Chapter II
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD:
CASE STUDIES AND CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

The Third World is the scene of numerous conflicts with a wide variety of antecedent causes of varying degrees of importance. In this chapter conflict in the Third World has been used in a broad sense of the term, and embraces armed conflicts between the states as well as socio-economic, political, ethnic and sectarian tensions which have caused internal conflicts with international ramifications. These have received 'conflict management' either by the UN or by regional agencies and in some cases by bilateral means. In any attempt to discover common denominators among the profusion of existing conflicts, potential conflicts, and sources of conflict in the Third World, a fundamental difficulty is the complexity of the causes which are more often overlapping in nature covering a wide stretch of space and a complex historical background.

The present analysis of the conflict scenario in the Third World from the perspective of conflict management is presented in two broad sections. The first section is devoted to the genesis of the Third World in which a great potential for conflicts can be seen. This section moves on
to analyse the genesis of conflicts as endemic to this World and concludes with an overview of the scale and intensity of conflicts. The second section deals with selected conflicts from the Third World in the form of brief and condensed case studies, with an analysis of their causes, and their eventual classification. (The theoretical perspective has been given in Chapter I). The third and final section deals with an overview of conflict management.

THIRD WORLD

In less than a decade after the conclusion of World War II that a large body of countries came to be designated as forming the Third World. Alfred Sauvy was among the first to use this label in 1952.¹ It has now become a convenient term for referring to the former colonies of European powers. Apart from expressing the historical antecedents of these countries, the term denotes a concept - the concept of backward nations, undeveloped, or underdeveloped. A sort of promotion however, has been conceded to a few among them who have come to be designated as the developing nations or 'Less Developed Countries'.

The newly independent countries constituting the Third World shared a common fate. All of them were characterized

by economic backwardness and deep poverty. This negative distinction was accentuated further by the technological revolution that occurred in the First and Second Worlds during the same period. As a consequence while the standard of living kept improving from decade to decade in the developed countries, the inhabitants of the Third World continued to sink deeper and deeper in a quagmire of socio-economic problems. The magnitude of this problem can be fairly well estimated from a few broad facts. The Third World comprises 49 percent of the earth's surface and is inhabited by 57 per cent of the World population. A major contributory factor for the deepening of poverty is an inordinate rate of population growth in the Third World countries. As a matter of fact this kind of population growth is in itself symptomatic of the pervasiveness of general backwardness. If the rapid expansion of the economies of a few countries in South-East Asia and Far-East in the eighties is ignored, the extent of its backwardness can be estimated from the fact that in the eighties the GNP of China was less than 10 percent of that of the USA, and the combined GNP of the more than 120 countries of the Third World was $2700 billion while that of Japan was $1300

billion and of the USA $3900 billion.\textsuperscript{3}

Besides poverty, political instability is a prominent problem that plagues most of the Third World countries. Among these countries India had appeared to be an exception to the rule, with its smoothly functioning democracy. But of late, India too has begun to be haunted by the spectra of political instability, although in the light of Indian experience it could be said that India would manage to surmount its socio-political dissensions. However, the same cannot be said for most of the other countries where coups and military rule have been the order of the day.

It is important to consider here that a majority of these countries were created under colonial rule and they were unable to attain historical and political cohesion either during the colonial rule or after decolonization. This awesome situation was compounded by the absence of any substantial progress in modernisation during the days of colonial rule. In a large number of countries, the mind-set of the people as well a their leaders remained pre-modern and in quite a few cases even primitive and tribal.

The picture of the Third World that has emerged here though not very reassuring is true to a great extent and provides an adequate context for understanding the genesis

\textsuperscript{3} Hans, n.1, p.3.
of the conflicts that ceaselessly plague the Third World.

**SOURCES OF CONFLICT IN THE THIRD WORLD**

**Colonial Rule:**
The first source of conflict in the Third World is historical in nature. The colonial powers ruled over these countries by following a policy of 'Divide and Rule'. This impeded the growth of political and social cohesiveness among the people, which ought to have been possible under a prolonged and stable centralized governance. On the contrary, a systematic pursuit of 'Divide and Rule' negated whatever advantages could have been gained from contact with modernisation which was a by-product of colonial rule in these countries. The policy of divide and rule was pursued so relentlessly that it was seen to climax in what has been called 'divide and quit'. The colonial powers at the time of 'quitting' these countries successfully managed to bring about their partition or alternatively by then had created conditions which would inevitably lead to dissensions and struggles for the secession. The classical examples are the Indian sub-continent, Nigeria, Yemen and Congo. Another telling example is provided by the internecine conflict

going on between the Inkatha party and the ANC in South Africa at this crucial juncture in their history when the rule of apartheid has ended. These historical examples show the abysmal failure of colonial rule as agents of modernisation in which alone lay the hope of attaining political cohesion and stability. This situation, thus, turned out to be like a veritable minefield in these countries which was entirely the creation of colonial rule, without any historical antecedents. They sooner or later became homelands of chronic civil-war, or alternatively became victims of malignant dictatorial rule. Another fall out of the colonial ascendancy has been the legacy of extended borders which have often been the cause of interstate wars between the countries of the Third World, whether it be a conflict between Iran and Iraq or between Iraq and Kuwait in the Middle East, or between India and China in South Asia, or among the countries of South East Asia such as Burma, Thailand and Cambodia.

