Chapter VI

PAKISTAN'S ROLE
Corresponding to the coolness which developed in India's relations with Indonesia between September 1961 and September 1965, relations between Indonesia and Pakistan grew warmer and closer. Pakistan which, since its inception in August 1947, did not count much in the calculations of Indonesian foreign policy for various reasons, came to have great significance in the four-year period following the first Non-Aligned States' Conference in Belgrade in September 1961. There are three distinct phases in which Pakistani overtures and Indonesian responses can be studied. The first phase up to the end of 1960, can be described as the one in which Indonesia's relations with Pakistan were less than cordial. The second phase, which is characterised with their search for common goals and similar approaches to various issues of national and international importance, culminated in Indonesia's open and categorical support to Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute in April 1964. The period of seventeen months, following Pakistan Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's visit to Indonesia in April 1964 and leading to the outbreak of Indo-Pakistan war in September 1965, constitutes the third phase.

First Phase

In its relations with Indonesia, Pakistan as a political entity separate from India, had to start with certain disadvantages. It could claim centuries old relationships with Indonesia

1. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Minority Problems in Southeast Asia (Stanford, California, 1955), p. 88. The authors describe Indonesia's relations with Pakistan at this stage, as "tactical rather than cordial".
only as a part of India and not as Pakistan, a new state that emerged on 14 August 1947. Besides, unlike Indian leaders, leaders in Pakistan lacked any personal contacts with the Indonesian leaders. None of the personalities to whom President Sukarno, Vice-President Mohammad Hatta and Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir, owed and acknowledged inspiration, belonged to Pakistan. No Pakistani leader had offered to Indonesia as much moral and diplomatic support as Prime Minister Nehru had done. Finally, whereas Pakistan came into existence and sought to perpetuate itself on the basis of hatred against India, Indonesia came to entertain positively friendly feelings towards India. There was only one factor of advantage with Pakistan. Both Pakistan and Indonesia were countries with predominantly Moslem populations. A common Islamic religion thus became the basis of Pakistan's initial overtures towards Indonesia. Incidentally, it was in tune with the first phase of Pakistan's foreign policy of evolving a world Islamic front with India as a focus of enmity.

Pakistan's moral and diplomatic support to Indonesia's cause for freedom became manifest during and after the second Dutch "police action" on 18 December 1948. Pakistan Government and Constituent Assembly denounced the Dutch action. While replying to a two-hour debate in the Constituent Assembly on 23 December 1948, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Chaudhri Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, described it as "barbarous" and "an affront to the soul of Asia and an outrage to human decency". He warned that if military action was not reversed "soon", the Government "will take every action in the diplomatic direction or any other direction open to it". The Foreign Minister's tone of condemnation was in keeping with the

2. *Dawn*, 24 December 1948. The Foreign Minister also disclosed that his Government had already made a "strong representation" to the Dutch Charge d'Affaires in Pakistan.
emotional outburst witnessed earlier in the debate in the Constituent Assembly. The mover of the motion of adjournment, Chaudhri Nazir Ahmad (West Panjab), had termed it "naked Dutch aggression" which was condemned by every Pakistan. Many members of the Constituent Assembly had risen thereafter to express their strong indignation against the Dutch. Feeling satisfied over the tone of deliberations in the Parliament, the Indonesian representative to Pakistan, Idham Chalid, had said: "The expression of indignation against the Dutch was very emphatic."

The press in Pakistan gave prominent coverage to the news relating to the consequences of the Dutch action on 18 December 1948. It also condemned the Dutch in strong terms. Commenting editorially, Dawn described it as "a perfidious attack on the Indonesian Republic...", and "the latest war of colonial plunder...." The title of an editorial in this English daily used for the Dutch epithets like "Murderers of freedom."

Although Government of Pakistan emphasised that their moral support to Indonesia was a part of their general opposition to colonialism in Asia, it considered Indonesia a special case for its sympathy, because of its predominantly Muslim population. "In the present instance", said the Pakistan Foreign Minister, "the fact that over 90 per cent people of Indonesia are Muslims means that their griefs and sufferings are their (the people of Pakistan's) own."

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3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. See for instance ibid. of 20 and 21 December 1948.
6. Ibid., 21 December 1948.
8. Ibid., 24 December 1948.
Thenceforward, Pakistan continued to give moral support to Indonesia's cause for freedom in and outside the United Nations. Pakistan also joined the eighteen nations' Asian Conference on Indonesia in New Delhi in January 1949. The Government in Karachi declared 27 December 1949, the day of transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch to the Republic of Indonesia, as a holiday. Indonesia also became the first of the two countries in South-East Asia, to which Pakistan sent its full-fledged ambassadors.

On their part, the Indonesians showed an equally warm attitude towards Pakistan. Pakistan was the second country President Sukarno thought it fit to visit following his visit to India in January 1950. Indonesia signed a Treaty of Friendship with Pakistan on the same day as it signed with India. Pakistan's diplomatic efforts to extract this Treaty on par with India, however, showed its anxiety to counteract Indian influence in Indonesia.

11. Interview with Mohammad Roem (former Indonesian Foreign Minister in Mohammad Natsir's Cabinet from September 1950 to March 1951), Djakarta, 6 October 1969.

Mohammad Roem told the author a story about the signing of the Friendship Treaty with India and Pakistan on 3 March 1951. When the question of signing the Treaty with India came up, he recalled, the Pakistani Ambassador approached him and urged for signing the Treaty first with Pakistan and then with India. Mohammad Roem observed that, for Indonesia, a choice between India and Pakistan, at this stage, was a difficult question. Relating to the moral, diplomatic and material support rendered by India, he said, Indonesia's priority in friendly relationship with India was quite natural. But then Indonesia was in need of friends. Moreover, Pakistan was an Islamic State, only recently a part of India. Thus it could not be annoyed. The result was a policy of equal friendship with both India and Pakistan. The Foreign Minister said he argued with the Pakistan Ambassador that the Treaty could not be signed with Pakistan first because it was India which established diplomatic mission in Indonesia before Pakistan or any other country did, that it was Indian... contd. on next page
Common ties of religion and the Friendship Treaty of March 1951 aroused expectations that relations between the two states would grow apace and strengthen for mutual benefit. But at least, until the end of 1960, Indonesia-Pakistan relations were just correct. President Sukarno visited Pakistan in 1950. It was in December 1960, however, that the President of Pakistan reciprocated it. It showed the lesser degree of importance Pakistan attached to Indonesia in its overall calculations of foreign policy.

A major foreign policy issue Indonesia faced during this period was the West Irian dispute. Pakistan always supported Indonesia's position as against the Dutch. UN General Assembly was one of the important places where Pakistan found opportunities to give moral support to Indonesia on this issue. Other occasions were provided by various conferences like the one at Bogor (West Java) in December 1954 and the other at Bandung in April 1955. In a public speech at Bogor, Pakistan Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali, said: 'We strongly condemn colonialism wherever it exists and we sympathise with your attitude to the Irian question.' But like India, Pakistan was in favour of settling the West Irian dispute in a peaceful way.

In exchange for its support to Indonesia on the West Irian question, Pakistan hoped that the Indonesians would support its case.
on the Kashmir dispute. But in the light of Indonesia's cordial
relations with India, it was too much to expect. Well up to April
1964, Indonesia continued to maintain its impartial posture towards
the Indo-Pakistan dispute on Kashmir. The Indonesian leaders, on
various occasions expressed the hope that India and Pakistan could
solve the Kashmir problem in an atmosphere of brotherhood and peace.
They also made several attempts to mediate in the dispute. On
6 March 1951, Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Mohammad Roem, said
that his Government was ready to help mediate in the Kashmir dispute
if asked. This offer was repeated by Indonesian Foreign Minister,
14 Soenario, in April 1954.

There were several reasons for Indonesia's attitude of
impartiality on the India-Pakistan dispute on Kashmir. Firstly,
as opposed to the theocratic nature of the State of Pakistan, the
Indian and Indonesian constitutions were secular in both letter and
spirit. Although, through its press and other media, Pakistan
attempted to give an exaggerated picture of communal riots in India
in order to distort India's secular image in Indonesian eyes, it did
not succeed in enlisting Indonesian sympathy as against India.
Indonesia's ruling elite with President Sukarno at the top, with
their commitment to secularism, tended to prefer a secular India to
a theocratic Pakistan. India held out Kashmir as a symbol of its
secularism and, on this basis, endeavoured to convince the Indonesian
leadership of the dangerous implications inherent in Pakistan's plea
that as majority of the people of Jammu and Kashmir professed Islam,

the state should go to Pakistan.

Secondly, from the very beginning, Indonesia adopted a foreign policy fundamentally similar to that of India. Sharing each other's interpretation of the cold war implications, both India and Indonesia had refused to align themselves with either of the two ideological military blocs. This policy of non-alignment permitted them a high degree of leverage in dealing with the two Super Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. It retained for them freedom of action in any cold war dispute and ensured that their independence remained uncompromised.

But, unlike Indonesia, Pakistan, for its own reasons, had opted for joining the US sponsored military alliances like SEATO and CENTO, in 1954. In view of the anticipated threat to its security from India, Pakistan had found little use in non-alignment. Alignment with the Western bloc would, at least, ensure its security. Pakistan might, in due course, also use Western pressures against India in the dispute on Kashmir.

Both India and Indonesia had expressed their strong opposition to these Western military agreements. Their opposition stemmed from their common understanding that by exploiting internal regional dissensions and anti-Communist fears, the Western Powers were extending the cold war near their door. This divergence in the

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15. To Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistan's plea for application of two-nation theory was not acceptable. Neither he nor any other leader had ever accepted it as a basis for India's partition. Nehru believed that if Kashmir was given to Pakistan because a majority of its people professed Islam it would threaten the lives of religious minorities in both the countries. While commenting on a question posed by a Pakistani correspondent in London on 20 September 1962, in this regard, Nehru counter-questioned him as to what would happen to 50 million Muslims in India and eight or nine million Hindus in Pakistan, if the fate of Kashmir was decided on the basis of religion. See Indonesian Herald, 22 September 1962.
foreign policies of Indonesia and Pakistan, constituted an important factor that kept the two countries' relations at a low key. Pakistan had also seen Indonesia's growing relations with the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China and other Communist bloc countries, all set against Western military pacts and bases in South and South-East Asia. Indonesia's general elections in 1955 and regional elections in 1956-57, which had brought the Indonesian Communist Party to the fore as the fourth largest party in the country, also went to confirm Pakistani apprehensions that Indonesia was drifting towards the Communist bloc.

Although there never arose a situation of hostility between the two States, thanks to domestic, religious and cultural factors, their relations continued to remain less than cordial until Pakistan changed its foreign policy stance of excessive dependence on the West. Obviously, Pakistan failed to build up a case against the secular image of India, strong enough to convince the Indonesian leadership. And Indonesia continued to maintain an attitude of impartiality towards the Kashmir dispute. While giving his "personal impressions" of his visit to Indonesia, Rais Ahmad Khan, a Pakistani scholar, wrote thus: "They desire closer relations with us. In official circles, however, the Indian influence seems to be stronger." He also stressed that to Indonesians, Indian neutrality was attractive whereas Pakistan's dependence on the West was repulsive. Co-relating it to Indonesia's attitude towards the Kashmir dispute, he wrote: "This in fact is responsible for the extremely lukewarm attitude of Indonesia towards the Kashmir dispute."

17. Ibid., p. 284.
The Pakistani scholar correctly points out that as a result of Pakistan joining the Western bloc, "Indonesia ... receded into the background of our foreign policy." Similarly, although Pakistanis continued to be treated as brothers in Islam, the country as such received a fairly small degree of importance in Indonesian foreign policy calculations. As against this, Indonesia's relations with India grew apace.

Other reasons were Indonesia's sense of gratitude for India's ungrudging moral, material and diplomatic support to Indonesia's cause for freedom, Indonesian commitment to socialism at home and long-standing personal friendship between the Indian and Indonesian leaders. All these reasons contributed negatively in impeding the growth of cordial relationship between Indonesia and Pakistan.

By December 1960, there had been little significant change in the pattern of Indonesia-Pakistan relations. But certain developments in Pakistan's relations with its Western allies showed some portents of change. These came to have an important impact on Pakistan's foreign policy towards the Communist bloc countries and Indonesia.

