CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

CHARACTER AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

After the conclusion of World War II, it was hoped that the Big Four would police the world and maintain international peace and security. It was this orientation which gave the UN its basic structure under which the Big Four and China were given the veto power. The mode of peace maintenance in the UN Charter does not contain the idea of either conflict management or use of peacekeeping force.¹ The mode contemplated by the United States was a demand from the contending parties to desist from use of force, and if that failed, imposition of peace by coercive methods. It would be appropriate to reproduce here a passage from K.J.Holsti which provides a glimpse of motivations and considerations of the Big Powers:

The president² justified his enthusiasm for the Big Four police concept on his assessment of trends in the 1930s. Given the character of modern warfare, small powers, he believed, were no longer able to provide for their own security. The economic burdens of arming to deter or repel a great power aggression would be ruinous. The small states, therefore, might just as well remain unarmed and delegate their security concerns to

¹ UN Charter Chapter VI and VII.
² The American President Franklin D.Roosevelt.
the care of great powers. The Big Four would be the trustees of a small power security....

The four policemen, maintaining significant armed capabilities would both deter and coerce. In the event of intractable conflicts between the minor powers, the policeman could dampen conflict through quarantine methods, that is, by starving the conflict parties of the means of conducting military operations. Beyond the quarantine, should that prove ineffective, the big four would bound the aggressor until it capitulated. Since all but the great powers would be effectively disarmed at the end of the war, small aggressors would have no means of defending themselves against armed coercion by one or more of the Big Four.

But this did not happen. The establishment of the UN was soon followed by the onset of cold war with three Big Powers on one side and one on the other. As a result the UN had to take to recourse to measures like peacekeeping and adopt the concept of managing the conflict. The concept of peacekeeping was firmly established and christened as such in 1956 during the Suez crisis. Since then conflict management with peacekeeping has been the major UN instrument, while coercive use of force in an explicit and unambiguous form became possible only after the process of

3 The quarantine method is being used by the Security Council against Iraq.


5 The Conflict management aspect has been dealt with detail in the Chapter III of this thesis.
radical political transformation had advanced in the ex-USSR. Yet examples are few, and such a measure has depended upon the readiness of the US to lead such an undertaking. Of course, the primary, and nearly the entire motivation for the US to act in this fashion has been its own strategic interest. Therefore the US acted and organised and led the Gulf war but used the Security Council resolutions only as authority for this, and never placed either its actions or operations under the control of the Council.

However, conflict management and peacekeeping operations undertaken either by the UN or regional organizations have been a mixed bag of successes and failures. At the same time, quite a few of the conflict management and peacekeeping endeavours have terminated in resolution of the conflicts. Among the early examples is that of Congo which was a four years long operation in which the peacekeeping force had to use force as well, which is not an usual characteristic of peacekeeping. The UN succeeded in restoring peace there, and reestablishing Congo's integrity. On a smaller scale the same story of success was repeated in Yemen, which had to be split but with the consensus of the parties in contention. Nearly thirty years later, the conflict between the north and the south in Yemen has reappeared. Such recrudescence of conflict reflect the essentially fragile nature of conflict.
resolution obtained. They also suggest the inescapability of the presence of instruments of conflict management in the interest of world peace. In cases like Arab-Israel conflicts and in Lebanon conflict management and peace operations had to accept failure. Cyprus is an example of success of conflict management and peacekeeping operations but with no prospect of resolution in sight. Among the regional initiatives in this sphere Chad is an example of failure of a regional organization's endeavour to manage a conflict, and to operate a peacekeeping operation as a part of that. This is, in particular, a very dismal and ignoble chapter in the history of conflict management. Egyptian initiative in Yemen, too, had failed because of its partisan character, and instead, in the given geo-political circumstances, the situation was rendered even more complicated through the intervention of Saudi Arabia. This had led to UN intervention. The Organisation of American States (OAS) has been much more successful in this regard and has at times acted in concert with the UN as in Dominican Republic. The most outstanding success story of


7 Both, Organisation of American States (OAS) and the Representative of the UN Secretary General in the Dominican Republic were involved in resolving conflict in the Dominican Republic.
the UN is that in Cambodia in which the UN acted with the full support and cooperation of regional groups. The Central American States have taken a major initiative and formed a commission comprising five countries to meet the requirements of conflict management, which envisages greatly lessening the over-influence of the US. The US action in Grenada was unilateral and almost falls in the category of aggression. The Indian initiative and operation in Sri Lanka was bilateral. It was a very complex operation and ultimately proved inconclusive in respect of its objectives. It has been treated fully in chapters IV and V. What conclusions can be drawn from this experience is dealt with here through an analysis of factors responsible for its limitations/non-success.