**Ethno-Religious and Cultural Incompatibilities**

Another persistent and equally pernicious cause of conflicts in the Third World has been the heterogeneity of ethno-religious and cultural incompatibilities in the population composition of states, which emerged in the wake of decolonisation. The countries of South-Asia and South-East Asia present a graphic picture of these conflicts.
Philippines has been faced with the problem of the need to integrate its Muslim minorities, and Malaysia with the task of bringing about durable integration of Malaysian, Chinese and Indian segments of its population. Indonesia, a preponderantly Muslim country contains a diversity of many ethnic groups. In the absence of the kind of modernist direction taken by states in Europe since the eighteenth century, the diverse ethnic groups in these countries do not have either an intellectual or emotional commitment to the respective states to which they belong. This factor coupled with other reasons have provided a very active source of conflicts in these countries.

Ethno-religious and cultural incompatibilities as sources and support of prolonged conflicts in several forms has been seen in the case of South Asia. It was religious incompatibility which had led to the partition of the Indian sub-continent in India and Pakistan in 1947 when they were granted independence by Great Britain. As it was seen later Partition did not really solve the underlying problems and India and Pakistan have been at loggerheads since then with a history of three major wars. At present there exists a war like situation in Kashmir along the line of actual

control. Moreover for about a decade, India's own secular polity has been threatened by a recrudescence of multi-cornered religious fundamentalism with loud cultural overtones - the main players being Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. The religious incompatibility has further been aggravated by an outbreak of tribal separatism in different parts of India. This has not only brought about political instability to what appeared like a stable political system, but has also become a threat to the very integrity of the country. Although it could have been expected that Pakistan would have been immune from similar problem as it has been avowedly and over-predominantly a Muslim country with no commitment to secularism in any form yet it has witnessed similar developments. The religious unity which bound together the two geographical halves - the West and the East - was skewed so violently by the ethnic and cultural factor that Pakistan split into two countries. However, even this has not brought either credible cohesion to the truncated and much smaller Pakistan both in area and population. On the one hand, there has come to the fore a religious conflict between the two major Muslim sects - Shia and Sunny. On the other, there is no genuine political and cultural integration among the different constituents of Pakistani nationhood - Frontier's people who are closer to Afghan ethnically and culturally as compared to Punjabis and
Sindhis. Religion has emerged as an important tool and consideration for major policy formulations in Pakistan but it is yet to be seen whether this 'help' is temporary or permanent. Thus, it has assumed a form as a source of conflict which is different from the manifestations of inter-religious conflicts. Egypt and Algeria have begun to suffer from religious fundamentalism which has pitted itself in a bitter feud with the established modernist and essentially secular polities of the two countries. Often the emotional charge that propels and sustains such movements is so great that it becomes nightmarish for a government to contain and scotch them.

In the Middle-East, Shia Iran, which is of Aryan stock, and the rest of the Arab countries which are Semantic and Sunni, have been living through a balance of power which too was severely upset during the prolonged Iran-Iraq war. The situation is somewhat similar among the littoral states along the Mediterranean, with the Christian as important players in the game. Lebanon is the most illustrative example. Above all, at the very heart of this complex political order of the Middle East sits Israel. Of course, the peace treaty has brought about a kind of settlement but the settlement has yet to pass the test of time and history. This is a broad view of the conflict scenario in the Middle-East, but a narrow and minute view would reveal many a
centre of crisis around major and minor, potential and actual centres of gravity. The most obvious reference can be made to Kurds, and the symmetry or asymmetry of relationship between Turkey and other Muslim states in this region, where Turkey has old historical scores to settle.

It is desirable to round up the consideration of ethno-religious and cultural incompatibility by going back to South-Asia and taking up the case of Sri Lanka which is the central subject and the case study in this thesis. Sri Lanka is a small Island country. The three constituents of this country are 11 million Sinhalese, 3 million Tamils and 1.5 million Muslims. In terms of percentage, this works out to be 74 percent Sinhalas, 18.2 percent Tamils comprising Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils, 7.1 percent Muslims and others 0.7 percent. During the time of colonial rule Sinhalese and Tamils cooperated in the freedom struggle, and after independence the United National Party (UNP) led by D.S.Senanaynake, was supported by both the Sinhalese and Tamils, even though it was a party dominated by the Sinhalese. But this co-operation between the two ethnic groups turned out to be fragile and short-lived. Sri Lanka


though a small country was never physically unified. It were the British who had unified the country in 1815, but the colonial rule, which built a well ordered state, failed to build a nation through genuine integration of its diverse constituents. As a consequence, in the second half of the 1950s when Sinhala was made the official language, diverse ethnic and cultural protests surfaced in the form of political agitations which climaxed in a civil war in the eighties, with a demand for a separate homeland for the Tamils. Since the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is the subject of the latter part of the study, in the present chapter it has been used as a mere illustration of ethno-religious and cultural incompatibilities as a major source of conflict in the Third World.