In September 1960, a Democratic candidate, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, was elected to the American Presidency. 

19. John F. Kennedy was inaugurated as President on 20 January 1961; results of the Presidential election were already known in September 1960.

20. In March 1958, as a Senator, John F. Kennedy had introduced a resolution in the Senate, which read: "... the Congress recognizes the importance of the economic development of India ... it is in the interest of the United States ... to assist India to complete successfully its current programme for economic development." See "Western Arms Aid to India", Pakistan Horizon, vol. 16, no. 4, Fourth Quarter, 1963, p. 333. For text of Kennedy's resolution, see Congressional Records, Proceedings and Debates of the 85th Congress, session 2, vol. 104, pt. 4, 25 March 1963, p. 5250.
feeling that under President Kennedy the United States might tend to ignore the interests of its allies, led Pakistan to make a serious study of the foreign policy options open to it. One important choice before Pakistan seemed to be to reduce gradually its excessive dependence on the West and diversify sources of its economic and military aid. It did not mean snapping links with the West. It only meant to restore the balance by pursuing a policy of establishing cordial relations with the two great countries of the Eastern bloc, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. A re-orientation of its foreign policy would ensure a high degree of leverage with the Western bloc countries, secure Soviet neutrality on the Kashmir dispute and friendship with China, a big Asian neighbour, the one showing prospects of having more or less permanently hostile attitude towards India. Moreover, a changed stance in favour of anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist forces in Asia and Africa, would go a long way in restoring Pakistan’s image in the eyes of Indonesian leaders.

The other development that was expected to have significant effect on Indonesian-Pakistani relations was a parallel eclipse of parliamentary democracy in both the countries. The idea of basic democracy as it developed in Pakistan following Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s take over as President in October 1958, was considered quite proximate to President Sukarno’s concept of Guided Democracy.

Ayub Khan’s Visit to Indonesia

These developments, if tactfully exploited, could be expected to lead to a major break-through in the two countries’ relations. With these calculations in mind, President Ayub Khan visited Indonesia in early December 1960. The primary purpose, as
it became evident from his statements and speeches in Indonesia during his visit, was to strike a wedge between Indonesia and India. If the Pakistani leader could convince Indonesian leadership that Pakistan's alliance with the West was only to secure itself from the threat posed by India, that it was India's reluctance to fulfil its pledge of plebiscite in Kashmir which had left no other alternative to Pakistan, that if Kashmir dispute could be resolved to her satisfaction, Pakistan could prove itself to be as strongly anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist as any other country including India, it would be a big achievement.

In the course of his tour, wherever President Ayub Khan went he received a huge welcome. While welcoming him, President Sukarno recalled the valuable services rendered by "Pakistan" soldiers in 1945 and added that "that is also why the Indonesian people receive the Chief of State of the people of that country with the sincerest brotherly feeling and profoundest sympathy."

While addressing a huge rally in Bandung on 7 December 1960, President Ayub Khan clarified to the Indonesians the necessity for Pakistan's joining the Western military alliances. He emphasised that it was solely in order to safeguard and defend her independence against the pressures brought to bear upon her by some Asian nations.

21. Indonesian Observer (Djakarta), 12 December 1960. It commented on President Ayub Khan's visit to Bogor.

22. Antara, 5 December 1960. In fact, there were no Pakistani soldiers in 1945, Pakistan having come into existence only in August 1947. This was an obvious reference to an Indian army contingent of about 700 soldiers who joined hands with the Indonesian army against the Dutch and actively participated in Indonesia's struggle for freedom. Later, around 250 of them declared their allegiance to India after partition and most of them were repatriated. The rest stayed on in Indonesia and engaged in varieties of traditional Indian professions. See O.P. Khosla, "Indians in Indonesia", Indonesian Observer, 9 January 1961.

Clearly, the reference was directed against India. President Ayub Khan attempted to put before the Indonesian leaders a choice between India and Pakistan. In a calculated move the Pakistani leader put the blame for Indo-Pakistan disputes squarely on India. Sensing the Indonesian sentiment against colonialism, he expressed Pakistan's willingness to join Indonesia in eliminating colonialism and imperialism in the world. But, at this stage, Indonesian leaders refused to take sides and maintained their earlier posture of friendship towards both India and Pakistan. President Sukarno said in the same rally in Bandung: "We, the Indonesian nation, are friendly towards these two nations, both with India and Pakistan. And ... we are also desirous in maintaining friendly relations with all countries...." Obviously, Ayub Khan's "reasons of self-defence" had carried little, if any, conviction with Sukarno. President Sukarno's speech in Bandung must have left President Ayub Khan in no doubt about Indonesia's deep commitment to secularism and non-alignment, which, in essence, meant continued friendship with India. The latter's idea of a united Islamic bloc against India had found little favour with the former.

Understandably, the President of Pakistan was not satisfied with Indonesia's theme of friendship with India. That explains why, while speaking at a press conference in Djakarta on 10 December 1960, he did not offer categorical support to Indonesia's demand for the convening of the second Asian-African Conference. When asked about its prospects, President Ayub Khan replied that the Afro-Asian

24. Ibid.
25. Ibid. See also Antara, 8 December 1960.
countries should first study the benefits of such a conference, if it should be held. For fear that it might not be interpreted as Pakistan's refusal, he added that this opinion of his did not mean he was against it. Even the Joint Statement issued by the two Presidents on 10 December 1960, only noted discussion on "the question of exploring the possibility of holding an Asian-African conference at the earliest possible time". On the West Irian issue also he withheld support to Indonesia's views about employing forcible means against the Dutch. The Pakistan leader expressed his hope that the West Irian dispute would not be settled in a military way. The Joint Statement omitted direct reference to West Irian issue. It merely contented itself by reaffirming the two Presidents' belief that colonialism in all its forms and manifestations must be eradicated from the world in the interest of peace, prosperity and stability.

Naturally, keeping in view Pakistan's less than categorical attitude towards the West Irian issue as well as the second Afro-Asian Conference, it was too much to hope for Indonesia's support on the Kashmir issue. There was no mention of Kashmir dispute in the Joint Statement. It only said: "Strong support was also voiced for the principle of self-determination for all people struggling under foreign domination. And these words, by no stretch of imagination, could be construed to mean Indonesia's support to Pakistan against

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27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. See also "Pakistan-Indonesia Joint Statement", Pakistan Horizon, vol. 14, no. 1, First Quarter 1961, pp. 77-78.
31. Ibid.
India on the Kashmir dispute.

The official and press circles in Indonesia brought to focus similarities as well as differences in the domestic and foreign policies of the two countries. Bringing these into sharp relief, the First Minister, Djuanda Kartawidjaja, said: "...from our side we have given clarifications about guided democracy and the Manipol-Usdek as the outlines of the State policy...". "Pakistan, too has come to the conclusion that the Western type parliamentary democracy is no longer suitable for Pakistan", he added. He also stressed: "Whereas the foreign policies of both countries are quite different, there are many similarities in their development policies."

"...Indonesia pursues a different foreign policy than Pakistan", said Subandrio, the Indonesian Foreign Minister. Rounding up the impressions of President Ayub Khan's visit to Indonesia, the Antara News Bulletin in its Weekly Review commented that "Indonesia and Pakistan differ almost as much as they have in common."

It may be noted that politically at least President Ayub Khan's one-week visit to Indonesia from 4 to 11 December 1960 was a failure. But it registered success in another field. On 10 December 1960 the two Presidents had signed a cultural agreement containing stipulations on bilateral co-operation in the field of art and science. Besides, in order to take "further steps ... to promote economic relations ... it was decided that trade delegations between the two countries should be exchanged at the earliest possible

32. Indonesian Observer, 6 December 1960.
33. Antara, 7 December 1960.
34. Ibid., 12 December 1960.
possibly, if Pakistan could strengthen its cultural ties and provide to Indonesia certain inducements in the economic and trade field over and above what India had been able to do, it might lead Indonesia to change its attitude on Kashmir in favour of Pakistan. But it was just a possibility which lay in future. For the present, it had no concrete results to show.

The visit of the Pakistan's President was, nonetheless, important in certain ways. It enabled him to make a first-hand assessment of the tone and temper of the Indonesian leadership and of the major objectives of Indonesia's foreign policy. President Ayub Khan succeeded in delimiting certain issues on the basis of which Pakistan-Indonesian relations could grow at the expense of India. Support to Sukarno's anti-colonial and anti-imperialist sentiment and to his demand for the second Afro-Asian Conference, and pursuance of a policy modelled on Indonesia's active and independent foreign policy in relation to the two power blocs, were the three such major issues. But as these suggested a compromise with Pakistan's earlier policy of alliances with the West, this could be achieved only when the circumstances in the international field took a different turn.

It also revealed to Pakistan that Indonesia's support on the Kashmir issue could not be elicited by only harping on common Islamic sentiment. The secular nature of Indian polity and leadership was more acceptable to Indonesian leaders than the theocratic nature of the State of Pakistan.

President Ayub Khan's visit was also instrumental in promoting personal rapport at the highest level. It enabled the Pakistan

leader to establish what he himself described as "the most fruitful contact" with the Indonesian leaders. In his departing message to President Sukarno, he expressed his "earnest hope that we will have further opportunities of meeting each other in the future...".

Second Phase: Period of Active Role

A change perceptible in the US Asia policy provided Pakistan with a justification for reviewing its earlier alignment policy and identifying other alternatives. Since John F. Kennedy's take-over as President, there was a growing feeling in Pakistan that the United States was going "out of the way to support neutralists against their friends..."; and this became "a cause for great concern". According to President Ayub Khan, "two basic requirements" which led Pakistan into Western alliances were "defence and security and our development". If a shift in the US policy created an impression in Pakistan that alliances no longer served these "basic" objectives, observed the Pakistani President in the course of an interview, "then naturally we have to see how can we adapt ourselves to the new circumstances". He refused to believe the plea that the American arms aid to India was meant to strengthen her against the People's Republic of China and perceived in a


militarily stronger India a threat to Pakistan's security. While commenting on the consequences of America's India-oriented policy on India's neighbours including Pakistan, the President of Pakistan also hinted at options open to them. He observed that with the increase in India's "military power", the neighbouring states would grow more and more apprehensive about their protection and will look towards "somebody else". And he foresaw that "they would seek protection from China and (that) China will be willing to give it".

Geo-politics also suggested a change in Pakistan's foreign policy. Growing rift between India and China on the border question indicated potential possibilities of a realignment of forces in Asia to Pakistan's advantage. If by a radical shift in policy, a basis of friendship with China could be laid, it might enable Pakistan to secure Soviet neutrality on Kashmir dispute, to recover a certain amount of leverage in its relations with the Western allies, to gain respectability in the Asian-African opinion and, especially, with the Indonesian leadership. Friendship with China to the north and

40. Ibid., p. 4. In this interview, President Ayub Khan said: "We feel that India ... will gain more strength if ... she obtains more arms from the United States of America. We have no doubt in our mind that those arms shall be used to intimidate Pakistan...."


42. "A Warning to Pakistan", (editorial), Dawn, 20 December 1961. Commenting on the serious implications for Pakistan, of India's action against Portuguese colonialism in Goa and showing options open to it, Dawn wrote: "Red China is Pakistan's greater potential friend. Let us fool ourselves no more that any power, however well-meaning, will eventually rush to our aid from across the oceans, if we are in peril. An alliance nearer home against a common enemy is far more logical."
with Indonesia to the south-east of India, the Pakistanis believed, would be far more effective in dealing with India than through alliances with the West. Certain important events during 1961 and 1962 strengthened this view in Pakistan.

Keeping these calculations in mind, the Pakistani leaders evolved a dual strategy towards Indonesia. Positively, through a gradual shift in their attitude away from their Western allies, especially, the United States, and towards China and the Soviet Union, Pakistan began to improve its earlier image in the eyes of the Indonesians. Negatively, it reinforced its propaganda campaign to tarnish India's overall image in Indonesia. The picture of India, the Pakistanis endeavoured to portray was internally that of a caste-ridden, poverty-stricken, chauvanistic and intolerant people, secular and democratic only in name, and externally that of an ambitious and aggressive country, threatening the existence of its small neighbours. Simultaneously there was an attempt to cultivate and play up the Indonesian leadership and play down the Indian leadership.

