Chapter V

CHINA'S ROLE
Early Phase

During the period of study, China proved to be a significant external factor adversely affecting Indian-Indonesian relations. Until 1961, however, it played only a marginal role. In the early years of Indonesian independence, it could be safely attributed to China's severe criticism of Indonesian nationalist leadership.

Following the Kremlin line, the Chinese Communists criticised and even abused the Indonesian leaders in unambiguous terms. As early as October 1948, when they (the Republican leaders) were busy fighting on two fronts against the Dutch on the one hand and the local Communist rebels on the other, a Chinese Communist analyst criticised the "right-wing Hatta Cabinet" for its readiness to secure independence through American co-operation and under the UN auspices. Describing such "Indonesian independence and liberation" as "superfluous", he charged that "the Hatta and Sukarno government has actually sold the Indonesian revolution down the river to Dutch and American imperialism".

Later, another Chinese Communist writer, Sha Ping, termed Sukarno-Hatta leadership as "Compradore bourgeoisie, and even fascist stooges of the Japanese occupation period", and observed: "They have the same outlook as the Nehru's, Jinnah's, Luang Phibun Songgram's, Quirino's, Syngman Rhee's - and that of other feeble-minded bourgeoisie of the East". Sha Ping was also severely critical of Hatta Government's anti-Communist policies pursued since the Madiun Revolt in September 1948. Calling them "the shameless

bourgeoisie of Indonesia", the Chinese analyst charged the Indonesian nationalist leaders with "carrying out the dictates of American imperialism", with adopting policies "in complete opposition to the peoples at home and abroad" and taking the Republic "into the arms of imperialism...".

It also commented adversely on Indonesian leadership's non-revolutionary way in seeking independence through negotiations with the Dutch, held out a model of the Chinese struggle and urged upon the Indonesians to "cast away the bourgeois path of capitulation and defeat and embark on the path of the victory of the people's revolution".

Such a bitter Chinese criticism of the Indonesian leaders was hardly conducive to growth of normal relations between the two countries. It was in sharp contrast to the moral and diplomatic support that, at this stage, India was offering to the Indonesians against the Dutch.

When in January 1949 India decided to convene the Asian Conference in order to support Indonesia's case during the second Dutch action in December 1948, the Communists in China did not view Indian initiative favourably. Probably what piqued them most was India's decision to invite the Kuomintang Government of China which was still in power. Instead of joining their voice in support of Indonesia, the Chinese Communists chose to minimise the significance

2. Sha Ping, "Lessons from Indonesia", China Digest, vol. 5, no. 12, 5 April 1949, p. 5.
3. Ibid., p. 6.
4. India's decision conformed to the rules of international law for the simple reason that the Asian Conference in New Delhi took place in January 1949 and the Chiang Kai-shek Government of China was in power until October 1949 when it collapsed and was replaced by the Communists.
of India's role. The Observer of China Digest criticised India for having "voiced no opposition" to the Anglo-American sponsored resolution regarding Indonesia in the UN Security Council on 23 December 1948. As to composition of the Asian Conference, it was sorry for the fact that it did not include "the Soviet Republic in Asia, and the Republic of Vietnam. The Chinese delegate invited was an agent of the collapsing KMT regime". The Observer criticised the results of the Conference in that it "decided nothing in favour of immediate action to support the Indonesian people, nor to condemn the Dutch ... throughout the (eight-point) programme, no immediate practical step has been proposed. Even as a protest, the resolution is weak and misleading."

Another reason which produced coolness among Indonesian leaders towards the People's Republic of China was the Chinese Communists' foreign policy stance of seeing the world as essentially divided into two ideological blocs, the imperialist and the anti-imperialist. It left no scope for Indonesia's policy of non-alignment or "independent and active" foreign policy. As early as December 1948, Liu Shao-chi, (later Chairman of the People's Republic of China) wrote that the world is divided between American imperialism "and its stooges in the various countries of the world - the reactionaries of the various countries" and the "anti-imperialist camp" including Soviet Russia, China, East European countries and the people's democratic forces all over the world. "Neutrality - standing neither on the one side nor on the other -", he categorically declared, "is impossible". About six months later,


on 1 July 1949, Mao Tse-tung himself made an unequivocal declaration:

... we must lean to one side ... either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road. 7

Although it was this Chinese foreign policy stance which was later reflected in Sukarno's concept of "NEFOS" versus "OLEDFOS", at least, at the early stages of its independence, Indonesian leadership opted for a policy of non-alignment similar, in essence, to that of India.

China's open and serious criticism of the Indonesian leaders continued to colour the attitude of Indonesian elite groups for long. Government of Dr. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo (April 1951 - February 1952) even entertained apprehensions about the growing expansion of Chinese diplomatic establishment in Djakarta and also about their activities in spreading their influence among the overseas Chinese community. On charge of violating diplomatic courtesy, Government refused sixteen out of twenty Chinese diplomatic personnel (assigned for work at various Chinese consulates in Indonesia) permission to enter the country.


Factually, however, the Indonesians suspected these Chinese to be "just propagandists". As reported in the press, this was the third time that China had sent diplomatic and consular representatives to Indonesia without giving prior notice to the Indonesian Government. See Aneta, 26 July 1951.
Situation, however, changed in 1953 when Ali Sastroamidjojo was appointed Prime Minister at the head of a Cabinet supported by the Indonesian Communist Party from outside. For the first time since transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, the Masjumi and the PSI (Socialist Party of Indonesia), the two anti-Communist parties, were out of the Cabinet. Ali Sastroamidjojo Government being "militantly anti-colonial" and eager "to gain for Indonesia a position of leadership within the anti-colonialist movement", chose to discard the "passive" attitude of its predecessors and to pursue a really 'active and independent' foreign policy.

A change in the tone and temper of new leadership in Indonesia coincided with a shift perceptible, about this time, in China's attitude towards the Asian nationalist and neutralist leadership. China halted its earlier attacks on their persons as functionaries of imperialism and showed signs of developing normal relations with the non-Communist Asian States.

This made it easier for ali Sastroamidjojo to take certain measures for normalising relations with China. In November 1953, Indonesian Government signed a first ever trade agreement with China. This was followed by the conclusion of a trade protocol and a payment agreement on 1 September 1954. Commenting on its significance, Sumarno, leader of the Indonesian delegation, said at the signing ceremony: "The signing of the trade protocol and the payment agreement is not only helpful to the economy of the two countries but will have a favourable influence on relations between

10. Feith, n. s, p. 384.
11. Ibid., p. 385.
the Asian countries."

In the political field, Indonesia agreed to the appointment of an Indonesian ambassador in Peking in May 1953. Although China had its ambassador in Djakarta before May 1953, no Indonesian Government before had appointed an Indonesian ambassador in Peking. It reflected, among the Indonesian elite, a new understanding of China's place in the region as well as of their attitude towards it.

The Chinese attitude leading to the Korean War Armistice on 27 July 1953, had convinced Prime Minister Nehru (of India) that the Chinese were genuinely desirous of peace. This conviction of his grew stronger as a result of Chinese attitude at the Geneva Conference on Indo-China in July 1954. When Nehru and Ali Sastroamidjojo met at the Five Prime Ministers' Conference in Colombo in April 1954, they came to share each other's opinion of China. They agreed that the aggressive tendencies which China had shown were due in large part to its exclusion from the community of nations. Both felt that if China could be brought out of isolation imposed upon it by the West, and induced to establish normal relations with the nations in South and South-East Asia, it would reduce tension and promote security and territorial integrity of all the newly free states in the region. They were also hopeful of doing so and, thereby, loosening China's ties with the Soviet Union.

12. Quoted in Ai Lan, "Chinese-Indonesian Friendship", People's China, no. 6, 16 March 1955, p. 8. Herbert Feith in his The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia notes that the total amount of bilateral trade as envisaged in the trade agreement of November 1953 (he mentions it having been concluded in December 1953) was raised from $2 million for the year 1954 to $16.8 million for the year 1955 as per stipulations of trade agreement renewed in August 1954. See p. 389.


Interestingly, however, Ali Sastroamidjojo and Nehru suggested different ways of dealing with the China problem. In May 1954, the Indonesian Prime Minister proposed a non-aggression pact among China, India, Burma and Indonesia in order to counterbalance the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) as sponsored by John Foster Dulles of the United States. But it fell through primarily because of Nehru's aversion to bloc formation. According to Nehru's views, it would lead to heightening of cold war with all its dangerous implications for the "peace area" he had in mind to bring about in South-East Asia. He was rather interested in evolving certain norms of inter-state behaviour, embracing China, which would constitute a certain moral restraint on China's expansionist tendencies towards the countries in its southern periphery. These norms later assumed the shape of "Panchsheel", a five-principle agreement, signed on Nehru's initiative, between India and China. The fact that Indonesia also followed suit and enshrined these five principles in the Joint Statement issued in Djakarta on 28 April 1955, suggested that the Indonesian leadership veered round to Nehru's views on the question.

Ali Sastroamidjojo and Nehru also showed divergence of approach to the question of composition of the Asian and African Conference. When, at the Colombo Conference in April 1954, Ali

15. Feith, n. 8, p. 389.
17. The five principles (Panchsheel) formed part of the preamble to the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet signed on 29 April 1954, in Peking. These principles were, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit.
Sastroamidjojo made the proposal for holding such a Conference, he had in mind only those Asian and African states which were members of the United Nations. This automatically excluded China from the proposed Conference. Later, however, he appeared to have reconciled to Nehru's view that China should also be included in the list of participants in this Conference. During Ali Sastroamidjojo's visit to India in September 1954, Nehru's agreement with him to hold an Asian-African Conference, gave an indication of it. Further evidence of the two leaders' agreement on the question of China's participation in the proposed Conference came in the five Prime Ministers' Conference in Bogor (West Java) in December 1954. The Indonesian Prime Minister, along with his counterparts from Burma, Ceylon and Pakistan, accepted Nehru's proposal to send an invitation to China.

**Indonesian Attitudes Towards China After Bandung Conference**

Indonesia's relations with China got strengthened during and after the Bandung Conference. The question of nationality of the overseas Chinese living in Indonesia, had been one of the factors inhibiting growth of normalcy in the two countries' relations in the past. As early as April 1954, China had expressed its willingness to negotiate with the Southeast Asian countries on this issue. Feeling encouraged, Ali Sastroamidjojo's Government entered into negotiations with the Chinese, which ultimately led to the signing of a Dual Nationality Agreement on 22 April 1955.

20. Ibid.
The Chinese described it as "A Contribution to Peace". They considered it significant because it "helps to promote friendship between the peoples of China and Indonesia and the development of good-neighbourly relations between them".

Obviously, by agreeing to Indonesians' demands on this issue, China made "an unprecedented concession" and thus betrayed its eagerness to give priority to "the development of good-neighbourly relations" with Indonesia over and above the interests of the overseas Chinese in that country. Herbert Feith interpreted it as "an important diplomatic victory" for Ali Sastroamidjojo's Government.

A satisfactory solution of the overseas Chinese problem put the two countries' relations on a different plain. Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of China, overstayed in Indonesia as an official guest of the Government from 25 to 28 April 1955. On Ali Sastroamidjojo's request, he also addressed a largely-attended Chinese meeting in which he exhorted them to "be loyal to the countries they live in" as well as to abide by Government rules.

Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo paid a return visit to China from 26 May to 7 June 1955. The Chinese gave him an enthusiastic welcome. The obvious reasons they gave out for this were China's sense of gratitude for Indonesia's efforts to help


24. Feith, n. 8, p. 390. See also Willmott, n. 22, p. 47. Willmott quotes Keng Po of 26 April 1955 (a Chinese language daily from Djakarta) as having written that the Chinese delegation had "given in" to almost every proposal of the Indonesian delegation.

25. Interview with Ali Sastroamidjojo, Djakarta, 24 September 1969. See also Stanley Karnow, "The Overseas Chinese: They are a powerful force in Southeast Asia, and their loyalties are still divided", Life (Special Issue), vol. 36, no. 2, 27 January 1964, p. 100.
bring about an armistice in Indo-China, Indonesia's opposition to SEATO and Ali Sastroamidjojo Government's successful convening of the Bandung Conference. Inspired by his talks with Chou En-lai, Ali Sastroamidjojo expressed his confidence "that the relationship and co-operation between our two countries will develop in the right direction."

On return home, the Indonesian Prime Minister made a pro-Peking statement in regard to the Taiwan question. He observed that "China's exercise of its sovereignty over Taiwan is purely a matter of internal affair." It demonstrated, if anything, Indonesia's readiness to share China's opinion on American intervention in China's affairs in the framework of the Americans' "Two-China" theory.

Indonesia's support to China on the Taiwan issue was reciprocal to China's concessions on the overseas Chinese question. Subsequently, the two countries found themselves in the process of strengthening mutual goodwill. In 1956, "a record number" of Indonesians visited China to participate in the Celebrations of the anniversary of the founding of People's Republic of China on 1 October 1956. They represented various cultural and other goodwill delegations. President Sukarno also paid a state visit to China during this year.

China took it as a valuable opportunity to play up Indonesian feeling of national identity. Many cinemas in Peking showed a colour film "Indonesia - Land of a Thousand Islands". The Radio of

27. People's China, no. 13, 1 July 1955, p. 12.
28. Ibid.
the Chinese People's Republic broadcast Indonesian folk songs.

Showing a deep understanding of President Sukarno's position as a top Indonesian leader, only a few days before his arrival in Peking, the Chinese Government published a few books like *The Speeches of President Sukarno of Indonesia*, *Paintings from the Collection of Dr. Sukarno*, a selection of Indonesian folk-songs, and *Random Notes on Indonesia*, for sale in bookshops. On his arrival in Peking, the Chinese gave a massive welcome to him. Among those present at the Airport was Mao Tse-tung himself, along with "practically the whole Chinese Government...". It was a singular honour to President Sukarno to ride with Mao Tse-tung in an open car with "hundreds of thousands of Peking citizens (lining) the roads for a length of some thirteen miles. To Sukarno, the Chinese hospitality was far more warm than he had seen in India during his first visit to that country in January 1950.

Complimenting the Government effort to cultivate President Sukarno, the Chinese press gave a prominent coverage to the Indonesian leader's visit. While *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily) considered Sukarno's visit to China as "an event of paramount importance" and highly commended Indonesian foreign policy, *Peking Daily Worker* described the Indonesian President as a "staunch champion against colonialism".

Various statements and speeches made by President Sukarno and the Chinese leaders on different occasions pointed to a fair

30. Ibid., p. 10.
31. Ibid., p. 11.
32. Ibid., p. 8.
degree of similarity in domestic and foreign policy ideals of the two countries. Particularly in the field of foreign policy, leaders of the two countries revealed a close identity of views. Explaining the nature of Indonesian foreign policy, Sukarno said: "We defend all justice ... we are not fence sitters. No, we are vigorous and active. Therefore we call our policy an active and independent one." This was, in a way, his attempt to convince the Chinese that in the framework of Indonesian foreign policy, a "third road" did exist. The degree of Sukarno's success, in this regard, can be gauged from Mao Tse-tung's observation, in the course of his speech at a State banquet in honour of Sukarno on 2 October 1956. While expressing solidarity with the Indonesian struggle against the Dutch, he remarked that Indonesian foreign policy was "greatly beneficial not only to the Indonesian people but also to world peace".

