always conscious of something else. We are conscious of a certain fact, of a certain emotion, of a certain object, of a certain desire, of a certain value, etc. It is through constant choices we direct our consciousness. We also define and determine the nature of our consciousness. Consciousness is a mere possibility whereas matter is an actuality. For Sartre, consciousness has no ‘essence in itself and it is inheritable ‘nothing’, ‘lack of being’. ‘Being-for-itself’ is embodied human consciousness. Sartre differentiates being-for-itself from being-in-itself. Being-in-itself is viewed as solid, self-identical, passive and inert. However, both are mutually exclusive in character yet human beings combine them together. Sartre holds that man is most inexplicable among the beings in the world because of his consciousness. The human mind just finds itself in a certain situation, that is, it finds itself existing. But what the human mind is ‘is of its own choosing’. The mind

---

6 Ibid., p.553.
7 Ibid., pp.79-83.
is consciousness, but consciousness is ‘nothingness’, a space or void for other things to enter. Sartre is further critical about the human nature and human essence as such. He argues that the nature human is essence is created by one’s own existence.

According to Sartre human beings are what one makes of oneself. Human being is always surrounded by a ‘situation’. He holds that there is only one being whose existence comes before its essence and that being is ‘human’. Human is indefinable, because to begin with human is nothing. According to Sartre, there is no human nature. Sartre’s phenomenology of human nature replaces traditional philosophical arguments. The traditional philosophers from Plato to Kant had taught that essence preceded our existence. In other words, it means we are predetermined to be what we are by some ‘innate’ are ‘a priori’ principle such as God, Nature or Reason. Sartre explains human subjectivity from atheistic point of view. He made human beings totally responsible for their acts.

According to Sartre, freedom is the very essence of human being. Freedom is not a mode but it is the existence. Freedom is extension of the notion of consciousness. Freedom makes a person to be authentic. He talks of freedom in the context where human being condemned being free.

**Sartre’s Phenomenological Psychology**

Sartre developed his scheme of phenomenological psychology based on his philosophy of human subjectivity. In exploring this scheme, he is critical about the traditional theories of psychology in understanding human personality and his / her behaviour. His approach of phenomenological psychology has explained through the concepts of emotion and imagination. He provides a new meaning to these concepts against traditional theories of psychology. According to Sartre, emotional consciousness is primarily consciousness of the world.\(^8\) He further emphasises that emotion is an organized form of human existence. In other words, it is an organized system of means towards an end. Sartre upholds that

emotions are certain way of apprehending the world.⁹ Emotion is behaviour or a kind of conduct which refers to our position in a world as a whole. It has its own teleological structure and it is not simply a meaningless by product of our normal rational level. Sartre views that emotions are strategies one employs to avoid action, to avoid responsibility, to ‘flee from freedom.’ Emotions are strategies for avoiding facing up to oneself and one’s situation which has become the prototype for the notion of ‘Bad Faith.’¹⁰

The predicament of human being is based on one’s own imagination. Imagination is a condition for what it is to be human and how human should live. The philosophers have been concerned with imagination as whether one can or cannot easily detach oneself from the concrete world of facts and experience. For them, imagination is mainly a faculty for producing mental images. This image is given the status of a thing. It is the copy of the original or it is lesser version of it. The classical theorists held the view that imagination and sensation are two species of the same genus, but among them, the latter is more vivid and immediate.

According to Sartre, ‘every image is an image of something.’ The image is in fact a vehicle of intentionality. It is a mediated relation between consciousness and its object. The image is not the thing, nor is it in any way thing like rather it refers to the thing or stands for it in an experience that is structurally similar to but ontologically distinct from the experience of the thing itself. Sartre holds that there is no thing as an image in imagination. The first difference between perception and imagination is not the presence or absence of image but a different way of referring to the intentional object of our consciousness. There is no difference in imaged object or perceived object but the difference is on the side of the imaging act. The image is a constructive element of consciousness; it is one of the ways in which consciousness ‘intends’ the thing. He says that it posits its object to be either as non-existent or as absent or as elsewhere. In other words, imaging consciousness posits its object as nothingness as imaginative.¹¹

---

⁹ Ibid., p.57.
¹⁰ Ibid., p.3.
In course of developing his theory of phenomenological psychology, Sartre is critical about other prominent theories of psychology. Especially, Sartre is dissatisfied with the methods applied by empirical psychology in understanding human existence. Empirical psychology defines human beings based on their desire. According to Sartre, empirical psychology by defining human beings based on their desire commits the error of remaining the victim of illusion of substance and also the error of considering psychological research as terminated as soon as the investigator has reached the concrete ensemble of empirical desires. Thus man would be defined by bundle of derives or tendencies which empirical observation could establish.\(^\text{12}\) He is also critical about psychoanalytic theory of Freud in understanding human behavior and proposes his own theory of existential psychoanalysis. The purpose of Freudian psychoanalysis is to determine the unconscious desire behind the behaviour. Whereas the purpose of Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis is to determine the original choice that stimulates the behavior.\(^\text{13}\) Sartre’s reaction against Freud can be viewed as reaction against ‘essentialism’ or ‘universalism’. Sartre emphasizes that it is through our consciousness and imagination that we are able to make of ourselves what we are not; this is our human freedom and it is a choice.\(^\text{14}\)

**Sartre’s Conception of Emotion**

Sartre’s exploration of emotion in phenomenological manner reveals that they are significant factor in determining an individual’s personality. He explained his theory of emotion in *Sketch for a Theory of The Emotions*. In this work, he formulated his own theory by critically evaluating other theories of emotion.

Emotion plays an important role in defining the human existence. Emotion motivates one’s own moral behaviour. Emotion affects the basic processes of perception and influence the way humans conceive and interpret the world around him or her. Emotions shape the human personality. Emotions are central issues of human survival and adaptation. The subject of emotion is studied from a wide range of views.


\(^{13}\) Ibid., p.570.

Behaviourally oriented neuroscientists study the neurophysiology and neuroanatomy of emotions and the relations between neural processes and the expression and experience of emotion. Social psychologists and cultural anthropologists study similarities and differences among cultures by the way emotions are expressed and conceptualized. Novelists, playwrights, and poets are interested in emotions as the motivations and defining features of fictional characters and as vehicles for communicating the meaning and significance of events. Philosophers are interested in the role of emotions in rationality, thought, character development and values. Psychologists have found a comprehensive definition of emotion; their general agreement is that the emotions are entailed to varying in degrees due to awareness of one's environment or situation, bodily reactions, and approach or withdrawal behaviour.¹⁵

For psychologists, emotions are “feelings that generally have both physiological and cognitive elements and that influence behaviour.”¹⁶ Psychologists have proposed different theories of emotion based on their understanding of human existence. James-Lange’s theory, Canon-Bard’s theory and Schachter-Singer theory are prominent theories of emotion. James-Lange theory firmly links mental states to physiological processes: it holds that an emotion is a perception of phenomena within the body. For example, when a person sees a frightening sight, the body immediately responds in certain ways. In other words, this theory proposes that we experience emotions as a result of physiological changes that produce specific sensations. In turn these sensations are interpreted by the brain as particular kinds of emotional experiences.¹⁷ According to Cannon-Bard theory, both physiological arousal and the emotional experience are produced simultaneously by the same nerve impulse.¹⁸ Schachter-Singer theory maintains that the emotion that is experienced is due to our interpretation of an arousal or stirred up bodily state.¹⁹ There are other theories like cognitive appraisal theory of emotion of Richard-Lazarus and descriptive theory of Robert Plutchik. The cognitive appraisal theory holds that felt emotion results from appraisal or evaluation of information about the environmental and