**Intergroup Rivalry for Political Power**

A major source of conflict in the Third World has been the inter-group rivalry for political power. Those who held the seats of power in the native governments that succeeded the colonial ones, soon lost their legitimacy in the eyes of others who felt convinced that they were better equipped to wield political authority and at the same time were confident that it was possible for them to seize power. The groups and persons who maintained these beliefs, had no commitment to any system of political values. Thus in a context and situation in which there was no native political
system which could have acted as a restraining factor, the withdrawal of the colonial rule resulted in a laissez faire of political legitimacy; everything that could be possibly done for the sake of capturing and holding power became permissible. Violent conflicts were an inevitable consequence of this situation obtaining in a host of Third World countries. Convenience and feasibility became the sole rule of the game, the rest were brazen rationalisations of fait accompli.

This sort of conflict assumed two principal forms - there were bloody coups and bloodless coups. The former inflicted great human misery and suffering upon the people. The latter invariably failed to deliver the goods and promises it had made as justifications of the coup. Pakistan with its repeated military coups in South Asia is a prime example of the bloodless coup. Africa and Latin America have provided horrendous examples of bloody coups, more often resulting in a chain reaction of course being ignited all over the region. In Africa any number of examples can be found across the continent from Somalia and Ethiopia to Angola. In Latin America the same features of political instability caused by bloody conflicts for the seizure of political power has been very common. From Mexico and Central America to Argentina, armed conflicts for the sake of political power have plagued the lives of
people. These political conflicts constitute some of the most tragic episodes in the political history of present century unredeemed even by 'mistaken' or 'faulty' political ideology/ideologies.

**Economic Inequality**

A number of appellation have been used to designate the countries of the Third World such as 'backward nations', undeveloped', 'underdeveloped', 'developing', and 'Less Developed Countries' (LDCs). All these terms connote economic backwardness and poverty that are endemic to these countries. Poverty and economic backwardness have economic inequality as their concomitant. In all of these countries the disparity between the rich and the poor have become wider, more deep and intense. Conspicuous consumption often flaunted by the rich and the powerful have acted as both irritants and stimulants for the poor. The newly gained political freedom brought neither relief nor any prospects for them. This has been the breeding ground for discontent and dissension. The poor saw no reason for continuing to support and serve a politico-economic system which proved so utterly barren and futile for them while their miseries kept accumulating. Moreover, they had lost their traditional

world view as well. At the same time due to these developments the pattern of life which emerged in the prevailing situation was bereft of traditional sources of satisfaction and contentment. As such, they were the ideal constituents to be attracted by different versions of politico-economic ideologies derived from Karl Marx. From a distance they saw the October revolution of 1917 in Russia as a great beacon of light, beckoning them to a real El Dorado of happiness and glory. Thus there was an outbreak of revolutionary and terrorist movements in the countryside. The example of USSR was further strengthened by China which acted as the catalytic agent especially in its Asian neighbourhood. The Naxalite movement in India in late sixties posed threat to law and order as well as challenge to the democratic polity of India cast in the Western mode. In the Western sphere in spite of the Monroe doctrine, it was not possible to save Cuba from a Communist takeover. In the recent past, Nicaragua has been another victim of internecine conflict generated by economic inequality and fuelled by revolutionary ideology of a deceptively attractive appearance. The cost of such conflicts has been immense, and this has made the objective of economic progress much more difficult. The impact of a glaringly accelerating economic inequality on the Third World Peoples has been such that it has unfolded the ironical truth that
their salvation lay in attainment of economic recovery and progress - goals which in the present circumstances seem nearly impossible.

Therefore, unless economic inequality is replaced by a realistic prospect of decent human living as has been achieved by the developed countries, this sort of inequality would continue to be a source of conflict. Even the dismantling of the communist politico-economic order in the erstwhile USSR and the change-of-tracks by China is unlikely to have any significant impact. Economic inequality in a state of acute poverty and regional imbalances in development will continue to generate conflicts of an unwholesome kind. In fact, regional imbalances in the matter of economic development has created situations of conflict with demands for secession/autonomy in the developing countries.

**Material and Political Deprivation**

It has been seen that in some of the decolonized countries the dominant majority has discriminated against a minority often the largest minority in the nation. This denial to the political super-structure, i.e., the refusal of the majority to share both political authority and market with the minority has created social dissensions. Together with this discrimination, the neglect of a minority in the ordinary social and economic spheres has further accentuated
the case of general deprivation. The phenomena is so widespread that examples abound all over the Third World. This has happened in Sri Lanka and South Africa. It was the prime cause of secession of East Pakistan from Pakistan after a protracted conflict. The denial of access to the political super structure (Mujib was denied Premiership) and developmental needs of the people of East Pakistan created within them a deep resentment and a strong awareness of their ethnic and cultural identity.9

It is clear that a fair and equitable treatment to all sections of the society is the minimum essential precondition for forging otherwise disparate ethnic cultural, religious and economic segment of a society into the unity of a nationhood to which all are committed. It is also obvious that this is the foremost need of all ex-colonial countries which have adopted the Western model of nation-state as their goal. In this context it has been observed "The modern age has given rise to a new civic and political consciousness which brings about the shifting of men's loyalties from decisively local and familiar commitments to the governing institution. As D.W. Hanson has shown it was this process of transformation in the political consciousness that made possible the rise of modern state in

England after the civil war of the 17th century. The new states have failed to bring about this kind of transformation through their developmental failure and have thus suffered protracted social conflicts threatening their cohesion and integrity.

