INTRODUCTION
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Conceptual clarity is essential in research. We encounter widespread confusion in connection with use of the term intellectual(s). It prevails both in academics and the common parlance. While some prefer to use the term intellectuals, others opt for the word intelligentsia. Lipset and Dobson rightly observe that the word intellectual is fraught with ambiguities and the meanings attached to it are diverse. So, our first endeavour would be to understand the terms intellectuals and intelligentsia.

1. Terms Intellectuals and Intelligentsia

Terms intellectuals and intelligentsia have been used interchangeably and with different connotations as well. In his contribution to *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* Roberto Michels applies the two terms interchangeably. Raymond Aron does the same in his work. Moreover, in the writings of some noted revolutionaries and academics on the subject the two terms appear synonymously. They are, e.g., Lenin, Karl Kautsky, Karl Mannheim and Edward Shils.

But some scholars have drawn a distinction between the two terms. The interests of intelligentsia are, according to Alvin Gouldner, 'fundamentally technical', but the interests of intellectuals are 'primarily critical, emancipatory, hermeneutic and hence often political'. For Syed Alatas 'an intellectual is a person who is engaged in thinking about ideas and non-material problems using the faculty of reason'. And by intelligentsia he means 'those who have gone through higher formal and modern education, the specialists and the professionals, and those who have acquired higher level education by other means'. Andre Beteille also has sought to differentiate the two terms. He opines that intellectuals engaged primarily in 'critical, creative and contemplative' activities are a much more restricted category than the intelligentsia considered in the broad sense of non-manual workers in general.
In his poser in Seminar he thinks that the term intellectual has acquired a very broad, perhaps even a loose meaning. However, he finds the term intelligentsia even broader. S. Bhattacharya takes note of the conventional referral similarity of the two terms. But he does not go by that. For him ‘All intellectuals’ are members of the intelligentsia -- or almost all are -- but not every member of the intelligentsia is an intellectual’. He talks of intelligentsia as a ‘collectivity’ comprising all who are educated. And intellectuals form, in his view, a sub-set of the category intelligentsia by their ‘special role as transmitters of ideology’.

While discussing the intellectual history of colonial India K.N. Panikkar talks of ‘intellectuals’ distinguished from ‘intellectual workers in general’.

The reasons for such confusions and inconsistencies in use of the two terms could be understood if we look into the etymological dimension of the problem. The origin of the English term ‘intellectual’ lies in the base (vulgar) Latin word Intellectualis. It came to English language partly through French in which it is intellectuel, the word used for the first time in French in 1265 as a noun signifying one who is concerned with knowledge or understanding.

According to The Oxford English Dictionary, the term intellectual signifies ‘a person possessing or supposed to possess superior powers of intellect’. It cites a number of examples of former use of the term. In 1652, for instance, Benlowes talked of ‘First race of Intellectuals’. In 1813, Byron said, ‘Canning is to be here, Frere and Sharpe, -- eperhaps Gifford... I wish I may be well enough to listen to these intellectuals.’ In 1884, A.A. Watts referred to ‘The silent person who astonished Coleridge at a dinner of intellectuals’. On 30 November 1898 the Daily News reported, ‘Proceeding to refer to the so-called intellectuals of Constantinople, who were engaged in discussion while the Turks were taking possession of the city’. On 19 December
1903, the Sat. Rev. stated, 'We are compelled to rank higher the mind of the average young man of fashion than the mind of the average "intellectual" at those listerary tea-parties'. On 12 August 1960, the Times Literary Supplement mentioned, 'The English have a great respect for brute facts; and the intellectual in politics often looks to them like a man busily engaged in brushing unpleasant facts under the carpet'. On 15 Feb 1974, the Times noted, 'Russian history has set a pattern of alienated intellectuals'. Ramond Williams holds that the word 'intellectual' has been an ordinary objective, from 14th century, for 'intelligence' in its most general sense. However, it became a noun to signify the faculties or processes of 'intelligence'. According to him, the use of the word 'intellectual' as a noun to refer to a particular kind of person or a person doing a particular kind of work dates effectively from first third of the 19th century though it had some isolated earlier instances. Moreover, he notes the application of its plural 'intellectuals' from first third of the 19th century to indicate 'a category of persons,' often unfavourably. He cites Byron who, in 1813, wrote: 'I wish I may be well enough to listen to these intellectuals'. In fact, several negative senses gathered around the word intellectual. There are complex reasons for this. But they certainly include, he opines, opposition to social and political arguments based on theory or on rational principle frequently connecting with the distinguishing use of the more of the most intelligent as a governing class, and with opposition to a "separation" of "head" and "heart", or "reason" and "emotion". Further, he observes that until middle third of the 20th century unfavourable uses of intellectuals were dominant in English, and such uses persisted even now. Finally, he states, 'But intellectuals, at least, is now often used neutrally, and even at times favourably, to describe people who do certain
kinds of intellectual work and especially the most general kinds'.

Further, it has been observed that the term intellectual(s) became popular during the fervid debate over the Dreyfus Affair in France at the close of the 19th century. It was a case of judicial error which polarised the French intellectual community into two rival camps, the Dreyfusards and the anti-Dreyfusards. The Dreyfusards included distinguished names of French men of letters, viz., Anatole France, Zola, Marcel Proust, Andre Gide, Claude Monet and many others. They published a protest, entitled 'Manifeste des Intellectuels' (Manifesto of the Intellectuals) in the newspaper _L Aurore_ in January 1898 against the (secret) conduct of the trial of Alfred Dreyfus and demanded a fresh probe into the matter. Immediately, the 'Intellectuals' were attacked by the anti-Dreyfusard critics which comprised Ferdinand Brunetiere, Auguste Rodin, Jules Lemaitre and others. Brunetiere wrote that this 'recently created word' designated a would-be aristocracy of individuals, researchers in laboratories and libraries, who looked at themselves as 'superman'.

Hence, the term 'intellectuals' referred to the Dreyfusards. The anti-Dreyfusards called themselves 'men of letters', 'literary critics', 'writers', and the like. They gave a pejorative connotation to the term 'intellectual', and the Dreyfusards happily adopted it.

The Dreyfusards were called deracines (uprooted) implying that they were enemies of the established order and national purpose. But they retorted saying they were désinteresses (selfless) holding that they were defenders of moral and cultural standards, disinterested guardians of universal ideas and ideals of justice and liberty against even the claims of the state and, hence, acting as true 'clerks' out of conscience and a sense of moral duty. In this way they were defending, they believed, their own claim
to represent the realm of ideas beyond narrow specialisation.

On the other hand, the anti-Dreyfusards had a vision of an ordered society based on the principle of strict division of labour confining people within the limits of their own occupations and professions. They thought the intellectuals who got concerned over abstract concept of justice above respect for the decisions of the judiciary were subversive of the social order and placed themselves above the national community.

As regards the term intelligentsia it is generally believed that it has Russian origin. Though Martin Malia finds no documentable idea of where the term came from. However, he holds that it emerged in the 1860s in Russia. L.G. Churchward thinks, that intelligentsia is an international word of Russian origin To Aron also it seems to have been used for the first time in Russia during the 19th century. And during the first third of the 20th century the term intelligentsia was, Williams observes, borrowed to the West (English) from Russian.

On further scrutiny we found some more information about the term intelligentsia. In Great Soviet Encyclopedia, E.A. Ambartsumov opines that the term intelligentsia was introduced by the writer P.D. Boborykin in 1860s in Russian from which it passed into other languages. According to him, 'At first, the term referred to educated people in general, and even today it is often used with this meaning'. Moreover, he defines intelligentsia as 'a social stratum consisting of people professionally engaged in mental work, primarily of a complex and creative kind, and in the development and spread of culture'.

