CHAPTER-I

A HISTORICAL SURVEY

The great uprising of 1857-58, the ‘most marvelous and unforgettable event of modern times’,¹ may well be considered as an epoch-making happening and a turning point in the history of British India. John Lawrence,² Charles Raikes,³ John Seeley⁴ and many more British scholars/historians characterized it as only ‘sepoy mutiny’ or military rising, whereas the nationalist scholars like Asoka Mehta,⁵ V.D. Savarkar⁶ and others called it as a ‘national rising’, ‘Indian war of independence’ and a ‘revolution’. Even if we accept that it began as a mere sepoy mutiny, there is no denying the fact that it soon afterwards developed into a stupendous revolt or rebellion.⁷ It assumed the character, at any rate, of ‘the biggest upsurge against the British’ up-to-then most serious challenge to the British imperialism, colonialism and supremacy in India.⁸ Whatever be the origin of this formidable upsurge, there was very little doubt that the policy followed by the Company’s Government towards the Native States in the course of the earlier decades, and

³ Charles Raikes, Notes on the Revolt in the North-Western Provinces of India, London, 1858, pp. 156-63.
⁵ Asoka Mehta, op.cit., pp. 39-47.
⁸ John William Kaye, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 617; Canning wrote, “The Indian Empire was in flames”.
particularly during the decade preceding the rising of 1857, was one of the potent factors leading to this powerful outbreak. Dalhousie’s annexation “had caused a thrill of uneasiness, suspicion and unrest throughout India”. According to Metcalfe, it was ‘foremost among the causes of the revolt’. By his ruthless implementation of the doctrine of lapse he had annexed the States of Satara, Nagpur, Jhansi, Jaitpur, Sambhalpur, Udaipur and Baghat. He had contrived war against the Sikhs and annexed Punjab in 1849. It was an act of ‘violent breach of trust’ on his part. Despite the traditional loyalty of the Nawab of Oudh, he had annexed his State on the plea of gross misrule. Dalhousie had deprived Nana Sahib, late Peshwa Baji Rao II’s adopted son, of the huge annual pension that had been granted to the latter. Regarding the titular Mughal Emperor of Delhi, it was decided that on the death of Bahadur Shah, his successor would leave the ancestral palace. All these high-handed and unjust measures provoked, as in fact they were bound to provoke, resentment and revolt. And the persons like Nana Sahib, Bahadur Shah, Rani Lakshmi Bai of Jhansi and many others, who were the victims of these measures, became the most leading and prominent leaders of the revolt. However, fortunately for the British imperialists, the Chiefs, especially the dispossessed Chiefs and their associates who took part in the rising were not in a large number, nor did they possess’ forces or resources of great consequence. More fortunately yet for the British Government, the other Native Princes and Chiefs who had the military strength and resources to turn the balance against the foreign rulers, such

12  The proportion of the Chiefs who joined the rebellion would not probably exceed one per cent. See R.C. Majumdar, *op.cit.*, p. 396.
as the Sindhia, the Holkar, the Gaekwar, the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Begum of Bhopal, the Maharajas and Rajas of Rajasthan, Mysore and Travancore and the Sikh Chiefs of the east Punjab states, either remained aloof from the upsurge or surely sided with the British.

The Sikh Chiefs of the Punjab were among the most conspicuous Chiefs who threw themselves without hesitation on the British side. They rendered active help to their Paramount during the great revolt. Under 1809 Proclamation, to be sure, the cis-Sutlej Chiefs were bound to assist the British authorities with their armies in times of need; also to furnish the British force with supplies of grain and other needs. However, that was freely the lesson taught to these Chiefs during 1809-1856 by their imperial masters. That ensured their loyalty and active support. Thus, their loyalty could pay them dividends. But, their disloyalty would not only mean for them the personal loss of their gaddis but might also involve the loss of their territories and, perhaps, total annexation of their States. These Chiefs could not forget that the Chiefs of Ladwa, Ropar and Anandpur had been liquidated for their disloyalty; Raja Devinder Singh of Nabha had been dethroned and Sardar Nihal Singh of Kapurthala deprived of a part of his State for their so-called dubious role during the First Anglo-Sikh War. In the episode of 1857, as it were, they found a great opportunity to render substantial services to the British authorities so as to win over their gratitude; then to procure some concrete territorial and other concessions from them. To the Chiefs of Nabha and Kapurthala, especially, the outbreak must have come as a god-sent chance.

13 See Articles 4 and 5 of the Proclamation and also Appendix-I.
14 For example, the Maharaja of Patiala was granted sixteen parganas as a reward for his services to the British during the Gurkha War (1814-16); and in recognition of their services rendered during the First Anglo-Sikh War, the Patiala, Jind and Faridkot Chiefs were granted certain estates and concessions. Vide. V.D. Savarkar, The Indian War of Independence, 1857, 8th edition, New Delhi, 1970, pp. 15-17; also see Major Evans Bell, The Annexation of the Punjab and the Maharajah Duleep Singh, London, 1882, pp. 14-15.
to better the previous records of fidelity of their respective house to the Paramount power, and thereby to regain the base that had been lost due to the mistakes of their predecessors. Little wonder, therefore, that the Sikh Chiefs vied with one another in extending whole-hearted assistance to the British rulers at this most critical juncture.

No Prince in India displayed greater loyalty or rendered more conspicuous service to the British power during the upsurge of 1857-58 than Maharaja Narinder Singh of Patiala. At once on hearing the news of the rising at Meerut and Delhi, he placed himself ‘boldly and heartily’ on the side of the British. Under the order of the Commissioner and the Commander-in-Chief, the Maharaja undertook the arduous responsibility of safeguarding the territory between the Yamuna and the Sutlej. He time and again expressed his desire ‘by letter and by word of mouth’ to go to Delhi but he was advised and dissuaded by the Chief Commissioner and the Commissioner from doing so on the basis that his presence in the cis-Sutlej territory could not be spared. Probably a more significant reason for not accepted with the repeated request of the Maharaja was that the cautious British officials suspected lest this distinguished Chief of the Punjab should be persuaded to join the rebels. Their doubts on this account was not without base in view of the reality that Emperor Bahadur Shah of Delhi had sent repeated requests to the Maharaja of Patiala “of noble rank and lordly dignity, our own devoted vassal, worthy of our confidence and favour” to rise against the British and march with his army to Delhi. The latter, however, evinced showing loyalty to the British cause and sent his troops to Delhi, Thanesar, Karnal, Jagadhri, Ambala Cantonment, Ferozepur, Hissar, Sirsa, Hansi, quelling disturbances at,
and safeguarding, all these places. The whole of the Maharaja’s troops employed to help the British Government. They consisted of 2,156 horses, 2,846 foot, 156 officers, 970 camp followers and 8 guns. Wherever these troops were employed, all the needs such as guns, magazines, ammunition, supplies, etc., were provided by the Maharaja himself. Besides, elephants, camels, carts, etc., were furnished by him to the British whenever, and wherever by whomsoever required. The Maharaja also advanced a loan of five lakhs of rupees to the British Government in India. He too expressed willingness to contribute another equal sum if needed by it.\(^{17}\) The Maharaja’s services were not confined to the Punjab and Delhi only. During the year 1858, his contingents rendered help in safeguarding Dholpur\(^{18}\) from the rebels, in clearing the road between Agra and Gwalior. The Maharaja also sent forces to Jhajjar and Lucknow; it rendered useful services and help at both these places.\(^{19}\)

The material help/aid given by the Maharaja during the revolt was, doubtless, of great value to the imperialist cause. He not merely provided men, money, supplies and carriage to be used at various places, but also kept the roads clear for marching of the British troops from the Punjab to Delhi and skillfully guarded and protected cis-Sutlej region when most of the British troops were away to Delhi. Of greater result to the British, however, was the very reality of the joining of this prominent Chief on their side. Being the master of the leading Punjab State situated in the


\(^{18}\) Dholpur was a Rajput State, situated between Agra and Gwalior. Its ruler, Rana Balwant Singh, had married the daughter of Maharaja Narinder Singh of Patiala. Most of the Rana’s troops and officials had joined the rebels and the Patiala forces came to the rescue of the Rana.