Great Powers

Today in the military sense the world is unipolar but historically it can be seen that the rivalry among great powers has often been either a source of conflict in a Third World country, or, it has aggravated an existing conflict and has rendered its management and resolution nearly intractable, with the price invariably having been paid by the contending parties themselves. Three distinct types of impact can be discerned in the roles played by the great powers. (1) Direct intervention, (2) Indirect intervention and (3) use of diplomatic means and aid with a view to influencing the course of their own strategic and economic interests. In the 1950s and 1960s, on a number of occasions the US and former colonial powers directly intervened such as, UK in Iran in 1953, the Anglo-French in Suez in 1956 and the French in Lebanon in 1958. These interventions/events form a chain which culminated in Vietnam. By the beginning

---

10. D.W. Hanson, From Kingdom to Commonwealth (Cambridge, 1970), p.5. Also see B.P.N. Sinha and Sunil Chandra, Valour and Wisdom (New Delhi, 1992), p.3.
of 1970 Soviet Union was in a position to intervene in the affairs of the Third World. The threat was so imminent and palpable that on the occasion of the fourth Arab Israel war in 1973 the American forces were alerted to challenge the possible Soviet intervention. Soviet Union together with Cuba directly intervened in the internal conflict raging within Angola and brought about the victory of the Marxist PLA.11 But this victory attained through the intervention of the Soviet Union, did not end the conflict. On the contrary, it continues to rage and ravage the country and is still far from over. In 1979, Soviet Union intervened massively in Afghanistan which was countered by the US through the induction of armaments and money via Pakistan. This escalated the scale and the cost of the conflict primarily for the Afghans themselves, and in the process the entire American operation left behind an extremely nefarious trail of drug and weapon smuggling in Pakistan has had an equally negative impact on several socio-political conflicts within Pakistan.

Indirect intervention has often been in the form of economic and military aid and diplomatic support. These interventions are not prompted by any altruistic

considerations or by any genuine desire to resolve the conflicts. The primary consideration in such cases has been the desire and decision to serve the strategic interests of the intervening power itself. This is best illustrated by the changing US approach to Pakistan - blowing hot and cold as dictated by considerations of its own objectives and goals.

The third type of intervention by a great power is primarily diplomatic and psychological. Often it has assumed the form of a mediatory role as the one played by the US between India and Pakistan. Intervention of this kind also involves certain ulterior motives, for example, US is suspect in the eyes of at least India which thinks that the Western initiative is motivated by the objective of bringing about a parity between India and Pakistan in favour of US's own strategic interests. It has been obvious that the US posturing over the Kashmir issue has made a resolution more difficult.

Thus it can be seen that the great powers often escalate a conflict without any genuine concern for the welfare of the contending parties.

CASE STUDIES OF SELECTED CONFLICTS

Steven R. David observes: "It is not an exaggeration to say that war since 1945 has been essentially a Third World
affair."¹² War here means both internal and interstate wars. It has been estimated that close to 20 million people were killed in the Third World countries. It is believed to be known that from 1951 to 1985 there were 174 conflicts which lasted an average of five years with a preponderance of domestic war over international wars. Some of the domestic wars had considerable external participation. It has further been calculated that the initiator of the conflict was victorious 21.3 percent of the time and suffered defeat 34.5 percent of the time. A compromise was achieved in 19.5 percent of all cases, and the outcome remained known with some of conflicts still continuing.¹³ These figures should be able to provide a vivid and comprehensive realization of the enormity of the problem of conflicts that have recurrently bedevilled these unfortunate countries, making the immediate and urgent task of national reconstruction and economic recovery all the more difficult. In this context, the task of conflict management has assumed the greatest urgency not only for these countries but for the entire international community which stands to benefit from the achievement of world peace.


In order to obtain a closer understanding of the salient aspects of conflicts two case studies of Third World conflicts from different regions have been selected for a detailed treatment. Both the conflicts have received conflict management with peacekeeping as an important component. The selected conflicts are those of CHAD and Cyprus.

Chad

Chad is one of the most backward countries of the world, sub-Saharan and land-locked, the nearest port being Doualla in Cameroon at a distance of 1500 kms. It is the fifth largest country of Africa, which shares its boundaries with six other countries, namely Sudan, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger. The people of Chad are broadly divided into the Arab and Arabized northern groups and the Pagan, or Kirdi, groups of the South. The Arabs and Arabized people form a relatively homogeneous cultural, religious linguistic and geographic group. Among the inhabitants of the South no single group forms a majority in any region and the largest group, the Sara, constitute only 24 percent of the population. It has an area of 1,284,000 sq. kms. and its population was estimated
to be 5,428,000 in 1988. Its backwardness is compounded by scarcity of natural resources and an extremely poor transportation infra-structure. Like a large number of other countries Chad has no 'historical depth', it being a creation of French colonial expansion in Africa. This territory was acquired by France in 1900 but France came to have complete control over it only in 1914 after the power of Sanusiya Islamic brotherhood, which had its roots in Libya, was 'crushed'. The main legacy of French rule was the transfer of effective power from the Muslim north to the animist and Christian south.

Although Chad was granted independence in 1960, the French handed over the formal administration of the country to the Chadians only in 1965. The French troops remained there till 1975 when they were finally withdrawn. However, France continued to maintain a patron-client relationship with Chad within a classic neo-colonial framework for its own economic and strategic reasons, and also on behalf of

---------------------


the Western powers especially the USA.\textsuperscript{16} The conflict which has been raging in Chad for thirty-four years has multiple sources - internal and external. Among the internal sources are (i) its backwardness, (ii) ethnic/tribal/occupational/religious incompatibilities, (iii) unguaranteed boundaries which were a creation of colonial rule and protracted by the same rule, (iv) unenlightened personal rivalries and resultant power games with no genuine commitment to either a political ideology\textsuperscript{17} or nationalism.