¹⁶ Ibid., p.303.
¹⁷ Ibid., p.306.
¹⁹ Ibid., pp.307-308.
the state of the body. The descriptive theory maintains that the primary emotions are derived from evolutionary process and therefore have adaptive value. They can be arranged in orderly way to bring out relationships, similarities and differences among them.\textsuperscript{20}

The common point which all these theories express is that emotion is mere physiological reaction to the stimuli. Sartre criticizes William James, Pierre Janet, Tamara Dembo and psychoanalytic theory of emotion for not taking consciousness into consideration in explaining emotion. Classical theories of James, Janet and Dembo hold that emotions are nothing but the mechanical projections of physiological events into consciousness. For Sartre, emotion is an organized system of means towards an end. He agrees with psychoanalysts’ introduction of the idea of ‘purposiveness’ into the interpretation of the emotions. However, in subscribing to the conception of the subconscious they continue to combine it with them mechanistic constructs which Sartre considered incompatible with the idea of functional purpose. Sartre’s aim was to remodel the hypothesis of the unconscious with the conception of prereflective consciousness in such a way that he could account even for the irrationality of our emotional life.\textsuperscript{21} He further refutes various psychoanalytic theories for their emphasis on unconscious aspect as driving force to measure human behaviour. He proposes his own phenomenological theory of emotion, in which his focus is on the way emotions alter our experience of the surrounding world. He is more concerned with the significance of the emotions than the essence of it. For him, emotions are ‘a certain way of apprehending the world.’\textsuperscript{22} Emotion is behaviour in the sense of a kind of conduct which refers to our position in the world as a whole. It has a teleological structure and is not simply a meaningless by-product of our normal rational life. Sartre argues that we are responsible for everything we do and everything we are and it includes our emotions. He views that emotions are strategies one employs to avoid action, to avoid responsibility, to ‘flee from freedom.’ He also holds

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., pp.273-278.
that emotions are strategies for avoiding facing up to oneself and one’s situation which has become the prototype for the notion of ‘Bad Faith.’

William James’ theory of emotion is known as theory of peripheric holds that emotion is the consciousness of physiological changes. For James, there are two phenomena in emotion, they are physiological phenomena and psychological phenomena or ‘state of consciousness’. For him, the psychological phenomena or state of consciousness is nothing but the consciousness of physiological manifestations. James states, “we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble.” According to James, the sadness is caused by the tears, is the state of physiological disturbance. In other words, emotional experience is a reaction to bodily events occurring as a result of an external situation. Sartre criticizes James for his inadequacy in distinguishing one emotion from another and its failure to account for plain facts, such as the subtler emotions, passive enjoyment and it fails to show that organic reactions suffice to render an account of distinct psychic states. As Sartre argues that the critics have examined the state of consciousness, emotion and the accompanying physiological manifestations. It has not been found that the former is the projection by the latter. So there is something else. Sartre says:

Something else; for, in effect, and even if the emotion objectively perceived presented itself as a physiological disorder, as a fact of consciousness it is neither disorder nor chaos pure and simple, it has a meaning, it signifies something.

It is clear that emotion is a not only a pure quality and it also gives a certain relation between our psychic being and the world; and this relation or awareness of it is not a

---

chaotic relationship between the self and the universe. It is an organized and describable structure.\textsuperscript{27}

Another psychologist, Janet holds that emotion is a twofold kind of behaviour, consisting both of mental and physical phenomena. He defined emotion as the behaviour of defeat.\textsuperscript{28} Janet holds that when faced with difficult situation a subject has to respond with ‘superior behaviour’ that is appropriate to that situation, but the subject has to face the heat of psychological tension. Alternatively, the subject may be seen to respond with inferior behaviour that avoids or diminishes the difficulty of the situation with the behaviour of less appropriate to the situation. In this way, the subject lowers the psychological tension. Sartre comments:

When the task is too difficult and we cannot maintain the better behaviour appropriate to it, the psychic energy that has been released expends itself along another path; we adopt an inferior behaviour which necessitates a lesser psychological tension.\textsuperscript{29}

Janet believes that when an individual face the difficulty the ‘setback’ behaviour will be automatically replaced by the ‘superior behaviour’. It would mean that the instating emotion is a matter of reflex, and makes the subject a passive sufferer of emotion. Janet’s theory of emotion viewed as a kind of degradation or an inferior form behaviour that arises from a setback, that is, an obstacle that prevents or frustrates the achievement of a goal. Though Sartre adopts Janet’s notion of emotion as arising in the face of a ‘setback’ but he is strongly critical of Janet’s evaluation of emotion as an automatic mechanism. However, Sartre believes that Janet misses significance of his own insight that emotion is ‘setback’ behaviour. By denying any role in emotion to an evaluating consciousness, for which behaviour can be superior or inferior, the idea of

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p.34.  
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p.37.  
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., p.35.
emotional behaviour as setback behaviour becomes incomprehensible. Sartre claims that Janet’s theory of emotion lacks an account of the finality, that is, the goal oriented nature of emotion. He criticizes Janet for his illegitimate introduction of the concept of finality or purposiveness. According to Sartre, Janet has not introduced consciousness or awareness of any kind hence there is no logic in introducing purposiveness. The mental element which Janet speaks of is as in the peripheric theory so it does not come close to consciousness. While for Janet emotional behaviour is a disorder that arises automatically when superior behaviour becomes difficult whereas for Sartre, emotional behaviour is not a disorder at all. It is an organised system of means aiming at an end.

Sartre critically evaluates Dembo’s theory of emotion and discusses the limitations of this theory. According to Dembo, anger is the alternative way out of difficulty when all other ways are blocked. Anger is the restoration of frustration. It is the same with all emotions. It is essentially inferior way out or a means towards an end. In the moment of frustration, we become less critical of ourselves and use the means which we should have rejected. Sartre feels that this model is perfect but still insufficient for there could be no change from one (superior) form of behaviour to another (inferior) form of behaviour without consciousness. The emotional behaviour theory is perfect but in its purity and perfection we can see its insufficiency. Consciousness alone by its synthetic activity can break up and reconstitute forms without ceasing. It alone can render an account of the finality of emotion. Dembo also shows the emotion aims to transform the aspect of the world. It serves to weaken the barriers between the real and the unreal, to destroy the differentiated structure that the problem has imposed upon to the self arises, the psychology of form fail to provide an adequate answer. So it is clear that we must have recourse to the consciousness. Sartre has shown that the physiological theory of James with its insufficiency has led us to Janet’s theory of behaviour, then the latter to the theory of functional emotion in the form-psychology, and this leads us to the consciousness. But this is supposed to be the starting point. So Sartre holds that emotion

---

31 Ibid., p.69.
can be described only in cognitive terms or in terms of consciousness. Thus James, Janet and Dembo have moved away in their conclusion of emotion.  