According to The Oxford English Dictionary, the term intelligentsia (also formerly 'intelligenzia') meant-- 'The part of nation, originally in pre-revolutionary Russia, that-- aspires to intellectual activity; the class of socie-
ty regarded as possessing culture and political initiative'. It cites some examples of the early use of the term. In 1907, M. Baring stated, 'They (the revolutionaries) fear that if the question of a republic is brought forward there will be a general massacre of the educated bourgeoisie, the so-called "intelligenzia"'. In 1916, H.G. Wells said, 'They are not sort of equivalent of the Russian Intelligentsia, an irresponsible middle class with ideas'. In 1922, C. Sidgwick affirmed, 'He told me... that he belonged to the Intelligentsia and that he was out to shoot capitalists'. In 1949, I.T. Sanders opined, 'The intelligentsia, as they were called by the [Bulgarian] peasants, were the most influential group in the community... I was sure to find several of them playing cards... The mayor... could watch... the municipal building... the priest could look... to the church just beyong. The village doctor's husband was near in case his wife needed him.' In 1956, R. Redfield avered, 'To the administrative and cultural intermediaries between local life and wider life the word "intelligentsia" has long been applied'. And in 1971, H. Seton-Watson observed, 'The revolutionary propensity of the intelligentsia has been definitely correlated with the extent of the cultural gap between the educated elite and the mass of the people'.

As used in 1860s the term intelligentsia referred to the small minority of educated Russians who mainly came from the nobility and the urban bourgeoisie. The term signified, according to Aron, a small group which had studied in university and acquired a culture largely of Western origin. They were drawn from the aristocratic families, bourgeoisie or even the better-off peasantry. They felt united by the knowledge they shared and the attitude they adopted towards the established order. 'All this,' Aron states, 'together with the new scientific spirit and liberal ideas, inclined them towards revolution.' So, before the end of the 19th
century the term was often used to describe that section of the broad social intelligentsia which sought radical changes to the Russian social and political structure. Churchward observes that this radical intelligentsia became increasingly significant after 1890 in Russia but it was never a majority of the intelligentsia.\textsuperscript{27}

Further, we see some confusions in connection with the use of the term intelligentsia in the early 20th century. It is evident from the excerpts reproduced below:\textsuperscript{28}

"Define an 'intelligent'," suggested a war correspondent from the United States during the First World War.

"What is meant is something which has escaped before it is captured," said the Petrograd editor. . . . An intelligent is an educated person — from a University — perhaps engaged in a profession — and perhaps with ideas of reform of Russia."

"And there is Leonid H. —!" said the Frenchman dreamily. . . . He never saw a university. His hobby was individual study. He is in no learned profession. He has no idea of reforming Russia. And he is a bureaucrat."

"But he, too, is an intelligent," the Englishman said, and the others nodded.

"Ah, there it is as always — an intelligent is an intelligent," the journalist cried out in despair.

The member of the Duma said, "Let us say that an intelligent is one who thinks."

"Who thinks —" repeated the Englishman waiting for more.

"Who thinks and talks and writes of change," finished the Russian.

"And intelligent is an intelligent."

"It will do," they all said.

Even in this conceptual untidiness Richard Washburn Child, an American writer who had published a series of articles on Russia during the War could infer that among women as among men in Russia there was a class of people identified by intellectual characteristics (and not by birth, wealth or bureaucratic position) who was called the 'intelligentsia', and an individual of this class called an 'intelligent'.\textsuperscript{29}
After the Bolshevik revolution in the Soviet Union the intelligentsia, in official publications, came to be seen in terms of involvement in mental work signifying a very large group of educated people. For instance, in Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism which was first published in Russian in 1959 intelligentsia is characterized as 'persons engaged in mental work'. Similarly, in the 1958 Soviet Political Dictionary it is said to comprise 'persons professionally employed in mental labour'. In the Soviet Dictionary of Philosophy, it is called 'a social group of people, professionally engaged in brainwork'.

However, Churchward points out that many Russians still use the term intelligentsia in its traditional 19th century Russian sense applying it only to a small minority of perhaps half a million people who are non-careerists, fully involved with intellectual activity of all kinds and, in general, are perennial critics of their own society and culture. And the majority of the professionally trained specialists are referred to as 'technocrats' or as 'intellectuals'.

Hence, etymologically we see that the terms intellectuals and intelligentsia signify a narrow (elite) section of the men of letters in one context, and to a broad group of people encompassing, in the widest sense, all the educated person in the other. In such a situation we would like to have a more authentic view in this regard. It leads us to the definitional domain.

2. Defining Intellectuals/Intelligentsia

There are broadly two conceptual perspectives on the definition of intellectuals/Intelligentsia. They are the Marxist and the non-Marxist. There are a number of writers and scholars among the non-Marxists belonging to Western Europe and the United States who have expressed their views on this issue. They are, e.g., Benda, Barzun, Znaniecki,
Williams, Brym, Michels, Kiernan, Aron, Dahrendorf, Coser, Parsons, Merton, Shils, Durkheim, Weber and Mannheim. In India they are, e.g., Bteille, Singh, Dube, Nandy, Chaudhuri, Jha, Bhoite, Srivastava and Sharma.

In the non-Marxist view intellectuals are primarily seen as the functionaries of the symbolic world and the cultural domain of life. While some scholars define them as a small group of knowledge elite, others identify them with a fairly large group of persons mainly involved in the realm of knowledge, and covering, in the broadest sense, all the educated people.

For Julien Benda intellectuals constitute a small knowledge elite. He defines them as

all those whose activity essentially is not the pursuit of practical aims, all those who seek their joy in the practice of an art or a science or metaphysical speculation, in short in the possession of non-material advantages, and hence in a certain manner say: 'My kingdom is not of this world'.

In history he finds an uninterrupted series of philosophers, men of religion, men of literature, artists and men of learning who had such dispositions. They were engaged in 'purely disinterested activity of the mind,' or in 'gazing as moralists upon the conflicts of human egotisms'. They preached 'in the name of humanity or justice' and adopted superior abstract universal principles. Their activity was 'chiefly theoretical'.

In Max Weber's opinion intellectuals are those who excel in the cultural sphere and, hence, occupy the position of leadership in society. He characterizes them as

a group men who by virtue of their peculiarity have special access to certain achievements considered to be 'culture values,' and therefore usurp leadership of a 'culture community'.

Emile Durkheim does not agree with the anti-Dreyfusards who maliciously attached a pejorative meaning to the word intellectual. For him 'the intellectual is not a person who has a monopoly of understanding (intelligence)'. He argues that there was no social functions where understanding is
unnecessary. But in case of intellectuals, he thinks, '(understanding) is at once both the means and the end, the instrument and the goal'. The peculiarity of intellectuals, according to him, is that they '(use) understanding to extend understanding, that is to say, to enrich it with knowledge, ideas, and new sensations'. This practice is, he believes, the basis of the professions in art and science. Further, he opines that intellectuals are 'accustomed by the practice of scientific method' and, hence, 'give in less readily to the entusiasm of the crowd and to the prestige of authority'.

For Mannheim, intellectuals constitute 'social groups whose special task it is to provide an interpretation of the world for that society (in which they live)'. He considers intelligentsia 'those who create culture'. For him 'the task of the intellectual elites is to inspire the life of culture and to lend it form, create a living culture in the different spheres of social life'.

According to Mannheim, the main types of elites are the political, the organizing, the intellectual, the artistic, the moral, and the religious. He regards the political and organizing elites as distinct in the sense that they aim at integrating a great number of individual wills. But the function of the intellectual, aesthetic, and moral-religious elites is to 'sublimate those psychic energy which society, in the daily struggle for existence, does not fully exhaust'. They 'sublimate objective knowledge as well as tendencies to introversion introspection, contemplation, and reflection...'. The function of such elites in all the spheres of cultural life is, he states, to 'express cultural and psychological forces in a primary form and to guide collective extroversion and introversion.'

Talcott Parsons regards intellectuals as sharply distinguished from an organization executive, an absolute monarch, an enterprise owner and a family man whose primary
responsibilities in terms of role are anchored mainly in functions for some social systems as such. But an intellectual, according to him, is in his principal role-capacity expected 'to put cultural considerations above social' in defining the commitments 'organized about the patterning of (normative) meaning in symbolic systems', i.e., the cultural systems. Similarly, for Robert K. Merton the intellectual refers to 'a social role and not to a total person'. He regards 'persons as intellectuals in so far as they devote themselves to cultivating and formulating knowledge'. They have 'access to and advance a cultural fund of knowledge'. According to Merton, it is not decisive whether their activities are vocational or avocational.