APPLICATIONS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AS A TOOL OF DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy has been the established and traditional mode of conflict management. This mode is still, in use in its traditional form and is being used for resolving or reducing conflict, as well as for diffusing tension. With the emergence of new types of intra-state conflicts, and inter-

8 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). It consisted of seven distinct components: (i) Human Rights, (ii) Electoral (iii) Civil Administration, (iv) Police (v) Repatriation and Resettlement (vi) Rehabilitation and (vii) Verification of the withdrawal and non return of all foreign forces.
state conflicts between the newly emergent nations, conflict
management operations acquired a distinct identity. But no
conflict management initiative can be taken, or conducted
without recourse to diplomacy. It is of course a different
matter that diplomatic initiation today is not the exclusive
sphere of governmental and bureaucratic diplomats. It could
even be a citizenship diplomacy. It was seen that the UN
had sent a mediator and a special representative to
accompany and oversee its peace operations in Cyprus. ⁹ The
special representative performed the functions of an
ambassador for the UN. The mediator's role was intensely
diplomatic, i.e., conducting mediatory negotiations with the
four concerned parties.

In the case of Indo-Sri Lanka agreement and its
aftermath, which has been dealt with at length in this work,
it can be seen that the accord was preceded by hectic
diplomatic activities between the two governments, as well
as between Tamil groups and Government of India. Although
the agreement was, in the formal and legal sense, bilateral
but in truth it was tripartite, because LTTE's and other
Tamil group's acceptance of the agreement was knowledgeably

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⁹ UNFICYP, UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus was
established by the Security Council in March 1964. Mr.
Galo Plaza Lasso was appointed as first Special
Representative by the Secretary General. United
involved. Otherwise there would have been no point in the accord at least from India's point of view. Of course, none of the Tamil groups were a signatory to the accord. In order to get a clear picture of all that transpired, the broad course of diplomatic efforts may be recapitulated here. Between July 1983 and July 1987 India sent several diplomatic missions to Sri Lanka. The External Affairs Minister of India, Mr. P.V. Narsimha Rao made several trips to Sri Lanka, and other ministers such as, Mr. P. Chidambaram and Kunwar Natwar Singh followed suit. During the course of mediatory negotiations foreign secretary Romesh Bhandari and his successor A.P. Venkateswaran also visited Sri Lanka more than once. In addition to these members of the government, as early as 1983 Mr. G. Parthasarathy was sent to Sri Lanka as a special envoy of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Although in the beginning President Jayewardene was most reluctant to have India to do anything with the situation, he was ultimately compelled to reciprocate by the force of circumstances and accordingly sent high level missions to India, and also use such occasions as SAARC Meeting and Commonwealth Conference to personally discuss this issue with the Indian Prime Minister.¹⁰

It is evident that conflict management is a special form of diplomacy, of which peacekeeping is an outcome and explicit extension. Even in the course of peacekeeping a large number of diplomatic activities have to be carried out, specially when there is a break-down of cease-fire and similar overt and covert activities which threaten the achieved peace on the ground.

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AS DESIRABLE PRELUDE

It is abundantly clear from the study of Indo-Sri Lankan accord that President Jayawardene epitomized the Sinhalese negative appreciation of the Tamil Segment of Sri Lanka's population. It is pertinent here to quote Kumar Rupesinghe:

Firstly, President Jayawardene tried to legitimise, through the use of symbols, that he was first and foremost a Sinhala-Buddhist President ('Dharmista' President, King Ashoka, etc.) At the first sitting in Parliament, he evoked the symbol of Duttugammu in confronting the Tamil opposition leader, Amirthalingam. Further, following the anti-Tamil programme of 1983 he justified the issues on the basis of the natural rights of the Sinhalese.\(^\text{11}\)

This shows that Jayawardene as President severely lacked in catholicity of perspective expected of a President, and he failed to rise above the level of ordinary