\(^{19}\) FD Pol. Cons., 20 May 1859, Nos. 74-75; PP 77 (HOC) of 1860 on Mutiny, pp. 33-38.
centre of the cis-Sutlej territory, the Patiala Chief commanded special position and impact in this region. He was the acknowledged Chief of all the Princes and chiefs in the plains as well as hills of the cis-Sutlej territory. He was looked upon by a large number of the Sikh community with great reverence and concern. His instance, thus, was bound to exercise a great impact on the attitude of the chiefs and also the people of this region. Hesitation or indifference on his part would have been almost as mischievous to the British interests as open revolt, for it would have driven the wavier into rebellion, it would have encouraged the lawless and perhaps rendered the British position in Ambala almost untenable.20

“Had he proved false or even hesitated to join our cause”, observed the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab afterwards, “the whole cis-Sutlej States would have risen and our communication with Delhi would have been cut off”.21 By virtue of his extra-ordinary ability, character and high position, Maharaja Narinder Singh could have proved ‘a most formidable leader against the Government’.22 If the disloyalty of the Maharaja would have been attended with disastrous results for the imperialists, his loyalty proved to be a turning point in their favour. With the prompt and firm stand taken by this influential ‘orthodox Hindoo’ Chief, all sorts of rumours about the greased cartridges, about the adulteration of flour with bone and about other subtle devices of the British to mar the caste of the Hindus began to be discredited. As a result the wavier and rebellious elements got discouraged. The Maharaja did help at such a critical time, it was believed, “was worth a Brigade of English troops to us, and served more to tranquillize the people than a hundred official disclaimers would

20 CCSS to CCP, 9 March 1858, FD, Political Proceedings, 2 July 1858, No. 182, para 4.
21 PG to GOI, 29 March 1859, FD, Pol. Cons., 29 April 1859, No. 42.
22 Griffin, ROP, pp. 213-14.
have done”. While acknowledging the service rendered by the Maharaja, the Chief Commissioner observed:

“The whole demeanor and attitude of the Maharaja brought much moral influence to our side, and instilled confidence into the minds of the people in the cis-Sutlej States. These services were of very great importance to the success of our cause”.

The Maharaja’s loyalty and avowed assistance to their cause had not only the impact of pacifying the people of the cis-Sutlej region, but also won over for them the zealous co-operation and aid of the other Sikh Chiefs. These Chiefs, indeed, “were drawn into his wake”.

Raja Sarup Singh of Jind did not want to lag behind the Maharaja of Patiala so far as serving the cause of his British masters was concerned. Accordance with the Commissioner’s instructions, he marched with all his troops ‘under a burning sun’ towards Thanesar and from there to Karnal’. Having made the needed arrangements for the protection of Karnal, he sent, at the Baghpat on the Yamuna, and ordered his cousin, Punjab Singh, to escort Hudson to Meerut. The Raja himself accompanied Captain Andrew and helped in the occupation and protection of the towns of Panipat and Raee. He was then engaged in keeping the road safe from Karnal to the Camp before Delhi. He was the only Chief who was personally present with the British army at Delhi. This all thereby gave the clear and strongest proof of his faithfulness and courage. “He never showed the slightest hesitation but evinced from the

23 CCSS to CCP, 9 March 1858, op.cit., para 6.
24 CCP to GOI, 13 April 1858, FD, Pol. Progs., 2 July 1858, No. 169, para 2.
26 The whole contingent of Jind did not exceed 800 men but they were ‘a soldiery and well-disciplined set’.
outset a resolution to stand or fall with us”. He too sent his troops to Hansi, Jhajjar, Rohtak and Gohana to assist the British in crushing the rebels at all these places.27

Raja Bharpur Singh of Nabha, though hardly 18 years of age at that time, “acted with the utmost loyalty and intelligence”28 for the British. Under cis-Sutlej States, on the Commissioner’s instruction. He proceeded to Ludhiana with his forces.29 He took charge of safeguarding that important place. He remained there in person throughout the campaign. He posted some of his troops for the protection of the roads between Ludhiana and Nabha, between Nabha and Ambala, between Ambala and Ludhiana and between Nabha and Feroepur. A Nabha contingent of 300 horses and foot soldiers were used for escorting heavy guns and ammunition from Phillaur to Ludhiana and thence to Ambala and Delhi. When the Jullundur rebels slipped towards Phillaur, the Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana took a detachment of the Nabha forces, consisting of 50 horsemen, 100 infantry and 2 guns, to chase the rebels. The Nabha soldiers fought gallantly against the rebels on the bank of the Sutlej. They inflicted a crushing defeat on them. On requisition from the British authorities, the Nabha Chief also sent his troops for assistance to Delhi, Panipat, Ambala, Ferozepur and Lahore. He also advanced a loan of rupees 2,50,000 to the British.30

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28 Griffin, ROP, p. 422.
29 The Raja’s troops consisted of 350 cavalry, 450 infantry, 2 guns, 15 camel-guns and 25 artillery-men.
Thus the three Phulkian Chiefs, regarded as a whole, rendered distinguished services to the British authorities. It was largely due to their fidelity and active help that a major portion of the Punjab either remained quiet or could be silenced without any mighty confrontation “The safety of this province”, wrote the Commissioner, “may be attributed to their loyalty and good example”. 31 Besides, by dispatching their forces to Delhi and keeping all the roads from Punjab to Delhi clear, they rendered valuable assistance to the British in the capture of Delhi. And since the safety of the British Indian Empire depended, to a large extent, upon the safety of the Punjab and the capture of Delhi, the determined help of the Phulkian Chiefs to the British cause may be regarded as a cause of great significance in ensuring the safeguard of British Empire in India. Therefore, this closely related faction of three Chiefs was rightly and most liberally rewarded by the British authorities. The other Sikh Chiefs of Kapurthala, Faridkot and Kalsia too exhibited conspicuous loyalty to them, and supplemented the efforts of the Phulkian Chiefs in bringing about peace and calmness in various parts of the province.