On many an occasion, President Sukarno made attacks on colonialism. He viewed colonialism and imperialism as impediments to world peace and prosperity, visualised its end and said: "And then the entire humanity over the whole of the wide world will live in happiness and prosperity." Sukarno repeated his views on colonialism at a banquet arranged in his honour at Canton on 13 October 1956. In his speech he urged the Asian and African countries to be firmly united to fight against imperialism and colonialism. With a focus

34. Ibid., no. 1387, 10 October 1956, p. 22.

35. Ibid., no. 1384, 5 October 1956, p. 21 and no. 1383, 4 October 1956, p. 22. Citing from the Daily Worker as reported in the New China News Agency (NCNA - Peking) of 30 September 1956, it reported that "Chinese people support the Indonesian Government policy of peace and neutrality".


37. SCMP, no. 1392, 18 October 1956, p. 13.
on colonialism and imperialism, it was one of the forthright statements of Sukarno, indicating the field in which the two countries could co-operate and co-ordinate their efforts.

The Chinese were satisfied to note it. In a statement Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, declared: "This is one point of view which is shared in common by all and which all endorse completely." Specific reference of support to the Indonesian struggle against Dutch colonialism, however, came from Mao Tse-tung himself. In his speech at the State banquet on 2 October 1956, he offered the Chinese people's firm support to the Indonesian people in their struggle "to recover West Irian". He also considered the Indonesians' struggle as "righteous".39

Responding equally warmly, in a speech at a 20,000-strong students gathering on 4 October 1956, Sukarno said: "Your struggle is our struggle and our struggle is yours. The revolution in our two countries has not been completed. You have the Taiwan question and we have the question of West Irian. Let us continue to march forward until the day our ideals are realized."40

Having indicated a similar approach to the domestic and foreign policy issues and founded the bases and field for co-operation, Sukarno and the Chinese leaders made statements expressing sentiments

39. Wang En-yuan, n. 29, p. 11. Mao Tse-tung's offer of support on the West Irian issue was in accordance with China's earlier attitude in this connection. China had been a signatory to the Bandung Conference resolutions which mentioned full support to Indonesian struggle to win back West Irian from the Dutch. Writing in People's China, in May 1955, Ho Cheng, a Chinese writer, stated in unambiguous terms: "West Irian must be restored to Indonesia, Goa to India." See Ho Cheng, "The Great Asian-African Conference", People's China, no. 10, 16 May 1955, p. 4.

40. quoted in Wang En-yuan, n. 29, p. 12.
for ever-lasting friendship between the two countries and peoples. At a banquet, hosted by Chou En-lai, on 4 October 1956, Sukarno declared amidst a strong ovation: "Our friendship is a friendship between two comrades-in-arms. I hope this friendship will last for ever. On the basis of commonly shared goals of "world peace and against colonialism" and of mutual understanding and sympathy, Chou En-lai stated at the banquet: "We should ... forever be friendly toward each other like kinsmen and brothers."

Sukarno's visit to China left deep impressions on his mind and, subsequently, had significant impact on political developments in Indonesia. The gradual decline of democratic institutions, Sukarno's introduction of his concept of "Guided Democracy" in February 1957 and his decree of 5 July 1959, effecting return to the 1945 Constitution, have already been examined. This made him an undisputed leader, endowed with both executive and legislative powers. Another parallel development was the emergence of the PKI as a strong factor in Indonesian politics.

Both these developments were a source of satisfaction to China. Two factors encouraging to China were Sukarno's emphasis on discarding of Communist phobia and on an early implementation of his NASAKOM concept in the domestic politics and his increasingly militant anti-colonial posture in the field of foreign policy. The Chinese might have calculated that it would ensure growing strength and political influence of the PKI on the one hand and increasing commitment to anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism of Sukarno on the other.

41. SCMP, no. 1386, 9 October 1956, p. 31.
42. Ibid.
43. See Chapter on The Background, pp. 65-70.
But this made a demand on China's policy towards Indonesia, namely, to continue to cultivate Sukarno by extolling him as champion of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism in the region as well as in Afro-Asia. Having calculated thus, China was never lacking in acknowledging Sukarno's contribution to the Afro-Asian struggle against Western colonialism and imperialism and in considering him as a champion of freedom and world peace. It extolled the Ten Bandung Principles whenever an occasion arose and joined Indonesia in celebrating the anniversaries of the first Asian-African Conference. It sought to establish contacts at various levels and in various fields by exchange of numerous types of goodwill delegations with Indonesia.

China also continued to give militant moral and diplomatic support to Indonesia on the West Irian issue. Unlike India, China reacted favourably to the anti-Dutch activities in Indonesia, following the failure of the UN General Assembly to pass on 29 November 1957 an Afro-Asian Resolution by a two-thirds majority. Writing under its "China and the World" column, People's China noted that Indonesia's campaign for West Irian had touched "a new height". It carried from the Chinese "utmost sympathy with this just demand" and mentioned about a huge mass rally of students from various countries including India, in Peking, on 20 November 1957, in support of Indonesia's struggle against Dutch colonialism.

China also offered full support to Sukarno's Government during the regional rebellions in 1958-59 and criticised the United

44. The Afro-Asian Resolution had called upon the two Governments of the Netherlands and Indonesia to resume negotiations for resolving the West Irian dispute. For India's reactions to Indonesian developments following negative UN vote on the Afro-Asian Resolution on West Irian, see ibid., p. 77.

45. People's China, no. 24, 16 December 1957, p. 44.
States for actively and materially promoting the cause of the rebels.

This, in a way, helped the PKI in its bid to isolate and discredit the two anti-Communist Indonesian political parties, the Masjumi and the PSI, to remove the stigma of its revolt against the nationalists in September 1948, and to establish its bonafides as a nationalist party. China was also reported to have given some arms aid to the Central Government in Djakarta during this revolt.

Difficulties over the Overseas Chinese Issue and Patching up of Sino-Indonesians Differences

But at a time when the two Governments were in the process of consolidating their mutual relations, an issue of importance to both arose to have considerably adverse effect on them. It related to the overseas Chinese community in Indonesia. Because of widespread opposition to the Dual Nationality Treaty, signed by the two countries in April 1955, the two Governments took over two years and seven months to ratify it.

During these years and in spite of the Treaty, Indonesia carried on its restrictive measures against the Chinese community.

After a Presidential Regulation issued in November 1959, these became still more severe. The Army made widespread arrests of Chinese shopkeepers in West Java, for defying orders requiring them to close down their shops and leave their villages. It led to forcible evictions and even beatings of the Chinese traders, injuries

47. "India's Image in the Eyes of Indonesia" (South-East Asia correspondent), The Hindu, 10 March 1965.
48. Indonesia ratified the Treaty on 7 December 1957 and China did it on 30 December 1957. The two countries took another two years to exchange Instruments of Ratification of the Treaty on 20 January 1960.
49. For an account of the anti-Chinese measures in Indonesia, see Willmott, n. 22, pp. 49-50.
to their person and damage to their property. Consequently, a large number of them left the countryside for the urban areas. Many of them, in panic, even left for China by the Chinese ships sent for this purpose.

The severe anti-Chinese measures in Indonesia, at this stage, could be related to the rough treatment meted out by Foreign Minister Chen Yi to Foreign Minister Subandrio, during the latter's visit to China from 7 to 11 October 1959. On his return from China, Subandrio was reported to have complained that, in Peking, he was "treated like a school boy".

The repression of the Chinese in Indonesia led to hard feelings in China, with Chinese Government and press alleging "unjustified discrimination and persecution" against their "compatriots" in Indonesia and warning the Indonesians about the consequences. Indonesia, however, seemed to be determined to resist the Chinese pressures. In fact, Indonesia was not happy about China's attitude towards the overseas Chinese. It was worried about China expecting the overseas Chinese to work for its interests. Commenting on China's attitude, Subandrio was quoted as having said:

51. The Statesman (Delhi), 15 January 1960. The Presidential Regulation prohibited the Chinese entry into rural areas and, in effect, meant to uproot the Chinese retail traders from there.


53. Ibid., p. 361.


"Frankly speaking, I and many other statesmen in Asia think that this attitude of People's China is a puzzle." He added that if China wanted to settle its claims regarding Indonesia or India by mere force, this could be regarded as outright expansionism. By the middle of January 1960, however, the two countries seemed to be in a reconciliatory mood. It led to exchange of Instruments of Ratification of the Treaty on 20 January 1960 and aroused hopes of normalisation of the Sino-Indonesian relations. But as it turned out, the Ratification failed to ease the situation. In a letter to Chen Yi in the last week of January, Subandrio made a pointed reference to "provocative external pressures and instructions" to the overseas Chinese in Indonesia, thus levelling an indirect charge against China for interference in Indonesia's internal affairs. He refuted Chen Yi's contention of overseas Chinese' contribution to the development and growth of Indonesian economy in these words: "On the strength of concrete evidences (of their anti-Indonesian bonafides), there is no reason whatsoever for the Indonesian people to feel indebted to the overseas Chinese, either in the past or at present". Subandrio also expressed his Government's determination to resolve all matters without in any way prejudicing the principles of mutual respect between the two parties..."

This, in a sense, represented Indonesia's assertion of its sovereign rights in the face of China's attempt at intimidation. It demonstrated to the Chinese the fact that their relations with Indonesia could be based only on "the principles of mutual respect" and non-interference.

In the following months, repressive anti-Chinese measures continued unabated and in July 1960, these caused a lot of diplomatic friction between the two countries. The situation, however, changed by the middle of August 1960. The indication came from the Chinese leaders attending Indonesia's National Day celebrations in Peking on 17 August 1960 and from Sukarno describing the overseas Chinese issue as "a little difficulty" with China.58

At least for the time being, this marked an end to mutual recriminations and put the two countries' relations in the process of normalisation. But the way and the short time in which they had resolved a potentially stormy issue determining their mutual attitudes, indicated a number of implications. It showed, for once, China's tendency, visible since the time of the Asian-African Conference in April 1955, to prefer friendship with the Indonesian leadership to overseas Chinese interests in Indonesia. On Indonesia's part, it was nothing short of a demonstration of its determination to stand up to and resist the Chinese political and economic pressures. Moreover, China could not afford to displease Sukarno who had been insisting on a NASAKOM government at home and a radical anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist policy abroad. It must have calculated that by resisting Indonesians' demands on this issue, it would promote nothing but ill-will among the Indonesian elite and would, as well, jeopardise the chances of the PKI emerging as a dominant political force in the country.

Indonesia, on its part, also showed a degree of urgency in agreeing to resolve the dispute. Obviously, once China had agreed to concede Indonesian demands on the issue and to show full respect

58. MacDougall, n. 52, p. 363.
for Indonesia's sovereign status, there was nothing left for the
Government to press further. President Sukarno, who had praised the
Chinese model, found himself nearer in ideological goals and aims to
China and seen in China agreat bulwark of anti-colonialism and anti-
imperialism, capable of and willing to help achieve Indonesian
foreign policy objectives, also came to prefer a friendly rather than
a hostile China.

Resolution of the overseas Chinese dispute was especially a
matter of satisfaction to the PKI. The consequences arising from
the issue had put it into a serious dilemma. If the Party chose to
support the Government policy, it would lose China's moral and
political support so essential to bolster up its strength and
influence. If it decided to criticise the Government for repressive
actions against the Chinese settlers, it would enable the anti-
Communist Army Leadership and all the parties and groups favouring
the Government's stance on the issue, to discredit the Party. By
linking it with the Chinese and China, the anti-Communist elements
would revive the memory of its Madiun revolt (September 1948) and
cast it in the role of an anti-national party.

Faced with this dilemma, the PKI adopted a cautious policy of
agreeing with the Presidential Decree of November 1959 in principle.
It supported Government policy in general and attacked the way it

59. Government measures against the Chinese received wide support
from the people. All the major political parties except the
PKI gave their complete support to Government's action. See
Vishal Singh, "The Problem of Chinese Traders in Indonesia",
International Studies (New Delhi, ISIS quarterly journal),
vol. 1, no. 4, April 1960, p. 452.

60. For a detailed analysis of the dilemma that the PKI faced at
this stage, see van der Kroef, The Communist Party of
Indonesia: Its History, Programme and Tactics (Vancouver,
Canada, 1965), pp. 117-20. It was, in fact, this alleged
linkage of the PKI with the overseas Chinese and China which,
after the September 1965 coup, led to its virtual elimination
from the political scene of Indonesia.
was being implemented. Selectively, it criticised a minister or
ministers or Army officers for anti-Chinese repressive measures.

By the beginning of 1961, the two countries virtually succeeded
in removing the major point of friction and estrangement between them.
Although both the Governments were aware of the adverse implications
of the issue of the overseas Chinese community in Indonesia, at least
for the present, they decided to patch up their differences and
resume normal relations in all fields of activity.

Especially, China found it necessary to play down the issue.
In his statements and speeches during his visit to Indonesia between
28 March and 2 April 1961, Foreign Minister Chen Yi showed keen
interest in restoring normal relations with Indonesia rather than
paying attention to the overseas Chinese problem. At a "grand"
farewell banquet on 31 March 1961, hosted to over 400 Indonesian
guests, including President Sukarno, Chen Yi observed that the two
countries had reached unanimity of views on important current
international issues. President Sukarno, on his part, said that
his heart was "full of feelings of friendship and gratitude towards
brother Chen Yi, the Chinese people and the Chinese Government".

As regards issues of direct importance to each other, while
Sukarno offered "all-out assistance" on Taiwan question, Chen Yi
gave "firm and unshakable" support for the recovery of West Irian
from the Dutch. The Joint Communique issued on 2 April 1961,
besides reiterating the two sides' "full support" to each other on
these two issues, contained their agreement that they "deemed it
very necessary to convene a second Asian-African Conference in the

61. Ibid., p. 120.
63. Ibid.
shortest time". Foreign Minister Subandrio also expressed his Government's support to China on the question of restoration of her rights in the United Nations.

Chen Yi's visit to Indonesia at this stage was important in that it enabled him to soften the ill-will he had created by overbearing attitude towards Subandrio during the latter's visit to China in October 1959. It also enabled China to perceive that Chinese fundamental interests, viz., "strengthening unity among Asian and African countries", and "defending world peace and opposing imperialism and colonialism", were "identical" to those of Indonesia. With the passage of time, this ideological convergence between China and Indonesia grew closer and led to strengthening of the two countries' relations. President Sukarno's visit to China from 13 June 1961 proved valuable in this context. As in October 1956, Sukarno received a "warm and brilliant" welcome on arrival at the Peking Airport. Over half-a-million Chinese stood all along the route to greet him. To cap it all, Sukarno was accorded the highest grace when Mao Tse-tung himself called on him and had his breakfast with him in a cordial and friendly atmosphere. The Indonesian President was pleased to observe that it was the warmest and grandest welcome he had received during his visit abroad this time.

In his welcome address at the airport, Chairman Liu Shao-qi referred to the Treaty of Friendship concluded by the two countries

64. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
65. Ibid., p. 6.
during Chen Yi's visit to Indonesia and observed that it had "ushered in a new stage in the friendly relations between the two countries".

Responding equally warmly, Sukarno said: "I have come to the People's Republic of China with the militant respect of the Indonesian people. I come to the People's Republic of China in order to strengthen the friendship between Indonesia and China."

The Joint Communiqué issued at the end of Sukarno's visit, contained references of mutual support on issues of direct importance to the two countries, viz., West Irian and the demand for the second Asian-African Conference on the Indonesian side and Formosa and the question of restoration of China's rights in the United Nations on the Chinese side. It also pledged the two countries to collaborate with each other in helping those fighting against imperialism and in the cause of Afro-Asian solidarity. The occasion was also used for the exchange of Instruments of Ratification of the Treaty of Friendship signed by the two countries on 1 April 1961. This also brought into force the Agreement on Cultural Co-operation signed by them on this day.

Not surprisingly, the potentially difficult question of the overseas Chinese community in Indonesia received very little attention during President Sukarno's visit. In the light of China's overall objectives in Asia and Africa and especially in view of the increasing tension on Sino-Indian borders, at this stage, it was quite natural for China to minimise the importance of this issue.