Psychoanalytic theory is another prominent theory that deals about emotion and its role in human behaviour. As per the psychoanalytic theory, anger or fear are means employed by unconscious urges to achieve symbolic satisfaction, to break out of a state of unbearable tension. Sartre attempts to substitute his own theory of emotion instead of Freudian psychoanalytic theory or theory of unconsciousness. Sartre holds that any explanation of thought or dream or feeling must be sought within consciousness. Consciousness is not a thing, it is directed towards something, and it always means something. So an emotion which is part of my life means something by being directed towards some object of its own. Sartre attacked Freudians for overlooking the intentionality of mental events, and holding a view that there can be an inductively determined causal relation between dream and some external object, the connection is not know because it is made through subconsciousness. So the causal explanation of mental phenomena is not tenable. Sartre argues that emotion must be understood meaningfully with consciousness. It is consciousness which makes itself conscious, moved by the inner need for an inner signification. Sartre says:

\[
\text{a theory of consciousness which attributes meaningful character to the emotive facts must look for that meaning in the consciousness itself.}\]

Sartre proposes his own theory of emotion after evaluating all these theories of emotion. He explains his theory from a phenomenological point of view. Sartre maintains that emotion is a certain way of apprehending the world. Emotion has to be understood with its signification. This signification leads to analysis the finality of emotion because this finality is inherent in its structure. This finality can be grasped concretely by the objective examination of emotional behaviour. Simple consideration of the facts brings

33 Ibid., pp.47-48.  
34 Ibid., p.49.  
35 Ibid., p.54.  
36 Ibid., p.55.
us to an empirical intuition of the finalist meaning of emotion.\textsuperscript{37} He argues that emotions are conscious acts. They are result of frustration and constitute a ‘degraded form of consciousness’ an act of bad faith that tries to tamper with the world beyond one’s reach. As Sartre explains the subject who seeks the solution of a practical problem is outside in the world; he perceives the world every moment through his acts. If he fails in his attempts, he gets irritated; his very irritation is still a way in which the world appears to him. Phenomenological theory suggests that the affected subject and the affective object are bound in an indissoluble synthesis. In this backdrop, Sartre argues in favour of the authentic existence that faces the world is not only has to purify it but has to eliminate the emotions completely.\textsuperscript{38}

Emotion is a transformation of the world. The reason Sartre states:

When the paths before us becomes too difficult, or when we cannot see our way, we can no longer put up with such exacting and difficult world. All ways are barred and nevertheless we must act.\textsuperscript{39}

In other words, when there is no other way to act we force ourselves to act in particular pattern. So we try to change the world, that is, to live as if the connection between things and their potentialities were not ruled by deterministic processes, but by magic. The emotive behaviour is not on the same plane as the other behaviours; it is not effective. Its end is not really to act upon the object as such through the agency of particular means. It seeks by itself to confer upon the object, and without modifying it in its actual structure, another quality, a lesser existence, or a lesser presence or a greater existence, etc. In short, in emotion it is the body which, directed by consciousness, changes its relations with the world in order that the world may change its qualities.\textsuperscript{40}

Sartre holds that emotion is like any other mental acts, are directed towards an object. It is impossible to discuss emotion without both the subject and the object. The

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p.48.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p.65.
emotion is a specific manner of apprehending the world. According to phenomenological doctrine this manner of apprehending can be described in abstraction from its object, but it would not be a complete account. So to have a complete account of emotion, the conjunction of subject and object, the ‘indissoluble synthesis’ is needed. We see the world in certain manner, as demanding something from us, but there are obstacles in fulfilling the demands so we pretend to be get what we need by magic instead of the proper, natural means, although it is goal directed, is not actually something upon which, at the time, we are in position to reflect. It is not the object of consciousness. It is part of consciousness in the sense we have discussed; that is, it is an apprehending of the world, accompanied by the knowledge that we are apprehending the world in a certain way. The new apprehending of the world produces new behaviour, but ineffectual and would-be-magical behaviour. That is to say we aim to change the world, but if we cannot then we change ourselves. In extreme cases we may even faint, thus magically annihilating the world for ourselves by seeing our connection with it for the time being.  

Sartre states that the theory of emotion is both a priori and empirical. His theory starts from a concept of man as a being in the world with certain potentialities; but it has recourse to experience and observation. This is said to be partly descriptive and partly metaphysical. It is to show that he is not only concern with description or to define emotion, but to show that human beings are of such a kind that they must adopt the characteristics behaviour which is he ascribes to them. But it is not possible to propound a theory of human nature without taking into account the fact that human beings necessarily have some sort of cognitive relation to the world. The central doctrine of existentialism is that men are nothing except what they choose to become, their essence consist in what they choose to do. But it also consists in what they choose to know, under what aspect they choose to see the world. Emotion arises when they choose to see the world in a particular way, namely magical. It is an essential part of human nature to be capable of this.

In the words of Sartre:

Ibid., p.11.
"Emotion may be called sudden fall of consciousness into magic; or, if you will, emotion arises when the world of the utilizable vanishes abruptly and the world of magic appears in its place."\(^{42}\)

According to Sartre, emotion is not an accident, it is a mode of our conscious existence, one of the way in which consciousness understands its Being-in-the-World. Emotion is seen as a structure of consciousness. It is not a pure, ineffable quality rather it has meaning, it signifies something in individual’s psychic life. Sartre’s theory of emotion was an experiment of a phenomenological psychology. It is also a refutation of psychological theories which propose that emotion is a lawless disorder, possesses a signification of its own and that cannot be understood in itself without comprehension of this signification. For Sartre, emotion signifies the totality of the relation of the human reality of the world.\(^{43}\)

Sartre holds that emotions have meaning in the sense that they constitute purposive behaviour. In particular, they are not simply passive states but “spontaneous degradations of consciousness”, as such they are basically insincere and in ‘bad faith’. Through the emotions consciousness tries to reach its objective ‘magically’ in running away from reality. The liberation from such an attitude presupposes a ‘purifying reflection’ which is related to phenomenological reduction and which will reveal the bad faith of the emotions. It is clear that Sartre’s interest in the emotions is connected with his concern for freedom, in opposition to the theories which make man a slave of his emotions and acquit him of all responsibility for them.\(^{44}\)

**Sartre’s Phenomenology of Imagination**

On the other side, Sartre explains human existence from the concept of imagination. Like emotion, he treats imagination also a conscious and intentional act of the individual. Imagination often figures prominently in debates about possibility, in that what is

---

\(^{42}\) Ibid., p.12.
\(^{43}\) Ibid., pp.92-93.
imaginable is often taken to be coextensive with what is possible. Sartre gives much more attention to the problem of imagination both philosophical and psychological point of view.

The imagination is a classical problem of both in literature and philosophy and the standard doctrine of imaginary was the degraded form of the real. Hence Sartre attacked the traditional understanding of imagination. He tries to approach the problem of imagination from the point of view of consciousness. In the classical philosophical as well as in psychological theory, the image is given the status of a thing, an image is the copy of the original or it is lesser version of it. They held the view that imagination and sensation are two species of the same genus, but among them, the latter is more vivid and immediate. Unlike the sensation, the image is like an idea produced in perception in Spinoza’s stand point. In case of Leibniz, the image stands to the idea as opacity to clarity. The common view to be found in empiricism and rationalism is that the image serves as a representation of the object in the absence of immediate perception. But the difference between them lies in empiricists’ belief and rationalist denial that thought itself consists in images. To Locke and associationists, the ‘ideas’ are just images in this sense and for Hume, ideas are ‘weak perception.’ Taine reassembles the parts by ‘simple recomposition’ with his synthetic method. Ribot brought in a creative imagination as a reaction to Taine, his psychology of synthesis improved Taine’s simple recomposition by introducing evolutionary and functional considerations make no difference to their basic conception. Bergson’s philosophical revolution leaves the image in the same unsatisfactory state.  

