Chapter VI

INDIA-I

I. Threat Perception

The purpose of India's foreign policy and defence preparedness has been to safeguard its security that is, territorial integrity and political unity. Security in broad terms includes political, economic, ideological and military aspects. Therefore, national security must be formulated or evaluated in relation to its geographical location, economic resources, industrial and technological base, and its ability to deter external aggression. Thus, we find, military security is only one aspect of national security. India chose non-alignment as the main focus of its foreign policy with a view to avoiding bloc politics and to promote peace, co-existence and international cooperation among all states. It was hoped that friendly relations with its neighbours would allow India to have small defence outlays.

Non-alignment was an alternative to the Western and the Communist bloc politics. The basic objective of this policy was to achieve economic development within the country, reduce tensions in the neighbourhood and avoid getting embroiled in the Cold War. It was not isolationism, it allowed a nation to judge each issue on its merit, and to pursue its foreign policy without compromising its sovereignty or independence.

India has faced security problems at two levels: external and internal. The external threat to India's security can be furthe
subdivided as: (a) from its neighbours at the subcontinent level — Pakistan and China; (b) from countries in the Indian Ocean littoral; and (c) from involvement of the superpowers in the subcontinent. The philosophy underlying India's defence planning and arms acquisition has been concerned primarily with the threats at the subcontinent level and threats from radical uprisings within the country.

*India and Pakistan*

India's relation with Pakistan have been affected by the fears and rivalries that marked the political scene before independence and culminated in the partition of the country. Besides religion, caste, language and regional loyalties tended to divide the country. Therefore, by encouraging communal rivalries, the British could divide their subjects without weakening the unity of their 'empire'. Subsequent schism between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League on the question of acquiring special rights, safeguards and privileges for the Muslims in India — gave way to the demand for a separate nation for the Muslims. The partition of the country created unavoidable problems. The stability in the subcontinent was threatened as the antagonistic attitude of the two parties in the pre-independence period became transformed into hostility and suspicion at the governmental level in the
post-dependence phase. While the Muslim League had competed with Congress, the new state of Pakistan sought parity vis-a-vis the larger state of India. Thus, the problem of identity, the need to make Pakistan a viable state and its fear of being absorbed by India have shaped its relationship with India. India and Pakistan have fought three wars in the last three decades; their problems continue to remain linked to their historical inheritance, despite geographical and cultural continuity and affinity.

The Government of India was faced with the problem of integrating over 500 princely states. Except for the Princes of Junagadh in Western India, Hyderabad in Central India and Kashmir in North Western India, all others had signed the Instrument of Accession with the Government of India. The desire of Junagadh and Hyderabad to remain independent and later on, to accede to Pakistan, posed a security threat. The Government of India had to use its defence forces in both these states to maintain law and order following the breakdown of civil administration in both states.1

Similarly, indecision of the Maharaja of Kashmir on the future status of his state was a cause of misgivings to the leaders

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of India and Pakistan. Kashmir was important for both the countries and was also the frontier of undivided India with China, Russia, Tibet and Afghanistan. Population in Jammu and Ladakh was primarily non-Muslim but in the Kashmir valley it was mainly Muslim. Prime Minister M.C. Mahajan noted that the Private Secretary of Jinnah "had come to Kashmir earlier and had been there for several months creating an atmosphere of communal frenzy against India. Communal minded persons and Muslim divines were worked up and were asked to request the Maharaja to give up accession of the State to Pakistan. When Pakistan imposed an economic blockade on 2 October 1947, it underminded the position of the State to a great extent. The issue escalated as tribesmen (the Mahsauds) from the frontier region of Pakistan infiltrated and invaded Kashmir on 22 October 1947. The State forces were unable and inadequate to stop the invading forces. In the face of mass scale invasion, the Maharaja asked for India's help on 24 October, which was only possible if the former signed the Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India. In view of the deterioration in situation, Maharaja Hari Singh finally signed the Accession on


when Mahatma Gandhi went on fast on 13 January 1948, the Government of India agreed to pay the balance also, a gesture to promote peace and goodwill between the two countries. Nehru repeatedly assured Pakistan that it was not interested in waging a war against Pakistan. He corresponded with Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan on the question of "No-war Declaration". On the question of Canal Water Dispute, India was willing to come to an agreement with Pakistan which would not affect its economy. India accepted the proposal put forward by the World Bank in 1954 but Pakistan did not accept it. Finally, an agreement was reached and the Indus Water Treaty came into effect on April 1, 1960. Pakistan's desire to acquire Kashmir and its initiation of hostilities in the Rann of Kutch in 1965 had also been a bone of contention between the two countries.

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**India and China**

India's relations with China too have been affected as


a result of border dispute. People's Republic of China did not recognize India's policy of non-alignment. India-China relations further suffered on the question of Tibet. Chinese have always considered Tibet an autonomous region under their 'suzerainty'. When it became clear that China was sending its troops to Tibet in 1950, India registered its protest. China repeatedly said, "The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people and defend the frontiers of China." It warned India that it would not tolerate foreign interference. It is, however, not clear from whom did China want to liberate Tibet! India had assured China that it had no intention of interfering in Tibet. Instead, it advocated "... a settlement of the Tibetan problem ... by peaceful negotiations, adjusting legitimate Tibetan claims to autonomy with in the framework of Chinese sovereignty".

At this time, India was also championing China's admission to the United Nations and, therefore, it advised China that a settlement with Tibet would certainly be to its advantage. Finally, a Sino-Indian agreement was signed on 29 April 1954. It made a

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9. Letter from Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of China, 26 September 1959. Reprinted in, The Chinese Threat (Govt. of India, Publishing Division, January 1963) p.33, Appendix I.


11. Note of the Govt. of the Republic of India: F.N. Continues...
qualitative improvement in their relationship with each other. The principles of peaceful coexistence was considered important, for it was seen as an agreement not to commit aggression against each other. Their relations, however, began to deteriorate after 1956. With the outbreak of an anti-Chinese rebellion in Tibet in March 1959, followed by the entry of PRC's army and flight of Dalai Lama to India, the relations became more strained.

India's policy of appeasement and recognition of 'Tibet region of China' brought Chinese forces to the borders of India. The British Legacy of McMahon line of 1914 was accepted by India as the boundary of North East India. Earlier, Tibet had served as the buffer zone between the British India and Russia. The Simla Conference (1914) had failed to produce Chinese acquiescence of the Tripartite Agreement between British India - Tibet and China. Because China refused to treat Tibet as a sovereign state. The line had been drawn on the map but had not been translated on ground. Moreover, China still refused to accept this demarcation. The Chinese map in 1954 still claimed the following as

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Previous F.N:

on the question of Tibet, dated November 1 1950; Reproduced in ibid., p.251, Appendix.