Raja Randhir Singh of Kapurthala, though he was not bound to render any military help, 32 sent every available soldier and gun to assist the British, extended firm co-operation to them during the rising. As soon as he got the news of the rising at Delhi, he marched to Jullundur with his troops, accompanied by his brother Bikram Singh and also his principal advisers. He remained at Jullundur throughout the emergency during the most trying season of the year. He protected the city from the rebels. He furnished guards, patrols and escorts to the Jullundur authorities. He too

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31 G.C. Barnes (CCSS) to Robert Montgomery (Judicial Commissioner, Pb.), 5 February 1858, PGR, MR, VIII, I, para 12, p. 7.
32 Since 1846 the Kapurthala Chief paid an annual tribute of rupees 1,31,000 in communication of military service. See G.C. Barnes (CCSS) to Robert Montgomery (Judicial Commissioner, Pb.), 5 February 1858, PGR, MR, VIII, I, para 12, p. 7, p. 16.
sent a detachment of 100 cavalry, 200 infantry and 2 light guns for the assistance of Col. Abbott at Hoshiarpur. The total force he placed at the disposal of the British consisted of 1200 infantry, 200 cavalry and 5 guns. Moreover, the conduct of his troops throughout was ‘most exemplary’. He agreed to send a portion of his troops, required for the security of the Jullundur Doab.\textsuperscript{33} The Government of India was appreciative of the distinguished loyalty and ‘very valuable and well timed’ help of the Raja who “placed all his troops and resources at our disposal...personally came to the front, and openly sided with the British Government, thereby giving a noble example, not only to his own followers, but to the people of the Jullundur Doab”.\textsuperscript{34}

The Raja of Kapurthala also offered his assistance to aid in the restoration of order in Oudh. On the strong recommendation of the Chief Commissioner, the Supreme Government accepted this offer. As a result, the Raja, along with 2,010 troops and his brother Bikram Singh marched to Lucknow in May 1858. During the following ten months the Raja and his troops rendered valuable help to the British in various engagements against the rebels. The Kapurthala contingent met the enemy in the field six times; it captured nine guns. The British officer under whose charge the Kapurthala contingent was placed, admired the ‘obliging and effective’ aid rendered at all times by the Raja who sparrowed himself no fatigue or discomfort, believing that his presence with his troops would animate his men to fight courageously and work willingly, ardently and laboriously.\textsuperscript{35}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[34] GOI to CCP, 2 June 1858, FD, Pol. Progs., 2 July 1858, No. 193, para 7.
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Raja Wazir Singh of Faridkot did for his masters whatever his limited sources could afford. At the first information of the disturbances at Ferozepur, he at once went there. He placed himself and his troops at the disposal of the Deputy Commissioner of Ferozepur. His troops guarded the ferries of the Sutlej up to Harike. He sent 25 of his troops with General Von Cortlandt, who served at Sirsa and elsewhere. He captured several fugitive sepoys escaping through his territory. He handed them over to the British authorities. Along with his five horsemen and two guns he personally joined the force sent against the rebel, Sham Dass. The Raja also contributed a sum of rupees 35,000 as loan to the administration of the place.36

Sardar Sobha Singh of Kalsia too did good service to the British, of course, within the limited means of his petty Chiefship. He and his son, Lehna Singh, placed themselves at the disposal of the British authorities along with their troops. They helped in guarding certain ferries on the Yamuna. They provided men for patrolling the main roads between Kalka, Ambala and Ferozpur. A Kalsia contingent of 100 men was also sent to Oudh to render service there.37

The Mohammedan Chiefs of the Punjab neither showed so conspicuous loyalty nor rendered such meritorious services to the Paramount Power as characterized the attitude of the Sikh Chiefs during the rebellion. On the other hand, they remained, by and large, lukewarm; some of them even adopted definitely hostile attitude. Several of the Muslim States of the Punjab, having been situated not far from Delhi, fell under the rebels’ influence. Some of the Mohammedan chiefs seemed to

October 1858, No. 45, of 12 November 1858, Nos. 158-161, of 19 November 1858, Nos. 316-318, of 31 December 1858, Nos. 2500-2502; also GOI to COD, No. 23 of 12 July 1858 and No. 40 of 1 October 1858.
37 Griffin, Massy and others, op.cit., p. 556.
have been won over, clearly or clandestinely, by the emissaries of the King of Delhi. There was no hiding the fact that a great majority of the Muslim Chiefs and their people in the Punjab had sympathies with the rebels. The *Nawabs* of Jhajjar, Farrukhnagar, Dadri and Bahadurgarh avowedly joined the cause of the rebels. They were all punished. The first two were hanged, and their States were confiscated by the British.

*Nawab* Fateh Khan of Bahawalpur, the premier Mohammedan State of the Punjab, displayed ‘no sincere desire’ to help the British.\(^{38}\) The Government of India, therefore, sent warning to him that if he misbehaved, exemplary penalty would be inflicted upon him.\(^{39}\) Though the *Nawab* lent no sincere co-operation, yet he took no part against the British. He also sent a detachment of 80 horses and foot men to General Van Cortlandt for aid in Sirsa. The help given was, of course ‘as insufficient as it was constrained’. Nevertheless, the *Nawab’s* neutral attitude was of worth for the British. For it he had joined the revolt, British communication with Sind would have been cut off, the district of Sirsa lost and probably the whole of southern Punjab thrown into a state of disturbance and insurrection.\(^{40}\) After the fall of Delhi, however, an important change took place in the attitude of the *Nawab*. He made offers of help willingly. Such offers, when accepted, were fully acted upon.\(^{41}\)

The Malerkotla Chiefs fared no better than the *Nawab* of Bahawalpur. In response to summons from the British authorities, *Nawab* Mahbub Ali Khan and his son, Sikander Ali Khan, went to Ludhiana with their troops. These were occasionally used for escorting ammunition,

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\(^{38}\) CCP to GOI, 30 June 1857, FD, Sec. Cons., 31\(^{st}\) July 1857, No. 21. There was a general rumour that the *Nawab* of Bahawalpur had soon after the outbreak of disturbances received a messenger from the King of Delhi. Vide., PG to GOI, 13 October 1859, FD, Pol. Cons., 30 December 1859, No. 100, para, 6.


\(^{40}\) PG to GOI, 13 October 1859, FD, Pol. Cons., 13 December 1859, No. 100, para 8.

patrolling the roads and checking the advances of the Jullundur rebels. However, but these troops behaved ‘in a cowardly manner’. The Nawab’s relative, the Bhatti Chief, was executed by the Judicial Commissioner’s order for his rebellious designs. His Nawab had failed to restrain his hostile attitude despite the Commissioner’s advice. Although Dilawar Ali Khan, the second member of the family, remained loyal to the British, yet the Commissioner, cis-Sutlej States and the Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana strongly suspected the loyalty of the two junior members of the family, Ghulam Muhammad and Rustam Ali. The Vakil of Rustam Ali was hanged at Ludhiana for carrying on seditious correspondence. For their lukewarm attitude and dubious loyalty, the two junior Chiefs were deprived of their independent jurisdiction and their authority was transferred to the Nawab. After three years, however, their power was restored to them on the basis that there was no tangible proof against either of them. “On the whole, I fear the Malerkotla Chiefs”, wrote the Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana “may be transferred without any injustice from amongst the rolls of the staunch to the most indifferent and lukewarm attitude of friends to our Government”.44

Nawab Muhammad Hasan Ali Khan of Dujana did nothing to help the British during the disturbances of 1857. He also did not take any part against them. His State hence escaped the fate of Jhajjar and Bahadurgarh. Nawab Akbar Ali of Pataudi was believed to be having communication with the King of Delhi in early stages. Soon after he changed and then firmly sided with the British cause. He sent a detachment of cavalry to help Mr. Ford, the civil officer of the district. He