Among the external factors can be counted the interventionist policies of France, USA, Libya and Nigeria. France and Libya were the principal foreign agents involved in direct intervention. Libya annexed the Aozou-strip coterminous with its own southern border in 1973. This provoked US interests which had been active since 1981 as a countermove against Libya - the US's bete-noir. Moreover, this annexation displayed the continued failure of Chadians to compose their differences and its likely consequences. In fact this protracted conflict has become chronic. The inherent danger was tragically illustrated when after the fighting between the troops of Mlloum, Felix (Head of the


\textsuperscript{17} FROLINAT abandoned its socialist ideals after gaining access to power under Habre.
State) and Hebre the FROLINET\textsuperscript{18} leader, broke out in 1979, and Chad state appeared to have disintegrated. The state was partially restored only in 1982 after Hebre entered the capital of Chad 'NDjamena' after unseating Felix Molloum. Later on, in November 1990 itself Deby, the MPS\textsuperscript{19} leader seized power and Habre' fled to Cameroon. He dissolved the national assembly which had come into being only in July 1990 that year on the basis of direct universal suffrage, with a five year mandate. Deby, too has not succeeded in achieving reconciliation of the warring sides and the conflict continues unabated, with all its causes unresolved. With the coming of Hebre to power, South had lost its ascendancy but with Deby at the centre it was restored to an extent.

Although the foreign powers only abetted the situation in Chad in pursuit of their own interests and designs, it is clear that the true responsibility for this state of affairs must remain with the Chadians themselves. Two external initiatives were made to restore peace and resolve the conflict there. The first initiative was taken by Nigeria early in 1979 at the request of Chadian government and with

-------------------

\textsuperscript{18} FORLINET - Front de Liberation Nationale due Tchad, which was formed on 22 June 1966 at Nyala (Western Sudan).

\textsuperscript{19} MPS - Mouvement patriotique due Salut
the consent of other neighbours. The aim was a peace-
keeping operation in order to maintain a cease-fire, and
stability around the NDjamena. Soon the differences propped
up between the peacekeepers and their hosts. Only a few
months after they had gone into Chad, Nigerians were asked
to leave. The other initiative was taken by Organization of
African Unity (OAU), a number of whose members agreed to
form an OAU's neutral force for the purpose of peace-keeping.
It was intended to have a strength of 1500 men to be drawn
from Benin, Congo and Guinea. In spite of all the attendant
fan-fare this move ended in a fiasco. Only the Congolese
came, went into Chad and soon thereafter returned without
performing any peacekeeping operation. In 1981 Libya sent
its troops deep into the country and with its help a pro-
Libyan government was established under Hebre. This caused
a consternation among the members of OAU who produced an
agreement to raise a peacekeeping force of 5000 men to
consist of members from Nigeria, Senegal, Zaire, Benin,
Guinea and Togo. However only Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire
sent troops and the strength of the force was just under
3500. Libya's successful politico-military intervention in
Chad alerted France, Britain and the US. They did not
contravene but gave various kinds of help to the three
members. However, Libya surprised everyone by withdrawing
at once at the request of the Chad. The OAU endeavour was
made in vain.\textsuperscript{20}

From Chadian experience a few vital lessons in respect of conflict management and peacekeeping as a part of it can be learnt. The OAU endeavour failed because of the following factors (i) Lack of finances (ii) lack of experience in conflict management and peacekeeping (iii) poor logistics (iv) lack of equal commitment by all members (v) lack of moral authority backed by material resources, and finally (vi) true support of the international community at large, either through the UN or otherwise. Any conflict management can have a chance of success only if certain preconditions are met, of which the cooperation of the parties to the conflict is foremost. A peacekeeping operation as a part of conflict management ought to be preceded by an unclouded viewing of the issues, forces and other allied factors motivating and sustaining the conflict. This entails protracted study and negotiations by experts chosen for this purpose, with all the sides involved in the conflict. It would be relevant to mention here that this kind of task was undertaken by Indian diplomat G.Parthasarthy in 1983, but he did not have much of a role in 1987 when the accord between India and Sri Lanka was made, with the result that it failed both in conflict

management as well as in peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{Cyprus}

Cyprus is a prime example of conflict management with peacekeeping as a principal component, undertaken by the UN. Besides, the success of the conflict management endeavour by the UN in Cyprus, the operation is also distinguished by the fact that it has been in existence for more than thirty years and is still continuing. Here the salient features of this operation would be presented with appropriate critical analysis.

Cyprus was granted independence in 1960. Its basis was a constitution which was guaranteed by three countries - The United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. The three treaties of Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance preceded the granting of independence, and they in turn had their roots in Agreements reached between Turkey and Greece in February 1959.\textsuperscript{22} The three treaties mentioned above were accepted by the two communities - Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, approximately forming eighty and eighteen percent of the population respectively - as the foundation for the final


settlement of the Cyprus problem. An effort was made by the makers of the constitution to ensure a balance of interest between the two communities who were ethnically and culturally heterogeneous. The very fact of Greek involvement at all stages gives a glimpse of the complexity of Cyprus's history dating back to Greek mythical and historical periods. This is pertinent because enosis\textsuperscript{23} has been the main inspiration and source of motive power for the Greek Cypriots in their persisting conflict with the Turkish element of the population.