12. The Preamble of the Agreement stated the underlying five principles of Peaceful Co-existence of 'Panch Sheel': Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, Mutual non-aggression, Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, Equality and mutual benefit, and, Peaceful co-existence. Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Governments of India and China 1954-1959, White Paper (Govt. of India, 1959), p.98.
part of China — Ladakh, NEFA, Andaman Islands, Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal, Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indo-China, Formosa, Sulu Islands, Ryuku Islands, Korea and some parts of the Soviet Union. 13

In 1958 when India discovered that China had built a road linking Sinkiang with Tibet through the Indian territory, it registered its protest with China. Thus began the boundary dispute between India and China. China refused to accept India's claim to Aksai Chin. Ambiguities and vague demarcations at various points coupled with differences in their claims, led to skirmishes on the border, at Longju and Kongka Pass. Chou En-Lai said that he was willing to settle the border problem through negotiations. Till then, each side should maintain the status quo. 14 Nehru agreed but his emphasis was on the status quo ante rather than status quo as claimed by the Chinese. 15

13. When Nehru drew Chou En-Lai's attention to the inaccuracies on the map, the latter said that the map was based on some old maps and the Chinese Government had not found time to correct them. Repeated in the Indian Note, 21 August 1958, White Paper I, p.46. For the map, see, A Brief History of Modern China (Peking : 1954), Reproduced in, V.B.Karnik, ed. Chinese Invasion : Background and Sequel (Bombay : The Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, 1966), p.82.


15. "If any party has trespassed ... across the traditional frontiers, it should immediately withdraw to its side of the frontier ... No discussions can be fruitful unless the posts on the Indian side ... held by fruitful

F.N. Continues ....
This attitude was consistently maintained by both sides. India's claim on Aksai Chin in the Western sector was unacceptable to China, as it was important for China as a link between Western Tibet and Sinkiang. China, on the other hand, had accepted McMohan line with Burma and said it was willing to do the same with India. The Sino-Indian dispute came to public knowledge only in 1959.

India opted for the "forward policy" in response to the vocal opposition at home over Chinese intrusion on Indian territory. It included the establishment of posts into the Chinese held Indian territory, along the McMohan line and at the trijunction in the East. As mentioned above, this line had not been demarcated on the ground and, therefore, any unilateral adjustment (taking into account the natural geographical feature) especially where the line was disputed was followed with a view that it would help India to defend its frontiers and to demonstrate its presence in these areas, lest China decided to occupy further Indian territory. For example, at Thag La Ridge, Longja, Khinzemane and Tamden.

Previous F.N:

Chinese forces are ... evacuated." Letter from the PM of India to the PM of China, September 26, 1959, n.9, p.46.

16. See, Annexure to the letter, ibid., p.47 ff.

Chou-En-Lai's suggestion that both countries should withdraw 20 kms. from the McMahon line in the East and the line of actual control in the West, that no armed personnel should be sent into the demilitarized zone and that both Prime Ministers should hold talks on the border issues. The status quo was not acceptable to India as except at Longju, Indian armed forces were nowhere in occupation to the north of the McMahon line. Further withdrawal would have left Indian territory exposed to Chinese aggression. Nehru assured China that the latter's troops should be withdrawn from Longju and India would not re-occupy it. As an interim measure, Indian personnel would withdraw to the West of the international boundary in the Ladakh region as shown in their maps, if Chinese forces would draw back East of the international boundary in the Ladakh region as shown in their maps, if Chinese forces would draw back East of the international boundary as shown in their maps. After which, the border problems could be discussed. This proposal was not acceptable to China. Thus, continued rejection of proposals and counter-proposals created a situation of stalemate.

By 1962, the Chinese forces had taken up new posts in the Western sector and extended patrolling. Towards the end of

18. Letter from the Chinese Prime Minister, November 7, 1959, White Paper III, p.44.
summer, a border clash seems to have been anticipated. This was followed by the border war of 20 October 1962 both on the Eastern and Western fronts. India suffered defeat and heavy losses. On 22 November 1962, China declared unilateral ceasefire. The war was followed by the Colombo Conference to bring about an early settlement of the issue. Although both the parties accepted the proposals put forward, they continued to interpret it differently. Moreover, China feared that India might use the Colombo mediation as "arbitration" of the disputed frontiers. It, therefore, remained unwilling to relinquish its advantages and said it was willing to wait for India to negotiate on the border question. In the mean time, China had settled its border disputes with Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Mongol. Thus the border dispute has seriously inhibited the Sino-Indian relations. It has increased the security problems for India. Besides the Chinese forces in the Aksai Chin, there is a historical silk route to the Middle East through Gilgit. If China strangulates Ladakh and Pakistan were to initiate hostilities in the Jammu and Kashmir valley, it would cause serious security problems for India. Moreover, China's threat to Chumbi valley which guards the approaches to Sikkim and Bhutan is also of much concern to India.


Relations with the Himalaya Kingdom

India's relations with her Himalayan neighbours have been of a special nature. Besides her (NEFA) North-Eastern Frontier Agency, the border along side Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh — the "middle sector", and Ladakh, Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal form the buffer zone between India and China. Therefore, Indian attempt to secure special relationship with these Himalayan states was with a view to secure the defence of India. Sikkim was inherited as a protectorate of India at the time of independence and the relations were regularised in the Indo-Sikkimese treaty of 5 December 1950. India retains the responsibility for the defence of Sikkim and the security of India. Bhutan was guaranteed internal autonomy and given annual subsidy under the friendship treaty of 8 August 1949. India retained the right of consultation on matters involving Bhutan's external relations and supervisory privileges over Bhutan's external relations and supervisory privileges over Bhutan's arms imports. The Government of India provided funds for the development of roads and communications network in this region. 22

Previous F.N:


22. For example, construction of roads to link Dirrang Dzong (NEFA) with foothills, and Kimin with Ziro in 1957. See, J.N.Hazarika, in Parliament on 16 March 1956, LSD, Part I, Vol.2, Col.1097-L. Also see his F.N. Continues......
A treaty of peace and friendship signed on 31 July 1950 reaffirmed the interdependence of the two countries — Nepal and India. It was stipulated that both Governments would consult each other to take effective measures against foreign aggression. India's involvement in Nepal has continuously increased. It also encouraged Nepal to normalize its relations with China in 1954.