In 1961, non-aligned leaders conference in Belgrade in September and India's action against the Portuguese colonialism in Goa in December, provided two valuable opportunities to Pakistan to create ill-will between India and Indonesia. It was a matter of satisfaction to Pakistan that President Sukarno had declined

43. While addressing a 200,000 strong mass rally in Bandung (West Java) on 7 December 1960, President Ayub Khan had traced the origin of Pakistan to 100 million Muslims' fears about Hindu domination. He had said Muslims were apprehensive that because of the rigid caste system of the Hindus, they (the Muslims) might become untouchables and fall from one slavery to another. After freedom, he had observed, their fears had been justified. See Dawn, 8 December 1960.
Nehru's invitation to visit New Delhi enroute to Belgrade, and instead decided to have a brief stop over at Karachi Airport. For the first time since independence, the Indonesian President had shown his preference to Pakistan over India and expressed his fondness for the people of Pakistan in these words: "I like Pakistan and I like the people here. There is a lot of goodwill amongst us." Although Sukarno's stop-over at the Karachi airport was for technical reasons, his refusal to respond to Nehru's invitation to visit India on way to Belgrade, gave a hint that some kind of coolness had developed between the two leaders at personal level. In its later policies towards Indonesia, Pakistan tactfully endeavoured to turn this coolness into antipathy between Indonesia and India.

In this effort, Dawn, a prominent English daily, played a significant role. In an editorial on 1 September 1961, the opening day of the Non-Aligned States' Conference, it expressed its doubts whether any meaningful "contribution" to the solution of present-day international disputes and issues was possible "by people professing and practising Mr. Nehru's brand of neutrality or non-alignment which has no basis on sincerity or honesty". In contrast to Nehru, it eulogised other non-aligned leaders like Presidents Nasser, Tito, Sukarno and Nkrumah. Dawn covered the views and statements

44. After meeting President Sukarno on 14 August 1961, Foreign Minister Subandrio told newsmen that the President will not call on any country on way to Belgrade. Nehru's invitation was thus ignored. See Antara, 14 August 1961. President Sukarno, however, made a brief 24 hours stop at Karachi Airport enroute to Belgrade, where he was received by Lieutenant-General W.A. Burki, Pakistan's Minister for Health, Labour and Social Welfare. President Ayub Khan, in a personal message, expressed sorrow at his inability to receive the Indonesian President in person. See Dawn, 30 August 1961.


critical of Nehru and his policy towards various issues facing the Conference and attempted to show that the Indian Prime Minister was neither enthusiastic about the Afro-Asian struggle against colonialism nor about the fate of the Arabs in Palestine. *Dawn* also endeavoured to make use of Nehru's known unwillingness to concede Indonesia's demand for convening a second Afro-Asian Conference. It reported that most Afro-Asian and other delegates including that of the UAR except Nehru, favoured President Sukarno's plea in this connection. Ejaz Husain, its European correspondent, linked it with Nehru's fear of Pakistan and China attending such a conference. It commented that Nehru was isolated on most of the issues and predicted that India was likely to lose its prestige further among the non-aligned group.

About three and a half months after the Belgrade Conference, on 18 December 1961, India took action against the Portuguese.

47. For instance, in its issue of 3 September 1961, *Dawn* reported that Ben Youssef Ben Khedda of the Provisional Government of Algeria, was disappointed at Nehru's casual and unenthusiastic reference to the question of recognition of his Government. In its issue of 8 September 1961, its European Correspondent, Ejaz Husain, reported that India, Burma and Ceylon were said to be strongly opposed to the inclusion of any reference in the Conference Communique to the Palestine question, and that Nehru was especially adamant on this issue. Only Nasser's threat to walk out ultimately over- rode Nehru's opposition. In its issue of 5 September 1961, it quoted an African delegate to show Nehru's ambivalent attitude to Berlin question. "One never knows where one is with Mr. Nehru. His presence at this Conference has been most ambiguous", he had said. See also ibid., 11 September 1961.


49. Ibid., 8 September 1961.

50. Ibid., 4 September 1961. The comments read: "If Bandung saw the rising influence of China at India's expense Belgrade may similarly witness the rising of an African voice in world affairs also at the expense of India." See also *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), 9 September 1961. Commenting editorially on the predicament of Nehru at Belgrade, it said: "... Nehru lacked enthusiasm for Belgrade and Belgrade lacked enthusiasm for Nehru."
colonialism in Goa and liberated all the territories under their rule. In a calculated move to show India's aggressive posture towards its small neighbours, President Ayub Khan said, in a question and answer meeting in Larkana (Sind), "India's invasion of Goa had fully exposed India's desire to grab and devour all surrounding countries". Pakistan, he feared, was the first on India's "invasion programme". A Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman described India's action as "naked militarism". "The mask is off", he declared. "Their much proclaimed theories of non-violence, secularism and democratic methods stand exposed".

Dawn took up the theme and pictured Indians as invaders. Commenting editorially, it wrote: "With the characteristic bravery of a coward, the Indian elephant has attacked the Goan mosquito, and ... the invading hordes of India have occupied almost all the Portuguese territory." It also gave prominent coverage to world press and public opinion critical of India on this issue, and gave captions to it like "Nehru's 'imperialism' Condemned".

To Pakistan's discomfiture, this line of anti-India propaganda failed to evoke any encouraging response from the Indonesian side. Indonesia, Dawn acknowledged, was one of the three countries in the world which supported India's action in Goa. In conformity with their commitment to anti-colonialism, the Indonesian leaders

52. Ibid. See also The Statesman, 6 January 1962.
55. Ibid., 19-20 December 1961.
56. Ibid., 19 December 1961. The other two countries it noted were the Soviet Union and the UAR.
hailed India's action. An Indonesian Foreign Office spokesman, in a statement in Djakarta, extended his country's "every sympathy" to the Indian people and the Government in their action against the Portuguese. "We are fully aware that India is compelled to use force in spite of the fact that India is a peace-loving nation", he observed. He added: "There can be no compromise with colonialism".

The Indonesian delegate to the UN Trusteeship Committee, in its meeting in New York, on 20 December 1961, termed Goa's liberation as "a most joyful occasion". Col. Latief Hendraningrat, Chairman of the Indonesian Parliament (House of People's Representatives Mutual Cooperation - DPR-GR) criticised the American attitude on Goa issue as one showing "lack of understanding towards the problem of colonialism and the liberation movements related to it". He also described it as "a liberation movement and not as aggression as propagated by the colonialists and their allies". This was, in fact, a strong re-buttal to anti-Indian propaganda carried on by Pakistan, in technical and practical terms, one of the "allies" of the "colonialists". The Indonesian Herald (an English daily close to Indonesian Foreign Office), in an editorial, asked the Western nations not to be shocked by India's action. "They should fully understand that this is only a matter of course, although long overdue", it observed.

In 1962, Pakistan found three events of considerable importance, effecting Indian-Indonesian relations to its own advantage. These

59. Ibid.
were: Pakistan's active role in West Irian after the Indonesian-Dutch Agreement on 15 August 1962, the so-called "Sondhi Affair" during the Fourth Asian Games in Djakarta in September 1962 and the Chinese attack on the northern frontiers of India in October 1962.

The Agreement on West Irian provided that before the final transfer of administration to the Republic of Indonesia on 1 May 1963, West Irian would remain under the administration of the UN Temporary Executive Authority, for a period of seven months, starting from 1 October 1962. India had been requested by the United Nations to depute six army officials for service in West Irian. The Indian Brigadier General, Inderjeet Rikhey, was selected to lead the UN Military Team, to supervise cease-fire during this period. But it was Pakistan which, on request by Indonesia, was chosen to despatch 1,000-strong armed forces contingent to work in West Irian. This enabled Pakistan to establish contacts with Indonesia in the armed forces field and earn Indonesian goodwill. Speaking before a group of Pakistan Air Forces officers in Djakarta on 11 October 1962, Ruslan Abdulgani, Chairman of the Indoctrination Committee and concurrently Chairman of Revolutionary Spirit Fostering Committee, commended Pakistani soldiers services in West Irian and commented on the healthy impact it will have on the two countries' relations, thus: "Once more we meet, not only you and I, 

61. "Pakistan and the World - Quarterly Survey", Pakistan Horizon, vol. 17, no. 4, Fourth Quarter, 1964, p. 326. While recounting outstanding features of Pakistan's relations with Indonesia, Pakistan Horizon noted that "Indonesia selected Pakistan from which the United Nations Force for West Irian was to be drawn." "This was", it observes, "in appreciation of the staunch support given by Pakistan to Indonesia on the West Irian issue."

In this sense, India which had been making meaningful contribution to the strengthening of Indonesia's case on West Irian issue at the United Nations, was ignored.
but Indonesia and Pakistan as the apparatus of the United Nations in West Irian, taking responsibility for making the way smooth for the transfer of administration of West Irian into Republican hands."

"I think", he continued, "it is not too much to hope that, with so many evidences of the open and friendly spirit between us, we can look forward to more extensive co-operation in the future."

Anti-Indian demonstrations in Djakarta in September 1962, provided Pakistan with a valuable opportunity "to hit at India", as the Indian Express, an English daily from New Delhi, editorially put it. Ignoring G.D. Sondhi's actual status as Senior Vice-President of the Asian Games Federation, his statement seeking participation of Israel and Taiwan into the Games was equated with Government of India's attitude towards the two states. Pakistan's calculated bid was to show to the Arabs as well as Indonesia that India was pro-Israel and not pro-Arabs and hence pro-imperialist. Zafar Ali, a spokesman of the Pakistani delegation (jointly with M.S. Osman, a spokesman of the Ceylonese delegation), condemned G.D. Sondhi "for attempting to change the name of the Asian Games, and impair the prestige of Indonesia". He also described him as "not a good Asian".

62. Indonesian Herald, 12 October 1962. The Pakistan Air Force men were a part of their country's armed forces contingent in West Irian, touring Indonesia as the guests of the Indonesian Air Force (AURI).

63. Indian Express, 5 September 1962.

64. Dawn, 4 September 1962. See also Indonesian Herald, 1 September 1962. Zafar Ali, in his statement, stressed that "these games will be the Fourth Asian Games. Nobody has any right to interfere in our affairs. All of us, members of the Asian Games Federation stand by the Indonesian side..." "Whoever acts against the interest of Asia is not a true Asian. We will fight against all kinds of foreign interference and aggression. All Asian nations should be united for the development and welfare of sports," he emphasised.
The incident as such enabled Pakistan to assess the strong tone of anti-Indian sentiment in Djakarta. Storming, by a mob, of the Indian Embassy, damaging of its property, attempting to pull down the Indian flag, and later, at the time of the closing ceremony of the Games, booing of the Indian players, and of India's national anthem, all showed the Indonesian feeling against India. One of the slogans raised by the 20,000 demonstrators at the Indian Embassy was: "Sondhi's statement is an insult to President Sukarno and the Indonesian Nation". Pakistan found it advantageous to stress on this fact in order to still further strengthen Indonesian antipathy towards India. Dawn published the account of the closing ceremony of the Games under the bold letters, ASIAN GAMES COME TO AN END - Indians booed at closing ceremony" and showed Pakistani determination to play a damaging role in relations between India and Indonesia. One of the significant indications of the adverse effect of the Sondhi episode had come from a statement by Indonesia's Trade Minister Suharto. This was a pointer to Pakistan to step in, fill the gap and strengthen its trade relations with Indonesia.

The third incident of importance to Pakistan in 1962 came to be China's invasion of the Himalayan borders of India. Its significance as far as Indian-Indonesian relations were concerned, lay in the newer avenues it opened to Pakistan to re-orient its policy attitudes towards China and other Communist countries. Prime Minister Nehru's request for arms aid in order to meet the Chinese

65. Dawn, 4 September 1962.
66. Ibid., 5 September 1962.
67. Suharto stated that he had "instructed" all key Government officials "to refrain from entering into new trade relations with India because such relations will become an object of criticism by society." See Indonesian Herald, Indonesian Observer, Harian Rakjat, 1 September 1962 and The Hindu, 1 September 1962.
invasion had evoked a fairly good and prompt response among Pakistan's Western allies, especially, in the United States. In this, Pakistan saw the prospects of its vital national interests being sacrificed in favour of a non-aligned country, India, from which it anticipated continued threat to its security. President Ayub Khan sensed "a complete and fundamental change" in the American policy towards the sub-continent. It released further pressures within Pakistan, expressing "disenchantment" about continued alliances with the West and the United States and demanding closer relations with China. It is, however, significant that Pakistan continued to maintain close military and economic links with the United States. At the same time the already existing feeling in Pakistan that, in the Asian setting, closer relations with China on the one hand and with Indonesia on the other, would be advantageous to its security problems, got an impetus.