In this context, Sartre noticed that the Wurzburg psychologists escape from this confusion and landed with Cartesian position. That is thought is independent of imagery, that latter in fact gets in the way. According to them, thought requires no intermediary in order to appear to itself that “thinking and to know that one is thinking are all one.” But Binet fell into contradiction by concluding that thought must be unconscious, image are

---

required again in order to bring it into consciousness. Hume was the one openly came up saying that by making images inert destroys the spontaneity of any thought that depends on them. But no one was willing to accept it. But again Alain who negated image by saying it as false perception and therefore it cannot play the role in thought. Sartre is clear that these kind of critical solutions will not change anything unless the starting point changes that is image is in consciousness.\textsuperscript{47}

Sartre has written two books on imagination, \textit{L'Imagination} largely critical survey of the preceding philosophical and psychological theories of the imagination, where Sartre tries to show the superiority of Husserl's new approach in the \textit{Ideas} and shortcomings in preceding philosophy and psychology. He also points out Husserl's incompleteness. Husserl makes distinction between perception and imagination, neither of them can be reduced to the other. Husserl's insight into the internal structure of the imagination is a remarkable, where the immanent imagining act and the transcendent imagined object are distinguished but these were over looked by the “immanentism” of the traditional theories.\textsuperscript{48}

The second book is \textit{The Psychology of Imagination}, where he tries to bring out his own positive phenomenology of imagination. Sartre starts with the description of imagination. So he introduces the method of proceeding, first to produce images then reflect upon them and describe them. He states that all new studies of the images should begin with describing the image and drawing conclusions regarding its nature. It is like passing from certainty to probability. Hence he recommends the prime duty of psychologist is to formulate concepts of the knowledge that is immediate and certain.\textsuperscript{49}

In \textit{Imagination: A Psychological Critique}, Sartre establishes, first, the indubitable psychic reality of the image and second, the impossibility of accounting for it as a sensible content of consciousness.\textsuperscript{50} The solution to the problem of the image lies in a rethinking of the nature of consciousness itself. If we take images as the reflection of

\textsuperscript{50} Op. cit., \textit{Sartre}, p.34.
thought and word for meaning, then what is that under lie these words and images that give substance to thought and meaning. But there is nothing under lies under the words, behind the images. Consciousness is the only deserve to be called spontaneous because it exist itself by itself and for itself. Consciousness thus appears for Sartre as a presuppositionless, absolute given, to which the image appears and it appears, not in the first instance as a thing, but precisely as an appearance. But then things also appear in the first instance as appearances. The location of the problem shifts, therefore, from the content of consciousness to its object.\textsuperscript{51}

Sartre brings in a dictum as Husserl that ‘every image is an image of something’ as every consciousness is consciousness of something. The image is in fact a vehicle for intentionality, in a mediated relation between a consciousness and its object as opposed to the immediate relation which is the grasping of the object in perception. The image is not the thing, nor is it in any way thing-like-rather it refers to the thing or stands for it in an experience that is structurally similar to but ontologically distinct from, the experience of the thing itself. The image is a constructive element of consciousness; it is one of the ways in which consciousness ‘intends’ the thing.\textsuperscript{52}

Sartre provides new meaning to the concept of imagination. He treats imagination is a conscious and spontaneous act. He further hold s that imagination is different from perception. He viewed that perception is a passive conscious act whereas imagination is an active conscious act. we depend on observation, but in case of imagination quasi observation.

\textbf{a. Imagination as Absence of Image}

Sartre makes clear that we had wrong understanding of image. He indentified errors on our reflection on image. The first is to think that the image is in consciousness and the second is that the object of the image is in the image. Sartre calls these errors as the illusion, where he draws a distinction between impressions and ideas:

\textsuperscript{51} Op. cit., \textit{Sartre}, p.34.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., pp.34-35.
“Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions… by ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning…”\(^{53}\)

According to Hume, these ideas are images, he further adds, our actual ideas of chair has but an extraneous relation to an existing chair. But it is not the chair of the external world, the chair we just perceived. He holds that the idea of chair and the chair as an idea are one and the same thing. To have an idea of chair is to have a chair in consciousness. Therefore what is true of the object is also true of the idea. Psychologists and philosophers are of the same view. It is also common sense to think that when we say that ‘we have an image’ of Peter, it is understood that certain picture of Peter is in our consciousness. Sartre says:

“If we accept the illusion of immanence, we are necessarily led to construct the world of the mind out of objects entirely like those of the external world, but which simply obey different laws.”\(^{54}\)

Sartre argues that one has to get rid of the illusion of immanence and see what reflection teaches us. “When I perceive a chair it is absurd to say that chair is in my perception since my perception is a certain consciousness and the chair is the object of that consciousness.”\(^{55}\) But the image of chair cannot enter into consciousness. That is an image of chair cannot be a chair. The chair always remains outside of consciousness. In case of my perception or in image the object are identical but the mode of relatedness to consciousness in perception whereas in image it is not so. The object is not in consciousness; not even as an image. The image is a relation of consciousness to the object; in other words, it means a certain manner in which the object makes its appearance to consciousness or a certain way in which consciousness presents an object to itself. The image is an imaginative consciousness. It is a relationship.\(^{56}\) Hence Sartre

\(^{54}\) Ibid., p.6.  
\(^{55}\) Ibid., p.6.  
\(^{56}\) Ibid., pp.6-7.
holds that there is no thing as an image in imagination. The first difference between perception and imagination is not the presence or absence of image but a different way of referring to the intentional object of our consciousness. There is no essential difference in imaged object and perceived object but the difference is on the side of the imaging act.\footnote{Op. cit., \textit{The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction}, p.518.}

b. The Phenomenon of Quasi Observation

To know about consciousness, we start examining image in its relationship to the concept and the percept. An object can be known in perception, conception and imagination. In perception, an object is observed and that object enters ones perception in its completeness though one can see it from one side at a time. Since one does not perceive all sides at same time, one side at a time the object is said to appear only in a series of profiles, of projections. Though the object one can see it or touch it, it always seen in certain fashion which includes and excludes at one and the same an infinity of other point of views. The object is synthesis of all the appearances. Therefore the perception of an object is thus a phenomenon of infinity of aspects. On the other hand, one think of an object as a concrete concept with its all possible in one stroke. This does not mean that one’s idea does not need to complete itself by an infinite progression. But one can think of the concrete essence in a single act of consciousness. This is the difference between thought and perception. This is the reason why one can never perceive a thought nor think a perception. These two phenomena are radically distinct; the first one is knowledge which is conscious of itself and which places itself at the centre of the object; the other is a synthetic unity of a multiplicity of appearances, which slowly serves its apprenticeship.\footnote{Op. cit., \textit{The Psychology of Imagination}, pp.8-9.}

In perception, knowledge forms itself slowly; in the image the knowledge is immediate. The image teaches nothing: it is organized exactly like the objects which do produce knowledge, but it is complete at the very moment of its appearance whereas in perception, everything has an infinite number of relationships as well as the infinite number of relationships between the elements of the thing which constitute the very
essence of a thing; whereas the elements of image have no relationship with the rest of
the world. While among themselves they have two or three relationships. The objects of
world of images can in no way exist in the world of perception.59

The second difference between imagination and perception concerns the way in
which we look at their objects. In case of perception, we depend on observation, but in
case of imagination quasi observation. While in the case of perception continued
observation can bring up constantly new items, no such enrichment can result from the
corresponding observation of the imagined object. It remains as rich or poor as our
original imagination was.60

c. The Object as Nothingness

All consciousness is consciousness of something. Non-reflective consciousness envisions
heterogeneous objects for consciousness: for example, the imaginative consciousness of
tree envisions a tree, that is, a body which is by nature external to consciousness;
consciousness raises out of itself transcends itself. The imaginative consciousness is
conscious by itself otherwise it would lead to contradiction. The transcendental
consciousness of tree as an image posits the tree. But it posits it as an image, that is, in a
manner which is not that of the perceptual consciousness.61

