Chapter IV
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE THIRD WORLD

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union, in the words of Lenoid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, "has always been and will be a class policy, a socialist policy in control and aim."\(^1\) Based on the Marxist-Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism, peaceful co-existence of the two social systems (capitalist and socialist), its chief task is to fight imperialism; to prevent the outbreak of a Third World War, to ensure favourable conditions for the development of socialism and communism; of strengthening the unity and solidarity of the socialist countries; aiding the national liberation and revolutionary movements throughout the world; and cooperation with the developing countries.\(^2\) However, the "two-camp theory" did not recognize the principle of neutrality of the developing countries and conceived these countries as divided into pro- or anti-socialist countries. The Soviet Union, therefore, extended aid to the socialist states and to those countries where anti-imperialist movements had emerged.

After the Second World War, the immediate aim of the Soviet leaders was to achieve economic recovery, internal

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stability, and internal security.

Therefore, it consolidated its position in Eastern Europe between 1944 and 1949. The Eastern Europe States also became a buffer zone between the West and the Soviet Union. East European countries and the emergence of Communist China also helped to strengthen the socialist bloc and polarize the world into two blocs. Despite the economic and military superiority of West, the Soviet advance into Europe remained unchecked. In response to the Soviet expansion in Europe and Asia (Turkey and East Europe), (Iran, China and Korea), the USA began to pursue its policy of containment.

Soviet Union had emerged from the war with the strongest and powerful tactical force in Europe, stationed also along the extended frontier line in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Ground Forces, thus, were the "deterrent" in the Soviet strategy, holding Western Europe as "hostage" and as an indirect counterpoise to the US nuclear capability. Military Strategy is a part of political strategy. The aims of political strategies "points out an expert" are also the aims of military strategy.³

Therefore, bilateral defence treaties were concluded with East European countries and considerable amount of equipment and arms were transferred to them to modify their forces in conformity with the Soviet military organizational patterns.

The Soviet detonation of the first nuclear weapon in 1949 ended the US monopoly in the field. Jet-fighter-interceptor, MIG-15 was developed which could counter US aircrafts.\(^4\)

The first Soviet aircraft capable of delivering 5½ tons atomic bomb-load was operational in 1946, the Tu-4 Bull; the bomber taking off in northern Russia and Siberia could reach some targets in the USA on a 13-hour, one way flight. However, the wide-spread US radar warning system across the Canadian and the Arctic reduced the potential effectiveness of the Soviet nuclear strike capability. Bull was followed by the development of Tu-16 Badger flown in 1952 but which entered service with Soviet Long-Range Aviation (LRA) in 1954-55.

At the end of the war, the Soviet Navy had to be structured to perform the function of defence and deterrence. The Soviet control over the Karelian Isthmus from Finland offered

a buffer zone for the naval complexes at Leningrad, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—the Baltic States afforded around the year ice-free ports for the Baltic Fleet. Soviet Flag also flew at former German naval bases at Pallau (renamed Baltiisk) and Konigsberg (renamed Kaliningrad) and other bases of East Germany and Poland. The Satellite bases in Rumania and Bulgaria were available for the Russian navy and it controlled the entire northern and western coasts of the Black Sea in 1945. Its presence as a Mediterranean power was also by virtue of its relationship with Albania and Yugoslavia. However, its attempts to extend its influence in Iran and Turkey (for control over the Dardanelles) met with opposition from the West. In the Pacific the USSR troops had control over Manchuria, northern Korea, the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin.5

Thus, in this phase of expansion of Soviet influence, Stalin decided that the Soviet Union required an ocean going fleet. The strategic mix of naval forces combined the "young school" strategy of reliance on submarines, small crafts, and aviation for coastal defence, and Stalin's naval program of 1937-40.6 The aim was also to build a strong and prestigious navy which would aid in achieving its foreign policy objectives. Therefore, alongside the construction of cruisers, destroyers

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and submarines were undertaken to build a balanced fleet. The changes in the 1953-64 Soviet foreign policy, in the Khrushev era were enunciated at the XXth Party Congress in February 1956. The principle of Peaceful Coexistence was emphasised once more. Because of the development of a politically, economically and militarily strong socialist bloc, war was no longer considered a fatal inevitability. Secondly, a country could make transition to Socialism through peaceful means. He also emphasised the need to extend support to all the newly independent countries or weak countries, who were seeking independence, irrespective of the nature of the ruling class. This was an important change in the policy which allowed the Soviet Union to befriend progressive regimes in the Third World.

In response to the NATO formation, the socialist countries under the leadership of USSR signed the WARSAW PACT in 1955. Under Khrushev the Soviet Strategic doctrine came to emphasise offensive operation based on the belief that nuclear weapons had revolutionized warfare. The focus on developing a strategic nuclear force and the subsequent reduction in the

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role of Ground forces led to the debate on the question of military strategy between "Traditionalists" and "Modernists". Finally, the modernists view prevailed.