69. SCMP, no. 2519, 19 June 1961, p. 31.
70. Ibid., p. 32.
71. Ibid., no. 2521, 21 June 1961, pp. 31-33.
72. Ibid., p. 32.
The interests of the overseas Chinese as well as those of the PKI also prompted China to maintain reticence on it. President Sukarno, on his part, referred to it as "small disputes" which might occur "between two brothers", and thus endeavoured to satisfy the Chinese on this score.

Anti-India Motivations of China's Attitude Towards Indonesia

China's cordial posture towards Indonesia could be ascribed to a growing realisation in China of its isolation in Asia. China found itself estranged from its three neighbours, Burma, Nepal and India, on the border question, and with three of the important non-aligned states, India, the UAR and Indonesia. Its dogmatic and big-power policies had distorted China's image in Asia and Africa. This forced Peking to undertake a reappraisal of its external relations and modify its policies towards certain countries.

Of all the countries in Asia, China perceived India to be its potential rival. Following the Tibetan rebellion in early 1959, the flight of the Dalai Lama to India and his reception by Indian officials in April 1959, relations between India and China had already been "almost fatally poisoned". By then, for China Indians had changed from votaries of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence" into "expansionists" in league with the "British imperialists". Subsequently, China's claim to large chunks of Indian territory in the eastern and western sectors of its Himalayan borders, led to a bitter boundary dispute between the two countries. The resultant tension on border dispute led in October 1959 to a serious clash between an Indian patrol party and the Chinese "frontier guards". The Chinese soldiers opened fire, killing nine

73. Ibid., no. 2519, 19 June 1961, p. 37.
and capturing ten Indian personnel.

The Sino-Indian border dispute, in due course, assumed the shape of a "vast political confrontation" between the two states. It became the function of the Chinese foreign policy to discredit India and its policy of non-alignment. Prime Minister Nehru, in this connection, became a special target of Chinese attack. China undertook to demolish India's image by highlighting India's failures in the economic field. Nehru's policy of friendship with both the blocs, of receiving economic aid from both, of making gradual progress under a system of mixed economy and a democratic framework, became subject of severe Chinese criticism. The major charge against India was, however, its growing dependence on the United States and other West European countries' aid for economic and industrial development.

In ideological terms, China viewed India's non-alignment as a "myth", because according to her it was weighted in favour of the Western countries. China saw the world divided between colonialists and imperialists on the one side and anti-colonialists and anti-imperialists on the other. In this framework, there was no room for those who adhered to peaceful co-existence between the two Super Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Even the Soviet Union which preferred to seek and open up avenues of peaceful co-existence with the United States became "revisionist" in the eyes of the Chinese. Pursuing a policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence, it was thus inevitable for India to become a subject of severe condemnation by the Chinese.

Looking upon India as "the chief obstacle to its objectives in Asia", China adopted a systematic policy of damaging India's image in Asia and Africa. China sought to portray India and its leadership
as completely reactionary in domestic policies and Indian foreign policy of non-alignment as a "myth".

Besides denigrating India in the eyes of the Afro-Asian and non-aligned states in general, China also attempted to isolate India from its neighbours. It successfully signed with Burma the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression and the Agreement on the Boundary Question in January 1960 and with Nepal a boundary agreement as well as an economic agreement in March 1960. China also changed its posture towards Pakistan and, in view of the latter's abiding hostility towards India entered into a boundary agreement with her on 2 March 1963.

China's overtures towards Indonesia may thus be seen in the background of China's growingly hostile posture towards India. The major Chinese objective, which is easily perceivable from its attitudes on various occasions and towards various issues of conflict between India and Indonesia, was to drive a wedge between India and Indonesia and to isolate India from its friends and neighbours.

**China and the West Irian Issue**

West Irian was the first major issue of Indonesian foreign policy which attracted China's attention. According to its earlier policy, China, on various occasions, offered its full moral support to Indonesia. Important among these were Chen Yi's visit to Indonesia in March-April 1961, Sukarno's visit to China in June 1961, and visit by Kuo Mo-jo, leader of the Chinese National People's Congress delegation, to Indonesia in August 1961.

75. Ibid., pp. 209-11.

Later, when Sukarno issued his "Tri-Command" on 19 December 1961, Chen Yi informed the Indonesian Ambassador in Peking, Sukarni Kartawidjaja, of his Government's firm support to Indonesian people's determination to fight against Dutch colonialism in West Irian. This was followed by a message from Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai to Sukarno on 9 January 1962, offering "all necessary and possible support from the Chinese Government and people".

The Chinese press likewise took up the Indonesian cause on a number of occasions. The major theme it emphasised, however, was the Chinese charge of American collusion with the Dutch in enabling the latter to perpetuate its colonial rule in West Irian.

Later, in August 1962, while commenting on the Indonesian-Dutch Accord on West Irian, People's Daily congratulated the Indonesians on their "important success" in restoring West Irian to their territory. It, however, warned them against any complacency, because it expressed its fears, imperialism might yet create all sorts of difficulties in the way of transfer of West Irian. It also reminded the Indonesians of Chinese constant and resolute support to their struggle against the Dutch.

Although Peking hailed the Netherlands-Indonesian agreement on West Irian on 15 August 1962, it felt uneasy on the prospects of the solution of the West Irian question. It might, China believed, lead to Indonesia disengaging itself from its revolutionary struggle against colonialism and imperialism in general and settling down to

77. Cheng Li-Ta, "Support for Indonesia's Just Struggle", in ibid., no. 52, 29 December 1961, pp. 11-12.
a policy of economic development through aid from the Western countries. Viewing it as a setback to the prospects of a Sino-
Indonesian relations and to PKI's growing political power and influence, it set to emphasise that the struggle for West Irian was not yet over and that it must be continued. In his welcome speech at a "grand banquet" arranged, in Peking on 2 January 1963, in honour of the visiting Indonesian Foreign Minister, Subandrio, Chou En-lai reminded the Indonesians that "the imperialists are not reconciled to abandoning their colonial interests, they are still creating all sorts of pretexts for hanging on in West Irian". "This", he continued, "is another proof that just as it is necessary to wage a struggle in order to negotiate and reach agreement with the imperialists, it is also necessary to wage a struggle in order to compel the imperialists to observe an agreement." This way the Chinese Premier reminded Subandrio that solution of West Irian was not final until it was restored to Indonesia and hence it was necessary to continue the struggle. It also implied a Chinese effort to sell out their idea that struggle against colonialism had no end until those against whom it is waged are totally eliminated, not only from West Irian, but from the region, entire Afro-Asia and the world. It meant committing Indonesia to a perpetual anti-
colonial and anti-imperialist struggle.

China and the Belgrade Conference

Belgrade Conference in September 1961 provided to China a significant opportunity to assess the nature and degree of differences between India and Indonesia. The differences as China perceived were

81. Ibid., vol. 6, no. 1, 4 January 1963, p. 23.
both at ideological and personal level. In the ideological field, in the course of his address to the Non-aligned States' Conference, President Sukarno had elaborated his concept of conflict between the 'New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) and the 'Old Established Forces' (OLEFOS). Identifying the former as forces seeking "independence and justice" and the latter as the ones seeking domination through "imperialism-colonialism", he had categorically declared that between these two "there can be no co-existence...". China viewed it as marking a clear departure from Prime Minister Nehru's view of non-alignment and getting closer to its own interpretation of this policy as "unidirectional - against the West". Sukarno's view of the world in the framework of this concept was found to be congruent to its (China's) own ideological stance of seeing the world as divided in two blocs, the imperialists and the anti-imperialists, with "no third road" existing between them. The Chinese also noted that the underlying theme of the three major goals of the Indonesian Revolution, viz., achievement of complete political freedom through restoration of West Irian to the Republic, establishment of a just and prosperous society, and friendship with all, especially the Asian and African nations, was anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. As it ensured Indonesia's commitment to a policy of opposition to colonialism and imperialism in the region as well as in Asia and Africa, it could become the basis of cooperation and friendship between the two countries. If India persisted in its preference for


non-alignment and peaceful co-existence between the two world blocs headed by the United States and the Soviet Union, she would automatically become the target of Indonesian hostility.

Besides noting ideological divergence between India and Indonesia, China also saw a growing sense of alienation between Prime Minister Nehru and President Sukarno. A significant pointer in this direction was Sukarno declining Nehru's invitation to visit New Delhi on way to Belgrade. The two leaders had also for the first time, expressed their divergent approach to issues of colonialism and world peace, openly in a gathering of heads of state or government of twenty-five non-aligned countries. This showed the extent of conviction with which each held his opinion on these issues. It was natural to increase bad feeling between the two.

Having thus assessed the nature and degree of Indian-Indonesian differences, China geared its press and other propaganda machinery to distort India's and Prime Minister Nehru's image among the Indonesians. Both at ideological and personal level, it endeavoured to cultivate and play up Indonesian leadership against the Indian leadership. Belgrade Conference, in this context, provided to China a valuable occasion to drive a wedge between India and Indonesia. The Chinese press took the line of argument that the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries was some kind of a continuation of the Bandung Conference which "raised high the banner of anti-imperialism-colonialism ... and exerted a tremendous and far-reaching influence on the development of the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America". People's Daily viewed opposition to imperialism and "new and old colonialism" as the keynote of the

84. See Chapter on The Background, p. 60.
Conference. It asserted: "This is the common voice of all peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and also the common will of all people who cherish peace and justice."

Naturally, Nehru, who had refused to share this "common voice" and "common will" and attempted to give less importance to the issue of colonialism and imperialism, was subjected to Chinese criticism. Commenting adversely on Nehru's attitude in this connection, Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily) wrote in an editorial thus: "Somebody at the Conference advanced also this argument: 'The era of classical colonialism is gone and dead', and that anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist and anti-racial discrimination problems were secondary. Such argument is obviously and totally contrary to the facts." "In the face of ... facts", it added, "what purpose can the argument that 'colonialism is dead' serve except to give cover to colonialism and imperialism?" It was as much an attack on Nehru's personal image as on his policy of non-alignment. People's Daily also explained China's attitude towards non-alignment and towards the countries following this policy. China supported non-alignment because adherents of this policy shared with her "common interests in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism" and also its view that only by opposing them they could "uphold national independence and defend world peace".

Criticising Nehru's role at the Belgrade Conference, another

86. The Statesman (Delhi), 11 September 1961.
87. SCMP, no. 2578, 14 September 1961, p. 30. See People's Daily correspondent Peng's notes from Belgrade. The fact that the Chinese correspondent omitted reference to the other half of Nehru's sentence which read: "though it survives and gives a lot of trouble yet", showed a deliberate effort on his part to paint a distorted image of the Indian Prime Minister.
Chinese daily *Ta Kung Pao* editorially wrote: "Anyone who attempts to use the terror of war created by U.S. imperialism to frighten the world's people and compel them to give up their struggle against imperialism and colonialism, will reveal his own true colors as a servant of the imperialist policy of aggression and land himself in isolation."

Side by side with its criticism of India and its leadership, the Chinese press bolstered up Sukarno and, by asserting that "colonialism and imperialism have not passed away...", it fully endorsed his thesis as opposed to that held by Nehru. *Remin Ribao* (People's Daily), writing editorially, gave wide coverage to the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist emphasis by various non-aligned Afro-Asian leaders. However, of all the participants in the Belgrade Conference, it considered Sukarno's speech as "important".

China's efforts, in this connection, did not go unnoticed in India. The Indian press was quick to perceive it. *The Hindu* published a despatch titled "Belgrade Talks: Peking Runs Down Nehru's Role". Describing it as a "tendentious press campaign", it observed that all efforts were being made towards minimising the significance of Nehru's role at the Non-Aligned Conference. *The Hindu* noted New China News Agency (NCNA) taking cue from the Indonesian (and Pakistan) press and flashing reports under the headlines such as "India's manoeuvres rebuked at the non-aligned countries' conference", "Indonesian paper criticises India's attitude in Belgrade", and "Nehru criticized at Belgrade, says a Pakistani paper". The Indian daily also noted NCNA's effort to make out that India's attitude at

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91. Ibid., p. 5.
the Conference had virtually isolated her.

It could be interpreted as a deliberate Chinese effort to highlight Indian-Indonesian differences and simultaneously play up Sukarno and run down Nehru. By eulogising Sukarno's stress on priority for the issue of colonialism and imperialism, China also endeavoured to divide the non-aligned countries into two groups, one supporting Sukarno's view and the other favouring Nehru's approach. It was, if anything, a clear indication of China's intention to play a divisive role in Indian-Indonesian relations. No less was it a reminder to Nehru that the era of "Panch Sheel" and peaceful co-existence was over and had yielded ground to active rivalry and hostility between the two big Asian nations.

China and the "Sondhi Affair"

"Sondhi Affair" during the Fourth Asian Games in Djakarta in September 1962 provided China with another such occasion. China exploited the incident to strengthen Indonesian ill-will towards India. Realising the potentialities of the incident, the Chinese press gave wide publicity to anti-India feelings brewing in Indonesia from Sondhi's statement of 27 August 1962. Prominent in its coverage was Indonesian Minister of Trade, Suharto's reaction against India.

On 4 September 1962, the second day of anti-India demonstrations in Djakarta, the Chinese press highlighted the incident. Besides publishing anti-Sondhi and anti-India statements emanating from Djakarta, it also reported the Pakistani and Ceylonese

92. The Hindu, 9 September 1961.

93. SCMP, no. 2615, 10 September 1962, p. 23. It gives full text of Suharto's statement.
representatives' criticism of Sondhi's attempt to change the name of the Games, linking it with the prestige of Indonesia. Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), came out with three articles critical of India. In its issue of 6 September 1962, People's Daily, editorially called G.D. Sondhi "a US imperialist agent", and criticised him for having "played a particularly inglorious role in aiding and abetting the sabotage activities of US imperialism".

By US sabotage it meant its "two Chinas" theory which, by his insistence on seeking participation by the Taiwanese team, Sondhi was alleged to have endeavoured to serve. In fact, China's full-throated sympathy and support to Indonesia, on "Sondhi Affair" flowed primarily from the latter's successfully keeping the Taiwanese athletes out of the Games. China was satisfied to note that Indonesia had proved its genuine friendship based on commonly-shared ideals of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, and that, by doing so, it had risked adverse world public opinion in its pro-Peking stance. In full acknowledgement of it, People's Daily wrote: "The Chinese people wish to express their great admiration and gratitude to President Sukarno and the Indonesian Government and people for their friendly attitude."

Exhibiting full awareness of Indonesians' sentimental reaction to Sondhi's activities, People's Daily highlighted their allegations

94. Ibid., no. 2816, 11 September 1962, p. 25.
95. Ibid., no. 2820, 18 September 1962, p. 37. The three articles were: (1) "Tens of Thousands of People in Djakarta Demonstrate Before Indian Embassy" (4 September 1962), (2) "Fourth Asian Games Close in Djakarta: Frustrating Acts of Sabotage by US Imperialism and Its Agents" (5 September 1962), and (3) "Indonesian Public Calls for Formation of Afro-Asian Sports Organization" (6 September 1962).
96. Ibid., no. 2817, 12 September 1962, p. 25.
97. Ibid.
against him and observed that he had made "disgraceful efforts to wreck the Asian Games, impair the prestige of Indonesia and that of its leader President Sukarno...". It also mis-interpreted Prime Minister Nehru's statement of 4 September 1962 as pro-Sondhi and hence anti-Indonesian. Referring to Nehru's hint at the possibility of Chinese "hand" in the anti-India developments in Djakarta, it asked: "Is this not itself proof that the Indian Government is openly supporting Sondhi?" By deliberately omitting Nehru's criticism of Sondhi and his words of praise for the Indonesian people's continuing goodwill towards the Indian people, it meant to impress upon the Indonesians that India and its Prime Minister were both anti-Indonesian and less respectful to President Sukarno.