44 G.H.M. Ricketts (DC Ludhiana) to G.C. Barnes (CCSS), 22 February 1858, PGR, MR, VIII, I, para 52, p. 110.
45 Griffin, Massy and others, op.cit., p. 569.
also gave shelter to some Englishmen whose lives were in danger at Gurgaon. He played an active role in suppressing the revolt of Tula Ram at Bahora (Gurgaon). His troops also took part in the action outside Jaurasi. In this more than 100 rebels were killed. When Muhammad Sher Khan, a leader of the rebels, entered Pataudi with a detachment of cavalry and asked for three *lakhs* of rupees in the name of the Delhi Emperor, the *Nawab* fought against him and killed fifty of the rebels. After the arrival of reinforcements, however, Muhammad Sher Khan defeated the *Nawab*. The former forced him to run away to Narnaul. He freely indulged in loot and plunder at Pataudi.\(^{46}\) It will have been natural that the Sikh Chiefs evinced more conspicuous loyalty; they rendered far more valuable aid and services to the British during the rising of 1857-58 than the Mohammedan Chiefs of the Punjab. It was in the context of these performances that the British authorities formulated its new policy towards the several rulers of this region; more especially towards the Sikh States.

Before dealing with the exceptional treatment accorded to the major Sikh States in recognition of the distinguished services rendered by them, it may be observed that after the revolt of 1857-58, an important change was brought in the general policy of the British Government towards all the Native States of India. In August 1858, by the Act for the ‘Better Government of India’, the East India Company was abolished. The government and revenues of India together with the rights of paramount power over the Indian States were transferred to the British Crown. The Queen’s Proclamation of 1858 issued a few months after\(^{47}\)


\(^{47}\) See GG’s Pol. Dispatches to SOS, NO. 1 of November 1858, No. 2 of 2 November, No. 3 of 6 November, No. 5 of 16 November, No. 8 of 1 December, No. 13 of 16 December, No. 22 of 31 December, and No. 6 of 16 January 1859; also Pol. Dispatch from SOS, No. 18 of 21 April 1859. The
proclaimed in clear terms the new policy to be followed or implemented hereafter towards all the Native States in general. It was also declared, in the first instance, that the treaties and engagements of the Princes and Chiefs with the British would be ‘scrupulously maintained’ that evidently implied that the British Government of India under the Crown would not go beyond the previous stipulations signed with the States in asserting or extending the scope of its paramount power. In the phrase, ‘we desire no extension of our present territorial possessions’. The policy of annexation and expansion of the British Government at the cost of the Native States was announced to have been abandoned once for all. Her Majesty’s Government also gave a solemn pledge to ‘respect the rights, dignity and honour of Native Princes’ which were certainly identified with Her Majesty’s own rights, dignity and honour. Finally, the Queen expressed her earnest desire for the prosperity and social advancement of the Princes and people of India, which could be obtained by internal peace and good government.

In pursuance, and as a valuable elaboration of the policy declared in the Queen’s Proclamation, Lord Canning, the first Governor-General and Viceroy under the Crown addressed a long, and indeed a brilliant Dispatch to the Secretary of State for India\(^{48}\) on the subject of the suggested right of adoption to be conceded to the Native States in India. The suggestions made and the principles laid down in this Dispatch were

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Queen’s Proclamation was read out by Canning to the assembled Princes and people at a *Darbar* held at Allahabad on November 1, 1858. Special measures were taken by the Viceroy to give it a wide publicity at the courts of the Princes and Chiefs of India, and it was received with special honour, and responded to in language expressive of loyalty and devotion to the British Crown, by several notable Chiefs, including the Holkar, the Sindhia, the Gaekwar, the Chiefs of Rajputana and the Sikh Chiefs of the Punjab. Her Majesty’s Government received intimations about the reception of the Proclamation at the hands of the notable Chiefs of India with ‘feelings of the loveliest satisfaction’.

\(^{48}\) Dispatch to SOS, No. 43-A of 30 April 1860.
of great value in the evolution of the British policy towards these States after the epoch-making event of 1857-58. Let it be noted so much so that this document was frequently quoted afterwards by the British authorities themselves as the basic document of the new policy. It may, therefore be analyzed briefly here:

Firstly, the Governor-General discussed at length the controversial views of the British authorities with reference to some previous cases to display that the British Government’s policy regarding adoption of heirs by the Native Chiefs had not been clear and coherent, that had caused ‘a haze of doubt and mistrust’ in the minds of all the Native Chiefs’.49

Secondly, he held that that was the most opportune time of removing all the suspicions from the minds of the Native Princes and Chiefs by making the British policy about adoption plain and certain. For the last vestiges of the Royal House of Delhi had gone the last pretender to the gaddi of Peshwa had disappeared. Now, the British Crown stood forth the unquestioned ruler in all India. He added, “There is reality in the suzerainty of the Sovereign of England which has never existed before and which is not only felt but eagerly acknowledge by the Chiefs”.50

Thirdly, he suggested that it would be a step of sound policy to give assurance to every Chief above the rank of a jagirdar that the Paramount Power wanted to see his government perpetuated. On failure of natural heirs, his adoption of a successor according to Hindu law and customs of his race (if he be a Hindu Chief) or selection of a successor which might be legitimate according to Mohammedan Law (if he be a Muslim Chief), would be recognized. That nothing would disturb the engagement hence made to him so long as his house remained faithful to the Crown and sincere to the conditions of the treaties or sanads. He

49 Ibid., paras 1-20.
50 Ibid., paras 21-22.
suggested that such an assurance should be conveyed to each Chief individually and not by a general notification.\(^{51}\)

Fourthly, “The proposed measure will not debar the Government of India from stepping in to set right such abuses in a Native government as may threaten any part of the country with anarchy or disturbance, nor from assuming temporary charge of a Native State where there shall be sufficient reason to do so”.\(^{52}\) And further, neither will the assurance, if worded as proposed, diminish our right to visit a state with the heaviest penalties, even to confiscation, in the event of disloyalty or flagrant breach of engagement.\(^{53}\)

Fifthly, he forcefully held that instead of extending the British rule, the British Government should give its first care to strengthen their rule within the present limits of the Empire; for they had neither sufficient European force, nor the requisite staff of the British civil officers nor sufficient economic means to launch plans of further extension of their territory. Further, any such undertaking would too make that difficult for them to discharge satisfactorily their already existing duties in the administration of justice, public works, etc. He, therefore, told “The safety of our rule is increased, not diminished, by the maintenance of Native Chiefs well affected to us”.\(^{54}\)

Lastly, stressing upon the need of treating Native Chiefs with consideration and kindness, he said that in the event of any danger from an outside enemy or any other emergency, “one of our best mainstays will be found in these Native States”, just as in the crisis of 1857-58 they had “served as breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise have

\(^{51}\) Ibid., paras 23, 28 and 29.
\(^{52}\) Ibid., para 30.
\(^{53}\) Ibid., para 31.
\(^{54}\) Ibid., paras 33-34.
swept over us in one great wave”. The Secretary of State approved the recommendations made and the principles laid down in the Governor-General’s Dispatch. Accordingly, adoption of Sanads was issued individually to a large number of Native Chiefs of India including the Chiefs of the Punjab, in 1862.