Sinhala. As an executive President Jayawardene both determined and executed the governmental policies. Right from the beginning he adopted a strident tone towards India and made it clear in no uncertain terms that he did not want India's involvement in any manner and to any extent, even the most friendly one. He displayed a singular lack of appreciation of India's geo-political compulsions and its legitimate interests. On the contrary he indulged in rhetoric when he thundered at the meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of State that Sri Lanka would rather meet Indian invasion to the last man of its 15 million people, in 1983. Sri Lankans indulged in dramatics when on 1st June 1987 Sri Lanka foreign minister sent a message to the UN Secretary General that his country was "facing a potential external 'threat' to its independence sovereignty and territorial 'integrity'". The fact remains that if Sri Lanka did not want India to interfere in her affairs, she equally did not want any UN intervention then, or even now.

The same syndrome characterises the present President, Mr. D.B.Wijetunga. V.Jayanth wrote in Hindu, dated 17 February 1994: "Having made it clear that there is no ethnic problem therefore no political package, what can he offer to the LTTE to give up the armed struggle and return to democratic path peace'? It seems that Wijetunga's intrasigence if not greater is equal to that of Pirbhakaran.

Rohan Gunaratne, n.10, p.xii.

Bangkok Post, 9 August 1993.
The Bangkok Post dated 9 August 1993 reported Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's burning of Peace plan involving UN, proposed by four Nobel prize winners, saying "This is a matter for the Sri Lankan government. The United Nations (if at all) must help the government (in its efforts). There is no need for (UN) intervention or observers." Sri Lanka's essential attitude and response to India was hostile in spite of India's unequivocal commitment to Sri Lanka's unity and territorial integrity. India considerably lost Tamils', especially LTTE's faith in it; for this posture and genuinely held public policy India paid a price later. The attempt to forcibly take 17 LTTE men, in spite of the protests of the local Indian commander, and thus driving those men to commit suicide, was a betrayal of agreement as well as of India. This incident at the obstinate insistence of Colombo turned the Tamil tide against IPKF. The rapid decline in mutual relations between IPKF and LTTE the most important Tamil militant group, suggests that the peacekeeping operations by India were started in a haste without taking necessary precautionary steps. In view of the known underlying

15 ibid.
attitudes, confidence building measures (CBMs) could have been put in place and firmly established prior to the actual peacekeeping. LTTE possibly perceived that India had ultimately no control over Sri Lankan government actions and that Sinhala's were using IPKF for serving their interest and scoring against them, and with hindsight one could say that intentionally or unintentionally Sinhala's succeeded in settling their score with both LTTE and India in short term.

Although CBMs are not a routine practice in peacekeeping operations, especially as a prelude the experience of IPKF suggests that CBMs should be an essential prelude to peacekeeping in the cases of protracted and chronic socio-political conflicts with a view to reducing mutual suspicion. Right now there is much talk of need for CBMs between India and Pakistan as a necessary first step towards managing the escalating conflict between the two. Even in the matter of CBMs one has to be very careful and should not act in haste to ensure the success of CBMs. Michael Krepon observes: "... brief sampling of CBMs suggest many short falls and halting steps, but it is nonetheless impressive for its regional diversity and creativity. More and more political and military leaders are turning to these tools to prevent conflict, provide indications and warnings of troubling developments, negotiate peace agreements, and
strengthen fragile accords. CBMs are barriers against tension building and are a conflict prevention measure on a stable footing. Therefore they are a very basic and important prelude to conflict management in a conflict ridden world. CBMs have been split into two stages - Conflict Avoidance Measures (CAMs) and Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). This scheme of things shows care and caution to ensure the success of CBMs. There are a number of CAMs between India and Pakistan, India and China as well as in the Middle East between Israel of Egypt, Israel-Syria or even informal and implicit CAMs between Jordan-Israel and Turkey and Greece over Cyprus. The most instructive instance of CAMs and CBMs, stretched over the entire course of forty years long cold war between the West and the East played, the crucial role of conflict prevention. They gradually grew from strength to strength through protracted but patient diplomatic negotiations climaxing in summits between the two super powers.