**China and Games of New Emerging Forces (GANEFO)**

"Sondhi Affair" did not end with the close of the Fourth Asian Games. Its consequences provided to China an opportunity to get closer to President Sukarno and the elite group around him and establish rapport at ideological as well as personal level.

The decision of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), on 7 February 1963, to "bar Indonesia from Olympic Games Competition for an indefinite period", led to a hardening of opinion in Indonesia. In a speech on 13 February 1963, President Sukarno reacted to state that Indonesia was "not a cowardly, weak and small nation". He also declared that "so long as we (Indonesia) remain an

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98. Ibid.
100. The period of suspension was to continue until Indonesia apologized not only to G.D. Sondhi but also to Taiwan and Israel. See Eva T. Pauker, "Sports and Politics in Djakarta", *Asian Survey*, vol. 5, no. 4, April 1965, p. 172.
indomitable nation, it will do us no harm to withdraw." Denying the IOC charge of mixing politics with Games, he asserted: "The Asian Games were held in a political framework; otherwise, why should the Chinese People's Republic be barred from participation? The reason was that it was described as a Communist country. Is this not politics?" He gave an order: "Organize as fast as possible GANEFO, the Games of the New Emerging Forces". He also exhorted the people to "create a sports association on the basis of the new emerging forces".

Assessing the strong tone of Indonesia's reaction and its determination to hold GANEFO, China came out with a vocal denunciation of the IOC decision and US "Imperialist Intrigues in Olympic Games", and a categorical moral support to Indonesia. It was in keeping with China's attitude as early as the first week of September 1962.

101. See extracts from President Sukarno's speech at the opening of the Conference of National Front Committees, Djakarta, 13 February 1963, in George Modelski, ed., The New Emerging Forces (Documents on the Ideology of Indonesian Foreign Policy), (Canberra, The Australian National University, 1963), pp. 88-89. This was a signal for Indonesia's withdrawal from the IOC. In fact, Indonesia withdrew from the IOC within a week of the latter's decision to "bar" Indonesia from future competitions.

102. In its editorial of 6 September 1962, People's Daily had criticised "the US imperialists and their agents" for their demand that "sports should be separated from politics". It had also offered the Chinese full support to Indonesian proposal to form an Afro-Asian sports organization with the newly emerging forces as its core. See Peking Review, vol. 5, no. 37, 14 September 1962, p. 17. In December 1962, Huang Chung, leader of the visiting Chinese sports delegation, had, in a personal meeting with President Sukarno and Minister R. Maladi, offered his country's support to the President's GANEFO proposal. Later, in the Joint Communiqué, issued in Djakarta on 13 December 1962, the Chinese sports delegation expressed the hope that GANEFO would be held at an early date. See ibid., vol. 5, no. 51, 21 December 1962, pp. 22-23.
In a long article titled "Imperialist Intrigues in Olympic Games", *Peking Review* described the IOC decision "barring" Indonesia as a "revenge" on the part of "US imperialism and Sondhi", and President Sukarno's idea of GANEFO as "Indonesia's reply to the challenge of the IOC masterminded by US imperialism". It quoted from Sukarno's statement of 13 February 1963 and covered Indonesian press, especially a pro-PKI language daily, *Bintang Timur*, which had urged for Indonesia's extrication "from the evil influence of imperialism, including that in the field of sports." *Peking Review* also gave wide coverage to Chinese Government, press and sports circle's support to Indonesia on this issue. Along with his Government's offer of firm support to President Sukarno's GANEFO proposal, Vice-Premier Ho Lung was quoted to have stressed that "the Indonesian people who have a glorious tradition of struggle against imperialism, will never yield to any pressure."

China continued to offer moral support to Indonesia on the question of holding the GANEFO. China also participated in the first GANEFO in November 1963 in a big way. Its contingent of over two hundred athletes was second in number only to the host country, viz. Indonesia. On 9 November 1963, a day before the opening ceremony of Games in Djakarta, Chairman Liu Shao-chi and Premier Chou En-lai sent a joint message of congratulations to President Sukarno and the GANEFO. Besides hailing the GANEFO as "a tremendous

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103. Ibid., vol. 6, no. 8, 22 February 1963, pp. 8-9.
104. Ibid., p. 9.
106. Ibid., vol. 6, no. 47, 22 November 1963, pp. 16-18.
victory of the "new emerging countries" the two leaders paid tributes to "the President and the Indonesian people" for their "steadfastness" and "outstanding contributions" in "holding GANEFO" as proposed.

Peking Review hailed the First Games of the New Emerging Forces and described its opening ceremony by Sukarno on 10 November 1963, as marking the ushering in of a "new era in world sports..." It issued two more articles covering the progress as well as the closing of the First GANEFO. In one of these articles, it listed the various countries' achievements in the Games and quoted President Sukarno as having described the First GANEFO as a great success. It paid tributes "to the excellent organizational work of the host country which impressed many people". It also carried an excerpt from a statement by Ho Lung, the Chinese Vice-Premier, which described "the First GANEFO (as) another event of tremendous historic significance after the Bandung Conference, a great victory of the Indonesian people, and the common victory for the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the rest of the world in their fight against imperialism and old and new colonialists."

The First GANEFO served the individual interests of both

107. Ibid., no. 46, 15 November 1963, p. 22.
108. Ibid., pp. 21-22. The words "Hail the First Games of the New Emerging Forces" formed the title of a two-page article in this issue of Peking Review. Peking Review also gave a photo of President Sukarno on the reviewing stand of the GANEFO; at his immediate left was shown standing China's Vice-Premier Marshal Ho Lung.
109. Ibid., no. 47, 22 November 1963, pp. 18-18 and no. 48, 29 November 1963, pp. 18-20. These articles appeared under the titles "New Wave in Sports and Friendship" and "First GANEFO Comes through with Flying Colours".
110. Ibid., no. 48, 29 November 1963, pp. 18-20.
Indonesia and China. With teams from 48 countries participating in it, the Games brought enormous prestige to Indonesia and its leader President Sukarno. To China, it provided a forum for projecting its image in Asia and Africa in a big way. It also served to bring China closer to Indonesia. The Chinese Vice-Premier and leader of his country's contingent to the GANEFO, Ho Lung, received a special treatment. This was evident from the march past when President Sukarno rose to shake hands with him, a gesture of goodwill he showed to none else. Besides, China was reported to have given financial support to Indonesia in arranging the Games. This way China earned a lot of goodwill among the Indonesian leadership and consequently succeeded in strengthening its ties with Indonesia.

111. GANEFO - I, Djakarta - 1963 (Ceremonies; Guides and Rules) (Djakarta, Pertjetakan Negara, Indonesia, 1963), 80p. The list of the participants included all the countries in South-East Asia except Malaysia. India was also conspicuous by its absence.

112. Pauker, n. 100.

113. Kroef, n. 60, p. 290. van der Kroef suggests the possibility that the PKI acted as middleman between Djakarta and Peking in providing the needed financial assistance to the Indonesian Government. The Chinese contribution was 18 billion Rupiah worth of foreign exchange in the form of Malayan currency and was equivalent to $53 million or US $18 million. Indonesia was to pay 18 billion Rupiah in exchange for it. See van der Kroef, "The Sino-Indonesian Partnership", Orbis, vol. 8, no. 2, Summer 1964, p. 351.

According to a Radio Malaysia report on 21 November 1963, China had agreed to destroy the 18 billion Indonesian Rupiahs given to her by Indonesia. However, lavish spendings by the Chinese, North Vietnames and other Communist athletes created suspicions that China had not destroyed the Indonesian money as promised. A check revealed that it was the same Indonesian money which China had promised to destroy. Government of Indonesia even attempted to withdraw that money, but by then 85 per cent of it was already in circulation. Indonesia reportedly protested to China but kept the matter secret for fear of repercussions on Games. See Indian Express (Delhi), 22 November 1963.
During the period of study, two more issues which determined Indonesia's attitude towards India were the Malaysia issue and the second Afro-Asian Conference. China utilised both these issues in strengthening Indonesian ill-will towards India. Its attitude on the Malaysia issue, however, at least until April 1964, did not impinge directly on Indian-Indonesian relations, as it did in the case of the second Afro-Asian Conference. China rarely criticised India for its pro-Malaysia attitude. Nevertheless, it utilised the Malaysia issue in demonstrating its acceptance of Indonesia's regional power role in marked contrast to India's posture. Finding the Malaysia issue both ideologically and strategically congruent to its policy goals in the region and thus offering categorical support to Indonesia's policy of 'confrontation' against it, China also sought to show to Indonesia that India had not only lost enthusiasm against colonialism but also, by welcoming the Malaysia proposal, had demonstrated its opposition to Indonesia's aspirations of a regional role. China continued this policy until April 1964, when in reaction to India's effort to tie the Malaysia issue with the prospects of the second Asian-African Conference, it came out in open criticism of India on this issue.

**China and the Malaysia Issue**

At the early stages, China was as indifferent to the proposed Federation of Malaysia as Indonesia was permissive towards it.

114. China criticised the scheme of Malaysia in June 1962, over a year after the proposal for it had been mooted in May 1961. Through its press, it charged the "British colonialists" with a shift in their "divide and rule" tactics to "a new fraud in the form of the 'Malaysian Confederation'" and wrote: "Britain's real aim ... is to use the Rahman regime and the reactionary forces in the four other territories to suppress the national independence movement and preserve its colonial interests". See "The 'Malaysian Confederation' Plot", *Peking Review*, vol. 5, no. 23, 8 June 1962, p. 21.
China's initial silence could, at least partly, be attributed to its pre-occupation with its border dispute with India. China maintained its posture of near silence towards the Malaysia issue until the Brunei revolt in December 1962. Within five days of the revolt, on 13 December 1962, Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily) noted the political disturbances in Brunei, the gains achieved by the insurgents, led by A.M. Azahari, leader of the Party Ra'ayat of Brunei, and the reactions in various countries. It devoted much space to the anti-Malaysia statements, demonstrations and declarations of solidarity with the Brunei rebels in Indonesia.

In an article in Peking Review, one Mao Sun eulogised the aims and cause of the rebels in seeking freedom from British colonialism and observed, "The uprising is a blow to the projected Federation of Malaysia..." The Chinese analyst quoted from a statement, issued by the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, to have warned the "British colonialists" not to "ignore any longer the just demand of the Brunei people.... British imperialism should immediately end its colonial rule in Brunei and stop its sanguinary repressions and massacre of the people there." The author of the article also charged the United States with an intention to "step in", wherever British colonialism weakened.

Interestingly, China's categorical support to the Brunei rebels against the "British colonialists" coincided with a shift in Indonesia's permissive attitude towards the Malaysia scheme into one


of hostility. An important factor which prompted China to adopt a posture of opposition to the Malaysia project was its border dispute with India. The six-power Colombo Conference on Sino-Indian border hostilities held on 10-12 December 1962, had already shown Foreign Minister Subandrio adopting a pro-Peking attitude. Perceiving in Sukarno's anti-Malaysia policy Indonesia's ambitions of a regional role, China sought to use its support to Indonesia on the Malaysia issue as a quid pro quo for Indonesia's support to her on the Sino-Indian border dispute. In view of the fact that Indonesia was one of the six invitees to the Colombo Conference on border dispute between China and India, Chinese calculations were quite understandable. In contrast to India's attitude of welcoming the Malaysia scheme, China's opposition to it in favour of Indonesia, would secure Indonesia's neutrality, if not active support, to it against India.

A positive indication of Indonesia's pro-China attitude had come from the Fourth Asian Games in Djakarta in August-September 1962. By refusing to grant visas to the athletes from Taiwan, Government of Indonesia had given a practical demonstration of its refusal to agree to "two-China" policy. Besides, "Sondhi Affair" had shown to China the degree of alienation which had developed between India and Indonesia. It would serve China's interests if it could exacerbate the growing Indian-Indonesian tensions.

It did not take much time to show that China's awareness of the potentialities of the Malaysia issue, as regards India was concerned, were correct. It has already been examined how, during

117. See Chapter on Bilateral Relations and the Malaysia Question, pp. 194-5.
118. Strains in Sino-Indian relations certainly prompted China to have President Sukarno "neutral on its side". See "Chinese in Indonesia", Economic Weekly (Bombay), vol. 15, no. 21, 25 May 1963, p. 833.
the six-power Colombo Conference, Foreign Minister Subandrio tilted more in favour of China and ignored the Indian susceptibilities in the matter. It could be considered a decisive gain of China's foreign policy, achieved at the expense of India.

After the Colombo Conference, Subandrio's visit to China in January 1963, made in connection with the Conference proposals regarding the Sino-Indian border dispute, and Liu Shao-chi's visit to Indonesia in April 1963, provided to China important occasions to exchange views with the Indonesian leaders on anti-Malaysia policy.

All through his 9-day visit, Liu Shao-chi emphasised the imperialist and colonialist nature of the Malaysia scheme and, on this basis, offered full support to Indonesia's anti-Malaysia policy. Extolling Indonesia's anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist role, he observed once: "Indonesia's just stand of opposing the neo-colonialist scheme of Malaysia... constitutes a serious blow to the colonialists, old and new", and with this Indonesia "has become an important force opposing imperialism and colonialism and safeguarding the peace and security of Southeast Asia and Asia as a whole". 119

Important enough, it could be considered as China's public acknowledgement of Indonesia's assumption of a power role concerning "peace and security" in the region as well as in Asia. It was in clear contradistinction to India's pro-Malaysia posture which Indonesia thought was opposed to its aspirations of a regional role.

One of the aims of Liu Shao-chi's visit to Indonesia, at this stage, was to ensure that Indonesia's stand in the Sino-Indian

The border dispute was not pro-India. China had every reason to be satisfied with the results of Liu Shao-chi's visit in this connection. The Joint Communique issued at the conclusion of the Chinese leader's visit, noted President Sukarno's support to the Chinese view of opposition to foreign "intervention" in the Sino-Indian border dispute. In an obvious reference to American and other Western arms aid to India, it observed that "this kind of intervention would only undermine Asian-African solidarity and consequently would put forth obstacles in the way towards a peaceful solution of the dispute."

Besides, the Joint Communique noted Indonesia's appreciation of the Chinese unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal, release of Indian prisoners of war as well as other measures taken by China "on her own initiative". This showed the extent to which Sino-Indonesian relations were developing at the cost of India.

Within about six weeks of Liu Shao-chi's visit, however, there erupted racial riots in Java, in which thirteen Chinese were reported killed and several hundreds wounded. Besides, riots resulted in damage to property worth Rupiah 4 billion. This demonstrated the seeming failure of the overall Chinese policy towards Indonesia since 1955, namely, befriending Indonesian nationalist leadership at the expense of overseas Chinese interests in Indonesia.

China, however, felt reassured when President Sukarno declared on 19 May 1963, that the riots had been caused by "counter-

revolutionaries as well as by foreign subversives", who exploited the Chinese minority problem. "because we have lately been in close contact with People's China." This made it easier for China to link the "counter-revolutionaries" with "foreign subversives", that is "Imperialists", working for the purpose of sabotaging "Sino-Indonesian friendly relations". To the satisfaction of China, Sukarno's statement also encouraged Chairman Aidit of the PKI to state that the recent "racialist acts of terror were anti-Sukarno, anti-Chinese and anti-Communist". This way, the two countries once again succeeded in patching up their differences on the overseas Chinese issue.