The constitution stipulated that the President would be a Greek Cypriot and the Vice-President a Turkish Cypriot elected by their respective communities. They would separately designate the members of the Council of Ministers to comprise seven Greeks and three Turks (Cypriot). The agreement between the two functionaries was made mandatory for certain decisions and appointments. Among the negative provisions in the constitution were two prohibitions. They were prohibitions of Union of Cyprus with any other state and the partitioning of the Island.\textsuperscript{24} The precipitating reasons for the conflict were the differing interpretations

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} Enosis, Union, the Aim and Rallying - Cry of the Greek Cypriot Movement for Union with Greece (Chambers, 1979).
\item \textsuperscript{24} The Blue Helmets, n.22, pp.281-2.
\end{itemize}
of the constitutional provisions by the two communities. The *enosis* among the Greek Cypriots, in the circumstances was paralleled by the special sensitivity and sense of insecurity that characterized the Turkish minority.

Consequently, the application of the provisions of the constitution was afflicted from the very beginning leading to a series of constitutional crises which climaxed in 1963. President Arch Bishop Makarios proposed amendments to the constitution and for this purpose publicly put forth a package of thirteen points. He justified the proposals on the ground that the constitution in its existing form was obstructing the functioning of the republic. There was no immediate response from the Vice-President but the Turkish Cypriot chamber characterised this as "false propaganda" and accused the Greeks of lacking in good faith. The Turkish government 'as one of the guarantors' rejected the proposals categorically without any hesitation. Soon there was an outbreak of violent disturbances which greatly dimmed the possibility of rational dialogue between the two communities. Tension rose high when the Turkish national contingent took up position at the northern outskirts of Nicosia the capital, where the disturbances were raging. On 25 December 1963 Cyprus government accused Turkey of war-like intentions, with its war planes flying at tree level
The first peace initiative was made by the three guarantors in the form of their offer of good offices if invited to do so. Cyprian government accepted the offer and a joint force was established on 26 December. This was followed by a cease fire on 29th and the agreement to create a neutral zone along the cease-fire line. It was also decided to hold a conference of all the parties involved in London in January 1964. These arrangements were communicated by the permanent British representative to the UN (the Security Council). These developments within Cyprus had been preceded by the request of the Cyprian government through its permanent representative asking for an urgent meeting of Security Council for considering its complaint against Turkey. At the request of all the concerned parties it was decided to appoint and send a personal representative of the Secretary General to observe the peace-making process in Cyprus. In the meantime the London Conference held on 15 January 1964 failed to reach agreement, and the proposals to strengthen the peace-making force already in operation was rejected by the Cyprus government which insisted on any such force being placed

25. ibid, p.283.


27. Lieutenant-General P.S.Gyani was appointed personal representative on 17 January 1964.
under the UN control.

General Gyani reported a rapid and grave deterioration in the situation with scattered inter-communal fighting leading to heavy causalities and unchecked activities by several irregular forces. The governmental machinery was disintegrating fast and there were serious apprehensions of military intervention by Greece and Turkey. This raised the possibility of a peacekeeping force. At the request of the representatives of the United Kingdom and of Cyprus, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution, recommending the creation of a United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) with the consent of Cyprus government. The Secretary General was authorised to bring the force into being and make necessary appointments and exercise overall control in terms of the mandate. Initially the stationing of the force was authorized for a period of three months. It is proposed here to highlight the salient features of this operation without going into details of actual operations conducted, from the point of view of conflict management. Besides the organization of the peacekeeping force the Security Council had recommended the appointment and posting of a mediator to act on its behalf.

28. S/5543 and S/5545 of UN.

with a view to promoting a peaceful solution and bringing about an agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem. This provision made the UN operations in Cyprus a full-fledged conflict management operation which took off on 27 March 1964 with the UNFICYP becoming operational. As it stands today the six-monthly mandate has been periodically extended to date since 1964. The peacekeeping operations have been going on in spite of serious strains and stresses including causalities of its personnel. An important and somewhat unusual feature of UNFICYP operations was the establishment of a separate civilian police force designated as UN civilian police (UNCIVPOL) which was interested with the tasks of adjudicating of local disputes and maintaining "law and order" in general. This was a radical extension of the usual task of 'direct inter position along the dividing line'. Right from the beginning UNFICYP maintained close and continuous liaison with the Cyprus government and the leadership of Turkish Cypriots as well as liaison at different levels of administrative and military establishments of both sides. Since it was not authorised to take any political decisions and appear to maintain strictest neutrality it kept various lines of communications open to both the sides to facilitate its peacekeeping task.

The UN mediator submitted its first report in March 1965.\textsuperscript{31} It was a detailed situation report based on observations under three headings:\textsuperscript{32}

i) Independence, self-determination and international peace;

ii) The structure of the state; and

iii) the protection of individual and minority rights.