19 ibid, pp.3-5.
20 ibid, pp.3-5 and 46.
REASONS FOR FAILURE OF INDO-SRI LANKAN AGREEMENT

Reference have been made to a number of detailed studies of this accord and its implementation in the previous chapters. A fresh treatment has been attempted with critical analysis here as well as elsewhere in other chapters. However, a few generalised conclusions about the basic reasons for the failure of the accord are given below:

India's Regional Image and Diplomatic Style

In the post Sikkim annexation and Bangladesh war period, India was perceived to have hegomonistic ambitions. Mrs. Indira Gandhi had set the diplomatic style which smacked of "arrogance". Rajiv Gandhi continued more or less with the same style.

Lack of Political Will

Both Sinhalas and LTTE lacked the political will to

22 Objectivity and total freedom are the two primary requisites. Their absence even in a small degree, is bound to vitiate the study as well as which, instead of helping conflict management and resolution, is likely to affect adversely any such endeavour is an instance. The authors seem to betray an underlying superciliousness and indifference. They lean towards faulting India without properly balancing it with their treatment of Sri Lanka. Their method is sleek which makes some of the facts less than accurate, slanted or even distorted. By contrast Kumar Rupesinghe's (n.12) treatment of the subject is characterised by catholicity and penetration, with no flinching from facts even when they could be very unpleasant. Ralph R. Premdas and S.W.R. de A.Samara Singhe, Asian Survey, vol.28, no.6, June 1988.

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compose their differences, and let grow enduring political
understanding which could underwrite Sri Lanka's unity and
peace. Sinhalas were irrevocably wedded to the idea of Sri
Lanka being only their homeland and therefore, all others
were, by right, inferior with no moral claim on the full
political and economic privileges. This complex rationalised
those actions which were perceived by the Tamils as unjust,
discriminatory and deprivatory, a view shared by others as
well. In psychological terms it is rather difficult to
get rid of such a complex. Leon Festinger designated this
complex as **cognitive dissonance**.

"Cognitive dissonance sheds light on the harsh treatment of minorities and other
underdogs by dominant groups. Assuming that a member of a
dominant group thinks of himself as a decent person, he may
experience cognitive dissonance induced by the
contradiction, "I am a decent person. But I am being cruel
to these people". This dissonance can be reduced by
convincing oneself that the humble or the oppressed deserve
to be treated harshly, because they are wicked, lazy,

23 Kumar Rupesinghe, "Theories of Conflict Resolution and

24 Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford, California, 1957); and Leon Festinger and
J.M. Carl Smith, "Cognitive Consequence of Force Compliance", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*,
no. 58, 1959, pp. 203-10.
irresponsible, carriers of an ancient curse, a horrible disease, or the like.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{Jayawerdena's and LTTE's Expectation from India}

To begin with, Jayawerdena right from 1983 to the time that he found the situation become precarious and almost unmanageable, made it known to all that he did not want India to be associated in any way with ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. He gave strong expression to this. LTTE on the other hand knew that he needed India's support and succour. But like Jayawerdena, Prabakharan too did not want any advice from India and wanted to chalk out his own course of action and policy independently, which included either neutralization or annihilation of other parallel and competing Tamil groups. Neither Jayewardene nor Prabakharan showed or had any appreciation of India's inherent and unavoidable compulsions arising out of its geopolitical interests. Both of them wanted to use India and its resources on their own terms and to serve their own purposes. Sooner or later it was bound to misfire with India asserting its independent position together with the readiness to help both the parties in what it judged to be fair. The consequence was that the agreement could not be

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\textsuperscript{25} Anatol Rapoport, \textit{The Origins of Violence: Approaches to Study of Conflict} (New York, 1989), pp.87-88.
\end{flushright}
implemented and to an extent LTTE charged that Colombo could not be trusted and was acting in bad faith. It is significant to note that on the one hand Jayawerdene spurned India's good offices but on the other, within nine days of the outbreak of ethnic riots in 1983 he approached the United States, Britain and Bangladesh, Pakistan, and even Israel at a later stage, to assist him in controlling the situation. He forgot that cold-shouldering India was one thing and spiting it in terms of its vital strategic and geo-political interests altogether another thing. The way Indian peacekeeping operations ran into the mischief of suicide by LTTE men for which Sri Lankan responsibility cannot be denied, gives rise to the thought that President Jayewardena entered the agreement with a view to extricating himself from a difficult situation, that the IPKF would ultimately have to fight LTTE. This was clever - killing two birds with a single stone and this might lead to a solution of ethnic problem on his terms. President Premdas's opening a dialogue with LTTE before the withdrawal of IPKF and as a measure to pressurise India to withdraw fast, showed a consistent proof of Colombo mindset, irrespective of personalities. Only the style