In the coming few months, China continued to offer full moral support to Indonesia on the latter's "Ganjang (Crush) Malaysia" policy. Interestingly, all along the process of establishment of Malaysia and after, China's responses to the Malaysia issue followed a set pattern of being in opposition to those shown by India. For instance, when the outcome of the meetings of the leaders of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, between May and August 1963, in Tokyo and Manila, created in India a sense of relief and aroused hopes of a peaceful settlement of the Malaysia dispute, China felt uneasy about these developments in the region. China found the Manila

125. Antara, 29 May 1963. While addressing the PKI's forty-third anniversary gathering in Djakarta on 27 May 1963, Chairman Aidit identified "counter-revolutionaries" as the banned Masjumi Party and others, and justified Sukarno's charge against them. According to him, by killing Chinese and destroying Chinese property, these elements wanted to increase "the people's suffering", to goad the people against Sukarno and to damage Indonesia's relations with China. The instigators of the anti-Chinese riots, he suggested, were those wanting to keep the Communists out of the Government.

126. See Chapter on Bilateral Relations and the Malaysia Question, pp. 223-4.
Agreements and the Maphilindo proposal, which were hailed by the press in India, at variance with its interests and objectives in Indonesia and the region. China, however, chose to reserve its own comments and contented itself by giving wide coverage to the Indonesian Communists' views critical of the Maphilindo scheme. In view of Sukarno and the entire non-Communist and anti-Communist elite group accepting and even hailing the Maphilindo scheme, China's reservations were quite understandable.

Later when India accepted the UN Enquiry report about ascertainment of the wishes of the people of Sarawak and Sabah, China outspokenly condemned it. Fully corroborating Indonesians' views in the matter, New China News Agency wrote: "This survey will go down in history as one of the quickest and crookedest public opinion polls ever held." Unlike in India, where Government and press welcomed the inauguration of Malaysia on 16 September 1963, China used its publicity media for coverage of anti-British and anti-Malaysian demonstrations and statements emanating from Djakarta. In its "Round the World" comments, Peking Review termed Malaysia as "An Unwanted Child" created "by Whitehall with Washington's blessings", in the face of "strong opposition from the people within the area it embraces - and beyond". Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)

127. For the anti-Maphilindo views as expressed by Chairman Aidit of the PKI and covered by the Chinese press, see ibid., pp. 224-5.


129. See SCMP, no. 3065, 23 September 1963, p. 20; no. 3066, 24 September 1963 and no. 3068, 26 September 1963, p. 16.

editorially traced the process of the establishment of Malaysia and highlighted the US collusion with Britain in the matter. It noted the anxieties about Malaysia in the neighbouring countries, especially in Indonesia, and considered Indonesia's expression of concern as "only natural". Besides, Remin Ribao described Indonesian measures of taking over British enterprises as "entirely justified" and, in order to strengthen anti-British and anti-United States' sentiment in Indonesia, termed their "provocations" as "insults" to Indonesia. This could be interpreted as China's overall effort to broaden Indonesia's commitment to a policy of active opposition to both the British and the American interests and influences in South-East Asia, a policy, in the successful evolution of which the PKI made not a small contribution.

China continued to pursue its pro-Indonesia posture on the Malaysia issue as distinct from that of India until April 1964 when, in response to Indian proposal at the preparatory meeting of the Second Afro-Asian Conference in Djakarta, to send invitation to Malaysia for participation in the Conference, provoked her to come out in open criticism of India on the Malaysia issue.

China and the Second Afro-Asian Conference

Besides the Malaysia question, another important issue, which China found determining Indonesian foreign policy attitudes towards India during 1961-65, was Indonesia's demand for the convening of a second Asian-African Conference. It was known to China that since the first Conference in Bandung (West Java) in April 1955, Indonesia had been insistently calling for the convening of another such conference and India, for reasons of its own, had been lukewarm to

131. Ibid., no. 40, 4 October 1963, pp. 24-25.
Indonesia's demand in this connection.

On several grounds, China found it advantageous to offer political support to Indonesia on this issue. Ideologically, Indonesia's demand was in accord with China's championship of Afro-Asian solidarity against imperialism and colonialism. Besides, China being out of the United Nations and barred from the gatherings of the non-aligned countries, (it being a "committed" country), the second Asian and African conference was thought to provide an important forum to China to project its Afro-Asian role. Also, since it represented an aspiration of the Indonesian leadership, China's support on this issue would increase its political influence among the Indonesians and thus make it difficult for the anti-Chinese elements in Indonesian politics to indulge in activities aimed against the interests of the Chinese in Indonesia. Furthermore, China's support to Indonesia on this issue, would, like the Malaysia issue, strengthen the PKI's influence in Indonesian politics and enable it to bring Indonesian foreign policy in line with that of Peking. Anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism being the basis of the demand for the second Asian-African conference, it would enable China to seek Indonesia's wider and continuing commitment to joint efforts for the removal of all Western political, economic and military influences, both West European and American, from South-East Asia. Seen in the light of Indian-Indonesian relations, thus, if India continued to be hesitant to concede Indonesia's call for the second

132. *Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism* (A collection of documents, speeches and Press Interviews from the visits of Chinese leaders to thirteen African and Asian countries) (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1964), p. 78. Prime Minister Chou En-lai used this term for his country while replying to a question relating to China's attitude towards a second conference of non-aligned states. He was addressing a press conference in Algiers on 26 December 1963.
'Bandung' conference as before, China would be in an advantageous position to portray India's role as being 'pro-imperialist' and the one working against Asian and African solidarity, and, consequently, discredit Indian leadership and its policy of non-alignment among the Indonesians.

With these calculations in mind, China supported Indonesia's demand for the holding of the second Conference of Asian and African countries. The first occasion China did it officially was during Foreign Minister Chen Yi's visit to Indonesia in March-April 1961. In the Joint Communiqué issued on 1 April 1961, Chen Yi joined Subandrio in stating that they "deemed it very necessary to convene a second Asian-African conference in the shortest time". It was in contrast to Prime Minister Nehru's reluctant attitude in this connection. The visits to China by President Sukarno in June 1961 and by Foreign Minister Subandrio in January 1963, and return visit to Indonesia by Chairman Liu Shao-chi in April 1963, provided other important occasions to China to reiterate its support to Indonesia's call for the second Afro-Asian Conference.

By the end of 1963, China joined Indonesia at the summit level of diplomacy in canvassing support for the second Asian and African Conference. In a bid to co-ordinate diplomatic activity with Indonesia, Prime Minister Chou En-lai paid a long two-and-a-half month visit to ten African and three Asian countries between 14 December 1963 and 29 February 1964. In the statements, speeches, 133 Sino-Indonesian Relations, January 1960 - April 1961 (Research Backgrounder) (Hongkong (Kowloon), 1961), p. 128. 134 Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, n. 132, 440p. The countries visited in Africa were the UAR, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. The Asian countries visited were Burma, Pakistan and Ceylon.
press conferences and welcome addresses made in all these countries, Chou En-lai stressed the need to still further strengthen Afro-Asian solidarity against imperialism and colonialism. At certain places such as Cairo, Algiers, Kindia (Guinea), Mogadiscio (Somalia), Karachi and Colombo, he reiterated China's support to President Sukarno's proposal and suggested that the time was ripe for holding the second Asian-African Conference. The Chinese leader was, nevertheless, only partially successful in as much as only seven out of the thirteen joint communiques issued during his visit contained the two parties' agreement to state that the time was appropriate for such a Conference. The joint communiques issued in the remaining six countries, namely, the UAR, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Burma and Ceylon, omitted any direct reference on the issue.

It is interesting to note that the first and the last state which Chou En-lai included in his itinerary, were the UAR and Ceylon, the two countries taking, at this stage, active interest in the holding of a second non-aligned summit meeting. Although leaderships in both the countries, more or less, agreed with the Chinese Prime Minister on the need to strengthen Asian and African unity against colonialism and imperialism and to convene the second Asian-African Conference, they were reluctant to agree about the

135. Ibid., pp. 50, 55, 56, 88-90, 97, 110, 144, 171, 195, 200, 265, 321, 397.

136. Ibid., pp. 18 and 34 (Cairo), 78 (Algiers), 203-4 (Kindia-Guinea), 279 (Mogadiscio - Somalia), 327, 332, 336 and 344 (Karachi, two other cities and Lahore in Pakistan), and 398 and 409 (Colombo - Ceylon).

137. Ibid. The countries in which such references of support were contained in the joint communiques were Ghana (p.160), Mali (p.184), Guinea (pp. 222-3), the Sudan (p.242), Ethiopia (p.259), Somalia (pp. 302-3), and Pakistan (p.372).
appropriateness of the present time for such a Conference. 138

Obviously, the Afro-Asian response to Chou En-lai's overtures, 139
in this connection, was not encouraging. This was more than
confirmed about a month later when ten out of the thirteen Afro-
Asian countries visited by the Chinese Prime Minister, attended a
meeting held in preparation of the second Conference of Non-Aligned
states in Colombo between 23 and 27 March 1964.

Apart from renewing contacts with the Afro-Asian leaders,
Chou En-lai also used this occasion to project his country's image
as a peace-loving nation, devoted to five principles of peaceful
co-existence and ten principles of the first Asian-African Conference.

138. Ibid. This is evident from Chou En-lai's replies at a press
conference in Cairo on 20 December 1963. He stated thus:
"A possibility exists of holding a Second Asian-African
Conference. Both President Nasser and myself agreed that good
preparations for this conference should be made. Only when
good preparations have been made can a meeting be successful."
(P.18). See also The Statesman, 22 December 1963.

As regards Ceylon, the Joint Communiqué issued on
29 February 1964, noted only Chou En-lai's opinion about the
appropriateness of the present time for holding this
Conference. Prime Minister Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike of
Ceylon merely contented herself by agreeing that such a
Conference would serve a useful purpose and that her Govern-
ment would participate in it. See ibid., p. 421. By
implication, it suggested, however, that Ceylon was not
agreeable to holding it at this stage.

139. Colina MacDougall, "Chou's African Safari", Far Eastern
Colina MacDougall described the meagre results of Chou En-
laï's long tour of African and Asian countries as "a heavy
defeat for Chinese policies:..."

140. These ten states were: Algeria, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea,
Morocco, Somalia, the Sudan, Tunisia, and the UAR. See Supplementary Documents for the Meeting of Ministers in preparation
of the Second Asian-African Conference (Djakarta, Organizing
Committee, 1964), pp. 13-14. It is a collection of four
documents, namely, Manila Declaration of 5 August 1963, the
Joint Statement by the Prime Ministers of India and China issued
in New Delhi on 28 June 1954, the Communiqué issued at the end
of the Preparatory Meeting of the Second Conference of Non-
Aligned States held in Colombo between 23 and 27 March 1964 and
the Pact of the Arab League issued at Alexandria on 25 March
1945.
In this connection, he sought to distort India's image by implying that it was India's intransigence which was impeding the resolution of the Sino-Indian border dispute.

Two reasons seem to have prompted China to co-ordinate diplomatic effort with Indonesia in facilitating the convening of the second Asian-African Conference. Firstly, it represented China's sense of satisfaction over Indonesia's attitude, first during the Fourth Asian Games in Djakarta in September 1962 and later during and after the Sino-Indian border hostilities in the following month. For China, these had provided opportunities to assess the genuineness of Indonesia's professions of friendship with her. China had reason to be satisfied over Indonesia's successful efforts to keep Taiwan out of the Fourth Asian Games even at the cost of expulsion from the IOC. Still greater source of satisfaction to China was Indonesia showing comparatively less warmth towards India on the Sino-Indian border dispute. India's sense of embarrassment resulting from the "Gondhi Affair" in Djakarta and its disappointment arising from its failure to enlist Indonesian sympathies against China's aggression on its northern borders, were decisive gains for China's diplomacy. It had revealed the measure of success China had achieved in its policy of driving a wedge between India and Indonesia.

Secondly, it showed China's awareness of certain non-aligned states, including India, making serious efforts to convene a second conference of non-aligned countries. Peking appears to have realised that if these countries succeeded in staging a second non-aligned summit meeting, it would delay, for an indefinite period, the prospects of the second Afro-Asian Conference. By offering active diplomatic support to Indonesia in realising her long-standing demand in this connection, China also sought to extend still further
its influence and prestige among Indonesia's governing elites.

Prompted by these considerations, China chose various occasions to reiterate its support to Indonesia's call for convening a second Conference of Asian and African states. Prominent among these occasions were Pakistan National Day Reception in Peking on 23 March 1964, and the third anniversary of the Sino-Indonesian Friendship Treaty in Peking on 1 April 1964.

In view of China's active political and diplomatic support in this connection, Indonesia's omission, initially at least, of an invitation to that country to attend the Preparatory Meeting of the Afro-Asian nations, was quite surprising. Possible reasons for this have been surveyed elsewhere.

Notwithstanding this, in its issue of 10 April 1964, the opening day of the Preparatory Meeting in Djakarta, Jen-min Jih-pao editorially offered Chinese people's warm support to Indonesia's efforts and sincerely wished the meeting every success. In his general statement at the Preparatory Meeting, following his country's usual policy of cultivating the Indonesian leadership, Foreign Minister Chen Yi, leader of the Chinese delegation, paid tributes to President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Subandrio and highly commended the "Bandung Spirit" under the "light" of which over thirty Asian and African countries had achieved freedom. He


143. SWB, FE/1525/C/2 and 3, 11 April 1964.

also praised the much publicised Indonesian principles of 'musjawarah' (consultation/deliberation) and 'mufakat' (unanimity) and expressed his "hope that all of us will follow these principles in the proceedings of our further sessions". Besides, he put major emphasis on the need for strengthening Afro-Asian solidarity in the face of colonialist and imperialist forces. In this connection, the Chinese Foreign Minister stressed that imperialism "will not step down from the stage of history of its own accord" and hence "the most urgent common task" of all the Asian and African "countries and peoples" was to "fight" against it, in order "to win and safeguard" national freedom.

Chen Yi also made a pointed reference to the divergence between the Indian and Indonesian approach to issues of colonialism and world peace. He considered President Sukarno's pronouncement that colonialism is not yet dead, as "perfectly true" and observed: "Imperialism and old and new colonialism are the sources of war. Failing to oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war, there can be no talk about the defence of world peace." Although he omitted any direct reference to the question of invitation to Malaysia, by considering Indonesia's stand towards the people of North Kalimantan as "just" and by offering his country's "support" to them, the Chinese Foreign Minister impliedly supported Indonesians' position relating to this question.

While reacting to the Indian proposals regarding invitations to the Soviet Union and Malaysia, the attitude of the Chinese delegation showed that China was not as enthusiastic in offering

145. Ibid., p. 86.
146. Ibid., p. 82.
147. Ibid., pp. 82-83.
148. Ibid., p. 83.
support to Indonesia on the Malaysia issue as it was expected to be. Although the Chinese delegation joined Indonesian and Pakistani delegations in carrying out intensive lobbying against the Indian proposals with regard to both the Soviet Union and Malaysia, it reserved its vehement criticism only against the one relating to the Soviet Union and left it to Indonesia to fight against the other proposal concerning Malaysia.

China's over-emphasis on exclusion of the Soviet Union and under-emphasis on exclusion of Malaysia, at this stage, could be ascribed to its unpreparedness to meet India's diplomatic offensive at the Preparatory Meeting. The Indian proposal regarding invitation to the Soviet Union and Malaysia had, besides for Indonesia and Pakistan, serious embarrassment in store for China. The Chinese difficulty lay in the fact that if it opposed Soviet Union's participation on the ground that it did not physically belong to Asia and Africa, its argument against Malaysia's inclusion would lose its significance. On the other hand, if it opposed Malaysia's entry (in support of Indonesia) on the ground that it was a neocolonialist project, its opposition to Soviet representation at the Afro-Asian Conference would lose its credibility.