His recommendation was that in the first instance the representatives of the two communities, and then the parties concerned should meet and hold discussions together on the basis of his observations. It was a major and comprehensive conflict management effort irrespective of its ultimate outcome. Unfortunately Turkey rejected the entire report and projected that Galo Plaza Laso functions as a mediator ended with the publication of the report. Plaza resigned in December 1965 and thus the effort proved vain.\textsuperscript{33} In March 1966 the Secretary General asked his Special Representative in Cyprus to use his good offices with all the parties within and outside Cyprus so that discussions of local or broader problems could be held. This mission of good offices has continued and in 1975 the Security Council

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} UN Doc No. S/6263.
\item \textsuperscript{32} \textit{The Blue Helmets}, n.22, p.289.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
requested the Secretary General to initiate a new mission of good offices.

There have been high plateaus in this thirty years long UN peace operation. The first crisis occurred in 1967 when the Greek commander of the Cyprus National Guard deployed a battalion in the Aophinou, which remained there in spite of an understanding reached between UNFICYP with the local Turkish Cypriot commander. The national guard unit was reinforced at the end of February, and the Turkish Cypriot fighter in retaliation moved forward at nearby Ayios Theodhoros. They manhandled senior UNFICYP officers and the situation also deteriorated in the two districts of Paphos and Lefca. Heavy fighting broke out in most of Theodhoros and parts of Kophino. Turkey protested and the Secretary-General requested the Cyprus and Greek governments to effect the withdrawal of the National Guard from the areas occupied by it, which was carried out on 16 November. In a similar manner in September, the Turkish-Cypriot side assured UN, it would not try to occupy the vacated positions. In spite of these measures, armed clashes spread to other areas and there were a number of Turkish overflights of Cyprus. There soon developed a serious political crisis. The Secretary General appealed to the President of Cyprus and to the Prime-Ministers of Greece and Turkey not to permit an outbreak of hostilities. He sent a
personal representative to the three capitals. The Secretary General, in a second appeal urged them to agree to a phased reduction and ultimate withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces, and for this purpose he offered the assistance of UNFICYP. On 3 December the Secretary-General made a third appeal to the three parties and asked for Greece and Turkey to effect expeditious withdrawal of their forces in excess of their contingent in Cyprus. This appeal received positive response, with Turkey supporting the enlargement of UNFICYP mandate to provide for the supervision of the disarmament of those forces which were constituted after 1963. Also, Greece and Turkey reached an agreement which resulted in the withdrawal of Greek national troops from Cyprus during December and January 1968. The leaders of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities held an initial meeting in Beirut on 2 June and thereafter in Nicosia under a formula devised for this purpose.

It can be seen that after the worsening of the situation throughout 1967, there was a distinct improvement in the security situation, a general lessening of tension with a new surge of co-operation with the UN scheme of things by all the three concerned. The year 1974 turned out to be crucial when the national guard under the direction of Greek officers staged a coup d'état against President Makario's government. This provoked Turkey to launch a
military operation resulting in the occupation of the main Turkish Cypriot enclave north of Nicosia and areas to the north, east, and west of the enclave. A cease fire was announced on 22 July at the UN initiative but only to break down the next day. This was a trying time for UNFICYP which was put on full alert. In accordance with the Security Council resolution 353 (1974) Foreign Minister of Turkey, Greece and the UK held discussions in Geneva towards the end of July. The outcome was Geneva Declaration by which they agreed to a set of measures involving action by UNFICYP. By 12 August the situation had been brought under control only to relapse on the 14 August with the break-down of the Geneva Conference. These developments hardly gave any respite to either UNFICYP or the Security Council. Negotiations were followed by Turkish declaration of cease fire. The UN was faced with another crisis in November 1983 when Turkish Cypriots proclaimed the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". The declaration was held to be legally invalid by the Security Council, governments of Cyprus,

34. The Blue Helmets, n.22, pp.301-5.

35. In the wake of 1974 hostilities UNFICYP undertook humanitarian functions with a wide range of relief assistance. This was recognized by the Security Council vide resolution 359 (1974). Further the Secretary General designated UN High Commissioner for refugees as Co-Ordinator of UN Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus.
Greece and the UK. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots have shown their reluctance to accept resolutions extending the UN mandate. However they have continued to co-operate with UNFICYP both on the military and civilian levels. The military status-quo after number of local agreements between the units of UNFICYP and of the sides concerned were eventually consolidated in a simple set of rules, which was communicated to the military forces in 1989.

The profile of the Cyprus conflict, which has emerged from the sketch of UN conflict management endeavours reveals the following characteristics of the conflict.

1. Cultural, linguistic and ethnic incompatibilities between the majority and minority lies at the root of the protracted conflict.

2. The majority is motivated by enosis, and the minority by its geographical proximity to a major regional power - Turkey - which has cultural linguistic and ethnic affinity with them.

3. External involvement - Greece and Turkey in respective supporting roles with a sense of commitment to the respective causes have rendered the resolution of the conflict nearly impossible.36 A similar criticism of the Cyprus operation has been the observation that its very

success has made the resolution of the conflict an uninteresting prospect.\textsuperscript{37}

4. The cooperation of the concerned parties with the UN peacekeeping and other conflict management measures has made the continuation of UN operations for such a long period feasible, in spite of occasional outburst of violence, even, severe and very wide spread violence.

5. The resolution of the conflict has remained out of reach. Henry Wiseman has made a very pertinent observation in this regard. UNFICYP is a clear case where effective peacekeeping is denied final completion of its mandate because of the failure of the peace-making process.