Every consciousness posits its object, but each does so in its own way, perception, for
instance posits objects in four ways, as non-existent, or as absent, or as existing
elsewhere or not posits its object as existing. This positional of absence or non-existence
can occur only on the level of quasi-observation.62 Hence the third difference is that there
is a lack in imaginative act in comparison to perceptive act.63

d. Spontaneity

59 Ibid., p.10.
62 Ibid., p.15.
A perceptual consciousness appears to itself as being passive whereas an imaginative consciousness presents itself to itself as an imaginative consciousness, that is, as a spontaneity which produces and holds on to the object as an image. This consciousness appears to itself as being creative, but without positing that what it has created is an object. It is due to this vagueness, it is like a wave among waves. It feels itself to be a consciousness through and through and one with the other consciousness which have proceeded it and with which it is synthetically united.64

So through reflection, we can bring about the certain things regarding image like its static nature. Image is not a condition, a solid and opaque residue, but a consciousness. But most psychologists believe that image is one element in an instantaneous synthesis, and each consciousness include or can include one or more images. So the role of image is said to find a place in a present consciousness of thought process where variety of objects found. In this sense, they argue that thought is supported by images. But the image is a consciousness which is sui generis, so it is in no way form a part of a large consciousness. Image is not contained in consciousness in addition to the thought, signs, feelings and sensations.

“The image consciousness is a synthetic form which appears like a certain moment of a temporal synthesis and organizes itself with other forms of consciousness which precedes and follows it, to make one continuous whole.” 65

The imaginative consciousness can be called representative in the sense it goes out in search of its object in the realm of perception and it sees the sensible element and they constitute this realm. The difference between this and perception is spontaneous and creativity, which is not found in perception. Perception is passive of consciousness. The flesh of the object is not the same in an image and in a perception.

65 Ibid., p.18.
e. Consciousness and Imagination

Sartre refers to the French psychologists of his time and points out that they have understood images like a type of existence strictly like that of things. They are copy of sensation which may differ in degree, in cohesion, in meaning from primary sensations, but which belongs, as do sensations, to the intra-mundane existence. The image is as real as any other existence. The problem is with regard to its relationship to other existence.66

Sartre tries to show that what must be the nature of a consciousness in order that it is able to successively posit real objects and imagined objects; since the existence of object of the image and object of perception are different. In perception, we perceive the beginnings and the endings of the hidden as being real. In this sense, to perceive this or that real datum is to perceive it on the foundation of total reality as a whole. So this reality is co-present as an essential condition of the existence of the reality actually perceived. But in imaginative act, the act of reality is reverse. If we want to imagine the hidden thing, we direct our attention on them and isolate them, we grasp them as absent, and they appear to us as empty data. So the imaginative act is constituting, isolating and annihilating.67

Though recollection in many respect close to the image and at point we use the examples from memory to clarify the nature of the image, the problem of both are radically different. And, there is an essential different between the theme of recollection and that of the image. The recall of the past is not the imagining of the past but recalling of the past incident. We do not posit it as given-in-its-absence, but as given-now-as-in-the-past. The recall is real but past. It exists past, which is one mode of real existence among others. When we want to apprehend it, we direct our consciousness towards that past object where it is. But if we imagine an object, we grasp it which is not at all given to us or which is given to us as being beyond reach. So we grasp nothing that is we posit nothingness. All real existence occurs with present, past and future structures. The future is real if it is connected to the ground of the present or it can be on contrary by isolating it

66 Ibid., p.234.
67 Ibid., pp.235-36.
and positing it for itself but by cutting it off from all reality and by annihilating it, by presenting it as nothingness.\textsuperscript{68}

To imagine of consciousness, it must have the possibility of positing a hypothesis of unreality. It does not mean cease to be consciousness of something. Consciousness should be able to form and posit objects possessing a certain trait of nothingness in relation to the whole of reality. The imaginary object can be posited as non-existent or as absent or as existing elsewhere or not posited as existing. The negative act is the constructive of the image.\textsuperscript{69}

To posit an image is to construct an object, that is to deny real from it. The totality of real, so long as it is grasped by consciousness as a synthetic situation for that consciousness, is the world. Consciousness to imagine the two pre-requisites are consciousness must be able to posit the world in its synthetic totality and it must be able to posit the imagined objects as being out of reach of this synthetic totality that is to posit the world as nothing in relation to the image. So now it is clear that the creation of the imaginary would be completely impossible to a consciousness whose nature is in-the-midst-of-the-world.\textsuperscript{70}

If we assume a consciousness to be in midst of the world as one existence among others we must conceive it hypothetically as completely subjected to the action of a variety of realities without its being able to avoid the details of these realities by an intuition which would embrace their totality. Therefore this consciousness can contain only real modifications aroused by real actions and all imagination would be excluded from it. If a consciousness to be able imagine it must be able to escape from the world by its very nature. Thus the thesis of unreality has yielded us the possibility of negation as its condition. Now the negation has revealed itself to us as being the reverse of the very freedom of consciousness. Here one need to take into account that act of positing the world as a synthetic totality and the act of taking perceptive from the world are both one and the same. Thus posit the world as a world or to negate it is one and the same thing.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., pp.236-238.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., p.238.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., pp.239-40.
So to be able to imagine, it is enough that consciousness be able to surpass the real in constituting it as a world, since the negating of the real always implied by its constituting in the world. This surpassing cannot be brought about by any means whatever, and freedom of consciousness must not be confused with the arbitrary. For an image is not purely and simply the world-negated, it is always the world negated from certain point of view, namely, the one that permits the positing of the absence or the non-existence of the object presented as an image.\footnote{Ibid., pp.240-41.}

The essential prerequisite that enables consciousness to imagine is that it be ‘situated in the world’ or more briefly, that it ‘be-in-the-world’. It is the situation-in-the-world is grasped as a concrete and individual reality of consciousness, which is motivation for the construction of any unreal object whatever ad the nature of that unreal object is circumscribed by this motivation. Thus the situation of the consciousness does not need to appear as a pure and abstract condition of possibility for all imagination but as the concrete and exact motivation for the appearance of a certain particular imagination.\footnote{Ibid., pp.241-42.}

Sartre is set out to show consciousness as *irrealisante* in *The Psychology of Imagination* which is not easily translatable in English, it means ’making unreal. He calls image as ‘the certain’ because according to him if something is given in reflection is certain although any explanatory hypothesis about it can only be probable. This certainty of reflection delivers to us is a series of propositions: that image is a consciousness in the revised sense; that it is incapable of giving new information; that it is positional but in certain specified ways; that it is spontaneous; and that it is never part of a more inclusive consciousness but it is *sui generis*. For Sartre, the modes in which the image is positional or *thetic* are important. He holds that it posits its object either as non-existent or as absent or as elsewhere, the last two cases being distinguished presumably by the emphasis in the one case on the here where the subject is not, in the other on the not-here where it is. In all three cases the operative modality is negation. In this the image is differs from the concept, we may have the concept of our absent friend in his present
circumstances, and this may be wholly positive, but it is of the very nature of image not to touch him or see him, a way he has of not being at such a distance, in such a position. In other words the imaging consciousness posits its object as a nothingness as imaginative.73

For Sartre, people also relate to the things in the world and their situation through imagination. In Sartre’s theory an image makes present that which is absent whether it is something that exists elsewhere or even something that is non-existent. Through these images people relate to the world in an open way because these images relate to the world from a problem solving, rational point of view. Even if people withdraw from the world in order to imagine, their images lean on reality and make sense of it in terms of that which their present situation lacks. Therefore imagination is also an authentic manner of existing in relation to the world.