The Qualitative improvements were undertaken; tactical nuclear surface-to-surface missiles were introduced; and measures taken to protect ground troops from thermal and radiological effects of nuclear explosives; the mechanization of infantry divisions, superior tanks and other armoured vehicles helped to enhance the mobility and firepower of the Soviet troops.

Developments of the Soviet nuclear forces, like West, began with the development of jet-era bombers. Tu-16

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8. The traditionalists emphasised defense primarily based on large scale ground forces. They expected the future war to be a protracted conflict with nuclear weapons playing not a decisive role. Therefore, they cautioned against extremes and argued for a moderate rate of innovation in the military strategy. By contrast, the modernists like Khrushev viewed the next war to be short, with no warning time. In their view, the nuclear weapons, firepower and delivery system - the initial exchange would play the decisive role. J. Record, n. 5, pp. 3-6; SIPRI Year Book 1974, n. 5, pp. 84-88; Whetten, ed., n. 4, p. 119.


Badger could deliver a 3½ ton bomb load at a distance of 3,800 miles at 620 mph approx. i.e. it could reach US cities on a seven-hour one-way flight mission from bases in northern Russia. This was followed by Tu-20 Bear bomber, a strategic turbo-prop bomber. Mya-4 Bison, a turbo-jet was also produced in 1956 but because of its slow speed it was adapted for tanker, photographic on electronic reconnaissance roles. With the introduction of cruise missiles in the mid-50's, the strike capacity of the bombers was enhanced. These missiles permitted them to launch missiles from a distance of 100 miles or more, thus reducing their vulnerability of the bombers to interception by US Air Force.

Whereas the USA had bases for its bombers in Europe, North Africa, Guam and Okinawa, the Soviet bombers had to fly greater distance to reach targets in the USA. Therefore, greater resources were granted for the development of nuclear missiles, based on the German V-2 missile. On August 3, 1957 an SS-6 ICBM was launched which impacted in Soviet Siberia. Two months later, the Soviet Union launched an SS-6 booster missile carried Sputnik 1 into orbit, followed by Sputnik 2 and Sputnik 3 in 1958. By mid-50's the Soviet ICBM's could reach France and Britain. During the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis, the Soviet Union used this threat to stop British and French participation.

By 1959, SS-4 Sandal, MRM (1040 nm) was in service. Kangaroo missiles were carried by Tu-20 bombers in 1961;
SS-5 Skean, IRBM (2,000 nm) and SS-7 Saddler, ICBM (6,080 nm) were introduced in 1961. By 1962, there were 100 Tu-20 Bear and 90 Mya-4 Bison long range strategic bombers and 75 ICBMs.

If we compare the strategic nuclear forces of the two super-powers in early 60's we find that the missile gap had developed in favour of the USA. Despite the initial

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11. US and Soviet Strategic Weapons (Fall 1962)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USA</th>
<th>USSR (approx.)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>639 B-52 heavy jet Bombers</td>
<td>100 Tu-20 Bear and Mya-4 Bison Bombers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>880 B-47 medium jet bombers</td>
<td>1,350 medium jet bombers</td>
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<tr>
<td>76 B-58 medium jet bombers and carrier based strike aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>142 Atlas ICBMs</td>
<td>35 SS-6 Sappwood and SS-7 Sadler ICBMs</td>
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<tr>
<td>62 Titan-I ICBMs</td>
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<tr>
<td>80 Minuteman-I ICBMs</td>
<td>and ICBMs that could not reach USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>60 Thor ICBMs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>45 Jupiter ICBMs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>112 Polaris A-1 and A-2 SLBMs in seven nuclear propelled submarines</td>
<td></td>
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(1) Additional Mya-4 Bison served in the reconnaissance and tanker roles.

(2) Additional B-47s served in reconnaissance and electronic warfare roles.

Source: Norman Polmar, n. 4, p. 46.
advantage, the USSR was 'inferior' to the USA in terms of nuclear strike capability.

The navy too underwent organizational changes in its strategy under Khrushchev. Manpower was reduced to 500,000.\(^{12}\) He announced his decision to scrap 90% cruisers and of building naval fleet with submarines, small ships, armed with missiles, destroyers and minesweepers.\(^{13}\) The naval air force was deprived of 1,500 to 2,000 fighter aircrafts, reducing the strength to less than a 1,000 aircrafts. It gave up three naval bases on foreign soil non-contiguous to the Soviet Union:\(^{14}\) Porkkala in Finland at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland; Saseno Island in Albania's Gulf of Valona which allowed a toehold in the Mediterranean; and Port Arthur, near Dairen on the Liaotung Peninsula of the PRC - in the Pacific outside the confines of the Sea of Japan which provided direct access to the Yellow and South China Seas.