In the opinion of Edward Shils:

Intellectuals are the aggregate of persons in any society who employ in their communication and expression, with relatively higher frequency than most other members of their society, symbols of general scope and abstract reference, concerning man, society, nature, and the cosmos.

Obviously they form, in his view, 'a minority of persons' in society. Moreover, in comparison with others they are more 'inquiring and desirous of being in frequent communication with symbols which are more general than the immediate concrete situations of everyday life and remote in their reference in both time and space'. They posses, Shils says, 'an unusual sensitivity about the nature of their universe and the rules which govern their society'. In addition, their existence is marked by an 'interior need to penetrate beyond the screen of immediate concrete experience'. Their quest is externalized in oral and written discourse, in poetic and plastic expression, in ritual performance and acts of worship. Hence, there is, Shils thinks, a wide difference between the life of intellectuals and ordinary life which is slovenly, full of compromise and improvisation concerned with 'here and now'.
V.G. Kiernan believes that the 'intelligentsia' do not live merely by their wits. But they are ‘in some fashion occupied with abstract or general ideas of meaning to mankind’. 44

According to Robert J. Brym intellectuals are ‘persons who, occupationally, are involved chiefly in the production of ideas’. 45 Williams observes that the term ‘intellectuals’ is now generally used to describe ‘people who do certain kinds of intellectual work and especially the most general kinds’. 46 He notices the distinction that is sometimes drawn between specialists or professionals who possess limited interests and intellectuals having wider interests. 47

Among non-Marxist Indian writers and scholars, Yogendra Singh identifies intellectual elites with ‘those who succeed in assuming a lead in society as also in their group by creative symbolizations through writings, scientific discoveries and artistic creations’. 48 Betteille considers intellectuals, in a strict sense, only those who are primarily engaged in ‘critical, creative and contemplative’ activities. ‘The intellectual function is’, in his opinion, ‘at once critical and creative, and it is rooted in practical activity’. 49 It is a critical appraisal of existing world-views, seeing how they relate to the real world of practical activity, organizing their various elements into a meaningful whole; and (Betteille paraphrases Marx) creating a new world in imagination before constructing it in reality. S.C. Dube characterizes intellectuals by their specific concern with quest for new solutions to new problems, exploring new frontiers of life and carving out new ways. 50 For Ashish Nandy the basic values possessed by an intellectual are self-esteem, autonomy and authenticity. 51

Further, for some non-Marxists, intellectuals are only those who are constant critic of their society. But their criticism is aimed at reform of the system rather than its
transformation. Here comes Ralf Dahrendorf who identifies intellectuals with those having the quality of 'critical detachment'. They have, according to him, the duty 'to doubt everything that is obvious, to make relative all authority, to ask all those questions that no one else dares to ask'. Such 'critical sting' of intellectuals would, he thinks, be essential to 'help rulers find their way when they are in danger of losing it'.

Similarly, Lewis Coser considers intellectuals 'gatekeepers of ideas and fountainheads of ideologies' who think otherwise and tend to 'scrutinize the received ideas and assumptions of their times and milieu' and, tend to cultivate a 'critical attitude'. Coser states,

Intellectuals are men who never seem satisfied with things as they are, with appeals to custom and usage. They question the truth of the moment in terms of higher and wider truth; they counter appeals to factuality by invoking the "impractical ought". They consider themselves special custodians of abstract ideas like reason and justice and truth, jealous guardians of moral standards that are too often ignored in the market place and the house of power.

Moreover, in their activities intellectuals exhibits, Coser holds, 'a pronounced concern with the core values of society'. They are the men who seek to provide moral standards and to maintain meaningful general symbols'.

In India also some scholars have seen intellectuals essentially as social critic. Singh characterizes the intellectual as 'a constant critic of tradition'. Dube views the intellectual as 'a conscious critic of contemporary tendencies'. Here, the liberal reformist clan of the role of intellectuals becomes evident when Dube assigns them the task of providing guidance in reform of social evils and in consolidating the roots of society and nation.

Hence, intellectuals are defined as a small group of creative, reflective, contemplative and evaluative individuals or a still smaller group of (reformist) social critic.

In addition, there are other non-Marxists who have characterized them as a fairly large group of individuals
chiefly involved in the realm of knowledge and covering, in the broadest sense, all the educated people. For Jacques Barzun intellectuals are 'the persons who consciously and methodically employ the mind'. 58 They form an integral part of the House of 'Intellect' which he characterizes as the 'capitalized and communal form of live intelligence', 'a product of social effort and an acquirement', an 'institution', 'an establishment, requiring appurtenances and prescribing conventions'. 59

Michels defines intellectuals in two senses. In a broad sense, he holds, 'intellectuals are persons possessing knowledge'. 60 And in a narrower sense, he identifies them with 'those whose judgment, based on reflection and knowledge, derives less directly and exclusively from sensory perception than in the case of non-intellectuals'. Florian Znaniecki has discussed eight distinct variety of intellectuals referring to their different social roles, viz., the 'discoverer of truth', the 'systematizer', the 'contributor', the 'fighter for truth', the 'eclectic', the 'disseminator', the 'discoverer of facts' and the 'discoverer of problems'. 61

Seymour M. Lipset designates intellectuals 'all those who create, distribute, and apply culture, that is, the symbolic world of men, including art, science, and religion'. 62 He demarcates two main levels within this broad group. 63 They are (i) 'the hard core or creators of culture' comprising scholars, artists, philosophers, authors, some editors, and some journalists, and (ii) the distributors consisting of performers in the various arts, most teachers, most reporters. And the 'peripheral group' of intellectuals is, in his view, 'composed of those who apply culture as part of their jobs', for instance, professions like physicians and lawyers. Moreover, he does not agree with the definition of intellectuals as 'critics of society and necessarily detached from it'. 64 Such a concept, he
thinks, avoids complex problems about the place of the intellectual in modern society. If intellectuals are, he argues, "by definition alienated, then the problem of what happens when they assume other roles in organizations, or move into the political arena directly, is simply dismissed". 65

Besides viewing intellectuals in a restricted way, Shils has defined them in a broad sense as well. For example the modern intellectual is constituted, he says, by "the independent man of letters, the scientist, pure and applied, the scholars, the university professor, the journalist, the highly educated administrator, judge or parliamentarian". 66

As regards the developing countries, he defines intellectuals as "all persons with an advanced modern education and the intellectual concerns and skills ordinarily associated with it". 67

Among Indian writers and scholars also there are some who see intellectuals in a broad sense. In addition to providing a restricted view, Beteille has defined intellectuals, in a broad sense, as "those who are concerned primarily with the creation, interpretation and transmission of ideas". 68 For him intellectuals, in the modern world, are "a highly differentiated category". Though he finds it difficult to make an enumeration of all the subtypes of intellectuals, he mentions their three broad categories 69: (i) poets, playwrights and novelists, or creative writers in the broad sense of the term; (ii) scholars and scientists, or intellectuals in the academic profession; and (iii) critics and journalists, including those in some branches of the mass media. He cites these categories as typical examples and calls them the "core elements" of intellectuals. Moreover, he clarifies that these categories are "neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive".

Nirad C. Chaudhuri finds it "relatively easy" to define the intellectual. For him an intellectual is a man who
does or tries to do the following: (i) he applies his intellectual faculties to understand and interpret the world around him; (ii) as a result of study, observation, and experiments he formulates conclusions which he believes to be true or, at all events truer than those which were current before; (iii) he communicates his ideas to fellowmen with a view to influencing their mind, life and actions. Moreover, he identifies two types of intellectual activity, the 'pure' and the 'applied'. The pure intellectual activity is regarded as 'absolute' (in nature) showing disinterest in immediate practical application. But the applied activity is, in his view, 'concerned with the problems of existence, including political, economic and social ones, and seeks to solve them'. Chaudhuri's favoured intellectual pursuits are teaching in universities, or journalism, or broadcasting, or publicity.

Claiming to avoid the 'two divergent and extreme definitional perspectives' on intellectuals Uttam Bhoite regards taking a cue from Shils, intellectuals as those in which 'symbols of general scope and abstract references concerning society's nature and cosmos are more frequently used'. Further, H.C. Srivastava thinks that the term intellectual is 'imprecise'. However, he characterizes intellectuals as those 'who are engaged with the creation of general ideas, and their evaluative interpretation in societal guidance'. This category gets widened because in this he includes not only the higher academics, the scientists and teachers, researchers, poets and artists but also administrators, journalists, lawyers, and so on.