Nevertheless, China's evident lack of open support to Indonesia on the issue of Malaysia's participation, proved temporary and could be interpreted as the two countries' diplomatic strategy against the Indian proposals rather than some kind of coolness developing between them. On 16 April 1964, Chen Yi had a meeting with President Sukarno, lasting for three-and-a-half hours.


150. Ibid. During informal meetings with leaders of the Afro-Asian delegations, Chen Yi let it be known that "if the Soviet Union comes there, there will be a fight."
Subandrio, who attended the meeting along with the Chinese Ambassador in Djakarta, Huang Chen, revealed later that the talks included "a thorough review of the Afro-Asian Conference." It is quite conceivable that the two sides discussed about the adverse impact the Indian proposals were expected to have on the prospects of the second African-Asian Conference and devised ways to counter it. In a written statement, issued at the time of his departure from Djakarta for Rangoon, on 17 April 1964, the Chinese Foreign Minister referred to Swaran Singh's proposals to send invitations to the Soviet Union and Malaysia. As regards the Soviet Union, he described the Indian proposal as "improper, because, as everybody knows, the Soviet Union is not an African or Asian country." He was satisfied to note that the Preparatory Meeting had "negated this proposal." As regards Malaysia, he expressed his happiness that the Meeting had "correctly handled this question." In this connection, Chen Yi once again commended the Indonesian principles of 'musjawarah' and 'mufakat' and denigrated the majority-minority way of putting things to vote. It was an obvious attack on the position Swaran Singh had taken at the meeting.

151. Ibid., p. 499, col. 3. See also Indonesian Herald, 17 April 1964. It gives information about Sukarno-Chen Yi meeting, but does not write anything about both Subandrio and Huang Chen attending the meeting and the former (Subandrio) revealing anything later.

152. Indonesian Herald, 18 April 1964. See also Asian Almanac, vol. 1, no. 42, p. 497, col. 3 and SWB, FE/1532/C/1 and A1-5, 20 April 1964. In fact, a 6-nation committee, comprising of Afghanistan, Ghana, Cameroon, Morocco, Ethiopia and Syria, instituted to resolve the deadlock on the Indian proposal regarding invitations to the Soviet Union and Malaysia, had, in the face of lack of unanimity, on 14 April 1964, agreed to defer the decision in this connection until the convening of the Conference in March 1965. In this sense, the statement of Chen Yi that the meeting had "negated" the Indian proposal, could not be considered correct.
In an editorial on 18 April 1964, *Jen-min Jih-pao* commented adversely on India's role at the Preparatory Meeting. It wrote thus: "At the preparatory meeting the Indian delegate, ignoring the principle that any invitation to a country to participate in the conference must have unanimous agreement, insisted on inviting a non-Asian, non-African country to the conference. He also proposed to invite 'Malaysia', knowing full well that it is a product of neo-colonialism. These actions can by no means be considered as conducive to the cause of Afro-Asian unity against imperialism." It was a deliberate Chinese effort to convince Indonesians as well as the other Afro-Asians that India was pursuing pro-imperialist policies and hence proving an impediment in the way of Afro-Asian unity.

After the Preparatory Meeting in Djakarta, China tended to link its responses to the two issues of Malaysia and the second Afro-Asian Conference. This was as a reaction to India's efforts at the Preparatory Meeting to tie the prospects of the Conference with its proposal, among others, to send invitation to the new Federation of Malaysia. The second Conference of Non-Aligned countries in Cairo in October 1964 provided to China another important opportunity to distort India's image among the Indonesians. China also used its press in cultivating the Indonesian leadership by showing it as somewhat above all other Afro-Asian leaders in their fight against the forces of colonialism and imperialism. In an editorial on 14 October 1964, *Renmin Ribao* expressed its satisfaction that the "strong desire" of the African and Asian peoples and countries for independence found "its manifestation at the Second Conference of

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Non-Aligned countries". It also described the voice against imperialism and old and new colonialism as raised in the Cairo meeting as "the mainstream of the conference". To all the Afro-Asian leaders, who had done so, it paid high tributes. For Sukarno, however, Renmin Ribao reserved a higher place. It quoted from his speech excerpts demonstrating his thesis that colonialism "is not yet dead", and that there could be no peaceful co-existence between the 'new emerging forces' and the 'old established forces'.

As against this, Renmin Ribao termed India's (and Yugoslavia's) role at the Cairo Conference as "a small adverse current" in the "mainstream" of opposition to colonialism and imperialism. It criticised the Indian (and the Yugoslav) delegate for having done "everything they could to distort the essence of the policies of peaceful co-existence and non-alignment". It added: "They attempted to set the Conference ... in opposition to the struggle against imperialism and colonialism by the people of various countries so as to achieve their objective of weakening and abolishing their struggle".

The Renmin Ribao editorial also charged "Indian Prime Minister Shastri" for having "tried to whip up an anti-China campaign in an effort to divert the focus of the struggle of the non-aligned countries and (to) serve US imperialism". It added: "The Indian leader's despicable manoeuvres gained nobody's interest; apart from further exposing the real features of the Indian Government which has sold itself to US imperialism and its collaborators, his activities achieved nothing whatsoever."


155. Ibid., p. 9. See also China's serious criticism of India and its leadership under the title "Sheep's Head and Dog's Meat" in ibid., p. 26. It charged India with "hypocrisy", double alignment and pro-US attitude.
Peking Review also surveyed what it described as "world opinion" on the Non-Aligned Conference in Cairo and chose newspaper comments which were strongly critical of India's policies and attitude there. It commented on Lal Bahadur Shastri's failure in imposing on the Conference his "line of peaceful co-existence with imperialism" as well as "in his foul anti-China manoeuvres", and, in order to reinforce its charges, gave prominent coverage to the anti-India views expressed in the daily newspapers, such as Nhan Dan (Hanoi), Harian Rakjat and Bintang Timur (PKI and pro-PKI dailies from Djakarta), Pakistan Times (Lahore) and Ludu (pro-Communist newspaper from Rangoon). It would be interesting to examine the highly anti-India tone of the Indonesian dailies, such as Harian Rakjat and Bintang Timur, to which Peking Review gave prominent coverage. It quoted Harian Rakjat to say: "As a U.S. hirling, India tried to scare the people with a gruesome picture of the destructive effect of atomic weapons. But it did not say a simple word for the national independence movement, which is sweeping Asia, Africa and Latin America." The passage it chose from Bintang Timur, read:

"India and Yugoslavia, which called themselves 'non-aligned' countries, in their frantic activity at the Conference to sell their 'peaceful co-existence' policy, tried to subordinate everything to their 'peaceful co-existence', even at the expense of the independence and liberation movements." Peking Review also cited the pro-Communist Indonesian daily to declare: "We shall never follow them".

China had reason to be satisfied with the strong fight the Indonesian delegation had put up against the Indian delegation's proposals demanding priority for "peace" and "peaceful co-existence",


157. Ibid.
urging abstention "from threat or use of force" and non-recognition of "any situation brought about" by these means, and pleading for despatch of a "special mission to persuade China to desist from developing nuclear weapons". Aiming at strengthening anti-India feeling still further, China found it necessary to emphasise the Indian-Indonesian differences manifested at the Second Non-Aligned Conference. President Sukarno's visit to Shanghai on 4 November 1964, within less than a month of his participation in the Cairo Conference, was thus a welcome occasion for China to show its appreciation of Indonesia's role at the Cairo meeting. Prime Minister Chou En-lai made it a point to receive President Sukarno in person. He, along with Vice-Premier Lo Jui-ching and Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Liu Hsiao, came especially from Peking to greet President Sukarno and accorded a "rousing welcome" to him at the Shanghai airport.

Sukarno's visit provided a valuable opportunity to the Chinese leaders to exchange views with him on various matters of mutual interest, a prominent issue being the prospects of the second Afro-Asian Conference. Despite their joint diplomatic efforts, India and other non-aligned countries had succeeded in convening a second Belgrade-type meeting before they could arrange a second Bandung-type Conference. It was, in a sense, a diplomatic defeat for both Indonesia and China and could be thought to have figured prominently in the talks between Sukarno and Chou En-lai. Possibly, the two sides decided about reinforcing their joint efforts in this direction. While speaking at a banquet he gave in honour of President Sukarno, Chou En-lai gave a hint to this end and, by way

158. See Chapter on India, Indonesia and the Second Afro-Asian Conference, pp. 304-5.
of re-assurance to Indonesian leaders, said: "Together with the people of Indonesia and other Asian and African countries, we shall make good preparations for the holding of the second Asian-African Conference...." Beside this, in a continuing Chinese effort to cultivate Sukarno, Chou En-lai paid rich tributes to the Indonesian President for holding aloft the banner of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism at the Conference of the Non-Aligned countries.

Sukarno responded with equal warmth and feeling pleased at the Chinese leader's appreciation of his role in Asia and Africa, said: "We are fighting against all imperialists and neo-colonialists, fighting for the establishment of a just and prosperous society and a new world of happiness for all mankind."

It was a significant remark as it indicated a change in the direction of Indonesian foreign policy. Although, in the framework of his concept of struggle between "new emerging forces" and "old established forces", he had always opposed colonialism and imperialism and championed Afro-Asian unity, the main direction of his attack since the restoration of West Irian to Indonesia, had been towards British colonial interests and influences in South-East Asia. Despite China's as well as the PKI's repeated emphasis on considering the United States as the leader of world imperialism and hence "enemy number one" of Indonesia, President Sukarno had been reluctant to treat the United States as such. His statement at the banquet in Shanghai on 4 November 1964, could thus be described as a pointer to Indonesia's agreement with China on the vital issue of considering the United States as the major enemy of the people of

160. Ibid., p. 4.
161. Ibid.
South-East Asia as well as of Asia and Africa. A near identity registered in the two countries' approach to the continued existence of British and American economic, political and military influences in the region, thus demonstrated the high degree of success China had achieved in its policies towards Indonesia.

From the Chinese side, as a follow-up action, Foreign Minister Chen Yi paid an unscheduled visit to Indonesia between 27 November and 3 December 1964. This followed his visits to Algeria and Cambodia and stop-overs in the UAR and Pakistan, where, among other things, he sought to push ahead the preparations for the second Afro-Asian Conference. On his arrival in Djakarta he was welcomed among others by the second Deputy Prime Minister, J. Leimena, and Chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party, D.N. Aidit. During his one-week stay in Indonesia, Chen Yi was engaged in intensive talks with President Sukarno, Foreign Minister Subandrio and other important government and political leaders. He had two meetings with the President on 28 November and 30 November and two meetings with the Foreign Minister on 30 November and 1 December 1964. Among the subjects he discussed with the Indonesian leaders were the general international situation, the present stage of struggle between the

162. This increased India's worries about Indonesia getting still closer to China. There were apprehensions about China and Indonesia entering into a secret military pact and agreement to divide Malaysia between themselves. Foreign Minister Subandrio himself hinted in this direction in the course of a closed door meeting in the office of the Indonesian mission at the United Nations on 9 December 1964. See S.B. Mookherji, "Where Indonesia?" Modern Review (Calcutta - Monthly), vol. 118, no. 3, September 1965, p. 214.

163. Asian Almanac, vol. 2, no. 25, 13-19 December 1964, p. 918, cols 2 and 3. This is evident from the fact that Foreign Minister Subandrio cancelled his scheduled visit to New York from Tokyo and returned to Djakarta on 29 November 1964. In fact, Chen Yi told the journalists, on arrival in Djakarta (at the airport) that he had promised Subandrio to visit Indonesia towards the end of the year and that he felt it necessary to visit Indonesia "now".
'new emerging forces' and 'old-established forces', the British and American involvement on the issues of Malaysia and Vietnam in the region, and the prospects of the second African-Asian Conference. According to J. Leimena, who was present at Chen Yi's first meeting with the President, Chen Yi talked about the results of his recent visit to Algeria, the UAR, Pakistan and Cambodia. Crucial talks, however, took place on 1 December 1964, when Chen Yi and Subandrio had a long seven-hour 'special conference' on various issues of mutual interest. Indonesia's First Deputy Foreign Minister, Suwito Kusumowidagdo, who assisted Subandrio at the talks, revealed later that the two leaders had discussed thoroughly the international situation and the "present stage in the common struggle against Nekolim" (an Indonesian acronym for neo-colonialism, colonialism and imperialism). Other issues, around which their discussions centered, as Kusumowidagdo disclosed, were the degree of preparations made so far for the successful convening of the Algiers Conference as well as the manner in which Malaysia could be kept out of the Conference.

The joint press release issued at the end of Chen Yi's visit showed that the two leaders shared each other's opinion on the situation in the world, in South-East Asia and Afro-Asia. It revealed similarity of approach on the stage of struggle between the imperialist and colonialist forces and the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist forces. It registered, in this connection, their agreement on the desirability of strengthening Afro-Asian unity and escalating the struggle against the 'old established forces'. Besides, there was discussion on the problems connected with the preparations for the Algiers Conference in March 1965. The two sides reaffirmed to adhere to and carry out the decisions of the Preparatory Meeting in Djakarta in April 1964 and to further promote the spirit of
'musjawarah' (consultation) and 'mufakat' (unanimity). Whereas Chen Yi reaffirmed his country's support to Indonesia's 'Crush Malaysia' policy, Subandrio upheld restoration of China's place in the United Nations.

In a commentary broadcast on Radio Indonesia on 4 December 1964, Indonesian Ministry of Information considered results of Chen Yi-Subandrio talks as of extreme significance in strengthening the 'new emerging forces' against 'old established forces'. The commentary noted the two countries' belief that the Algiers Conference would be of great importance for the African and Asian countries. The talks were said to have strengthened the will of the two countries to promote unity among the Afro-Asian countries in their struggle against imperialism and showed an agreement to make the forthcoming Conference a success.

By the end of 1964, Indonesia's anti-Malaysia policy became quite intensive. Indonesia reacted sharply to the prospect of Malaysia getting a non-permanent member seat in the UN Security Council. On 31 December 1964, President Sukarno declared that in case Malaysia was seated in the Security Council, Indonesia would withdraw from the United Nations. Despite his warning, when Malaysia became a member of the Security Council, Sukarno announced on 7 January 1965, Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations.

Whereas Government of India regretted Indonesia's decision to quit the United Nations and requested her for reconsideration.

164. Ibid., pp. 918-19, cols 3 and l.

165. Indonesian Herald, 2 January 1965. Sukarno made this declaration in the course of his speech at a ceremony, proclaiming Indonesia free from illiteracy.

166. Ibid., 9 January 1965.
of it, China came out openly and resolutely in support of Indonesia's action. In a statement issued on 10 January 1965, the Chinese Government described it as a "just, correct and revolutionary action". It repeated its allegation of British-US collusion behind Malaysia, considered Malaysia "as Israel" in the Arab world and said: "It is perfectly just and right for Indonesia to withdraw from the United Nations." The statement paid "high tribute" to the Indonesians and said: "You have done the right thing, and done it well. We resolutely side with you." The following day, Foreign Minister Chen Yi declared it "a lofty and just revolutionary move" and "the first spring thunderbolt of 1965 which resounded throughout the world".

Likewise, in its editorial on 6 January 1965, Renmin Ribao described the seating of Malaysia in the Security Council as "an outright move of provocation and hostility against Indonesia". It commended Indonesia's decision "to withdraw from the United Nations", offered, in this connection, the Chinese support for "this just step" and observed that "by deciding to withdraw from the United Nations, Indonesia has truly upheld its independence and sovereignty. The independence of Indonesia was won through its own struggle, not bestowed by the United Nations."