Soon after the above Governor-General’s Dispatch, Sir Barley Frer wrote a separate minute relating to the subject of adoption. He firmly supported Canning’s viewpoint that all doubts existing in the minds of the Native Chiefs regarding British policy should be removed; the right of adoption be conceded to all of them. He went a step further as to suggest that an Indian Committee of the Privy Council, comprising of such jurists and statesmen as had served in India, be formed. To this committee might be referred all issues affecting the rights of the Native States and of the interpretations of treaties and engagements of the Princes with the British Government. Such a proposal he held “may afford an easy and trustworthy solution of many questions connected with native states and form a valuable addition to the concession of the right to adopt”. This Minute was forwarded to the Secretary of State; the new proposal made by Freer was, however not favourably considered by Her Majesty’s Government.

But before these Dispatches were exchanged between Calcutta and London the British Government of India had thrown some important concessions to the major Sikh chiefs of the Punjab States. Even prior to the assumption of authority by the Crown, the Supreme Government had already conferred some rewards upon them for the valuable services rendered by them during the disturbances of 1857-58. To the Maharaja of

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55 Ibid., para 34.
56 Dispatch from SOS, No. 59-P of 26 July 1860.
Patiala was granted the Narnaul division of the Jhajjar territory valued at rupees 2,00,000 per annum in perpetuity, the jurisdiction over Bahadur (together with the right of escheats therein and the annual commutation tax amounting to rupees 5,265) and the confiscated house in Delhi formerly belonging to Begam Zeenat Mahal and valued at rupees 10,000.\textsuperscript{58} The Maharaja’s honorary titles were also increased.\textsuperscript{59} The Raja of Jind was given the Dadri territory valued at rupees 1,03,000 per annum in perpetuity; thirteen villages in the Kularan pargana situated near Sangrur and valued at rupees 13,813 per annum; and the confiscated house of the rebel Shahzada Mirza Abu Bakr in Delhi valued at rupees 6,000. The Raja’s salute was increased to 11 guns; the number of trays of gifts presented to him in Viceregal Darbars was raised from 11 to 15; and he was given the privilege of having his state visits to the Governor General returned by the Secretary.\textsuperscript{60} His honorary titles were also increased.\textsuperscript{61} The Raja of Nabha was given the division of Bawal and Kanti in the confiscated Jhajjar territory. It valued at rupees 1,06,000 annually in perpetuity, and equal privileges with the Jind Chief in respect of salute-guns, the khillat on the occasions of Viceregal Darbars and return state visits by the Secretary. Likewise, an addition was also made to his titles.\textsuperscript{62} As a consequence of these rewards, the Nabha Chief won back for his house an accession of revenue nearly equal to what his

\textsuperscript{58} GOI to CCP, 2 June 1858, \textit{Ibid.}, No. 187, para 3; CCP to GOI, 13 April 1858, FD, Pol. Progs., 2 July 1858, No. 169, Para 4; \textit{Kharita} from GG to Maharaja of Patiala, 2 June 1858, \textit{Ibid.}, No. 188.

\textsuperscript{59} For the exact addition in the honorary titles of the Maharaja, see section V of Ch. XII.

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Kharita} from GG to Raja of Jind, 2 June 1858, \textit{Ibid.}, No. 189; CCP to GOI, 13 April 1858, FD, Pol. Progs., 2 July 1858, No. 169, para 6; GOI to CCP, 2 June 1858, \textit{Ibid.}, No. 187, para 4.

\textsuperscript{61} For the exact titles granted to the Jind Raja, see section V of Ch. XII.

\textsuperscript{62} GOI to CCP, 2 June 1858, \textit{Ibid.}, No. 187, para 5; \textit{Kharita} from GG to Raja of Nabha, 2 June 1858, No. 190; also see section V of Ch. XII; CCP to GOI, 13 April 1858, FD, Pol. Progs., 2 July 1858, No. 169, para 7.
father’s treachery forfeited with an increase of honour and importance which never before attached to the Nabha house. But it may be noted that the territories given were rather troublesome and were indeed, a poor compensation for the loss of one-fourth of the Nabha estates in 1846—the estates which were never restored to the Nabha house despite of repeated representations of the Nabha Chiefs after 1858. The Government under the Crown not merely confirmed these rewards given to the Phulkian Chiefs of Patiala Jind and Nabha but also gave certain concessions of exceptional nature to these three Chiefs which for their unique significance will be treated separately in some details. It is, however, significant to say here that the British authorities had made a very judicious and clever selection of territories from the confiscated Jhajjar and Dadri estates for rewarding the services of the Phulkian Chiefs. By doing so they placed friendly Sikh powers in the midst of turbulent Mohammedan population. The territories granted to Patiala and Nabha were also contiguous to the borders of the States of Rajputana, i.e. Alwar and Jaipur. They were frequently disturbed by the border offences and disputes. Evidently, their protection required a strong frontier police backed by a large military force. The shrewd British statesmen knowingly transferred this perpetual burden to the Phulkian Chiefs. This was done by ostensibly rewarding them with the grant in perpetuity of these territories. Little did the Phulkian Chiefs realize at the time that for the most meritorious services rendered by them to the paramount power, they were being rewarded not only with additional territories but also with additional burdens, problems and troubles?

The Kapurthala Raja was rewarded with the remission of one year’s tribute. The reduction of annual tribute by rupees 25,000, a khillat

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of rupees 15,000, a salute of 11 guns, and additional honorary titles, a garden at Naraingarh in the Ambala district the estates of Bundi and Bithouli in Istumrari tenure at half rates in Oudh, the annulment of the will of his late father and the consequent restoration of full authority in the whole of his state were other rewards that the British gave him. The Raja’s brother, Kanwar Bikram Singh, was also rewarded for the services rendered by him. He received the title of ‘Bahadur’ with a Khillat of rupees 5,000. An estate in Oudh was also granted to him in perpetuity in return for an annual tribute of rupees 25,000. However, the civil and police jurisdiction of the estates remained with the British. The Raja keenly desired, and repeatedly requested for, grant of full jurisdiction over the estates. After about three years when the matter was reopened even the Lieutenant-Governor strongly recommended that the Raja’s desire should be compiled with. But despite all this, the British Government of India refused to restore to him jurisdiction over the estates which had been under the British jurisdiction for the last 15 years. The Paramount Government thought it “politically more wholesome, as an example, that the defection of the Aloowalia Chief, which lost to the

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64 GG’s Kharita to the Raja of Kapurthala, Ibid., No. 194; GOI to CCP, 2 June 1858, FD, Pol. Progs., 2 July 1858, No. 193, para 8.
65 FD, Pol. Cons., 15 October 1858, Nos. 459-462. This garden valued at rupees 1300 had been taken over by the British Government on the confiscation of the cis-Sutlej estates of the Kapurthala Chief due to his doubtful loyalty during the First Anglo-Sikh War.
66 GOI to CCO, 15 April 1859, Ibid., No. 503; GOI to PG, 15 April 1859, Ibid., No. 504; CCO to GOI, 10 February 1859, FD, Pol. Cons., 15 April 1859, No. 501.
68 These estates, consisting of 18 villages in the Lahore district and 21 in the Amritsar district and valued at rupees 26,300 per annum, had been resumed by the British Government on the death of Raja Nihal Singh not due to any bad conduct on the part of the late Chief but simply in accordance with the rules applied to the cases of all conquest-tenure jagirdars. See Griffin, ROP, p. 531.
69 FD, Pol. Cons., 3 February 1860, Nos. 84-90.
family the *Baaree Doab* villages, should bear the stamp of a permanent mark of the displeasure of the British Government*. The last and ‘the most highly valued’ of the privileges bestowed on the Raja of Kapurthala was the right of adoption granted by the *Sanad* of March 5, 1862. But this privilege was not exceptional in its timing or for what it conceded. Also, for the ‘Adoption of Sanads’ of much the similar nature had been granted to most of the Indian Chiefs in March 1862.