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Goa

India was also faced with the problem of liberating Goa from the Portuguese colonial rule. Government's policy of non-violence failed to do this. Portugal refused to relinquish its hold over its colony in India and took refuge behind its NATO Allies. The political factors necessitated a change in Nehru's policies in 1961: Afro-Asian countries had become critical of India's fight against colonialism. In their view if the Portuguese hold on Goa could be relinquished it would help

Previous F.N:

the Portuguese African Territories, to overthrow the yolk of colonialism. At home the opposition too wanted the Government to take active measures (use force, if necessary) to integrate Goa in India. A change in Government's policy was evident in Nehru's speech at Chowpatty, Bombay. He said "... We have been forced into thinking afresh by the Portuguese to adopt other methods to solve the problem. When and how I cannot say now. But, I have no doubt that we will do it (Goa will soon be free)... ..." Finally on 17-18 December, 1961 Operation Vijay commenced to liberate Goa and to integrate it with India.

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Internal Threats

Besides the problem of integration at the time of partition, India has faced security threats from tribals in the North-East region. Other internal problems threatening the country have been political instability, socio-economic problems and the emergence of certain radical groups like the Naxal movement. The Indian army has been so far deployed only in the North-East region to deal with the Naga and Mizo, problems.

23. Arthur, G. Rubinoff, India's Use of Force in Goa (Bombay; Popular Prakashan, 1971), Ch. IV and V.
24. Ibid.
26. See, P.N. Khera, Operational Vijay: The Liberation of F.N. Continues....
Naga Uprising

The Naga hills had been annexed in 1890s and formed an integral part of the British Empire. During the Second World War, Nagas had joined the British Indian Army to fight the advancing Japanese troops. On the question of the status of Nagaland in a free India, Viceroy Lord Wavell and the Secretary of State for India, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, had agreed that the responsibility for the tribal people could not be transferred to an outside authority. Therefore, it was later on agreed that this region should continue to be administered by the Governor of Assam. The Government of India did not consider constituting a separate colony or state of the tribals.

However, the Naga National Council (NNC) made four demands at the time of independence.

1. It stands for the solidarity of all Naga tribes, including those in the unadministered areas.
2. It strongly protests against the grouping of Assam with Bengal.
3. The Naga Hills should be constitutionally included in an autonomous Assam in a free India, with local autonomy.

Previous F.N:
Goa and other Portuguese Colonies in India 1961 (Historical Section, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1974), Ed. by S.N. Prasad.

27. See, Y.D. Gundevia, War and Peace in Nagaland (New Delhi: Palit and Palit, 1975), Ch.3.

28. Ibid., p.53.

29. Press Note, Quoted in ibid., p.53.
and due safeguards for the interests of the Nagas.

4. The Naga tribes should have a separate electorate.30

The Government of India tried to accommodate their demands and a nine point agreement was signed under which at the end of the ten years, the Naga people were to decide their future. A minority of Nagas led by A.Z. Phizo were dissatisfied on this point and demanded independence for the Nagas.31 As the leadership of NNO passed into the hands of extremist Phizo, demands became more radical. He mobilized Nagas and propagated armed resistance. The Nagas boycotted the 1952 general elections, refused to pay taxes, withdrew from schools and Government offices. Discussions, visits of peace missions, etc. failed to solve the problem and the relations between the Centre and Nagas began to deteriorate from 1952 onwards. The Assam Government's armed forces were reinforced with para-military Assam Rifles, and Indian Army in 1955 as arson, murder, looting and intimidation of Government servants increased.

A separate unit—(NHTA) Naga Hills Tuensang Area — was constituted to be administered by the Governor of Assam from December 1957 and the Nagaland Assembly was constituted in 1964.

30. Ibid., p.57.

31. See, Ibid., pp.57-61. M.Alemchiba, Ed., A Brief Historical Account of Nagaland (Kohima, Nagaland : Naga Institute of Culture, 1970), Ch.VI.
However underground terrorists continued their war. They were aided and abetted by the Chinese who were supplying them arms and ammunition and also training them.\(^{32}\) They also imported arms from Pakistan.\(^{33}\) By 1967, Phizo and Morn Angami were all for asking Chinese help. Many of them went through Burma to China to receive training. By 1968, the Cease-fire was giving way to renewed hostilities during which the security force recovered Chinese arms from the Naga underground.\(^{34}\) The Indian border forces had to be used to stop insurgency and seal passages to East Pakistan and Burma.

**Mizo Problem**

Similar problems faced the Government of India in the Mizo Hills. The demand for a separate state and independence was voiced by the Mizos only in 1961. However, like the Nagas, their experience in the Second World War made them expert in handling the firearms. In the post-war period, the Mizo Union and the United Mizo Freedom Organisation had been formed. The former

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34. These included 60 mm Chinese mortar, 7.62 rifles with folding Chinese bayonets and light and medium machine guns, and short range rockets of Pakistani make. See, *ibid.*, p.194. Asoo Yonuo, *The Rising Nagas* (Delhi, Vivek Publishing House, 1974), p.353, Also see Chapters V-IX.
was supported by the demobilised Mizos. It stood for the
abolition of rule by tribal chiefs and supported inclusion in
the Indian Union. The latter, however, had its base in the
tribal chiefs and favoured a merger with Burma. The Mizo Union
won all the assembly seats in 1952 election but with the abolition
of the tribal system its popularity waned. Its mis-handling of
the 1959-60 famine was followed by the formation of the Mizo
National famine front, and later, the Mizo National Front. This
political party began to train armed volunteer force and became
committed to achieve an independent Mizoram. Outbreak of
hostilities in 1966 was countered by punitive measures imposed by
the Government. Army was deployed to counter insurgency operations
Political concessions and autonomy were given and in January 1972
the Mizo Hill District was separated and given the status of a
Union Territory. 35

Mizo National insurgents have once again become active
this year, spreading their activities in the entire north-eastern
states of Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura, Assam and Arunachal. It is
reported that these insurgents had their headquarters in East
Pakistan during the 1965 Indo-Pak War. They had been handover to
the Indian authorities during the Mujib Government in Bangladesh.
However, the present military ruling elite in Bangladesh is

35. See Dilip Hiro, Inside India Today (London: Routledge
once more extending aid to them.\(^{36}\) It has been necessary for the Government of India to use its army to counter-insurgency operations in this region. The situation is likely to remain volatile until some solution is found to appease the demands of the MNF insurgents. Thus, the North-eastern region will continue to pose security threat for India.

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II. Arms Acquisition

India's policy of arms acquisition has been governed by its security considerations discussed above. Its acquisitions till 1962 were a result of its preoccupation with internal security problems and increasing threat from Pakistan (especially after its alliance with the USA in 1954). From 1962 to 1970 Indian policy was to modernize its defence forces to meet the combined threat from China and Pakistan. The 1962 Sino-Indian war had highlighted the inadequacies of Indian defence forces. Therefore, the task of planners was to overcome these limitations within the limited resources of a developing economy.