6. Besides peacekeeping as a conflict management measure, the UN operators in Cyprus took recourse primarily to persuasion, negotiations, liaison, facilitating communication and mediation largely with short term gains.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: AN OVERVIEW

Conflict management is essentially a process of consensus building,\textsuperscript{38} specially in case of intra-state conflicts. But at a deeper level consensus building without which a conflict can neither be managed nor resolved is difficult to obtain in some conflicts. Among the various

\textsuperscript{37} James, n.20, p.235.

\textsuperscript{38} Azar, n.7, p.1.
types of conflict those which are identity related are the most difficult ones to handle and often prove to be intractable. This is true about the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot conflict and Israeli-Palestine conflict. Of course all identity-related conflicts are not similar in all respects; they differ in their respective chemistries. During the struggle for freedom in Sri Lanka, Sinhalese and Tamils fought together and after attaining independence there were no conflicts initially except for the given separate ethnic and religious identities of the two communities. It was only after the Sinhalese abused their majority to discriminate against Tamils and to deprive them of their due share in the politico economic sphere that Tamils acquired a sense of identity crisis, i.e. they found that their very identity as a distinct national groups was threatened and they were being reduced to a second-rate status. Once precipitated thus, this awareness gathered an accelerating momentum. In Israel the identity cleavage between Israelis and Palestinians is compounded and complicated by the precedent historical factor of the territory being a well settled home land of Palestinians. Yet a limited accord has been achieved which most likely has been made possible by a realistic estimate of the physical feasibility of attaining certain goals. The consensus in this case is a result of
the readiness of both the parties to make concessions and arrive at reciprocal adjustments even without removing the ultimate cause of the conflict. Consensus, it could be inferred is a product of mutual efforts to understand the true nature of mutual incompatibility.

All other types of conflict (in terms of their causation) are susceptible to consensus through appropriate conflict management. This is also applicable in the case of those conflicts in which there is no direct and overt violence. Such a conflict may be contained or arrested even though it may have the potentiality of erupting into a world-wide catastrophe. The conflict between the former USSR and the US was contained by a balance of power and terror (nuclear) in its first and longer phase. In the second phase, the balance was replaced by building up of a limited consensus at each stage through dialogue at the summit preceded by prolonged diplomatic negotiation. This was given the name of detente.

The conflicts arising from border disputes, geographical factors like water sharing, trade, territory, etc. are more amenable to conflict management, there is a total possibility of arriving at a consensus, even though the process may be a long one. Among the disputes, the conflict over Falkland/Malvinas between the United Kingdom and Argentina was a legacy of colonial history, with not
much of a substantial consideration, economic or strategic, for the United Kingdom. In 1960 India had forced the Portuguese to leave Goa by recourse to military invasion. Portuguese in spite of their brave posturings had no other option because of their inherent military weakness aggravated by geo-political logistics. The United Kingdom, a great power in the recent past, could not have relished the idea of being forced to go away helplessly in the manner of Portugal. Its action was more in the nature of a re-assertion of its residual status as a once great power. Therefore it can be reasonably hoped and is being hoped that the conflict would soon be resolved.

In any conflict management, its agency is a vital consideration - whether the agency is UN or a third party. Internal bilateral negotiations terminate internal conflicts on a regular basis and a study of the process can give a lot of insight into the task of conflict management in general. A conflict can be managed bilaterally in the international context. It has been done, and right now India and China are managing their serious border dispute on a bilateral basis. India wants the same mode to be adopted in its conflict with Pakistan but Pakistan aims at internationalising the conflict with a view to forcing India to concede advantage instead of a genuine consensus. India, though it has taken a fixed stand in respect of Kashmir,
wants to use bilateralism for the sake of managing the conflict. The relevant provision in the Simla agreement provides an institutional basis for this. The short term prospect is conflict management instead of conflict resolution if Pakistan decides to adhere to the agreement.

Today a number of non-governmental organisations play the role of agencies of conflict management.39 They have also achieved success in their endeavour to varying degrees. The most outstanding example of this is Israeli-Palestinian accord. Even where such an agency seems to have made no progress, it succeeds in clearing the ground a bit for the prospect of successful conflict management in the future. The initiative for conflict management can come from trusted friends and good neighbours as well. Such an initiative was taken by Sri Lanka during the border war between India and China.

In today's world conflict leading to physical violence are the most serious problems and the issue needs to be given the highest priority. The most important role in this regard can be and should be played by the UN, which is its

sinaquor non. The scale of the problem is so vast that UN itself might choose to use other agencies\textsuperscript{40} operating in the field as well as benefit from the experience gained by them in conflict management, for the sake of refining its own modes of conflict management. In order to adequately meet this truly challenging task before mankind, the UN must be strengthened to enable it to play the central role.

At the same time, in the context of a whole range of Intra-state conflicts one of the primary requisites for conflict management leading to conflict resolution, is the readiness to meet development needs of backward regional sectors, and social sectors which have remained low on the development scale.\textsuperscript{41} Again the UN, by extending and strengthening the scope of its organs and thereby its own ambit can act as the main ideologue of a new peace culture in the world.

\textsuperscript{40} James, n.20, p.1.
\textsuperscript{41} Azar, n.7, pp.9, 19.