Akhileshwar Jha defines intellectuals in a broad sense. According to him, the intellectual community comprises 'all those who are educated, not merely literate, and are doing jobs which require the exercise more of mental than of manual power'. He includes in this community scientists, educationists, lawyers, literary writers, bureaucrats,
business executives and even office clerks. However, he
delineates two sub-types of intellectuals, primary and
secondary. He regards the 'primary intellectuals as a tiny
group of people constituting the 'nucleus' and assiduously
preoccupied with the production of knowledge. They are busy
with their 'constant endeavor of extending, the frontiers of
modern knowledge'. In contrast, the 'secondary' intellec-
tuals form a vast majority. They are, as Jha says, the dis-
tributors as well as the consumers of knowledge.

M.C. Sharma also treats intellectuals in a broad sense.
He talks of 'the knowledge class'. He defines this class as
'that section of the population which earns its livelihood
primarily by the sale of its knowledge, know-how or expert-
tise'. In this class, he places professional politicians,
bureaucrats, scientists, managers, engineers, foremen and so
on. He regards engineers and managers as the first echelon
of this class. Scientists, philosophers, theorists and
idea-praxists, he calls, 'spiritual or intellectual gurus,
mentors, path-finders and pace-makers' of the class. More-
over, Sharma divides this class into two sub-classes, the
knowledge bourgeoisie and the knowledge proletariat.
In the modern world of increasing complexity and specializa-
tions the 'knowledge bourgeoisie' is, according to him, a
superior class of plant-cum-production supervisors who
understand the working and complement the complexity of
machines and production-structures with their knowledge
oriented practice. But the 'knowledge proletariat' is
composed of the 'plain members' of this class, e.g., the
teacher, the clerk, and so on.

Now, we would come to the Marxist concept of intellec-
tuals. We do not find a categorical definition of intellect-
uals in the vast corpus of the writings of Karl Marx and
Frederick Engels. However, it has been observed that their
frequent use of expressions such as 'ideologists', 'ideological
representatives', 'ideological strata' and 'ideological
classes', refer to the intellectuals and thinkers of social classes. In The German Ideology they call the thinkers of the ruling class 'active, conceptive ideologists, who make the formation of the illusions of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood'.

The ceaseless endeavour of Marx and Engels to demolish eminent bourgeois thinkers has given a negative connotation to (the term) ideologists in the sense that the latter engaged in creating and propagating half-truths and false ideas. They call ideologists 'privileged to cherish illusions'. They place the (bourgeois) 'theorists, ideologists, and philosophers' in general and Hegel in particular in the 'speculative' creed whose whole 'trick [lay in] .... proving the hegemony of the spirit [over matter] in history'. Parekh observes that for Marx the ideologist is an apologist who 'canonises the existing world' by explaining away its disagreeable features, especially its fundamental conflicts of interest and historicity. But Paul Baran has a different perception of intellectuals in Marx. Citing Marx, he identifies them with those who undertakes 'ruthless criticising of everything that exists, ruthless in the sense that the criticism will not shrink either from its own conclusions or from conflict with the powers that be'.

V.I. Lenin takes a wider view of intellectuals. He does not think that it is only the (bourgeois) ruling class that has its intellectuals (ideologists) and that all intellectuals create and transmit false ideas. Rather intellectuals represent, in his view, the interests of different classes in society. He observes:

... the intelligentsia are so called just because they most consciously, most resolutely and most accurately reflect and express the development of class-interest and political groupings in society as a whole.

Karl Kautsky also holds a broad view of intellectuals. For him, what is necessary for intellectuals is 'a particular disposition and acquired knowledge'. According to
him, one who takes up intellectual activities as a vocation and "function(s) as an organ or democracy, becomes thereby an intellectual'. "One must not', he opines, include only the academically trained among the intellectuals'. 87 He includes in this group all paid skilled workers who sell their services either piecemeal or in return for a salary, e.g., directors and managers, doctors, lawyers, artists, scholars, and officials of every kind. 88 Similarly, Mao's grouping of intellectuals is also large comprising educators, teachers, journalists, writers, men of letters, artists, scientists, engineers, technicians, doctors, and rank-and-file cultural workers. 89

Antonio Gramsci has paid special attention the the concept of intellectual. He does not use the term in a restricted sense. Rather he "extend(s) the notion of intellectual considerably, and does not limit himself to "the habitual meaning which refers only to great intellectuals'. 90 He expresses serious doubts regarding finding a unitary criterion to characterize equally all the diverse and disparate activities of intellectuals and to distinguish these at the same time from the activities of other social groupings. The most common error of method he finds, here, in looking for this criterion of distinction in the "intrinsic nature of intellectual activities', i.e., mental work. 91

Gramsci rejects the criterion of mental labour for defining intellectuals. He thinks that every kind of physical work involves a minimum of technical qualification, that is, a minimum of creative mental activity. He argues that 'the worker or proletarian is not specifically distinguished by his manual or instrumental work, but by performing this work in specific conditions and in specific social relations' apart from the fact that 'purely physical labour does not exist'. If a distinction is made between intellectuals and non-intellectuals on the basis of mental/manual labour

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division, then he thinks, what one considers is 'the direction in which their specific professional activity is weighted, whether towards intellectuals elaboration or towards muscular-nervous effort'. So, he opines, 'although one can speak of intellectuals, one cannot speak of non-intellectuals, because non-intellectuals do not exist'. 92

'The relationship between efforts of intellectual-cerebral elaboration and muscular-nervous effort is not always the same'. In fact, 'there are varying degrees of specific intellectual activity'. Gramsci observes:

There is no human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded: homo faber (Man the maker or took-bearer) cannot be separated from homo sapiens (Man the thinker). 93

All human beings perform, he argues, some intellectual activity outside his professional work. This is evident in ones participation in a particular conception of the world, having a conscious line of moral conduct, and thus contributing 'to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it, that is, to bring into being new modes of thought'. In this way, he holds, 'All men are intellectuals, one could therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals'. 94

Instead of the 'intrinsic nature of intellectual activities' (mental work) Gramsci prefers to locate the criterion of distinction of intellectuals in the ensemble of the system of relations in which these activities (and therefore the intellectual groups who personify them) have their place within the general complex of social relations. 95

Further, he finds that the relationship between the intellectuals and the world of production is not as direct as it is in case of the fundamental social groups (classes). This relation is, in his view, 'mediated' by the whole fabric of society and by the complex of superstructures. And it is here that Gramsci defines the intellectuals as the 'functionaries' of the complex of superstructures, i.e., 'civil society' and 'political society' or 'the state'. 96
Their functions are "organisational and connective". To be more precise, Gramsci states, "The intellectuals are the dominant groups "deputies" exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government".

Further, in his discussion on intellectuals Nicos Poulantzas draws heavily from Gramsci. Like Gramsci he deals with this issue under the rubric of the mental/manual division of labour. He affirms,

It is not only the intellectuals as a social category who perform mental labour, or rather who are located on the side of mental labour; the intellectuals as a specific social category are only a product of a mental/manual labour division that goes much further.

He emphasises the fact that the content of this division and its terms cannot be reduced to empirical criteria of the kind 'those who work with their hands' and 'those who work with their brains', those in direct contact with 'machines' and those who are not. He does not think that the working class only works with its 'hands', that these unfortunate workers stupefied by the fragmentation of labour do not use their 'heads'. Here, he appreciably cites Gramsci who rejects the unitary criterion of the 'intrinsic nature of intellectual activities' as a distinctive mark of intellectuals and avers that homo faber cannot be separated from homo sapiens. For him 'the division is rather a function of the ideological and political relations that mark the places occupied by their agents'. He affirms that,

every kind of work includes 'mental activity', but that not every kind of work is located on the mental labour side in the political-ideological division between mental and manual labour.