Foreign Minister Subandrio's visit in January 1965 provided another occasion to reiterate its support to Indonesia's decision to withdraw from the World Body. While welcoming Subandrio, at a rally in Peking on 26 January 1965, Chen Yi offered full support to Indonesia's action and suggested the "setting up of another United Nations, a revolutionary one, so that rival dramas may be staged in competition with the existing U.S.-manipulated United Nations for people to make the comparison." Chen Yi also reiterated China's staunch support to Indonesia for its "just struggle" against Malaysia and for the people of North Kalimantan. Similarly, in the course of his speech at a banquet he gave in honour of the Indonesian delegation led by Subandrio, on 24 January 1965, Chou En-lai praised the Indonesian leadership and people for their revolutionary action in withdrawing Indonesia from the United Nations.

In various ways, Subandrio's visit to China in January 1965 was a major landmark in the two countries' relations. Subandrio's statements and the Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of his visit on 28 January 1965 revealed a still closer identity of views between the two countries on the issues relating to South-East Asia, Afro-Asia and the world. In the political field, fully in accord with the basis of approach towards the United States, as laid during President Sukarno's short visit to Shanghai on 4 November 1964, Subandrio stated: "We have a common enemy - imperialism headed by the United States and Britain. Our struggles are inseparable because they are based on a common ideal and are directed against a common enemy." On this basis, he declared:

172. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
"No force from within or without can divide them." It showed Indonesia's readiness to discard earlier inhibitions in its relations with the United States and come out openly in support of China's anti-US stance in South-East Asia. China had, at last, succeeded in inducing Indonesia to support its anti-American policies in Vietnam in exchange for its continued anti-British and pro-Indonesia policy on the Malaysia issue. The Joint Statement only confirmed this view. It noted the two countries' "common opinion" on "the tense situation in Southeast Asia" and declared "that the U.S. imperialists' expansion of the war of aggression in Indo-China and the British imperialists' sending of military reinforcements to 'Malaysia' are aggressive activities carried out by the neo-colonialists and colonialists in this region in support of each other."

Ideologically, the Joint Statement, for the first time, juxtaposed President Sukarno's theoretical formulation of the struggle between the 'new emerging forces' and 'old established forces' with the Chinese view of the Afro-Asian struggle against imperialism and colonialism. Both the countries shared "the view that in the present international struggle there exist, on the one hand the imperialist forces, representing the old established forces of domination, exploitation, oppression and aggression, and on the other hand, the anti-imperialist, progressive and revolutionary forces, being the new emerging forces of the world today." They also "stressed that no peaceful co-existence is possible between the new emerging forces and the old established forces or between the imperialist forces and anti-imperialist forces."

173. Ibid., no. 6, 5 February 1965, p. 4. Subandrio made this observation during his speech at a banquet he hosted in Peking in honour of the Chinese leaders.


175. Ibid., p. 6.
Besides, the two sides also shared each other's view of the situation in Asia and Africa. Considering that the "convocation of the Second African-Asian Conference will be of great significance", they "reaffirmed their determined will to implement the resolutions adopted at the Djakarta Preparatory Meeting and continue to develop the spirit of the Bandung Conference of reaching unanimity through consultation." The two sides also "noted that imperialism and its followers are trying to forestall the Conference. They expressed their determination to work jointly with the other Asian and African countries for the convening and success of this Conference."

Besides, Subandrio's visit also contributed to the strengthening of the two countries' relations in the economic, trade, communications and military fields. The Joint Statement noted their decision "to strengthen their technical co-operation, expand their trade, develop maritime transportation between them and strengthen their friendly contacts in the military field." The tangible result of the talks in these fields was the conclusion of an agreement on economic and technical co-operation and a credit agreement. The two countries also decided to exchange delegations in various fields, including the military field, for mutual benefit.

Subandrio's visit, which led to these "major achievements" was considered to have marked "a new phase" in the two countries' relations. Renmin Ribao in an editorial on 30 January 1965, hailed it as having "greatly strengthened the Sino-Indonesian comrade-in-arms relations of friendship and mutual help". Besides, revealing a common approach towards Malaysia, it wrote: "Indonesia

176. Ibid., p. 7.
177. Ibid., p. 8.
178. Ibid., p. 3.
is in a just struggle in its confrontation with 'Malaysia'. It quoted Foreign Minister Chen Yi’s warning to the United States and Britain as saying: "We warn the imperialists against any adventure in Southeast Asia. Should they ignore this warning and insist on taking risks, the result can only be that Southeast Asia will become their burial ground." As regards the Algiers Conference, Remmin Ribao believed that "it will be a new milestone in Afro-Asian unity and co-operation. The imperialists are doing their best to sabotage the Conference. But we are convinced that the unity and concerted efforts of the Asian and African countries will ensure that Conference's success."

As it represented a near synchronisation of Indonesian-Chinese foreign policy goals in South-East Asia and Afro-Asia and marked a clear shift in Indonesian foreign policy away from non-alignment and peaceful co-existence and in favour of the Chinese world view in which "third road" did not exist, it created misgivings in India as to the two countries' joint efforts against India's interests. Subandrio’s visit to China and the Sino-Indonesian Joint Statement issued in Peking on 28 January 1965, confirmed India's fears about the two countries' intentions vis-a-vis the region. Subandrio's "mission to Peking" was seen as marking "not only the beginning of a new chapter in Sino-Indonesian relations but also the emergence of a new pattern in the alignment of nations in East and South-East Asia". In an article in The Hindu, K.V. Narain surveyed the implications of the Sino-Indonesian Joint Statement and observed that the two countries had lined up ideologically in a front against "imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism". He traced the present line-up to Sukarno's one-day
visit to Shanghai in November 1964, when, according to him, foundations for this axis were laid. Chen Yi's unscheduled visit to Indonesia in late November 1964, followed by Subandrio's visit in late January 1965, he held, were aimed at filling the gaps. Commenting on the serious implications, the author of the article visualised a sort of link-up between Indonesia, China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Cambodia. "Thus, a sort of loose grouping or alliance of these five countries, Communist and non-Communist, is slowly taking place". Anticipating a threat from this emerging combination to other countries in the region as well as India and making reference to Thailand and Malaysia, the author observed: "India has friendly relations with both these countries and it is in its best interests that these ties are maintained and strengthened."

As regards the military overtones of the Sino-Indonesian relations, Rakshat Puri of the Hindustan Times noted the presence of Lo Jui-ching, the Chief of the Chinese Armed Forces, along with Chou En-lai and Chen Yi, at the ceremony arranged to welcome Subandrio. Commenting on its importance, he speculated that Subandrio's visit might result in Chinese arms aid to Indonesia.

Between January and April 1965, China continued to participate actively in Indonesia's diplomatic offensive to make preparations for the Algiers Conference. Chen Yi's visit to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nepal and Chou En-lai's trip to Algeria, the UAR, Pakistan and Burma, in March-April 1965, were important in this connection. During this period, China also sent a delegation of the National People's Congress to Africa. Led by Liu Ning-I,

Vice-chairman of its Standing Committee, the Chinese delegation paid a month-long visit to Guinea, Mali, the Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville) and Ghana.

These visits at various levels showed the degree of importance which China attached to the successful convening of the forthcoming Algiers Conference. It also, however, revealed to the Chinese leaders the constraints imposed upon their diplomatic offensive in this regard. These arose from India's continued insistence on seeking participation in the African-Asian Conference by the Soviet Union and Malaysia. As the countries they visited, by and large, showed disinclination to choose sides between China and the Soviet Union as well as lack of agreement on the question of invitation to Malaysia, reference to these issues was omitted from the Communiques and Statements issued in these countries. A typical instance was provided by the China-Algeria Joint Communique signed in Algiers on 31 March 1965. It noted the two countries' support to the liberation movements in Asia and Africa and made no mention either of struggle for independence in North Kalimantan or of the question of invitation to Malaysia and the Soviet Union.

China and the Tenth Anniversary Celebrations

After Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations in January 1965, the Tenth Anniversary (Dasa Warsa) celebrations of the first Asian-African Conference, in Djakarta in April 1965, provided another important occasion to China to still further consolidate its influence among the Indonesian elites. Speaking


at a rally held in celebration of the occasion, in Peking on
18 April 1965, Peng Chen, Vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress, hailed it as "an event of great
importance" and extended "cordial and fraternal greetings to all
Asian and African peoples fighting heroically against imperialism,
colonialism and neo-colonialism". He observed: "The facts of the
past ten years and present reality convincingly prove that unity
against imperialism remains today the most important urgent common
task of the Asian-African peoples". He also referred to the forth-
coming African-Asian Conference in Algiers and cautioned the people
in the two continents against "imperialism and its followers,
hostile to Asian-African solidarity", who were "trying to sabotage
it by hook or by crook". The Chinese leader expressed the hope:
"The disruptive schemes of imperialism and its lackeys will surely
fail and the Asian and African people's cause of solidarity against
imperialism will surely triumph".

Prime Minister Chou En-lai, at the head of a large Chinese
dlegation including Foreign Minister Chen Yi, visited Djakarta
between 16 and 26 April 1965. Significantly, Chou En-lai was one
of the three Prime Ministers who represented their countries at the
tenth anniversary celebrations in Djakarta.

In a written statement, distributed at the airport on his
arrival in Djakarta, on 16 April 1965, Chou En-lai commended the
"great vitality" of "the Bandung spirit" and urged upon the "Asian

183. Ibid., no. 17, 23 April 1965, p. 11.
184. Ibid., p. 12.
186. The other two Prime Ministers were Kim Il Sung of North
Korea, and Pham van Dong of North Vietnam. Prince Souvanna
Phouma of Laos was the Fourth Prime Minister to join them
later on 21 April 1965.
and African countries to hold still higher the banner of Bandung...".

The Peking press gave prominent coverage to the Chinese commendation of the Tenth Anniversary celebrations in Djakarta. Peking Review covered, in full, Chairman Liu Shao-chi's "Inscription for Bandung Anniversary", Acting Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping's speech at a reception given on this occasion by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Peng Chen's speech at a mass rally, a two-page contribution by its correspondents in Djakarta and a map by Chu Yu-lien, depicting changes in Asia and Africa between 1955 and 1965.

The Chinese delegation and the delegations of the Communist and pro-China states such as North Korea, North Vietnam and Cambodia, were given favoured treatment in the ceremonies. This became evident when some of the Asian delegates were even not allowed to speak to the Afro-Asian gathering. During the Flag Parade on 18 April 1965 President Sukarno made a singular gesture of honour towards the Chinese when he rose to welcome the Chinese delegate, shook hands with him and embraced him.

The one-week celebrations in Djakarta remained charged with the theme of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. The tone was set by President Sukarno in his inaugural speech on 18 April 1964,

188. Ibid., pp. 10, 10-11, 11-14, 19-20 and 21.
189. Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister of Thailand, when denied the opportunity to address the gathering, even went to the length of withdrawing from the celebrations. He withdrew because he was upset at the preponderance of Communist leaders at the celebrations. See Straits Times, 21 and 23 April 1965.
190. President Sukarno did not give this honour to any other Asian and African delegate. It was in sharp contrast to the treatment meted out to the Indian delegation. C. Subramaniam, Indian Minister for Food and Agriculture, was even denied the opportunity to see President Sukarno. See Chapter on India, Indonesia and the Second Afro-Asian Conference, p. 314.
and was later stressed by Prime Minister Chou En-lai and other leaders of pro-China and Communist states. The major enemy as it was made out to be was the United States. In India it was seen as a show dominated by China, Indonesia and Pakistan, all showing, at this stage, an openly hostile attitude towards India's leadership and its policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. It was also noted with amazement how China, "a new-comer" a decade ago, was "seeking to dominate the Afro-Asian scene".

Chou En-lai used this occasion to renew and strengthen his personal contacts with leaders of thirty-five countries attending the tenth anniversary celebrations. The intense diplomatic activity on the part of Chou En-lai was intended to win the Afro-Asian support for the militant Peking line in order to dominate the deliberations of the forthcoming Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers. During his meetings with the Afro-Asian leaders, Chou En-lai spared no efforts in making a favourable impression on them. According to a Hsin-hua despatch from Djakarta, he even danced at a banquet hosted by President Sukarno on 21 April 1965, and sang songs with delegates from other countries.

Besides meeting President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Subandrio, Chou En-lai also utilised this opportunity to still further strengthen his personal relations with the Indonesian leaders, at various levels. On 24 April 1965, he paid separate calls on Indonesian Government leaders and leaders of various Indonesian political parties. These included J. Leimena, Third

Deputy Prime Minister, Chaerul Saleh, Ali Sastroamidjojo, General Chairman of the PNI, and Idham Chalid, General Chairman of the NU (Indonesian Muslim Scholars' Party). The following day, he called on D.N. Aidit, Chairman of the PKI, at party headquarters.

Chou En-lai also made it a point to extoll President Sukarno as "a leader with creativeness and revolutionary spirit". At a farewell banquet hosted by him at the Chinese Embassy in Djakarta, he paid high tributes to the Indonesian President for having made "an important speech" at the commemoration ceremony. He praised Sukarno for having emphasised that imperialism was not yet dead, that the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism had not yet ended and that there could be no talk of peaceful co-existence with imperialism. He described President Sukarno's speech as one containing "a profound analysis of a whole series of major international problems of the present day", the one that "developed the Bandung spirit" and was "an embodiment of the revolutionary will of billions of Asian and African people".195

Besides, he paid wholesome tribute to the people of Indonesia, saying that "everywhere there pervades a militant spirit of fighting imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism" and that the "Indonesian people are not unworthy of the name of a revolutionary people". Finally, he remembered to praise the organising skill of the Indonesian leadership. He observed: "Like the Bandung Conference ten years ago, these celebrations were excellently organized and highly successful". At the end, Chou En-lai recalled Indonesia's contributions to the Afro-Asian struggle against imperialism and concluded by assuring the Indonesians "that no matter what happens

195. Ibid., p. 6.
in the world, the Chinese people will forever stand by your side."

China's Role in Indian-Indonesian Relations
After April 1965

After the tenth anniversary celebrations, China continued to offer full support to Indonesia on keeping Malaysia out of the second Afro-Asian Conference. The meetings of the Standing Committee of fifteen countries, instituted by the Preparatory Committee in April 1964, provided China with a forum to do so. When R. Goburdhun, the Indian Ambassador to Algeria and the Indian representative, at a Standing Committee meeting on 29 March 1965, forcefully pleaded for Malaysia's participation in the second Afro-Asian Conference, the Chinese delegate joined his Indonesian counterpart to thwart the Indian move. Likewise, when the Indian representative suggested that the Afro-Asian Foreign Ministers and Heads of State and or Government had every right to add to the list of invitees, the Chinese and the Indonesian delegates combined to block the discussion. They claimed that the list of invitees to the Conference had been settled at the preliminary talks in Djakarta in April 1964. Countering their arguments, R. Goburdhun proposed that the question of invitations be left to be decided by the Foreign Ministers' meeting in June 1965. According to reports in the Indian press, even though China and Indonesia strongly opposed the Indian move, substantial majority of the participants agreed to it.

As regards the second Afro-Asian Conference, China continued its stance of offering diplomatic assistance to Indonesia to ensure its success. Chou En-lai once again left Peking for one-week visit

196. Ibid.
197. Both China and India were among the fifteen Afro-Asian countries represented at the Standing Committee of Ambassadors instituted to resolve the deadlock on the question of inclusion of Malaysia and the Soviet Union.
to Pakistan and Tanzania. The Chinese Prime Minister utilised the opportunity to meet leaders of various other countries during his brief stop-overs between Karachi (Pakistan) and Dar-es-Salaam (capital of Tanzania). These included the President and Prime Minister of Iraq, Prime Minister Aly Sabry of the UAR and the Prime Minister of the Sudan.