This led Pakistan to improve its contacts with China, Soviet Union and other East European Communist states. Its overtures towards China culminated in the conclusion of a boundary agreement between the two states on 2 March 1963. The two countries also signed a trade agreement in January 1963, an air agreement in August 1963 and a barter deal at the end of September 1963. Besides, Pakistan also sought to promote its trade relations with the Soviet


69. In October 1959, President Ayub Khan announced that his Government would soon initiate border talks with China. Pakistan approached China in 1960 for border demarcation and boundary settlement. This was followed up by a diplomatic note from Karachi to Peking on 28 March 1961. China took almost one year to respond to it in February 1962. The two countries announced "agreement in principle" on 26 December 1962 and concluded a boundary agreement on 2 March 1963.
Union and the Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe. Within thirty-three days from 30 August to 1 October 1963, it concluded seven trade and barter agreements with the Soviet Union, Poland, Albania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It also signed an air agreement with the Soviet Union in October 1963. These agreements with the countries of the Communist bloc, first since Pakistan came into being in August 1947, represented a change in its outlook and determination to free itself from total dependence on its Western allies. This was certain to improve Pakistan's image in Indonesia and to convince President Sukarno that Pakistan was veering away from the "Old Established Forces" (OLEFOS) and getting closer to "New Emerging Forces" (NEFOS).

Side by side, Pakistan geared its propaganda machinery to put pressure on the West to stop military aid to India. In a clever move to cultivate China on the one hand, and, thereby to intensify anti-Indian feeling in Indonesia, Pakistan played down the Indian thesis that China was an ambitious, aggressive and expansionist state, that China had invaded India, and that India's arms build-up was meant only to meet the Chinese attack against India's territorial integrity. It, instead, charged India with harbouring evil designs against its small neighbours. The Pakistani Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, interpreted the Sino-Indian "conflict" as "no more than border warfare" and blamed India for seeking massive arms aid from the West under the pretext of Chinese threat. "It is obvious," he observed, "that Nehru has refused a peaceful settlement of the dispute with China in order to derive from it the maximum

advantage in the form of massive aid rushed to India by the Western Powers. Basing its reports on New China News Agency (NCNA), the press in Pakistan gave a Chinese version of the Sino-Indian war, and, in a systematic attempt to demolish India's image in Indonesia, portrayed India as an aggressor against China.

Indonesia's posture of treating China and India at par and its refusal to agree to India's contention that China had committed aggression, encouraged Pakistan to believe that its propaganda line against India was becoming increasingly acceptable among the Indonesian elite.

**Sukarno's Visit to Pakistan**

However, at least up to June 1963, Pakistan's anti-India propaganda in Indonesia did not show any appreciable results. It is clear from various statements by Indonesian leaders during their visit to Pakistan in June 1963. While addressing a press conference in Karachi on 26 June 1963, Subandrio attributed Western arms supply to India to her differences with China, and expressed his "hope (that) it is for that purpose". He emphatically stated that if an independent nation wanted to build-up its strength, that was its own affair. "It is not for us to make any comment on (actions of) other countries. Sovereign nations should judge for themselves."

72. Ibid., p. 40.
73. *Dawn*, 19, 20, 21 October 1962. On 19 October, it gave headlines "INDIANS CROSS MACMAHON LINE, ATTACK CHINESE ... ACTION FOLLOWS DELHI CABINET MEETING"; on 20 October, it wrote: "Chinese Border; Indian attacks on Western Sector also"; on 21 October, its headlines ran: "ALL-OUT OFFENSIVE BY INDIA ON CHINA BORDER".
As regards Kashmir issue, Subandrio told the journalists that Indonesia was keeping "hands off" the judgment in the Kashmir dispute. Any solution acceptable to both India and Pakistan would be welcome to Indonesia, he declared. Talking to newsmen in Bangkok the next day, he reiterated Indonesia's preparedness to mediate on the dispute "if pressed", but also stressed that it "will not offer her services".

Even the Joint Communique issued at the conclusion of President Sukarno's third visit to Pakistan, showed that Indonesia had not changed its earlier attitude of neutrality on the Kashmir dispute. It had merely expressed the two Presidents' hope "that in view of the need for strengthening the Afro-Asian solidarity, an honourable and equitable settlement of the problem of Kashmir would be reached in the near future".

Obviously, Pakistan had failed to evoke favourable response in Indonesia's official attitude on the two specific issues of major concern to it, namely, Western arms aid to India and Kashmir. Even President Ayub Khan's direct demand for Indonesia's "powerful support" on the Kashmir dispute had yielded no tangible results.

77. Ibid., 28 June 1963. See also The Statesman, 28 June 1963.
78. See text of the Joint Communique in Pakistan Horizon, Third Quarter, 1963, pp. 277-9. The only indication of a change in Indonesia's attitude on Kashmir issue came from President Sukarno's address to the National Assembly of Pakistan on 26 June 1963. Towards the end of his address, he appreciated Pakistan's persistent call for peaceful methods of solution in the intractable Kashmir dispute with India, and, by implication, suggested that it was India which refused to come to terms with Pakistan. See Indonesia, New Nationhoods and New Forms (Address by President Sukarno before the National Assembly of Pakistan, Rawalpindi, 26 June 1963), Special Issue 108 (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1963), p. 22. See also The Statesman, 27 June 1963.
79. Praising President Sukarno for release of West Irian from colonial bondage, the Pakistani President had stated in a state banquet arranged in Karachi on 24 June 1963, in honour of the former: "This remarkable achievement of your nation encourages us to believe that you will lend your powerful support for a similar struggle being waged in this (Indo-Pakistan) subcontinent." See Antara, 26 June 1963. See also The Statesman, 26 June 1963.
The sense of failure was all the more bitter in view of every effort made by Pakistan's official and press circles to cultivate Sukarno on to their side. Several important English dailies had called President Sukarno's visit as "epoch-making" and "historic". In their comments there were indications of Pakistan's hopes of inducing Indonesia to join her in a line-up against India. The Pakistani press was full of editorials, comments, articles and special supplements about Indonesia and its leader President Sukarno. Dawn editorialized Sukarno as "A Great Asian" and highlighted contrast between India's forcible seizure of Goa with Indonesia's belief in avoidance of the use of force in resolving West Irian issue. In its editorial "Welcome to a Great Leader", Morning News, another Pakistani English daily, praised the Indonesian President as an Asian leader of great calibre who should prove more than a match for those "forces of brown imperialism" that are threatening the nations of resurgent Asia. It was intended to inflate Sukarno's ego as against Nehru, who, for Pakistani press, represented "forces of brown imperialism". During his visit to Murree, a hill resort in West Pakistan, President of Indonesia was presented with an address of welcome. By extolling President Sukarno as a "symbol of freedom in Asia and the greatest son of Indonesia, who spoke for millions of Muslims all over the world", it attempted to coax Sukarno into an Islamic front against India.

Although Pakistan did not succeed in seeking Indonesia's official support on two specific issues, it would be far from

82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., 28 June 1963.
correct to suggest that from Pakistani point of view, President Sukarno's visit had been a total disappointment. For the first time did Pakistani leaders find some encouraging response from President Sukarno on their much publicized plea for bilateral relations on the basis of sharing a common religion. Speaking at Murree on 25 June 1963, the Indonesian leader had stressed the need for "close cooperation and real kinship", between the two countries. He had interpreted the "tumultuous welcome" accorded to him as a spontaneous gesture which spoke for the brotherly feelings among the Pakistanis for their Indonesian brothers. The Joint Communique had also expressed the two Presidents' determination to strive for closer Indonesian-Pakistani bonds "as is appropriate between brothers in Islam and based on the ten principles of Bandung".

It was a matter of deep satisfaction to Pakistani leaders to hear President Sukarno putting stress on similarities in the domestic and foreign policy postures of the two countries. While addressing the Pakistan National Assembly, the President of the Indonesian Republic had said: "Both Indonesia and Pakistan are introducing new political structures in their respective efforts to create the institutional vehicles through which our people may return to their ancient greatness." He continued: "Your form, you call the 'Basic Democracy'. Our Indonesian form, we call 'Guided Democracy'." Although, he added, these might be "made up" forms of democracy, "this is something we are proud of, not the reverse".

84. Ibid., 26 June 1963.
85. Ibid., 28 June 1963.
86. Ibid.
87. New Nationhoods and New Forms, n. 78, p. 6.
Besides, Pakistan was successful in improving its image in the eyes of Indonesian leaders. Its growing relations with the countries of the Communist bloc, especially with China, agreement to attend the Games of New Emerging Forces, readiness to attend and to work for the holding of the second Afro-Asian Conference "in the near future", combined to create a favourable Indonesian attitude towards Pakistan. Although Pakistan continued to be a member of the American-sponsored military alliances and allowed American bases on its territory, for Sukarno, she had become one of the active members of the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS). While speaking at the banquet arranged in his honour on 24 June 1963, the Indonesian President had said that close collaboration between his country and Pakistan was essential to rally the newly emergent forces of the world against the old established order of domination, exploitation and suppression. On this basis, he had declared: "There will always be very close cooperation" between the two countries. The Indonesian leader had succeeded in enlisting Pakistan's "full, immediate support to the newly emerging forces". In his address to the Pakistan National Assembly, President Sukarno had stated in a jubilant mood that Pakistan "now like Indonesia look forward to the holding of a world revolution, from the basis founded by the Bandung principles". So, from Indonesian point of view, two notable achievements of President Sukarno's visit to Pakistan had been Pakistan's agreement on basic matters relating to the holding of a second Afro-Asian Conference and her preparedness to take part in the projected "GANEFOS".

Keeping a long-term perspective in view, Indonesian President's visit in June 1963 showed certain important lines in which future Indonesian-Pakistani relations might further develop and get strengthened. By giving full support to Indonesia's demand for second "Bandung", and by showing ideological proximity in the framework of "NEFOS" versus "OILSEFOS", Pakistan had, to a great extent, succeeded in presenting its image as a serious contrast to that of India. Obviously, there could be expectations that if Indian-Indonesian relations continued to drift (there had been a sharp decline since the Sondhi episode in September 1962), the day would not be far off when Indonesia would shift its neutral stance on Kashmir dispute and come out openly in favour of Pakistan. And this is what happened less than a year later.

From then on, Pakistan became an active advocate of the second Asian-African Conference. When Indonesia approached various Afro-Asian governments for a preparatory meeting, Pakistan readily agreed to attend it. By doing so she showed to Indonesia that her attitude was in sharp contrast to India's reluctant, hesitant attitude, in attending the meeting. In response, Indonesia's attitude towards Pakistan grew more and more cordial.

91. A typical example is provided by President Ayub Khan's address to a joint session of Ceylon's Parliament on 9 December 1963. Therein, the President of Pakistan stressed the need for calling a second Afro-Asian Conference rather than a second non-aligned conference. See the relevant part of the text of Ayub Khan's address in Rais Ahmad Jafri, ed., Ayub: Soldier and Statesman (Speeches and Statements (1958-1965) of Field Marshal Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan) (Lahore, 1966), pp. 200-2. A correspondent of The Hindu interpreted it as Pakistan's effort to sow discord between the non-aligned neighbours, India and Ceylon. See The Hindu, 11 December 1963.
Pro-Pakistani Shift in Indonesia's Attitude towards Kashmir Dispute

The 22-nation Foreign Ministers' meeting preparatory to the second Afro-Asian Conference held in Djakarta on 10-15 April 1964, was an important event in the history of Indonesian-Pakistani relations. It provided both the governments with an opportunity to show a high degree of mutual co-operation on the issue before the meeting. Pakistan attached much significance to this meeting. This is evident from the Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto preferring to attend this meeting in Djakarta rather than the Annual SEATO Ministerial Conference scheduled to be held at Manila from 13-15 April 1964. By doing so, Pakistan, to a large extent, succeeded in establishing its bonafides as a champion of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism in the eyes of the Indonesians.