Khrushchev considered cruisers and carrier task forces expensive and desired to have cuts in their strength. More-


over, the latter were discredited on the basis of their vulnerability and were considered useful only for first-strike capability/missions. Missiles were emphasised. However, of the 14 'Svemdlov' cruisers only two were fitted with surface-to-air missiles, while several classes of destroyers had been armed with surface-to-surface missiles. However, in the end Khrushev's low opinion of surface ships had undergone a change. Research and development of nuclear submarines was accelerated in response to the US development of long range carrier aircraft and Polaris. In 1959 'Lenin' the first nuclear powered surface ship went to sea. The nuclear powered submarines and nuclear powered cruise (anti-ship) and ballistic missile submarines were under construction by 1960. It is estimated that 30 nuclear and conventional ballistic missile submarines were initially armed with SS-N-4 Sark SLBM, 350 nm and later on with 650 n.m. range missiles. Thus, navy had acquired a new strategic role with the development of ballistic missile submarines.

Of the total of 385 submarines, 25 were of medium range Q-class suitable for operations in coastal waters,

or in the Baltic, Black or Caspian seas, mainly for experimental and training work. Of 278 long range torpedo attack class, whatever be needed for defense against NATO and Polaris, others could be employed against Free World shipping in case of a protracted war. 82 missile submarines could be stationed mainly in the Northern Fleet and, to a lesser extent, in the Far East — to allow free access to the Atlantic and the Pacific to carry out deterrent mission or general war missile strike mission against NATO navy or land targets in Western Europe. It allowed Russia to extend its defensive perimeter to intercept the US strategic bombers. Besides improving the efficiency of the sea-lane interdiction mission, the missile armed submarines were supposed to enhance the nuclear threat along the periphery of USA.17

The overall strategy, therefore, had come to emphasize the role of the nuclear technology. Increased allocation of resources for the development of strategic forces and intercontinental and medium ranged ballistic missiles gave the Soviet Union initial lead over parallel developments in the USA. This was enhanced by the availability of a large conventional force of the Soviet Union, with increased and improved capabilities of forward based tactical nuclear weapons.

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such as Frog and Scud, and new Scaleboard missiles which trebles the range of the Scuds, thus bringing the critical targets in Western Europe and Asia into its range of operation and also reducing their dependence on MREMs/IRBMs force. Thus the concept of "dual capability" formed the strategic doctrine of the Soviet Union under the Khrushew era. The joint air defense arrangements of the Soviet Union and WTO were improved in the early 1960's and re-equipment and modernization of the East European defense forces initiated. Only in 1964 did the Soviet Union furnish them with nuclear delivery systems such as the tactical missiles of 150 miles range. In 1962, the two super powers came closest to initiating a thermonuclear holocaust when the USA announced that USSR had been shipping and emplanting missiles in Cuba. Following the US naval quarantine, Khrushev announced his decision to withdraw them in return for removal of US forward based Jupiter IRBMs in Turkey and Italy.

The Cuban missile crisis also revealed that the USSR was a yet unable to effectively escort its cargo vessels on distant oceans. Following which, the navy and ocean-going fleet was to be considerably upgraded and its capability enhanced. Moreover, Sino-Soviet ideological differences had become evident, leading to the Sino-Soviet split in 1962.

During this period, the Soviet Union had extended its influence in the Third World countries, especially with
the non-aligned states -- Egypt, Indonesia, India and Burma. Thus, USSR began its policy to find "allies" in the Third World to counter-balance the US policy of containment. Its relations with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan too were normalized. Rapprochement with the Indian Ocean littoral countries through aid, trade and cultural exchanges was encouraged. It also provided a means of countering Western influence and also limiting Chinese influence.

The triumvirate who succeeded Khrushev -- (Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny) -- re-emphasised the global role of the Soviet Union; an accommodation with the USA; the principle of collective leadership; and, lastly, the principle of peaceful co-existence. 18 Khrushev's "one-variant war" and the concept of "minimum nuclear deterrence" was replaced by the principle of "flexibility with caution" (gibkoe reagirova nie). The Soviet Union's pre-occupation was to attain parity with the USA in strategic nuclear power, to have a more equitable balance between the conventional and strategic nuclear weapons, in order to increase Soviet options, and to compete with the USA and to support its interests in the Third World. It was an attempt "to break out of the bounds of the continental Eurasian geo-strategic shell without relying directly on intercontinental missiles." 19

The three years following Khrushchev's ouster from power, witnessed intense debate on Soviet military policy. SS-7 Saddler ICBM which had become operational in 1962 was increased in number. In 1963, SS-8 Sasin ICBM became operational; these missiles had storable-liquid fuels and could carry 5 megaton (MT) warheads to over 6,000 n.m. range. Already, the Soviet Union was placing these missiles in underground silos in order to increase their survivability in case of a US pre-emptive attack.

Successive new ICBMs became operational in late 60's; SS-9 Scarp in 1965 which could deliver 25 megaton (25-MT) warhead to a target at 6,000 n.m. range. It has also been

20. The decision to develop large warhead ICBMs was taken under Khrushchev when US ICBMs etc. were not in hardened silos, and SAC still played a major role in delivering US nuclear weapons. The large warhead was required to affect "area devastation" of a known area. The radius of blast damage increases as the cube root of the yield, $y$; and the area of the damage increases as $3\sqrt[3]{y^2}$; the incendiary effect of targets increases as the $\sqrt{y}$ or $3\sqrt[3]{y}$ at large distances. Thus the no. of missiles that can destroy a given area is inversely proportional to the size of the warhead. That is fewer missiles of large warhead could create turbulence over USA; and the accuracy factor becomes relatively insignificant. Quoted, in Michael Mcc Gwire, "Soviet Strategic Weapons Policy, 1955-70", in MccGwire, Booth and Mc Donnell, ed., Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints (USA: Praeger, 1975), pp. 493-5.
tested with the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) in 1967. The missile is fired in a low trajectory in the opposite direction from the target; it enters a partial earth orbit and then strikes the target. This reduces the warning time and also increases the problems of target defense relative to a high ballistic trajectory ICBM.