Bad Faith as Self Denial

The philosophy of existentialism is primarily concern with Human existence. Sartre as existentialist gives important to freedom and responsibility. According to him, man is free. He emphasizes on absolute freedom. In other words, human being is condemned to be free that is human being is vested with inescapable freedom. He also equally gives important to responsibility. According to him, man is free to act and he is responsible for his act. In this context, he introduces the notions like ‘bad faith’ and ‘authenticity’. Bad faith is “a lie to oneself within the unity a single consciousness. Through bad faith a person seeks to escape the responsible freedom of Being-for-itself. Bad faith rests on a vacillation between transcendence and facticity which refuses to recognize either one for what it really is or to synthesize them.” 74 For Sigmund Freud, the lived deception is resort to protect oneself from the unpleasant truth which a person represses. Sartre emphasizes on moral and metaphysical implications. The Freudian account requires a substantial self that exists prior to and independently of its formation by experience, because it can be acted upon experience. For Sartre, being-for-itself is responsible for its

acts. Being-for-itself knows itself and knows all there is to know about itself and if it fails to acknowledge something about itself or acts out of character with itself. This is something being-for-itself knowingly deceives itself. This is in terms of Sartre is called as ‘bad faith’. Sartre points out that bad faith is a form of faith, not just cynical deception practiced by the self on itself but a genuine belief that it entertains about itself. In some sense, it can be said that being-for-itself know that this belief is a mistake. But being-for-itself maintains this self deception. Bad faith is not a lie. A lie is to lie to other to convince them but bad faith is a lie to oneself. Sartre argues: “if I lie to myself I know not only that I am lying but also that I am lied to, and I must therefore be in good faith to the extent that I acknowledge my own bad faith.”

Sartre considers being as for-itself and in-itself. The horrifying reality is that human being is a transcendent being, devoid of any stability that prompts human being to attempt to approximate some degree of constancy, thereby negating his transcendent nature. Thus exists the phenomenon of ‘bad faith’ i.e. mauvaise foi. Sartre calls bad faith that “consciousness instead of directing its negation outward turns it toward itself.” Consciousness is characterized by transcendence in such that it is directed towards what is not itself. Bad faith is project of flight from being towards non-being and from non-being towards being. It is a negation of the transcendence of one's being. Indeed, Sartre holds that the goal of bad faith is to put oneself out of reach; in other words, it is an escape.

It is necessary to understand that ‘bad faith’ is not essentially the same as falsehood. While Sartre affirms that both lie and bad faith are negative attitudes. In both cases, there exist acts of lying, deceit and distortion of truth; it does not mean both are the same act. Instead, he asserts that there exists a basic difference between them. He defines a liar as “a cynical consciousness, affirming truth within himself, denying it in his words, and denying the negation as such.” This definition is to be understood as; the negation that exists in a lie is directed towards a transcendent ‘other’, and not to one's

---

77 Ibid., p.48.
78 Ibid., p.48.
consciousness itself as in the case of bad faith. It thus affirms fourfold aspects of existence: of myself, of the other, of myself in relation to the ‘other’ and of the ‘other’ in relation to myself. In first, the duality of the deceiver and the deceived in a lie is rooted in a distinction of subjectivities. This characteristic of lying in general makes facile the act of hiding the truth from the ‘other’. Second, the liar possesses the truth in its totality in so far as he is able to hide it from the ‘other’. Sartre then concludes that he is willing to grant that bad faith is a lie to oneself, with the prerequisite of a distinction between lying to oneself and lying in general. Thus he emphasizes the fact that lying in general is not necessarily the same as bad faith.

To term in Sartre’s word:

Thus the lie does not put into play the inner structure of present consciousness; all the negations which constitute it bear on objects which by this fact are removed from consciousness. The lie then does not require special ontological foundation, and the explanation which the existence of negation in general requires are valid without change in the case of deceit.79

Sartre Further states:

In bad faith it is from myself that I am hiding the truth. Thus the duality of the deceiver and the deceived does not exist here. Bad faith on the contrary implies in essence the unity of a single consciousness.80

Sartre holds that there is a difference between bad faith and insincerity. Sincerity presupposes an ideal, which cannot be affirmed by the Sartrean notion of absolute freedom. Sartre asserts that man is abandoned in this world with no set of extrinsic, objective criteria imposed upon him. The ideal of sincerity consists in one having to be

79 Ibid., p.48.
80 Ibid., p.49.
for oneself only what one is for others. According to Sartre, the essential structure of
sincerity and bad faith are not altogether different. The goal of sincerity is:

to bring me to confess to myself what I am in order that I
may finally coincide with my being; in a word, to cause
myself to be, in the mode of the in-itself, what I am in the
mode of 'not being what I am'.

He further elaborates the goal of bad faith is to cause oneself to be what one is
through the mode of 'not being what one is' or it makes one to be not what one in the
mode of being what one is. Both sincerity and bad faith are attempts to flee from one’s
being. It may be true that the person who pursues sincerity as a goal is in bad faith.
Furthermore, the notion of sincerity is integral to the possibility of the phenomenon of
bad faith. The condition of the possibility for bad faith is that human reality, in its most
immediate being, in the infrastructure of the pre-reflective cogito, must be what it is not
and not be what it is.

Finally, bad faith is not a state one undergoes, nor a malady infected on one's
consciousness. Since bad faith involves a single consciousness, there is nothing outside
consciousness which makes possible the phenomenon of bad faith. Bad faith is integral to
the very structure of consciousness. The need to construct a semblance of duality between
the deceiver and the deceived in view of its absence depends solely on one's
consciousness. Consciousness is intentional, bad faith is likewise intentional. However,
the intentionality of this phenomenon is directed reflectively and inwardly, and this
makes bad faith a special phenomenon. “Bad faith involves a conscious decision to be in
bad faith; it decides and wills what it is; it is 'conscious of its own structure.'” Moreover,
Sartre traced the possibility of bad faith to the human tendency of fleeing from that which
threatens its very own project towards self-fulfillment.

---

81 Ibid., pp.65-66.
82 Ibid., pp.66-67.
83 Ibid., p.68.
Authenticity as Existential Virtue

The affirmation of the inevitability of the possibility of bad faith leads Sartre to explore his moral notion of ‘authenticity’. Sartre discusses authenticity in relation to freedom. Sartre brings in this concept of authenticity from his atheistic existentialism. For Sartre, authenticity is the genuine existence which is conceived as free. For Sartre, authenticity is not facing death like Heidegger; rather it is facing the meaningless ground of its own transcendence. According to Sartre freedom makes a person to be authentic. Authenticity has the etymological root in Greek term auto-heutes, which means ‘to make’ or ‘create oneself’. To be authentic is to embrace our existence as an open-ended field of multiple possibilities of self-identify from which we choose. Consequently authenticity demands that we negate or transcend our ‘objective’ essence in order to invent new role to play, new personae to identify with, and new masks to express our numerous projects. Sartre holds that to choose freely one needs to be oneself and open to the possible experimental in a given circumstances.