The *Raja* of Faridkot was too rewarded for his services during the upsurge of 1857-58. He was exempted from the service of ten sowars which he was bound to furnish earlier. His khillat was increased from 7 to 11 pieces; even his honorary titles were increased. He was allowed the honour of a salute of 11 guns as a further reward for his services. The right of adoption was also granted to him by the *Sanad* of March 11 1862.

Nawab Sikandar Ali Khan of Malerkotla too claimed reward for the services alleged to have been rendered by his late father during the said revolt. However, on the recommendation of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, his claim was considered ‘inadmissible’ by the Paramount Government on the basis that the conduct of the Malerkotla family had not been satisfactory. Moreover, the representative of that family had not rendered any substantial service. Nor was any substantial reward in terms of addition in the territories and titles conferred upon any other Muslim Chief; the *Nawab* of Pataudi who had been ousted by the rebels was, of course restored with all his authority. But the Muslim Chiefs of Malerkotla, Loharu, Dujana and Pataudi, like the Muslim Chiefs in other parts of the country, were granted Adoption *Sanads* in March 1862.

71 GOI to PG, 8 June 1864, FD, Pol. A, June 1864, No. 94.
72 FD, Pol. Cons., 23 July 1858, Nos. 312-315.
For their unwavering loyalty and distinguished services during the disturbances of 1857-58, the Phulkian Chiefs of Patiala, Jind and Nabha were granted some extraordinary concessions. These, in certain respects, placed their relationship with the British Government on a peculiar footing. It is significant to note that the initiative for acquiring such concessions had come from the three Chiefs themselves. That was a manifest proof of their sagacity and practical wisdom. This fact incidentally suggested that it was not without a purpose that they had been supporting their Paramount. Therefore, very ardently and enthusiastically Maharaja Narinder Singh of Nabha, despite the spirit of jealousy that they frequently harboured for one another, combined hands together in their common interests, as indeed they very often did. Having put their minds together they prepared a ‘Paper of Requests’. This paper was submitted for the consideration of the Paramount Power at a very opportune time, when the services rendered by the Chiefs were fresh in the minds of the British Government. The paper contained eight requests in all. These are as such:

(i) The Phulkian Chiefs’ request was that they should be given the power of inflicting capital sentences on their own subjects without requiring a reference to the Commissioner, cis-Sutlej States. As has already been described earlier, it was after the First Anglo-Sikh War in 1844-45 that they had been deprived of their rights of giving death punishment to their subjects without the approval and consent of the Commissioner or British Agent. The Chiefs regarded it as an unjust encroachment upon their rights. They viewed this limitation on their independence as more serious than any other of the regulations issued in the wake of the Sutlej campaign. They tried their best to evade this rule

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75 See, Supra, p. 17.  
76 Griffin, ROP, p. 224.
in practice. They either abstained from giving death punishment or gave it secretly but would not lie to refer the cases to the British Agent or commissioner. From 1845 to 1856 the Maharaja of Patiala did not refer a single case to the Commissioner, cis-Sutlej States, whereas the Raja of Jind referred only two cases. The Commissioner recommended the removal of this restriction. He held that the existing rule had been very embarrassing to him, as he was not empowered to try such cases. No criminal was brought before him or any of the witnesses. Only a cut and dried narrative was furnished to him. On perusing that he was expected to concur in a sentence of death. The Chief might present the case in any manner by so arranging the proofs that he had but to give his consent. He was of the view that there was nothing to prevent the Chief from putting a man to death secretly, and he referred to evasion of the rule by the Maharaja of Patiala by imposing penalties other than death for the last five years. Finally, he observed that during the late disturbances (1857-58) he had authorized the Phulkian Chiefs to execute the heinous criminals without making any reference to him. He added that he saw no possible object in withholding the power for the future.\textsuperscript{77} The Chief Commissioner concurred with the Commissioner. He observed that the Chiefs were probably more sparing in the exercise of this power than the European officers. He recommended that the request of the Chiefs should be accepted. To add significantly that the Chiefs set greater store on this concession than other things. So much so that the Raja of Jind had told him that he would hardly care to accept the grant of Dadree unless this power was given along with that.\textsuperscript{78} The British Government of India accepted the recommendation of the Chief Commissioner and the Commissioner had conceded to the three Chiefs the power of inflicting

\textsuperscript{77} CCSS to CCP, 20 May 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 85, paras 2-3.
\textsuperscript{78} CCP to GOI, 16 June 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 84, para 2.
capital sentences on their subjects without reference to the Commissioner.\textsuperscript{79}

(ii) The Phulkian Chiefs’ request was that in the case of an infant heir succeeding to any of the three Chieftains, a Council of Regency consisting of three of the old and trusty and most capable ministers of the State might be selected by the Commissioner with the advice of the other two surviving Chiefs. In the event of misconduct on the part of a member of the Council, his successor be appointed by the same means, and that strangers and relatives of the infant heir should not be admitted to this Council. It implied three things. (a) The two surviving Phulkian Chiefs should have a decisive hand, with the permission of the Commissioner, in selecting the members of the Council of Regency. It is interesting to note that the Phulkian Chiefs, though often very jealous of one another, would willingly join hands together in dealing with the British and in other matters of common interest. They, therefore, preferred to keep the decisions about the Regency Council’s choice of the members in their own house instead of leaving it to the outsiders. (b) The members of the Council of Regency were to be selected from the old, trusty and most capable ministers for the simple reason that they being experienced and faithful would be able to run the administration smoothly and efficiently. (c) The strangers and relatives of the infant ruler were to be excluded from the Council. The exclusion of strangers was meant very probably to remove the apprehension of the Phulkian Chiefs lest the British should thrust their own nominee in the Council who might appropriate virtually all or most of the powers of the State. The idea of exclusion of the relatives of the infant ruler may be explained by the fact that there being so many widows and relatives in the family, the inclusion of one might provoke jealousies and intrigues from, others, as indeed had already been

\textsuperscript{79} GOI to PG, 25 May 1859, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 87, para 2.
experienced during the minorities of some Chiefs of Patiala and Nabha. The Commissioner regarded the request as ‘characterized by much common sense’. He observed that it had always appeared to him necessary to employ the hereditary ministers for the management of a Native State during the minority of the heir, adding significantly.