In 1966, SS-II (6,500 n.m.) and in 1969, SS-13 ICBMs were deployed. The former with storable-liquid propellant and carrying a 1-megaton warhead could strike targets in the USA, while the latter, a solid fuel propellant could carry a 1-megaton warhead to 5,500 n.m. By 1970, the Mod 4 version of the SS-9, with 3 five-MTRV's was tested, apparently designed to attack the Minuteman silos in USA. It is feared that improvements in accuracy could provide the RV's with precision of the order of 0.25 n.m. CEP which (5 M T warhead) would have high probability of destroying a 300 psi missile silo.21

New weapons began to be tested intensively in 1972-73. These included the Light SS-X-16, the medium SS-X-17 and SS-X-19 and the large SS-X-18 all (except SS-X-16) with MTRV warheads. SS-X-16 might become the mobile ICBM. All these have greater strike capacity and might be replacements for SS-II ICBMs.

The Soviet Naval Policy was modified: to destroy enemy naval forces and also to ensure the preservation of, in the words of Michael MccGwire, "the post-exchange balance".22 This was followed by the decision to construct larger and more powerful "Ship Killing" surface combatants. The deployment of cruise missiles against US naval air still remains an important strategy of Soviet fleet air defense. Hence, SSN - 3, a 400+ n.m. cruise missile with mid-course correction and terminal guidance, and installation of short-range, high performance SSN - 10 is to be found in Soviet Navy. In 1970s, delta class submarines had been introduced. These carry 12 SS-N-8 missile of 4,200 n.m. range which enables it to target US cities without leaving Soviet waters. Second version of SS-N-8 missile is believed to be MÂRV ed.

Moreover, Soviet Union has the largest and most advanced fishing fleet and a large merchant fleet, plus auxiliary vessels to collect information and conduct research etc. with advanced electronic equipment.

Geopolitics of the Soviet Union necessitated the deployment of the Soviet navy in four fleet areas: the Northern fleet, the Baltic fleet, the Black fleet and the Pacific fleet.

Since 1961, the Soviet naval presence has steadily increased. Since 1962, ships from the Black Sea come to the Atlantic to join the northern fleet in the Arctic and one group of ships circumnavigates the British Isle. For a period of 2-3 months a squadron of Mediterranean ships visits Cuba every year including Y-class ballistic missile submarine patrolling the US coasts. The Soviet Union's major concern has been to prevent blocking by the enemy of the Baltic entrance, the Mediterranean exit and entrances and egress from the sea of Japan. Subsequently, with the added threat of the US Polaris A-3, the 'Anti-submarine defence zone' according to the Soviet specialists, "is of necessity oceanic". Therefore, coverage 'counter presence' to the Polaris threat in the Norwegian Sea became important, culminating in the Operation SEVER in 1958 involving the northern and Baltic fleets. Following reorientation in the relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey in the 60's, the Soviet ships have passed through the Dardanelles to the Mediterranean Sea. Most of the surface ships from the Black Sea fleet and submarines from the Black Sea and the Northern fleets (especially nuclear submarines) transit the strait of Gibraltar. Since the June war, the Soviet squadrons have servicing facility arrangements at Alexandria and Port Said. It is reported that Soviet Union is also developing a deep water naval port at Mersa Matruh.

23. J. Erickson, n.21, p.57.
on the West Egyptian Coast. The Mediterranean squad is supported
by Badger reconnaissance aircrafts and ASW flying boats based
in Egypt. Though some Badger have been reported to have been
sighted in the Libyan runways, other Mediterranean ports
including Algiers and Yugoslavia, the Soviet interest in
deploying naval forces in the Mediterranean is presumably to
gain passage through the Suez Canal to South Asia. A
A cruiser and 2 destroyers of the Pacific Fleet had moved as far
as Indonesia in 1959, followed by transfer of warships and
auxiliaries to Indonesia. With change in Indonesia's relations
with China, Soviet Union's association with Indonesia came to
an end in 1965. This was followed by talks with Singapore for
port facilities.