Moreover, he reiterates Gramsci that the distinctiveness of the intellectuals should be located 'in the ensemble of the system of relations in which these [intellectual] activities (and therefore the intellectual groups who personify them) have their place within the general complex of social relations'.
Following Gramsci, Poulantzas reserves the term intellectuals for 'specific groupings of agents who fulfil particular social functions in relation to the elaboration of class ideologies'. He calls them 'ideological functionaries'. He categorically states that the intellectuals are defined by their 'role in elaborating and deploying ideology'. The 'principal role' of the intellectuals is, in his view, the 'inculcation of ideology'.

Further, Baran draws a distinction between an intellectual and 'intellect workers'. The latter constitute 'a large group of people' which he defines as 'individuals working with their minds rather than with their muscles, living off their wits rather than off their hands'. Moreover, the intellect worker takes the existing order of things for granted and questions the prevailing state of affairs solely within the limited area of his immediate pre-occupation. Under capitalism he is 'typically the faithful servant, the agent, the functionary, and the spokesman of the capitalist system'. He does not address himself to the meaning of his work, its significance, its place within the entire framework of social activity. His motto is to mind his own business. In the large group of intellect workers Baran includes businessmen and physicians, corporate executives and purveyors of 'culture', stockbrokers and university professors. But the intellectual is distinct. Baran states,

... what marks the intellectual and distinguishes him from the intellect workers and indeed from all others is that his concern with the entire historical process is not a tangential interest but permeates his thought and significantly affects his work.

It implies that the intellectual systematically seeks to relate his specific area of work to other aspects of human existence. Baran considers this effort to 'interconnect' things one of the outstanding features of the intellectual. Likewise, this effort identifies one of the principal function of the intellectual to serve as a symbol and
as a reminder of the basic fact that the seemingly autonomous, disparate, and disjointed morsels of social existence under capitalism - literature, art, politics, economy, science, the cultural and psychic condition of people - could be understood (and influenced) only if they are clearly viewed as parts of the comprehensive totality of the historical process.\textsuperscript{109}

In addition, the intellectual possesses, Baran says, the desire to tell the truth, courage, readiness to carry on rational inquiry to wherever it may lead, and to undertake 'ruthless criticism of everything that exists,... [without] shrink(ing) either from its own conclusions or from conflict with the powers that be' (Marx).

Finally, Baran affirms,

An intellectual is thus in essence a social critic, a person whose concern is to identify, to analyze, and in this way to help overcome the obstacles barring the way to the attainment of a better, more human, and more rational social order. As such he becomes the conscience of society and the spokesman of such progressive forces as it contains in any given period of history. And as such he is inevitably considered a "troublemaker" and a "nuisance" by the ruling class seeking to preserve the status quo, as well as by the intellect workers in its service who accuse the intellectual of being utopian or metaphysical at best, subversive or seditious at worst.

There are some Marxists scholars and writers in India also who have expressed their views on the concept of intellectuals, viz., K.N. Panikkar, S. Bhattacharya, Bipan Chandra, Romila Thapar, Irfan Habib, Ashok Rudra, P. Bardhan, K.M Kurian and C.T. Kurien.

Bhattacharya prefers to use the term intellectual in the sense of Marx's connotation of 'active, concepitive ideologists'.\textsuperscript{111} Moreover, he makes a distinction between 'intelligentsia' and 'intellectual'. The former is, in his opinion, a broad 'collectivity' comprising all the educated, and the latter forms a sub-set (small group) or the former distinguished by the special role as transmitters of ideology.\textsuperscript{112} He finds Bipan Chandra's (1966) denotation of the term intellectual appropriate.
In his discussion on economic nationalism in India in the 19th century, Bipan Chandra (1966) has used the term intellectuals to denote the early Indian nationalist writers, public men, journalists and thinkers. He does not consider them (intellectuals) a class but the "intellectual representatives of new Indian classes and of Indian nationalism". He asserts that like the best and genuine intellectuals, the Indian thinkers and intellectuals of the 19th century were "philosophers and not hacks of a party or a class". Moreover, he clarifies that "they were not above class or group and in practice [objectively] represent concrete class and group interests... through the prism of ideology and not directly as members, or the obedient servants, of that class or group". Further, while participating in a seminar in 1979 on the prospects of "left" unity he appears distinguishing between intellectuals from teachers, lawyers, journalists, engineers and doctors. But he employs the term intelligentsia to refer to all these groups. It means he has applied the terms intellectuals in a limited sense and the term intelligentsia in a broad sense. However, later he (1984) has used the two terms interchangeably in his work on communalism in modern India. Panikkar approvingly cites Gramsci and identifies intellectuals by their "specific social function". He affirms that intellectuals are engaged in the creation of a new equilibrium and the perpetual innovation of the physical and social world. In his discussion on colonial India he calls intellectuals those who were "non-conformists, critical of existing social conditions" and performing "the social function of generation or adoption and propagation of ideas" for ushering in socio-political progress and advancement.

In her discussion on the academic professional Thapar treats the term intellectual in a restricted way. The intellectual has, in her opinion, the ability to focus on more than just the dimensions of his skills and to apprehend the
quality of knowledge and its application to his society. Besides being a scholar, the intellectuals can project the application of the results of scholarship to his society. He recognizes the necessity of a wider perspective rather than getting confined to his specialization. Moreover, he possesses an awareness of the given situation and the consciousness of a direction of change. He is not unaware of the political implications and uses of knowledge. Finally, she opines that intellectuals should feel concerned with the application of his discoveries and research and ensure not only they are not abused but also that the authentic results reach the wider audience. 117

In the inaugural issue of the journal Social Scientist (1972) its editor K.M Kurian raised the question of intellectuals. Kurian follows Baran's view who drew a distinction between intellectuals and intellect workers. Accordingly he defines, citing Baran, an intellectual as 'one who is systematically seeking to relate whatever specific area he may be working in to other aspects of human existence'. 118 In contrast, the intellect worker is concerned primarily with his particular job, trying to master and manipulate his specific branch of knowledge without addressing himself to the meaning of his work, its significance and its place within the entire framework of social activity. Kurian quotes Baran who holds that the intellectual is distinct from the intellect workers and from all others in the sense that his concern with the entire historical process is not a tangential interests but permeates his thought and significantly affects his work'. 119 Commenting on Kurian's article Irfan Habib expresses his reservation about Baran's concept. He thinks that Baran's intellectuals form an ideal rather than an actual category. 120 Moreover, he draws our attention to the prevalence of petty intellectuals referring to Mao who included, in this category, students, primary and middle school teachers, lower government func-
tionaries, office clerks, and small lawyers. This implies a broad view of intellectuals covering roughly the educated people.

In continuation of the discussion in the *Social Scientist* appeared an anonymous contribution. It has argued for recognizing within the 'large mass of intellectuals' produced and employed by the dominant classes, the existence of a 'special segment' whose functions are qualitatively different from those of the rest. The special segment comprises, it says, philosopher, scientists, political thinkers, writers, artists, leading theoreticians of a political party or any other set of people who act as 'specialists in examining, elaborating and organizing ideas and concepts' in accordance with the interests of the social class that has started playing or has the potentialities of playing a dominant role in the existing structure.

Further, C.T. Kurien feels that 'the intellectuals, obviously, have knowledge'. He characterizes them as 'those who are primarily concerned with the creation, interpretation and transmission of ideas'. Moreover, he affirms that 'intellectuals must not only be learned'. He concurs with Baran's distinction between 'intellectuals' and 'intellect workers'. Like Baran he holds that the former systematically relate whatever specific area they may be working in to other aspects of human existence. He avers, 'the hallmark of the intellectuals, therefore, is not knowledge per se , but the ability to relate, to discern, to interpret.'

Further, Rudra has made a serious effort to understand the intelligentsia. He thinks that the general meaning attached to this category is 'more or less the same as that of non-manual laborers; that is, persons who earn their living by the sale of mental labour'. In fact, he identifies two 'basic properties' defining the intelligentsia. He states,
The first is that the members of this class are mental labourers as distinguished from manual labourers. The second is that the value of the products that they produce (which are of the nature of services) are less than the value of their labour power. In this respect members of the Intelligentsia occupy a position symmetric but opposite to that of wage labourers employed by capitalists. While wage labourers generate positive surplus, the Intelligentsia produces what may be called a negative surplus. While the positive surplus produced by wage labourers gets appropriated by the owners of the means of production, the negative surplus of the Intelligentsia is taken care of by transfers made from the surplus generated by the wage labourers.