But its major importance as regards Indonesian-Pakistani relations is concerned, lay in the Joint Communique issued on 16 April 1964 by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries. It called for an early solution of this (Kashmir) dispute in accordance with the wishes of the people of the state and other provisions as envisaged in the Security Council resolutions which were accepted by both India and Pakistan.

It was a clear departure from the

93. "Joint Communique", ibid., pp. 201-2. Only two months earlier, President Ayub Khan had with Prime Minister Chou En-lai, issued a similar joint communique, in February 1964. It had expressed the hope that the Kashmir dispute would be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan. See Dawn, 26 February 1964. It was a significant development. Both China (in February 1964) and Indonesia (in April 1964) had, for the first time, chosen to discard their neutral posture on Kashmir dispute and to come out openly in favour of Pakistan.
earlier Indonesian stance on the Kashmir issue. Now Indonesia was no longer eager to maintain an attitude of impartiality between India and Pakistan. India had/seen rather as a stumbling block in the realisation of Indonesian foreign policy objectives.

Pakistan had at last achieved a big diplomatic gain. By forging ahead with her growing relations with Peking and Djakarta without impairing much her ties with the United States and other Western allies, Pakistan had succeeded in isolating India.

Pakistan's diplomatic triumph in enlisting Indonesia's clear and direct support on Kashmir dispute, must have created an element of anxiety in Indian circles. As earlier, now there could be no guarantee of Indonesian neutrality in case Pakistan chose to solve the dispute by force of arms. It aroused fears in India that in future Indonesia might also join forces with Pakistan in pressuring her into submission on the Kashmir question. The PKI had also, by then, egged President Sukarno on to an alignment with China. Pakistan's growing relations with China and her preparedness to concede Indonesian foreign policy demands, had rendered it acceptable to Indonesian leadership. In this light, to India's serious embarrass-ment, there were clear indications of an anti-India alliance coming into being.

The immediate reason that could explain this shift in Indonesian policy towards the Indo-Pakistan dispute on Kashmir was India's effort at the Preparatory Meeting to seek Malaysia's participation in the main Asian-African Conference. To Indonesia, India's pro-Malaysia attitude had been a source of serious embarrassment. For fear of losing Malaysian sympathies, the Pakistani delegate had maintained a sort of non-committal attitude on the question of Malaysia's participation. A neutral posture thus had
enabled Pakistan to avoid a bad feeling between her and Indonesia.
and the Indonesian-Pakistani Joint Communiqué showed that Pakistan
had been the major beneficiary of anti-Indian sentiment that had
been roused in Indonesia over India's attitude towards Malaysia's
participation in the second Afro-Asian Conference.

Third Phase: Climax of Indonesia-Pakistan
Relations at the expense of India

The Indonesia-Pakistan Joint Communiqué in Djakarta in April
1964, virtually laid the basis for the future Indonesian-Pakistani
relations. In the diplomatic and political field Pakistan's collabora­
tion with Indonesia in furthering prospects of the second Asian-
Afro-Asian Conference became still closer. Pakistan started taking
active part in the Afro-Asian gatherings. Even in the economic
field, Pakistan did not lag behind. On Indonesian approach, Pakistan
agreed on 31 July 1964 to supply goods worth 10 million dollars on
credit. There was an increase in the number of delegations and
goodwill missions exchanged between the two countries.

President Sukarno's two-day visit to Pakistan in September
1964 strengthened Indonesia's relations with that country still
further. The Joint Communiqué issued on 19 September 1964 at the
conclusion of the visit, reiterated Indonesia's pro-Pakistani
position on Kashmir dispute. "... the two Presidents regretted the
fact that the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir had
not been resolved and continued to pose a serious threat to peace
in this region. They called for an early solution of this dispute
in accordance with the wishes of the people of the state, as
envisaged in the resolutions of the Security Council which both
94 India and Pakistan had accepted". As regards the two countries:

94. "Pakistan-Indonesia Joint Communiqué", Pakistan Horizon,
vol. 17, no. 4, Fourth Quarter 1964, pp. 403-4.
efforts to convene the second Asian-African Conference, the Joint Communique expressed the two Presidents' agreement that "continuing collaboration between Pakistan and Indonesia would not only contribute to the success of the Conference but would also promote the cause of Asian solidarity and world peace." So far as the issue of Malaysia was concerned, Pakistan continued to maintain a neutral posture. The Joint Communique merely expressed President Ayub Khan's concern over increasing tension in Indonesia-Malaysia dispute and his hope of an early solution "through peaceful means probably through the Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission". Maybe the difference lay in the Pakistani and Indian approach to the issue as such. Whereas Pakistan managed to maintain a discreet silence over Malaysia's participation in the second Afro-Asian Conference, India, for her own diplomatic reasons, vocally supported and canvassed for Malaysia's case. Naturally, it was India which attracted growing hostility from Indonesian leadership; and Pakistan well utilised this anti-India sentiment to her own advantage.

95. Ibid. See also Guardian (Rangoon), 22 September 1964.
96. Guardian (Rangoon), 22 September 1964. The move for the set up of an Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission was initiated by President Macapagal of the Philippines at a summit meeting of the three Malay leaders, President Sukarno, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman and Macapagal himself, at Tokyo on 20 June 1964. Originally, the Commission was proposed to include four members, one each from Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, and the fourth one representing an Asian country to be chosen unanimously by the three as chairman of the Commission. Sukarno agreed in principle; but he suggested an amendment asking for two representatives each from the three Malay States and two more from among Asian and African countries, namely, Cambodia and Algeria. Later, however, he agreed to the original proposal. See Indonesia, Why Indonesia Opposes British-Made "Malaysia" (Djakarta, 1964), p. 48.
Pakistan-Indonesia Relations in the field of Trade and Economy

Growing cordiality in political relations had an inevitable impact on the two countries' ties in the trade and economic field. During President Sukarno's visit to Pakistan in September 1964, the two Presidents had expressed their common desire for wider collaboration in the economic and cultural fields. Even in June 1963, Indonesian Trade Minister, Suharto (then accompanying the President) had expressed his keen desire to promote and expand the volume of bilateral trade. There was a common awareness on both sides that the trade agreement signed as early as 1953 had not been implemented to the satisfaction of both parties. No effort had been made all this while to establish some permanent organization which could facilitate a regular flow of bilateral trade. Even as late as 1963-64, the trade between the two countries did not show encouraging prospects. During this year Indonesia's exports to Pakistan were of the order of just over Rupees (Pakistani) 1.5 million, whereas imports from Pakistan amounted to Rupees (Pakistani) 6.2 million.

In view of the desire (on both sides) to strengthen cooperation in the trade and cultural fields, it was found necessary to do something concrete. Only in July 1964 the two countries had concluded a Trade Agreement. Sukarno's visit in September this year had provided an excellent opportunity to probe further possibilities in this direction. Those accompanying the President included Suharto, Minister for National Development Planning and

100. Pakistan Times, 9 March 1965.
Jusuf Muda Dalam, Minister for Central Bank Affairs. A serious attempt was made to arrive at a modus operandi in this field. The Joint Communiqué expressed the two Presidents' feeling "that there should be wider collaboration between the two countries in the economic and cultural fields". There was mutual agreement on pursuing "vigorously the task of establishing close co-operation" in these fields "along the pattern set by the Regional Co-operation for Development (ECD) between Pakistan, Iran and Turkey...."

Another important stage in the field of trade and economic relations was reached about a month and a half after President threatened to Sukarno had/take Indonesia out of the United Nations on 31 December 1964. A few days after his visit to Burma, People's Republic of China and Thailand, the Indonesian Foreign Minister paid a three-day official visit to Pakistan from 16 to 19 February 1965. It paved the way for intensive round of talks for trade and economic collaboration between the two countries. In a snap interview at the Chaklala (West Pakistan) Airport on 18 February 1965, he expressed his satisfaction with the progress achieved in his talks with Pakistan Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and said that concrete basis had been laid for co-operation in economic and commercial sphere between Indonesia and Pakistan. "We are determined to build up our economic relations", said Subandrio in Rawalpindi after a meeting with President Ayub Khan on 19 February 1965, and hinted that a basic foundation had been laid in this field. It was also agreed to exchange trade and economic delegations in order to probe various possibilities and avenues for

strengthening links between the two countries.

In pursuance of talks during President Sukarno's visit in September 1964 and during Subandrio's visit in February 1965, an Indonesian delegation led by Hadji Mohammad Hassan, Minister for Budgetary Affairs arrived in Pakistan on 27 February 1965. This led to the first in a series of three conferences on Economic and Cultural Co-operation held subsequently between the two countries. The Conference ended on 8 March 1965 and resulted in "agreement for cooperation in the field of trade, joint ventures, shipping, air-transportation, film, cultural cooperation, technical assistance and between news media". One major result had been the signing of a Trade Protocol in Lahore on 8 March 1965. It envisaged for the 1965 calendar year Pakistan's exports to Indonesia worth Rupees (Pakistani) 50 million and imports therefrom worth Rupees (Pakistani) 25 million. In view of the 1963-64 figures of Rupees (Pakistani) 7.7 million of total bilateral trade, the figure of Rupees (Pakistani) 75 million as envisaged in the Trade Protocol, a little less than ten times that of 1963-64, could be considered massive. Moreover, the provisions of the Trade Protocol were in addition to the credit of US $10 million which Pakistan had afforded to Indonesia on 11 January 1965. The Pakistan Ambassador in Djakarta, M.A. Hussein, described it as marking a "New Era" in the two countries' "co-operation".

104. Ibid., 2 March 1965. See also Dawn, 6 April 1965. Hadji Mohammad Hassan was Indonesian Minister for Revenue, Expenditure and Supervision.


106. Ibid. and Indonesian Herald, 12 March 1965.


News editorially described it as "another milestone in the cordial relations that bind the two fraternal Asian countries". In a characteristic anti-India style, it wrote that "at a time when ... arms supplied by Big Powers have emboldened the Indian imperialists to deny the inalienable human right of self-determination to the people of Kashmir, the agreement signed between Indonesia and Pakistan serves as a beaconlight to the Afro-Asian nations."

The second Indonesian-Pakistani Conference on Economic and Cultural Co-operation took place in Indonesia from 25 May - 2 June 1965. A five-man Pakistani delegation headed by Akbar Adil, Economic Adviser in the Planning Division of the President's Secretariat, attended the Conference. The Indonesian delegation was led by Umarjadi, the Trade Minister. It reviewed the progress achieved during the first Conference held in Pakistan in March 1965 and reached certain conclusion which were later submitted in final shape to another Conference held in Indonesia in August 1965. These Conferences ultimately led to an announcement on 19 August 1965, of the formation of Indonesia-Pakistan Economic and Cultural Cooperation Organization (IPECC) on the pattern of Regional Co-operation and Development (RCD) already existing between Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. The successful evolution of the IPECC represented fulfilment of Sukarno-Ayub Declaration for mutual co-operation and collaboration in...


On this date, in Djakarta, the two countries signed the Indonesian-Pakistan Economic and Cultural Co-operation Agreement. It included three documents: (1) the Joint Declaration; (2) the Agreement of Co-operation in Ocean Shipping; and (3) the Agreement on Technical Co-operation.
economic and cultural matters, issued in September 1964. The Indonesian press hailed it as "A Milestone in Even Closer Relations Between Two Countries". In the sense that it enabled Pakistan to open up newer channels of communication in order to keep the friendship going should it sustain some shocks in future, it was a major achievement of Pakistan's diplomacy. To that extent, India which had failed in establishing regular channels in these fields, was in a disadvantageous position. The IPECC clearly showed how assiduously pursuing its policies towards Indonesia and her leadership, Pakistan had by August 1965 succeeded in virtually eliminating India as a contender for Indonesian friendship. Terming the IPECC as an expected rival to Colombo Plan, a leftist English daily from New Delhi even suggested that an axis between Indonesia and Pakistan was in the offing. To the extent Pakistan had been successful in institutionalising bilateral cultural and trade relations with Indonesia, it should be considered a significant achievement for her. It is cooperation in these fields that bear direct and visible results which constitute the tangible basis for continuing friendship between the two countries.