India avoided making any purchases from either superpowers in early 1950's. India's relations with Britain continued after its independence in 1947. Its defence forces were influenced

\(^{36}\) Blitz (Bombay), August 18, 1979, p.23.
to a large extent by the British legacy — their organization under colonial rule, familiarity with weapons, and training. Its defence forces in the immediate post-independence period continued to be indigenized under British officers. Therefore, it was natural that the new government would turn to Britain for purchase of weapons. Secondly, India had positive balance with London which helped it to make such acquisitions.\(^1\) India had 100 British-built Spitfire and Tempest fighter aircrafts in 1948. It acquired Short Sealand, D.H.Vampire utility transports, Fairey Firefly and Canberra aircrafts through mid 1950s. It also acquired Ouragans\(^2\) and Dassault Mystere fighters from France and Chipmunk from Canada. See Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 (Separate sheet, p.268 )

Indian army (280,000 personnel) was equipped with obsolete World War II equipment. India purchased 30 Sherman tanks from the USA in 1953 as a stop-gap measure. It acquired British Daimler and Humber AC vehicles between 1948 and 1951. The .303 Enfield remained its standard rifle.

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<tr>
<td>1956-57</td>
<td>-37.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957-58</td>
<td>-74.0</td>
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Economic Survey, 1959-60, Table 5.4

2. \(^1\) The Times, 15 December 1953. India had first considered buying Meteors from Britain. \(^2\) The Ouragans were F.N.Continues......
<table>
<thead>
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<td>Destroyer, “R” class</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Destroyer escort, “Hunt”</td>
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<td>Inshore minesweeper, “Horn”</td>
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<td>Coastal minesweeper, “Ton” class</td>
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<td>Cruiser, “Colony” class</td>
<td>UK</td>
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<td>1957-58</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Seaward defence craft, “Savilir” class</td>
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<td>Anti-aircraft frigate, “Leverard” class</td>
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<td>1958</td>
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<td>Anti-submarine frigate, “Backwood” class</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
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<td>Seaward defence craft, “Sharada” class</td>
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<td>Anti-aircraft frigate, “Leopard” class</td>
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Armed forces vehicles

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<td>1953</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>M-4 Sherman</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Large numbers supplied before 1950</td>
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Register 18. Arms supplies to Nepal

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<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>PT-76</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>PT-76</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-73</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Vijayanta</td>
<td>UK/India</td>
<td>Version of Vickers 37 produced under licence, indigenous content 68 per cent 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-71</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>T-54</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-71</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>T-55</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-72</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>OT-62A</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Produced under licence in India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>OT-64</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Register 19. Arms supplies to Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Supplier</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Scottish Aviation Twin Pioneer</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Ex-Soviet aircraft medical equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>B-14</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Gift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Short Skyvan</td>
<td>(UK)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Douglas C-47</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Doosan F-200</td>
<td>(South Korea)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>DHC-6 Twin Otter</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Register 20. Arms supplies to India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Supplier</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>AMX-13</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>AMX-13</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-70</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>AMX-13</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>DHC-6 Twin Otter</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Item Description</td>
<td>Supplier</td>
<td>Comment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Aero L-39 Basic Trainer</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Ordered in 1974 due to delays in the production of HAL, HT-16 Kiran Trainer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Aero L-29 Delfin Basic Trainer</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Delivery pending completion of L-39 orders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Patrol boat, ASW equipped</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-10</td>
<td>&quot;A-14&quot; - Class Submarine</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>To be built in Sweden and fitted in India.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Westland Sea King ASW Helicopter</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>In addition to 3 delivered in 1973.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>MIG-23 &quot;Flogger&quot; Strike/Interceptor</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Chosen vs: UK Harrier</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>YAK-36 VIOL Strike fighter</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Frigate, &quot;Petya&quot; - Displ:1050 tons class</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>In addition to 9 previously delivered.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>Submarine, &quot;roxtrot&quot; class</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>In addition 4 in 1968-70.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>WSK-Nielec TS-11 Iskra Jet Trainer</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4+3</td>
<td>Ilyushin 11-38 &quot;May&quot; Bomber/ Maritime recce</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>For navy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-75</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>&quot;Manuchka&quot;-class</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Arms: SS-N-9 ShShM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&quot;Polnocny&quot;-class</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>In addition to earlier 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 1976</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Britten-Norman Defender</td>
<td>UK/Belgium</td>
<td>For Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Westland Wasp</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>For &quot;Leander&quot; class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>&quot;L-38 &quot;May&quot;</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Navy order instead of too costly H's Himrod.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>54*/144</td>
<td>SS-N-9</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>To be supplied prior to future licensed production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>48*/84</td>
<td>SS-N-2 &quot;Styx&quot;</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Arming new &quot;Osa&quot;-class (7) missile boats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>3*/8</td>
<td>&quot;Manuchka&quot;-class</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Arms: SS-N-9 ShShM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Origin</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>(78)/2*</td>
<td>&quot;Osa 65&quot;-class Missile Patrol Boat</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Arms: SS-N-2 &quot;Styx&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>&quot;Polnocny&quot;-class Tank landing ship</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>In addition to earlier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Alize ASW Fighter</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>R-550 Magic AAM</td>
<td>France/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Licensed Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-77</td>
<td>70*/140</td>
<td>SA-315 B Cheetah Light Helicopter</td>
<td>France/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Licensed Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-77</td>
<td>99*/99</td>
<td>SA-316 B Alouette-3 Helicopter</td>
<td>France/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Licensed Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-77</td>
<td>2100*/3000</td>
<td>SS-11 ATM</td>
<td>France/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Licensed Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>10/100</td>
<td>Gnat HK-2 Fighter/Bomber</td>
<td>UK/India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>HS-748 M Military Transport</td>
<td>UK/India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-77</td>
<td>4*/6</td>
<td>&quot;Leander&quot; Frigate</td>
<td>UK/India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*/5</td>
<td>Westland Sea King ASW Helicopter</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-77</td>
<td>96*/144</td>
<td>Short Seacat Sh AH</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-77</td>
<td>300*/1000</td>
<td>Vijayanta-2 Tank</td>
<td>UK/India</td>
<td>Licensed Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Boeing 737-100 Transport</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>4*/4</td>
<td>IIL-38 ASW Aircraft</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-79</td>
<td>600*/600</td>
<td>K-13 A Atoll AAM</td>
<td>USSR/India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ka-25 Hormone ASW aircraft</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>&quot;Kashin&quot;</td>
<td>ASW destroyer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-78</td>
<td>24*/150</td>
<td>MiG-21-Bis</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-79</td>
<td>100*/100</td>
<td>MiG-21 M</td>
<td>USSR/India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>../92</td>
<td>SSN-11</td>
<td>ShShM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