Clarifying the concept of 'negative surplus' he holds that 'members of this class (intelligentsia) sell their services at a price higher than the value produced by them'. But workers who generate 'positive surplus' sell their labour power at a price lower than the value of what they produce. But, Rudra drops first criterion of mental labour in his rejoinder to Iyer's comments on his paper and firmly sticks to the second criterion. Moreover, he makes no modification in the substantive composition of the Indian intelligentsia as stated by him. He includes in this category all white-collar workers in the organized private sector from managers at the top to clerical worker at the lower level, all the personnel in administrative services covering top bureaucrats to lower division clerks, teachers from the school to the university levels, salaried and private professionals (e.g. doctors, lawyers, architects), writers, journalists, artists, professional politicians, trade union leaders etc. However, he imposes two restrictions in this connection. One, people engaged in business and making profit are excluded from this category. Two, he is concerned only with the office workers who belong to the organised sector and, hence, completely excluding those engaged in the unorganised sector. Moreover, he draws a distinction between the intellectuals and the intelligentsia characterizing the former as only those 'performing the most important task of giving ideological directions to the people'. In his comments Bardhan objects to the use of
the term intelligentsia to describe the (broad) class meant by Rudra. He refers to the Russian origin of the term which, in his opinion, denotes 'a group with a certain capacity for independent thinking'. This feature is absent in case of the majority of the members of the Rudra's category of the intelligensia. He prefers to designate Rudra's intelligentsia as the class of 'professionals' even though he does not find this too a 'very satisfactory' term.

Remarks

Here are some of the main points which we have drawn on the basis of the preceding exposition of various definitions of intellectuals/intelligentsia offered by some noted Marxist and non-Marxist thinkers, scholars and writers.

(i) In case of both the Marxists and the non-Marxists, intellectuals are broadly viewed as functionaries of the symbolic world, i.e., the world of knowledge, culture, ideas and ideology. For instance, Weber, Parsons and Lipset find intellectuals involved in the sphere of culture; Durkheim, Merton, Michels, Thapar and Sharma in the realm of knowledge; Marx, Engels, Gramsci, Poulantzas and Bhattacharya in the domain of ideology; and Beteille, Panikkar, Chaudhuri and Srivastava in the region of ideas.

(ii) In both perspectives some thinkers, writers and scholars see intellectuals as forming a small group of knowledge elite. Among non-Marxists, Weber finds them holding the leadership of a 'culture community' due to their special access to 'culture values'. Durkheim identifies them with having understanding as the means and the end. Shils distinguishes them by an 'uncommon reflectiveness' and frequent communication with symbols. Singh witnesses them taking 'lead in society' through creative symbolizations. Among Marxists, some academics see intellectuals as those who systematically seek to relate whatever
they may be working in to other aspects of human existence and, thus, have an integrated view of society. This position is held by Baran, Kurian and Kurien. Thapar also has a somewhat similar opinion in distinguishing intellectuals from scholars. But early Marxist (revolutionary) scholars do not have such a restricted perception of intellectuals.

(iii) In the opinion of some other scholars, intellectuals constitute a comparatively large group. Among non-Marxists, Shils characterizes them as 'all persons with an advanced modern education'. Lipset includes in this category all those who create, distribute and apply culture. Beteille covers all those primarily concerned with the creation, interpretation and transmission of ideas. Michels designates them as 'persons possessing knowledge'.

Furthermore, in contrast with some recent Marxist academics all the early Marxist (revolutionary) scholars have a broad view of intellectuals, viz., Lenin, Kautsky, Gramsci, Mao, and Poulantzas. Gramsci includes among intellectuals all the 'functionaries' of the complex of superstructures. Poulantzas places in this group all those engaged in elaborating, deploying and inculcating ideology. In fact, classical Marxist view (particularly Gramsci) of intellectuals is much broader than that of the non-Marxists. Here, even those performing 'directive' function in the domain of material production are regarded as intellectuals.

Here, it has to be noted that in case of Marx the picture is not clear. He has not applied the terms intellectuals or intelligentsia as they were not (much) in use during his time. Obviously, it has provided scope for different interpretations of Marx's view by recent scholars, like, Larrain and Baran.
(iv) In both perspectives intellectuals are portrayed by some scholars as social critics. As regards non-Marxists Dahrendorf identifies the duty of intellectuals 'to doubt everything that is obvious, to make relative all authority, to ask all those questions that no one else dares to ask'. Dube calls them a conscious critic of contemporary tendencies. And Marxists like Baran, Kurian and Kurien see intellectuals engaged in 'ruthless criticism, of everything that exists'.

But there is a major difference. The critique of society offered by intellectuals is in non-Marxist view, aimed at reform of society. The 'critical sting' of intellectuals is to help rulers find their way when they are in danger of losing it (Dahrendorf). They are supposed to provide guidance in reforming social evils and in consolidating the roots of the existing society (Dube). In contrast, Marxists consider the intellectual to be the 'spokesman of progressive forces' who would help to overcome the obstacles barring the way to the attainment of a better, more humane, and more rational social order' (Baran). His task is to get involved in 'the creation of a new equilibrium and the perpetual innovation of the physical and social world' (Panikkar citing a variant of Gramsci's intellectuals).

(v) The Marxists reject the unitary criterion of mental/manual labour division for defining intellectuals. They prefer to locate intellectuals in the ensemble of the system of social relations. The distinct mark of intellectuals lies, in their view, in performing the social function of creation, elaboration and inculcation of class ideology. This is specifically propounded by Gramsci and Poulantzas and noted by Bhattacharya and Chandra. In comparison, the non-Marxists, generally keep intellectuals confined to the realm of mind, knowledge, culture and symbols and ignore the role of the latter in
relation to the social devisions (e.g., class) in society. To put it more sharply, the Marxist view of intellectuals is more penetrating and integrated, but the non-Marxist perception is rather partial and fragmented.

(vi) In both perspectives, terms intellectuals and intelligentsia have been used by some to refer to a small group of intellectual elite and by others to signify a large group of people engaged mainly in the symbolic world encompassing, in the broadest sense, all the educated people. For instance, the term intellectuals is used in a narrow sense (small elite group) by Marxists like Baran, Kurian, Kurien, Rudra, Bhattachrya Thapar and Panikkar; and by non-Marxists, such as, Weber, Durheim, Benda, Gouldner, Alatas and Singh. Moreover, the term intellectuals is treated in a broad sense by Marxists like Lenin, Kautsky, Mao, Gramsci, Poulantzas Habib and chandra; and by non-Marxists such as Lipset, Michels, Barzun, Churchward, Chaudhuri, Srivastava Jha and Sharma.

Further, the term intelligentsia is applied in a restricted (elite group) sense by Marxist like Bardhan, and non-Marxist Kiernan, Aron, Williams. It is employed in a wide sense by Marxists; Lenin, Rudra, Bhattacharya, Chandra and the official Soviet view; and non-Marxists such as Gouldner, Alatas Aron, Lipset, Bottomore, Churchward and Beteille.

(vii) Moreover, terms intellectuals and intelligentsia are used interchangeably in the writings of Marxists like Lenin, Kautsky, Habib, Chandra and non-Marxists such as Mannheim, Shils, Aron, Michels, Churchward Beteille, (recent journalistic pieces), Chaudhuri, Srivastava, , and Dube. Further, Churchward affirms that 'what some writers call the intelligentsia, other writers call intellectuals'. Hence, he has used both the terms interchangeably in his study of the Soviet intelligentsia.132
Besides our observations we find eminent sociologists disagreeing with one another in their views on usage of the terms intellectuals and intelligentsia. Aron holds that the term intelligentsia is applied both in a wide and a narrow senses. According to him, it is made, in the widest sense, to cover all non-manual workers, but in a second and narrower definition it would include experts and men of letters only. Moreover, he opines that the current tendency in the (erstwhile) Soviet Union was towards the first definition signifying the whole of the technical intelligentsia and writers. And the second narrower definition would, in his view, get more favour in the West. But Lipset maintains that the term is employed in the West to refer to a broad group and in America to a relatively small group. 'When Europeans speak of the intelligentsia', he states, 'they mean all three categories' i.e. the broad group of 'all those who create, distribute and apply culture, that is, the symbolic world of man'. And in case of America he includes, in this category, creators and distributors of 'culture' but not the 'peripheral group' that apply culture as part of job.