It was a mistake to introduce a nominee of their own or to engraft on the native system any of their own institutions and customs. They could not take permanent root, and would produce only hybrid results prejudicial to good government.\(^80\) The Chief Commissioner agreed with the Commissioner in the propriety of the proposed arrangement.\(^81\) The Supreme Government too sanctioned it.\(^82\)

(iii) Request of these Chiefs was that in default of a male survivor in the direct line the reigning Chief should be permitted to adopt a successor from among the descendants of their common ancestor, Baba Phul. Closely related with this was the fourth request that in case of sudden death of any of the three Chiefs without leaving a male issue and without having adopted a successor, the two surviving Chiefs might in the like manner be permitted to nominate his successor from among the descendants of Phul. The Commissioner remarked that the question should be disposed of by the Supreme Government according to the maxims of general policy. He perceived no cause for making an exception in favour of the cis-Sutlej Chiefs. He argued that the right of adoption had not been allowed to Nagpur, Jhansi and other States which had lapsed and he was, therefore, not in favour of conceding it to these Chiefs, as that would tend, in practice, to the perpetuation of their dynasties. He pointed out that there were, at that time, 31 male descendants of Phul, and their number would further increase in future, so

\(^{80}\) CCSS to CCP, 20 May 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 85, para 4.
\(^{81}\) CCP to GOI, 16 June 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 84, para 3.
that the chances of escheat would become more and more remote. He, however, concluded by saying that the privilege solicited “is tantamount to the full recognition of the right of adoption and would lead to the ultimate exclusion of Government from all escheats.” The Chief Commissioner accepted and supported the Commissioner’s view-point and reiterated that whatever rules of Imperial policy were made in this regard, should apply equally to these Chiefs. He, however, suggested that if on reconsideration of the Government’s policy the right of adoption was permitted, a fine not exceeding one year’s revenue of the Chief should be levied in each case. He further observed that such fines would be readily paid. In accordance with the Commissioner’s and the Chief Commissioner’s recommendation, the Government of India declined to accept these requests of the Chiefs on the ground that “these are important innovations on the custom which has always prevailed among the Chiefs of the cis-Sutlej territories”. But the Home Government, adopting a more considerate attitude, ruled that in view of the very great services rendered by these Chiefs, their long tried loyalty and fidelity to the British and their great anxiety to obtain this boon, the desired privilege was conceded to them as a special case. Accordingly, Canning made the announcement of the grant of this privilege in the Ambala Darbar held on January 18 1860. Regarding the fourth request, however, the Governor-General wrote to the Secretary of State:

"If a Chief is so little careful to provide a successor of his own choice as to neglect to adopt one during his life time, it appears to us quite reasonable and in accordance with the established relations between the Paramount Power and the native states that the succession should

84  CCP to GOI, 16 June 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 84, para 4.
86  Dispatch from SOS, No. 64 of 1 December 1859."
lapse to the British Government. I have no doubt that the Government would in almost every case act wisely in reestablishing the Chief and in forbearing to take the territory to itself, but I am certain that the selection of the new Chief would be more judiciously and disinterestedly made by the Government than by an association of kindred Chiefs.  

The Secretary of State, thereupon, consented that in such a case the selection should be made by the Governor General of India in communication with the surviving Chiefs. By the Sanads of May 5 1860 issued to the three Phulkian Chiefs, the power of adoption was granted to each of them and his successors forever under Clause III. It was also stated that in case any one of them should die suddenly without a son and without having adopted heir, the two surviving Chiefs, in concert with the Commissioner, might select a successor from among the Phulkian family. In that case a nazarana to the extent of one-third of the income of the State for one year would be paid into the treasury of the British Government. The condition of the payment of nazarana was considered to be somewhat unjust, yet the Phulkian “chiefs, on the whole, felt much satisfied, as they valued the power of adoption conceded to them more highly than the new territory, the reward for their loyalty. It may be said that the Phulkian Chiefs were not the first to be granted the right of adoption, as in November-December 1858 such a privilege had already been conceded to the Chiefs of Rewa, Gwalior, Jaipur and Chirkhari. Nevertheless, the three Phulkian Chiefs were among the first few privileged to get this, for the adoption, Sanads were issued to most of the Native States in March 1862.

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87 Dispatch to SOS, No. 9 of 28 January 1860.
88 Dispatch from SOS, No. 32 of 18 April 1860, para 6.
89 See Appendix-II.
90 Griffin, ROP, p. 229.
Their fifth request was that women should not be allowed to interfere in the affairs of the State either on the pretext of the Chief being young or upon any other plea, and that no complaints of any sort preferred by the women of the families of the Chief be received by the British Government. The Commissioner observed that the exclusion of women from the Council of Regency or from any participation in public affairs was ‘a wise and sensible provision’, and that nothing but evil could accrue from the nominal supremacy of women, uneducated and secluded as they were in the country. He recommended that the Government might give assurance to the Chiefs that it would entertain no complaints from the women nor intervene on their behalf except in extraordinary cases.91

The Chief Commissioner concurred with the Commissioner’s opinion that women, placed as they were, should not take part in politics. He observed that as a rule the Government did not interfere in the matters of complaints from women but in extraordinary cases the Government might be compelled to interfere on humane grounds, as they did in the cases of the two sisters-in-law of the Raja of Faridkot which had come before the Supreme Government last year.92 The Government of India agreed with the Chief Commissioner’s viewpoint and accepted in principle this request of the Phulkian Chiefs.93 Their sixth request was that the British Government should promise never that it would interfere on behalf of relatives, connections and dependants of the Chief, as it had always bound itself by treaty and practice hitherto. Regarding this request, the viewpoint of the Commissioner and Chief Commissioner was that the Government very seldom interfered in such matters and would

92 CCP to GOI, 16 June 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 84, para 5.
not do so unless it was very imperative.94 This viewpoint did concur in by the Governor General in Council.95

The Phulkian Chief’s seventh request was that each one of them might be favoured with a Sanad assuring to them and to their heirs in perpetuity the hereditary possessions together with the territories bestowed upon them by the British Government under the thumb and seal of the Sovereign of Great Britain. The Commissioner recommended the acceptance of this request on the basis that the Chiefs “would highly appreciate the honour and feel double confidence in the Government”.96 The Chief Commissioner too held that it would be ‘highly politic’ to comply with this request.97 The Governor-General referred this request to the Secretary of State for final order. He held that this request should not be compiled with. He expressed fear that if the Phulkian chief’s this request was granted, similar requests of the Sindhia, the Holkar and even of the smaller Chiefs would also have to be compiled with. He firmly observed:

“I strongly deprecate leading the Chiefs to think that when any substantial act of justice or favour is done to them, more force and sanctity will be given to the act by its being done in England than by its being done by the Queen’s Representative in India”.