The Indian Ocean became an important area of Soviet
interest in the 1960's. Following the Indo-Pak 1965 war and
US arms embargo, India turned to the Soviet Union for assistance.
The Soviet cruiser and two destroyers and auxiliaries visited
eight countries in 1968. A squadron of a "sverdlov" and two
destroyers and tankers entered Madras on 27 March 1968. It
visited eight countries in four months before returning to
Vladivostok - Bombay, Mogadishu, Umm Quasr, Karachi, Bandar
Abbas, Aden and Colombo were ports of call. The second visit

24. Polmar, n.5, p.46; Erickson, n.21, pp.58-59;
Whetten, n.17,pp.102-103.
25. Erickson, ibid., p.59.
was undertaken from November 1966 to 1 May 1969. A combined squadron from the Pacific, Northern and Black sea Fleets, including two submarines visited Mombasa, Aden, Massawa, Hodeida, Bandar Abbas, Umm Qasr, Dar-es-Salaam, Chittagong and Mauritius. In 1969, the Arabian sea/Red sea area became important focal point for the Soviets. It has repair, refuelling, communications and missile facilities at Barbera. Moreover, the reopening of the Suez Canal has reduced the distance to Berbera from the Black sea (aprox. 2000 miles as against 7,000 miles via the Cape of Good Hope). Soviet navy is also assisted by the 'Aeroflot' which brings spare crews for Soviet trawlers to Mauritius. The Soviet navy has been most active since 1970-71. The Soviet navy has no bases but for the usual ports facilities and anchorage facilities in the Indian Ocean -- one off Socotra and the other near the Seychelles Islands. Alternatively, the task forces from the Pacific and Northern fleet operate in this region.

Exercise Okean-70 marked the beginning of the coordinated largest and longest naval exercise in Soviet history. It was an exercise in testing simultaneously communications on a global


27. Also see, Tan Su-Cheng, The Expansion of Soviet Seapower and the Security of Asia (Taiwan : Asia and the world Forum, 1977), sec.III.
scale and included all aspects of naval operations. The naval forces demonstrated their presence as far South as the Philippine Sea and in the Caribbean waters. Cuba, however, refused to serve as the refuelling base for Soviet Tu-20 Bear long range naval reconnaissance aircraft. The Soviet Navy demonstrated its credible presence without marking its anchorage bases for permanent presence on a large scale.

Okean-70 was followed by the Soviet vessels moving to distant waters to call at ports or to establish its permanent presence, such as Cape Verde Islands and then to ports in West Africa. In July 1970, Soviet Union leased limited docking facilities at Mauritius. Other facilities are available at Yemen, Somalia, Egypt, Malagasy, Iraq and India - most of them in return for Soviet assistance. Similar exercises were held under Okean-75 which demonstrated increased mobility of the naval air arm.28

Thus, the Soviet navy has expanded and modernised over the years. However, the Soviet strategy remains one of deterrence and defense,29 based on cruise missile equipped submarines, surface combatants, aircraft carriers, and land based naval arms. The navy supports the Soviet foreign policy abroad and attempts to counter "gunboat diplomacy" of the West. It increases the USSR's ability to intervene for sea-lane

interdiction, to prevent or deter preemptive strike by US
carships, to assure egress for friendly vessels and block
the hostile warships at choke points during the war, to blockade
any reinforcement which may come from USA to Europe in the
event of war, to elevate its position as the regional protection
vis-a-vis other powers, especially China. However, in the
absence of worldwide surface naval forces, the Soviet merchant
ships become "hostages" to NATO's naval forces. It, however,
lacks capability to project its naval power in distant waters
against opposition from West. It requires deployment of new
warships of greater endurance capability, a significant sea-
based air capability, amphibious assault capabilities, logistic
forces which can provide the navy support on high seas in a
hostile environment, and sea repair capabilities.30 Furthermore,
lack of bases, and aircraft carriers restricts the maritime
reconnaissance and air support to Soviet surface vessels and
submarines. Even surface vessels are not at par with those
of the Western powers.31

Analogous to the overseas forces of the USA, the Soviet
Union also has its balancing forces in the East Asia, Mediterrane-
nean and Eastern Europe. Its presence in Eastern Europe

30. Blechman, ibid.; Whetter, ibid., p.116; Herrick, ibid.;
David Fairbairn Russia Looks to the Sea (London :
Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1971) Chap.16.

31. K.R.Singh, The Indian Ocean : Big Power Presence and
Local Response (New Delhi :Manohar Book Service,1977),
p.62-3.
(especially the large conventional forces) has balanced the NATO. The forces in Mediterranean prevent the USA from intervening in the Middle East as the sole influential power. Its presence in the East Asia is indirectly against the USA but more directly to "contain" the growing Chinese sphere of influence.

In the three decades since the Second World War, the USA and the USSR have made tremendous technological advancements in the field of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has attained parity with the USA. However, in the 1970's Soviet Union had numerical superiority over the USA. SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) has been a result of each one's recognition of the others strategic strength and ability to inflict unacceptable retributions in a nuclear war and of legitimizing the question of parity of the two superpowers.

However, the question of qualitative improvements on the development of MIRV warheads, etc. remained untouched. It was merely an effort to maintain some kind of restriction on the fast rate of Soviet developments of nuclear weapons — an attempt to codify the situation without limiting either side's options to improve its strategic forces within the set upper limit of numbers. Although the Soviet Union has an advantage in terms of numbers, the USA has a higher capacity to deliver warheads. This advantage is offset somewhat by the megatonnage of the Soviet missile warheads, which will be further enhanced.