26 S.D.Muni, n.10, Appendix I, p.286.
27 ibid, pp.53-54; and Rohan Gunnaratna, n.10, pp.9-18.
differed. Premdasa was much more strident than Jayawerdene. The conflict and attendant violence is continuing unabated with Prabhakaran growing more intransigent and self confident because of India distancing itself from the scene. He is a classical specimen of rabid terrorism with an unreasoning faith in his adopted ideology refusing to see any other point of view and working with determination, perseverance and extraordinary guerrilla leadership. This has been fuelled and strengthened by Colombo's own intransigence.28

**India's Failure**

India failed in two important ways. First of all it acted with undue haste without obtaining the right conditions for launching the peacekeeping operation, without securing firm commitment of LTTE leadership to the accord and at the same time failing to understand them and their deep intentions. This was a failure in 'real-politik' terms, merely relying upon the soundness of its ideological position. This was a crucial failure. The second failure was non-assertion of its geo-political interests publically to the entire international community unambiguously - something which is an established practice recognised all

28 It is interesting to learn as reported in the Hindustan Times of 5 April 1994, p.11, that "LTTE have set up a defence college to train an officer corps."
around. It ought to have shown that it was not acting out of petty and unacceptable self interest, and should have endeavoured to convince others that it was not being hegemonistic. The haste in which food (a humanitarian aid) was air-dropped could have been moderated. Even the UN acts with patience in such a situation as in Bosnia, irrespective of the magnitude of sufferings and miseries inflicted upon the people. The US learnt a bitter lesson in Somalia because of its adventuristic approach and style.

A number of supplementary causes also lay at the back of Indian failure. Its policy direction to IPKF was not realistic and it did not give a clear direction that humanitarian aspects and the task of keeping peace should be rightly balanced without affecting the main mission. The consequence was that IPKF was not able to keep on course in the performance in its main mission, while at the same time in its humanitarian work, which too was of considerable scale it did not earn the gratitude that it deserved from Tamils. New Delhi also failed to be sufficiently assertive with Colombo at this stage as the suicide episode shows. It was a situation in which petty legalistic considerations came into play. The Indian commander stationed at Palaly was not suitably tactful as to stop the Sri Lankan commander from proceeding with taking away the arrested LTTE men. It was not because he did not have courage or means for doing
so. Behind his failure could be seen the hand of higher command's direction based on whatever policy was formulated by the political leadership and handed over to the army. When General K.Sunderjee\textsuperscript{29} arrived on 6 October 1987 at Palaly he turned down Lt. General Depinder Singh's recommendation that going in for the hard option would mean getting 'stuck in insurgency situation for the next twenty years' he was overruled by General K. Sunderjee. The next day he received orders to use force against LTTE. Whatever might have been the personal and professional view of the Indian Army Chief, which it is difficult to establish, the inference is that he was carrying out a decision taken at the political level, and given to him. The result was violence, heavy casualties even on IPKF side and loss of image. It has to be remembered that Lt. General Depinder Singh, who had made his views known, was replaced by another overall commander in Sri Lanka.

**The Scope of IPKF**

The Indo-Sri Lankan agreement was not simply a peacekeeping accord. Peacekeeping was only a part of it, though an important component. It was a comprehensive and full fledged conflict management and conflict resolution, ---------------

\textsuperscript{29} General K.Sunderjee was the (COAS) Chief of Army Staff, Indian Army.
detailing the passage from various stages of management to effecting the resolution of conflict, beginning with peacekeeping. The stages were disarming of Tamil militants, sending back of Sri Lankan army to their barracks, holding of election and formation of provincial council and devolution of power. Never before in its entire history, any peacekeeping force was burdened with such responsibilities, which also included the sole responsibility for maintenance of law and order, civil and humanitarian services. And IPKF had to perform all this in a most complex and difficult situation. It is to be remembered that even US led peacekeeping force placed between Egypt and Israel confined itself to only peacekeeping operations, and left the larger issues of total conflict management and resolution to other more appropriate and more competent agencies for this purpose. The peacekeeping operation is still in existence with mutual consent of the parties. Moreover, in the agreement itself no time limit was set for the conclusion of the operations. It is to be remembered that this was a vital difference between UNEF I and UNEF II. Kumar Rupesinghe has made a pointed analysis of the accord which reveals its inherent weaknesses. Among other things he has highlighted ten