The existentialists are not interested in the happiness of a human being’s life, the goodness of his or her disposition rather they are concerned over the authenticity of human existence. The precedence of existence over essence ultimately resolves in the negation of human nature. This same negation endows human being with the freedom to make oneself. Human being is nothing else but what he or she makes of oneself. Human being is nothing else than the totality of his or her free actions. However, we cannot conceive of freedom without responsibility. Responsibility is always proportionate to freedom. Sartre freedom provides extreme absolute freedom and he also emphasizes equal amount of responsibility. Man is being condemned to be free carries the weight of the whole world in his shoulders. One is not only responsible for his own acts; he is responsible for all men. As Sartre views, “I am creating an image of man of my own choosing. In choosing myself, I choose man.” The responsibility towards oneself and others gives raise to anguish, forlornness and despair in our existence. We always feel

85 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticity_(philosophy)>
87 Ibid., p.324.
responsible for anything that happens in the world. But there is a tendency to attempt to avoid this sense of responsibility. This paves way for Sartre’s discussion of the notion of ‘bad faith’ or ‘inauthenticity’. A lack of authenticity is considered in existentialism as ‘bad faith’. 88

Sartre initially discussed the notion of authenticity through the phenomenological ontological treatment of the concept of bad faith. Sartre’s notions of bad faith and authenticity are derived primarily from his initial discussion of consciousness; thus it is necessary to explore the connection that exists between the concepts of consciousness and bad faith. Sartre’s notion of bad faith necessarily follows his ontological conception of consciousness. Sartre defines consciousness as “a being, the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingness of its being.” On the one hand, the given definition explicates self-awareness on the part of consciousness. As Sartre states in The Transcendence of the Ego, “consciousness is aware of itself insofar as it is consciousness of a transcendent object.” On the other hand, such a definition restricts the concept of consciousness to a perpetual attempt to a nihilation of being, more specifically, of one's being.

Consciousness is a ‘not’, and its transcendent character makes it an enduring negation of being. Consciousness is dynamic and any attempt to view it as a static entity is itself a negation of the very definition of consciousness. There is a relationship between consciousness and authenticity. Sartre’s characterization of consciousness as free spontaneity reflectively positing its own transcendent objects, as active rather than reactive, as neither caused by nor causing external objects and as transparent to itself, is exposed to the attributes of authenticity such as spontaneity, lucidity, activity, reflectiveness, self-sufficiency and originality. However, before providing positive descriptions of authenticity, it would best serve to recourse first to provide negative descriptions of this concept through a discussion of what bad faith is not, after tracing the phenomenon of bad faith to consciousness.

88 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticity_(philosophy)>
Authenticity is supposed to be a self-recovery of being which was previously corrupted. It is to be kept in mind that the nature of consciousness itself is favourable to bad faith. Indeed, bad faith is rooted in the very consciousness of man. Sartrean authenticity may be radically described as the affirmation of human reality of its lucidity, spontaneity and freedom. It is when man confronts the dreadful truth of his existence and starts to live with it that he begins to live an authentic life. Authentic living supposes the transcendence over the naturally negative tendency of consciousness of being what it is not, and not being what it is. The authenticity requires radical conversion from the project of being-god to a project based on freedom.

**Inescapable Existential States of Emotion**

In order to be free and authentic beings, human beings must learn to live with these existential states of emotion such as anguish, despair, forlornness and shame. According to Sartre, these are reflective emotions. They are all intrinsic parts of one’s experiences. It is possible to mask one’s anguish and to ‘flee from it’. In other words, Sartre argues that one can purposefully push anguish out of one’s consciousness. It is not avoiding choice, not avoiding anguish. But rather avoiding one’s freedom. According to Sartre, one cannot avoid free choice. Either one accepts freedom and makes choices with the absurdity of each choice in mind or one tries to pretend that one is not totally free to choose and to live an ‘authentic life’. He further argues that one can even pretend as there is no choice. Sartre categorically states that one cannot help being in the situation one is. He says if one blames it on environment or genetics is to live in ‘bad faith’.

Anguish is the awareness of our own freedom. One is aware of oneself as being freely choosing being. As authentic being, one cannot deny one’s own freedom. Every choice is equally arbitrary and equally absurd. Forlornness is closely related to anguish. Forlornness is an awareness of being left on one's own, of having been abandoned; it is
the experience of utter loneliness. Man experiences ‘the death of God’ as abandonment. Without God, human freedom is experienced as an intolerable burden that man is condemned to be free. If God is dead, then, there can be no objective standards of life. There is no basis for making excuses for oneself and there is no escaping from one’s freedom. An individual is rather responsible. Man or woman is ‘thrown’ into this situation. He or she is forced to define him or herself without the sets of fixed standards.\textsuperscript{94}

Despair is a consequence of anguish and forlornness. Despair is the realization that one cannot ultimately count on anyone or anything outside of one’s own will and one’s own field of action. Despair is the giving up of all hope in standards and realities outside of those which we ourselves define and create through our own concrete lives and actions. It is acceptance of one’s full and awful responsibility for one’s choices and actions, for one’s own life and for one’s world. In other words, despair is the awareness that one cannot control the actions of others. Even though one feels as if one is choosing for all people; one is aware that others are free and independent; one can never be sure of one’s actions. With others, one has only probabilities never certainties. One must concern oneself primarily with one’s own possibilities. Shame is the awareness of being objects of experience by others. ‘The other’ as part of our subjective experience, we experience others. These emotions play an important in making the human personality.\textsuperscript{95}

**Sartre’s Existential Psychoanalysis**

Sartre was familiar with the psychoanalysis of his time. Sartre views that his theory of consciousness has certain obvious implications for psychotherapy. Sartre critically analyses Freudian psychoanalytic theory. He criticizes Freudian psychoanalysis for its methodology. The purpose of Freudian psychoanalysis is to determine the unconscious desire as causes for the human behaviour. Sartre agrees with the general objective of penetrating below the surface of our manifest behaviour. Besides, he believes that human behaviour is filled with symbolic meanings which if properly interpreted would reveal deeper purposive forces at work than are accessible without ‘analyses. But he rejected psychoanalytic school’s conception of the unconscious as something essential opaque and

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., p.214.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., p.535.
impenetrable to consciousness and their introduction of id, ego and superego. He also rejects the subconscious mechanism as repressions and sublimation. Sartre emphasizes that the interpretative hypotheses of psychoanalysis can be verified directly rather than indirectly. Thus he proposed an account of existential psychoanalysis through which the underlying meaning of behaviour can be manifested by consciousness.\textsuperscript{96}

For Sartre, the purpose of existential psychoanalysis is to determine the original choice that stimulates the human behaviour. Sartre’s reaction against Freud can be viewed as reaction against ‘essentialism’ or ‘universalism’. One of the main themes of Sartre’s version of existentialism is to reverse the traditional ordering of general to particular, and to exalt the individual.