32. See, Edward Teller, H. Mark and John S. Foster, Jr.,
with the deployment of MIRVs on Soviet missiles, although the American missiles have greater accuracy. SALT II has been concerned with the question of limiting the qualitative arms race. For example, the Soviet Union would have to choose between a replacement for SS-II, S-17 or SS-OJS missile with one not exceeding ten warheads. It also limits the total number of ICBM/SLBM launchers, and the qualitative improvements in the new systems. This treaty would help the USA by limiting the developments of the Soviet weapons systems.33

According to the Marxist-Leninist understanding, the Soviet Union is justified in initiating a world war if it is certain of its victory and if the gains outweigh the cost. Moreover, its aim is to fight imperialism. Deterrence is considered essential to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. But, unlike the concept of "nuclear deterrence" as understood in the West to mean capability to inflict unacceptable damage, in the Soviet Union nuclear weapons are considered as important adjuncts to win a war, and to enhance their war fighting

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capability. Their capability to defend the Soviet Union, acts as a deterrent. Therefore, its main objectives in the case of war include reducing West's war-fighting potential, preservation of Western Europe as an alternative economic base and protection of the homeland and to reduce possible damage to the Soviet Union. Its strategy (as discussed above) therefore is geared to meet these requirements. Based on the military strength and the thermonuclear capacity, the strategy is aimed to achieve, in the first phase replacement of the Western influence in the Third World without seeking to make them communist. In the second phase, it hopes to witness the result of the triumph of communism as a result of the imbalance produced by the phase one. Third phase marks cooperation amongst the developed and the developing communist countries.

II. Arms Trade and Aid

The development of arms trade and aid policy coincides with the reorientation of the Soviet foreign policy. Till 1955, arms assistance was only extended to its Socialist block members in Eastern Europe and North Korea. Its arms trade and aid

34. Mcc Gwirle, n.20, pp.488-490 ff.
policy is guided by its political, strategic, ideological and economic interests. Its main objectives have been to undermine the influence of the Western countries, to extend its own area of influence to have friendly relations with regimes neighbouring or adjacent to its borders, to support the national liberation movements and to control strategically important areas and hamper Western access to it. The economic stakes have been of secondary considerations. Unlike the West, Soviet Union is not dependent on the West Asia for its oil supplies. Therefore, its interests in the Third World countries have been concerned with increasing its prestige and influence in these areas and to offer an alternative to the dominant presence of USA. Its policy has been further guided by its desire to continue as the leader of the Socialist World and to counter the influence of the PRC since the Sino-Soviet conflict in early 1960's.¹

With signing of arms deal with Egypt in 1955, the Soviet Union and its allies broke the Western monopoly of arms supply. Arms assistance began in 1954 to Syria and the Soviet Union is the major aid donor — furnishing nearly 90% of the


estimated aid by the Socialist bloc to the Third World between 1955 and 1968.³ Except for the small fractional of aid from Poland and East Germany, rest came from Czechoslovakia.⁴ The Warsaw Pact members have an occasions acted as the intermediary, for example during the first arms deal with Egypt, Czechoslovakia acted as the intermediary for the Soviet Union.⁵

The Soviet Union has rarely given away arms free; most of them are loans on long-term credits, varying from 6 to 10 to 12 years period or more (as in the case of Afghanistan for 50 years with 25 years grace period⁶) at a nominal rate of 2% - 2.5% interest.⁷

Cases of cash payment have been few. The credits are re-payable on soft terms in local currency or in exchange for

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4. Ibid., Czechoslovakia's ability to supply weapons is linked to the presence of arms industry in the interwar period. Discussed above, see, Chapter 1.

5. This subject has been fully treated by various authors. See, Joshua and Gibert, ibid., pp.98-9; SIPRI, n.1, p.181; Uri Ra'anan, The USSR Arms The Third World (Massachusetts : MIT, 1969), Part I.


commodity goods. The barter system has been to the advantage of the Soviet Union. For example, in the case of arms deal with Egypt in 1955, USSR accepted cotton in return. This type of exchange is highly unfavourable to the one-crop economies of the Afro-Asian countries. They tend to lose Western markets which are their only source of earning "hand currency". Moreover, the Soviet Union has a limited capacity to absorb their produce, and is likely to dump the products on the world market, thereby bringing down the world prices. Thus, the recipients annual produce is tied for years to pay for arms weapons. The USSR also insists on evaluating the prices of the commodities at depressed world prices and expects annual re-adjustments to be made. In case of bankruptcy, it expects to be paid the rest of the amount in convertible currency or produce. Thus, we may find that US grants of weapons may appear economically advantageous to the recipient than such terms of USSR transactions.