" " " 1976, p.264
" " " 1977, p.317
" " " 1978, pp.262-3.
India had (as its share), 32 naval vessels of various
types, 1000 officers and 10,000 ratings/seamen at the time of
partition. The Government wanted to develop its navy as strate-
gically important and preponderant vis-a-vis its neighbours.
The ten-year programme involved indigenization of the Navy and
gradual development of it as a carrier task force.\(^3\) It acquired
a light cruiser, 3 'R' class destroyers, and 2 oilers from Britain
were discarded in 1950 when reassessment
in 1948-50. 4 Trawlers and 6 fleet minesweepers\(^4\) was made and it
was decided that a "Hunter-Killer" type of small carrier force
was to be developed.\(^4\) India purchased a fleet replenishment
vessel from Italy in 1953 and borrowed 3 ex-escort destroyers of
the 'Hunt' type 2 class from Britain (loaned subject to extension
after 3 years). Another light cruiser was purchased from Britain
in 1954 April\(^5\) and 2 inshore minesweepers were transferred from
the Royal Navy in 1955.

When Pakistan signed the Mutual Security Agreement with
the USA in 1954, it became recipient of Military Assistance
Programme (MAP). It began to acquire weapons to offset India's
man-power superiority with fire-power superiority. From 1954

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Previous F.N:

\(^3\) They were probably financed by a US Subsidy. SIPRI, *Arms Trade with
the Third World* (Sweden: Almgvist & Wiksell, 1971), p.481. They were also probably cheaper as they were obsolescent in Europe.


\(^5\) The Hindu, 22 January 1950.

\(^5\) Joined the Indian Fleet in 1957 after being refitted. 
Onwards, Indian arms acquisitions were in response to Pakistan's military resources. Moreover, there was a sizeable increase in the foreign exchange reserve in 1950-51, following the international trade boom which enabled India to diversify her arms purchases, although UK was the main arms supplier till 1959 when because of reduced foreign exchange reserves India had to limit or avoid outright purchases.

Expansion of the defence forces had been planned at the time of independence. Orders for Gnats, Mysteres and Canberra fighter and bomber aircrafts were placed in 1954. Later orders of Hunters and additional Canberras and Ouragans closely followed the reports that Pakistan was to receive F-86 Sabre fighters and B-57 Canberra bombers from the USA under MAP. In 1956 India was hesitating over signing an order for Gnats with Polland of UK. It was suggested that the Soviet Union had perhaps offered MIGs. However, the Government of India signed the deal and placed an order for the assembly and licence production of the


7. India's balance of payment in the sterling Area had fallen to Rs.-74.0 crores in 1957-58. See Footnote 1. Source: Economic Survey, 1959-60, Table 5.4

same in India. It also acquired 160 Hawker Hunter MK56 FGA's (fighter ground attackers) and 22 MK66 two-seat trainers between 1957-61.  

In the bomber category, the Soviet Union offered India Ilyushin IL-28 at 1/4th - 1/2 of the marketprice of British Canberra in 1954-56.  

The Government, however, chose the Canberras in 1956. It also acquired B(1).58 light bombers and PR.57 photo-reconnaissance aircrafts in 1957-58. Most of the Indian acquisition of jet fighters were of political prestige value and presumably had some deterrance value. It lacked spares for most of the weapons systems.

India had also acquired Bell helicopters from America, commercial transports from UK between 1955 and 1962. The Soviet Union presented to the Indian Air Force with 2 Ilyushin Il-14 commercial transport aircraft. The Indian Air Force, however, preferred the British Avro-748 and signed an agreement for its production in India in 7 July 1959.


10. *Aeroplane and Astronautics*, 15 February 1957, p.222. According to Mahavir Tyagi in *The Times*, 9 May 1956 - The decision may have been partly influenced by Britain's willingness to release 'blue study' radar bombsight. IL-28 was offered at £ 60,000 a piece; Vs. British Canberra at £ 250,000 each. See, M.Kidron, *Foreign Investments in India* (London :Oxford University Press, 1965), p.118.


By 1959, problems over Sino-Indian border made the Government purchase aircrafts capable of high altitude operations. It purchased Mi-4 Hound helicopters, IL-14 transports and Antonov An-12 heavy air freighters from the Soviet Union in 1960-61 — for supply operations in the Ladakh region. It also purchased Fairchild C-119G transport aircraft from the USA and ordered Sikorsky S-62's in August 1960. In response to the reports that Pakistan was to receive F-104 supersonic aircrafts, India began to negotiate with the Soviet Union for MIG-21. This in turn provoked the British and the Americans to offer jet aircrafts to India. It was reported that Britain had offered Lightning at a unit cost of $750,000, nearly $ the market price and was willing to discuss its licenced production in India. Another report stated that Britain and America had offered 12 (1 squad) of Lightnings and F-104s each. However, nothing came of India's inquiries and evaluation of Lightning (UK), F-101 Voodos(USA) and Mirage III (Fr.). An agreement was signed with the Soviet Union for MIG-21s and their production in India. Its another advantage for India was payment in Indian rupees. Moreover,

friendship with the Soviet Union at this point was welcomed by political leadership in view of its conflict with China which did not possess anything faster than MIG-19s.

India, however, failed to acquire sidewinder air-to-air missiles for its IAF subsonic fighters in 1960-61. The US State Department also refused to give data on Hughes HM-55 air-to-air missile system. It also attempted to acquire Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles from Britain. 16

In the Army, its commitments increased from 1959 onwards. It was redeployed in the Sikkim-Bhutan and Ladakh area to secure the defence of Himalayas. New posts were created in the NEFA area. The Army began to take over the security duties from the Assam rifles. Contingency planning was based on the assumption that Pakistan would not attack India if and when Sino-Indian war broke out. India purchased British Centurion heavy tanks in 1956-57 and French AMX-13 Light tanks to balance Pakistan's acquisition of M-41 Bulldogs. However, it did not attempt tocounter Patton tank acquisition of Pakistan. The vehicles were reconditioned from spares acquired from Canadian Levy Auto Parts as India could not buy new ones. Its requirement of new vehicles was met from licenced production of Japanese Nissan Patrol Jeeps and 1-ton

16. UK & USA were afraid that their equipment might fall into the hands of Chinese. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 26 November 1962. Kavic, ibid., pp.105-6
trucks and West German 3-ton trucks in 1959-61. The Government did not acquire any new mortar or the much recommended Colt AR-15, a lightweight American rifle. It was hoped that indigenous production of Ishapore rifles would be sufficient to meet the requirements and also it would save foreign exchange.