He recommended to Her Majesty’s Government that the request be not acceded to, but that the Chiefs of the cis-Sutlej should be replied to the effect that their possessions and rights were thoroughly secure under

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97  CCP to GOI, 16 June 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 84, para 7.
the assurance and hand of the Queen’s Representative.\textsuperscript{98} The Secretary of State recognized the validity of the arguments given by the Governor General and declined to recommend the grant of \textit{Sanads} to the cis-Sutlej Chiefs under the thumb and seal of the Queen.\textsuperscript{99}

The Phulkian Chiefs' eighth request was that no claim against their subjects should be heard in the civil courts located in the British territory. The rule existing at that time was that no such claims were entertained in the British courts except when the cause of action cropped up in the British territory or the defendant possessed property therein. The Commissioner's remark that the Native States’ subjects freely resorted to the British courts to prosecute claims against the parties' resident in the British territories. As such they enjoyed a great benefit over the people living in the British territories. It was made clear that the advantage that would yet further be enhanced if this request was conceded. He, therefore, was of the opinion that he was not in favour of any change in the prevailing system.\textsuperscript{100} The Chief Commissioner and the Governor-General in Council concurred with the Commissioner in thinking that no change was essential in the system that prevailed.\textsuperscript{101}

Though all the requests of the Phulkian Chiefs were not accepted, yet most of them that appeared reasonable enough to the British Government were accepted.\textsuperscript{102} The \textit{Sanads} of May 5 1860\textsuperscript{103} issued individually to the three Chiefs on their own application, formally embodied many of the concessions given to them in response to their

\begin{itemize}
  \item Dispatch to SOS, No. 9 of 28 January 1860; Minute by GG, 23 May 1859, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 86.
  \item Dispatch from SOS, No. 32 of 18 April 1860, para 5.
  \item CCSS to CCP, 20 May 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 85, para 10.
  \item GOI to PG, 25 May 1859, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 87, para 8; CCP to GOI, 16 June 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 84, para 8.
  \item For further details, see A.C. Arora, ‘Phulkian Chiefs’ Paper of Requests (1858); in PPP, V-I, April 1971, pp. 227-246.
  \item See Appendix-II.
\end{itemize}
‘Paper of Requests’. These *Sanads* too defined the respective titles and territories of the Chiefs. These papers gave renewed assurances to them that they would exercise sovereignty over their possessions in accordance with the ancient customs,\(^{104}\) that the British Government would not entertain any complaint against them from their subjects, *jagirdars*, dependents, brothers, servants, etc. They would respect the arrangements made by them regarding internal management and household affairs of their States.\(^{105}\) The British Government would continue to uphold their ‘honour, respect, rank and dignity’.\(^{106}\) Apart from specifying the Chiefs’ powers and privileges, these *Sanads* also defined the liabilities expected of them. It was decided that the Chiefs would promote the welfare and happiness of their subjects by all possible means. They would also redress the grievances of the oppressed. They were to prevent the inhuman practices like female infanticide, *sati* and slavery in their territories.\(^{107}\) They would not fail in their faithful and devoted obedience to the British sovereign;\(^{108}\) they would co-operate with the British forces in repelling the hostile troops, should they appear at any time, and render all possible assistance in providing supplies, grains, carriage, etc., according to the requirements of the British authorities.\(^{109}\) They would arrange to supply the essential materials needed for the construction and repairs of roads on payment. They would concede lands free of charge required for the construction of rail-roads or Imperial roads.\(^{110}\)

From what has been discussed above, it may be concluded that the foundations of the new policy towards the Native States in General, and the main Sikh States of the Punjab in particular, were laid during the

\(^{104}\) *Ibid.*, Clause I.

\(^{105}\) *Ibid.*, Clauses VII and VIII.

\(^{106}\) *Ibid.*, Clause X.

\(^{107}\) *Ibid.*, Clause IV.

\(^{108}\) *Ibid.*, Clause V.

\(^{109}\) *Ibid.*, Clause VI.

\(^{110}\) *Ibid.*, Clause IX.
viceroyalty of Lord Canning. Coming, as it did, in the wake of the great revolt of 1857-58, this policy was based upon the lessons which the British authorities had learnt from the stupendous rising. It reflected the thinking of the Home Government of that time. It bore the imprint of the personalities of Queen Victoria, the Empress, Lord Derby, the Prime Minister, and Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of State for India. Above all, it was the product of the Lord Canning’s genius, the first Viceroy of India under the Crown. It took into prominent consideration, in the Punjab States’ case the conspicuous services rendered by the Sikh Chiefs during the upsurge of 1857-58.

The Government of India under the Crown decided firmly to abandon for ever the policy of any further extension of the British Empire in India; the non annexation of the Native States was, indeed, a sine qua non of the new policy. It may be observed, such an irrevocable decision of the British Government, was not made due to any innate generosity on the part of the Government under the Crown. On the other hand, it was based upon cool calculations and realistic realization of their limitations. Canning felt that, placed as the British were at that time, it was neither possible nor desirable for them to resort to any further accession of territory. They had already had a very bitter experience in the upheaval of 1857-58. They could not, hereafter, rely upon the Indian sepoys. They did not have sufficient European force, nor could they afford to have a bigger one than what they had,\footnote{The total strength of the Indian army (1864) was 2,05,000 men, of whom only 65,000 were Europeans. Vide. IGI, IV, p. 345.} that could undertake the task of any fresh annexation. The financial position of the Government after the revolt was also not satisfactory, nor did they have sufficiently large number of British officers. Under the circumstances it was decided, and very prudently, that the Government of India should apply all its energy and
efforts for the security of the British Empire, rather than for its extension. And for the British Empire’s security, the friendliness and fidelity of the Princes and Chiefs was regarded to be a requisite safeguard.

For the objective of keeping in fact the Natives States and also ensuring the loyalty and devotion of their rulers, the British Government promised, clearly and categorically, to maintain scrupulously the treaties and engagements concluded earlier with them. The British also promised to respect the rights, dignity and honour of these Native Chiefs. They might well be regarded as a high watermark of the new policy, consisted in the assurance that it wanted to perpetuate their governments and houses. In the Adoption of *Sanads* it granted individually to each one of them in fulfillment of that desire.

However, there were some British officials, who did not subscribe to the wisdom of granting Adoption of *Sanads* to all the Native Chiefs. They were prone to think that Canning’s Government was precipitate in guaranteeing thrones to the hundreds of ruling Chiefs, their families. Griffin, for example, opined:

> At it is, the indiscriminate grant of the right of adoption by Lord Canning, making the Government an earthly providence whose favours are conferred alike on the just and the unjust, has deprived it forever of the power of rewarding loyalty and devotion most splendidly and of most effectively punishing treason.\(^{112}\)

But Canning, as already noted, felt firmly convinced of the imperative need and undoubted wisdom of granting Adoption *Sanads* at that most opportune time to all the Native Chiefs above the rank of *Jagirdars*. He brought the Home Government round to his viewpoint. There was little doubt that in the grant of Adoption of *Sanads* to a large

number of Native Chiefs in 1860-62. Right thing was done at the right time; for nothing did more to win over the confidence and goodwill of the Native Chiefs than this measure of the British. Also perhaps nothing did more to strengthen the possibilities of the security of British Empire in India after the uprising and disturbances of 1857-58.

Besides the above-mentioned solemn promises, assurances security of the pledges which were given in general terms to the Rulers of all the Native States, the Sikh Chiefs of Patiala, Jind, Nabha, Kapurthala, Faridkot as also many other Chiefs in different parts of the country were granted additional titles, territories and honours as rewards for the valuable services rendered by them during the revolt of 1857-58. However, the Chiefs, benefited the most from the new policy were the Phulkian Chiefs of Patiala, Jind and Nabha. They had rendered most conspicuous services to the British during the preceding disturbances. As their houses remained traditionally loyal, they were granted some exceptional concessions. The same were generally not granted to other Chiefs and Princes of Punjab or India.

How far the British statesmen, in the following four and a half decades, adhered to these strands of the vividly declared policy and to what changes and considerations this policy was subjected in response to the changing conditions and growing needs of the Paramount Power, effort will remain to answer the same in the following chapters.