In general the political criteria is important in the choice of recipients for Soviet military or economic aid. The pro-Soviet stand in international affairs, hostility to the USA and China determine the choice of clientele. Economic aid is extended to many countries to wean them away

8. See Uri Ra’anan, ibid., pp.329-331; for details of the repercussions of this kind of deals for the recipients.
from the Western influence or where strategic considerations have become important — such as countries bordering the Soviet Union.9

Soviet economic aid has been for the development of means of transport and communications for the civilians. It includes building up of and improvement of landing strips for jet aircrafts and improvement of maritime port facilities, (in Guinea, Yemen, Somalia, the UAR and Afghanistan). In return overflight, landing, refuelling rights and port facilities have been granted to the Soviet bloc.10

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine in detail the reasons and the nature of all arms trade and aid transactions between Soviet Union and the Third World. Therefore, only general trends will be discussed below.

Till 1960, the Soviet Union sold or gave away its obsolescent arms. Thereafter the Soviet Union, like USA, began to sell sophisticated arms, old weapons having been exhausted.

Middle East has been of strategic importance to the Soviet Union. Egyptian willingness to negotiate with Soviet Union through Czecks in 1955 paved the way for future Soviet deals with other

9. Joshua and Gibert, n.1, Ch.6, The Question of choice of military aid or economic aid has been dealt with here in details. Also see Ra'anan, ibid., p.54 ff. on Political Motivations.

"progressive" Arab world countries. Furthermore, the Soviets have championed the cause of Arabs against Israel, thus, pursuing the 'diplomacy of polarization'.

Middle East is important for Soviet Union: 1) for undermining the strength of the Mediterranean flank of NATO, 2) for countering balance the presence of the US Sixth Fleet, 3) for reducing the credibility of US commitments in the region, and 4) for controlling important oil resource areas on which USA and other Western countries are heavily dependent.

The military elites of this region have become allies of Soviet Union in extending its influence. While pursuing detente with Washington, Moscow made inroads in the Middle East, winning over pro-US allies, such as Turkey. It was further facilitated by the desire and willingness of these countries to acquire weapons from the Soviet Union, as they were unsatisfied with the Western supplies. The Soviet supplies included MIG-21 interceptors and T-54/55 Tanks in 1962-63, marking a qualitative change in the arms


13. Also see, J. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1975), Ch. 6, p. 191.
weaponry available to the Third World countries. The Soviet supplies to Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Algeria were an effort to upgrade and augment the strategic-bombing capabilities of these countries. In the post-1967 six-day war period, the Soviet Union stepped up its arms supply to reinforce its image and to win over other countries. It replaced Egypt as supplier of arms to Yemen, and also signed agreements with Cyprus, Algeria and S-Yemen. Another qualitative change occurred in 1970's when the Soviets supplied "offensive weapons" like 30 Scud missiles to Egypt and committed Soviet combat personnel. The supplies included weapons which had not been made available to Warsaw pact or to Vietnam. Thus, arms aid and trade have facilitated the Soviet Union to become entrenched in the Middle East which helps it to maintain the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean and to challenge the supremacy of the West in this region.

In the South and South-East Asia, Afghanistan, Indonesia and India have been the most important countries in the Soviet foreign policy. Afghanistan was the first to sign an arms deal with USSR in 1956. The problem of the Pushtunistan was the immediate problem facing Afghanistan. Secondly, both Iran and Pakistan were members of SEATO and the Bagdad Pact, by virtue of which they could acquire

weapons from the USA. It received 11 MiG-15 fighters, 14 cargo planes, 2 Mi-4 helicopters, mobile radio units and small arms plus instructors. Also, a jet-airstrip was constructed at Termez. In the 1960s, it had continued to receive sophisticated equipment and to modernize its forces; significant amount of economic aid has also been given. In the late '60s and early '70s Soviet policy towards Afghanistan can be adjudged as two pronged: a) maintenance and upgrading of the friendly government to government relations, and b) at the same time, aiding and abetting the pro-Soviet military faction which culminated in the overthrow of Daoud regime in 1978.

The case of India and Pakistan will be examined in greater detail in Part II of the thesis. Inability to get US military assistance, helped Indonesia, like Afghanistan, to come closer to the Soviet Union. In 1958, it signed arms agreement with the USSR through its intermediaries Poland and Chechoslovakia for $250 million, which included 90 MiG-15 and MiG-17 jet fighters, etc. Larger quantities of weapons were delivered between 1960-63. However, Indonesia's


confrontation with Malaysia posed a dilemma for the Soviet foreign policy. Although the USSR was willing to side with Indonesia in its efforts to drive the Dutch out of West Irian, it was not ready to support Indonesia; Vs: Malaysia. On the other hand, it did not wish to lose Indonesia to China and also wanted its support for attending the preparatory meeting of the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference in Djakarta in April 1964. More military aid was given in 1964. Economic aid for steel mill, road construction and construction machinery had also been extended in this period. However, after the coup in 1965, and the fall of Sukarno regime, Indonesia turned towards the West for aid and military hardware.