Chou En-lai's visit to Tanzania was important in that it showed the limitations imposed upon Chinese efforts for the second Afro-Asian Conference. The China-Tanzania Joint Communiqué significantly omitted any reference to the question of participation by the Soviet Union and Malaysia in the ensuing Algiers Conference. It reflected Tanzania's resistance to Chinese overtures on this issue and China's agreement to exclude the points of disagreement between the two countries.

As the scheduled dates for the Foreign Ministers' meeting and the main Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers, viz., 24 June 1965 and 29 June 1965 respectively, drew near, Prime Minister Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi, at the head of a sixteen-member Chinese delegation, left Peking for Africa. The Chinese leaders reached Cairo on 19 June 1965, ten days before the African and Asian Conference was scheduled to be held. It showed China's anxiety about the prospects of the Algiers Conference. The Chinese leaders desired to ensure, by physical presence among the Afro-Asian delegates arriving Cairo on way to Algiers, that the efforts being

200. Ibid., p. 8.
201. Ibid., vol. 8, no. 26, 25 June 1965, p. 7. The sixteen-member Chinese delegation included the Chinese ambassadors to Indonesia and Pakistan and was accompanied by a large group of seventeen advisers.
made by some countries at postponing the Conference did not succeed. China was not unaware of the efforts, being made by India and some other Afro-Asian countries belonging to the Commonwealth, to canvass support for the inclusion of the Soviet Union and Malaysia into the Algiers Conference. China knew how in all the meetings of the fifteen-member ambassadorial-level standing committee, since April 1964, the Indian representative had been insistent on seeking participation by the Soviet Union and Malaysia. Their frequent visits to Asia and Africa, during this period, also must have convinced them that the Afro-Asian countries were, by and large, favourable to participation by Malaysia and non-committal on the issue of the Soviet Union.

It was at this stage that, like others, the Chinese were caught unawares by the political disturbances in Algiers, the venue of the second Afro-Asian Conference. It was a coincidence that the coup in Algeria took place on 19 June 1965, the day when Chou En-lai and Chen Yi reached Cairo enroute to Algiers. The forcible change in the Algerian government and the political uncertainties flowing from it, made the Chinese leaders all the more anxious about the successful convening of the Conference. They fully realised that the coup in Algeria would provide to some countries a ready excuse to seek its indefinite postponement.

This realisation prompted the Chinese leaders to direct their energies to foil such attempts. On 20 June 1965, the day following the coup in Algeria, the Chinese Ambassador in Algiers, Tseng Tao, sought an audience with Houari Boumedienne, the leader of the coup and told him that Prime Minister Chou En-lai had expressed his total and unconditional support for the Algerian revolution and for the
Algerian National Council of the Revolution. Foreign Minister Chen Yi arrived in Algiers on 22 June and busied himself in contacting the leaders of the new Algerian Government as well as the incoming Afro-Asian delegates. In the evening, accompanied by Vice-Foreign Ministers Chang Han-fu and Chiao Kuan-hua and the Chinese Ambassador in Algiers, he went to the airport to receive Foreign Minister Subandrio and the members of the Indonesian delegation accompanying him. Then the two Foreign Ministers were reported to have had an amicable and cordial meeting. It is quite conceivable that the two leaders discussed the impact of the coup on the ensuing Conference. They might also have discussed ways how to counteract propaganda carried on by some delegates to seek postponement of the Conference. On 23 June 1965, the Chinese Foreign Minister had a friendly meeting with H. Boumediene. In the course of his talks, he reiterated his country's support to the Algerian National Council of the Revolution. He also expressed his country's determination, together with Algeria and other Afro-Asian countries, to make the Conference a success.

On his part, Chou En-lai engaged himself in long parleys with President Nasser. The Chinese believed that an exchange of views with the UAR leader would contribute to the success of the Conference and help promote the Asian and African people's cause of solidarity against imperialism. On the day of his arrival in Cairo, i.e., 19 June 1965, the Chinese Prime Minister declared: "The Chinese Government consistently supports the convening of the second Afro-Asian Conference. Our attitude is positive. It has been so in the

203. Ibid., 24 June 1965.
204. Ibid., 25 June 1965.
past, and it remains so now. On 22 June 1965, Chou En-lai was reported to have his fourth round of talks with the UAR leader since his arrival. According to a Government spokesman in Cairo, the two leaders reaffirmed the necessity of holding the Conference as planned. They also examined the proposed agenda for the Algiers Conference and exchanged views on the basic principles which should guide the Conference.

Their reaffirmation of the necessity of convening the Conference as scheduled, at this stage, could be attributed to two important developments, namely, the coup in Algeria and the appeal for postponement of the Conference issued in London on 21 June 1965 by the leaders of thirteen African and Asian countries belonging to the Commonwealth. In fact it was the coup which led Chou En-lai to change his date of departure for Algiers, i.e., 23 June 1965 and to prolong his visit to the UAR.

China also attempted to influence the Asian and African members of the Commonwealth in favour of sticking to the scheduled dates of the Conference. On 23 June 1965, China's Charge d'Affaires in London, Hsiang Hsiung, appeared at the Marlborough House, the site of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, in an effort to persuade the Afro-Asian members attending this Conference to stick to their programme of attending the Algiers Conference. It was a sensational move in as much as it was designed to influence,

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208. Ibid. For appeal and for names of thirteen Afro-Asian countries which made it, see Chapter on India, Indonesia and the Second Afro-Asian Conference, pp. 319-20.

by physical presence, the opinion of the Asian and African states belonging to the Commonwealth. It, however, failed to produce the desired results. This is evident from the fact that, undeterred by the Chinese pressure tactics, the thirteen Commonwealth states renewed their appeal to postpone the Algiers meeting as well as to refrain from sending their foreign ministers to attend the preliminary meeting scheduled for 24 June 1965.

During his visit to the Marlborough House, the Chinese Charge d'Affaires met both the President and the Foreign Minister of Pakistan for half-an-hour. It was significant because it was in awareness of the fact that Pakistan was one of the thirteen Commonwealth countries which had issued the appeal for postponement. It would be relevant here to note that, in order to seek a change in Pakistan's attitude towards the issue of postponement of the Conference, Chou En-lai had joined Sukarno and Nasser in sending a cable message to President Ayub Khan.

It appears Pakistan's attitude in signing the appeal for postponement created additional anxiety for both the Chinese and the Indonesians, who were straining their nerves to ensure successful convening of the Algiers Conference as scheduled. Some adverse comments in Indonesian press on Pakistan's attitude to the second Afro-Asian Conference at this stage reinforce this belief. In an editorial, Duta Masjara\-kat, an Indonesian daily belonging to the Nahdatul Ulama Party and known for its sympathies for Pakistan,

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210. Ibid.
211. Ibid.
212. Ibid., 25 and 26 June 1965. It was reported that, in their message to President Ayub Khan, the three leaders expressed the hope that he would attend the summit meeting.
expressed concern at Pakistan joining others in calling for postponement and observed that "the present development really constitutes a test for Pakistan. We believe that President Ayub Khan and his assistants are not going to put Pakistan on a wrong road."  

In contrast to Pakistan's attitude, the Chinese and Indonesian delegations continued to actively support each other in salvaging the Conference. On 24 June 1965, the Standing Committee of Ambassadors met at the instance of the Algerian delegation and postponed the Foreign Ministers' meeting to 26 June 1965. Those represented at this meeting were the ambassadors of China, Ghana, Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Iran, Morocco, UAR and Algeria. It was reported that the Chinese representative did not take active part in the meeting and was the first to come out of the meeting room. 

As the move for postponement, to which the Indian delegation at Algiers made a wholesome contribution, gathered momentum, both the Chinese and Indonesian delegations at Algiers felt highly embarrassed. It appeared that the Foreign Ministers' meeting as well as the Summit Conference would have to be postponed. Various factors such as the disputes among the Arab countries, differences among the African states, the still unresolved issue of participation in the Conference by the Soviet Union and Malaysia, the still

213. See translation of the editorial "Test for Pakistan" in ibid., 26 June 1965.

214. Ibid., 25 and 26 June 1965. This was a second postponement. The first postponement for 24 hours was announced on the night of 23 June 1965. Lack of material preparations was the main plea for seeking this short postponement.

The countries not represented at the Standing Committee meeting on 24 June 1965, were Cambodia, Guinea, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania and Ethiopia.

uncertain conditions in Algiers and the failure of a large number of African delegates to reach Algiers in time, only strengthened the move for postponement.

Not unexpectedly, therefore, the Standing Committee met for two-and-a-half hours on the night of 26 June and decided to postpone the Summit Conference to 5 November 1965 and the Foreign Ministers' meeting to 28 October 1965. The postponement was proposed by Ethiopia and Pakistan on the ground that many of the African and Asian countries were unable to attend the Conference as scheduled. Curiously, China, along with Indonesia and the UAR, did not send its representative to this meeting. It is quite possible that the three countries which had made all efforts to ensure successful convening of the Conference, did not desire to be associated with the move for postponement until they were convinced that a majority of the representatives of the Standing Committee were in favour of postponement. Whatever might be the reason, the absence of the representatives of China and Indonesia enabled the Standing Committee to discuss and decide the issues in a less inhibitive atmosphere. According to C.S. Jha, Secretary to the Ministry of External Affairs of India, who accompanied the Indian delegation to the Algiers meeting, delegates of six states spoke at the meeting and none of them against adjournment. C.S. Jha also revealed that there were some differences of opinion but not harsh words.

The Chinese delegation was embarrassed beyond limits. Despite all his efforts to seek convening of the Conference as scheduled,

216. *Indonesian Herald*, 28 June 1965. The decision about postponement was announced by the Algerian Minister of Justice after the Standing Committee meeting which was convened in lieu of the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

217. Ibid., 29 June 1965.
Foreign Minister Chen Yi had not succeeded in his objective. The Indonesian delegation led by Foreign Minister Subandrio needed to be reassured of China's continuing active support on this matter. In an impromptu interview with a small group of newsmen on 27 June 1965, however, Foreign Minister Chen Yi appeared to be unperturbed about the decision for postponement. Surprisingly, the Chinese leader did not indicate whether postponement was a setback.

In a written statement at the airport issued on the eve of his departure from Algiers on 28 June 1965, Chen Yi stressed that the Conference was postponed in order to make it a greater success. He also termed postponement as a failure for the "imperialists" and "reactionaries" hostile to the Asian and African peoples. It meant to dispel the impression of indifference about the fate of the Conference, which Chen Yi had allowed to grow in his interview with some newsmen a day before.

In the meantime, on 26 June 1965, the day when the Standing Committee decided to postpone the date of the Conference, President Sukarno arrived in Cairo. Prime Minister Chou En-lai rode out to the airport to welcome the Indonesian President and the top ministers and leaders of various Indonesian political parties accompanying him. The following day, Prime Minister Chou En-lai and Presidents Sukarno and Nasser discussed reports of their Foreign Ministers in Algiers and considered measures concerning the Afro-Asian summit meeting. In view of the new developments, Chou En-lai and Sukarno decided to prolong their stay in Cairo. Together with Nasser, they also decided to recall their Foreign Ministers from Algiers and to have

218. Ibid. Chen Yi devoted all his time to the Vietnam issue and did not even once make mention of the decision about postponement.

another meeting on 29 June 1965. This would enable them to discuss the issues in the light of first-hand information presented by their Foreign Ministers.

To both Sukarno and Chou En-lai, who were directing all their efforts to convene the Algiers Conference as scheduled, the decision about its postponement was nothing short of a diplomatic defeat. They were not unaware of the active role played in this connection by India and some other countries. The reports of the Foreign Ministers conceivably highlighted the significant role played especially by the Indian delegation in Algiers in canvassing support for its view to postpone the Conference.

Later, the Chinese Prime Minister and the Presidents of Indonesia and the UAR and the President of Pakistan, who made a brief halt at Cairo on their way back home from London, entered into long parleys and had a "full and frank exchange of views on the Second Afro-Asian Conference...". According to a Press Communique issued in Cairo on 30 June 1965, the leaders of the four countries gave full consideration to the views of their Foreign Ministers and "endorsed the decision of the Standing Committee to postpone the Second African-Asian Conference". In line with Chen Yi's written statement at Algiers on 28 June 1965, they refused to consider postponement as a "setback" and wished "to reaffirm their determination to hold it on November 5 in Algiers...."

After a long, 12-day stay in the UAR, Chou En-lai left Cairo for home on 30 June 1965. In the presence of Sukarno and Subandrio,


who came to see him off at the airport along with Nasser and Ayub Khan, Chou En-lai observed that "the Chinese Government and people will continue to do their best for the success of the Conference".

In the meanwhile, in an article contributed to Peking Review, a Chinese analyst came out heavily against "imperialism and all reactionary forces" for their having "tried their best to kill the spirit of Bandung and Afro-Asian solidarity". He, however, reserved his condemnation mainly for India. He charged the "Shastri Administration of India which are heavily dependent on U.S. doles" with having played a role destructive of the Conference's work. He observed: "In the past few weeks the Indian Government has been busy sending out ranking officials to more than 20 Asian and African countries to peddle its ideas which are aimed at wrecking the Algiers Conference in its first stage. It vehemently champions the admission of the Soviet Union and 'Malaysia'." As regards Malaysia, he commented that India had assumed the task of seeking Malaysia's participation only "to please its patrons...".

In his report from Algiers, the Hsinhua (New China News Agency) correspondent also launched a strong attack on India's role regarding the second African and Asian Conference. He charged a "few countries" with harbouring "ulterior motives" and with having "tried to sabotage the Conference from the outset". In this connection, the Hsinhua correspondent sarcastically noted that although Indian Foreign Minister failed to come to Algiers, the Indian delegate had called for the holding of the Foreign Ministers'
meeting as scheduled. He also invited reference to disclosures that the Indian delegate, together with the delegates of certain other countries, had plotted for a motion at the Foreign Ministers' meeting to "recess" the African-Asian Conference and for the formation of a "provisional committee". The Hsinhua correspondent saw in it an Indian effort to supersede the original Standing Committee and in fact to write off all the decisions taken at the Preparatory Meeting in Djakarta in April 1964, so that the Conference could not be convened at all.

In conformity with its objectives, China continued to play a damaging role in Indian-Indonesian relations until the coup in Indonesia in September 1965. The major Chinese effort, however, continued to be to still further tarnish the image of India, its leadership and its foreign policy of non-alignment. India's efforts to seek postponement of the second Afro-Asian Conference provided an excuse to China to carry conviction with the Indonesian leadership that India was proving an obstacle to Afro-Asian unity in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism.

A typical instance of China's anti-India propaganda theme was provided by an article, contributed to Peking Review in the middle of August 1965. In his three-page piece, a Chinese analyst made a scathing attack on Indian leadership and its policy of non-alignment. The author of the article traced the Indian policy of maintaining economic and military relations with both the United States and Soviet Union to Nehru and progressively implemented by Lal Bahadur Shastri, and charged them for pursuing the name of non-alignment a

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224. Peking Review, vol. 8, no. 27, 2 July 1965, pp. 6-7. The charges levelled against India by the Hsinhua correspondent may be seen in the light of Indian efforts in the direction of postponement of the Conference as examined in Chapter on India, Indonesia and the Second Afro-Asian Conference, pp. 319-321.
policy of "double alignment". He charged India with "working hand in glove with the modern revisionists", with "doing yeoman service for US imperialism" and with undermining "the struggles against imperialism and colonialism ... in Asia, Africa and Latin America, trying to break up Asian-African unity". Shih Yen also attacked India's role vis-a-vis the second Afro-Asian Conference. He referred to the Indian tactics of stressing Soviet and Malaysian participation in it and deplored "Indian reaction" for having made every effort to undermine the Conference.  