Regarding Russia Bottomore recognizes the fact that the term intelligentsia was used in the 19th century to refer to the small group of university educated people, but later its denotation was extended by many writers to cover all those engaged in non-manual occupations. But, as of now Betteille observes:

Soviet writers do not use the term 'intelligentsia' in a completely uniform manner. In its most inclusive sense it is coterminous with 'mental workers', although it is also used in a more restricted sense to refer to those in superior non-manual occupations.

Concerning application of the term intellectuals Bottomore believes that it generally refers to the small group of 'those who contribute directly to the creation transmission and criticism of ideas' comprising writers, artists, scientists, philosophers, religious thinkers, social scientists
Chart 1: Definitional View Of The Terms Intellectuals And Inteligentsia

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intellectuals</th>
<th>Intelligentsia</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Small elite group</strong></td>
<td><strong>Broad group</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Marxist</td>
<td>Marxist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durkheim</td>
<td>Baran</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weber</td>
<td>Kurian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mannheim</td>
<td>Kurien</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shils&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Rudra</td>
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<td>Benda</td>
<td>Bhattatharya</td>
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<td>Parsons</td>
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<td>Merton</td>
<td>Paunikkar</td>
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<td>Aron</td>
<td>Lenin</td>
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<td>Bottomore</td>
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<td>Williams</td>
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<td>Brym</td>
<td>Barzun</td>
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<td>Gouldner</td>
<td>Lipset</td>
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<td>Alatas</td>
<td>Kautsky</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beteille&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Michels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dahrendorf</td>
<td>Mao</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coser</td>
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<td>Singh</td>
<td>Mao</td>
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<td>Dube</td>
<td>Mao</td>
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<td>Nandy</td>
<td>Mao</td>
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| **Broad group** | **Small elite group** |
| Non-Marxist | Marxist |
| Gouldner | Lenin |
| Rudra | Kurian |
| Bhattatharya | Kurian |
| Chandra | Kurian |
| Soviet official view | Kurian |

Terms used interchangeably:

- Marxist
  - Lenin
  - Kautsky
  - Habib
  - Chandra

- Non-Marxist
  - Mannheim
  - Shils
  - Aron
  - Michels
  - Beteille
  - Dube
  - Chaudhuri
  - Srivastava

Note: <sup>a</sup>Viewed both as a small elite group and a broad group.

33
and political commentators. However, Aron does not think that characterization of intellectual is constant. 'The qualifications required in order to earn the title of intellectual,' he opines, 'grow higher as the number of non-manual workers increases - in other words, they are proportionate to economic development'. This is implied in Shils' clarification that his definition was 'less selective or discriminating one' in case of developing countries than he would use to designate the intellectuals in the advanced countries.

We present schematically in Chart 1 the definitional view of the two terms intellectuals and intelligentsia as offered by different thinkers, scholars and revolutionaries. Finally, despite prevalence of various differences regarding usage of the terms intellectuals and intelligentsia we could have some plausible position on the basis of our preceding discussion.

(a) The two terms could be used interchangeably as we find them both etymological and definitionally applied by different scholars to signify a small elite group and also a large group of persons who are primarily engaged in the domain of knowledge, culture, idea and ideology which form the symbolic world. Further, it would be in line with the usage made of these terms by some revolutionaries, scholars and writers like, Lenin, Shils, Aron, Michels, Churchward, Habib, Chaudhuri, Srivastava, Dube, and Beteille (recent journalistic pieces). It is only some contemporary academics who insists on making a rigid distinction between them on their own, viz., Gouldner, Bottomore, Alatas, Bhattacharya and Beteille (early writings).

(b) The Marxist definition, as specifically provided by Gramsci and noted by others is precise and objective. It defines intellectuals in terms of their place in the system of social relations, more clearly, their social
function of creation, elaboration and inculcation of ideas, ideology and knowledge. However, this point is missed even by some Marxist scholars like Baran, Rudra, Kurien Bhattacharya, Thapar Kurian, and Panikkar who take a circumscribed view of intellectuals. Further, the criterion of mental work and consideration of economic development which appear, explicitly or implicitly, in definition offered by non-Marxists are imprecise and, hence, unreliable.

(c) It would be worthwhile to make an internal division within the category of intellectuals/intelligentsia based on the intrinsic nature and degree of directiveness of their work. We would regard the mainly creative, directive and critical variety as intellectual elite (elite intelligentsia) and the largely/purely reproductive, imitative and distributive type as subordinate/subaltern intellectual (subaltern/subordinate intelligentsia). In this manner, the uses of the terms intellectuals/intelligentsia in both senses, a narrow and a broad one, is accommodated. Moreover, this division is not arbitrarily made as similar categorizations are found in some writings on the subject, e.g., creative, distributive and peripheral intellectuals (Lipset); primary and secondary intellectuals (Jha); and knowledge bourgeoisie and knowledge proletariat (Sharma). It would be further discussed in our later discussions.

So, we think it worthwhile, on the basis of above exposition, to define intellectuals in terms of their objective position in society and the intrinsic character of their activities. Moreover, we reject the mental/manual labour criteria for distinguishing intellectuals. With this understanding we consider intellectuals/intelligentsia all those who perform the social function of creation, elaboration, distribution and inculcation of knowledge, culture, idea and ideology which is 'directive', in varying degree,
in nature. This signifies broadly two strata/classes of intellectuals in terms of the intrinsic character and degree of creative-ness and directive-ness of their work. We call them intellectual elite (elite intelligentsia) and subalern/subordinate intellectuals intelligentsia, the former being more creative (productive) and directive and the latter being less so i.e. chiefly distributive (reproductive). Obviously, we use the terms intellectuals and intelligentsia interchangeably. And we call the individual member of this category intellectual/intelligent.

NOTES


5. The interchangeable use of the two terms is found in the English version of their writings which we would discuss later.


8. Ibid.

10. See, Seminar, No. 222, Feb. 1978, p. 10. Further, We see that Betelie has not been consistent in using the terms intellectual and intelligentsia. He has sought to make a distinction between them in his earlier writings on the subject. But he has used them interchangeably in his recent journalistic pieces. In his article "Nataly, An Uneasy Relationship" he talks of 'Indian intellectuals' and 'nationalist intelligentsia' (TOI, Nov. 30, 1991). In another write-up, "The Politics of Backwardness" he uses the expressions 'Indian intellectuals' and 'Indian intelligentsia' without making any distinction (TOI, Dec. 29, 1991).

11. See, S. Bhattacharya, "Notes on the role of the intellectuals in colonial society: India from mid-nineteenth century", in Studies in History, Vol. 1 No. 1, Jan.-June 1979, pp. 97-98. Bhattacharya distinguishes them though noticing the fact that 'conventionally both the terms intelligentsia and intellectuals are used to denote the same groups'. See, p. 97.

12. See, K.N. Panikkar, "The Intellectual History of Colonial India: Some Historiographical and Conceptual Questions," in S.Bhattacharya and R.Thapar (eds), Situating Indian History, Delhi, Oxford Univ. Press, 1986, pp. 412-13. In addition, Panikkar draws our attention to the distinction made between the 'cultural objective' and 'philosophic subjective' intelligentsia by Richard Pipes, between the educated and the intelligentsia by Theodor Geiger and Boris Elkin, the concept of concentric circles for differentiating the intellectuals from intelligentsia by Milnikov, and Edgar Morin's definition of intellectuals, as some examples.