Cambodia received 3 MiG-17s, 24 anti-aircraft guns, a radar station, a jet trainer, trucks and mobile field units for the Soviet Union in 1964, to build its air defense system. The Soviet aid helped to undermine Chinese influence in Cambodia and also to undercut American assistance. However, increased Chinese assistance and Soviet assistance to Vietnam took precedence over Cambodia. It received approximately

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18. For detailed analysis, see, Joshua and Gibert, n. 1; Ch. 4; SIPRI, n. 1, p. 205.
§ 25 million worth economic aid from 1956 to 1969. Laos is an example of the Soviet military aid which has not received any economic assistance. As in case of Cambodia, the Soviets were competing for influence in Laos with China and to counter the American support for pro-Western forces. Other minor aid recipients in this region include Burma, Ceylon, and Nepal — all of them received only economic aid.

Both Africa and Latin America have been low-priority areas relative to Asia and North Africa. The Soviet desire has been to have friendly relations with countries in these regions in order to have access to port facilities, landing and overflight rights; to counter Chinese influence; and, in general, to neutralize Western influence. The African nations have small capacity for absorbing sophisticated weapons, therefore, most of the arms supplied have been small and easy to handle; some included MIG-17 fighters as the most sophisticated weapon system. This, however, has only been supplied to Mali, Somalia and Nigeria. Major part of assistance of hardware has gone to the national-liberation movements, especially with Marxist-Leninist ideological commitments such as MPLA in Angola, PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau. Training has been amply provided to enable the Africans to use

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these arms.

The Latin American countries have close historical links with the North America, and hence, the dominant position of the latter has continued unchallenged by the Soviet Union. Except for some arms aid to Guatemala in 1954, Cuba has been the only one to receive economic and military assistance. Following deterioration in US-Cuban relations, Cuba turned to the Soviet Union for assistance in 1959-60. By 1961, Cuba had received estimated total of 75 MiGs, 250 tanks, 100 assault guns, 1,000 anti-aircraft field guns, 500 mortars, 200,000 anti-small arms and unspecified number of patrol vessels and torpedo boats, and large training personnel. However, when the Soviet Union attempted to export its strategic missiles for emplacement in Cuba which would have altered the strategic balance between the two super-powers and also would have posed direct threat to USA, the situation escalated in what is well known as the Cuban Missile Crisis; followed by the return of the Soviet strategic missiles from Cuba. In the following years the Soviet-Cuban relations have been strained. The Soviet economic assistance has been extended to Chile since 1966, Venezuela and Colombia since 1967, and Brazil since June 1967.22


Overall calculations show that between 1956 and 1967 the Middle East has received 48% of the total military aid and 41.2% of the total economic aid; South and South-East Asia received 38% of the total military aid and 41.2% of economic aid; 13% of total military aid and 41.97% of economic aid went to Latin America and only 1% of total military aid and 12.59% of economic aid went to Africa. If we look at the number of recipients, we find that the Soviet aid is more concentrated than the American aid — 8 in Middle East, 6 in South and South-East Asia, 1 in Latin America and 9 in Africa, total of 24 countries as against 54 countries receiving almost the same amount of US military aid. Although, similarity in priority area is found in both donor's aid programs.

Moreover, in terms of the Soviet categorization of the Socialist countries and the non-aligned countries, the share of the former in importing major arms had decreased from 100% in 1950-54 to 41.9% in 1965-69, while the share of latter increased from 0% in 1950-54 to 58.1% in 1965-69.

On the average 37.9% of major arms have been exported to the Socialist countries as against 63.1% to the rest of

23. See separate sheet (Table 4.1), p. 185.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Aid</th>
<th>Middle East %</th>
<th>S. &amp; S.E. Asia%</th>
<th>Latin America %</th>
<th>Africa %</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>2748(5+3)(^1) 48%</td>
<td>2185(0+6) 38%</td>
<td>750(0+1) 13%</td>
<td>85(5+4) 1%</td>
<td>5768(10+14) 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2602(7+3) 48%</td>
<td>2148(4+6) 40%</td>
<td>523(20+1) 10%</td>
<td>126(9+4) 2%</td>
<td>5399(40+14) 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Estimated Aid (mil.) and region of priority (1956 to 1967).

\(^1\) No. of the recipient countries of sole suppliers and no. of recipients receiving from both USA and USSR.

SOURCE: Joshua and Gibert, n. 1, pp. 131 and 135.
the Third World countries. Graph 4.3 highlights the export of major arms to the Third World. Middle East continues to enjoy top priority, followed by South-East Asia. South Asian countries too had increased their imports in the 1960s. Other regions are relatively low priority areas. On the whole, Soviet aid has continued to most of its recipients, except in the case of Iraq in 1963, when it was temporarily suspended and Indonesia after the fall of Sukarno. Unlike the reduction and near termination of US aid/military grant, the Soviet aid is likely to continue playing an important role to subserve its foreign policy and diplomacy. Nevertheless, the Soviet policy has been, like the USA, to prevent a direct confrontation between the two super powers in any region of the Third World.

25. Table 4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>1950-54</th>
<th>1955-59</th>
<th>1960-64</th>
<th>1965-69</th>
<th>Total 1950-69</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Countries</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-aligned Countries</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIPRI, n. 1. p. 190.