**Developments in Political Field**

In the meantime Indonesian-Pakistani relations, in the field of politics and diplomacy, continued to grow apace. President Sukarno's visit to Pakistan in September 1964, had laid firm basis of relations between the two countries. Political implications of this visit, as far as India is concerned, have already been surveyed at some length. If Indonesia had confirmed its pro-Pakistan attitude


113. *Patriot* (Delhi), 22 August 1965.
on Kashmir dispute, Pakistan had come out increasingly in favour of the Afro-Asian solidarity and their struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Since the Preparatory Meeting in Djakarta in April 1964, the two countries, in conjunction with China, had been jointly conducting their diplomatic activity for the early convening of the second Asian-African Conference. By fully supporting Sukarno’s concept of "NEFCO" versus "OLDEFCO" and at the same time focusing Indonesian attention on India’s attitude towards anti-colonialism, Pakistan leaders and press were, on the one hand, projecting their own image as revolutionary Afro-Asian anti-imperialists, and, on the other, slighting India’s image. The extent to which Pakistan succeeded in these efforts can be seen from excerpts from a front-page article "The Year 1964 in Review" as it appeared in the Indonesian Herald. It read:

An interesting phenomenon of 1964 is illustrated by the irony of Pakistan and India. The former, formally a "pro-West" country, had come out in practice to oppose certain manifestations of Western policy in Asia and Africa. India, traditionally a "neutral" country had come out in practice in support of and to identify herself with certain manifestations of Western policy in Asia and Africa. While Pakistan had shown signs of de-aligning herself with neocolonial powers, India had shown increasing indications of neo-alignement.

As such India stands alone in Africa as well as in Asia as a country which had moved closer to West while the rest had been charting a more independent course.

This drift of India from the historic stream of Africa and Asia cannot but have unfavourable effects on unity and solidarity of Afro-Asian world. 114

That Dawn gave full coverage to it under the caption "India now toeing neo-colonialist line, says 'Jakarta daily'", showed clearly on what grounds Pakistani press sought to enhance Pakistan’s prestige.

114. Indonesian Herald, 30 December 1964.
among the Indonesians at the expense of India.

The year 1965 provided newer opportunities to the two countries to consolidate their political relationships. Subandrio's official three-day visit to Pakistan in February 1965, (a month and a half after President Sukarno decreed Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations on 31 December 1964), proved valuable in strengthening economic ties. On the political level, the Indonesian Foreign Minister felt reassured to say on 19 February 1965 "that Pakistan and Indonesia are one", and that he would be most pleased "to continue to work for the strengthening of the solidarity of both the countries". In an interview with the press at the Chaklala airport a day earlier, Subandrio had declared that a complete agreement had been reached with the Pakistan Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto, on political issues confronting the world and the region.

The Pakistan press as usual gave wide coverage to anti-India articles and comments that appeared in the Indonesian press during Subandrio's visit to Pakistan. One such instance is provided by the Pakistan Times having published an editorial from the Indonesian Herald. According to this editorial, from a "Brahman of the Afro-Asian world", and a champion of "the cause of the Afro-Asian continents in the fight against imperialism", India had "become the outstanding apologist and collaborator for Nocolim domination over these very countries". From a nation of self-respect in the early years of freedom, she had "become a nation isolated and pitied".

118. Ibid.; 18 February 1965 and Indonesian Herald, 10 February 1965. See also Chapter on India, Indonesia and the Second Afro-Asian Conference, pp. 309-10.
This clearly showed that Indonesia's image of India had undergone a serious transformation.

That India's image was fast falling in the eyes of Indonesian official and press circles, was a source of satisfaction to Pakistan. That Pakistan's ties with Indonesia were being further consolidated at all levels was a matter of jubilation in Rawalpindi. But the type and basis of support which Pakistan was getting from within Indonesia was different from what she fervently desired. From the very beginning Pakistan had entertained hopes of an Islamic front against India. But Sukarno's secular tendencies had thwarted all such earlier Pakistani efforts as far as Indonesia was concerned. Even now the major cementing bond between the two countries was not so much Islam as it was the idea of Afro-Asian solidarity, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. It was only by demonstrating its readiness to loosen its ties with the West and the United States, that Pakistan had attracted the flow of sympathy and support from Indonesia. India lost its earlier image in Indonesia not because it was a Hindu majority state, as Pakistan painted it, but because, in the Indonesians' eyes, it had lost its earlier enthusiasm against western colonialism and imperialism and had become dependent on them for economic and military aid.

All along the period under review, Pakistan had never lost sight of this ultimate objective of bringing Indonesia in line with its own way of thinking. A reference has already been made (elsewhere in this chapter) to the efforts made by Pakistani leaders and press in June 1963 to extol President Sukarno as the leader of the Muslim world, arrayed with Pakistan against the forces of "brown imperialism" (viz. Hindu imperialism). Never an opportunity had

119. See p. 442 of this Chapter.
been let slip which showed Indian Government discriminating against its Muslim minority. Reports about communal riots within India were exaggerated to demonstrate to Indonesian leaders the "hypocrisy" of Indian secularism.

The week-long thirty-three nation Afro-Asian Islamic Conference in Bandung in the first half of March 1965, provided a valuable opportunity to Pakistan to carry on its anti-India campaign on these lines. Speaking in a plenary session, the leader of the Pakistan delegation, Professor Hamid Ahmad Khan, made serious attacks on Indian secularism. The two major themes of his speech were communal riots in India and the issue of Kashmir. The Pakistani delegate came out with a paper on Muslim minority in India which was a serious critique of the Indian Government for its failure to protect Muslim rights, property and even their lives.

The Pakistani press also played a vital role in making Islam as the basis of Indonesian-Pakistani relations. In a clever bid to render Islam synonymous with anti-colonialism, Dawn came out with an editorial "Islam and Colonialism". It held that Islam had become a "unifying force" for eradication of last vestiges of colonialism in Asia and Africa. In other words, only those who professed Islam as their faith were champions of colonialism and imperialism, and those who did not, were ipso facto in the colonialist and imperialist camp. In this sense it was a subtle Pakistani press attempt to pin-point the enemy viz. India which, according to it, abetted colonialism by standing in the way of Afro-Asian solidarity.

120. Pakistan Times, 9 March 1965.
122. Ibid., 8 March 1965.
It was a calculated move to give religious colour to Sukarno's concept of "NEFOS" versus "OLEDOS".

It is difficult to say with certainty what impact this Pakistani move had on President Sukarno. The fact that the Indonesian President himself inaugurated the Islamic meet, should not, however, be ignored. In his opening address, Sukarno had exhorted the gathering, in the name of Islam, to seek freedom from "neocolonialism". He had said: "Let us make our countries free from imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism because they have oppressed and suppressed Islam; they have put Islam in chains. Break, break this chains (sic) so that Islam can prosper and blossom in our countries." It might be interpreted to mean that Sukarno was equating Islam with freedom from colonialism. In fact, the plenary session of the Conference later commended President Sukarno as "the champion of Islam and Freedom".

However, one thing was certain. His secular bent of mind could have little truck with religious bigotry. India was out of his favour on other than religious grounds. It was Pakistan's growing advocacy of Afro-Asian solidarity and anti-imperialism that was making it more amenable for Sukarno's favours.

But there were other Indonesian leaders who received definite impact of Pakistani propaganda. Subandrio was prominent among them. While speaking at a reception he gave for the delegates of participating countries in Bandung on 6 March 1965, the Indonesian Foreign Minister declared that Islam "should be made the tool of human revolution". Besides, in spite of protests from the participating

123. Indonesian Herald, 8-9 March 1965.
124. Ibid., 12 March 1965.
Indian delegate, that Pakistani leader's speech was tantamount to interference in India's internal affairs, the Pakistani delegate was permitted to continue with his attacks on India's secularism. It showed that the principle of Islam as basis of Indonesian-Pakistani relations was working itself out as a near reality.

An outstanding result favourable to Pakistan was the Conference call to the world Islamic community to present a united front against aggression committed against any one of them by a non-Muslim state and to give all possible assistance to the victim of such an aggression. Pakistan thus succeeded in enlisting Indonesian support against India, which fitted the Pakistani definition of a non-Muslim state.

In the Tenth Anniversary (Dasa Warsa) Celebrations of the First Bandung Conference on 18-19 April 1965, Pakistan joined as a full-fledged "NEFQS" state. Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who led the Pakistan delegation, was reported as having had "the warmest hug from Foreign Minister Subandrio". This was in marked contrast to the treatment meted out to India's Food Minister, C. Subramaniam, who led the Indian delegation to the "Dasa Warsa" Celebrations. The unceremonious way in which the Indian Flag disappeared from the Flag Parade and the cool manner in which the Indian delegation was treated, demonstrated how far part the two countries had travelled since the signing of the Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Unalterable Friendship in March 1951. By demonstrating

128. Sunday Standard (Delhi), 18 April 1965.
129. For reference to Indonesia's Treaty of Friendship with India and Pakistan, see n. 11, pp. 416-17 of this Chapter.
its full acquiescence to and ready support for the concept of "NEFOS" versus "OLDEFO" and Afro-Asian solidarity, Pakistan succeeded in gaining Indonesia's recognition as a member of the "NEFOS" group. By contrast India appeared to have fallen from Sukarno's grace for not lining up with him.

During the Tenth Anniversary Celebrations, Pakistan pursued a two-pronged but mutually complementary policy. Whereas the official circles, for fear that they might lag behind Djakarta's (and Peking's) revolutionary fervour, continued to project their image as a revolutionary New Emerging Force working in full consonance with her partners, its press came out with still bitter attacks on India's secular image. In his speech, on 18 April 1965, Bhutto, still technically speaking, the Foreign Minister of a country allied militarily or otherwise with Western colonial and imperialist powers, declared:

"It has become our historic mission to put an end to imperialism and colonialism in every part of the world. It is our inescapable duty to God and man to clear away systems of domination and exploitation which have brought untold sorrows to mankind.

As we prepare ourselves for the second world Congress of Africa and Asian peoples, let us invoke the spirit of Bandung which builds the world anew."

130. The Pakistani Foreign Minister paid full tributes to President Sukarno as "an originator of the movement for African-Asian solidarity".

As for press circles, Dawn came out with an editorial captioned "The Bandung Spirit". Stressing Pakistan's "complete identification with the spirit which Bandung generated", it


131. Ibid.
highlighted the constant threat posed to smaller neighbours "by Indian expansionism". "One development which is highly disruptive of Afro-Asian solidarity is the emergence of Indian chauvinism and neo-colonialism, which is receiving direct encouragement from certain Western powers", it added. In a bid to slight India, Dawn, in its issue of 19 April, splashed a news item about the charges made by the Indonesian Minister - Co-ordinator, Ruslan Abdulgani, in an article circulated by the official Indonesian News Agency Antara. The charges referred to Prime Minister Nehru's attempts at Bogor Conference in December 1954 to smuggle Israel into the main Afro-Asian Conference and to the fact that both Indonesian and Pakistani Premiers had foiled them. Another news item that received prominence in the Pakistani press was India's disinclination to send its External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh, to participate in the Tenth Anniversary Celebrations. Pakistan Times interpreted it as an insult to President Sukarno, and as India's vanishing interest in Afro-Asian solidarity. Still another piece of news which received about a quarter-column coverage in the Dawn was a reported despatch by the Sunday Standard (Express News Service) special correspondent. The Dawn quoted the correspondent to comment about "New cracks in Indonesia's relations with India". As regards President Sukarno, it quoted him to write that "not even once in his long speech did he mention India". The Indian Express

132. Ibid., 18 April 1965.
133. Ruslan Abdulgani was the Secretary-General of the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung in April 1955.
136. Dawn, 19 April 1965. The reason for Indian correspondent's comments lay in Indian Envoy's refusal to take part in the joint dinner on 25 April 1965 at the Hague, in connection with the Celebrations.
special correspondent was reported by Pakistan Times to have described Sukarno as "a pleasure-loving playboy" and lamented: "Today India is forgotten; Nehru is forgotten; Nehru's name is being defaced from the Bandung papers and instead efforts are being made to inscribe those of Mr. Chou and President Ayub".