The \textit{principle} of this psychoanalysis is that man is a totality and not a collection. Consequently he expresses himself as a whole in even his most insignificant and his most superficial behaviour.\textsuperscript{97}

Sartre states the goal of existential psychoanalysis is to interpret the empirical behaviour pattern of man in order to make it explicit. For Sartre, the point of departure is experience. Existential psychoanalysis recognizes nothing before the original upsurge of human freedom. Existential psychoanalysis rejects the hypothesis of the unconscious.\textsuperscript{98}

Existential psychoanalysis is the one of central ideas of \textit{Being and Nothingness}. It is through our consciousness and imagination that we are able to make of ourselves what we are not; this is our human freedom and it is a choice. For Sartre, freedom is precisely the being which makes itself a lack of being.\textsuperscript{99} However, this freedom takes place in the world as a being-in-the-world. Therefore the purpose of existential psychoanalysis is to determine the original choice.\textsuperscript{100} Sartre further argues:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{98} Ibid., pp.568-570.
  \item \textsuperscript{99} Ibid., p.567.
  \item \textsuperscript{100} Ibid., p.570.
\end{itemize}
Since what the method seeks is a *choice of being* at the same time as a *being*, it must reduce particular behaviour patterns to fundamental relations … of being – which are expressed in this behaviour. It is then guided from the start toward a comprehension of being and must not assign itself any other goal than to discover being and the mode of being the being confronting this being.\textsuperscript{101}

The illustration Sartre uses is the question of why Flaubert became a writer. In studying Flaubert, he seeks to show how a choice was made, in spite of Flaubert’s thrownness and so called predisposition. So he makes clear that desire alone cannot explain everything; neither it can have an appeal to environment. Sartre has tried to illustrate this traditional mistake by many biographies written from a psychological viewpoint. He quotes from a biography of Flaubert:

A critic, for example, wishing to explain the ‘psychology’ of Flaubert, will write that he appeared in his early youth to know as his normal state, a continual exaltation resulting from the twofold feeling of his grandiose ambition and his invincible power... The effervescence of his young blood was *then* turned into literary passion as happens about the eighteenth year in precocious souls who find in the energy of style or the intensities of fiction some way of escaping from the need of violent action or of intense feeling, which torments them.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p.274.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., p.558.
Sartre views that there are two problems in the above passage. It reduces Flaubert to the intersection of general principles. It misses all the uniqueness of Flaubert. There is an effort to reduce the complex personality of an adolescent to a few basic desires, as the chemist reduces compound bodies to merely a combination of simple bodies. Here the psychological analysis proceeds from the postulate that an individual fact is produced by the intersection of abstract universal laws. It simply fails to explain what make the individuality. The reason given as the intense feeling which made Flaubert a writer is not an explanation for the ‘calling’ of Flaubert. Therefore, one may show thousands of circumstances which may not be the explanation. The empirical psychology also rejects the pure individual who has been banished from the pure subjectivity of Flaubert into the external circumstance of his life. The empirical psychology emphasizes that Flaubert had the intense feeling for writing from his early childhood even before he faced the crisis of adolescence. Sartre argues that we cannot exhaust the individual by generalities in this way. Sartre rather calls for the individual’s ‘original project’. This ‘original project’ is what the individual is fundamentally trying to make of himself. The original project is Sartre’s answer to Freud’s notion of a complex. Sartre thinks classical Freudian analysis is not entirely in agreement with itself. The clinical practice is fine. Sartre has no quarrel with Freudian practice. Freud, after all, could actually cure people, and there’s no denying that. But Sartre is critical of the Freudian theory. Sartre views that the Freudian theory does not really fit his own practice.

Freudians hold that they are trying to bring the deep-seated complexness which is responsible for the patient’s behaviour into consciousness. It helps the patient to understand his or her behaviour and deal with it. Sartre argues that whatever there is in the patient’s mind is already conscious, even if only non-positionally. For Sartre, there is no unconscious in the Freudian sense. In other words, there is nothing unconscious about consciousness. Sartre further argues that the patient might even know what the particular fact which is involved and he or she may even know what is going on in the ‘unconscious’. The patient might very well know this in the sense that he is already conscious of it in a positional way, that he has made whatever it is an object of.

103 Ibid., p.559.
104 Ibid., p.559.
consciousness, reflected on it. For Sartre, any act of consciousness can be reflected on. According to him, there is nothing which cannot be reflected upon. He argues that we certainly do not need an analyst to help us to understand this. For Sartre, the original project is the ultimate project that is the transcendent meaning of all the patient’s acts, the original plan that amounts to what the person is trying to make of himself. He advocates existential psychoanalysis as a method to make a person understand his original project.\textsuperscript{105} For Sartre, an individual’s original project is his or her willful choice. Thus an individual is responsible for his or her acts and behaviour.

**Freedom as Absolute Freedom**

Sartre’s philosophy is rooted in freedom. The paradigm shift of ‘existence precedes essence’ in existential philosophy has deeply influenced the thinking of Sartre. This revolutionary change led Sartre to come up with a new conception of human being with freedom to act. The rejection of determinism of any kind over human existence has led to the absolute freedom. Sartre upholds for this absolute inescapable freedom. He terms it as ‘man is condemned to be free’. The emphasis of absolute freedom makes man responsible for his or her action. According to the existentialist thinkers determinism, whether genetic, social or environmental, does not offer adequate explanation of human’s inner potentialities and capabilities. But the modern psychologists would differ in this respect because for them genetic, social or environmental situation plays a vital role in human. Whereas existentialists hold that each human persons are unique and reveal one’s inner potentialities and creative skills only because of one’s freedom. First of all human exists in the world and with the utmost freedom, he or she creates himself or herself through each and every actions. A person is the maker of himself or herself. Human being is the project which possesses subjective life and apart from this projection of self, nothing exists. And therefore each one has to complete the project in and through one’s freedom. Hence there comes responsibility for whatever one does and, in this way, the whole responsibility of one’s action falls on one’s own shoulders. As Sartre states in *Being and Nothingness*, “man is being condemned to be free carries the weight of the

whole world on his shoulders; he is responsible for the world and for himself as a way of being.\(^{106}\) Human beings have considerable freedom within one’s own being in case one wills to express it. Freedom is a unique quest which lies in working out the demands of one’s inner self and impressing one’s genuine or authentic self. Freedom means facing conflicting choices, making decisions and accepting them.

According to him, freedom is the very essence of human being.\(^{107}\) He also makes a distinction between historical or political and philosophical freedom. According to Sartre, the historical or political freedom consists in being successful in what one does. Freedom is to be able to obtain what one wishes. That is a capacity to achieve a goal is historical or political freedom. Sartre is not interested in this kind of freedom. For Sartre, freedom is capacity to choose a goal. In this kind of freedom success is not essential an issue at all. Sartre calls this as autonomy of choice. He holds that freedom is an exile.\(^{108}\) We are responsible for our choice. For Sartre holds that consciousness is freedom.\(^{109}\)

Sartre has elaborated a detailed theory of freedom. According to him, Human beings are what one makes of one self. He approaches the problem totally from the atheistic view point by denying the existence of God. Human beings are completely free to do whatever they like as though there is no God to stop them. He holds that there is only one being whose existence comes before its essence and that being is ‘human’. Human is indefinable, because to begin with human is nothing. For Sartre, Freedom is precisely nothingness which is made-to-be at the heart of human and which forces human reality to make itself instead of to be for human reality, to be is to choose oneself; nothing comes to it either from outside or from within which it can receive or accept. Thus, freedom is not a being; it is the being of human therefore it is one nothingness of being. Human is not free but human is freedom. Freedom is not a mode but it is the existence.\(^{110}\)

Sartre does not wish to deny that we exercise our freedom, but we choose our freedom within limits. He is the first to acknowledge that our existence is always situated

\(^{107}\) Ibid., p.25.
\(^{108}\) Ibid., p.508.
\(^{109}\) Ibid., p.29.
\(^{110}\) Ibid., pp.567-568.
in concrete historical contexts. One does not choose to be born, nor does one choose once physical or biological condition, nor what economic class or political state or national culture one is born into. But one does choose how to exist within the limitation of these circumstances. Human being is what one makes of oneself, in spite of the conditioning, influences of one’s factual circumstances. Human being is free because he or she defines what he or she is and how he or she is by a series of free choices.  

Sartre centre theme of freedom is bases for each and every act of human being. For Sartre, freedom is exercised in emotion and imagination. These two are the basic human activities. In this way, he makes human being solely responsible for each and every act. In spite, inescapable bad faith, he emphasizes that human being should live authentic life. This authentic life is possible through exercise of freedom.

111 Ibid., pp.484-485.