In Navy, the emphasis was anti-submarines and anti-aircraft frigates. Small ships were not acquired. Acute foreign exchange shortage (§ 650 mn deficit in 1957-58) was one of the main reason for reduced acquisition in 1957-58. It purchased 3 'R' Class destroyers which had been loaned from the Royal Navy. Other vessels — minesweepers, frigates, etc. — were to be constructed in Indian dockyards. From 1955-61, the air arm of the Naval fleet was developed and modernized. 10 Short Sealand light amphibians, 5 Fairey Firefly T.T.I and 5 T.T.4 targetting aircraft were acquired. Vampire jet trainers and Hindustan HT-2 jet trainers were added. In 1957, Hercules — light fleet carrier was purchased from the Royal Navy, 24 Sea Hawk FGA MK-6 jet fighter bombers were ordered in late 1959 and more in 1961 from Britain; 15 Breguet 1050 Alize turboprop aircraft in 1960 and 4 Alouette 3 helicopters in 1962 were ordered from France.

By 1962, Indian Air Force was the largest and most effective national Air Force in the Indian Ocean region. Multiplicity of weapon systems — American, British, French, Canadian and Soviet makes — needed highly qualified technical personnel. This involved different maintenance schedules, spare parts, service requirements and necessitated continuous retraining of ground and air crews. 20 Many of the Harvard trainers and Vampires were grounded primarily due to lack of spares. 21 Even the repair depot at Kanpur failed to perform its functions during the Sino-Indian war. 22 Except for radars at Delhi and Calcutta airports, Indian Air Force lacked radar warning system. It was primarily trained and deployed for tactical role in support of the Indian Army in Punjab and Kashmir against Pakistan — based on the concept of early strikes with the aim of crippling the PAF. However, the Air Force was not adequately equipped to cripple a Chinese threat or to effectively assist the army. Moreover, it was hampered by the high altitudes, rugged jungles and mountain terrain of NEFA and Assam and Lack of Training. Its role was reduced to one of supplying the army with essential commodities.

The Army was equipped with somewhat inferior tanks as compared to Pakistan, nevertheless, it was fairly well prepared for conventional operations against Pakistan. The strategy was

20. Ibid., p.113.
two-pronged attack on Pakistan, should the latter initiate war on Kashmir. It was planned that Pakistani attack would be repelled by offensive operations directed towards Sialkot, Peshawar and Rawalpindi, and, from Punjab towards Lahore.

Indian planning for Himalayan operations was, however, without much preparation. The Indian army lacked training to fight in the rugged, jungle terrain of NEFA. Officers in-charge felt that any encounter with the Chinese near Thag La Ridge was impracticable. There were problems in reaching the target point to set up posts. Food had to be rationed severely, supplies were made by Dakota flying over the region but it was too distant from the troops and not a very satisfactory source of supply. Adequate clothing was lacking. In artillery, only light pieces could be dropped via paratroops, which were in any case out-ranged by the Chinese infantry mortars. Besides inadequate appreciation of logistic requirements and demographic hazards, other factors primarily responsible for India's unpreparedness and defeat in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 were related to administration and planning. Krishna Menon as the Defence Minister, had differences with his colleagues, especially the Finance Minister, Morarji Desai, which invariably delayed sanctions for any defence proposals. He also failed to inspire the defence forces. The Officers at the top too failed to plan adequately. Promotion of B.M. Kaul as C.G.S. in 196 was debated both in military circles and in the Parliament.

23. See, Neville Maxwell, India's China War (Bombay: Jaico Publishing House, 1971), Ch.IV.
Similarly, Navy lacked facilities and necessary ships which reduced its operational capability. The refit of units of the fleet were missing and, therefore, only few ships would have been ready to go to action, had the need arisen. It could not have gone for prolonged action against a hostile navy in the Bay of Bengal as there were no adequate docking or repair facilities except at Bombay and Cochin. The Indian Navy would have been no match for the Indonesian Sverdlov-class Russian cruiser. It was probably contemplated for use against Pakistan only.

Defeat of India in 1962 war brought to light the deficiencies in Indian planning. Till 1961-62, India had not accepted military aid. Krishna Menon, the then Defence Minister, said in 1961, "there is not one stick in our services that has not been paid for. There is no item of equipment in the Indian Army, Navy or Air Force, which has been given or received by us in aid from anywhere." Now, it began to look for military aid. National security took precedence over its foreign policy. Britain and America gave support to India and responded to its request for an emergency airlift of arms. First shipment of British arms (infantry weapons) reached India on 9 October 1962, and US aid came from its supplies in West Germany. Within one week of the Cease-fire, Averell Harriman (US) and Duncan Sandys (UK) had

arrived in India to study India's defence requirements. Under the agreement between India and UK on 27 November 1962, Britain was to supply arms and equipment free of payment within certain financial limits and it was to be used only against China. Britain was allowed to keep its representative to "observe and review" the use of such equipment. 26

On 22 December 1962, President Kennedy and Prime Minister MacMillan announced in a joint communique at Nassau, emergency aid to India of £ 45 mn = $ 120 mn = Rs. 57 crores to be shared equally by them. 27 America supplied C-130 transport planes to supply equipment on the Himalayan borders on loan basis. However, both the British and American governments were careful not to commit themselves for any long-term plans, unless India sought to solve the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. India now visualized a joint threat from Pakistan and China. India's interest in acquiring supersonic fighters was not in keeping with Anglo-American assessment, who did not want to supply it with identical equipment as Pakistan and, thus precipitate a crisis in their relations with the latter. By 1963, most of the equipment had been supplied to India.

Moreover, joint India, American and British Commonwealth Air Forces were to hold air exercises over India. The plan of "air umbrella" was widely criticised. Therefore, the Government


27. The Sunday Times, 23 December 1962; The Times, 5 March 1963. Commonwealth countries were to supply a part of Britain's share of aid.
of India played it down as an exercise to train IAF personnel in the use of radar and other communications equipment. \(^{28}\) Nehru assured his critics that there was no question of allowing any foreign power to establish bases in India. \(^{29}\) Thus, differences on the role of air exercises began to affect its relations with the West. \(^{30}\)

At this point it must be noted that India had concluded the MIG-deal prior to the Sino-Indian War. Many expected the Soviet Union to back out. \(^{31}\) However, the split between China and the Soviet Union in 1962 further strengthened Indo-Soviet friendship and 6 MIGs were delivered in 1963. These had undergone test flight but had not been supplied to the Indian Air Force when the Indo-Pak war broke out in 1965. The Soviet Union had at first refused to convert these into an all-weather and night planes suitable for deployment at the Himalayan border. \(^{32}\) Despite prompt assistance from the West in 1962, the Government of India was taking precaution not to let anything spoil its relations with the Soviet Union. In 1964, the USSR extended $300 mn. loan to

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30. US Ambassador, Galbraith, was reported to have said "the Indian call for all-out Western assistance including, if necessary, deployment of American and British Air Force Fighters squadrons, was made on November 19 when the Chinese were destroying the Indian defences at Se La and Bomdi La". *The Times*, 20 February 1963.