During the following months bilateral relations in all fields continued to grow apace, with Pakistan zealously matching its verbal support for the second Afro-Asian Conference with active political and diplomatic collaboration. The Preparatory Conference in Jakarta in April 1964 had fixed the second Afro-Asian summit Conference to meet in Africa on 10 March 1965. The choice of venue had been left to the Organization of African Unity, which later suggested Government of Algeria as the host. To permit completion of arrangements, the Conference was postponed from 10 March to 29 June 1965 with the Foreign Ministers' meeting preceding it on 24 June 1965.

To India's growing embarrassment, Jakarta, Peking and Rawalpindi had been jointly carrying on a vilification campaign against India's attitude on invitations to Malaysia and the Soviet Union. Although Pakistan desired that Malaysia should participate, it did not propose to displease his two partners on this issue.

In fact, India's insistence on seeking Malaysia's inclusion in the second Afro-Asian Conference was a source of continuing embarrassment to Pakistan. It had created a dilemma for Pakistan's

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137. Pakistan Times, 20 April 1965.


139. Speaking to newsmen in Singapore on 16 April 1965, Foreign Minister Bhutto said: "Malaysia, like Pakistan, is a member of the (British) Commonwealth, and both are the independent states. I don't see why Malaysia should be excluded." See Dawn, 18 April 1965.
foreign policy as regards its relations with Indonesia and Malaysia. By supporting India's proposal, Pakistan would be annoying the Indonesian leadership, something quite opposed to its (Pakistan's) policy of alienating Indonesia from India. On the contrary, by rejecting the Indian proposal, Pakistan would be alienating the leadership of Malaysia.

Pakistan's dilemma did not end with the Preparatory Meeting in Djakarta in April 1964, where Foreign Minister Bhutto managed to save face by adopting some kind of a neutral posture on the issue. In all the meetings of the Standing Committee of Ambassadors of the fifteen Afro-Asian countries, held between April 1964 and June 1965, Pakistan had to face the difficulty of a choice between Indonesia and Malaysia. A typical instance of Pakistan's predicament was provided by the Standing Committee meeting on 29 March 1965. According to official circles in New Delhi, Pakistan's attitude on the question of Malaysia's participation was, at best, ambivalent.

Pakistan, in fact, wanted to avoid irritations to both Indonesia and Malaysia. For this, Pakistan adopted a neutral posture on the issue. The measure of success Pakistan thus achieved in maintaining friendly relations with Indonesia, could be seen from the views of the Indonesian Deputy Foreign Minister, Ganis Harsono, as reported by B.K. Tiwari of the Indian Express. Ganis Harsono

140. See this Chapter, pp. 447-8.

141. Pakistan was one of the fifteen members of the Standing Committee instituted by the Preparatory Meeting in April 1964 to resolve the deadlock on the question of participation by Malaysia and the Soviet Union. There were in all eleven meetings of the Standing Committee between April 1964 and June 1965.

142. Personal information.
charged India with "hurriedly and prematurely" throwing her "weight" and advised her to follow Pakistan, which, according to him, had adopted a neutral posture on the Malaysia issue.

As regards the second Afro-Asian Conference and in the face of the three countries' collaboration, there were apprehensions in India that at the Algiers Conference on 29 June 1965, the three powers might try to create embarrassing situation for her in connection with her disputes with Pakistan and China. So, the Indian Government desired that the Summit Conference be postponed until such time as, by its diplomatic effort or otherwise, it succeeded to some extent, in neutralising the combined hostility of Indonesia, China and Pakistan. The coup in Algeria on 19 June 1965, just five days before the Foreign Ministers' meeting was scheduled to take place in Algiers, made India's task easier. India took advantage of the political uncertainties and physical fears arising from the political disturbances in Algiers. On 21 June 1965, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri joined twelve other Heads of State or Government of the Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth in London, in issuing an appeal for postponement of "the Afro-Asian Conference for the present". In Algiers, India's official delegation, including C.S. Jha, Secretary to the Ministry of External Affairs, and four members of the Indian Parliament, also made every effort to mobilise

143. *Indian Express* (Delhi), 23 April 1965.

144. *Indonesian Herald*, 21 June 1965. In a successful coup bid in Algiers, Colonel H. Boumedienne overthrew the government of President Ben Bella and emerged as the leader of the new Algerian Government.

145. *India, Foreign Affairs Record (Ministry of External Affairs)*, vol. 11, no. 9, September 1965, p. 260. Nine of the signatories to the appeal belonged to Africa and four to Asia. Those from Asia included President Ayub Khan of Pakistan.
the Afro-Asian opinion in favour of postponement. Having thus made sure of support from various Asian and African countries, the Indian delegation decided to sponsor a resolution in the Foreign Ministers' meeting, rescheduled for 26 June 1965, asking for postponement of the Summit Conference as well as the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

Pakistan took full advantage of it. President Ayub Khan made unsuccessful efforts to see that the appeal for postponement was reversed. However, finding a substantial majority of the Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth favouring India's plea for postponement, he also signed the appeal. Later, on reaching Algiers back from London on 26 June 1965, Foreign Minister Bhutto agreed with the decision of the 15-nation Standing Committee, to postpone the Conference to 5 November 1965. On 26 June 1965, President Ayub Khan made a brief three-hour halt at Cairo, on way back home from London, and exchanged views with President Nasser, President Sukarno and Prime Minister Chou En-lai (the latter two being already there in Cairo). The discussions obviously concerned the prospects of the

146. Ibid. Delegations from Ceylon, Japan, Laos and Thailand agreed to co-sponsor the resolution on postponement.


148. Indonesian Herald, 29 June 1965. On 26 June 1965, in the face of a substantial opinion in favour of postponement, to the building of which India had made a significant contribution, the Standing Committee had already unanimously decided to postpone the Summit Conference to 5 November 1965 and the Foreign Ministers' meeting to 28 October 1965.

Representatives of Indonesia, China and the UAR had not joined this meeting. The Ethiopian delegate had sponsored the postponement resolution and the Pakistani delegate had co-sponsored it. See Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 11, no. 9, September 1965, p. 260.

149. Indonesian Herald, 30 June 1965. President Ayub Khan made a brief halt at Cairo on a special request from Presidents Nasser and Sukarno.
second Afro-Asian Conference. Presumably, the President of Pakistan gave an account of India's efforts in London in mobilising Afro-Asian opinion in favour of postponing the Algiers Conference and thereby influencing President Sukarno against India and its leadership. He also might have attempted to justify his signing the appeal for postponement in view of a substantial majority of Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth favouring this move. A couple of days later, Foreign Minister Bhutto joined the discussions in Cairo as a special representative of President Ayub Khan. Pakistan also joined Indonesia, China and the UAR, in issuing a Joint Communique in Cairo on 30 June 1965, confirming the decision for postponement.150

In the meantime, there had been strong anti-India demonstrations and stoning of the Indian Embassy in Djakarta on 23 June 1965. The accumulated mass anger whipped up by the Pakistani (and the Chinese) propaganda, and official and press statements in Djakarta, had burst out into the open for the second time in three years. Those who had led this mass anger represented pro-Pakistani elements in the Nahdatul Ulama Party and the pro-Peking PKI dominating the National Front.

Clearly, far from being a friend, India had, by the middle of 1965, become a subject of active Indonesian hostility. This had corresponded to the growing degree of goodwill Pakistan had succeeded in evoking for itself in the eyes of the Indonesian leaders. In an article, contributed to Pakistan Horizon, the Indonesian Ambassador to Pakistan, Brigadier-General Roekmito Hendraningrat, wrote "that the people of Pakistan have an amount of goodwill and affectionate feelings for their brethren in Indonesia

such as would be hard to find in the relations of any other two countries." Referring to the bases of friendship, the Indonesian Ambassador wrote: "Pakistan being a prominent member of the NEFO is fortunately very close to Indonesia." Apart from the indestructible ties of Islam, our political, economic and cultural interests also seem to be complementary," he added. Describing the reason why Indonesia supported Pakistan on Kashmir dispute, Roekmito Hendraningrat observed: "As Indonesia was firmly supported by Pakistan in its just struggle to regain West Irian, I am happy to say that Indonesia too has come forward to support the right of self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, as it has always supported freedom movements elsewhere in Asia and Africa." In the light of growing economic collaboration, the Indonesian Ambassador visualised "further cementing of our ties...."

Indonesia and the Indo-Pakistan Conflict

Within three months of the developments in Algiers in June 1965, Pakistan, with support from Djakarta and Peking fully assured, decided to revise the status quo in Kashmir by force. By the first week of September 1965, massive infiltration by thousands of the so-called Pakistani "Mujahids" into the Indian part of Kashmir territory led to counter-measures by Indian security forces and consequent war between India and Pakistan. The major flare-up ensued when, on 6 September 1965, Lal Bahadur Shastri's Government decided to launch a diversionary counter-offensive at the points of its own choosing in order to checkmate the Pakistani aggressive threat to the territorial integrity of the Indian Union.


152. Ibid., p. 142.
The fact that one partner was found involved in a military confrontation with the common enemy, India, the other two, viz., China and Indonesia, came out in open sympathy and support for Pakistan's cause. China's 72-hour ultimatum to India with a threat to open a new front in the north and Indonesia's readiness to offer moral and military support to Pakistan, confirmed India's worst fears that the three had formed an anti-India combination. Indonesian Government, press and public opinion refused to see the justification of India's cause and did not mince words in branding India as an aggressor. "Especially now, the sympathy and prayer of the Indonesian people are dedicated to the people in Pakistan who are now fighting fiercely to maintain the sovereignty and freedom of their country and people," the Indonesian President was quoted as having told the reporters on 7 September 1965. In the capacity of Chairman, President Sukarno called, on the same day, a special session of KOTI (Supreme Operational Command) to discuss what kind of help Indonesia will send Pakistan. Clearly, in Sukarno's eyes, India was the aggressor and Pakistan, a victim of its aggression. Sukarno's anti-India statement was fully supported by Arudji Kartawinata, Chairman of the Indonesian Parliament (DPR-GR). In a meeting with the Chinese Ambassador in Djakarta, Yao Tjung-ming, on 7 September 1965, Chairman Aidit of the Indonesian Communist Party shared the Chinese view that the just struggle of the people of Kashmir and Pakistan against India's aggression must be supported in the greatest possible manner, because this aggression was in conflict with the

154. Ibid. See also editorial in Times of India, 13 September 1965.
155. The Statesman, 10 September 1965. See also Indonesian Herald, 10 September 1965.
Bandung Spirit. All these official statements in Indonesia were in complete accord with the Indonesian Ambassador, Roekmito Hendraningrat's statement in Dacca on 1 August 1965. Speaking on the occasion of the inauguration of the Indonesian Consulate, the Indonesian Ambassador had then said: "The Indonesian Government and the 105 million Indonesian people are giving you full political and moral support without any reservation." Identifying "Islamic religion and Afro-Asian solidarity" as "common" and "solid foundations" of Indonesian-Pakistani relations, Roekmito Hendraningrat had asserted that "no power or force on earth can disturb our close relations". The present outflow of sympathy for Pakistan was thus an active expression of Indonesia's friendly feelings towards it.

Press Reactions in Indonesia

The Indonesian press came out with open and severe condemnation of India, which, according to it, had committed aggression against Pakistan. The Indonesian Communist Party daily, Harian Rakjat, in a cartoon, depicted a skeleton-like India, wearing a "$" marked jacket and "$" marked trousers, fighting against the robust people of Kashmir. In an editorial, this daily charged India with aggression against Kashmir and Pakistan, and wrote that numerous mass demonstrations in favour of Kashmir and Pakistan are evidence of how deep-rooted was the Bandung Spirit in the minds of the Indonesians.

The Indonesian Herald, usually representing Foreign Ministry views,

156. Harian Rakjat, 9 September 1965 and The Statesman, 10 September 1965.
158. Harian Rakjat, 8 September 1965.
159. "Agresi India" ("India's Aggression"), editorial, Harian Rakjat, 9 September 1965.
stated thus: "As the invasion launched by the warlords of India, Shastri and Chavan failed to produce quick and spectacular results, the starving Indian masses who are experiencing famine for last few months, are rising in revolt against their warlords...." It also charged Indian armed forces with committing barbarous actions on the Pakistanis out of "demoralization". "Indian barbarity is mounting in fury", it wrote, "as the Indian Army and Air Force severely mauled, are showing signs of demoralization. The huge loss suffered by the Indian armed forces during the last 12 days' fighting could not be kept hidden from the Indian public and in retaliation the Indian armed forces are indulging in most barbaric methods." In its issue of 15 September 1965, Indonesian Herald endeavoured to boost the morale of Pakistani armed forces and the Air Force in these words: "India brought up the bulk of its armoured forces in an effort to force a decision, but the Pakistani Armed Forces stood like an impregnable wall and dealt a heavy punishment to the enemy columns. The destruction was completed by the Pakistan Air Force when it gave a close support to the ground forces and hit the enemy reinforcements. The Indian infantry divisions which were brought up to support the tank columns in Sialkot sector also retreated in a futile bid to escape fury and the punishment from the Pakistan forces."