14. Simpson and Weiner, n. 13 (ii). ['n.' refers to our notes in this chapter].

15. Ibid.


17. Ibid., Williams, n.16, p. 170.

18. In 1894, Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer of the French General staff was convicted of espionage for Germany. For this he was condemned in a secret military trial to life long incarceration on Devil's Island. In 1896 Colonel Picart informed his superiors that he
believed the main incriminating document, the so-called bordereau (a letter supposedly written by Dreyfus to the German military attache) was written by a Major Esterhazy and that Dreyfus was innocent. But the army and the government remained adamant on the conviction of Dreyfus holding that an admission of error would hurt the cause of the army. Hence, a vigorous campaign started against this miscarriage of justice which divided the French intellectual community into two warring camps. After fresh investigation and court of appeals Dreyfus was finally fully rehabilitated in 1906. Albert Thibaudet has called the Dreyfus Affair a 'tumult of intellectuals'. For further details of this case see Lewis A. Coser, Men of Ideas - A sociologist's view, New York, The Free Press, 1965, pp. 215 ff.

19. Ibid., p. 222.

20. Ibid., p. 223. Brunetiere lambasted Zola's "J'accuse" in which the latter had accused the army of partiality, thus, And what is Zola up to? His letter, J'accuse, is a monument of stupidity, presumptuousness and absurdity. This novelist meddling in a problem of justice seems to me no less impertinent and preposterous than the intervention of a captain of gendarmerie in a question of syntax and prosody...

Cited by Coser. See, Ibid., p. 222.


25. Ibid., pp. 1070-71.


27. Churchward, n.22.

28. We have drawn this excerpt from the article by Leopold Labedz, "The Structure of the Soviet Intelligentsia" in Pipes (ed), n. 21, pp. 63-64.

29. Ibid., p.63.

30. Cited in Churchward, n.22, p.3.

31. Ibid.


34. See the reprinted part of Julien Benda's book The Treason of the Intellectuals (1928) in George B. de Huszar (ed), The Intellectuals - A controversial portrait, Illinois, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960, p.217. Benda is a French scholar. He calls intellectuals the 'clerks'. The definition provides his view of the traditional intellectual. He feels that a fundamental change had occurred by the end of the 19th century when the 'clerks' began to play the game of political passions rather than acting as a check on the realism of the people'. Ibid., p. 218.


36. See, Steven Lukes, "Durkheim's 'Individualism and The Intellectuals'" in Political Studies, Vol. XVII, No.1 1969, note 5 on p.19. Here, Durkheim's article "Individualism And the Intellectual" has been translated into English by S. and J. Lukes, and introduced by Steven Lukes for publication in this journal.

37. Ibid., p.25.


41. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, New Delhi, Amerind Publishing Co. (1949) Third Indian reprint 1981, p. 263. Merton's concept of intellectual encompasses, among others, 'those who are specialists in the field of social, economic and political knowledge', e.g. social scientists and lawyers. He does not think that every teacher or professor is an intellectual. 'The limiting case occurs' he states, when a teacher merely communicates the content of a textbook, without further interpretations or applications'. In such cases, the teachers is' he holds, 'no more an intellectual' but merely a cog in the transmission belt of communicating ideas forged by others'. Ibid, pp.263-64.


46. Williams, n.16, p.170.

47. Ibid. Moreover, Williams draws our attention to a difference in emphasis in intellectual work between the "direct producers in the spheres of ideology and culture" and those whose work require mental effort but primarily dealing with administration, distribution, organization or repetition.


49. Beteille, n.9, pp.29-30,44.


52. Ralf Dahrendorf, "The Intellectual and Society : The Social Function of the 'Fool' in the Twentieth Century" Philip Reiff (ed.), n.40, p.55. Dahrendorf calls intellectuals the 'fools' of modern period and the 'court jester' of modern society. The fool, he thinks, 'always acts out of character' while everyone who is above, in the middle, or at the bottom (social stratum) of the society plays his social role. The fool enjoys freedom from the hierarchy of social order. He speaks 'from outside as well as from inside' it. 'The fool belongs to the social order and yet does not commit himself to it', observes Dahrendorf.

53. Ibid.

54. Coser, n.18, p.viii.

55. Ibid.

56. Yogendra Singh, "Sociological Issues", Seminar, No.112, Dec. 1968, p.29. This number of the journal is devoted to the issue of academic colonialism.

57. S.C. Dube, n.50.

58. Barzun, n.16, p.3.

59. Ibid., pp.3-5, passim.

60. Michels, n.3, p.118.


63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

67. Shils, n.42, p.389. Here, Shils clarifies that this very broad definition was less selective or discriminating one' than he would use to designate the intellectuals in the advanced countries. This definition was, in his view, an acknowledgement of the smaller degree of internal differentiation prevailing within the educated class in the New States and also a recognition of a means of identification employed by them and their countrymen. Moreover, he thinks that this definition was getting inadequate due to the extension of opportunities for higher education which involved changes in the composition and outlook of educated people.

68. Beteille, n.10.


70. Nirad C. Chaudhuri, The Intellectual In India, New Delhi, Vir Publishing House, 1967, p.55, Chaudhuri is a well known novelist.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., p.62.

73. U.B. Bhoite, Sociology of Indian Intellectuals, Jaipur, Rawat Pub., 1987, p.10. Bhoite delineates two definitional perspectives on intellectuals. In one case, intellectuals are characterized as 'all those who earn their livelihood by mental labour'. Bhoite does not accept this view as it would include even a clerk in the category of intellectuals. In second view, 'an intellectual is a person of a high intellectual calibre, man of exceptional creative abilities'. He rejects this also because it would entitle only a few to be called intellectuals. Hence, he takes a vague middle position. He appreciates Shils' view in this connection.


75. Ibid.


77. M.C. Sharma, The Knowledge Class - A New theory of Proletarian Revolution, New Delhi, Marwah Publications, 1981, p.190. Unlike Marxists Sharma equates possession of knowledge with that of land and capital. He holds that the carriers of knowledge constitute an independent class - the knowledge class.

78. Ibid., pp.192, 202-3.


81. Ibid., p.211.
82. Ibid., p.70.
87. Ibid., p.399.
91. Ibid., p.8.
92. Ibid., p.9.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., p.8.
96. Ibid., p.12. Gramsci identifies two major superstructural levels which he calls 'civil society' and 'political society' or 'the State'. The former is, he states, the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private'. It corresponds to the function of 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises throughout society. And the latter is the domain of 'direct domination' or command exercised by the dominant group through the State and 'juridical' government. Further, in civil society the hegemony of the dominant group is achieved by consent of the masses to the general direction of social life. It is 'imposed' on them by the dominant fundamental group. On the other hand, in political society the apparatus of state coercive power 'legally' enforces discipline on those groups who do not 'consent' either actively or passively.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid. [Emphasis added].
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid., p.254.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid., p.252.

104. Ibid., p.23.


107. Ibid., p.9.

108. Ibid., p.12. Moreover, Baran clarifies that 'intellect workers can be (and sometimes are) intellectuals, and intellectuals are frequently' intellect workers'. He says frequently because even an industrial worker, artisan, or farmer could be an intellectual without being an intellect worker. This has been so in some historical situations. See his note, ibid.


110. Ibid., p.17.

111. Bhattacharya, n.11.

112. Ibid.


115. Panikkar, n.12, p.412. Here Panikkar has noticed only one type of intellectuals, i.e. a 'new stratum of intellectuals' signifying the proletarian revolutionary type, and not the status quoist type which is also implicit in Gramsci's schema. See also, p. 413.

116. Ibid., p.413.


119. Ibid.


121. Ibid., note 1 on p.63.

122. See, Social Scientist, Vol.1, No.9, April 1973, p.64.


125. Ibid., p.165.


128. Rudra, n.124, pp.163-64.

129. Ibid.

130. Ibid., p.165.


132. For interchangeable use of the terms intellectuals and intelligentsia, see, Lenin, Lenin On the Intelligentsia, Moscow, Progress Pubs., 1983, passim; Mannheim, n.39, assim (esp. pp.9-11); Churchward, n.22, p.1; Shils, n.66, passim (pp.15-21); Beteille, n.10, (ToI Articles); Chaudhuri, n.70, pp.27ff.; Srivastava, n.74, pp.8 ff.; Habib, n.120; Dube, n.50. Dube has used the terms prabudha varga and budhijivi which could be roughly translated as intelligentsia and intellectual respectively.

133. Aron, n.4, p.205.

134. Ibid., p.208.

135. Lipset, n.62.


139. Aron, n.4, p.205.

140. Shils, n.42, p.389.