India for the purchases of fighters, helicopters and light tanks. The *New York Times* reported that Soviet military aid had been approximately $40 mn = Rs. 19 crores. It included ground-to-air missiles, radar training equipment and mobile and fixed launching installations.\(^{33}\) By the end of 1950s, India had diversified its sources of arms acquisition.

India also received emergency aid from Canada, France and Australia — totalling $10 mn approximately.\(^{34}\) It included 16 Caribou medium transport aircrafts on credit from the Canadian Government plus a gift of 18 Dakota aircraft. The USA supplied 24 Packet aircraft under MAP. The US Government also agreed to give sets of powerful static radar installations and related communications equipment and provided mobile radar installations as temporary measures.\(^{35}\) The British aid mainly included electronic and communications equipment.\(^{36}\)

In 1964, the Government of India was formulating a 5-Year Defence Programme to modernize, expand and adequately equip its defence forces to meet the dual threat from Pakistan and China. Y.B. Chavan, the then Defence Minister, visited USA "to secure material and assistance for the implementation of India's 5-year

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33. 13 May 1964.


35. Ibid., p.478.

defence plan... As a result of negotiations, the USA agreed to provide the following:

1. immediate credit of $10 mn. = Rs.4.7 crores for the purchase of defence articles and services - mainly related to replacement and modernization of plan and equipment in ordnance factories;

2. US assistance would continue to be $50 mn approximately for Fy 1965. It was, however, difficult to assess the exact amount given for the development and support of mountain divisions, defence communications, purchase of related equipment, transport aircraft support and road building equipment for the Border Roads Organization;

3. $50 mn credit for setting up an artillery plant at Ambajhari during the financial year 1965.

The British aid was estimated at £24.7 mn for 1962-63 to 1968-69. It was agreed to give a loan to enable the construction of "Leander" Class frigates in India. India failed to get submarines and "Daring" class frigates from Britain. Britain offered old "Weapon" class destroyers instead which India did not accept. Also, the terms offered for the construction of an "oberon" class submarine were unfavourable. India, instead accepted favourable terms for the purchase of "Petya" class frigates from the Soviet Union in 1965.

37. Times of India, 23 September 1964.
40. SIF, n.2, p.484.
The 5-year defence plan had envisaged:

"(a) the maintenance of a well equipped army with a strength of 825,000 men;

(b) maintenance of a 45 - squadron Air Force, including a programme of re-equipment and replacement of the older aircraft like Vampire, Toofani(Ouragans) and Mystere by more modern aircraft, and improvement of the air defence radar and communication facilities;

(c) a phased programme for replacement of over-aged ships of the Navy;

(d) improvement of road communications in the border areas;

(e) strengthening the defence production base to eventually meet the requirements in arms and ammunition of our armed forces; and

(f) improving the organizational arrangements in the fields of provisioning and procurement, storage, training, etc. to ensure the most economical utilisation of funds allotted for defence." 41

10 mountain divisions (14,000 men and 300 vehicles) had been raised, including 4-5 formations capable of expanding in emergency. The .303 Lee-Enfield rifle was replaced with semi-automatic Ishapore rifle. French heavy mortars -- Hotchkiss Brandt were acquired and are now under production in India. Mountain howitzer began to be developed. Production of Nissan jeeps was speeded up. 42 PT-76 and T-55 tanks were acquired from USSR, T-54 from Czechoslovakia and later on licences for OT-62 APC.

In aircraft category, Alouette III and MIG-21 were to be

41. Times of India, 22 September 1964.
42. SIPRI, n.2, p.477.
produced under licences from France and the USSR respectively. India began to acquire various landing crafts, fast patrol boats, submarines, frigates, torpedo boats, ASW destroyers and missile patrol boats from USSR, after it failed to acquire these from USA or UK. These acquisitions were made in view of the submarine acquisitions by Pakistan and Indonesia, and a possible Rawalpindi-Peking-Jakarta naval threat. 43

India acquired K-13 Atoll missiles from Russia to arm MIG-21s, followed by SA-2 and SS-N-2 "Styx" missiles in 1963-66. It acquired Short Seacat missile from UK in early 1970's and Nord missiles in 1977 from France.

India's arms acquisition after the 1962 war and assistance from West was criticized by Pakistan. In 1954 when India had been critical of Pakistan's alliance with the USA, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sir Zafrulla Khan had declared: "why should we have any objection if India is in need of equipment and can obtain it from a friend State like the USA."44 He had probably never envisaged such a situation, especially in view of the India's proclaimed policy of non-alignment. Therefore, when India began to modernize and expand her defence forces with the help of Western powers, Pakistan felt betrayed and became critical of India's acceptance of arms aid.

At the time of 1965 the Indo-Pakistani war, the Indian Air Force lacked supersonic aircrafts to match Pakistan's superiority.

43. The Times of India, 3 February 1964.

Thus, India's superiority in numbers was offset by qualitative superiority of the Pakistani Air Force. However, Indian-made Gnats proved an excellent combat aircraft against the modern fighters of Pakistan. Orpheus-701 turbo-jet engine powered Gnat was found to be more manoeuvrable than the F-86 Sabres of Pakistan and the high speed effectiveness of F-104 Star fighters was neutralized by the Indian pilots who kept the air war at a low altitude. 45

The Army still used old Centurions, Shermans, Stuarts and relatively newer AMX-13 (purchased before 1958) tanks. Artillery pieces were still of the British origin. If India had one-third superiority in infantry division deployed against West Pakistan, Pakistan had one-third superiority over India in the heavy equipment it used — Patton tanks, besides Chaffees and Shermans. 46

The outbreak of 1965 war was followed by imposition of embargoes on both belligerents by the UK and the USA. It may have been an attempt of the two donors to control the escalation by controlling the spares and equipment. It affected Pakistan more than India. The embargo was lifted in 1966-67, following India's purchases from the Soviet Union. It purchased 40 Mi-4 helicopters at $4.5 mn, about 100 SU-7 ground attack fighters, and ordered naval vessels, including torpedo boats. 47

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46. Raju, n.17, p.162.
47. SIPRI, n.2, p.485.
Following the partial lifting of the US embargo in 1967, the USA agreed to provide $17 mn loan to India to complete the air warning system which had began after 1962. It was probably an attempt to balance the growing influence of the Soviet Union. The agreement also provided for limiting Indian defence spending on arms.

In the period following the 1965 war Indian defence forces began to be gradually equipped with the license produced and indigenous manufactured weapons besides the above discussed acquisition of arms.