In a similar vein, Angkatan Bersenjata, the Armed Forces language daily, in its issue of 9 September 1965, commented: "Pakistan armed forces were able to break through the Indian aggression by launching a counter-attack and destroyed 30 Indian planes within two days. It is noteworthy that though the Pakistan

161. Ibid.
162. Ibid., 15 September 1965.
armed forces are smaller in quantity compared with those of India, yet their spirit is high and they have achieved more victories than the armies of India...."  Djakarta Daily Mail, an English daily, commented in its issue of 11 September 1965: "In the 5th day's war Pakistani forces have not only repulsed Indian attack at the Wagah sector of the Lahore front but have also penetrated into Indian territory and have captured a number of Indian posts." Commenting on the attitude of Afro-Asians, it said: "More and more Afro-Asian countries are expressing their strong condemnation of Indian aggression against Pakistan, and Iran and Turkey are discussing how to give military assistance to Pakistan...."

Bintang Timur, the pro-Communist daily from Djakarta, on 13 September 1965, surpassed all in its unequivocal condemnation of India's "aggression". "Everyone knows", it wrote, "that it is India who is aggressor, it is India who first committed military attack on Pakistan. And for this, India must be condemned, Pakistan must be defended.... Indian aggression has not only been broken off, but military units of this imperialist agent may be attacked far into their own border areas, and even in some places Pakistani troops have already occupied Indian territories even though Indian strength and military equipments are double those of Pakistan, and even though India is using British, U.S. and Soviet arms.""}

When anti-India sentiment was whipped up by what Indonesian leaders and press considered to be India's "aggression" against

165. Ibid.
166. English translation in Beg, n. 163.
Pakistan, it manifested itself in huge anti-India demonstrations, ransacking of the Indian missions, damaging of property and violent activities aimed at the Indian community in Indonesia. On 3 September 1965, about 1,500 members of the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) Party demonstrated at the Indian Embassy in Djakarta and shouted anti-India and pro-Pakistani slogans. The feeling against India took a violent turn following India's diversionary counter-offensive on 6 September. On 9 September, thousands of Indonesians were reported to have forced their way into the Indian Embassy and set fire to archives. The demonstrators overturned and battered the Embassy cars, smashed typewriters, cupboards, tables and chairs and then carried the files into the garden and set them afire. They later roamed the city streets and tried to loot dozens of Indian shops as well. A mob of about seventy members of the youth front also stormed the Indian Information Centre and occupied it. They also pasted on the walls of the Information Centre handbills with slogans reading "Property of the Indonesian Republic" and "Crush India".

The anti-India activities did not remain confined to Djakarta for long. On 13 September, the Indonesian mobs attacked and ransacked the Indian Consulate in Medan (North Sumatra). As revealed by Minister for External Affairs, Swaran Singh, in the Rajya Sabha on 21 September, and by Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Dinesh Singh, in the Lok Sabha on 22 September, the demonstrators hauled down the Indian flag and replaced it with the Indonesian flag. They removed the Indian National Emblem and the name plate and took them away. The rioters also carried away two almirahs of books from the

168. Ibid., 10 September 1965.
In an announcement on 15 September 1965, the Governor of West Java put the Indian property in West Java, outside Djakarta, under the custody of the West Java Administration. There was no information as to the way in which the custody would be applied. The Indian community got highly perturbed. There could be no guarantee against a violent mob working under the direction of the Islamic parties and the pro-China PKI. Besides, in mass rallies, demands were made urging President Sukarno to sever diplomatic ties with India and to boycott all Indian films. The mob fury against India had the clear backing of the Indonesian leaders. It was evident from Sukarno's 7 September 1965 statement to the reporters in which he had expressed satisfaction at the anti-India demonstrations staged the previous day by various youth organisations before the Indian Embassy in Djakarta. Government of Indonesia's reactions to anti-India demonstrations were rather disappointing. Following the sacking of the Indian Embassy on 9 September, Foreign Minister Subandrio announced that his Government would pay compensation for the damages caused. Disclosing, however, that he had received a protest from the Indian Ambassador, Peralta Ratnam, he sarcastically observed that "we get used to receiving protests."

170. Indian Express, 16 September 1965 and The Hindu, 22 September 1965.
Indian Responses

Indonesians' anti-India activities were seen with grave concern in India. The Indian press came out with strong criticism of Indonesia's pro-Pakistani actions. Writing editorially, The Hindu suggested that the "ruling group in Indonesia is now anxious to stir up anti-Indian feeling and show solidarity with Pakistan and Communist China". It referred to the Indonesians' having "swallowed the line of Peking propaganda", under the influence of the PKI and "for turning (their) back on the very countries which worked hard to secure Indonesia independence from Dutch control two decades ago." Warning that India was "not inclined to accept gratuitous insults from Indonesia", it asked the Indonesians to "realise that their international behaviour in the past few months is merely a reflection of the foreign policy attitudes of the Peking regime which are quite irrelevant to the true interests of the independent countries of South Asia." Times of India described India's "strong resentment" at "President Sukarno's action in unleashing the mob against the Indian Embassy" and his Government's other pro-Pakistani actions, as "only natural". It, however, tended to relate President Sukarno's present anti-India posture to domestic political compulsions in Indonesia. It also highlighted the anti-India role played by pro-Pakistani Nahdatul Ulama Party all along the period of study.

There were also voices of serious criticism of Indonesia in the two Houses of the Indian Parliament. If some members in the Rajya Sabha raised the question as to whether Government of India still considered Indonesia as a friendly country, others termed

175. "Provocation", (editorial), Times of India (Delhi), 20 September 1965.
Indonesians' activities as "very provocative and insulting to our honour and dignity". One of the members, S.S. Mariswamy even called Indonesia "ungrateful", considered it "high time" for breaking off "our diplomatic relations" with her so as to win over Malaysia and other South-East Asian countries in order to meet China's threat and asserted: "This is the demand of the entire people of this country." Still another member of the Rajya Sabha, G. Murahari, called for the recall of the Indian Ambassador from Indonesia and went to the length of saying: "... it is shameful on our part to go on tolerating this kind of rowdiness."

Some members of the Lok Sabha also expressed strong indignation at the anti-Indian activities in Indonesia. If one member described these actions as "acts of violence or vandalism of Indonesian crowds", another member wanted to know whether this is a calculated and concerted mischievous action of the Government of Indonesia with the encouragement of Peking and Pindi to provoke us into severing our diplomatic relations" with Indonesia. In view of Indonesian hostility towards India in favour of Pakistan and China, some other members of the Lok Sabha also pleaded for breaking off diplomatic ties with that country.

Despite criticism of Indonesia in the press and parliament and repeated demands for severing diplomatic relations with that country, however, Government of India refused to be hustled into this action. This was fully in keeping with the long-term prospects of relations with Indonesia. Responding to a call attention motion in the Rajya Sabha on 21 September 1965, Swaran Singh made a statement about the events in Indonesia. He was sorry for the fact

176. Rajya Sabha Debates, n. 169, cols 4809-12.

177. Lok Sabha Debates, n. 169, cols 6953-4.
that the "police on duty ... did nothing to prevent the demonstra-
tors." He considered it "clear, beyond doubt, that the Indonesian
Government could not discharge its international obligation of
giving protection to foreign missions stationed in Indonesian
territory." He also did not mince words in agreeing that Indonesia's
actions against Indian diplomatic mission and against Indians and
their property, were certainly not friendly activities. Neverthe-
less, he refused to oblige those demanding severance of diplomatic
relations with Indonesia. He observed: "At the present moment ...
after very careful consideration, I have come to the conclusion that
it will not be in our interest to do so." Swaran Singh also mildly
chided one of the members of the Rajya Sabha for making an unfounded
suggestion that Indonesian Embassy personnel in New Delhi were
"actively doing some espionage work". The following day, that is,
on 22 September 1965, Dinesh Singh expressed his Government's "great
regret" over the anti-India happenings in Medan and Djakarta.
Nevertheless, he found it difficult to say how much Government of
Indonesia was involved in it. He also refused to believe that the
Indonesian people were one with their Government in these anti-India
policies and expressed his conviction that there existed friendly
relations between the Indonesian and the Indian people.

The two outstanding personalities who had been instrumental
in bringing Djakarta and Rawalpindi closer into militant friendship
(as the events in September 1965 showed) were the Foreign Ministers
of the two countries. In full acknowledgement of their services in
this regard, both Z.A. Bhutto and Subandrio, had been, at different

times, conferred with the highest state award by Presidents Sukarno and Ayub Khan. At a special function in Djakarta on 19 April 1965, President Sukarno decorated Pakistan Foreign Minister with the "Order of the Republic of Indonesia". The President praised Bhutto as "a great freedom fighter and a greater worker for Afro-Asian solidarity" and commended him for his "great services" to promote friendship between Indonesia and Pakistan. Bhutto's substantial contribution in strengthening Pakistan's relations with Indonesia was equally matched by one made by Subandrio. In full acknowledgement of his services, the Indonesian Foreign Minister was also awarded the highest Pakistani state award, "Hilal-i-Pakistan", on the occasion of Pakistan's Independence Day on 14 August 1965.

The Indo-Pakistan conflict could, in this light, be considered the high water-mark of Pakistan's relations with Indonesia. It would be interesting to note that Indonesia's attitude did not remain confined only to moral support. Indonesia made an official approach to Ceylon for permission to take military aircraft with personnel from Indonesian Staff College to Pakistan. President Sukarno also sent Chief of the Indonesian Air Force (AURI), Vice-Marshall Omar Dhani, on a secret mission to China in the middle of September 1965. The purpose, as it was revealed later, was to seek spare parts for aeroplanes in order to give tangible support to


182. **The Hindu**, 13 September 1965. Ceylon, however, refused permission to Indonesia to do so.

183. "China's Involvement in Indonesian Coup", (editorial), **Thought** (New Delhi - Weekly), vol. 17, no. 43, 23 October 1965, p. 3.
Pakistan against India. In a despatch from Karachi, The Times correspondent reported that Indonesia had lent Pakistan a flotilla of six Russian-built craft, including two sub-marines. It was considered the "most conspicuous contribution" made by Pakistan's friends to her depleted arsenal after the Indo-Pakistan war had been over. The flotilla consisted of two sub-marines, two missile-carrying boats in size between a frigate and a large motor torpedo boat, and two similar vessels without missiles. The Indonesian flotilla was reported having gone to Pakistani waters on a "goodwill visit" and had "either been lent to the Pakistan Navy or even made over to it". The meeting of the supreme operational Command on 7 September 1965, and the subsequent pro-Pakistani statements by President Sukarno had naturally aroused fears in India about the anticipated naval threat from the Indonesian side. In the absence of any evidence, it is difficult to say exactly how much this threat of aggression from the side of the Bay of Bengal had deflected the Indian strength which had already been diversified to meet the twin threats posed from Pakistan and China. But, on the whole, it must have created an additional element of anxiety in the minds of Indian leaders about security of India's territorial integrity which lay threatened from all sides, West, North, North East and East. Ceylon's refusal to permit facilities to Indonesia for supplying reinforcements to Pakistan, should, in this light, be considered a gesture of goodwill for India.

184. This was disclosed during the trial (by Special Military Tribunal - Lahamilub) of Coup Leader Ex-Air Force Chief, ex-Vic-Marshal, Umar Dhanj, 5 December - 24 December 1966. See Facts & Figures, no. 11/FF/Penlugri Vol. IV/69 (Djakarta, Department of Information, 1969), pp. 15, 1E, and 33.

185. The Times (London), 18 December 1965, p. 5. See also Hindustan Times, 23 December 1965.