30 Chapter III of the thesis.

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features of the accord which make this weakness obvious. Like a building top heavy it collapsed under its own weight. India, to its own regret, whether realised or unrealised wanted to do too much at a go.

**The United Nations**

It may appear strange that Colombo never sought the help of the UN, nor did LTTE take any initiative of this kind. Both did not want the UN to come to Sri Lanka. It is curious that India too did not advise any of the parties to approach the UN, perhaps because it treated the conflict as its backyard problem. The same thing had happened in erstwhile East Pakistan. But this time India had to pay a very heavy price. Even now, with no resolution in sight no party in Sri Lanka wants the UN there. Right now India has completely distanced itself. There is no control mechanism and fortunes of battle keep shifting but not to an extent that either victory is in sight for Colombo or Prabhakaran is dismayed or demoralised. The prospects of peace in Sri Lanka through internal dialogue have become a speculative possibility with the victory of PA and the formation of a new government in Colombo with Ms. Chandrika

32 Bangkok Post, 9 August 1993.
Ranatunge as Prime Minister, even though armed conflict continues. The ideal thing would be for the UN to assume conflict management either at its own initiative or someone else’s initiative. The fact remains that the track record of parties other than the UN in peacekeeping has been deficient and poor.33

VALIDITY OF THEORIES

Conflict Theories

This thesis has attempted a reasonable demonstration of the truth of conflict theories outlined in Chapter 1. The contradiction apparent in this assertion is not real, because the essential difference among the theories can be understood as different ways of expressing a single idea. This is the reason why theories overlap with each other like Jacob Bercovitch’s and Peter Wallenstein’s. It can also be seen that the notion of incompatibility and scarcity have a fundamental correlation. Another reason why we have a multiplicity of conflict theories is the fact that different theoreticians adopt different perspectives. Differences are there also because those who have in mind either management or resolution or some other band of the spectrum foremost, move from one point to another of the theoretical spectrum.

This results in different emphases and priorities. Incompatibility and scarcity are important, for example, in the approach of Maryland Forum. But since the accent in the case studies undertaken by them perforce falls upon developmental needs and deprivation, these become the core of their implicit conflict theory. Likewise identity-linked conflicts are rooted in incompatibility, and once this is recognised and the effort to bridge the incompatibility between the two parties succeeds, the crisis of identity is expected to disappear. Now, if somebody with a different perspective uses a different set of vocabulary to pin-point the same incompatibility, the identity or correlation between this and his vocabulary may not be apparent at first. In this work ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka has been co-related with the psychological concept of Leon Festinger - Cognitive dissonance which in fact is the socio-psychological face of the reality comprehensively designated as 'incompatibility'. Thus it can be seen that the divergences among the conflict theories are more apparent than real. The regional and specific diversities of


35 Cognitive Dissonance and Incompatibility both may be used as descriptive and explanatory terms to represent the same phenomenon. The difference between the two at a deeper level, is immaterial. They do not cancel out each other.
conflicts are such that different theoretical constructs of conflict can be used as complementary to each other.

The case studies made here and those listed in appendix confirm the truth of conflict theories which make it possible for the appropriate agencies and interested parties to formulate management and resolution studies. It may be that a particular conflict theory is appropriate and relevant in the context of a particular set of conflicts. But that does not mean invalidation of all other theories. Of course a particular conflict theory may have a greater or less generality. Conflicts vary according to era, location, period and historical antecedents but there can always be discerned a common pattern and dynamics. It is believed that this study amply shows the value of conflict theories and in general establishes their validity. Like all viable theories, conflict theories remain falsifiable, but until such time that the instance of a conflict appears and it cannot be understood in terms of a theory, the theory would remain valid. The treatment here also points out that the conflict theories are complementary to each other and are capable of refinement and amplification which is only expected in a matter so essentially human a phenomenon as socio-political conflict, which is also highly institutionalized.