When the USA made a "one-time" exception in October 1970 to allow Pakistan to purchase weapons for $13.3 million, it generated a lot of discussion in India. K. Subramanyam, the then Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, emphasised the need to build communication infrastructure for air defence, expand ground and air surveillance equipment, improve our integrated air defence system, hasten the MiG-21M project, modernize the field artillery, and, step up the production of and increase the indigenous content of Vijayant tank.50 Another embargo was imposed on India and Pakistan during the 1971 Bangladesh war. The USA once more lifted the embargo in March 1973 and returned to the 1967 policy.

48. Ibid., p.485.
50. K. Subramanyam, "The US Arms to Pakistan in the Context F.N.Continues .....
Despite the US assurance of nuclear shield protection to India in 1969, the US Seventh Fleet entered the Indian Ocean against India in 1971. India realised that it could not rely on the USA to deter the Chinese in future and, that the USA was sympathetic to Pakistan, its ally. On the other hand, India had assumed importance for the Soviet Union following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960's. Soviet Union had also become an important supplier of arms and technology to India. Moreover, India was facing internal problems as the number of refugees from East Pakistan increased. The international support for creating favourable conditions in East Pakistan for the refugees to return, was insufficient. Moreover, in view of reapproachment between China and the USA, India could not depend upon the USA to lend it adequate support and pressurise Pakistan to settle the Bangladesh problem. Therefore, it became necessary and a matter of urgency, for India to get Soviet military support to neutralize possible Chinese or American intervention to aid their ally Pakistan.

The politico-military necessity of Soviet support led to the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty on 9 August 1971. Articles

Previous F.N:

of Indo-US Relations", in Seminar on American Arms to Pakistan, (New Delhi: IDSA, 1970), Part III.

8, 9 and 10 were significant provisions in the Treaty. The bilateral agreement prevented both parties from joining a military alliance which is directed against any of them. It also provided for possible military and diplomatic assistance to each other in case one of them is engaged in war. An important function of the Treaty was to deter Chinese or American intervention in the subcontinent. However, it does not include military intervention by either side in case of a conflict in the Indian sub-continent or along the Sino-Soviet border.

52. Article 8. In accordance with the traditional friendship established between the two countries, each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it will not enter into or participate in any military alliances directed against the other.

Each of the High Contracting Parties pledges to refrain from any aggression against the other side and not allow the use of its territory for committing any act that may be militarily detrimental to the other High Contracting Party.

Article 9. Each of the High Contracting Parties pledges to refrain from giving any assistance to any third party taking part in an armed conflict with the other side. In the event that either side is attacked or threatened with attack, the High Contracting Parties will immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to eliminate this threat and take appropriate effective measures to ensure the peace and securities of their countries.

Article 10. Each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it will not undertake any commitment, secret or open, to a third state or states and will not make any commitments that may be militarily detrimental to the other side.

For full text, see, Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 23 August 1971, p.5.

India's arms acquisition in all categories have been primarily from the Soviet Union in the 1970's, except for very limited purchase of naval vessels from Britain. Pakistan had replenished its 1971 war loses and also acquired new equipment to strengthen its forces by 1974. Prime Minister Bhutto was interested in making the Pakistan defence forces a formidable force.\(^5\) India's defence planning had to, therefore, take into account the need to meet the threat from Pakistan aided by China. Indian forces are being increasingly equipped with items produced in the country. The need to expand and modernise the navy has been recognized. The navy has acquired submarines, Maritime Long Range Anti-Submarine aircraft, frigates, missile patrol boats, corvettes and ASW helicopters for frigates. The necessity of having V/STOL aircraft for air support to navy has been emphasized. Bases and repair facilities too have been improved, to increase the operational capacity of the navy. Nearly Rs. 27 crores of the Rs.32 crores of capital outlays in 1975-76 were planned to expand the ground and air surveillance facilities.\(^5\) Thus, Indian defence planning is directed to meet threat primarily from Pakistan or China separately or in collusion with each other, and thirdly, from both indirectly — by inciting certain radical groups within India.


Indian arms acquisition till 1962 was on cash basis or credits. After the Sino-Indian war, India accepted arms aid from the western powers. Imposition of arms embargo by the USA in 1965 and refusal of other Western powers to sell supersonic fighters made India turn to the Soviet Union. Many of the purchases were subsidised but some were on cash basis, others on credit -- mostly repayable in local currency/rupee till 1970. The Soviet Union also gave economic assistance on favourable basis, and extended technical assistance to India to set up its steel plants at Bhilai and Bokaro. In most of the cases, India approached the western sources first and on being unsuccessful, it turned to the Soviet Union who was ready to assist it, and at the same time, replace the Western influence in India.

However, many of the agreements have been on barter basis -- exchange of arms for commodities produced in India. This is a process of unequal exchange. It is difficult to put the value of a weapon and, for example, jute on the same level. Supply of a limited number of weapons means bartering a large quantity of a product (in other words, produce of months). Thus, exports offset import of weapons, which could have been used to import other essential items. Furthermore, Soviet Union and East Europe have a limited capacity for absorbing Indian products.56

56. Emile Benoit has cited reports when the Soviet Union and East European countries have re-exported Indian goods, like rail-road rolling stock and Cashewnats, for higher price in hard currency. Benoit further writes that, F.N. Continues...
The surplus can be sold on the international market. This lowers the price of the Indian products entering the international market. Thus, India stands to lose its foreign markets, get lower price and, therefore, less hard currency (e.g., dollars).

Of late, the Rouble credits are becoming difficult to absorb and the Rupee-Rouble parity question has been an irritant in the Indo-Soviet relations. Moreover, now Soviet Union has refused to accept barter agreements and has asked for payments in dollars. This reduces the advantage that India had enjoyed earlier on favourable credits or by paying in rupee. India has again started diversifying its arms purchases from other Western sources, such as purchase of Jaguars from Great Britain in 1978. Nevertheless, purchase of capital-intensive weapon systems which incorporate sophisticated technology, on cash basis involves large expenditures and depletion of foreign exchange reserves for a developing country. Only by diversifying its sources of supply can a country avoid its dependence on any one suppliers, and, thereby, reduce political interference by the supplier in the recipient country.

India’s desire to achieve self-sufficiency in the field of military technology has been an important factor in the development of its domestic arms industry. Development and production of weapons in India is discussed in the following Chapter.

Previous F.N:

"if industrial-type resources in the Indian defence programme were directed into exports or civilian import substitutes, India might gain foreign exchange equal to about half of its foreign economic resources and nearly three quarters of its key developmental imports of machinery and parts over the years". Defence and Economic Growth in Developing Countries (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1973), p.191.