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Management Theories

In the context of conflict management theories the present research points to three conclusions:

(a) Conflicts are ruinous
(b) Conflicts are ubiquitous
(c) Conflict management deserves top priority on the contemporary agenda.

Until such time as the UN is in a position to give effect to coercive mandate and has the means to apply them, the established modes of conflict management will have to be used. Of course in the process of using them, improvements and refinements would suggest themselves and they would have to be incorporated. Since there is a multiplicity in the nature of conflicts, there is a variety in the modes of conflict management, and the choice of a particular type of management. Although the record of non-UN conflict management endeavours is not very encouraging, this should not cause dismay. Since the UN is not free from the power and interest politics of major powers it is desirable that in the light of experience of failures, regional organizations should try to make their own conflict management efforts more viable. Given the ubiquity of conflicts and its rootedness in the human nature as well as in human social order, the UN effort needs to be supplemented by other efforts. It is also a question of
means, resources and scale. The UN suffers chronically from paucity of funds. The formation of Five Nation Security Commission by the Central American States, which has had some success, is a positive development in this regard. It can be hoped that organizations like SAARC, ASEAN, which are at present not concerned with conflict management, at some future date may decide to undertake this task and perform it with economy and speed because of their regional proximity. The experience of Indian conflict management has been unfortunate and dampening in its effect but that again should not be dampening initiatives in this direction on a bilateral basis. Lack of experience, inherent intractability that characterizes the conflict, and the short sightedness of the parties concerned doomed the Indian venture from the very beginning even though India's intentions were positive and for the good of Sri Lanka. Any incidental advantages in terms of India's geo-political interest, in the case of success, would have had the character of by-products. Unlike in Sri Lanka, India performed successfully a violence control mission in Maldives. Even much prior to this, India had lent similar help to Burma (1948-49), Indonesia (1949), Nepal (1950-51; 1951-53; 1960-62), Sri Lanka (1971). 36 Indian lack of

36 S.D. Muni, n.10, p.12.

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experience refers to the specific context of the situation in Sri Lanka and the complex spectrum of responsibilities taken upon itself by India - from conflict management through peacekeeping to conflict resolution. The Indian mission in Sri Lanka surpassed and exceeded anything that India had ever undertaken to do prior to this.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary-General of the UN has drawn the attention of the member countries to issues of conflict and peace as they exist at the moment in the form of an agenda for peace.37

The operational disappearance of Veto in the Security Council since 31 May 1990 has not rendered the task of maintaining peace and international security any easier or any less urgent because the mandate of the UN is far from established, for example, as in Bosnia. This is so in spite of positive and encouraging developments that characterize this decade, such as dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, the peace accord between Palestine and Israel, the opening of dialogue between Israel and its Arab neighbours Jordan and Syria, and the prospect of peace in Northern Ireland. The curtailment of arms race between the US and Russia does not seem to have been much of an inspiration to others in the Third World, and new conflicts and issues for

conflict have appeared. Therefore the task of conflict management is more than likely to remain in the foreground of international relations within the UN and outside it. This will entail a continuing effort to study and understand conflicts, existent, imminent and possible, and further to devise better and more effective instruments of conflict management. It has been pointed out that in the course of some 100 conflicts since 1945, 20 million people have been killed.38 The killing is continuing and the fears of holocaust are getting aggravated with the emerging prospect of nuclear confrontation in the Indian subcontinent itself, where there has been, of late, talk of nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan.

Therefore, it has become imperative for the nations to give a much greater more concentrated attention to the issues of conflict and conflict management. This has an overriding relevance for the Third World countries because they have been the breeding ground and victims of conflicts - international and intranational. One may be sceptical about the character of the commitment of the developed countries of the West to the ideal of global peace. One could see in the policing of the World by the U.S. a pursuit in disguise of its own interests; one could also see a

38 ibid.
hubris in this. But for the Third World countries, afflicted by underdevelopment, famine, disease and even the scarcity of drinking water, management of conflict is a matter of life and death. They have got to understand, and must be made to understand this. This piece of research may be seen as an humble effort towards generating this understanding by examining the relevance, parameters and success and failures of conflict management and peacekeeping.